ON THE FIGURES OF PREDICATION.

With Special Reference to the Modes of Signifying.

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. St. Thomas’ account of the modes of predicating at In III Physic. lect. 5, nn. 14-16.

Being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into species, but
according to a diverse mode of being [or ‘manner of existing’]. Now the modes of being are
proportional to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of some other thing,
we say ‘this is that’. Hence the ten genera of being are called ‘the ten predicaments’.

Now every predication is made in [one of] three ways. In one way, when that which
pertains to its essence is predicated of some subject, as when I say, ‘Socrates is a man’, or
‘Man is an animal’. And according to this the predicament of ‘substance’ is taken.

But there is another way in which is predicated of something that which is not of its
essence, yet inheres in it, which has itself either on the part of the matter of the subject [as
when I say, ‘Socrates is six feet tall’, or ‘The people in the room are ten’], and according to
this there is the predicament of ‘quantity’—(for quantity properly follows the matter: for
which reason Plato put down the Great on the part of matter); or follows the form, and in this
way there is the predicament of ‘quality’ [as when I say, ‘Socrates is white’, or ‘The plane
figure is three-sided’], (hence qualities are founded on quantity, as color in a surface, and
figure in lines or in surfaces); or it has itself with respect to another, and in this way there is
the predicament of ‘relation’—(for when I say, ‘The man is a father’, something absolute is
not predicated of a man, but a respect which is in him to something extrinsic). But the third
mode of predicating is when something extrinsic is predicated in the manner of some
denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated of a subject. Yet we do not
say that ‘man is whiteness’, but that ‘man is white’.

Now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in some way commonly in all
things, and in some way particularly in those things which pertain only to man. Now,
commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according
to the ratio of a cause, or according to the ratio of a measure. For something is denominated
as ‘caused’ or ‘measured’ from something exterior.

But since there are four genera of causes, two of these are parts of the essence, namely,
matter and form. And so the predication which can come to be according to these two
pertains to the predicament of ‘substance’ as, for example, if we were to say that ‘man is
rational’, and ‘man is bodily’. But the final cause does not cause something apart from the
agent: for to the extent that the end has the ratio of a cause, to that extent it moves the agent.
Therefore, only the agent cause remains from which something can be denominated as from
something exterior. In this way, therefore, according as something is denominated from the
agent cause, there is the predicament of ‘passion’; for ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to undergo’] is
nothing other than to receive something from an agent.

But conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the
predicament of ‘action’; for ‘action’ is an act from the agent in another, as was said above.

Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain one intrinsic: the intrinsic, as each thing’s
own length, breadth, and depth.

From these, then, something is denominated as from something inherently intrinsic; for
which reason it pertains to the predicament of ‘quantity’. But the exterior measures are time
and place. Therefore, according as something is denominated from time, there is the
predicament ‘when’; but according as something is denominated from place, there is the
predicament ‘where’, and ‘situation’ [or ‘position’], which adds beyond ‘where’ an order of
parts in place.

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 Now it was not necessary for this to be added on the part of time, since the order of the
parts in time is implied in the ratio of time; for time is the number of motion according to a
before and after. In this way, therefore, something is said to be ‘when’ or ‘where’ through a
denomination from time or from place.

Now there is something special in men. For in other animals, nature has adequately
provided those things which pertain to the preservation of life, as horns for defense, thick
and hairy skin for a covering, and claws or something of the sort for proceeding without
harm. And in this way when such animals are said to be ‘armed’, or ‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, they
are not in some way denominated from something extrinsic, but from something of their
parts [sc. which is intrinsic]. And so in these things this is referred to the predicament of
substance: as, for example, if one were to say that man is ‘furnished with hands or with feet’.
But things of this kind could not have been given to man by nature, both because they would
not have befitted the subtlety of his make-up, and because of the multiformity of the works
which do befit man inasmuch as he has reason, to whom certain determinate instruments
could not have been accommodated by nature. But in place of all these there is reason in
man, by which he prepares things exterior to him in place of those things which are intrinsic
in other animals. Hence, when man is said to be ‘armed’, or ‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, he is
denominated from something extrinsic that does not have either the ratio of a cause or a
measure. Hence there is a special predicament, and it is called a habitus [a ‘having’ or
‘possession’]. But one must bear in mind that this predicament is attributed even to other
animals, not according as they considered in their nature, but according as they come under
the use of man, as if we were to say ‘a horse is caparisoned’, or ‘saddled’, or ‘armed’.

In this way, then, it is clear that although motion is one, nevertheless, the predicaments that
are taken according to motion are two, according as predicamental denominations result
from diverse exterior things. For an agent is one thing from which, as from something
exterior, the predicament of ‘passion’ is taken in the manner of denomination. And the
patient (or one undergoing) is another thing from which the agent is denominated. And in
this way the solution to the first difficulty is clear.

2. St. Thomas’s account of the modes of predicating at In V Meta. lect. 9, nn. 5-10.

According to Aristotle, that those things are said to be according to themselves which the
figures of predication signify in whatever way. For one must know that being cannot be
contracted to something determinate in this way, as a genus is contracted to its species
through differences. For a difference, since it does not share in the genus, is outside the
essence of the genus. But nothing can be outside the essence of being which by an addition
to being constitutes a species of being. For what is outside of being is nothing and cannot be
a difference. And so in the third [book] of this [work], the Philosopher proved that being
cannot be a genus. And so it is necessary that being be contracted to the diverse genera
according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows a diverse mode of being, because
as often as being is said; that is, in as many ways as something is predicated, so often is
‘being’ signified; that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. And because of this,
those things into which being is first divided are said to be ‘predicaments’ because they are
distinguished according to the diverse modes of predicating. Therefore, since of those things
which are predicated, some signify ‘what’, i.e. ‘substance’; some, ‘what kind’ [i.e. ‘quality’];
some, ‘how much’ [i.e. ‘quantity’], and so on about the others, in each mode of predicating it
is necessary that ‘being’ signify the same thing, as when it is said, ‘man is an animal’,
‘being’ signifies substance; but when it is said, ‘man is white’, it signifies ‘quality’, and so
on about the others.

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 For one must know that a predicate can have itself to a subject in [one of] three ways. In
one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, ‘Socrates is an animal’. For
‘Socrates’ is that which is an animal. And this predicate [sc. ‘animal’] is said to signify first
substance, which is individual substance, of which everything [else] is predicated.

In the second way, as the predicate is taken according as it is in a subject, which predicate
is either in it through itself and absolutely, as following the matter, and in this way it is
quantity; or as following the form, and in this way it is quality; or is not in it absolutely, but
in respect to another, and in this way it is ‘toward something’ [sc. ‘relation’].

In a third way, as the predicate is taken from that which is outside the subject, and this in
two ways: in one way, as it is in entirely outside the subject, which, if it not be a measure of
the subject, is predicated in the manner of a habitus [a ‘having’ or ‘possession’], as when it
is said, ‘Socrates is shod’ or ‘is clothed’.

Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament
is taken either on the part of time, and in this way there will be ‘when’; or from place, and in
this way there will be ‘where’, the order of the parts in place not being taken into
consideration; but being taken into consideration there will be ‘situation’ [or ‘position’].

In another way, as that from which the predicament is taken according to something [that]
is in the subject of which it is predicated. And if according to a principle, in this way it is
predicated as ‘acting’ [or ‘to act’]. For the principle of action is in the subject.

But if according to a term, in this way it will be predicated as in ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to
undergo’]. For passion is terminated in the subject undergoing. But since certain things are
predicated in which manifestly this verb ‘is’ is not placed in apposition, lest it be believed
that these predications do not pertain to the predication of being, as when it is said, ‘Man
walks’, therefore, he subsequently removes this, saying that in every predication of this kind
something is signified to be. For any verb whatsoever is resolved into this verb ‘is’, even the
participle. For there is no difference in saying, ‘Man is convalescing’ and ‘Man
convalesces’, and so on about the others.

And so it is clear that in as many ways as predication is made, in so many ways ‘being’ is
said.

3. The number and sufficiency of the categories as posited by Aristotle according to Simon
of Faversham.

Cf. Simon of Faversham, Questions of the Categories (tr. John L. Ridgeway):1

Question 12

Next it is asked concerning the part “of those which are said according to no complexity,” in
which the Philosopher posits the number of categories. Therefore we inquire concerning the
number and the sufficiency of them.

And it seems that there are more than ten, for is one of a pair of opposites is said in several
ways, the other is too. But substance and accident are opposites. Since there are nine genera
of accidents, there will be nine genera of substances. In the same way it can be shown that
there are only two genera, since if one of the opposites is not said in several ways, neither is

1
(uwp.edu/~longeway/category.htm [2/1/06])

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the other, but substance is only one genus; therefore there will be only one genus of accident,
since substance and accident are opposites.

Again, it is argued that there are more than ten, since just as acting is distinct from re-
ceiving action, so is having distinct from being had, but acting and receiving action are dif-
ferent categories; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is clear through the Philosopher, who says there are only ten
categories, namely substance, quantity, etc.

It must be said in response to this that there are ten categories and no more nor less. To
make this clear it must be considered that all things other than primary substances are either
said of primary substances or are in primary substances. If they are said of primary sub-
stances they are either said of them according to name, or according to formula, for that is
strictly said of another what is said according to name and formula, as the Philosopher says
in the text.

If, then, another than primary substance is said of primary substance according to name and
formula, in this way it is in the category of substance.

If they are in primary substances, then, since such things are accidents, they are in them
either through something extrinsic or through something intrinsic.

If through something intrinsic, they are either in them absolutely or in relation to another.

If absolutely, either through the nature of matter, and in this way it is quantity, or through the
nature of form, and in this way it is quality, since quality is what informs and denominates.

If they are in them in relation to another, in this way it is relation.

But if accidents are in primary substances through something extrinsic, that extrinsic thing is
related to primary substances either as measure to measured, or as agent to patient, or as
something that is had to what has it.

If it is related to primary substance as agent to patient, or conversely, in this way two

categories result, namely action and passion, for the action of an agent on a patient causes a
certain motion, which is called action from the agent, and passion from the patient.

If that extrinsic thing is related to primary substance as measured to what is measured, since
an extrinsic measure is not unless it is two, namely place and time, therefore an extrinsic
accident can be related to a primary substance as place to what is placed in it, and in this way
it is the category where. For where is a certain way of being which is caused in what is in a
place from the relation place has to it—and this is what the author of the Six Principles
wished to signify when he said that where is a limiting etc., according to which we say up
and down are distinct.

But if place is not related to what is located in it, in this way it is the category which is
position. For position is nothing except a certain way of being caused in a body located in a
place from the relation which place has to it and its parts, according to which we say
something is seated or standing because its parts are disposed in the whole differently when
it is seated and when it stands. And the author of the Six Principles wished to signify this
when he said that position is a situation etc.

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If an extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as time to a temporal thing, in this
way the category when results. For when is not unless a certain way of being is caused in a
temporal thing from the relation which time has to it. And this is what the author of the Six
Principles wished to signify when he said that when is what is left etc., according to which
manner of denomination something is said to be on one day, or of one year. But if the
extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as having is related to what has it, in this
way the category of having results. And it is in this way that we say the attire of Socrates is
related to Socrates when he is dressed. So the having caused in Socrates when he is dressed
from the clothing which he has is said be his habit. And this is what the author of the Six
Principles says, that having is of a body and of those round about the body, so that having
consists in a certain application of those which are around the body to the body—and this
category of having is not found in animals other than human beings except when they enter
into the customs of human beings. Therefore Thomas says on Physics III that being attired
and such as pertain to having clothing, as they are said of other animals than human beings
that belong to the category of substance, they are in the category of having.

In this way, then, the number and sufficiency of the categories is received, so that
categories are distinguished into three ways of being: being not in another, being in another,
and being in relation to another. Being not in another belongs to substance, being in another
merely absolutely belongs to quality and quantity, but being in another and in relation to
another is with respect to relation and the other six categories. For the other six are certain
relations, or are caused from certain relations. So although it can be granted that depending
on another is of the essence of seven categories, still I do not believe is of the essence of
quantity and quality. Even though quality and quantity agree in this, that both indicate being
in another absolutely, still there is no reality found except in these two. They differ,
however, in this, that quantity measures a substance and quality informs a substance.

In response to the arguments.

In response to the first, when it is argued, “if one opposite is said in several ways so are the
others,” I reply that this is true as far as what is signified is concerned, but as far as supposita
are concerned. For if different things are opposites it is necessary that as many as are sig-
nified by one opposite be signified by the other. And let the minor premise be granted. Still it
does not follow that as many are contained under the subject as are contained under accident.
And therefore although accident contains nine genera, it does not follow that substance
contains that many; and the reason that there are many genera of accidents is that many
things can belong to one thing. Therefore, although there is one genus of substance, there
can be many genera of accidents. That many belong to one is obvious, for some belong to
substance as dispositions, some as effects, and so on for the rest.

And in the same way the second argument is apparent. For it was seen how the proposition
is to be understood, for if one opposite etc.

In response to the other, when it is argued, “just as acting is distinct from suffering action,
etc.,” I reply that it is so in a certain way, and in a certain not. Just as acting is not suffering
action, thus having is not being had. Nevertheless, there is not so much difference between
having and being had as there is between acting and suffering action, for between acting and
suffering action there is enough difference for the distinction of categories, but between
having and being had there is not. And the reason for this is that categories are distinguished
within ways of being, since they are distinguished within ways of predicating. Because of
this substance is distinguished from the others. But ways of predicating arise from ways of
being as ways of signifying, and because of this categories are distinguished within ways of
being but not within all ways of being but only those ways which agree in nothing, and of

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which one does not reduce to the other. Now the ways of being of action and passion agree
in nothing, for according to the way of being of action the cause gives being to the effect,
and according to the ways of being of passion an effect receives being from the cause.
Therefore action and passion are distinguished as cause and caused, but cause and caused are
of different primary being, and agree in nothing, nor does one reduce to the other, and
therefore from such different categories can arise. From this sort of different ways of being,
then, different categories arise, but what has and what is had do not distinguish being in this
way, nor do they arise from ways of being which distinguish a being as being; but these
ways of being which are of what has and what is had are reduced to other ways of being, and
so do not constitute different categories; and this way of being to which what has and what is
had reduces is called having.

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4. On the division of being into the ten predicaments according to the modes of predi-
cating.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Physic., lect. 5, nn. 14-16 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB3 LC-5N.14
sed restat circa hoc duplex dubitatio.
prima quidem quia, si actio et passio sint unus
motus, et non differunt nisi secundum rationem,
ut dictum est, videtur quod non debeant esse
duo praedicamenta, cum praedicamenta sint
genera rerum.
item, si motus vel est actio vel passio, non in-
venietur motus in substantia, qualitate, quan-
titate et ubi, ut supra dictum est; sed solum con-
tinebitur in actione et passione.
LB3 LC-5N.15
ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod
ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non uni-
voce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum di-
versum modum essendi.
modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis
praedicandi.
praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dici-
mus hoc esse illud:
unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem
praedicamenta.
tripliciter autem fit omnis praedicatio.
unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo sub-
iecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam
eius, ut cum dico socrates est homo, vel homo
est animal;
et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum
substantiae.
alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo
id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret
ei.
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But two difficulties still remain regarding this
matter.
First, because, if action and passion be one
motion and do not differ except in ratio, as has
been said, it seems that there ought not to be
two predicaments, since the predicaments are
genera of things.
Again, if motion is either action or passion,
motion will not be found in substance, quality,
quantity, and where, as has been said above, but
will be contained only in action and passion.
Therefore, in order to clarify these difficulties, it
must be understood that being is divided into
the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus
into species, but according to a diverse mode of
being.
Now the modes of being are proportional to the
modes of predicating.
For in predicating something of some other
thing, we say ‘this is that’.
Hence the ten genera of being are called ‘the ten
predicaments’.
Now every predication is made in [one of] three
ways.
In one way, when that which pertains to its
essence is predicated of some subject, as when I
say, ‘Socrates is a man’, or ‘Man is an animal’.
And according to this the predicament of
‘substance’ is taken.
But there is another way in which is predicated
of something that which is not of its essence, yet
inheres in it,
quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae which has itself either on the part of the matter
subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum of the subject,2 and according to this there is the
quantitatis predicament of ‘quantity’—

(nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: (for quantity properly follows the matter:

unde et plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); for which reason Plato put down the Great on
the part of matter);

aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedica- or follows the form, and in this way there is the
mentum qualitatis predicament of ‘quality’,3

(unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, (hence qualities are founded on quantity, as
sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in color in a surface, and figure in lines or in
superficiebus); surfaces);

aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est or it has itself with respect to another, and in
praedicamentum relationis this way there is the predicament of ‘relation’—

(cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur (for when I say, ‘The man is a father’, some-
de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui thing absolute is not predicated of a man, but a
ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum). respect which is in him to something extrinsic).

tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando But the third mode of predicating is when
aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per something extrinsic is predicated in the manner
modum alicuius denominationis: of some denomination:

sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantiis for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated
praedicantur; of a subject.

non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed Yet we do not say that ‘man is whiteness’, but
quod homo sit albus. that ‘man is white’.

denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur Now to be denominated from something ex-
quidem quodammodo communiter in omnibus, trinsic is found in some way commonly in all
et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad ho- things, and in some way particularly in those
mines pertinent tantum. things which pertain only to man.

communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari Now, commonly, something is found to be de-
ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem nominated from something extrinsic either
causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; according to the ratio of a cause, or according to
the ratio of a measure.

denominatur enim aliquid causatum et For something is denominated as ‘caused’ or

mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori. ‘measured’ from something exterior.

cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo But since there are four genera of causes, two of
ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et these are parts of the essence, namely, matter
forma: and form—

2
As when I say, ‘Socrates is six feet tall’, or ‘The people in the room are ten’.
3
As when I say, ‘Socrates is white’, or ‘The plane figure is three-sided’.

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unde praedicatio quae posset fieri secundum
haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substan-
tiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis,
et homo est corporeus.
for this reason the predication which can come
to be according to these two pertains to the pre-
dicament of ‘substance’ as, for example, if we
were to say that ‘man is rational’, and ‘man is
bodily’.

causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid But the final cause does not cause something
ab agente: apart from the agent:

intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, for to the extent that the end has the ratio of a
inquantum movet agentem. cause, to that extent it moves the agent.

remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest Therefore, only the agent cause remains from
denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. which something can be denominated as from
something exterior.

sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a In this way, therefore, according as something is
causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, denominated from the agent cause, there is the
predicament of ‘passion’;

nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid for ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to undergo’] is nothing
ab agente: other than to receive something from an agent.

secundum autem quod e converso denominatur But conversely, according as the agent cause is
causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum denominated from the effect, there is the
actionis, predicament of ‘action’;

nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra for ‘action’ is an act from the agent in another,
dictum est. as was said above.

mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain
quaedam intrinseca. one intrinsic:

intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo unius- the intrinsic, as each thing’s own length,
cuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: breadth, and depth.

ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrin- From these, then, something is denominated as
seco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamen- from something inherently intrinsic; for which
tum quantitatis. reason it pertains to the predicament of ‘quan-
tity’.

exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: But the exterior measures are time and place.

secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a Therefore, according as something is denomin-

tempore, est praedicamentum quando; ated from time, there is the predicament ‘when’;

secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est but according as something is denominated
praedicamentum ubi et situs, quod addit supra from place, there is the predicament ‘where’,
ubi ordinem partium in loco. and ‘situation’ [or ‘position’], which adds be-
yond ‘where’ an order of parts in place.

hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte Now it was not necessary for this to be added on
temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in the part of time, since the order of the parts in

10
ratione temporis importetur:
est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius
et posterius.
sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse quando vel ubi per
denominationem a tempore vel a loco.
est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus.
in aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter
ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut
cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et
pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid
huius-modi ad incedendum sine laesione.
et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel
vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denomin-
antur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis
partibus.
unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum
substantiae:
ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel
pedatus.
sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a But things of this kind could not have been
natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati given to man by nature, both because they
complexionis eius, would not have befitted the subtlety of his
make-up,
tum propter multiformitatem operum quae
conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem,
quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta
accommodari non poterant a natura:
sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua
exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis
animalibus intrinseca sunt.
unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel
calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco,
quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque
mensurae:
unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur
habitus.
11
time is implied in the ratio of time,
for time is the number of motion according to a
before and after.
In this way, then, something is said to be ‘when’
or ‘where’ through a denomination from time or
from place.
Now there is something special in men.
For in other animals, nature has adequately
provided those things which pertain to the
preservation of life, as horns for defense, thick
and hairy skin for a covering, and claws or
something of the sort for proceeding without
hurt.
And in this way when such animals are said to
be ‘armed’, or ‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, they are not
somehow denominated from something ex-
trinsic, but from some of their parts [thereby
being denominated from something intrinsic].
And so in these things this is referred to the
predicament of ‘substance’:
as, for example, if one were to say that man is
‘furnished with hands or with feet’.
and because of the multiformity of the works
which befit man inasmuch as he has reason, to
whom certain determinate instruments could not
have been accommodated by nature.
But in place of all these there is reason in man,
by which he prepares things exterior to him in
place of those things which are intrinsic in other
animals.
Hence, when man is said to be ‘armed’, or
‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, he is denominated from
something extrinsic that does not have either the
ratio of a cause or a measure.
Hence there is a special predicament [for man],
and it is called a habitus [a ‘having’ or ‘posses-
sion’].
sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus
hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum
quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum
quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus
equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.
But one must bear in mind that this predicament
is attributed even to other animals, not accor-
ding as they considered in their nature, but
according as they come under the use of man, as
if we were to say a horse is ‘caparisoned’, or
‘saddled’, or ‘armed’.

LB3 LC-5N.16

sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen
praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum mo-
tum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus
exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denomin-
ationes.
In this way, then, it is clear that although motion
is one, nevertheless, the predicaments that are
taken according to motion are two, according as
predicamental denominations result from di-
verse exterior things.

nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, For an agent is one thing from which, as from
sumitur per modum denominationis praedica- something exterior, the predicament of ‘passion’
mentum passionis: is taken in the manner of denomination.

et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. And the patient [or ‘one undergoing’] is another
thing from which the agent is denominated.

et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis. And in this way the solution to the first diffi-
culty is clear.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, nn. 5-10 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB5LC-9N.-5

deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum Then, when he says, [Those things are said to
entis per se: be] according to themselves, he distinguishes
the mode of a being through itself.

et circa hoc tria facit. And with respect to this he does three things.

primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per First, he distinguishes into ten predicaments the
decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. being which is outside the soul, which is perfect
being.

secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum Second, he puts down another mode of being
quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et according as it is in the mind only at, But
esse significat. further, being signifies….

tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: Third, he divides being into potency and act:

et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens and being so divided is more common than
perfectum. perfect being.

nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid For being in potency is being in a certain respect
tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse only and imperfect at, Further, being signifies
significat et ens. ‘to be’….

12
dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secun- So he says first, that those things are said to be
dum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedi- according to themselves which the figures of
cationis. predication signify in whatever way.

sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc For it must be understood that being cannot be
modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut contracted to something determinate in this way,
genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. as a genus is contracted to its species through
differences.

nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est For a difference, since it does not share in the
extra essentiam generis. genus, is outside the essence of the genus.

nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, But nothing can be outside the essence of being
quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem which by an addition to being constitutes a
entis constituat: species of being.

nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia For what is outside of being is nothing and can-
esse non potest. not be a difference.

unde in tertio huius probavit philosophus, quod And so in the third [book] of this [work], the
ens, genus esse non potest. Philosopher proved that being cannot be a
genus.

LB5LC-9N.-6

unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa And so it is necessary that being be contracted
genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, to the diverse genera according to a diverse
qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; mode of predicating, which follows a diverse
mode of being,

quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid because as often as being is said; that is, in as
praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot many ways as something is predicated, so often
modis significatur aliquid esse. is ‘being’ signified; that is, in so many ways is
something signified to be.

et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, And because of this, those things into which
dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur being is first divided are said to be ‘predica-
secundum diversum modum praedicandi. ments’ because they are distinguished according
to the diverse modes of predicating.

quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam Therefore, since of those things which are predi-
significant quid, idest substantiam, cated, some signify ‘what’, i.e. ‘substance’;

quaedam quale, some, ‘what kind’ [i.e. ‘quality’];

quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; some, ‘how much’ [i.e. ‘quantity’], and so on
about the others,

oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse in each mode of predicating it is necessary that
significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, ‘being’ signify the same thing, as when it is
esse significat substantiam. said, ‘man is an animal’, ‘being’ signifies
‘substance’;

13
cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat
qualitatem, et sic de aliis.
LB5LC-9N.-7
sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad
subiectum tripliciter se potest habere.
uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut
cum dico, socrates est animal.
nam socrates est id quod est animal.
et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substan-
tiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de
qua omnia praedicantur.
LB5LC-9N.-8
secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secun-
dum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedi-
catum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut conse-
quens materiam, et sic est quantitas:
vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas:
vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad
aliud, et sic est ad aliquid.
tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod
est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter.
uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod
quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur
per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, socrates est
calceatus vel vestitus.
si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrin-
seca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedica-
mentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit
quando:
vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato
ordine partium in loco,
14
but when it is said, ‘man is white’, it signifies
‘quality’, and so on about the others.
For it must be understood that a predicate can
have itself to a subject in [one of] three ways.
In one way, when it is that which the subject is,
as when I say, ‘Socrates is an animal’.
For ‘Socrates’ is that which is an animal.
And this predicate [sc. ‘animal’] is said to sig-
nify ‘first substance’, which is individual sub-
stance, of which everything [else] is predicated.
In the second way, as the predicate is taken
according as it is in a subject, which predicate is
either in it through itself and absolutely, as fol-
lowing the matter, and in this way it is ‘quan-
tity’;
or as following the form, and in this way it is
‘quality’;
or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to an-
other, and in this way it is ‘toward something’
[sc. ‘relation’].
In a third way, as the predicate is taken from
that which is outside the subject, and this in two
ways.
In one way, as it is entirely outside the subject,
which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is
predicated in the manner of a habitus [a
‘having’ or ‘possession’], as when it is said,
‘Socrates is shod’ or ‘clothed’.
Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic
measure is either time or place, the predicament
is taken either on the part of time, and in this
way there will be ‘when’;
or from place, and in this way there will be
‘where’, the order of parts in place not being
taken into consideration;
quo considerato erit situs.
alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum,
secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo prae-
dicatur.
et si quidem secundum principium,
praedicatur ut agere.
nam actionis principium in subiecto est.
si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut
in pati.
nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur.
LB5LC-9N.-9
quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus
manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum est, ne
credatur quod illae praedicationes non per-
tineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur,
homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet,
dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedica-
tionibus significatur aliquid esse.
verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum
est, et participium.
nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est,
et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis.
unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot
modis ens dicitur.
LB5LC-9N.10
nec est verum quod avicenna dicit, quod prae-
dicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, prin-
cipaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius
accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musi-
cum.
nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam
qualitatem significat.
4
There is, of course, a grammatical difference, pertaining to the notion of ‘aspect’.
but being taken into consideration there will be
‘situation’ [or ‘position’].
In another way, as that from which the predica-
ment is taken according to something [that] is in
the subject of which it is predicated.
sic And if according to a principle, in this way it is
predicated as ‘acting’ [or ‘to act’].
For the principle of action is in the subject.
But if according to a term, in this way it will be
predicated as in ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to undergo’].
For passion is terminated in the subject under-
going.
But since certain things are predicated in which
manifestly the verb ‘is’ is not placed in appos-
ition, lest it be believed that these predications
do not pertain to the predication of ‘being’, as
when it is said, ‘Man walks’, therefore, he sub-
sequently removes this, saying that in every
predication of this kind some being is signified.
For any verb whatsoever is resolved into the
verb ‘is’, and the participle as well.
For there is no difference in saying, ‘a man is
convalescing’ and ‘a man convalesces’, and so
on about the others.4
And so it is clear that in as many ways as a
predication is made, in so many ways is ‘being’
said.
Nor is what Avicenna says true, that predicates
in the genera of accident signify substance prin-
cipally, and accident per posterius, as when I
say ‘white’ and ‘musical’.
For ‘white’, as it is said in the predicaments,
signifies a quality solely.
15
hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex Now the name ‘white’ signifies the subject sub-
consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per sequently, insofar as it signifies ‘whiteness’ in
modum accidentis. the manner of an accident.

unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in And so it is necessary that it include the subject
sui ratione subiectum. in its ratio subsequently.

nam accidentis esse est inesse. For the being of an accident is to be in.

albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen For ‘whiteness’, although it signify an accident,
per modum accidentis, sed per modum sub- nevertheless does not do so in the manner of an
stantiae. accident, but in the manner of a substance.

unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. And so in no way does it consignify the subject.

si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc For if it were to signify the subject principally,
praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philo- then Aristotle would not have placed accidental
sopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente se- predicates under being according to itself, but
cundum accidens. under accidental being.

nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens For this whole which is a white man, is a being
secundum accidens, ut dictum est. according to accident, as has been said.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 13 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB5LC-8N.13

unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in But those things are in one genus which agree in
figura praedicationis, idest quae habent unum a figure of predication; that is, which have one
modum praedicandi. mode of predicating.

alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, For the mode in which substance is predicated is
et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; other than that in which ‘quality’ or ‘action’ is
predicated;

sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum But all substances have one mode of predica-
praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in ting, inasmuch as they are predicated as not
subiecto existentes. existing in a subject.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 22, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB5LC22N.-8

alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicun- In another way those things are called diverse in
tur secundum diversam figuram categoriae, id- genera which are said according to a diverse
est praedicationis entis. figure of category; that is, [according to a
diverse figure] of the predication of being.

alia namque entia significant quid est, alia For some beings signify ‘what it is’, some ‘of
quale, alia aliis modis, sicut divisum est prius, what sort’, others in other ways, just as they
ubi tractavit de ente. were divided earlier where being was treated.

16
istae enim categoriae nec resolvuntur invicem, For these categories are neither resolved into
quia una non continetur sub alia. each other, because one is not contained under
another—

nec resolvuntur in unum aliquid, quia non est nor are they resolved into some one thing,
unum aliquod genus commune ad omnia prae- because there is not some one genus common to
dicamenta. every predicament.

5. Comparison of texts on the modes of predicating.

IN III PHYSIC. LECT. 5, N. 15. IN V META. LECT. 9, NN. 6-8.

Now the modes of being are proportional to the And so it is necessary that being be contracted
modes of predicating. to the diverse genera according to a diverse
mode of predicating, which follows a diverse
mode of being,

For in predicating something of some other because as often as being is said; that is, in as
thing, we say ‘this is that’. many ways as something is predicated, so often
is ‘being’ signified; that is, in so many ways is
something signified to be.

Hence the ten genera of being are called ‘the ten And because of this, those things into which
predicaments’. being is first divided are said to be ‘predica-
ments’ because they are distinguished according
to the diverse modes of predicating.

Therefore, since of those things which are predi-

cated, some signify ‘what’, i.e. ‘substance’;
some, ‘what kind’ [i.e. ‘quality’]; some, ‘how
much’ [i.e. ‘quantity’], and so on about the
others,

in each mode of predicating it is necessary that

‘being’ signify the same thing, as when it is
said, ‘man is an animal’, ‘being’ signifies sub-
stance;

but when it is said, ‘man is white’, it signifies

‘quality’, and so on about the others.

Now every predication is made in [one of] three For one must know that a predicate can have
ways. itself to a subject in [one of] three ways.

In one way, when that which pertains to its In one way, when it is that which the subject is,
essence is predicated of some subject, as when I as when I say, ‘Socrates is an animal’. For
say, ‘Socrates is a man’, or ‘Man is an animal’. ‘Socrates’ is that which is an animal.

And according to this the predicament of ‘sub- And this predicate [sc. ‘animal’] is said to
stance’ is taken. signify ‘first substance’, which is individual
substance, of which everything [else] is
predicated.

17
But there is another way in which is predicated In the second way, as the predicate is taken ac-
of something that which is not of its essence, yet cording as it is in a subject,
inheres in it,

which has itself either on the part of the matter which predicate is either in it through itself and
of the subject, and according to this there is the absolutely, as following the matter, and in this
predicament of ‘quantity’— way it is ‘quantity’;

…or follows the form, and in this way there is or as following the form, and in this way it is
the predicament of ‘quality’, ‘quality’;

(hence qualities are founded on quantity, as

color in a surface, and figure in lines or in
surfaces);

or it has itself with respect to another, and in or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to
this way there is the predicament of ‘relation’— another, and in this way it is ‘toward something’
[sc. ‘relation’].

(for when I say, ‘The man is a father’,

something absolute is not predicated of a man,
but a respect which is in him to something
extrinsic).

But the third mode of predicating is when some- In a third way, as the predicate is taken from
thing extrinsic is predicated in the manner of that which is outside the subject,
some denomination:

for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated

of a subject.

Yet we do not say that ‘man is whiteness’, but

that ‘man is white’.

Now to be denominated from something extrin- and this in two ways:

sic is found in some way commonly in all
things, and in some way particularly in those
things which pertain only to man.

Now, commonly, something is found to be de-

nominated from something extrinsic

either according to the ratio of a cause,

or according to the ratio of a measure.

For something is denominated as ‘caused’ or

‘measured’ from something exterior.

But since there are four genera of causes, two of

these are parts of the essence, namely, matter
and form.

18
And so the predication which can come to be
according to these two pertains to the predica-
ment of ‘substance’ as, for example, if we were
to say that ‘man is rational’, and ‘man is
bodily’.

But the final cause does not cause something

apart from the agent: for to the extent that the
end has the ratio of a cause, to that extent it
moves the agent.

Therefore, only the agent cause remains from |In another way, as that from which the
which something can be denominated as from predicament is taken according to something
something exterior. [that] is in the subject of which it is predicated.

