RODRIGUEZ vs COMELEC G.R. No.

120099, July 24, 1996

Facts: Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonist for the gubernatorial seat in the Province of Quezon. During the 1992 elections, Rodriguez won which was questioned by Marquez through a quo warranto petition (EPC 92-28) with the COMELEC. The protest cited Sec 40 (e) of the LCG as the basis of disqualification. Marquez revealed that a charge was filed against Rodriguez in the US on 12 Nov 1985 for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft. The petition was DISMISSED. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court via certiorari (Marquez vs Rodriguez GR 112889) the court promulgated on 18 Apr 1995 the MARQUEZ decision effectively defining the term fugitive from justice: includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. It REMAMDED the case to the COMELEC for its factual determination WON Rodriguez was in fact a fugitive of justice. Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rodriguez and subsequently an Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in support of such motion was filed to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on 25 Jun 1985 (prior the charge against him was ever filed). Pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration, during the 1995 elections wherein Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position. Marquez this time challenged Rodroguez candidacy via a petition for disqualification (SPA 95-089) on the same grounds as EPC 92-28, this was filed on 11 April 1995. Subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration of Rodriguez regarding GR 112889 was DISMISSED. Thereby, the COMELEC promulgated a CONSOLIDATED Resolution dated 7 May 1995 on EPC 92-28 and SPA 95-089, ruling in favor of Marquez Ordered Rodriguez to immediately vacate his position and his certificate of candidacy was set aside. At any rate Rodriguez emerged victorious in the 8 May 1995 elections and he was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as Governor despite the suspension from the COMELEC in relation to the consolidated resolution promulgated in 7 May 1995. This order of suspension of proclamation is the issue of this petition for certiorari (GR 120099) as filed by Rodriquez on 16 May 1995. The decision of the court with regard to this petition DIRECTED COMELEC to receive and evaluate evidence. After the proper proceeding COMELEC declared Rodriguez NOT a fugitive from justice, the intent to evade is material to the definition of fugitive from justice in t he Marquez Decision, such intent is ABSENT in Rodriguezs case evidence has established that Rodriquez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the US. But it further stated that it would be more comfortable if the Supreme Court decided on the matter given the conflicting interpretations of the parties as to the definition provided in the Marquez Decision. Issue: Whether or not, Roodriguez was a fugitive from justice as defined in the Marquez Decision, rendering him ineligible to run for office as provided for in Sec 40 (e) of the LGC. Rulings: NO, the element of intent to evade not present in the case of Rodriguez, which is a compelling factor in the Marquez Decision definition, he cannot be held as a fugitive from justice.

The definition in the Marquez Decision indicates that the intent to evade is a compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. There can be no intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is NO knowledge of the same by the supposed fleeing subject. One cannot evade something he does not know for a fact. Rodriguez case cannot fit into the said concept (Marquez Decision). The filing of the felony in LA was five (5) months after he left the United States. There was no sufficient evidence to conclude that he attempted to evade the law. His compulsion to return to the country was due to the ouster of Former President Marcos. A broader concept of the definition as espoused by the COMELEC and Marquez i.e., that someone can be considered a fugitive from justice by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction were a charge is pending before him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight, cannot be adopted by the Court. Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition.