Consti Chalc PC Midterms

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW
(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)
1. Garcia vs. Board of Investments Facts: 1. PD 1803 allotted 536 hectares of public domain located in Bataan which would be reserved for the Petrochemicals Industrial Zone under the ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) 2. Taiwanese investors formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corp (BPC) in order to help supplement the PNOC thru its project of joint venture. 3. BPC was given the ff benefits: a. exemption from taxes on raw materials b. repatriation of the proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation c. remittance of earnings on investments d. House of Reps passed a bill introduced by the petitioner to eliminate the 48% tax on naphtha (used in the plant) 4. The major investor of BPC however wished to move the site to Batangas instead of Bataan and also increasing the investment amount from 220$ million to 320$ million. 5. The BOI (respondent- Board of Investors) approved the revision and claimed that the FINAL CHOICE rests with the investor because he bears the funding and capital for the project. Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Respondent for allowing the corp to move to Batangas. Held: Yes Ruling: 1.The site was already paid for and allotted, thus decreasing the amount needed to invest. 2. BRC, can provide feedstock requirements for the plant, thus avoiding the necessity to have naphtha delivered to the plant at the proposed site. 3. the law on ad volorem tax was enacted for the petrochemical industry. The policy determined by both Congress and the President is clear, neither Respondent or investor should disregard the policy. 4. Sec 10, Art 12 of the Consti claims that it is the duty of the state to regulate and exercise authority over foreign inve stments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. The national goals are clearly set out through all the intended pre-planning, thus the plant should not be moved. 2. Oposa vs. Factoran Jr. July 30, 1993 Feliciano Facts: 1. Petitioners are all minors represented by their parents praying for the DENR to cancel all the existing timber license agreement in the country and to cease and desist from receiving and processing new licenses and renewal of license. 2. Petitioners asserted that: a. The continuing unhampered destruction of rain forests will cause serious injury and irreparable damage that the present and future generations will bear. b. Constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to be protected by the State c. TLAs which is contrary to the Philippine Environment Policy 3. Defendant Asserted that: a. Petitioners lack of cause of action Issue raised Is a political question which properly pertains to the executive or legislative branch Issue: Whether or not the case at bar is subject to the judicial power of the court Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. 2. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. 3. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. 4. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. (Isagani) Concept: 1. A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 3. Manila Prince Hotel Vs. GSIS FACTS 1. Pursuant to a privatization program, GSIS decided to sell shares of Manila Hotel Corp (MHC) thru public bidding; 2. 2 bidders: one was Manila Prince Hotel Corp (Mla Prince) and the other was Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which offered a higher bid but was later matched by Mla Prince 3. Bidding rules: a. If highest bidder cant be awarded block of shares, GSIS may offer this to other qualified bidders b. Highest bidder will be declared only after 1) execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC and 2) securing requisite approvals 4. While the winner hasnt not yet been declared, apprehensive Mla Prince sought to stop the alleged sale to Renong Berhad 5. PETITIONER says: - that Manila Hotel cant be sold to a foreign firm cause its part of the national patrimony under Art 12, Sec 10 of the Constitution; and also that Manila Hotel is part of the tourism industry and that its part of the national economy - that it should be preferred over Renong Berhad because accdg to the rule that if the highest bidder cant be awarded xxx since it cant be awarded to Renong Berhad, it must be given to petitioner RESPONDENT says: - Art 12, Sec 10 isnt self-executory - Manila Hotel is not within the contemplation of that national patrimony bec this only refers to lands of public domain, waters, minierals, etc etc, and they say that if petitioners were only referring to the guests that have visited Mla Hotel or the important events that happened there, these alone dont make the Hotel fall under the national patrimony. - prohibition is against the State, not GSIS, which is separate and distinct from the former - case is premature and its not yet time for petitioners to demand because the condition that will deprive the highest bidder of the award has not yet materialized - theres no grave abuse of discretion on the part of GSIS - petitioners have no legal right to demand anything from GSIS bec GSIS has no legal duty to them ISSUES 1. Is Art12, Sec 10, self exec? Held: Yes 2. Does Manila Hotel fall under national patrimony?Held: Yes 3. Does the term qualified Filipinos apply to MPH? Held: Yes 4. Is GOCC covered by the prohibition? Held: Yes 5. Does petitioner have the right or personality to compel respondent to accept its offer? Held: Yes, after it matched the bid of Malaysian firm and subsequently denied by GSIS RULING 1. Self executory: provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without enabling legislation; rule is that although its self-executory, legislature may still enact legislation. A provision may be self-executing on one part and not on the others. -as to whether one is not self-executory is just a matter of style 2. Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony: provision talks about heritage but not just public lands, waters, or other natural resources. Manila Hotel is a living testament of Philippine heritage. 3. MPH is a qualified Filipino - by holding that a Fil company is qualified, doesnt mean that Fil companies should be pampered; it only means that they be preferred over foreign firms particularly if these are companies whose capital is wholly owned by Fil citizens and that it can make viable contributions to the common good because of credible competency and efficiency. Filipino First rule applies in this case. The fact that MH was held to be a qualified bidder, means that it possess requirements, and that in choosing between a Fil and foreign firm, the former should be chosen. 4. GSIS is covered by the prohibition when a Consti prov refers to State, it doesnt only mean people and government but also elements of the State. Theres the concept of state action: 1) when activity engaged in is a public function; 2) when govt is so 6.
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3 significantly involved in the actor as to make the govt responsible for his action; 3) when govt has approved or authorized the action. GSIS selling of the shares is under categories #2 and #3. Petitioner has legal right or personality when petitioner had not yet matched Renong Berhads bid, it didnt have the right or personality to compel respondent to choose it over the foreign firm; but when it finally matched the bid which was apparently disregarded by GSIS, it then had a cause of action.
4. Kilosbayan vs. Morato 17 Jul 1995 J. Mendoza Facts: 1. A decision in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona invalidated the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) for being violative of the charter of the PCSO. 2. 3. The parties then entered into a new agreement that would be consistent with the charter and conformable to the SC decision. On 25 Jan 1995, the parties signed an 8-year Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for the lease of on-line lottery equipments and accessories to the PCSO at the rate of 4.3% of gross ticket sales or in no case less than 35,000 pesos per machine annually. The PGMC submitted a copy of the ELA to the SC in accordance with its manifestation in the previous case.
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On 21 Feb 1995, Kilosbayan filed this petition to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Issue: 1. Does Kilosbayan have standing to file the case? 2. Does the petition contain questions of law? Held: Kilosbayan does not have legal standing. The case involves contract law, not constitutional law. Ruling: 1. The change in the membership of the Court merits reexamination of the ruling on their standing. Justices Cruz and Bidin retired while Justices Mendoza and Francisco were recently appointed. 2. The law of the case doctrine is not applicable considering the fact that the case is a sequel of the first case, not a cont inuation. The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. The parties are the same but the cases are not. 3. Collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in this case. This case involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from, the one dealt with in the first case. 4. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and no constitutional question is involved in this case. 5. This case involves questions on contract law. In actions for annulment of contracts, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement. Kilosbayan is not a real party in interest in the case. 6. In the absence of a clear and convincing showing that the agreement was made in grave abuse of discretion of the PCSO, the SC is not inclined to review the case. This is a matter of business judgment. 7. The ELA is a lease contract that contains none of the features of the former contract which was nullified being in the guise of a joint venture agreement. 8. The charter of the PCSO does not absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery in collaboration, association, or joint venture with another party. It is merely prohibited in investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries, and similar activities. The PCSO should not invest in the business of a competitor. 9. The ELA does not require public bidding because it is a lease agreement, not a contract for the purchase of supplies. Lease agreements do not require public bidding per Sec. 6 and 7 of E.O. No. 301. Concept: Law of the case doctrine the opinion delivered on a former appeal; whatever that is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Collateral estoppel must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable rules remain unchanged. Real party in interest the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 1987 Constitution, Art. 8, sec. 5, par. 2, subpar. e: [SC power to review] All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
5 - Tanada vs. Angara May 2, 1997 Justice Panganiban Facts: 1. To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, there were plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions: The first was the World Bank, the second, the IMF, and the third, the ITO. 2. ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT, a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents. 3. April 15, 1994 - DTI Secretary Navarro, representing the Government of the Phils., signed in Morocco, the Final Act, embodying the WTO Agreement, as well as other pertinent decisions. 4. August 12-13, 1994 - Senate received a letter from President Ramos, stating that Final Act is submitted to the Senate for its concurrence (Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution). 5. December 9, 1994, President Ramos certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of a resolution: Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which the Senate then adopted and the President ratified. 6. On December 29, 1994 The present petition was filed, praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement. Two of the petitioners were senators who did not concur: Coseteng and Tanada. 7. January 1, 1995 - The emergence of the WTO; Majority of the countries as members 8. December 12, 1995 - The Court resolved to give due course to the petition, and the parties filed their respective memoranda. Issue: Do the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO interfere with the exercise of judicial power? *The main issue in this case, is actually the alleged violation of Economic Nationalism. The statement above, which relates to Judicial Power, is the 4th issue. Held: NO Ruling: Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires a WTO Member to provide a rule of disputable presumption that a product identical to one produced with a patent would be deemed to have been obtained illegally. This applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patent is new or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos is not met, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. The burden of proof in Article 34 is understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to rule out such presumption, t he burden of evidence to show that his product was produced with the intention to be authentic. Nonetheless, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since the owner still has to introduce evidence of the existenc e of the alleged identical product, the alleged genuine one. Art. 34 presents no problem in changing the rules of evidence since the Patent Law (Sec. 60, Infringement), provides a similar presumption. It also does not contain an unreasonable burden, as it is consistent with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. Since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in rules of procedure will not be substantial. Concept: 1. Rule on Evidence - "The necessity of proof always lies with the person who lays charges." 2. The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. 3. See Const. Art. VIII, sec. 4.2 and sec. 5.2 The case is decided en banc
6. Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista March 30, 1970 J. Barredo Facts: 1. Teodoro Santiago was a grade six graduating grade 6 student of Sero Elementary in Cotabato City. He was a consistent honor student and was determined to graduate 3rd place in his batch by the schools Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor. 2. They personally appealed to the school Principal, District and Academic Supervisors alleging that there were irregularities in the ranking of the honor roll but they only passed the buck on each other 3. Thus in order for a speedy remedy before the graduation rites, Teodoro, represented by his mother he filed a case against the rd said Committee including the District and Academic Supervisor in the CFI disputing the 3 place rank he received. They allege that there was grave abuse and irregularities in trying to pull him down on the rankings. 4. The court dismissed the case because the graduation was already set on the following day. Eventually the case was dismissed upon a motion to dismiss by the respondents because 1.) it does not comply with sec 1 of Rule 65 of Rules of Court, 2.) they have not exhausted the administrative remedies and 3.) that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the Committee. Issue: Is the action for certiorari appropriate in this case? Held: No Ruling: 1. The court reasons that the committee does not perform a judicial or quasi judicial action, thus the certiorari proceeding could not apply. Also, there should be a law that that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which an adverse claim is made. The Appellant have failed to provide a record of any rule of law to prove that the committee exercises a quasi or quasi-judicial function. 2. In the case of Felipe vs Leuterio, the court has ruled that they have no authority to reverse the decision of the board of judges in an oratorical contest as well as beauty contests and similar competitions for it is an unwritten rule that the board of judges decision is final and unappealable. 3. The appellant have failed miserably to comply with sec.1 of rule 65 of rules of court, in failing attach a copy the pertinent documents such as Service Manual for teachers, altered grading sheets etc. which is fatal to their cause. Concept: Certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182) In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. (3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. Judicial or Quasi-judicial acts: it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 7. Muskrat vs. U.S. Facts: 1. Congress passed an act that gave original jurisdiction to the court of claims and appellate jurisdiction to the SC to determine the validity of certain acts of Congress (to issue advisory opinions) 2. The Congressional acts related to the distribution and allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee Indian Tribe 3. Muskrat and the other plaintiffs in this case brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking a declaration that Congressional acts of 1904 and 1906 be declared unconstitutional and that an earlier and more favorable act of July 1902 was controlling. 4. The court of Claims sustained the validity of the acts of 1904 and 1906 and dismissed the petitions. Issues: 1. What is the scope of judicial power conferred by the constitution upon the SC? 2. May Congress expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts by empowering them to issue advisory opinions?
Ruling: 1. The judicial power is limited to cases and controversies or simply the claims of litigants brought before the courts for the protection or enforcement of rights or the prevention, or punishment of wrongs. 2. No, congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the judiciary by empowering it to issue advisory opinions. Concept: 1. Congress does not have the power to provide for a suit of this nature to be brought in federal court to test the constitutionality of prior acts of Congress because such a suit is not a case or controversy. 2. The fight of the court to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional can only be exercised when a proper case between the opposing parties is submitted to determination. 8. PACU vs. Secretary of Education 97 Phil. 806 (1955) October 31, 1955- Bengzon Facts: 1. The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed that Act No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was ame nded by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that a. the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; b. it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and c. its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. 2. Petitioner complained that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. 3. petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right The defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1. the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2. Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and the Act is constitutionally valid. Issue: Is Act No. 2706 unconstitutional? Held: No Ruling: I. No Justifiable Controversy Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. 1. 2. 3. The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. There is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determine a real and vital controversy between litigants.
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II. No Undue Delegation 1. Inherent in the Police power of the State 2. Despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years.

III.
Validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1: Textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks)
No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing. 3. Police Power of the state to regulate: prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper Concept: Topic: Standing 1. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. 2. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.) Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
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9. GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA 1963 Concepcion, J. FACTS 1. respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation 2. petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; 3. Respondents say that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition 4. Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action on the theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-inChief "for military stock pile purposes"; and that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any special authority" 5. Respondents allege, that provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". 6. Then there were contracts involved - The contracts with Vietnam and Burma Respondents say that Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the Purchase of rice; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing by representatives; ISSUE 1. Is the importation valid? Held: No 2. Do petitioners have personality/interest to file this suit? Held: Yes RULING 1. As to status of petitioner- the Court said: RA 3452 not only prohibits importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency", it also declares, in that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines... ." Now, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest file this petition.

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As to whether respondent is a government agency Court said it is/they are. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of the Government, our government agencies and/or agents. This conviction is even more apparent considering a provision in RA 3452 saying that "that the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions As to its authorization by the President as the Commander-in-Chief- Court said: The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice. If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the civilian population.
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As to the contracts -Court doesnt believe that the 2 contracts have attained the status of executive agreement; and even if they have, they are unlawful, as well as null and void, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts , - Constitution says yes by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. As to the writ of preliminary injunction majority ruled in the negative (meaning it cant be granted). Because I think, from what I understand from the Ruling, that these contracts can still be enforced WITHOUT the Philippines IMPORTING rice from those 2 countries [Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the conditions Prescribed in said Act])
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10. Gonzales vs. Marcos 31 Jul 1975 J. Fernando Facts: 1. There was an exchange of diplomatic notes between RP and US as to the use of a special fund from the US for a Philippine cultural development project. 2. Acting on it, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 30 to create a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. 3. The Board of Trustees of the CCP accepted donations from the private sector, secured a $5M loan from the Chemical Bank of New York, and received $3.5M from President Johnson of the US. 4. The Cultural Center of the Philippines was then constructed and subsequently inaugurated on 11 Sep 1969. 5. On the same day, Ramon Gonzales filed a petition questioning the validity of E.O. No. 30 at the CFI Manila. 6. On 27 Feb 1970, the petition was dismissed citing Gonzales lack of standing. Gonzales appealed to the SC. 7. P.D. No. 15 was promulgated on 5 Oct 1972 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines. Issue: Does Gonzales have legal standing to question E.O. No. 30 as a taxpayer? Held: No, he did not have the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of the E.O. The petition is now moot. Ruling: 1. The funds administered by the President (by the Board of Trustees) came from donations and contributions, not by taxation. There was the absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest for a taxpayers suit. 2. The President merely disposed of a matter of general concern with the issuance of E.O. No. 30. There was no encroachment of legislative powers. Citing Govt of the Philippines vs. Springer: the duty of caring for governmental property is executive, the donations received were governmental property. E.O. No. 30 was superseded by the issuance of P.D. No. 15. It was done in the exercise of legislative powers under martial law.
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11. People vs. Vera Nov. 16, 1937 Justice Laurel Facts: 1. October 15, 1931 - The information in "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al" was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. 2. January 8, 1934 - CFI convicted Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment 3. March 26, 1935 - Upon appeal, the court modified the sentence, lessening the years of imprisonment, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. 4. November 27, 1936 - Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. In his petition, he states that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. 5. June 18, 1937 - CFI, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. 6. April 5, 1937 - CFI, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, heard the case and concluded that Unjieng is innocent of the crime of which he stands, but denying the latter's petition for probation. 7. August 6, 1937 - The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment and to commit Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. 8. August 21, 1937 - The scheduled hearing before the trial court was suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Issue: Does Judge Vera lack the power to place Unjieng under probation, that in the first place, he should have denied the application for probation right away? Held: YES Ruling: It is true that Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. However: 1. Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 516 - SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. 2. Act. No. 4221 is unconstitutional, and so there is no basis for Judge Vera to consider probation: a. The application of the system is dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system. (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power) b. The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time, or has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila, is no reason to consider the People of the Philippines estopped from assailing its validity. c. The President recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act, resulting in the bill repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions. But that said bill was vetoed by the President. However, whatever opinion is expressed by him cannot sway SCs judgment and prevent them from taking what in their opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. They are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government, undeterred by any consideration. Concept: Writ of Prohibition An extraordinary judicial writ issued out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court to prevent the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. Probation - He is not finally and completely exonerated, not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts; probationer remains in legal custody; the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances Power to Suspend Sentence and Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons - former was always a part of the judicial power, latter was always a part of the executive power
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12. Flast vs Cohen June 10. 1968 Majority Opinion CJ Warren Facts: 1. The appellants are taxpayers alleging that the federal funds have been disbursed under the Elementary and Secondary Education act to finance education materials for use in religious and sectarian schools which is in violation of Establishment and Free exercise clause. 2. They requested the authority of a three-judge court to to determine its unconstitutionality. 3. The court ruled that they lacked standing on the authority of Frothingham vs Mellon, that a taxpayer is without standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute. Issue: Do the appellants have standing to invoke the federal courts jurisdiction of their case? Held: Yes. They have standing as federal taxpayers consistent with Art.III to invoke federal jurisdiction. Ruling: 1. The Frothingham ruling does not provide a bar to taxpayers suit as the Courts holding rests on something less than a Constitutional foundation. Frothingham was denied because her tax bill was not large enough and the court in order to avoid attendant inconveniences of opening the door to countless taxpayers suits. Now, these are not consistent with modern conditions as they can now file class suits. The Frothingham decision should be examined of the limits it sets upon standing to sue in a federal court and in taxpayers suit. 2. The governments position that standing should not be conferred on federal taxpayers who challenge a federal taxing or spending program because it raises separation of powers problem related to improper judicial interference should be rejected. As the fundamental aspect of standing is whether a party seeking relief has alleged personal stake in the outcome of the controversy or simply a proper party to request an adjudication and not if the case is justiciable. 3. The courts ruling on standing is that it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 4. The nexus demanded has two aspects: 1.) The taxpayer must establish a logical link between the status and the type of legislative enactment attacked and 2.) the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. (the Flast test) 5. The Appellants have satisfied both nexuses to support their claim of standing. Their challenge is made on Congress exercise of power under Art.I, 8, to spend for the general welfare and the challenged program involves a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds. It also supports the Constitutional provision on Establishment clause which aims to prevent the use of taxing and spending power to support or promote one religion over the other or a religion in general. 6. On the other hand the court has expressed no views as to the merits of the appellants claims. Concepts: Article Three of the United States Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. The judicial branch comprises the Supreme Court of the United States and lower courts as created by Congress. Establishment Clause of the First Amendment refers to the first of several pronouncements in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" Free Exercise Clause Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. 13. Marbury vs. Madison Facts: 1. Petitioner was nominated to become a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia. His commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state. 2. Mr. Madison, was tasked to deliver petitioners commission as well as other situated commissions. 3. Madison failed to do so. 4. Petitioners now wish to use a writ of mandamus to compel Madison to deliver their commissions. 5. It is being insisted that the original grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior courts are general and carry no restrictive words thus should grant the legislature to assign other jurisdictions to said court. Issues: 1. Does the applicant have the right to the commissions demanded? Held: Yes 2. Does this right, if violated have a remedy by law? Held: Yes 3. Is the writ of mandamus that remedy? Held: Yes 4. Can the court issue the writ? Held: No
11
Ruling: 1. The applicant has the right to the commission because it was signed by the President and sealed by the secretary of state, thus legally entitling him to said commission. 2. The Secretary of State has both a public ministerial duty to the US and an agency to the President. It is in this former capacity that he is accountable to the people. His discretionary power ended with the signing of the President of the Commission. 3. Mandamus is the proper remedy but because the US Constitution clearly defines the original and appellate jurisdictions of the court, it says that the issuing of a writ can only come from the inferior courts. 4. The very fact that the jurisdictions have already been supplied by the constitution already bars the legislature from creating laws or statutes that supersede it. It would be giving the legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath whic h professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits Concepts: 1. This is the birth of the Courts capacity of Judicial review over the determination of declaring a law unconstitutional. 14. US vs. SCRAP (STUDENTS CHALLENGING REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEDURES) June 18, 1973 - MR. JUSTICE STEWART Facts: 1. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the initiative for rate increases remains with the railroads provided they give 30 days prior notice to the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission). Within the 30-day period, the ICC may suspend the operation of the proposed rate within 7 months pending review of the legality of the raise. 2. December 13, 1971, substantially all of the railroads in the United States requested Commission authorization to file on 5 days' notice a 2.5% surcharge on nearly all freight rates 3. As justification for the proposed surcharge, the railroads alleged increasing costs and severely inadequate revenues 4. The Commission issued an order on February 1, 1972, shortly before the surcharge would have automatically become effective 5. On May 12, 1972, SCRAP filed the present suit against the United States and the Commission in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, along with other relief, a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the Commission's February 1 and April 24 orders allowing the railroads to collect the 2.5% surcharge. 6. Shippers, competing carriers, and other interested persons requested the ICC to suspend the tariff for the statutory sevenmonth period. 7. Various environmental groups, including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) five law student- and the Environmental Defense Fund, appellees here, protested that - failure to suspend the surcharge would cause their members "economic, recreational and aesthetic harm," and specifically, - that the new rate structure would discourage the use of "recyclable" materials and promote the use of raw materials that compete with scrap, thus adversely affecting the environment. Problem: 1. The main thrust of SCRAP's complaint was that the Commission's decisions of February 1 and April 24, insofar as they declined to suspend the 2.5% surcharge, were unlawful because the Commission had failed to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Defendant: 1. Challenge the appellees' standing to sue, arguing that the allegations in the pleadings as to standing were vague, unsubstantiated, and insufficient under our recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton Issue: Whether or not SCRAP has standing to sue. Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Their pleadings sufficiently alleged that they were "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 2. they point specifically to the allegations that their members used the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that this use was disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods brought about by a rate increase on those commodities. 3. Vs. Sierra - No such specific injury was alleged in Sierra Club. - Unlike Sierra Club, were the effect of the assailed project is limited to a special geographic area, the federal action complained here is applicable to all railroads in the country and therefore its alleged environmental impact is nationwide.

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12
Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the . . . development." Here, by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area. - Injury alleged here is also very different from that at issue in Sierra Club because here the alleged injury to the environment is far less direct and perceptible - SIERRA there complained about the construction of a specific project that would directly affect the Mineral King Valley. SCRAP, the Court was asked to follow a far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees complained - a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area. Concept: 1. "injury in fact" we made it clear that standing was not confined to those who could show "economic harm." Nor, we said, could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency's action any person who had in fact suffered injury. 15. KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA, JR. 1994 Davide, Jr. FACTS 1. Petitioner, KILOSBAYAN is a non-stock domestic corp composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. OTHERS sue in their capacity as SENATORS, TAXPAYERS, AND CONCERNED CITIZENS. They seek to prohibit the execution of the Contract of Lease executed by PCSO and PGMC (Phil Gaming Mgt System) in connection with lotto-online lottery system.
2.
WHAT HAPPENED the charter of the PCSO grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, races, lotteries... so because of this, they decided to establish and online lottery system 4. when PCSO knew about this, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multi-natl Malaysian company offered its services and resources to PCSO. 5. So this Berjaya group organized with some Fil investors to form a Phil corp named Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) they intended this to be the medium thru which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. 6. PCSO then issued Request for Proposal for the Lease Contract; under this Proposal, there were citizenship requirements; now PGMC claims that MALAYSIAN Berjaya undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% (so in other words, its saying that it now qualifies to enter into a contract in the Phils) 7. So PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO; a report was submitted to the Office of the Pres (OP) which then granted the bid of PGMC. 8. Petitioner wrote Pres. Ramos opposing this because of moral and ethical considerations; then there were reports saying that Malacanang will nonetheless push thru with this saying that it is actually PCSO which will operate this lottery with PGMC being only LESSORS 9. So finally, Contract of LEASE was executed. Some important provisions of the CONTRACT: 10. Then OP said that only a court injunction can stop Malacanang- and they sure did get what they wished for- This petition. 11. PETITIONERS say: a. That this Contract cant push thru cause its an arrangement where PCSO would get into a collaboration with PGMC which is in violation of RA 1169 which prohibits such collaboration with any person, entity, etc. b. that even if this contract tries to show that it would only be about lease of facilities, and such lease is not within the meaning of collaboration, yet it shows that there is actually a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC; it even shows that PGMC is not merely a lessor but the ACTUAL OPERATOR. c. That theres a requirement in connection with the Contract for PGMC to set up a telecommunications network; this can only be done if PGMC has a franchise which it doesnt; and because its 75% foregn-owned, it cant be granted a franchise 12. RESPONDENTS allege: a. That its an independent contractor; its neither the co-operator of this lottery system; and that its not in collaboration with PCSO; b. Respondents brush aside the issue on setting up of telecommunications network-that it doesnt require franchise cos PGMC wont operate a public utility; 3.
c.
d. ISSUE 1. Do petitioners have legal standing? Held: YES 2. Is the Contract of Lease valid? Held: No, its invalid RULING 1. On legal standing Yes, petitioners have legal standing. Court said issue on legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised, - the rule is: the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. -Court said that this case is of transcendental importance to the public; issues are of paramount public interest; the consequences affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people... the legal standing then of the petitioners here deserve recognition. 2. In holding that the Contract is invalid, the Court reasoned: -Law is clear: theres prohibition on PCSO to enter into a collaboration. It cannot share nor lease its franchise thru collabo ration with any person, entity, etc. -as to whether PGMC is only a lessor: it doesnt depend on the designation, intent of the parties may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself; a -The Contract shows that its not really a contract of lease but a collaboration. Collaboration - acts of working together in a joint project. There must be a community of interest. - acts of respondents revealed that PCSO has neither funds nor expertise; in its Request for Proposal, it was seeking for a suitable contractor which shall builed, at its own expenses, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain the system; RFP also states that operation would be at no risk to the government, so PGMC would shoulder everything; -in short, the only contribution of PCSO is its franchise, and everything else would be provided for by PGMC- thus showing that its really the operator.
13 That PCSO has the authority to enter into all kinds of transactions to attain its objectives and that what its charter prohibits is the joint-venture like arrangement, such feature which cant be found in the Contract That PGMC is just a LESSOR
16. Lacson vs. Perez 10 May 2001 J. Melo Facts: 1. On 1 May 2001, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion. 2. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, four petitions were filed assailing the declaration and the warrantless arrest, to wit: a. Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino, and Cesar Mancao praying that an information against them be filed first before their arrest and the hold departure order issued be lifted b. Miriam Defensor Santiago questioning the warrantless arrests and the imminent threat of her being arrested c. Ronald Lumbao questioning the declaration as violative of separation of powers d. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino questioning the declaration and the warrantless arrests that ensued 3. On 6 May 2001, President Arroyo lifts the declaration of the state of rebellion. Issue: Is the issue ripe for adjudication? Are the petitions already moot and academic? Held: The issue is not ripe for adjudication. The petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration. Ruling: 1. The petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the lifting of the declaration on 6 May 2001. Also, the DOJ Secretary has denied that he had ordered warrantless arrests. 2. The petitioners contention that they are under imminent threat of arrest do not justify their resort to petitions on mandamus and prohibition since when subjected to warrantless arrest, they are not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 3. On Lacson petition: the petition is premature considering that no complaints or charges have been filed against them. 4. On Santiago petition: she has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. The authorities also said that she will not be arrested without a warrant. 5. On Lumbao petition: the Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the calling-out power of the President. However, it is no longer feasible, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted. 6. On LDP petition: it does not have a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed. It is a juridical person not subject to arrest. The claim that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest cannot stand because every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed.

17 Francisco vs. House of Representatives November 10, 2003 Justice Carpio Morales Facts:
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1. November 28, 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings 2. July 22, 2002 - House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation regarding the disbursements and expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) by Chief Justice Davide 3. June 2, 2003 - (1st) Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 4. August 5, 2003 - The complaint was endorsed by the House of Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. 5. October 22, 2003 - The House Committee voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in substance. 6. October 23, 2003 (2nd) An impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution; It was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 7. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Reps. and others, mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article XI of the Const. that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one ye ar. Issue: Do the petitioners have legal standing to file such action? Held: YES Ruling: While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. They invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession, supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. In a long line of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court. a. Citizen - he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement b. Taxpayer - he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute c. legislator - he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator The mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Therefore, the SC relaxes its rule on locus standi. Philippine Bar Association invoked transcendental importance. There is no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, and so the following are instructive determinants made by SC Justice Feliciano: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Applying these, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised are indeed of transcendental importance.
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In petitioner Atty. Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing. In the same way, an intervenor must possess a legal interest in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer. Persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. a. Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, sought to join petitioners Candelaria as they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed. - GRANTED b. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join Francisco. They invoke their rights as citizens. - GRANTED c. World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. sought to support the petitions of transcendental importance. GRANTED d. Senator Pimentel sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. GRANTED e. As to Jaime Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Also, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing. Concept: STANDING and REAL-PARTY INTEREST former, Do the parties have personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, latter, Is he the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment? 18. SANLAKAS vs Exec. Sec. Feb.3 , 2004 J.Tinga Facts: 1. On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed the Oakwood Premiere Apartments and bewailed the corruption in the AFP, demanding among other the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and PNP Chief. 2. The President in response proclaimed a state of rebellion through Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4 directing the armed forces and PNP to suppress the rebellion. 3. The Oakwood occupation ended late at night of the same day but the President lifted the state of rebellion only on Aug.1, 2003 through proclamation 427. 4. Several petitions were then filed challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and G.O. No.4 Issue: 1. Whether Sanlakas has legal standing to invoke 2. Whether the President has acted beyond her powers Held: 1. No, Sanlakas has no legal standing. 2. Yes. The President acted within her powers as chief-executive and commander-in-chief Ruling: - The court in order to avoid similar questions on the validity of the state of rebellion from reemerging has seized this opportunity to make a decision despite the mootness of the petition as the state of rebellion have already been lifted. First Issue: 1. The party-list has no better right than Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino which in a similar case in Lacson v.Perez was declared to have no standing. 2. They have not shown any injury to be suffered by it and being a juridical person it cannot be threatened with warrantless arrest. Neither are their members threatened to be arrested thus their action shows no legal right under the threat of imminent invasion or infringement. 3. Their contention to as being a people organization recognized by the Constitution to promote peoples interest under Art. XIII sec. 15-16 it still remains that only real parties in interest or those with standing can invoke the judicial power.
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Second Issue: 1. The President in accordance with her powers as Commander in Chief, provided in sec.18, Art. VII, may call out the such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 2. Taken from the U.S. constitutional history and Philippines as well it is well within the auth ority of the President to declare a state of rebellion being the Commander-in-Chief and in her exercise of executive powers as Chief executive. It is within her residual powers to address the threats which undermine the very existence of the government or the integrity of the State. 3. Furthermore the court said that the confusion brought by Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring the state of rebellion couldnt diminish or violate the constitutionally protected rights . Such as the operation of the constitution or the automatic suspension of writ of habeas corpus. 4. The Court in this case may examine whether the power was exercised within the constitutional limits and none of the petitioners have given proof that the President has acted without factual basis. 5. The allegations that the declaration of rebellion being tantamount to a declaration of martial is unfounded as the President has not exercised legislative and judicial powers, nor the military tribunals replaced the civil courts or civil and political rights curtailed. 6. Also the Presidents declaration is not an undue declaration of emergency powers which requires the a grant by Congress pursuant to sec 23(2) of Art. VI. Concept: - Legal Standing /locus standi - has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. - Sec. 18, Art VII The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. 19. Tan vs. Macapagal Facts: 1. Petitioners are suing as tax payers but also on behalf of the Filipino People in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution or the Constitutional Convention. 2. The claim that the SC is without power to make such a resolution because of Art 15, Sec 1(1935 Const) and RA 6132. 3. The original petition that carried only 5 pages was dismissed. 4. A 32 page motion was filed for reconsideration with American Jurisprudence Issue: Do the Petitioners have standing? Held: No Ruling: 1. SC cannot exercise what petitioners want them to do because of the Separation of Powers. 2. As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by the legislature there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. (681) 3. Simply put, it is still not ripe for adjudication. Concepts: 1. Rule of non- interference or the Doctrine of Separation of Powers 2. Locus Standi: a. Must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he will sustain direct injury through its enactment b. There are many decisions nullifying the disbursement of public funds because of tax payers. 20. POE v. ULLMAN 367 U.S. 497 (1961) June 19, 1961.- MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER Facts: 1. Challenge the constitutionality, under the Fourteenth Amendment, of Connecticut statutes which prohibit the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice in the use of such devices.

2.
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No. 60 combines two actions A. Paul and Pauline Poe, are a husband and wife, who live together and have no children. (1) Mrs. Poe has had three consecutive pregnancies terminating in infants which each died shortly after birth. (2) Plaintiffs have consulted Dr. Buxton, an obstetrician and gynecologist of eminence, (3) Dr. Buxton's opinion that the cause of the infants' abnormalities is genetic, (4) Dr. Buxton knows of drugs, medicinal articles and instruments which can be safely used to effect contraception. (5) Medically, the use of these devices is indicated as the best and safest preventive measure necessary for the protection of plaintiffs' health. (6) Plaintiffs, however, have been unable to obtain this information for the sole reason that its delivery and use may or will be claimed by the defendant State's Attorney to constitute offenses against Connecticut law. B. Jane Doe, a twenty-five-year-old housewife. (1) Mrs. Doe, it is alleged, lives with her husband, they have no children; (2) Mrs. Doe recently underwent a pregnancy which induced in her a critical physical illness (3) Another pregnancy would be exceedingly perilous to her life. (4) She, too, has consulted Dr. Buxton, who believes that the best and safest treatment for her is contraceptive advice. (5) The remaining allegations of Mrs. Doe's complaint, and the relief sought, are similar to those in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Poe.
3.
No. 61 action by Dr. Buxton is the plaintiff. He asks that the Connecticut statutes prohibiting his giving of contraceptive advice be adjudged unconstitutional, as depriving him of liberty and property without due process. -Allege that appellee Ullman threatens to prosecute them for use of, or for giving advice concerning, contraceptive devices. The allegations are merely that, in the course of his public duty, he intends to prosecute any offenses against Connecticut law, and that he claims that use of and advice concerning contraceptives would constitute offenses. Issue: Can the action prosper? Whether or Not the allegations raised by petitioners regarding the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute raise a justiciable question before the Court. Held: No. Ruling: 1. Petitioners do not allege that appellee, Ullman threatens to prosecute them for their use of or for giving advice regarding contraceptives. 2. The allegations merely state that in the course of his public duty he intends to prosecute any violation of Connecticut law. 3. There is thus no imminent or impending threat of arrest on the petitioners. 4. The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives has been on the State's books since 1879. 5. During the more than three-quarters of a century since its enactment, a prosecution for its violation seems never to have been initiated 6. We were advised by counsel for appellants that contraceptives are commonly and notoriously sold in Connecticut drug stores. Yet no prosecutions are recorded 7. The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication. Gist: held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a Connecticut law that banned the use of contraceptives, and banned doctors from advising their use, because the law had never been enforced. Therefore, any challenge to the law was deemed unripe , because there was no actual threat of injury to anyone who disobeyed the law. Concept: 1. This court can have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the constitutionality of a State law. Such law must be brought into actual, or threatened operation upon rights properly falling under judicial cognizance, or a remedy is not to be had here." " 2. The party who invokes the power [to annul legislation on grounds of its unconstitutionality] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement . . . ." 21. US v. Richardson 1974 Burger: FACTS 1. Respondent, as a taxpayer, sued Congress- claims that Central Intelligence Agency Act which permits CIA to acct for its expenditures solely on the certificate... and not regular statement and acct of public funds, is unconstitutional 2. District Court dismissed for lack of legal standing; CA reversed DC saying that it satisfied Flasts requirements: 1) challenge an enactment under the Taxing Spending Clause; 2) show a nexus between the plaintiffs status and a specific constitutional
18
limitation on the taxing and spending power. ISSUE: Does respondent have legal standing? Held: No. RULING 1. His are generalized grievances, as theyre about the conduct of the government 2. His challenge is not about the taxing power but to the statutes regulating CIAs acctg and doesnt provide a nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the asserted failure of Congress to require more detailed reports of expenditures 3. Being a generalized grievance, failed to show that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining direct injury as the result of such action. 22. DeFunis vs. Odegaard 23 Apr 1974 Per Curiam (US) Facts: 1. In 1971, Marco DeFunis Jr. applied for admission to the University of Washington Law School (UWLS) but was eventually denied. 2. He subsequently filed a suit against the school in a Washington trail court contending that the admission procedures and criteria invidiously discriminated against him on the account of his race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3. The court agreed with him and issued a mandatory injunction which enabled him to be admitted in the fall of 1971. 4. During his second year in law school, the Washington Supreme Court (WA SC), upon appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the admissions policy did not violate the Constitution. 5. DeFunis then appealed to the Federal Supreme Court which issued a stay of judgment of the WA SC decision. This stay enabled him to remain in law school. 6. In the first term of his last year, the Federal Supreme Court considered his petition for certiorari and was granted on 19 Nov 1973 after obtaining guarantee from the parties that the case is not yet moot. 7. The UWLS indicated that if the WA SCs decision were permitted to stand, DeFunis could still complete the term for which he was enrolled but would have to apply to the faculty for permission to continue for the next term. 8. The case was orally argued on 26 Feb 1974 where DeFunis counsel admitted that DeFunis has now registered for his final quarter in law school. The counsel for UWLS also made clear that it will not seek to abrogate his registration. Issue: Is the issue now moot? Held: Yes. Art. 3 of the US Constitution require that the Federal Supreme Court, even in cases arising in the state courts, resolve the question of mootness before is assumes jurisdiction. Ruling: 1. The UWLS has represented that without regard to the ultimate resolution of the issues in the case, DeFunis will remain a student in the Law School for the duration of any term in which he has already enrolled. Since he is on his final term, he will be given opportunity to complete all academic requirements for graduation and if he does so, receive his diploma. 2. A determination of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to compel that result and could not serve to prevent it. The controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be definite and concrete and no longer touches the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. 3. Mootness here does not depend upon a voluntary cessation of the schools admission practices but upon the simple fact that DeFunis is in his final term and the schools fixed policy to permit him to complete the term. 4. The case is no longer capable of repetition without evading review since DeFunis will never be again be required to go through the Law Schools admission process. 5. There is no reason to suppose that another case might come up because the WA SC has already spoken that the admission policies are not contrary to the Constitution. JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, respondents. July 15, 1936- LAUREL, Facts: 1. The elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; 2. October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed Jose A. Angara as the winning candidate 3. November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office 4. Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. 5. Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified 6. Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. 7. Angara objected to such resolution
a.
b. Issue: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission? (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly Held: (1) Yes the court has jurisdiction (2) No, the Electoral Tribunal did not act in excess of its power.
19 contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case
Ruling: Issue 1 1. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. 2. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. 3. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. 4. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 5. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other . 6. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Issue 2 1. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. 2. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. 3. It is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. 4. the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. 5. The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara. Concept: I. Judicial Supremacy - The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. - When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them . JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, respondents. July 15, 1936- LAUREL, Facts: 1. The elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; 2. October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed Jose A. Angara as the winning candidate 3. November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office 4. Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.

5.
20
Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified 6. Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. 7. Angara objected to such resolution c. contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and d. the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case Issue: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission? (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly Held: (1) Yes the court has jurisdiction (2) No, the Electoral Tribunal did not act in excess of its power. Ruling: Issue 1 1. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. 2. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. 3. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. 4. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 5. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. 6. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Issue 2 1. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. 2. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. 3. It is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. 4. the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. 5. The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara. Concept: II. Judicial Supremacy - The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them .
34. Removed
21
35. Lochner vs. New York April 17, 1905 J. Peckham Facts: Joseph Lochner was convicted of misdemeanor, second offense, for allowing his employees in a bakery establishment of working more than 10 hours per day or more than 60 hours per week. This was in violation of New York labor laws (section 110) which prohibits workers in bakeries and confectionery establishments from working more than sixty hours per week, Issue: Is the New York on law on labor hours constitutional? Held: The Court held that the law was unconstitutional since the right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by the Constitution. The mandate that no employee shall be required or permitted to work prohibits employers from allowing their employees to work more than ten hours per day. This disallows the employee from seeking to work beyond the prescribed hours in order to earn more. This is against the right of an individual to contract in relation to his business as protected by the 14 th amendment of the Federal Constitution. The conflict between the police power of the state and the individuals right to contract in this case should be ruled in favor of the right to contract of the class of bakers. They are distinct from the class of miners who in contrast to a miner is as a class intelligent, is not threatened by his power to negotiate hours of employment. But the labor law on bakers on the pretext of safety and public health couldnt be held because there is no causal link as to the work rendered by a baker and its effect on his job or healt h. The labor law which acts as a health law therefore merely regulates the hours of labor between employer and employees being contrary to right to contract and against the Federal Constitution. Also, the purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and legal effect if the language employed; and whether it is violative of the Constitution must be determined from the natural effect if the statute when put into operation, not from its proclaimed purposes. The judgment of the SC and the lower court is hereby reversed. 36. Removed 37. NDC vs. Philippine Veterans Bank December 10, 1990 J. Cruz Facts: 1. AGRIX had executed in favor of Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage in 1978, over 3 parcels of land in Los Banos. 2. While the mortgage was existing, AGRIX went bankrupt. 3. In order to salvage this and other Agrix companies, PD 1717 was issued by Marcos. This ordered the rehabilitation of AGRIX to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. 4. (1980) When the bank filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee, but failed to get results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor. 5. NDC and AGRIC then challenged the foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4(1) of the decree: all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished. 6. Trial Court Judge Guerrero annulled not only the challenged provision, but the entire decree on the grounds that: 1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of powers, 2) the law impaired the violation of contracts, 3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. rd 7. The motion for reconsideration was denied; thus, the present petition was filed. This was originally assigned to the 3 Division, but because of the constitutional questions involved, it was transferred to the Court en banc. 8. In 1988, the Court granted NDC and AGRIX prayer for a TRO and instructed the PVB to cease and desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in question. Issue: Is PD 1717 unconstitutional? Held: YES Ruling: No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law 1. Police power is not a panacea for all constitutional maladies. 2. The interests of the public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with the private contracts of AGRIX. The decree speaks vaguely of the public particularly the small investors who would be prejudiced if the corporation were not to be assisted. 3. It has also not been shown that by the extinction of the property rights of the creditors of AGRIX, the interests of the public as a whole, as distinguished form those of a particular class, would be promoted or protected. 4. A legislative act based on the police power requires: 1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
5. 6.
22 particular class as justification of such interference, 2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. A mortgage lien is a property derived from contract and so comes under the protection of the Bill of Rights. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and give to another without compensation and any known public purpose.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Equal Protection Clause The decree lumps the secured creditors with the unsecured creditors and places them on the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. All of them are considered unsecured creditors. It is not clear why AGRIX was singled out for government help, and why other companies entitled to similar concern were not similarly treated. The stockholders of the PVV were no less deserving of protection, which they did not get. Impairment of Obligation of Contract While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to public welfare. The contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX are purely private transactions and have not been shown to be affected with public interest.
1. 2.
38. Removed 39. Balacuit vs. CFI Agusan del Norte 30 Jun 1988 J. Gancayco Facts: The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640 which penalizes any business establishment who charges in full children below 7 to 12 yrs old in any movie, public exhibition or performances. Petitioners are owners and managers of theaters who asks the court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Issues: Does the ordinance infringe the right of property and therefore unconstitutional? Held: Yes. It is not a valid exercise of police power. Ruling: Although the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated power by the local government, its reason for the ordinance on the pretense of police power under the general welfare clause is untenable. For the legislature couldnt under the guise of protecting public interest arb itrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Police power is not final or conclusive but subject to the courts supervision. The selling of theatre ticket represents a right, which is a right of property. Thus the owner has the clear right on how he chooses to dispose of it as with regards to whom and the price. The ordinance then is an is in conflict with the state constitution securing the right of property, as held in Collister vs. Hayman, wherein the proprietor are given control of their business and may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable way. The controlling of prices for the reason of general welfare could not be held as the businesses affected by the provision are not public utilities. Although a business may be regulated it should be within the bounds of reason, it should be reasonable and not and its provision not oppressive as amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. Thus the right of a theater owner to set the price of his tickets is well-within the protection of the due process clause. And thus they have the right to manage their property in their own way, to their advantage as to profitable to them and those who do not approve may stay away.
40. Removed 41. Removed
23
42. Skinner v Oklahoma 1 Jun 1942 J. Douglas (US) Facts: An Oklahoma statute that punishes habitual criminals with sterility is being assailed for alleged unconstitutionality. The apparent intent behind the law is the discovery during that time of transmissibility of criminal genes. It provides a notice, and opportunity to be heard, and the right to jury trial. It also defines a habitual criminal as one who has been convicted of a felony a third time, except if the felony is either one of those mentioned in its section 195. The petitioner is a guy who was first convicted of stealing chickens, then robbery with firearms, then robbery with firearms again. Issue: Is the statute unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment? Held: YES Ruling: The court started answering the main question with a comparison of the crimes of larceny and embezzlement, pointing to the fact that there is really no difference between the two when it comes to their intrinsic nature. It then proceeded to discuss the police power of the state, offering that a certain degree if flexibility should be allowed in order to make sure that the machinery of government will work. However, the court found that the present statute does not show the kind of flexibility that is deemed acceptable. It runs afoul of the equal protection clause because despite the gravity of the penalty (with its potentially devastating effects, like the extinction of a certain race), it does not apply the standard equally among people who are convicted of pretty much the same offense. The law does not even explain which qualities in one who has been thrice convicted of larceny are not present in those who have been convicted of embezzlement (not even if the embezzler was convicted a hundred t imes). The two crimes rate the same under the states penal code, but the penalty for larceny is a lot worse than that for embezzlement. Concept: When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same offense, the equal protection clause becomes a formula of empty words Note on the concurring opinions: Chief Justice Stone opined that the real problem lies in the uncertainty behind the findings of science (during that time, at least), of whether or not criminal tendencies are indeed transmissible. If such a possibility exists, the fatality of the law lies in the fact that it does not provide procedural due process in determining whether a habitual criminal really will pass on his criminal genes. Mr. Justice Jackson bewailed the whole idea of conducting experiments on criminals. They are not the same as imbeciles, who are easily observable and a lot more predictable. 43. Griswold vs. Connecticut 7 Jun 1965 J. Douglas (US) Facts: Appellants were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advise on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appllants claimed that the accessory statute as applied violates the 14th amendment. Issues: Is the right to privacy contemplated in the U.S. Constitution? Held: Yes Ruling: Jurisprudence provided in this case shows that there are certain specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights that have penumbras or gray areas. It draws out the existence of the right to privacy by drawing from the right to due process. The case concerns itself with the privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees and concerns a law that forbids the use of contraceptives rather than the regulation of their manufacture or sale. This law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. They utilize the 3rd, 4th, 5thand 9th amendment in order to justify the existence to the right of privacy. Concepts / Laws: 3rd amendment- prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner 4th amendment- affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5th amendment- enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. 9th amendment- The enumeration in the Consti, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

44. Removed 45. Removed
24
46. Roe vs. Wade January 22, 1973- Blackmun J. Facts: The Texas statutes being questioned are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code. These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. Petitioners here were as follows: 1. Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy ; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy , protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint, Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated. 2. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint, he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes , and that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present "a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that, if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."
3.
Section 6 - The case presented a history of abortion regulations, in eight subparts: 1. Ancient attitudes (including those of the Persian Empire, Greek times, the Roman era). 2. The Hippocratic oath. 3. The common law. 4. The English statutory law. 5. The American law. 6. The position of the American Medical Association 7. The position of the American Public Health Association. 8. The position of the American Bar Association. (wiki) Section 7 - Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence
1. 2.
3.
25 It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman - Modern medical techniques have altered this situation . Appellants and various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe. State's interest -- some phrase it in terms of duty -- in protecting prenatal life.
Section 8 The court recognized the right of privacy in connection to the right of the women for abortion - The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. - In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. - This right of privacy,is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. - We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation Section 9 The court tried to identify if the fetus has a personality in the constitution. If it is already a person in their laws. - our observation, supra, that, throughout the major portion of the 19th century, prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. - Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. - We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins . When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer Section 10 Established the constitutionality of the Texas law (see below ruling) Issue: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have standing in the court? (2) Whether or not the Texas penal code is unconstitutional Ruling: (1) Standing a. Jane Roe with standing - record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, [n6] or on the following June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy . - Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." b. Dr. Hallford no standing - Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. - Neither is there any allegation of harassment or bad faith prosecution. - Dr. Hallford seeks to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a "potential future defendant," and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here. - We see no merit in that distinction. The Does No standing - Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, - But they "fear . . . they may face the prospect of becoming [p128] parents." - This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future
c.

-
26
impairment of health But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy
(2) In reference to section 10 - In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. - We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. - These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches [p163] term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling." - The "compelling" point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medicalfact, that, until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth . - It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. - This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. - With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Ruling: - Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those " procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. - The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here. 47. Bowers v. Hardwick 1986 Justice White: Facts: 1. Bowers is charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of his home 2. He filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute because it criminalizes consensual sodomy Issue: Is the statute criminalizing sodomy constitutional? Held: YES Ruling: Major ruling: a. The Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. b. To claim that a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious. IN FACT: - Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. - Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law, and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. c. There should be great resistance to expand the reach of the Due Process Clauses to cover new fundamental rights. The claimed right in this case falls far short of overcoming this resistance. - Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority. d. The fact that homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the home does not affect the result. - If respondent's submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home. Makes a lot of sense.
e.
27 Sodomy laws should not be invalidated on the asserted basis that majority belief that sodomy is immoral is an inadequate rationale to support the laws. - The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate.
48. Lawrence vs. Texas 26 Jun 2003 J. Kennedy (US) Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, the Houston police entered the house of John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner and saw them engaging in anal sex. They were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse under Texas law. The statute defined deviate sexual intercourse as (a) oral or anal sex or (b) penetration with the use of an object. Upon conviction, they were fined $200. They challenged the statute and the conviction to the State Court of Appeals on the grounds of the violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution. In affirming the trial courts decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the statute by considering the US Supreme Courts decision in Bowers vs. Hardwick. Issue: Does the Texas statute violate the Due Process Clause? Held: The Bowers decision was not correct when it was decided and therefore overruled. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexuals the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives. The Court noted that after the Bowers decision, the number of states proscribing homosexual relations has dwindled from 25 to 13 but only 4 states, including Texas, enforce that law. Similarly, two cases decided after Bowers reaffirmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Clearly, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers no longer hold today. This case involved two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. They are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Thus, the Court held that the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into private life. The case is remanded for further proceedings. 49. Board of Education vs. EARLS June 27, 2002 J. Quisumbing Facts: 1. In the fall of 1998, the School District of Tecumseh, Oklahoma adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all middle and high school students to consent to drug testing in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. 2. This policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities. 3. They must submit to random drug testing while participating in that activity, and must agree to be tested at any time upon reasonable suspicion. 4. The urinalysis tests are designed to detect only the use of illegal drugs including amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates and barbiturates, not medical conditions or the presence of authorized prescription medications. 5. Under the policy, a faculty monitor waits outside the closed restroom stall for the student to produce a sample and must listen for the normal sounds of urination to guard against tampered specimens and ensure an accurate chain of custody. 6. The policy requires that test results be kept in confidential files separate from a students other records and released to school personnel only on a need to know basis. 7. Moreover, the test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority, nor do the test results lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences. 8. At the time of their suit, Lindsay Earls and Daniel James were students of Tecumseh High School. Lindsay was a member of the show choir, marching band, the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society. Daniel sought to participate in the Academic Team. 9. Together with their parents, they brought action against the School District challenging the Policy both on its face and as applied to their participation in extracurricular activities. The policy violates the 4th Amendment as incorporated by the 4th Amendment and requested injuctive and declarative relief. They School district failed to identify a special need for testing students who participate in extracurricular activities, and that the Drug Testing Policy neither addresses a proven problem nor promises to bring any benefit to students or the school. Issue: Is this policy justifiable? Held: YES
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Ruling: 1. It is a reasonable means of furthering the School Districts important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren and does not violate the 4th amendment. 2. Vernonia ruling: A school districts policy of randomly testing the urine of its student athletes for illicit drugs did not violate the 4 th amendment Drug use increased the risk of sports-related injury. Vernons athletes were the leaders of an aggressive local drug culture that had reached epidemic proportions A public school district facing a disruptive and explosive drug abuse problem had special needs that justified suspi cionless testing of district athletes as a condition on their athletic participation 3. The students affected by this Policy have a limited expectation of privacy. In any event, students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes. The court concludes that the invasion of students privacy is not significant, given the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results are put. 4. Preventing drug use by schoolchildren is an important governmental concern. 5. The only consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the students participation: After the first positive test, the school contacts the students parent or guardian for a meeting. The student may continue to participate in the activity if within 5 days of the meeting the student shows proof of receiving drug counseling and submits to a second drug test in two weeks. For the second positive test, the student is suspended from participation in all extracurricular activities for 14 days, must complete hours of substance abuse counseling, and must submit to monthly drug tests. Only after a third positive test will the student be suspended from participating in any extracurricular activity for the remainder of the school year. 6. Drug testing must not be presumptively based on an individualized reasonable suspicion of a wrongdoing because it might unfairly target members of unpopular groups. 50. Ople vs. Torres July 23, 1998 - Puno Facts: Senator Blas Ople challenges A.O. 308, Adoption of a National Computerized Identification System as a usurpation of legisla tive power and invasion of the fundamental right to privacy. The respondent is Executive Secretary Ruben Torres together with the other heads of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) who leads the implementation. A.O. 308 seeks to establish a uniform ID system with three main purposes: (1) streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of service, and (3) generate population data for development planning. The ID system will use biometrics which requires the use of an individuals physiological and behavioral characteristic that w ill be stored in a computer. Each one will be issued a Personal Identification Number (PIN) and all of his transactions may be recorded. The petitioner contends that the said order be invalidated. Issues: (1) Does A.O. 308 breach the power of the legislative as it enacts a law? (2) Does A.O. 308 invade the right to privacy and is unconstitutional? Held: (1) Yes. It deals with a subject that requires the passage of a law. (2) Yes. It intrudes the fundamental right to privacy. Ruling: A.O. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order but by a law. It expands the limit of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress. The argument that it implements the Administrative Code of 1987 could not hold ground as it is a general law and only incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Id entification System which requires the delicate adjustment of various contending state policies. Furthermore it violates the right to privacy as held in Grisworld v. Connecticut, where the US Supreme Court gave more substance to the right to privacy which can be found in the various penumbras of the Constitutional Amendments. Likewise these zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws, by our Constitution in the Bill of Rights, Civil Code and Revised Penal Code. The grave danger of intrusion into privacy easily possible as provision on who is to control and access the data, under what
29 circumstances and purpose is not specifically provided. There is no assurance that it will only be process for specified purpose and that there will be a reasonable expectation of privacy. There is a great threat that it will be misused and abused by authorities and unscrupulous persons. Furthermore our laws do not provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Although it may have been for a worthy cause, A.O. 308 does not show that there is a compelling state interest and fails constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn as to preclude abuses. As when a given fundamental right is at stake the Court gives it a stricter scrutiny. This is demanded because the 1987 Constitution is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. Concept: Administrative Code 1987 - These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government Administrative Order - An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative Operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 51. Duncan Association vs. Glaxo Welcome 17 Sep 2004 J. Tinga Facts: Pedro Tecson, a medrep for Glaxo Welcome, fell in love with and married Bettsy, a branch coordinator for Astra, Glaxos compe titor. He found himself in a tight situation with his company because of its policy against marrying employees from competitor companies. The company provides a six month period within which the employee can attempt to resolve the possible conflict. During this period, Tecson was transferred by Glaxo to a different branch, which he did not accept. A few other measures were taken by the company to make sure that there would be no conflict of interest. After this procedure proved ineffective, Tecson and the company submitted the matter to voluntary arbitration. The company offered a separation package to Pedro but he also refused. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board eventually rendered a decision which supported Glaxos policy on relationships and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to a different branch . From the decision Tecson filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Issue: 1. Is Glaxo Welcomes policy on marrying employees from competitor companies a violation of the equal protection clause? Held: No. 2. Was Tecson constructively dismissed? Held: No Ruling: The policy does not violate the equal protection clause. The company has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, and other like information, especially from rival companies. The right of management prerogatives justifies the policy, which is not a prohibition on marriage, but on conflict of interests with competitor companies. This is evident in the fact that the policy provides for various ways to make sure that a conflict of interest is avoided, while at the same time preserve the integrity of the em ployees right to choose who to marry. The employee is informed about this policy at the moment he signs the contract so he cannot object to the requirement when he experiences difficulty with it afterwards. Tecson was also not constructively dismissed because what the company did to him did not satisfy the requisites of constructive dismissal. The refusal to allow Tecson to participate in product conferences and the denial of opportunities to market certain products were all done by the company in its desire to validly protect its business interests. The transfer is also valid because as a medical representative, Tecson should expect himself to travel a lot. Its part of the job. Concept: The equal protection clause is not a shield from ANY kind of private conduct. It has to be the kind of private conduct that is wrongful and grossly arbitrary. The company actually tried its very best to arrive at a favorable arrangement with Tecson. The policy was enforced even-handedly and without disregard for his right to due process and equal protection.
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Notable Obiter: Social justice does not require that every case should be decided in favor of labor. 53. Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty () Dec 21, 1915 - Trent *Taxes on billboards are obscene Facts: 1. This case resulted from the British and German Consuls which each filed complaints against billboards within their area that were offensive to the sight and served as a nuisance. 2. Petitioners claim that Section 100 of Act No 2339, which empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is unconstitutional, and constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law. 3. Petitioners claim that Sections 139 and 140 are unconstitutional because they a. deprive tax payers of their property without due process of law, and b. diminish the jurisdiction of the courts. Issues: 1. Is Section 100 of Act No unconstitutional? Held: No 2. Are sections 139 and 140 unconstitutional? Held: No Ruling: Issue 1: 1. It is a valid use of police power, because the presence of the billboards may affect people who see them to the point that it has been recognized to be quite natural for people to protest against [it] 2. The regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares. 3. Police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes, but SC is of the opinion that billboards which are offensive to the sight are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. Issue 2: 1. No government could exist if every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. 2. That is why any means to delay the payment of taxes (including court suits or procedures) is frowned upon. 3. Although there always exists the possibility that a person maybe taxed incorrectly, the solution has already been stated that the tax payer must still pay the taxes on time but state that he paid it under protest. 4. Court jurisdiction for any civil action regarding taxes only arise once the CIR allows such jurisdiction to be granted, which is after they review the tax record of the complainant. Laws / Concepts: 1.Sec 139- forbids the use of an injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax 2. Sec 140- provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive. 3. Power to tax necessarily carries with the power to collect the taxes. The weight of authority supports the proposition that the Government may fix the conditions upon which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. 54. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant. () January 26, 1910- Toribio * killing of carabao is penalized Facts: Luis Torinio slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasuerer in violation of Act 1147. It was contended that the Act was unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Issue: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional? - Is it excessive exercise of police power? Held: No, the act is a proper exercise of police power because of the public interest to preserve the threatened extinction of carabaos in the Philippines due to a disease. Thus, constitutional Ruling: The court held that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. Examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities .
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Why is the restriction reasonable? For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. Conclusion: The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power. Concept: What is police power: - the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same . - Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Circumstances Justifying use of police power: To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, (1) first, that the interests of the public generally , as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, (2) second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
55. People v. FAJARDO () 1958 Reyes, J.B.L.: *former Mayor penalized for the Dont Destroy the View of the Public Plaza! Ordinance Facts: 1. An Ordinance was passed in Baao, Camsur saying: Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor; and without this permit, the violator will be penalized 2. Former mayor of Baao, CamSur, and his son in-law, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name (located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek); 3. The request was denied because proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza 4. Despite the request being denied, Fajardo and son-in-law still pursued their plan of constructing a bldg. 5. Accordingly, they were penalized and now contest the Ordinance Issue: Is the Ordinance constitutional? Held: No, its unconstitutional Ruling: 1. Its an invalid delegation of legislative powers because: a) The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action b) No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. c) It confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others; The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities 2. On the defense (by the municipality) that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the