In this way, therefore, according as something is [And] if according to a term, in this way it will
denominated from the agent cause, there is the be predicated as in ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to under-
predicament of ‘passion’; go’].

for ‘undergoing’ [or ‘to undergo’] is nothing For passion is terminated in the subject under-
other than to receive something from an agent. going.

But conversely, according as the agent cause is [But] if according to a principle, in this way it is
denominated from the effect, there is the pre- predicated as ‘acting’ [or ‘to act’]; for the prin-
dicament of ‘action’; for ‘action’ is an act from ciple of action is in the subject.|5
the agent in another, as was said above.

Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain

one intrinsic:

the intrinsic, as each thing’s own length,

breadth, and depth.

From these, then, something is denominated as

from something inherently intrinsic; for which
reason it pertains to the predicament of ‘quan-
tity’.

But the exterior measures are time and place. Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic
measure is either time or place,

Therefore, according as something is denomin- the predicament is taken either on the part of
ated from time, there is the predicament ‘when’; time, and in this way there will be ‘when’;

but according as something is denominated or from place, and in this way there will be
from place, there is the predicament ‘where’, ‘where’, the order of the parts in place not being
taken into consideration;

and ‘situation’ [or ‘position’], which adds be- but being taken into consideration there will be
yond ‘where’ an order of parts in place. ‘situation’ [or ‘position’].

5
I have moved this text to its present location and have changed the order of the treatment of action and
passion to make them correspond to the order of Thomas’s treatment of them in the Physics commentary.

19
Now it was not necessary for this to be added on
the part of time, since the order of the parts in
time is implied in the ratio of time; for time is
the number of motion according to a before and
after.

In this way, therefore, something is said to be

‘when’ or ‘where’ through a denomination from
time or from place.

Now there is something special in men.

For in other animals, nature has adequately

provided those things which pertain to the pre-
servation of life, as horns for defense, thick and
hairy skin for a covering, and claws or some-
thing of the sort for proceeding without harm.

And in this way when such animals are said to

be ‘armed’, or ‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, they are not
in some way denominated from something ex-
trinsic, but from something of their parts [sc.
which is intrinsic].

And so in these things this is referred to the

predicament of ‘substance’:

as, for example, if one were to say that man is

‘furnished with hands or with feet’.

But things of this kind could not have been

given to man by nature, both because they
would not have befitted the subtlety of his
make-up,

and because of the multiformity of the works

which do befit man inasmuch as he has reason,
to whom certain determinate instruments could
not have been accommodated by nature.

But in place of all these there is reason in man, |in one way, as it is in entirely outside the
by which he prepares things exterior to him in subject,
place of those things which are intrinsic in other
animals.

Hence, when man is said to be ‘armed’, or which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is
‘clothed’, or ‘shod’, he is denominated from predicated in the manner of a habitus [a ‘hav-
something extrinsic that does not have either the ing’ or ‘possession’], as when it is said, ‘So-
ratio of a cause or a measure. crates is shod’ or ‘is clothed’.|6

Hence there is a special predicament [for man],

and it is called a habitus [a ‘having’ or ‘posses-
6
I have also moved this text from its original position for the same reason given in the previous note.

20
sion’].

But one must bear in mind that this predicament

is attributed even to other animals, not accord-
ing as they considered in their nature, but accor-
ding as they come under the use of man, as if
we were to say ‘a horse is caparisoned’, or ‘sad-
dled’, or ‘armed’.

N.B. For the modes of predicating in the divine, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist.
22, q. 1, art. 3, obj. 2, ad 2:

DS22QU1 AR3- AG2

praeterea, non est nisi duplex modus praedi- Furthermore, there are no more than two modes
candi in divinis, scilicet vel substantialiter vel of predicating in the divine, namely, substan-
relative. tially or relatively.

sed nomina non possunt diversificari nisi vel But names cannot be diversified except with re-
quantum ad id quod significatur, vel quantum ad spect to that which is signified or with respect to
modum significandi. the mode of signifying.

ergo videtur quod vel tantum unum debeat esse Therefore it seems that either there must be just
propter unitatem rei, vel ad plus duo propter one by reason of the unity of the thing, or more
duos modos praedicandi. than two by reason of the modes of predicating.

DS22QU1 AR3- RA2

ad secundum dicendum, quod aliter dividitur To the second it must be said that equivocal,
aequivocum, analogum et univocum. analogous, and univocal are divided differently.

aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res sig- For equivocal is divided according to the thing
nificatas; signified;

univocum vero dividitur secundum differentias; but univocal is divided according to differences;

sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos but analogous is divided according to diverse
modos. modes.

unde cum ens praedicetur analogice de decem And so since being is predicated analogously of
generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos the ten genera, it is divided into them according
modos. to diverse modes.

unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus And so a proper mode of predicating should be-
praedicandi. long to each of the the genera.

et quia in divinis non salvantur nisi duo genera
quantum ad rationem communem generis, sci-
licet substantia et ad aliquid; ideo dicuntur in
divinis duo modi praedicandi.
unumquodque autem genus dividitur univoce in
And because in the divine only two genera are
preserved with respect to the common notion of
the genus, namely, substance and toward some-
thing, therefore [only] two modes of predicating
are spoken of in the divine.
Now each genus is divided univocally into the

21
species contentas sub genere, et ideo speciebus
non debetur proprius modus praedicandi.
et propter hoc quamvis quaedam contenta in
praedicamento qualitatis dicantur de deo secun-
dum rationem speciei, non tamen afferunt
novum modum praedicandi, etsi afferant novam
rationem significandi.
unde quamvis in deo non sint nisi duo modi
praedicandi, sunt tamen plures rationes signifi-
candi secundum quas divina nomina multiplicari
possunt.
22
species contained under the genus, and therefore
there ought not to be a proper mode of pre-
dicating for [each] species.
And for this reason although some things con-
tained in the predicament of quality are said of
God according to the notion of the species, they
nevertheless do not bear the nine modes of pre-
dicating, even if they do bear the nine notions of
signifying.
And so although in God there are no more than
two modes of predicating, still, there are many
notions of signifying according to which the
divine names can be multiplied.
6. On the notion of measure.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS23 QU1 AR1- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod in omnibus quae I reply that it must be said that in all things
habent regulam et mensuram, eorum bonitas et which have a rule and measure, their goodness
rectitudo consistit in conformitate ad suam and rightness consists in a conformity to its rule
regulam vel mensuram; or measure;

malitia autem, secundum quod ab ea discordant. but their evil in their failure to accord with it.

prima autem mensura et regula omnium est Now the first measure and rule of all things is
divina sapientia; the divine wisdom;

unde bonitas et rectitudo sive virtus unius- and so the goodness and rightness or virtue of
cujusque consistit secundum quod attingit ad each thing consists in its attainment of this, that
hoc quod ex sapientia divina ordinatur, ut dicit it be ordered by the divine wisdom, as Anselm
anselmus. says.

7. On the analogy of ‘measure’.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 3. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR2- AG3

praeterea, secundum philosophum, unumquod- Further, according to the Philosopher, each

que mensuratur minimo sui generis, thing is measured by what is least in its genus,

et dicit ibi commentator quod illud ad quod and in the same place the Commentator says
mensurantur omnes substantiae est primus that that with respect to which every substance
motor, qui, secundum ipsum, est deus. is measured is the first mover who, according to
him, is God.

ergo deus est in genere substantiae. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

DS8QU4 AR2- RA3

ad tertium dicendum, quod mensura proprie To the third it must be said that ‘measure’ is
dicitur in quantitatibus: said properly in quantities;

dicitur enim mensura illud per quod innotescit for that is called a ‘measure’ by which the quan-
quantitas rei, tity of a thing is made known,

et hoc est minimum in genere quantitatis vel and this is what is least in the genus of quantity,
simpliciter, ut in numeris, quae mensurantur either simply, as in numbers, which are mea-
unitate, quae est minimum simpliciter; sured by unity, which is the least thing simply—

aut minimum secundum positionem nostram, or the least according to our imposition, as in
sicut in continuis, in quibus non est minimum the continuous, in which there is no least thing
simpliciter; simply—

23
unde ponimus palmum loco minimi ad men-
surandum pannos, vel stadium ad mensurandum
viam.
exinde transumptum est nomen mensurae ad
omnia genera, ut illud quod est primum in
quolibet genere et simplicissimum et perfec-
tissimum dicatur mensura omnium quae sunt in
genere illo;
eo quod unumquodque cognoscitur habere de
veritate generis plus et minus, secundum quod
magis accedit ad ipsum vel recedit, ut album in
genere colorum.
ita etiam in genere substantiae illud quod habet
esse perfectissimum et simplicissimum, dicitur
mensura omnium substantiarum, sicut deus.
8. On the notion of ‘modes of being’.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU1AR1 CO
respondeo. dicendum, quod sicut in demon-
strabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua
principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando
quid est unumquodque;
alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret
omnino scientia et cognitio rerum.
illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit
quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones om-
nes resolvit, est ens, ut avicenna dicit in prin-
cipio suae metaphysicae.
unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones
intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens.
sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea
per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel
accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est
essentialiter ens;
unde probat etiam philosophus in iii metaphys.,
quod ens non potest esse genus,
24
and thus we put down the span of the palm for
measuring cloth, or the stade for measuring a
road.
From this the name ‘measure’ has been carried
over to every genus, such that that which is first
in any genus and simplest and most perfect is
called the measure of everything which is in that
genus;
the reason being that each thing is known to
have more or less of the truth of the genus ac-
cording as it approaches it more closely or re-
cedes from it, like ‘white’ in the genus of color.
So also in the genus of substance that which has
the most perfect and simplest being is called the
measure of every substance, like ‘God’.
I reply that it must be said that, just as in de-
monstrable matters a reduction to certain prin-
ciples known to the intellect through themselves
must take place—so it is in investigating the
quid est of each thing;
otherwise, in both cases one would go on to
infinity, and thus science and the knowledge of
things would utterly perish.
But, as Avicenna says in the beginning of his
Metaphysics, that which the understanding first
conceives as most known to it, and in which it
resolves all its conceptions, is being.
For this reason it is necessary that every other
conception of the understanding be taken from
an addition to being.
But nothing can be added to being as extraneous
in the way in which a difference is added to a
genus or an accident to a subject, since any
nature is essentially a being.
And so the Philosopher also proves in the third
book of the Metaphysics that being cannot be a
genus.
sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super But in accordance with this some things are said
ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis to add to being insofar as they express a mode
qui nomine entis non exprimitur. of being which the name ‘being’ does not ex-
press.

quod dupliciter contingit: But this happens in two ways.

uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis In one way, as the mode expressed is some
specialis modus entis. special mode of being.

sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum For there are diverse grades of being in accor-
quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, dance with which the diverse modes of being
are taken;

et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum and according to these modes the diverse genera
genera. of things are taken.

substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam dif- For substance does not add to being any differ-
ferentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam ence which might designate some nature super-
superadditam enti, added to being;

sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis but by the name ‘substance’ a special mode of
quidam modus essendi, being is expressed,

scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. namely, being through itself; and so on in the
other genera.7

alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus In another way, such that the mode expressed is
generalis consequens omne ens. a general mode following upon every being.8

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, De Natura Generis, cap. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

CP3-

divisio autem entis in substantiam et accidens, But the division of being into substance and
est divisio entis per se dicti: accident is a division of being said per se:

illa enim per se sunt, quae continentur in figuris for those things are per se which are contained
praedicationis, ut ibidem dicitur. in the figures of predication, as is said in the
same place.

cum autem ens contrahi non possit, sicut genus
contrahitur per differentiam, ut dictum est,
oportet quod ens contrahatur ad praedicta per
diversum modum praedicandi.
But since being cannot be contracted in the way
in which a genus is contracted by a difference,
as has been said, it must be that being be con-
tracted to the things mentioned by diverse
modes of predicating.

eorum autem quae praedicantur, quaedam Now of those things which are predicated, some
significant quid, quaedam quantum, quaedam signify a ‘what’, some an ‘amount’, some a
7
It should be noted that each of these genera, which are the nine genera of accidents, expresses the mode of
being in another, ens in alio; for the being of an accident is to be in (inesse).
8
This division manifests the so-called ‘transcendentals’, but it is passed over here as not being necessary to
our purpose.

25
quale, et sic de ceteris; ‘sort’, and so on in the remaining cases;

ideo oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi therefore, it must be that in each of the modes of
esse idem significet: predicating ‘being’ signify the same thing:

ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat as when it is said, ‘man is an animal’, ‘being’
substantiam; signifies substance;

cum vero dicitur homo est albus, esse significat but when it is said, ‘man is white’, ‘being’
qualitatem; signifies quality;

et sic de aliis praedicamentis, de quorum ortu and so on about the other predicaments, which
infra dicetur. shall be discussed below.

9. On the division of real being into the ten predicaments according to the modes of being.

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

TR2 CP01

ens autem reale dividitur in decem praedica- Now real being is divided into the ten predica-
menta, quae sunt decem genera rerum. ments, which are the ten genera of things.

et quia res est fundamentum intentionis, re- And because a thing is the foundation of an in-
motum tamen; secundum istam duplicem divisi- tention, in accordance with this twofold division
onem possunt dupliciter accipi praedicamenta. the predicaments can be taken in two ways.

ad sciendum autem praedicamenta oportet Now in order to know the predicaments, it is ne-
dividere ens reale. cessary to divide real being.

ubi nota, quod licet ens non possit esse genus, Where note that, although being cannot be a
quia non invenitur differentia contrahens illud, genus because there is found no difference
tamen contrahitur per modos essendi. contracting it, still, it is contracted by diverse
modes of being.

modus autem essendi alicujus rei potest accipi Now the mode of being of anything can be
dupliciter. taken in two ways.

uno modo, ut est proprietas realis alicujus In one way, as it is a real property of something
realiter differens ab eo, sicut dicimus de aliquo, really differing from it, just as we say of some-
iste habet bonum modum, quia est mansuetus thing, ‘this has a good mode [manner]’ because
vel concors. it is gentle or agreeable.

constat autem quod mansuetudo et concordia But it cannot be denied that the gentleness and
quas diximus modos, res sunt differentes ab eo agreeableness which we have called ‘modes’ are
cujus sunt. things differing from that to which they belong.

secundo modo dicitur modus res concepta: In a second way, ‘mode’ means a thing con-
ceived:

uno modo respectu suiipsius: in one way with respect to itself:

alio modo, ut est concepta: in another way, as it is conceived:

26
qui quidem diversi modi considerandi non
sumuntur ex diversis in re existentibus, sed ex
habitudine ad diversa, sub qua habitudine res
intelligitur:
verbi gratia: substantia secundum quod est
subjectum accidentium, significatur per modum
substantiae, quia substantia dicitur a substando:
secundum autem quod a nullo priori dependet
cui innitatur, significatur ut ens per se:
et isti modi sunt idipsum quod substantia,
differentes sola ratione animae concipientis
ipsam secundum diversas habitudines:
quae ratio non est ficta, sed accipitur a re,
ita enim in re est: nam et substantia substat
accidentibus et nulli innititur.
tamen istae non sunt duae res distinctae, sed
distinctio inter ista solum est ex ratione.
unde tales modi sunt ens reale, scilicet sub-
stantia, quae et substat accidentibus et nulli inni-
titur: distinctio tamen eorum est a ratione.
contrahitur autem ens per modos: non quod
modus sit aliqua differentia contrahens ipsum:
sed quia in ente reali communiter sumpto in-
veniuntur aliqua entia habentia inter se diver-sos
modos essendi, quibus non respondet una et
eadem res, nisi forte ipsum ens in universali.
primi autem modi quibus contrahitur ens, sunt
esse per se, et esse in alio.
esse autem per se est modus praedicamenti sub-
stantiae;
esse vero in alio est modus aliorum novem prae-
dicamentorum.
27
which diverse modes of considering are not
taken from diverse things existing in a thing, but
from a habitude to diverse things, under which
habitude the thing is understood.
To take an example: substance, insofar as it is
the subject of accidents, is signified in the man-
ner of a substance, because ‘substance’ is so-
called from ‘substanding’:
But insofar as it depends on nothing prior on
which it leans, it is signified as a being through
itself:
and these modes are that substance itself, differ-
ing merely by reason of the soul conceiving it
according to diverse habitudes:
a ratio which is not made up, but rather is taken
from the thing;
for it exists in the thing in this way: for sub-
stance ‘stands under’ accidents and leans on no-
thing.
Still, these are not two distinct things, but the
distinction between them is only from reason.
And so such modes are real being, namely, sub-
stance, which both ‘stands under’ accidents and
leans on nothing: yet their distinction is from
reason.
But being is contracted by modes: not that a
mode is some difference contracting it:
but because in real being taken commonly there
are found some beings having among them-
selves diverse modes of being to which one and
the same thing does not correspond, unless,
perhaps, being itself taken universally.
Now the first modes by which being is contrac-
ted are being through itself, and being in an-
other.
But being through itself is the mode of the pre-
dicament of substance;
whereas being in another is the mode of the
other nine predicaments.
alio modo adhuc contrahitur ens per duos
modos: quorum unus est esse ad se:
et iste modus comprehendit tria praedicamenta
absoluta; scilicet substantiam, quantitatem et
qualitatem.
secundus est esse ad aliud; et iste modus com-
prehendit septem praedicamenta respectiva,
scilicet relationem, actionem, passionem,
quando, ubi, situm et habere.
quae omnia qualiter inter se differant, dicetur
infra.
notandum est autem quod divisio entis in decem
praedicamenta non est divisio univoci, sed
analogi:
ens enim analogice dicitur de eis:
per prius enim dicitur de substantia in qua
maxime salvatur sua realitas;
de aliis vero dicitur in quantum sunt aliquid
ipsius substantiae:
quantitas enim est materia extensa, vel extensio
substantiae;
qualitas vero est ejus affectio, idest dispositio; et
sic de aliis:
unde de eis praedicatur ens sicut sanum prae-
dicatur de animali, urina et medicina.
dividitur ergo ens in decem praedicamenta, quae
sunt substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio, actio,
passio, quando, ubi, situs et habere seu habitus,
de quibus sigillatim dicendum est, et primo de
substantia.
10. On the mode of being of substance.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 13 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB5LC-8N.13
unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in
figura praedicationis,
28
Being is contracted in yet another way by two
modes, one of which is being toward itself:
and this mode comprehends the three absolute
predicaments, namely, substance, quantity, and
quality.
The second is being toward something else, and
this mode comprehends the seven respective
predicaments, namely, relation, action, passion,
when, where, situation, and having.
The way in which all these differ among them-
selves will be discussed below.
But it is to be noted that the division of being
into the ten predicaments is not a univocal divi-
sion, but an analogous one:
for ‘being’ is said of them analogously:
for per prius it is said of substance, in which its
reality is chiefly preserved;
but it is said of the others insofar as they are
something of [= belonging to] substance itself:
for quantity is extended matter, or the extension
of substance;
but quality is its affection—that is, its dis-
position; and so on about the others.
And so being is predicated of them just as
‘healthy’ is predicated of ‘animal’, ‘urine’, and
‘medicine’.
Therefore, being is divided into the ten predica-
ments, which are substance, quantity, quality,
relation, action, passion, when, where, situ-
ation, and having or habitus, each of which will
be treated individually, and first of substance.
But those things are in one genus which agree in
a figure of predication;
idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi. that is, which have one mode of predicating.

alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, For the mode in which substance is predicated is
et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; other than that in which ‘quality’ or ‘action’ is
predicated;

sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum But all substances have one mode of predi-
praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in cating, inasmuch as they are predicated as not
subiecto existentes. existing in a subject.9

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR2- AG2

praeterea, substantia est quod non est in Further, substance is what is not in a subject,
subjecto, sed est ens per se. but is a being through itself.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-5N.-7

exponit ergo primum quod verbum consignificat So he first explains by an example that the verb
tempus, per exemplum; quia videlicet cursus, consignifies time, since ‘(a) run’,

quia significat actionem non per modum because it does not signify an action in the
actionis, manner of an action,

sed per modum rei per se existentis, but in the manner of a thing existing through
itself,10

non consignificat tempus, eo quod est nomen. does not consignify time because it is a name
[or ‘noun’].

11. On the mode of being of accident.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, qu. 8, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU8AR2 CO

omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substan- Everything inhering in something beyond its
tiam est accidens…. essence is an accident.…

ratio enim accidentis est inesse. For the ratio of an accident is to be in.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB7LC-1N.10

9
Since the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating (In II Physic., lect. 5, n. 15), it
follows that the mode of being of substance is that it not exist in a subject.
10
It is evident from the texts already cited that to be a thing existing through itself is proper to substance,
from which it follows that to exist in the manner described is to exist per modum substantiae.

29
licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit Now although the mode of being of accidents is
ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint…. not that they be through themselves, but only
that they be in….

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR3- CO

ratio autem accidentis imperfectionem continet: But the ratio of an accident contains imper-
fection,

quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, the reason being that the being of an accident is
to be in and to depend,

et compositionem facere cum subjecto per con- and as a consequence to produce a composition
sequens. with the subject.

12. On the modes of being of substance and accident.

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

TR2 CP01

primi autem modi quibus contrahitur ens, sunt Now the first modes by which being is con-
esse per se, et esse in alio. tracted are being through itself, and being in
another.

esse autem per se est modus praedicamenti sub- But being through itself is the mode of the pre-
stantiae; dicament of substance;

esse vero in alio est modus aliorum novem prae- whereas being in another is the mode of the
dicamentorum. other nine predicaments.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB7LC-1N.-4

secundo ibi, nam quando probat propositum; et The second there, (where he says) For when (we
utitur tali ratione. say), he proves what he has proposed, and he
uses the following argument.

quod est per se et simpliciter in unoquoque In each genus, what exists through itself and
genere, est prius eo quod est per aliud et secun- simply is prior to what exists through something
dum quid. else and in a certain respect.

sed substantia est ens simpliciter et per seipsam: But substance is being simply and through it-
self.

omnia autem alia genera a substantia sunt entia But all the genera other than substance are
secundum quid et per substantiam: beings in a certain respect and through sub-
stance.

30
ergo substantia est prima inter alia entia.
13. On substance as ‘being through itself’.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes I, cap. 25, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 CP25 N.9
potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen
substantiae deo proprie convenire non possit,
quia deus non substat accidentibus; res tamen
significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit in
genere substantiae.
nam substantia est ens per se: quod deo constat
convenire, ex quo probatum est ipsum non esse
accidens.
LB1 CP25 N.10
sed ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis quod in
definitione substantiae non est ens per se.
ex hoc enim quod dicitur ens non posset esse
genus: quia iam probatum est quod ens non
habet rationem generis.
similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur per se: quia
hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tan-
tum:
dicitur enim ens per se ex hoc quod non est in
alio; quod est negatio pura.
quae nec potest rationem generis constituere:
quia sic genus non diceret quid est res, sed quid
non est.
oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur
hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat
esse non in subiecto;
nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut
nomen entis ab esse;
et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod
habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in
31
Therefore substance is first among the other
beings.
But it might appear to someone that, although
the name ‘substance’ cannot properly belong to
God, since God does not stand under accidents,
still, the thing signified by the name belongs to
Him, and so He is in the genus of substance.
For substance is ‘being through itself’, which all
admit to belong to God, from which it is proved
that He is not an accident.
But to this it must be said from what has been
said that ‘being through itself’ is not in the
definition of substance.
For from the fact that it is called ‘being’ it can-
not be a genus, since it has already been proved
that being does not have the ratio of a genus.
Nor likewise from the fact that it is called
‘through itself’, since this does not appear to
imply anything except negation alone:
for it is called ‘being through itself’ from the
fact that it is not in another, which is a pure
negation.
But this cannot constitute the ratio of a genus,
since in this way a genus would not express
what a thing is, but what it is not.
Therefore the ratio of substance must be un-
derstood in this way, that substance is ‘a thing
to which it belongs not to be in a subject’;
but the name of a thing is imposed from the
whatness, as the name ‘being’ from the ‘act of
being’;
and in this way in the ratio of substance there is
understood that it have a whatness to which it
alio. belongs not to be in another.

hoc autem deo non convenit: nam non habet But this does not belong to God, for He does not
quidditatem nisi suum esse. have a whatness except His own act of being.

unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in genere And so it remains that in no way is He in the
substantiae. genus of substance.

et sic nec in aliquo genere: cum ostensum sit And so neither is He in a genus, since it has
ipsum non esse in genere accidentis. been shown that He is not in the genus of acci-
dent.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR2- AG2

praeterea, substantia est quod non est in sub- Further, substance is what is not in a subject,
jecto, sed est ens per se. but is being through itself.

cum igitur deo hoc maxime conveniat, videtur Therefore, since this chiefly belongs to God, it
quod ipse sit in genere substantiae. seems that He is in the genus of substance.

DS8QU4 AR2- RA2

ad secundum dicendum, quod ista definitio, To the second it must be said that this definition
secundum avicennam, non potest esse sub- according to Avicenna cannot be of substance:
stantiae: substantia est quae non est in subjecto. ‘substance is that which is not in a subject’.

ens enim non est genus. For being is not a genus.

haec autem negatio non in subjecto nihil ponit; But this negation ‘not’ places nothing in the
subject.

unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subjecto, non
dicit aliquod genus: quia in quolibet genere
oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dic-
tum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse.
And so when I say ‘being is not in a subject’, it
does not express a genus, because in any genus
it is necessary to signify some whatness [i.e. a
quiddity], as has been said, of whose under-
standing there is no ‘to be’ [i.e. in whose con-
cept ‘existing’ is not included].

ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum But being does not express a whatness, but only
actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; the act of being, since it is its principle;

et ideo non sequitur: est non in subjecto: ergo and so it does not follow: ‘it is not in a subject:
est in genere substantiae. therefore it is in the genus of substance’.

sed hoc deo non convenit, ut dictum est, loc. But this does not belong to God, as has been
cit.. said in that place.

14. On the true descriptions of substance and accident.

32
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quodlibetales, n. 9, qu. 3, art ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

N.9QU-3ARRA-2

ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum avicen- To the second it must be said that, according to
nam in sua metaph., esse non potest poni in Avicenna in his Metaphysics, ‘being’ cannot be
definitione alicuius generis et speciei, placed in the definition of any genus and
species,

quia omnia particularia uniuntur in definitione the reason being that all particulars [i.e. individ-
generis vel speciei, cum tamen genus vel spe- uals] are united in the definition of the genus or
cies non sit secundum unum esse in om-nibus. the species, yet the genus or the species does not
exist according to one being in all things.

et ideo haec non est vera definitio substantiae: And therefore this is not a true definition of sub-
substantia est quod per se est; vel: accidens est stance: ‘substance is what exists through itself’;
quod est in alio. or ‘accident is what exists in another’.

sed est circumlocutio verae descriptionis, quae rather, it is a circumlocution of a true descript-
talis intelligitur: tion, which is understood as follows:

substantia est res cuius naturae debetur esse non ‘substance is a thing to whose nature it is due to
in alio; not exist in another’;

accidens vero est res, cuius naturae debetur esse but ‘accident is a thing to whose nature it is due
in alio. to exist in another’.

unde patet quod, quamvis accidens miraculose And so it is clear that, although accident is not
sit non in subiecto, non tamen pertinet ad in a subject miraculously, it still does not per-
definitionem substantiae; tain to the definition of substance.

non enim per hoc eius naturae debetur esse non For by this it is not due to its nature not to exist
in alio; nec egreditur definitionem accidentis, in another; nor does it go out of the definition of
quia adhuc natura eius remanet talis ut ei accident, because its nature still remains such
debeatur esse in alio. that it be due to it to exist in another.

15. That every mode of substance is reduced to two things: a quid est or ‘what it is’, and to
a hoc aliquid or ‘this something’, by the quid the essence of substance being understood,
by the hoc aliquid, the supposit.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).:

LB7LC-1N.-3

primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur mul- First, he proposes what he intends, that being is
tipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo said in many ways, as was stated in the fifth
diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, book, in which he distinguished the many ways
in which names of this sort are said,

quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc ali- the reason being that that some being signifies a
quid, idest substantiam; ut per quid, intelligatur ‘what it is’ and a ‘this something’; that is, ‘sub-
essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid stance’, such that by ‘what’ the essence of sub-

33
suppositum, stance is understood, by ‘this something’, the
supposit,

ad quae duo omnes modi substantiae reducun- to which two every mode of substance is re-
tur, ut in quinto est habitum. duced, as is had in the fifth book.

illud vero significat qualitatem vel quantitatem, But another signifies ‘quality’ or ‘quantity’, or
aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum. one of the other predicaments.

et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod And since ‘being’ is said in so many ways, it is
inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, clear that among all beings the first is that which
idest ens quod significat substantiam. is; that is, the being which signifies ‘substance’.

16. On the two meanings of ‘substance’.

Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU29 AR2 CO

respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philo- I reply that it must be said that, according to the
sophum, in v metaphys., substantia dicitur du- Philosopher in the fifth book of the Meta-
pliciter. physics, ‘substance’ is said in two ways.

uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam In one way the whatness of a thing is called
significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus ‘substance’, according as we say that ‘the
quod definitio significat substantiam rei, definition signifies the substance of a thing’,

quam quidem substantiam graeci usiam vocant, which substance the Greeks call ousia, which
quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. we may call ‘essence’.

alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel sup- In another way the subject or supposit which
positum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. subsists in the genus of substance is called ‘sub-
stance’.

et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, no- And this, taking it commonly, can be named by
minari potest et nomine significante inten- a name signifying an intention,
tionem,

et sic dicitur suppositum. and in this way it is called ‘supposit’.

17. On what ‘substance’ names.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 2. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR2- RA1

ad primum ergo dicendum, quod deus sim- To the first it must be said that simply God is
pliciter non est accidens, nec tamen omnino not an accident, nor can He be called ‘sub-
proprie potest dici substantia; stance’ properly in any way,

tum quia nomen substantiae dicitur a substando, both because the name ‘substance’ is said from
‘substanding’ [i.e., from ‘standing under’ acci-

34
 dents.],

tum quia substantia quidditatem nominat, quae and because ‘substance’ names a whatness,
est aliud ab esse ejus. which is something other than its being.

unde illa est divisio entis creati. And so that division [sc. that everything that is
is either substance or accident] is of created
being.

18. Names related to ‘substance’.

Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU29 AR2 CO

nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significan- It is also named by three names signifying a
tibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, sub- thing, which are ‘thing of nature’, ‘subsistence’,
sistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem con- and ‘hypostasis’, in accordance with a threefold
siderationem substantiae sic dictae. consideration of substance so called.

secundum enim quod per se existit et non in For according as it exists through itself and not
alio, vocatur subsistentia, in another, it is called ‘subsistence’.

illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, For we say those things ‘subsist’ which are not
sed in se existunt. in another, but exist in themselves.

secundum vero quod supponitur alicui naturae But according as it is supposed to [= subject to]
communi, sic dicitur res naturae; sicut hic homo some common nature, thus it is called ‘thing of
est res naturae humanae. nature’, just as this man is a thing of human
nature.

secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, But according as it is supposed to accidents, it is

dicitur hypostasis vel substantia. called ‘hypostasis’ or ‘substance’.

quod autem haec tria nomina significant com- But what these three names signify commonly
muniter in toto genere substantiarum, hoc in the whole genus of substances, the name ‘per-
nomen persona significat in genere rationalium son’ signifies in the genus of rational sub-
substantiarum. stances.

19. That those things are said to subsist which are not in another, but exist in themselves.

Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU29 AR2 CO

secundum enim quod per se existit et non in For according as it exists through itself and not
alio, vocatur subsistentia, in another, it is called ‘subsistence’,

illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, for we say those things subsist which are not in
sed in se existunt. another, but exist in themselves.

20. On the mode of being per se.

35
Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 8, cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

TR8 CP02

tertio modo dicitur aliquid esse per se, quod In the third way something is said to be per se
significat aliquod solitarium, sicut singulare which signifies something solitary, like the
quod est in genere substantiae, ut socrates et sing-ular in the genus of substance, like
plato. ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’.

album vel ambulans, isto modo non dicitur per ‘White’ or ‘walking’ are not called per se in this
se, cum non intelligatur aliquid solitarium per se way, since something solitary existing per se
existens: [through itself] is not understood:

dicendo enim album, dico accidens et subject- for by saying ‘white’, I say an accident and a
tum; subject;

sed cum dico socrates, dico aliquid solitarium, but when I say ‘Socrates’, I say something soli-
et sic dicitur per se. tary, and in this way it is called per se.

sciendum est autem quod iste modus non est But it must be understood that this mode is not a
modus praedicandi per se, sed est modus essen- mode of predicating per se; rather it is a mode
di. of being.

21. On the mode of being of the nine genera of accidents.

Cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR3- AG1

ad tertium sic proceditur. One proceeds to the third as follows.

videtur etiam quod alia praedicamenta de deo It also seems that the other predicaments are
dicantur. said of God.

de quocumque enim praedicatur species, et For whatever the species is predicated of, so is
genus. the genus.

sed scientia, quae est species qualitatis, invent- But ‘science’, which is a species of quality, is
itur in deo, et magnitudo, quae est species quan- found in God, and magnitude, which is a species
titatis. of quantity.

ergo et quantitas et qualitas. Therefore both quantity and quality [are pre-
dicated of God].

DS8QU4 AR3- AG2

praeterea, philosophus dicit: unum in substantia Further, the Philosopher states: a unity in sub-
facit idem, in quantitate aequale, in qualitate stance makes the same, in quantity, the equal, in
simile. quality, the like.

sed in deo dicitur vere aequalitas et similitudo. But ‘equality’ and ‘likeness’ are truly said in

36
 God.

ergo oportet de eo dici aliquid per modum quali- Therefore, it is necessary that something be said
tatis et quantitatis, sicut scientiam vel magnitu- of Him through the mode of a quality and of a
dinem. quantity, just as ‘science’ and ‘magnitude’.

DS8QU4 AR3- AG3

praeterea, natura generis propriissime reperitur Further, the nature most proper to the genus is
in eo in quo primo est. found in that in which it first is.

sed deus est primum agens. But God is the first agent.

ergo in eo actio praecipue invenitur. Therefore action is found principally in Him.

DS8QU4 AR3- AG4

praeterea, quanto aliquid est debilioris esse, Further, the weaker in being something is, the
tanto magis repugnat summae perfectioni. more repugnant it is to the highest perfection.

sed inter omnia alia entia relatio habet debilis- But among all the other beings relation has the
simum esse, ut dicit commentator, weakest being, as the Commentator says.

unde etiam fundatur super alia omnia entia, And so it is also founded on all the other beings,
sicut supra quantitatem aequalitas, et sic de aliis. as equality is founded on quantity, and so on in
the case of the others.

cum igitur in divinis inveniatur relatio, multo Therefore, since relation is found in the divine,
fortius alia praedicamenta. with much greater reason are the other predica-
ments.

DS8QU4 AR3- SC-1

contra, augustinus: omne quod de deo dicitur, To the contrary, Augustine: Everything that is
aut secundum substantiam aut secundum rela- said of God is said either according to sub-
tionem dicitur; stance or according to relation;

et ita alia praedicamenta non erunt in divinis. and so the other predicaments will not be found
in the divine.

hoc etiam habetur ex auctoritate augustini in This is also had from the authority of Augustine
littera. cited in the text.

DS8QU4 AR3- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod quidquid inventum I reply that it must be said that whatever is
in creaturis, de deo praedicatur, praedicatur found in creatures predicated of God is pre-
eminenter, ut dicit dionysius, sicut etiam est in dicated by way of eminence, as Dionysius says,
omnibus aliis causis et causatis. as in all other causes and things caused.

unde oportet omnem imperfectionem removeri And so it is necessary for every imperfection to

37
ab eo quod in divinam praedicationem venit.
sed in unoquoque novem praedicamentorum
duo invenio; scilicet rationem accidentis et rati-
onem propriam illius generis, sicut quantitatis
vel qualitatis.
ratio autem accidentis imperfectionem continet:
quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, et
compositionem facere cum subjecto per con-
sequens.
unde secundum rationem accidentis nihil potest
de deo praedicari.
si autem consideremus propriam rationem
cujuslibet generis, quodlibet aliorum generum,
praeter ad aliquid, importat imperfectionem;
quantitas enim habet propriam rationem in
comparatione ad subjectum;
est enim quantitas mensura substantiae,
qualitas dispositio substantiae, et sic patet in
omnibus aliis.
unde eadem ratione removentur a divina prae-
dicatione secundum rationem generis, sicut
removebantur per rationem accidentis.
si autem consideremus species ipsarum, tunc
aliqua secundum differentias completivas im-
portant aliquid perfectionis, ut scientia, virtus et
hujusmodi.
et ideo ista praedicantur de deo secundum
propriam rationem speciei et non secundum
rationem generis.
ad aliquid autem, etiam secundum rationem
generis, non importat aliquam dependentiam ad
subjectum;
immo refertur ad aliquid extra:
et ideo etiam secundum rationem generis in
divinis invenitur.
38
be removed from what enters into the divine
predication.
But in each of the nine predicaments I find two
things: the ratio of an accident and the proper
ratio of that genus, [or the ratio proper to that
genus] as in quantity or quality.
But the ratio of an accident contains imper-
fection, the reason being that the being of an
accident is to be in and to depend, and as a
consequence to produce a composition with the
subject.
And so nothing can be predicated of God accor-
ding to the ratio of an accident.
But if we were to consider the proper ratio of
any genus, any of the other genera, except to-
ward something, implies imperfection.
For quantity has a proper ratio in comparison to
the subject;
for quantity is the measure of substance,
quality the disposition of substance, and thus it
is clear in all the other cases.
And so by the same argument they are removed
from the divine predication according to the
ratio of the genus, just as they are removed by
the ratio of an accident.
But if we were to consider their species, in that
case some, according to the differences which
are completive of them, imply something of
perfection, like ‘science’, ‘virtue’, and the like.
And so these are predicated of God according to
the proper ratio of the species, and not ac-
cording to the ratio of the genus.
But toward something, even according to the
ratio of the genus, does not imply any depen-
dence on the subject;
on the contrary, it is referred to something out-
side:
and so it is found in the divine even according
to the ratio of the genus.
et propter hoc tantum remanent duo modi prae-
dicandi in divinis, scilicet secundum substan-
tiam et secundum relationem;
non enim speciei contentae in genere debetur
aliquis modus praedicandi, sed ipsi generi.
DS8QU4 AR3- RA1
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dictum
est, in corp. art., scientia non praedicatur de deo
secundum rationem generis, sed secundum
propriam differentiam, quae complet rationem
ipsius.
unde non praedicatur univoce de deo et de aliis;
sed secundum prius et posterius.
DS8QU4 AR3- RA2
ad secundum dicendum, quod in divinis quae-
dam dicuntur habere modum quantitatis vel
qualitatis;
non quia secundum talem modum praedicentur
de deo, sed secundum modum quo inveniuntur
in creaturis, prout nomina quae a nobis imposita
sunt, modum habent qualitatis et quantitatis:
sicut etiam damascenus dicit, quod quaedam
dicuntur de deo sicut assequentia substantiam,
cum tamen, prout in ipso est, nihil sit assequens.
DS8QU4 AR3- RA3
ad tertium dicendum, quod actio, secundum
quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab
agente, et cum motu;
sed in deo non est aliquid medium secundum
rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non
dicitur agens actione quae est praedicamentum,
sed actio sua est substantia.
de hoc tamen plenius dicetur in principio
secundi, dist. 1, qu. unica, art. 2.
DS8QU4 AR3- RA4
39
And on this account only two modes of predi-
cating remain in the divine, namely, ‘according
to substance’, and ‘according to relation’.
For there ought not to be any mode of pre-
dicating of a species contained in the genus, but
of the genus itself.
To the first, then, it must be said that, just as has
been said in the body of the article, ‘science’ is
not predicated of God according to the ratio of
the genus, but according to the proper differ-
ence, which completes its ratio,
And so it is not predicated univocally of God
and of other things, but according to a before
and after.
To the second it must be said that in the divine
some things are said to have the mode of a
quantity or a quality;
not because they are predicated of God
according to such a mode, but according to the
mode by which they are found in creatures,
according as names imposed by us have the
mode of a quality or of a quantity:
as Damascene also says, that certain things are
said of God as following substance, but never-
theless, according as it is in Him, there is no-
thing following.
To the third it must be said that ‘action’, ac-
cording as it is a predicament, means some-
thing flowing from an agent, and with motion;
But in God there is not in reality some mean be-
tween Him and His work, and so He is not
called an agent by the action which is a predica-
ment, but action is His substance.
And this will be discussed more fully at the
beginning of the second part (dist. 1, the single
question, art. 2).
ad quartum dicendum, quod debilitas esse rela- To the fourth it must be said that the weakness
tionis consideratur secundum inhaerentiam sui in being of relation is considered according to
ad subjectum: its inherence in a subject,

quia non ponit aliquid absolutum in subjecto, the reason being that it does not place some-
sed tantum per respectum ad aliud. thing absolute in the subject, but merely through
a respect to something else.

unde ex hoc habet magis quod veniat in divinam And so that it come into the divine predication
praedicationem: quia quanto minus addit, tanto belongs to it from this because the less it adds,
minus repugnat simplicitati. the less repugnant it is to the divine simplicity.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IX Meta., lect. 1, n. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB9LC-1N.-1

dicit ergo primo, quod in praemissis dictum est He says first that in the things premised there
de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedica- has been a discussion about the ‘first being’, to
menta entis referuntur, scilicet de substantia. which every other predicament of being is re-
ferred, namely, about ‘substance’.

et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur
sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia alia
entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi
dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae.
And that they are all referred to substance as to
the first being is obvious, the reason being that
every other being, namely, quality and quantity
and the like, is spoken of according to the ratio
of substance.

dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura For it is called ‘quantity’ from the fact that it is
substantiae, the measure of substance,

et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio and ‘quality’ from the fact that it is a certain
substantiae; similiter in aliis. disposition of substance; and likewise in the
other cases.

et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia
habent rationem substantiae, quia in definitione
cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium
subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur
nasus.
And this is clear from the fact that accidents
have the ratio of substance, the reason being
that the proper subject must be placed in the
definition of any accident, just as ‘nose’ must
be placed in the definition of ‘snub’.

et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in And this is made clear in what has been pre-
principio septimi. mised, namely, at the beginning of the seventh
book.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 6, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB-1LC-6N.-7

manifestum est autem, quod illud quod est ens But it is obvious that that which is a being
per seipsum, scilicet substantia, est naturaliter through itself, namely, substance, is naturally
prior omnibus his quae non habent esse nisi in prior to everything which does not have being

40
comparatione ad substantiam, except in comparison to substance,
s
icut est quantitas, quae est mensura substantiae, like quantity, which is the measure of substance,

et qualitas, quae est dispositio substantiae, and quality, which the disposition of substance,

et ad aliquid, quod est habitudo substantiae. and toward something, which is the habitude of
substance.

et idem est in aliis generibus, quae omnia And it is the same in the other genera, all of
assimilantur propagini entis, which are likened to the offspring of being—

idest substantiae, quae est principaliter ens, a that is, of substance, which is a being princi-
qua propaginantur et derivantur omnia alia pally, from which all other genera are propa-
genera. gated and derived.

quae etiam in tantum dicuntur entia, inquantum And these are only called beings insofar as they
accidunt substantiae. ‘befall’ substance [i.e. insofar as they are acci-
dents of substance].

22. On the mode of being of toward something or relation.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Physic., lect. 5, lect. 15 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB3LC-5N.15

aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est Or it has itself through a respect to another, and
praedicamentum relationis; thus there is the predicament of ‘relation’;

(cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur (for when I say ‘The man is a father’, something
de homine absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest absolute is not predicated of a man, but a re-
ad aliquid extrinsicum). spect which is in him to something extrinsic).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB5LC-9N.8

vel in est ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad Or it is not in it [sc. a subject] absolutely, but in
aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. respect to something else, and thus it is ‘toward
something’.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, art. 2, ad 12 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU8AR2AG12

praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est Further, those things are said to be ‘toward
ad aliud se habere, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. something’ whose being is to have itself toward
something else, as is said in the Predicaments.

esse ergo relationis est in respectu ad aliud, non The being of relation, then, is in respect to
autem esse substantiae. something else, but not the being of substance.

41
QU8AR2RA12
ad duodecimum dicendum quod, cum relatio sit
accidens in creaturis, esse suum est inesse;
unde esse suum non est ad aliud se habere;
sed esse huius secundum quod ad aliquid, est ad
aliud se habere.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU8AR2 CO
ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod
inter novem genera quae continentur sub acci-
dente, quaedam significantur secundum rati-
onem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est
inesse;
et ideo illa dico significari per modum acci-
dentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri,
sicut quantitas et qualitas;
quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est,
et similiter qualitas.
ad aliquid vero non significatur secundum
rationem accidentis: non enim significatur ut
aliquid eius in quo est, sed ut ad id quod extra
est.
et propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod
scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis,
sed scibilis.
23. On names relativa secundum esse and relativa secundum dici.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, qu. 13, art. 7, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU13 AR7 AG1
ad septimum sic proceditur.
videtur quod nomina quae important relationem
ad creaturas, non dicantur de deo ex tempore.
omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant
divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur.
42
To the twelfth it must be said that, since relation
is an accident in creatures, its being [or ‘to be’]
is to be in;
and so its being is not to have itself toward
something else;
but to be of this [i.e. to belong to this] according
as it is toward something, is to have itself to-
ward something else.
For the evidence of this, then, it must be under-
stood that among the nine genera under which
accident is contained, some are signified in ac-
cordance with the ratio of an accident: for the
ratio of an accident is to be in;
and so I maintain that those things are signified
in the manner of an accident which are signified
as inherent in another, like quantity and quality;
for quantity is signified as of [= ‘belonging to’]
that in which it is, and likewise quality.
But toward something [= ‘relation’] is not signi-
fied in accordance with the ratio of an accident:
for it is not signified as something of [= ‘be-
longing to’] that in which it is, but [it is sig-
nified] as to that which is outside.
And on this account the Philosopher also says
that science, to the extent that it is a relation, is
not of the knower, but of the knowable.

unde et ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen do-
minus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina
substantia, et creator significat dei actionem,
quae est eius essentia.
sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed
aeterna.
ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de deo ex
tempore, sed ab aeterno.
QU13 AR7 RA1
ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quae-
dam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas
habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater
et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa
secundum esse.
quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas
res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines,
sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et
alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secun-
dum dici.
sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differ-
entia est consideranda.
nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad
creaturam, ut dominus.
et huiusmodi non significant substantiam divi-
43
To the seventh one proceeds as follows.
It seems that names which imply a relation to
creatures are not said of God from time.
For every name of this sort signifies the divine
substance, as is commonly said.
And for this reason Ambrose says that the
name ‘Lord’ is the name of a power, which is
the divine substance, and ‘Creator’ signifies
the action of God, which is His essence.
But the divine substance is not temporal, but
eternal.
Therefore, names of this sort are not said of
God from time, but from eternity.
To the first, then, it must be said that certain
relatives are imposed in order to signify the
relative habitudes* themselves, like ‘Lord’,
‘servant’, ‘father’, and ‘son’, and the like, and
these are called relative according to being.
* It is clear from the argument that a ‘relative
habitude’ is what is also called ‘toward some-
thing’, or relation proper.
But some are imposed in order to signify the
things which certain habitudes follow upon,
like ‘mover’ and ‘the thing moved’, ‘head’ and
‘the thing having the head’, and others of the
sort, which are called relative according to
being said.
In this way, then, this difference is also to be
taken into consideration in the case of the
divine names.
For certain ones signify the very habitude to
the creature, like ‘Lord’.
And names of this sort do not signify the divine
nam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesup- substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as
ponunt ipsam, sicut dominium praesupponit they presuppose it, just as ‘Lord’ presupposes
potestatem, quae est divina substantia. power, which is the divine substance.

quaedam vero significant directe essentiam di-
vinam, et ex consequenti important habitu-
dinem;
sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant
actionem dei, quae est eius essentia.
But some signify the divine essence directly,
and imply the habitude subsequently;
just as ‘Savior’, ‘Creator’, and the like, signify
the action of God, which is His essence.

utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de deo di-
cuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam impor-
tant, vel principaliter vel consequenter, non
autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essenti-
am, vel directe vel indirecte.
Still both names are said of God from time with
respect to that habitude which they imply,
whether principally or subsequently, but not
with respect to the fact that they signify the
essence, whether directly or indirectly.

24. That ‘action’, according as it is a predicament, means something flowing from an

agent, and with motion.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU4 AR3- RA3

ad tertium dicendum, quod actio, secundum To the third it must be said that ‘action’,
quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab according as it is a predicament, means some-
agente, et cum motu; thing flowing from an agent, and with motion;

sed in deo non est aliquid medium secundum But in God there is not in reality some mean
rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non dici- between Him and His work, and so He is not
tur agens actione quae est praedicamentum, sed called an agent by the action which is a predica-
actio sua est substantia. ment, but action is His substance.

de hoc tamen plenius dicetur in principio secun- And this will be discussed more fully at the be-
di, dist. 1, qu. unica, art. 2. ginning of the second part (dist. 1, the single
question, art. 1).

25. That esse and vivere are predicated in the manner of an act.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU2 AR1- RA3

ad tertium dicendum, quod vivere et esse di- To the third it must be said that ‘living’ and
cuntur per modum actus; et quia cuilibet actui ‘being’ are predicated in the manner of an act;

44
respondet mensura sua, ideo oportet ut divino
esse et vitae divinae intelligatur adjacere aeter-
nitas, quasi mensura; quamvis realiter non sit
aliud a divino esse;
and because to any act there corresponds its
measure, therefore eternity must be understood
to lie adjacent to the divine being and the di-
vine life as a measure, although in reality it is
not something other than the divine being.

et quia vivere magis habet rationem actus quam And because ‘living’ has the ratio of an act
esse, ideo forte definit aeternitatem per vitam more than ‘being’ does, therefore he boldly de-
potius quam per esse. fines eternity by ‘life’ rather than by ‘being’.

Note that esse taken concretely as a participle means ‘being’; taken in the abstract as a verb
in the infinitive mood means ‘to be’. Hence vivere means both ‘living’ and ‘to live’.

26. That action can be signified in three ways.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-5N.-5

potest autem actio significari tripliciter: But action can be signified in three ways:

uno modo, per se in abstracto, velut quaedam in one way, per se [or ‘as such’] in the abstract,
res, as a certain thing,

et sic significatur per nomen; ut cum dicitur and in this way it is signified by a name [or
actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et similia; ‘noun’], as when it is said, ‘action’, ‘passion’,
‘(a) walk’, ‘(a) run’, and the like.

alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet est In another way, [it can be signified] in the
egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut sub- manner of an action, namely, as going out from
iecto, a substance and inhering in it as in a subject;

et sic significatur per verba aliorum modorum, and in this way it is signified by verbs of the
quae attribuuntur praedicatis. other moods, which are attributed to pre-
dicates.11

sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia But because the very process or inherence of an
actionis potest apprehendi ab intellectu et signi- action can also be apprehended by the under-
ficari ut res quaedam, standing and be signified as a certain thing,

inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi modi, quae it follows that verbs in the infinitive mood,
significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad sub- which themselves signify the very inherence of
iectum, possunt accipi ut verba, ratione con- an action in a subject, can be taken as verbs by
cretionis, reason of concretion,

et ut nomina prout significant quasi res quas- and as names [or ‘nouns’] according as they sig-
dam. nify as certain things.