a)
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view of the public plaza or occupies any public property": Still, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property (its, in effect, a taking of property) ; b) it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation c) The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the Ordinances purpose and for this to be just, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. d) On another defense that this ordinance is for the purpose of establishing fire limits in populous centers: Ordinance still not justified because there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits 56. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court () 20 Mar 1987 J. Cruz *government cant ta ke my carabaos away from me Facts: Restituto Ynot questions the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibited the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and carabeef. The violation of the order would subject such objects to government confiscation. On 13 January 1984, Ynot transported six carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo and upon apprehension the Iloilo police confiscated the carabaos. He sued for recovery and the Iloilo RTC issued a writ of replevin upon filing a supersedeas bond of 12,000.00. After conside ring the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation and since Ynot can no longer produce the carabaos, ordered the confiscation of the bond. Ynot appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it upheld the trial courts decision . He complained that the penalty was invalid because it was imposed without according him the right to be heard before a competent court as guaranteed by due process. Issue: Is E.O. No. 626-A constitutional? Held: No. The Due Process Clause is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard and is immediately condemned and punished. Ruling: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing . In this case, the executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the violator and immediately imposed punishment which was carried out forthright. It did not give him a chance to be heard thus denying him of elementary fair play, the embodiment of due process. The lack of due process may only be justified for two instances: the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In this case, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the dictatorial treatment. Being penal in nature, the violation of the Executive Order should have been pronounced not by the police but by a court of justice , which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. Since it is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive, the Supreme Court declared E.O. No. 626-A unconstitutional. Concept: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. Due process is not like some provisions of the Constitution, an iron rule laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all person s. 57. US vs. Causby May 27, 1946 Douglas *Farm near airport, overflights, compensable Facts: The respondents own a farm near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The end of the airports northwest -southeast runway is close to the barn, that the path of glide to this runway passes directly over their house. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. It was still habitable, but the residents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the property had depreciated in value. Issue: Do the overflights constitute an appropriation of property? Held: YES. Ruling: The overflights by military planes rendered the farm worthless and hence constitute a taking of property warranting compensation by the U.S. government. There was no need for the property to become uninhabitable for it to be considered compensable. The airspace is a public utility, but it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. The use of the airspace immediately above the land limited the utility of the land caused the diminution of its value.
58. Republic vs. PLDT
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January 27, 2969 J.B.L. Reyes Facts: The Bureau of Telecommunications (BoT) was created in order for the government of the Republic to set up its own Government Telephone System using its own appropriations and renting trunk lines from PLDT. Respondent, PLDT is a public service corporation given the legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain a telephone system and electrical transmission of messages throughout the Philippines as to other countries. The dispute started when PLDT sensed that the BoT has competed parasitically with their own telephone system. It complained that it was violation the terms of their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) and when it received no reply from them disconnected the trunk lines BoT was renting resulting into the isolation of the Philippines telephone service to the world except to the US. Hence, the case is filed in order to compel PLDT to execute a contract with BoT for the use of its facilities at the terms the court may see reasonable. Issues: Does the petition commanding PLDT to execute contract with BoT within the powers of eminent domain? Held: Yes. It is well within the powers of the state in the interest of national welfare. Ruling: The Republic in the exercise of its eminent domain require the a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided they may be given just compensation as provided in sec.6 Art. XIII of the Constitution. The lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of inter-connecting services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation. The claim of PLDT that the courts have no jurisdiction and the proper forum for the action is with the Public Service Commission couldnt be taken as it has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private property. Furthermore BoT was not limited to service of government offices alone and thus not limited to non-commercial activities and couldnt be guilty of fraud, abuse or misuse of the public poles of PLDT. 59. Republic vs Castellvi () August 15, 1974 Zaldivar *The fattest case on expropriation, like ever. Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the contract expired the Republic wanted to extend the lease but Donya Castellvi refused When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing him that the heirs of the property wanted it back. The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President. Castellvi then sued them in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (civil case). While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic said that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and it requested that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that it also requested for authority to immediately possess the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic got the lands in 1959. The CFI of Pampanga, meanwhile, dismissed the civil case upon petition of the parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, which the trial court denied on 12 July 1961. The Republics record on appeal was submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial court

dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time (ouch).
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On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for reconsideration, and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and f inally determined by the Supreme Court, and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the trial court approved the Republics record on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal. Issue: Should the taking of Castellvis property be dated in 1947 or in 1959? Held: DECISION MODIFIED. Ruling: A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. Two essential elements in the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. The taking of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing o f the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Here it is undisputed that the Republic took possession of Castellvis property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959 . The taking of the Castellvi property for the purp oses of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. Concept: Private property taken through the power of eminent domain is still subject to procedural restrictions. But as long as the state follows the rules on expropriation, the action is always valid. 60. Bel-Air Association vs. IAC () August 21, 1991 - Gutierrez Facts: 1. Bel-Air association expressly prohibits the operation of businesses within the village because it believes that it is an exclusive residential area. 2. Private respondents set up a Pandesal business and the Association sent a letter asking defendants to stop operating the store. 3. Bel-Air wishes the SC to overrule the former Sangalang Case, wherein the SC said that Jupiter Street is a high density commercial zone, Issue: Is Jupiter Street classified as a residential zone? Held: No Ruling: 1. Petitioners have failed to substantiate that Jupiter street should be classified as a residential zone. 2. There is thus no reason as to why private respondents cannot operate a pandesal business. 61. EPZA vs. DULAY () April 29, 1987- Guiterrez Jr. *appropriation of land for EPZA Facts: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority.
35
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation , to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. Problem: Because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation. Held: Unconstitutional, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitution and void Ruling: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. (Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.) Just compensation: In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. Concept: What is Just Compensation - Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking . It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered 62. NPC v. CA () 1984 Melencio-Herrera, J.: *Bulacan property torn between 2 buyers: NPC & San Diego Facts: 1. This involves the Bulacan property (owned by Sadang couple) (which was twice mortgaged: in 1957 to DBP, and in 1958 to San Diego) 2. NPC negotiated with Sadang re purchase of the land which it would use as access road for its Angat River hydroelectric project 3. Though no final agreement was reached or contract entered into, in 1961, NPC started its construction in the property, with the consent of Sadang spouses