11
The phrase quae attribuuntur praedicatis here presumably means the same as ‘they are put down on the
side of predicates’, and this would be proper to ‘verbs of the other moods’ insofar as they are ‘always an
indication of those things which are predicated of another’.

45
N.B. In order to understand the modes of signifying, one must first be clear about the
meaning of mode, a subject to which we turn next.

46
27. On modus.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Propositionibus Modalibus (init.) (tr. B.A.M.):

Because a proposition is called ‘modal’ from ‘mode’, in order to know what a modal
proposition is, one must first know what a mode is. Now a mode is a determination lying
next to a thing, which, in fact, results from the ‘placing next to’ of an adjectival name, which
determines a substantive, as when it is said ‘A man is white’, or by an adverb, which
determines a verb, as ‘A man runs well’.12

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

Properly, quality implies a certain mode of a substance. However, as St. Augustine says
(Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure predetermines [praefigit], and so it
implies a certain determination according to some measure. 13

28. Notes.

A measure praefigit—that is, ‘predetermines’—a mode. But a mode consists in the

determination or commensuration of a thing’s principles, whether material or efficient.
Hence a measure fixes or determines a thing’s principles, whether material or efficient.
That is why it is said that a mode is a determination lying next to a thing.
In speech, a ‘mode’ or ‘determination lying next to a thing’ results when an adjec-
tival name, or adjective, is ‘placed next to’ a substantive, or when an adverb determines a
verb.

An example of the first case is when it is said Homo est albus, ‘A man is white’.
An example of the second is when it is said Homo currit bene, ‘A man runs well’.

29. Definitions.

MODUS (‘MODE’). (1) “A mode is a determination lying next to a thing” (modus

est determinatio adiacens rei, St. Thomas Aquinas, De propositionibus modalibus); (2) “a
mode is what a measure predetermines” (modus autem est quem mensura praefigit, St. Au-
gustine, Super gen. ad litteram); (3) “a mode is a certain determination according to some
measure” (est autem modus quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram, St.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1).

 by form and matter: a determination lying next to a thing

 by causal predication: what a measure predetermines (a measure being a cause of a
mode)
 by genus and difference: a certain determination according to some measure

12
quia propositio modalis a modo dicitur, ad sciendum quid sit propositio modalis oportet prius scire quid
sit modus. est autem modus determinatio adiacens rei, quae quidem fit per adiectionem nominis adiectivi,
quod determinat substantivum, ut cum dicitur homo est albus, vel per adverbium, quod determinat verbum, ut
homo currit bene.
13
…proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super
gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam
mensuram.

47
30. On the modes of real being.

If a mode is a determination lying next to a thing, then a mode of being is a

determination lying next to being.

The determination lying next to the being which is substance is that it exist through
itself; of an accident, that it exist in another;

of a quantity, that it be the measure of substance;

of a quality, that it be the disposition of substance;

of a relation or ‘toward something’, that it be the habitude of substance.

Again, the mode of a relation is that it be in something not absolutely but with
respect to something else; that is, that it be a respect which is in a thing toward something
extrinsic.

An accident is what has being only in comparison with substance as (or which has a
proper ratio in comparison to its subject as):

its measure (quantity)

its disposition (quality)
its habitude (toward something, or relation)

its extrinsic measure

from time (when)
from place (where)
from an order of parts in place (situation or position)

neither its extrinsic cause nor measure, but what is entirely outside the subject (habitus,
having or possession)

its extrinsic cause

as the agent which is denominated from its effect (action)
as the agent from which its effect is denominated (passion)

31. A division of real being into its modes.

to be
through itself and simply (substance)
not through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect,
which is to be in another (accident, the remaining nine genera)

to be through itself and simply (which is to subsist)

as substanding, or standing under, accidents (first substance)
as not standing under accidents (which is to subsist only) (second substance)

to be through itself and simply as not standing under accidents (which is to subsist only)

48
 as having differentiae and not differentiated (second substance most particular species)
as having differentiae and differentiated (second substance both species and genus)
as not having differentiae, but differentiated (second substance highest genus)

to be in another
as intrinsic
as extrinsic, or as entirely outside it

to be in another as intrinsic
absolutely
not absolutely, but through a respect to something else (relation or ‘toward something’)

to be in another as intrinsic absolutely and

through itself on the part of the matter (quantity)
not through itself, but as following the form (quality)

to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it

as either its measure or cause
as neither its measure nor cause (having or possession)

to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it

as its measure
as its cause

to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure

from time (when)
from place (where)
from an order of parts in place (situation or position)

to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it

as its agent cause
[as its final cause14]

to be in another as extrinsic as entirely outside it as its agent cause

denominated from its effect (action)
from which its effect is denominated (passion)

32. The modes of signifying taken according to the modes of real being.

to signify as being
through itself and simply (substance)
not through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect,
which is to be in another (accident, the remaining nine genera) etc.

14
Not applicable because it does not cause something apart from the agent.

49
33. Some modes of signifying found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas:

a) in the manner of a substance

b) in the manner of an accident
c) in the manner of a quantity (or quality, etc.)
d) in the manner of a form
e) in the manner of a nature
f) in the manner of an essence
g) in the manner of inhering (or something inherent)
h) in the manner of concretion
i) in the manner of abstraction
j) in the manner of an act
k) in the manner of a motion
l) in the manner of a supposit
m) in the manner of a subsistent thing

34. Some other modes:

a) in the manner of change

b) in the manner of making
c) in the manner of participation

per modum substantiae

per modum accidentis
per modum qualitatis
per modum formae
per modum inhaerentis
per modum actus
per modum suppositi
per modum mutationis
per modum concretionis
per modum abstractionis
per modum factionis
per modum participationis

ut inhaerenter
ut inhaerens
ut inhaerentem

50
35. On the modes of predicating, the modes of being, and the modes of signifying: a
schema of correspondences:
The Mode of Predicating
(a) every predication is made in
[one of] three ways
(b) a predicate can have itself to-
ward a subject in [one of] three
ways
(a) in one way when that which
pertains to its essence is predi-
cated of some subject
(b) in one way when it is that
which the subject is
(a) but there is another way in
which is predicated of something
that which is not of its essence,
yet inheres in it (sc. in the subject)
(b) in the second way, as the
predicate is taken according as it
is in a subject
(a) which has itself either on the
part of the matter of the subject,
and according to this there is the
predicament of ‘quantity’
(b) which predicate is either in it
through itself and absolutely, as
following the matter,
and in this way it is ‘quantity’
(a) or follows the form,
and in this way there is the pre-
dicament of ‘quality’
(b) or as following the form,
and in this way it is ‘quality’
(a) or it has itself with respect to
another,
and in this way there is the pre-
dicament of ‘relation’
(b) or is not in it absolutely, but in
respect to another,
The Mode of Being
to be in the manner of a substance,
which is to be through itself and
simply
to be in the manner of an accident,
which is not to be through itself
and simply, but through some-
thing else and in a certain respect,
which is to be in another
to be in the manner of a quantity,
which is to be in another as intrin-
sic absolutely and through itself
on the part of the matter
to be in the manner of a quality,
which is to be in another as in-
trinsic absolutely and not through
itself, but as following the form
to be in the manner of a relation,
which is to be in another as in-
trinsic not absolutely, but through
a respect to something else
51
The Mode of Signifying
to signify in the manner of a sub-
stance, which is to signify (or be
signified) as being through itself
and simply
to signify in the manner of an ac-
cident, which is to signify as being
not through itself and simply, but
through something else and in a
certain respect, which is to signify
(or be signified) as being in an-
other
to signify in the manner of a quan-
tity, which is to signify as being in
another as intrinsic absolutely and
through itself on the part of the
matter, which is to signify (or be
signified) as of something in
which it is; that is, to be signified
as inherent
to signify in the manner of a qua-
lity, which is to signify as being in
another as intrinsic absolutely and
not through itself, but as following
the form, which is also to signify
(or be signified) as of something
in which it is; that is, to be signi-
fied as inherent
to signify in the manner of a re-
lation, which is to signify as being
in another as intrinsic not absolu-
tely, but through a respect to
something else, which is not to be
signified as something of that in
which it is, but as to that which is
outside it, which is the way in
and in this way it is ‘toward
something’
(a) but the third mode of predica-
ting is when something extrinsic is
predicated in the manner of some
denomination: for in this way ex-
trinsic accidents are predicated of
a subject;
(b) in a third way, as the predicate
is taken from that which is outside
the subject
(a) now to be denominated from
something extrinsic is found in
some way commonly in all things,
and in some way particularly in
those things which pertain only to
man;
now, commonly, something is
found to be denominated from
something extrinsic either accor-
ding to the ratio of a cause, or
according to the ratio of a
measure;
(b) and this in two ways
(a) but the exterior measures are
time and place
(b) now if it be its measure, since
an extrinsic measure is either time
or place
(a) therefore, according as some-
thing is denominated from time,
there is the predicament ‘when’
(b) the predicament is taken either
on the part of time, and in this
way there will be ‘when’
(a) but according as something is
denominated from place, there is
the predicament ‘where’
(b) or from place, and in this way
there will be ‘where’, the order of
the parts not being taken into con-
sideration
(a) and ‘situation’ (or ‘position’),
which adds beyond ‘where’ an or-
der of parts in place
to be in the manner of something
extrinsic or as entirely outside it,
which is to be in another as ex-
trinsic, or as entirely outside it
to be in the manner of something
extrinsic, which is to be in another
as extrinsic or entirely outside it
as neither its measure or cause, or
to be in another as extrinsic or not
entirely outside it as its measure
or cause
to be in the manner of something
extrinsic, or as entirely outside it,
as its measure from time or place
to be in the manner of a when,
which is to be in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as its
measure from time
to be in the manner of a where,
which is to be in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as its
measure from place
to be in the manner of a situation
or position, which is to be in an-
other as extrinsic or entirely
outside it as its measure from an
52
which a relation is said to have
itself toward something else
to signify in the manner of some-
thing extrinsic or as entirely out-
side it, which is to signify as being
in another as extrinsic, or as en-
tirely outside it
to signify in the manner of some-
thing extrinsic, which is to signify
as being in another as extrinsic or
entirely outside it as neither its
measure or cause, or as being in
another as extrinsic or not entirely
outside it as its measure or cause
to signify in the manner of some-
thing extrinsic, or as entirely out-
side it, which is to signify as being
in another as entirely outside it as
its measure from time or place
to signify in the manner of a
when, which is to signify in the
manner of being in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as its
measure from time
to signify in the manner of a
where, which is to signify as being
in another as extrinsic or entirely
outside it as its measure from
place
to signify in the manner of a situ-
ation or position, which is to sig-
nify as being in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as its
(b) but being taken into consider- order of parts in place measure from an order of parts in
ation there will be ‘situation’ (or place
‘position’)

(a) hence, when man is said to be
‘armed’, or ‘clothed’, or ‘shod’,
he is denominated from something
extrinsic that does not have either
the ratio of a cause or a measure;
hence there is a special predica-
ment (for man) and it is called a
habitus (a ‘having’ or ‘posses-
sion’)
to be in the manner of a having,
which is to be in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as
neither its measure nor cause (ha-
ving, rather, the ratio of those
things which pertain only to man)
to signify in the manner of a
having, which is to signify as
being in another as extrinsic or en-
tirely outside it as neither its mea-
sure nor cause (having, rather, the
ratio of those things which pertain
only to man)

(b) in one way, as it is entirely

outside the subject, which, if it not
be a measure of the subject, is pre-
dicated in the manner of a habitus
(a ‘having’ or ‘possession’), as
when it is said, ‘Socrates is shod’
or ‘is clothed’

(a) therefore, only the agent cause
remains from which something
can be denominated as from
something exterior;
in this way, therefore, according
as something is denominated from
the agent cause, there is the pre-
dicament of ‘passion’;
for ‘undergoing’ (or ‘to undergo’)
is nothing other than to receive
something from an agent
to be in the manner of an under-
going, which is to be in another as
extrinsic or entirely outside it as
its agent cause from which it is
denominated
(to exist in the manner of a pas-
sion is to exist as coming into a
substance and inhering in it as in a
subject; or again, it is to exist as
flowing into a patient, and with
motion)
to signify in the manner of an un-
dergoing, which is to signify as
being in another as extrinsic or en-
tirely outside it as its agent cause
from which it is denominated
(to signify in the manner of a
passion is to signify as coming
into a substance and inhering in it
as in a subject; or again, it is to
signify as flowing into a patient,
and with motion)

(b) in another way, as that from

which the predicament is taken
according to something (that) is in
the subject of which it is predi-
cated;

and if according to a term, in this

way it will be predicated as in ‘un-
dergoing’ (or ‘to undergo’);

for passion is terminated in the

subject undergoing

(a) but conversely, according as
the agent cause is denominated
from the effect, there is the pre-
dicament of ‘action’;
to be in the manner of an acting,
which is to be in another as ex-
trinsic or entirely outside it as its
agent cause denominated from its
effect
to signify in the manner of an
acting, which is to signify as being
in another as extrinsic or entirely
outside it as its agent cause de-
nominated from its effect

for ‘action’ is an act from the (to exist in the manner of an (to signify in the manner of an
agent in another action is to exist as going out from action is to signify as going out

53
(b) but if according to a principle,
in this way it is predicated as
‘acting’ (or ‘to act’);
for the principle of action is in the
subject
a substance and inhering in it as in from a substance and inhering in it
a subject; or again, it is to exist as as in a subject; or again, it is to
flowing from an agent, and with signify as flowing from an agent,
motion) and with motion)

36. Some notes on the modes of signifying based on the Modi Significandi of Martin of
Denmark.

The modes of signifying are taken from the modes of understanding, which are taken from
the modes of being.

The modes of signifying distinguish the parts of speech.

The modes of being, as they are understood, become the modes of understanding.

But whatever it is possible to understand, it is also possible to signify.

Hence the modes of signifying are taken from the modes of understanding.

In order to signify our concepts we “put them into voice”; that is, we fashion a vocal sound
and place it upon the concept in order to signify it to another.

Thus, through this imposition the modes of understanding become modes of signifying.
For example, if the intellect understands something as a substance, it signifies it as a sub-
stantive.

The modes of being are in a thing as in a subject.

The essential modes make a thing different in kind; the accidental do not.

The modes of signifying are the principles of the science; they are that in virtue of which
the parts of a sentence go together.

The modes of signifying are consignifications 15 and are the proper concern of the gram-
marian.

The modes themselves are the properties of a thing as they are consignified through the
voice.

Consignification is something that happens to a voice that is already a sign. It adds a fur-
ther signification to the sign by conveying the properties of the thing. Each part of speech
consignifies its proper mode.

The following is a list of the principle parts of speech together with their modes of
signifying according to Martin:

15
On consignificaion, see The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction Among the Parts of
Speech (Papers in Poetics 10).

54
Noun a) the mode of habit and rest (material)
b) the mode of determinate apprehension (formal)

The mode of signifying here is composite. Form signifies the essence apprehended
by the intellect. Matter signifies the subject in which the form inheres. The material aspect
is taken from the mode of being of matter; the formal aspect, from the mode of being of
form.

Example: “Peter runs.”

Verb a) the mode of becoming (material)

b) the mode of standing apart (formal)

Example: “Peter runs.” The action is signified as coming from an agent.

Pronoun: the mode of habit and rest (formal and completive)

The pronoun is so-called from “standing for a noun” (pro nomen)

Example: “He was Peter.”

Adverb: the mode of determining another, or of being adjacent to another

Example: “Peter ran swiftly.”

Participle: the mode of becoming not standing apart from substance

Example: “Peter running.” The action is signified as being in an agent.

Conjunction: the mode of joining

Example: “And another thing, Peter.”

Interjection: an adverb with the mode of emotion

Example: “Oh, Peter.”

Division of the Noun:

The noun is divided into the mode of the common and the mode of the proper.

Example: “man” (the mode of the common)

“Socrates” (the mode of the proper)

“Man” is predicable of many; but Socrates designates this particular man. The
mode of the common makes the appellative noun, which has the mode of being applicable
to many. “Man” signifies indeterminately insofar as it is not determined more toward So-
crates than Plato.

55
 The mode of the common is divided into the mode of standing by itself and the
mode of the adjacent. A substantive noun [e.g., green] signifies through the mode of
standing by itself. The adjectival noun [e.g., musical] signifies through the mode of the ad-
jacent.

The substantive noun is itself divided into a) the abstract noun, and b) the concrete
noun. The abstract noun has its being essentially distinct against the subject. The concrete
noun has its being not as essentially distinct, but as accidentally making one with its
subject.

The concrete noun is twofold: 1) the substantive noun, as “man”, and 2) the adjec-
tival noun, as “white”.

37. Peter of Spain on matters relevant to the modes of signifying.

(a) On composition.

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncate-
gorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D,
pp. 17-18):

Composition is the union of possible components resulting from a proportion of act and
potency: for every composition requires act and potency, and along with this a union of these
to each other which is caused by a tendency of act toward potency. Compositions, however,
are real or logical. A real composition is one whose extremes are distinct from each other.
This composition is of four kinds: one kind is the composition of integral parts; another type
is that of essential parts; another kind is that of capacities, as the composition of the
capacities of the soul in relation to one another or with the soul [itself]; another is that of an
accident with a subject, as of whiteness with the wall of a house. A logical composition is
one whose extremes are dis- [17-18] tinguished by reason alone, whether they are real or not,
as is the composition of a quality with a substance in a noun or of a genus and a differentia
in a species. As regards logical composition, some are signified in a word; others, however,
in a proposition. Certainly that which belongs to a word is a composition of the essential and
accidental modes of signifying (modorum significandi) of the eight parts of speech, to treat
of which at length belongs to the grammarian. In relation to what has been proposed we
discuss only the composition of the modes of signifying of a noun, a verb, and a participle,
through whose negation an infinite term can come into existence, and the composition of a
perfect proposition through whose negation a negative proposition comes into existence.

(b) On the composition of the noun, the verb, and the participle.

Cf. ibid., pp. 19-20):

Therefore one must note that the composition of a noun is twofold. One is the composition
of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a substantive noun, as “man” has
for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a
quality of it. The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists
in the case of adjectival names; for example, “white” signifies an accident in relation to an
indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a
quality. And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded

56
 with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency which it has toward the
substance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in which they are.
For if such a composition be other than and distinct from the quality and from the substance,
it would be united with them, and, therefore, without an intermediate. And then for the same
reason it will have to be determined in the first way or through an intermediate. However,
once should ask about that intermediate through which it would be united with the extremes.
The process then would be infinite unless something were naturally united with another.
In a verb, however, there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as for
example, “He is running” (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running; and the
thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act. The reason for this is that although
a verb signifies an act concretely, it necessarily implies an indefinite substance. This is the
substance united in the verb. But that substance does not function as a subject in the
proposition. Rather it is predicated in the proposition, as when one says: “Sortes is running,”
running is not predicated absolutely and abstractly but rather the reality is predicated under
the aspect of running; just as is clear that in saying, “Sortes is white,” the sense is not “Sortes
is whiteness,” rather it means: “Sortes is a thing having whiteness.” This intrinsic com-
position of the verb is the union of an act implied by the verb with an intrinsic substance.
[19-20]
Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united
substance, as for example, “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads.” Whence “who”
affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a determinate act. From
this it is clear that a verb and a participle do not differ so far as the signified is concerned
because each signifies an act conjoined with an intrinsic substance. Therefore Priscian 3 says
that a participle has reference to that which is signified by a verb under the accidents of a
noun. However, verb and participle differ in the mode of signifying. A verb signifies an act
or movement in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in the manner
of going into a substance in the case of passion, by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of
predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior
substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a proposition. A
participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense of going into a
substance or of going out of a substance.
3
Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae. Books I to xiii are edited by Henry Keil from an
edition by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1855), volume I. Books xiii to xviii are
edited by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1859), volume II. All references are to these
editions of Priscian, ix, I. 9.

(c) In sum: The composition of a noun is twofold.

(1) One is the composition of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a
substantive noun, as “man” has for its object the reality under humanity. There the
reality is a substance and humanity is a quality of it.

(2) The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists in
the case of adjectival names; for example, “white” signifies an accident in relation
to an indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the
accident as a quality.

And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded

with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency [= ‘an aptitude’] which it
has toward the substance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in
which they are.

57
(d) The composition of the verb.

In a verb, however, there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as

for example, “He is running” (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running;
and the thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act.

(e) The composition of the participle.

Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a

united substance, as for example, “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads.”
Whence “who” affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a de-
terminate act.

(f) Summary of Peter’s teaching.

In the substantival noun there is a composition of an essential quality with a sub-

stance, as “man” has for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a sub-
stance and humanity is a quality of it.

In the adjectival noun there is a composition of an accidental quality with a sub-

stance, as “white” signifies an accident in relation to an indefinite substance which is con-
tained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a quality.

In the verb there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as for exam-
ple, “He is running” (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running; and the
thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act.

In the participle there is a composition of a united act with a united substance, as

for example, “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads.” Whence “who” affirms
substance; it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a determinate act.

In the case of a noun there is a composition of a quality with a substance.

A verb signifies an act or movement,

in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or

in the manner of going into a substance in the case of passion,

by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of predicable of another and it implies an

act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior substance and for this reason it implies the
composition which belongs to a proposition.

A participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense of
going into a substance or of going out of a substance.

58
38. Supplement: On substantives and adjectival names.

St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica
(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

   Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of
what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional
acts; and of the comparison of these with each other.

   As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
    (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
    (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the
singular?
    (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the
essential names taken in a concrete sense?
    (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?
    (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names?
    (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
    (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?

 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

  Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For
whenever essence is the same as person or “suppositum,” there can be only one
“suppositum” of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those
things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other.
But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above
expounded (Question [28], Article [3]; Question [30], Article [2]). Therefore essence is not
the same as person.

  Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the
same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of

59
person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not
the same.

  Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence;
whence it is called “suppositum” or “hypostasis.” Therefore person is not the same as
essence.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): “When we say the person of the Father
we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father.”

  I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity.
For it was shown above (Question [3], Article [3]) that the divine simplicity requires
that in God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intellectual substances is
nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the
divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as
Boethius says (De Trin. i), “relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought
that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be
“adjacent”; considering only in the relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the
relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question [28], Article [2]) in creatures
relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it
follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are
really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (Question [29], Article
[4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the
essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred
to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are
one essence and three persons.

  Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of “suppositum” in creatures by

means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are
not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition
between them they distinguish the “supposita”; and yet the essence is not distinguished,
because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are
identified with the essence.

  Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it
follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore,
when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

  Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as
above explained (Question [13], Articles [1],3). And since created natures are
individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that
individuals are called “subjects,” “supposita,” or “hypostases.” So the divine persons
are named “supposita” or “hypostases,” but not as if there really existed any real
“supposition” or “subjection.”

 
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60
Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?

  Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For
Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost “are indeed three by
substance, but one in harmony.” But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the
three persons are not of one essence.

  Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by

the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never
says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be
asserted.

  Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices
therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.

  Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that
the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons
are of one essence.

  Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three
persons are “from one essence [ex una essentia],” lest we should seem to indicate a
distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply
transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three
persons are “of one essence [unius essentiae].”

  Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error.
Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of
error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): “One substance predicated of the Father and the
Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into
two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two.”
Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word {homoousion}, which
the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one
essence.

  I answer that, As above explained (Question [13], Articles [1],2), divine things are
named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them
not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence
the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the
matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the “suppositum” of
the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to
our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that
whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we
do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective
qualifies the form; as when we say: “That woman is of a handsome figure,” or: “This

61
man is of perfect virtue.” In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the
essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons
of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.

  Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the “hypostasis,” and not for the
essence.

  Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many
words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards
the meaning; for instance, “I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30),” and “I am in the Father,
and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)”; and there are many other texts of the same import.

  Reply to Objection 3: Because “nature” designates the principle of action while “essence”
comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some
action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of “one
essence” which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the
three persons are “of one essence,” than by saying they are “of one nature.”

  Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging

to that of which it is the form, as we say “the virtue of Peter.” On the other hand, the thing
having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to
qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the
form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say,
“Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],” or else one genitive must have the force of two,
as, for instance, “he is a man of blood”—that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi
sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may
properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless
we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the
“divine essence”; or, the three persons are “of one essence.”

  Reply to Objection 5: The preposition “from” or “out of” does not designate the
habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause;
which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the
causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be
its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, “three persons of one
essence,” taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is
different from person, which we should mean if we said, “three persons from the same
essence.”

  Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): “It would be prejudicial to holy things,
if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some
misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The
oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of
possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.”

 
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62
Question: 39  [<< | >>]

Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

  Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name “God,” should not be
predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as “man” signifies
“one that has humanity,” so God signifies “one that has Godhead.” But the three
persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are “three Gods.”

  Objection 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, “In the beginning God created heaven and
earth,” the Hebrew original has “Elohim,” which may be rendered “Gods” or “Judges”:
and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are
“several Gods,” and not “one” God.

  Objection 3: Further, this word “thing” when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to
substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost.” Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the
three persons.

  Objection 4: Further, as this word “God” signifies “a being who has Deity,” so also this
word “person” signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are
three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are “three Gods.”

  On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God.”

  I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of
substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which
signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in
the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons
in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of
substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a
subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or
multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the
form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have
unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of
adjectives depends upon their “supposita.” In creatures, one form does not exist in
several “supposita” except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So
if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in
the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college,
or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians.

Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (Article
[2]), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (Question [3], Article
[7]; Question [11], Article [4]). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive
manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then,
is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are “three men”; whereas we do

63
not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are “three Gods,” but “one God”; forasmuch as in
the three “supposita” of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three
divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify
essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of
the plurality of “supposita.” For we say there are three “existent” or three “wise” beings, or
three “eternal,” “uncreated,” and “immense” beings, if these terms are understood in an
adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say “one uncreated, immense,
eternal being,” as Athanasius declares.

  Reply to Objection 1: Though the name “God” signifies a being having Godhead,
nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name “God” is used
substantively; whereas “having Godhead” is used adjectively. Consequently, although
there are “three having Godhead,” it does not follow that there are three Gods.

  Reply to Objection 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by

reason of the plurality of “supposita” the Greeks said “three hypostases,” so also in
Hebrew “Elohim” is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to “God” or
to “substance,” lest plurality be referred to the substance.

  Reply to Objection 3: This word “thing” is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as
it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred
to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted,
that “the same Trinity is a thing supreme.”

  Reply to Objection 4: The form signified by the word “person” is not essence or nature,
but personality. So, as there are three personalities—that is, three personal properties in the
Father, Son and Holy Ghost—it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the
plural.

 
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Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the
person, so that we can truly say “God begot God.” For, as the logicians say, “a
singular term signifies what it stands for.” But this name “God” seems to be a singular
term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (Article [3]). Therefore,
since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.

  Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the

predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But
when I say, “God creates,” this name “God” stands for the essence. So when we say “God
begot,” this term “God” cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.

64
  Objection 3: Further, if this be true, “God begot,” because the Father generates; for the
same reason this is true, “God does not beget,” because the Son does not beget. Therefore
there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that
there are two Gods.

  Objection 4: Further, if “God begot God,” He begot either God, that is Himself, or
another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i,
1), “nothing begets itself.” Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God.
Therefore it is false to say, “God begot God.”

  Objection 5: Further, if “God begot God,” He begot either God who is the Father, or God
who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God
who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false.
Therefore it cannot be said that “God begot God.”

  On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, “God of God.”

  I answer that, Some have said that this name “God” and the like, properly according to
their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to
stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity,
which requires that in God, He “who possesses” and “what is possessed” be the same. So
He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead.
But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of
signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word
“God” signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name “man”
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word “God,”
from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the
word “man.” So this word “God” sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say “God
creates”; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified
—that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we
say, “God begets,” or for two, as when we say, “God spirates”; or for three, as when it is
said: “To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,” etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).

  Reply to Objection 1: Although this name “God” agrees with singular terms as regards
the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so
far as the form signified is to be found in several “supposita.” So it need not always stand
for the essence it signifies.

  Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the word “God” does
not naturally stand for person.

  Reply to Objection 3: The word “God” stands for the person in a different way from that
in which this word “man” does; for since the form signified by this word “man”—that is,
humanity—is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person,
even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person—that is, to a distinct subject. The
unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the
consideration of the mind. Hence this term “man” does not stand for the common nature,
unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, “man is a species”; whereas the
form signified by the name “God”—that is, the divine essence—is really one and common.

65
So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as
to stand for the person. So, when we say, “God generates,” by reason of the notional act
this name “God” stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, “God does not
generate,” there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence
the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something
be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, “God begotten
does not beget,” is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a “God
generator,” and a “God not generator”; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons;
as, for instance, if we were to say, “the Father is God the generator” and the “Son is God
the non-generator” and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and
the Son are one God, as was said above (Article [3]).

  Reply to Objection 4: This is false, “the Father begot God, that is Himself,” because the
word “Himself,” as a reciprocal term, refers to the same “suppositum.” Nor is this
contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that “God the Father begot another
self [alterum se],” forasmuch as the word “se” is either in the ablative case, and then it
means “He begot another from Himself,” or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to
identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so
that it would really mean, “He begot another most like to Himself.” Likewise also it is false
to say, “He begot another God,” because although the Son is another than the Father, as
above explained (Question [31], Article [2]), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is
“another God”; forasmuch as this adjective “another” would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet
this proposition “He begot another God” is tolerated by some, provided that “another” be
taken as a substantive, and the word “God” be construed in apposition with it. This,
however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to
error.

  Reply to Objection 5: To say, “God begot God Who is God the Father,” is wrong,
because since the word “Father” is construed in apposition to “God,” the word “God” is
restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, “He begot God, Who is
Himself the Father”; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.
Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, “He begot God Who is not God the
Father.” If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require
something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the
negative is false; so that the meaning would be, “He begot God Who is God Who is the
Father.” Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply
that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that
both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative “Who” in the affirmative
proposition can be referred to the “suppositum”; whereas in the negative it denotes both the
thing signified and the “suppositum.” Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that “to be
God the Father” is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that “to
be God the Father,” is to be removed from the Son’s divinity as well as from His
personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher
(Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.

 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 5  [<< | >>]

Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?

  Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so
that this proposition is true, “Essence begets essence.” For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i,
2): “The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken
singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence.”

  Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or

corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine
essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.

  Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is
above explained (Question [3], Article [3]). But, as was shown, it is true to say that “God
begets God.” Therefore this is also true: “Essence begets essence.”

  Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the
Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus
the essence begets.

  Objection 5: Further, the essence is “a thing begetting,” because the essence is the Father
who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be “a thing
begetting,” and “not begetting”: which cannot be.

  Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): “The Father is the principle of the
whole Godhead.” But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father
begets or spirates the Godhead.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): “Nothing begets itself.” But if the
essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as
distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.

  I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say
“God begot God,” so we can say “Essence begot essence”: considering that, by reason of
the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,
because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the
thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (Article [4]).
Now although “God” is really the same as “Godhead,” nevertheless the mode of
signification is not in each case the same. For since this word “God” signifies the
divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own
nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be
predicated of this word, “God,” as, for instance, we can say “God is begotten” or is
“Begetter,” as above explained (Article [4]). The word “essence,” however, in its mode of
signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form.
Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from
each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the
divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the “supposita.”

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  Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have
sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms
allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them:
thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by
personal names; as when we find “essence from essence”; or “wisdom from wisdom”; we
should take the sense to be, “the Son” who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who
is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order
should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the
persons because actions belong to “supposita.” So “nature from nature,” and “wisdom from
wisdom” are less inexact than “essence from essence.”

  Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically
as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it
anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the
divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.

  Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the same,
nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a
different way about each of them.

  Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity
by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its
mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things
which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

  Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names

consists in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do
not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say
that the substantive is considered in the light of “suppositum,” whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the “suppositum.” Therefore substantive personal terms
can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a
personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the “suppositum” implied in
the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence
unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the “essence is begetting”; yet we can
say that the “essence is a thing begetting,” or that it is “God begetting,” if “thing” and God
stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no
contradiction in saying that “essence is a thing begetting,” and “a thing not begetting”;
because in the first case “thing” stands for person, and in the second it stands for the
essence.

  Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several “supposita,” it agrees in a

certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, “the Father is the
principle of the whole Godhead,” the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons
together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He
is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without
being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not
as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.

68
 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 6  [<< | >>]

Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential
names; so that we can say for instance, “God is three persons”; or “God is the Trinity.” For
it is false to say, “man is every man,” because it cannot be verified as regards any
particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the
same way this proposition, “God is the Trinity,” cannot be verified of any one of the
“supposita” of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the
Holy Ghost. So to say, “God is the Trinity,” is false.

  Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental
predication; as when I say, “animal is man”; for it is accidental to animal to be man.
But this name “God” as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons
cannot be predicated of this name “God,” except in an accidental sense.

  On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini],
“We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity.”

  I answer that, As above explained (Article [5]), although adjectival terms, whether
personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive
terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The
divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the
three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as
if we were to say, “The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” And
because this word “God” can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (Article
[4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, “The essence is the three persons”; so likewise it is
true to say, “God is the three persons.”

  Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term “man” can of itself stand for
person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature.
So it is false to say, “Man is every man”; because it cannot be verified of any particular
human subject. On the contrary, this word “God” can of itself be taken for the divine
essence. So, although to say of any of the “supposita” of the divine nature, “God is the
Trinity,” is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by
Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.