4. 5. 6.
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In Dec 1962, San Diego acquired same property at a public auction, and accordingly it was issued the land title Of course, NPC filed a complaint against Sadang couple on the ground of eminent domain; Lower court ruled in NPCs favor rendering the latter full legal right over the property by virtue of eminent domain and orde red it to indemnify San Diego at the rate of P3.75 per sqm (with interest of 12% per annum from March 1963) 7. San Diego appealed from this- it wanted higher payment. Its contentions were that it improved the property; and it had its plans of bldg a subdivision in there and NPC kind of ruined it, because remember back in 1961, it already began its construction there? Thats probably what San Diego was referring to. Because of NPCs crooked road construction, it separated the land into irregular statements, thereby giving San Diego a wonderful source of headache. 8. But evidence showed that it was actually NPC which improved the property, not San Diegow! (intense) CA reversed. Accdg to its decision: from P3.75, it became P7; (12% interest order stayed) Issue: Is P7 appropriate as just compensation (is it the fair market value)? Held: No. SC said it should be P3.75 (as correctly held by the lower court) Ruling: 1. For the purpose of fixing just compensation for the land, fair market value should be taken, and that which has for its basis not always what the property is worth in the market but uses to which it is plainly adopted, i.e., what is its worth from its availability for valuable uses (ano daw?!) 2. Its also settled that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the govt, the basis should be the price of value at the time it was taken from the owner so whatever plans San Diego had in its mind isnt controlling; Note that at the time NPC started its construction (this was in 1961,the time the property was taken from the owner by the govt) the land was cogonal Plus, when Sadang couple offered the property to San Diego, price was set at only P4; and when San Diego purchased the land at a public auction, it was just P.16 per sqm Apparently, CA based its P7 from the civil suits for lands condemned in the immediate vicinity (prices were P12 and P15), but this wasnt a fair gauge since the court didnt even adopt these amounts. So clearly, P7 has no basis.
63. De Knecht vs. Bautista () 30 Oct 1980 J. Fernandez *From EDSA to Roxas Boulevard, the house is a home Facts: Due to a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard, the DPWH Secretary ordered the City Engineer of Pasay to halt the issuance of construction permits within Cuneta Avenue. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary changed the plan and decided the extension to go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets instead . It justified the sudden change to minimize the social impact cost where motels would be affected. Aggrieved, the owners of residential houses that would be affected (Cristina De Knecht included) petitioned President Marcos to order the reversion to the original plan. The President then referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for investigation where all parties may be given opportunity to ventilate their views and present their evidence. After hearing, the Commission submitted a recommendation to revert to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue. Undeterred, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on its plan and asked the CFI for expropriation of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Thereafter, it filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the properties sought to be expropriated which the court granted on 14 Jun 1979. Issue: Can the government take possession of the houses? Held: No. The governments decision to change the original plan was arbitrary. Ruling: There is no question as to the right of the government to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. However, it is recognized that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken . In this case, it was odd for the government to suddenly change the plan for the EDSA extension from Cuneta Avenue to Fernando Rein and Del Pan. In its Report, the Human Settlements Commission considered functionality, social impact and cost .It said that for functionality, the Cuneta route should be taken while for social impact and cost, the Fernando Rein-Del Pan route would be the better choice. However, it recommended the reversion to the original plan. Considering the recommendation, the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets as the line through which the EDSA extension should pass is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
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64. Republic vs. De Knecht () February 12, 1990 Gancayco *SC can yield to a subsequent legislative fiat, in lieu of eminent domain Facts: Cristina De Knecht was among the owners of the houses along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets was. In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceeding against Cristina and some 15 others in the CFI. She filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. She also filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the government from the immediate taking and control of the property. On the other hand, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property, alleging that it had made the required deposit with the PNB of 10% of the compensation. The trial court granted the Republics motion, and a Committee of three was formed to determine a just compensation for the lands. She directed her case to the Supreme Court on certiorari, praying that the Republic be desisted from further proceeding with the expropriation. The Supreme Court ruled in her favor. In 1981, faced with the same expropriation action, Antonio Roxas, Maria Carmen Roxas vda. De Elizalde moved to dismiss it in accordance with the Supreme Courts decision which had become final and to avoid further damage. Initially, the Republic decl ared that it had no objection to such motion; however, 2 years after, it filed a motion to dismiss the case due to the enactment of BP 340, expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. This was granted by the lower court, but this order was set aside in the CA. The Republic then filed this petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Can the court allow such expropriation proceeding to be subjected to a subsequent legislation of expropriation? Held: YES Ruling: The decision of the Supreme Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat. While it is true that said final judgment becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. The proceedings may be undertaken by voluntary negotiation with land owners, but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation . Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve the drainage and flood control problem and will minimize the heavy traffic in the area. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. The court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. 65: Manotok vs. National Housing Authority () May 21, 1987 Gutierrez, Jr. *Martial law on expropriation of private lands Facts: The President issued PDs 1669 and 1670 respectively expropriating the Tambunting estate and the Sunog-Apog property of the Manotoks. This is connection with the governments Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program (SIR), the properties being considered as blighted communities (which are rented by tenant-occupants) are in the priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP). The government through the NHA proceeded with the transfer of title and set a maximum compensation of the properties. The petitioners contest that they were denied just compensation as the amount paid for the expropriation is fixed in the decree without giving them due process to determine the market value. They maintain that they are denied due process and equal protection because by mere passage of the bill their properties were automatically expropriated and they were denied of their properties without a chance to oppose and or contest the just compensation. The respondents alleged that eminent domain is inherent in the state and that when it is enacted by the President or Congress the public use and public necessity of the expropriation, and the fixing of the just compensation becomes political in nature and courts must respect it unless it is clearly arbitrary, and that the determination of just compensation does not require judicial process but only due process of law. Issue: Do the assailed PDs violate the right to due process, right to due process and applied eminent domain beyond its limitation? Held: Yes. It is declared unconstitutional and void ab initio. Ruling: The government acted beyond the limits of eminent domain, the Constitution laid down the limits of its application in Republic vs. Juan: first, the taking must be for a public use; secondly, the payment of just compensation must be made: and thirdly, due process must be observed in the taking. The properties were categorized as blighted communities (contrary to evidence presented) and singled out from hundreds of other (without proof) and the government automatically appropriated the lands without having debates in Congress as usual in expropriations through legislations. The provision also allows the NHA to use it for commercial
38
purposes; it is well-established in Guido v. Rural Progress Admin. of the principle of non-appropriation of private property for private purposes, that no one property may be transferred even with full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted. The decree which didnt provide a hearing should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the revised Rules of Cour t but because of express provision in the decree didnt deem it necessa ry as all questions with regard to expropriations are moot and academic. Furthermore the valuation of the property and its conditions should be determined upon the time of the taking of the government or the time of judgment of the court and not within the provision of the decree, in order to arrive at a just valuation of the property. 66. Ermita Malate Hotel vs City Mayor of Manila July 31, 1967 Fernando *Bad Ordinance (Rara, ah-ah-ah) Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged. Petitioners questioned the validity of the law for meddling with their lives too much. According to them it is patently unconstitutional for being a misuse of police power, and invalid regulation of conduct. The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari. Issue: Has the ordinance complied with the due process requirement of the constitution? Held: JUDGMENT REVERSED, INJUNCTION LIFTED. Ruling: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be absurd to think that an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. The provision cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction of that situation.
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CONCEPT: Every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute. This case does not show an absolute measure of curtailment of liberty. 67. Association of Small Landowners vs. DAR Secretary () 68. Sumulong vs. Guererro () September 30, 1987- Cortes *Socialized housing of NHA Facts: On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the small lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to President ial Decree 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. On 17 January 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was, however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the taking of private property for socialized housing, which would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for public use. Held: Yes, socialized housing is considered public use - Provisions of PD 1259 about just compensation are unconstitutional and in violation of due process Ruling: The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare . The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once. Thus, Socialized housing falls within the confines of public use . Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. Herein, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of public use. The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. The Supreme Court holds that socialized housing defined in Presidential De cree 1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees 1259 and 1313, constitutes public use for purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional . Herein, the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process. Concept: - The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. 1. that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that 2. no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
40
69. CITY GOVERNMENT of QC v. Hon. Judge ERICTA () 1983 Gutierrez, J.: *sosyal na dead paupers and their place in the 6% of the cemetery Facts: 1. This is a case which involves a prayer for the declaration of Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 of the Quezon City Council null and void 2. Sec 9 of the Ordinance says tha at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers 3. City Gov argue that: a) the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. b) the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to do such thing 4. Private respondent Himlayang Pilipino (which owns a cemetery in QC) contends that: a) its actually a taking or confiscation of property because ordinance permanently restricts (and doesnt just regulate!) the use and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. b) the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." And if an owner is deprived of his property under the police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed to promote the general welfare >> and the latter is where Himlayan sees this case to fall under. LC declares Sec 9 of the ordinance null and void and SC agrees with it. Issue: Is Sec 9 of the Ordinance a valid exercise of the police power? Held: No Ruling: 1. 1st of all: Nothing in the QC Councils charter authorizes it to pass this ordinance; it has a police power clause there but it cant justify such an unreasonable provision as Sec 9; the Charters police power clause only authorizes QC to (tax, fix the licens e fee, and ) REGULATE such other business, trades, etc etc. And this power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or consifcate. This Ordinance not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because one of its provisions says that if a businessman violates the ordinance, the permit of his cemetery business shall be revoked. 2. a) Now on the main issue of valid or invalid exercise of police power, this is what the Court has to say: Police power is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. b) In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof c) Sec 9 of the Ordinance is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, not even compensation. d) That taking of 6% of the area of the cemetery is not actually for public use. Theres just no reasonable connection between t he providing for the paupers burial place and the promoting of the general welfare. (Konek?!?) e) City Govs are mandated to provide for the burials of the paupers, but they should do it at no ones expense (particularly the private sector). But what they did here was, instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passed the burden to private cemeteries. So here is a case of taking without just compensation. 70. Luz Farms vs. DAR Secretary () 4 Dec 1990 Paras *pigs and chickens are not vegetables Facts: The President signed Republic Act No. 6657 providing for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act. The law included the raising of livestock and poultry as an agricultural activity and agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine production in its definition of commercial farms. In its Implementing Rules, the Department of Agrarian Reform ordered the institution of a production-sharing plan of 3% of gross sales and 10% of the net profit for the farmworkers. Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business stands to be adversely affected and questions the validity of Sections 3b, 11, 13, and 32 of the said law. They claim that livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming in the sense that the land resource in such industry is not the primary resource of the industry. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity.
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Issue: Are livestock and poultry-raising included in the CARL? Held: No. The framers of the Constitution did not include it in the agrarian reform program. Facts: The Court viewed the question as one of constitutional construction. It went through the transcript of the framers of the Constitution and found that it was never the intention to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Since the inclusion of private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock in the definition of commercial farms is erroneous, requiring Luz Farms to implement the production-sharing plans is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of due process. In Justice Sarmientos separate opinion, he said that the assailed sections are violative of the equal protection clause beca use it subjected both lands (livestock and agricultural) that are not similarly situated into the same treatment. The livestock and poultry industry should not be included in the coverage of the agrarian reform program. 71. Cariday Investment Corporation vs. CA & Forbes Park Assoc. Inc. () August 2, 1989 Grino-Aquino *Forbes Park, One Single family residential building Rule, 2 Tenants not allowed Facts: The central issue in this case is the proper interpretation of a provision in the Deed of Restrictions on the title of a lot in the Forbes Park Subdivision which binds the owner to use his lot for residential purposes and not more than one single family r esidential building will be constructed thereon. Cariday is the owner of a residential building in Forbes Park , which automatically makes it a member of the Forbes Park Association (FPA). When the civil engineer retained by the FPA inspected the repairs made by Cariday of its building, it was observed that the building can be used by more than one family. FPA, then demanded that corrections be made in the structure. However, without heeding to the FPA, Cariday then leased one portion of the house to an Englishman, James Duvivier who occupied the house 4 days after. The other half was leased to Procter and Gamble for the use of one of its American Executive, Robert Haden, who notified the FPA that he would be moving in soon. Cariday also notified the FPA and requested that the necessary clearance be issued for presentation to the subdivisions security guards. However, when Haden tried to move in, he was stopped by the sec urity guards. Cariday received a letter from the FPA, with the advise that it would not be allowed to lease it house to more than one tenant as this would violate the rule on one single-family residential restriction. Cariday was also threatened that water service would be disconnected to Caridays property. Cariday filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages. The trial court granted preliminary injunction; however, the CA annulled the said order, and ruled that the FPA acted within its powers under the rules. Issue: Is this restriction by the FPA interpreted correctly? Held: YES Ruling: Cariday avers that while it is indeed bound by the restriction to construct only "one residential building" on its lot, "nowhere in the rules and regulations is there a categorical prohibition and/ or restriction preventing it from exercising its rights to let its residential building to two or more tenants." This is unacceptable. The restriction clearly defines not only the type and number of structures (one residential building) that may be built on each lot, but also the number of families (a single family) that may use it as a residence. The court is persuaded that the purpose of the restriction is to avoid overcrowding both in the houses and in the subdivision which would result in pressure upon the common facilities such as water, power and telephone connections, accelerate the deterioration of the roads, and create problems of sanitation and security in the subdivision. The restrictions are "for aesthetic consideration and for the preservation of the peace, beauty, tranquility and serenity of living at Forbes Park." However, recognizing the cohesive nature of our family ties as Filipinos, the concept of a single-family dwelling may embrace the extended family. But leasing one's house in Forbes Park to two or more tenant families who are not related to the owner, nor to each other, would be impermissible under the one single-family restriction. Dissenting: More liberal and reasonable interpretation: There is absolutely no showing that two families living in one big residence in Forbes Park would lead to any of the unpleasant consequences. What the Court is protecting are not sanitation, peace and orderbut inflated land values and an elitist life style. Metro Manila has run out of available residential land for its huge and still exploding population. Land use has to be rationalized. Without sacrificing their comfort and security, the rich have to yield a little.
42 As can be read from the Association's rules, the only restriction regarding occupancy is that it must be used solely for residential purpose. It does not limit the number of families which may occupy the building. If We were to sustain Forbes Park's argument, strict compliance of the alleged implied restriction would effectively prohibit the homeowners from allowing families of their own children to reside with them, much less, their relatives. The inequity of this situation would leave no alternative but to make an exception to the interpretation that homeowner's married children may continue to live with their parents.

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CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

40. Removed 41. Removed

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

58. Republic vs. PLDT

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(CONSTI 1 Atty. Francisco)