  Reply to Objection 2: When we say, “God,” or “the divine essence is the Father,” the
predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in
God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, “The Father is God” is
of itself true, so this proposition “God is the Father” is true of itself, and by no means

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accidentally.

 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 7  [<< | >>]

Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the
persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of
divine things; for, as Jerome says, “careless words involve risk of heresy” [*In substance
Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three
persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to
the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than
to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.

  Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by

mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished
in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.

  Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the
idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior
to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.

  On the contrary, the Apostle says: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1
Cor. 1:24).

  I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes
should be appropriated to the persons. For although the Trinity of persons cannot be
proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (Question [32], Article [1]),
nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the
essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the
personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes
from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding
the personal properties, as was above explained (Question [32], Article [1]). As, therefore,
we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation
of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential
attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential
attributes is called “appropriation.”

   The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in
one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to
the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as

70
power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old
age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God

  Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if
they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of
similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
manifestation of the truth.

  Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as

exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a
form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing
that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were
Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father
without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom
from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both
together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him,
but by the wisdom which is His own essence.

  Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to
person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated,
there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is
appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to
“white body,” considered as white.

 
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Question: 39  [<< | >>]
Article: 8  [<< | >>]

Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the
holy doctors?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons
unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): “Eternity is in the Father, the
species in the Image; and use is in the Gift.” In which words he designates three names
proper to the persons: the name of the “Father,” the name “Image” proper to the Son
(Question [35], Article [2]), and the name “Bounty” or “Gift,” which is proper to the Holy
Ghost (Question [38], Article [2]). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he
appropriates “eternity” to the Father, “species” to the Son, and “use” to the Holy Ghost.
This he does apparently without reason. For “eternity” imports duration of existence;
“species,” the principle of existence; and ‘use’ belongs to the operation. But essence and
operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not
fittingly appropriated to the persons.

  Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “Unity is in the Father,
equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity.” This does
not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from
what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as

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above explained (Question [37], Article [2], ad 1). But, as he subjoins, “All these three are
one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.” The above,
therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.

  Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed “power,” to the

Son “wisdom,” to the Holy Ghost “goodness.” Nor does this seem fitting; for “strength” is
part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the
text, “Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, “strength [*Douay: virtue] came
out from Him and healed all” (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to
the Father.

  Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): “What the Apostle says, “From
Him, and by Him, and in Him,” is not to be taken in a confused sense.” And (Contra
Maxim. ii) “‘from Him’ refers to the Father, ‘by Him’ to the Son, ‘in Him’ to the Holy
Ghost.’“ This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words “in Him” seem to
imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of
cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle from no principle.”

  Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, “I am the
Way, the Truth, and the Life”; and likewise “the book of life,” according to Ps. 39:9, “In
the beginning of the book it is written of Me,” where a gloss observes, “that is, with the
Father Who is My head,” also this word “Who is”; because on the text of Is. 65:1, “Behold
I go to the Gentiles,” a gloss adds, “The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am.”
These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For “truth,” according to
Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), “is the supreme similitude of the principle without any
dissimilitude.” So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also
the “book of life” seems proper to the Son, as signifying “a thing from another”; for every
book is written by someone. This also, “Who is,” appears to be proper to the Son; because
if when it was said to Moses, “I am Who am,” the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have
said, “He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,” so
also he could have said further, “He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost
sent me to you,” pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is
Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to
the Son.

  I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must
consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature
four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken
absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of
consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration
comes to our mind in reference to God.

   According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His
being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which “eternity” is
appropriated to the Father, “species” to the Son, “use” to the Holy Ghost. For “eternity” as
meaning a “being” without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is
“a principle without a principle.” Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the

72
Son. For beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” or “perfection,” since those
things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”;
and lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called beautiful which have a
bright color.

   The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in
Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in
his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): “Where—that is, in the Son—there is supreme and
primal life,” etc.

   The second agrees with the Son’s property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the
Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an
ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), “Where there
exists wondrous proportion and primal equality,” etc.

   The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and
splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the
same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and,
so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God,” etc.

   “Use” has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the “use” be taken in a
wide sense, as including also the sense of “to enjoy”; according as “to use” is to employ
something at the beck of the will, and “to enjoy” means to use joyfully, as Augustine says
(De Trin. x, 11). So “use,” whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with
the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10):
“That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him” (Hilary). But
the “use” by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift;
and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “In the Trinity, the Holy
Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures
His immense bounty and wealth.” Thus it is clear how “eternity,” “species,” and “use” are
attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being
common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.

   The second consideration of God regards Him as “one.” In that view Augustine (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates “unity” to the Father, “equality” to the Son, “concord” or
“union” to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways.
For “unity” is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it
is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the
“principle without principle.” “Equality” implies unity as regards another; for that is equal
which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the
“principle from a principle.” “Union” implies the unity of two; and is therefore
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that “The Three
are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by
reason of the Holy Ghost.” For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find
it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein
we find the first trace of life. Now “unity” is perceived at once in the person of the Father,
even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons
derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find

73
equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by
reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that,
without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the
Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be
excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son.
So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find
whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.

   According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God
in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of “power,”
“wisdom,” and “goodness.” This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of
similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we
consider what is in creatures. For “power” has the nature of a principle, and so it has a
likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an
earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. “Wisdom” has likeness to the
heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly
son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. “Goodness,” as the nature and
object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit,
which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: “The spirit of the
strong is as a blast beating on the wall.” “Strength” is appropriated to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express
that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an
agent is its strength.

   According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God’s relation to His effects, there arise
appropriation of the expression “from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom.” For this
preposition “from” [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which
has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father
in the same way as power. The preposition “by” [per] sometimes designates an
intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works “by” a hammer. Hence the word
“by” is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
according to the text, “All things were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an
instrument, but as “the principle from a principle.” Sometimes it designates the habitude of
a form “by” which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as
wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression “by Whom.” The
preposition “in” strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things
in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing
in His knowledge. In this sense the expression “in Him” should be appropriated to the Son.
In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves
and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression “in
Him” is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is “goodness.” Nor need the habitude
of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is “the
principle without a principle”: because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the
principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end;
but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a
natural power.

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   Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since “truth” belongs to the
intellect, as stated above (Question [16], Article [1]), it is appropriated to the Son, without,
however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or
in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to
the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted
from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The “book of life” directly
means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Question [24],
Article [1]), it is God’s knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life.
Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost,
as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of
the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book
considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply
origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression “Who is” is
appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct,
inasmuch as, in God’s word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race
accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word “Who” is taken in a relative sense, it
may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken
personally; as, for instance, were we to say, “The Son is the begotten ‘Who is,’“ inasmuch
as “God begotten is personal.” But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although
the pronoun “this” [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless
everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its
own nature it is not a person; as we may say, “this stone,” and “this ass.” So, speaking in a
grammatical sense, so far as the word “God” signifies and stands for the divine essence,
the latter may be designated by the pronoun “this,” according to Ex. 15:2: “This is my
God, and I will glorify Him.”

75
Quaestio 39
Prooemium
[29984] Iª q. 39 pr. Post ea quae de personis divinis absolute tractata sunt, considerandum
restat de personis in comparatione ad essentiam, et ad proprietates, et ad actus notionales;
et de comparatione ipsarum ad invicem. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, octo
quaeruntur. Primo, utrum essentia in divinis sit idem quod persona. Secundo, utrum
dicendum sit quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Tertio, utrum nomina essentialia
praedicanda sint de personis in plurali vel in singulari. Quarto, utrum adiectiva notionalia,
aut verba vel participia, praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretive acceptis.
Quinto, utrum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus in abstracto acceptis. Sexto,
utrum nomina personarum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretis.
Septimo, utrum essentialia attributa sint approprianda personis. Octavo, quod attributum
cuique personae debeat appropriari.

Articulus 1
[29985] Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non
sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona seu
suppositum, oportet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturae, ut patet in omnibus
substantiis separatis, eorum enim quae sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest, quin
multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personae, ut ex supra dictis
patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona.
[29986] Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur
de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona, nam persona est
distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem.
[29987] Iª q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil subiicitur sibi ipsi. Sed persona subiicitur
essentiae, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod
essentia.
[29988] Iª q. 39 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum dicimus
personam patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris.
[29989] Iª q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem,
quaestio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra quod divina
simplicitas hoc requirit, quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum; quod in substantiis
intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod,
multiplicatis personis divinis, essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, relatio
multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam
et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus
solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut
relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo
sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem; et tamen quod
personae realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat
relationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata,
non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute
oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personae.

76
[29990] Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in creaturis non potest esse
distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia
relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes, et
ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita.
Neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem
secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia.
[29991] Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum essentia et persona in
divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari
de uno, quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod, supposito uno, non supponatur
alterum.
[29992] Iª q. 39 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus
secundum modum rerum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturae rerum creatarum
individuantur per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei, inde est quod individua
dicuntur subiecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae
supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio
secundum rem.

Articulus 2
[29993] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum
tres personas esse unius essentiae. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., quod pater et
filius et spiritus sanctus sunt quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum.
Sed substantia Dei est eius essentia. Ergo tres personae non sunt unius essentiae.
[29994] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, non est affirmandum aliquid de divinis, quod
auctoritate Scripturae sacrae non est expressum, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div.
Nom. Sed nunquam in Scriptura sacra exprimitur quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus
sunt unius essentiae. Ergo hoc non est asserendum.
[29995] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura divina est idem quod essentia. Sufficeret ergo
dicere quod tres personae sunt unius naturae.
[29996] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, non consuevit dici quod persona sit essentiae, sed
magis quod essentia sit personae. Ergo neque convenienter videtur dici quod tres personae
sunt unius essentiae.
[29997] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod non dicimus tres personas esse
ex una essentia, ne intelligatur in divinis aliud esse essentia et persona. Sed sicut
praepositiones sunt transitivae, ita et obliqui. Ergo, pari ratione, non est dicendum quod
tres personae sunt unius essentiae.
[29998] Iª q. 39 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, id quod potest esse erroris occasio, non est in divinis
dicendum. Sed cum dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae vel substantiae datur erroris
occasio. Quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., una substantia patris et filii praedicata,
aut unum qui duas nuncupationes habeat, subsistentem significat; aut divisam unam
substantiam duas imperfectas fecisse substantias; aut tertiam priorem substantiam, quae a
duobus et usurpata sit et assumpta. Non est ergo dicendum tres personas esse unius
substantiae.

77
[29999] Iª q. 39 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro II contra
Maximinum, quod hoc nomen homousion, quod in Concilio Nicaeno adversus Arianos
firmatum est, idem significat quod tres personas esse unius essentiae.
[30000] Iª q. 39 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus
noster res divinas nominat, non secundum modum earum, quia sic eas cognoscere non
potest; sed secundum modum in rebus creatis inventum. Et quia in rebus sensibilibus, a
quibus intellectus noster scientiam capit, natura alicuius speciei per materiam individuatur;
et sic natura se habet ut forma, individuum autem ut suppositum formae, propter hoc etiam
in divinis, quantum ad modum significandi, essentia significatur ut forma trium
personarum. Dicimus autem in rebus creatis formam quamcumque esse eius cuius est
forma; sicut sanitatem vel pulchritudinem hominis alicuius. Rem autem habentem formam
non dicimus esse formae, nisi cum adiectione alicuius adiectivi, quod designat illam
formam, ut cum dicimus, ista mulier est egregiae formae, iste homo est perfectae virtutis.
Et similiter, quia in divinis, multiplicatis personis, non multiplicatur essentia, dicimus
unam essentiam esse trium personarum; et tres personas unius essentiae, ut intelligantur isti
genitivi construi in designatione formae.
[30001] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia sumitur pro
hypostasi; et non pro essentia.
[30002] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet tres personas esse unius
essentiae non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura per haec verba, invenitur tamen quantum ad
hunc sensum, sicut ibi, ego et pater unum sumus; et, ego in patre, et pater in me est. Et per
multa alia haberi potest idem.
[30003] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia natura designat principium
actus, essentia vero ab essendo dicitur, possunt dici aliqua unius naturae, quae conveniunt
in aliquo actu, sicut omnia calefacientia, sed unius essentiae dici non possunt, nisi quorum
est unum esse. Et ideo magis exprimitur unitas divina per hoc quod dicitur quod tres
personae sunt unius essentiae, quam si diceretur quod sunt unius naturae.
[30004] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma, absolute accepta, consuevit
significari ut eius cuius est forma, ut virtus Petri. E converso autem, res habens formam
aliquam non consuevit significari ut eius, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare
formam. Et tunc requiruntur duo genitivi, quorum unus significet formam, et alius
determinationem formae, ut si dicatur, Petrus est magnae virtutis, vel etiam requiritur unus
genitivus habens vim duorum genitivorum, ut cum dicitur, vir sanguinum est iste, idest
effusor multi sanguinis. Quia igitur essentia divina significatur ut forma respectu personae,
convenienter essentia personae dicitur. Non autem e converso, nisi aliquid addatur ad
designationem essentiae; ut si dicatur quod pater est persona divinae essentiae, vel quod
tres personae sunt unius essentiae.
[30005] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec praepositio ex vel de non
designat habitudinem causae formalis, sed magis habitudinem causae efficientis vel
materialis. Quae quidem causae in omnibus distinguuntur ab his quorum sunt causae, nihil
enim est sua materia, neque aliquid est suum principium activum. Aliquid tamen est sua
forma, ut patet in omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Et ideo per hoc quod dicimus tres
personas unius essentiae, significando essentiam in habitudine formae, non ostenditur aliud

78
esse essentia quam persona, quod ostenderetur, si diceremus tres personas ex eadem
essentia.
[30006] Iª q. 39 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Hilarius dicit, in libro de
Synod., male sanctis rebus praeiudicatur, si, quia non sanctae a quibusdam habentur, esse
non debeant. Sic, si male intelligitur homousion, quid ad me bene intelligentem? Sit ergo
una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate, non sit autem ex portione, aut ex unione,
aut ex communione.

Articulus 3
[30007] Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia, ut
hoc nomen Deus, non praedicentur singulariter de tribus personis, sed pluraliter. Sicut
enim homo significatur ut habens humanitatem, ita Deus significatur ut habens deitatem.
Sed tres personae sunt tres habentes deitatem. Ergo tres personae sunt tres dii.
[30008] Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, ubi dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum
et terram, Hebraica veritas habet Elohim, quod potest interpretari dii, sive iudices. Et hoc
dicitur propter pluralitatem personarum. Ergo tres personae sunt plures dii, et non unus
Deus.
[30009] Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, hoc nomen res, cum absolute dicatur, videtur ad
substantiam pertinere. Sed hoc nomen pluraliter praedicatur de tribus personis, dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de Doctr. Christ., res quibus fruendum est, sunt pater et filius et
spiritus sanctus. Ergo et alia nomina essentialia pluraliter praedicari possunt de tribus
personis.
[30010] Iª q. 39 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat habentem deitatem,
ita hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura aliqua intellectuali. Sed dicimus
tres personas. Ergo, eadem ratione, dicere possumus tres deos.
[30011] Iª q. 39 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus
tuus, Deus unus est.
[30012] Iª q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nominum essentialium quaedam
significant essentiam substantive, quaedam vero adiective. Ea quidem quae substantive
essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis singulariter tantum, et non pluraliter,
quae vero adiective essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis in plurali. Cuius
ratio est, quia nomina substantiva significant aliquid per modum substantiae, nomina vero
adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis, quod inhaeret subiecto. Substantia
autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem, unde et
singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam
per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subiecto, ita ex subiecto suscipiunt
unitatem et multitudinem, et ideo in adiectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum
supposita. In creaturis autem non invenitur una forma in pluribus suppositis nisi unitate
ordinis, ut forma multitudinis ordinatae. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint
substantiva, praedicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adiectiva. Dicimus
enim quod multi homines sunt collegium vel exercitus aut populus, dicimus tamen quod
plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum
formae, ut dictum est quae quidem simplex est et maxime una, ut supra ostensum est. Unde

79
nomina significantia divinam essentiam substantive, singulariter, et non pluraliter, de tribus
personis praedicantur. Haec igitur est ratio quare Socratem et Platonem et Ciceronem
dicimus tres homines; patrem autem et filium et spiritum sanctum non dicimus tres deos,
sed unum Deum, quia in tribus suppositis humanae naturae sunt tres humanitates; in tribus
autem personis est una divina essentia. Ea vero quae significant essentiam adiective,
praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim tres
existentes vel tres sapientes, aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos, si adiective
sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum et aeternum,
ut Athanasius dicit.
[30013] Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Deus significet habentem
deitatem, est tamen alius modus significandi, nam Deus dicitur substantive, sed habens
deitatem dicitur adiective. Unde, licet sint tres habentes deitatem, non tamen sequitur quod
sint tres dii.
[30014] Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod diversae linguae habent diversum
modum loquendi. Unde, sicut propter pluralitatem suppositorum Graeci dicunt tres
hypostases, ita et in Hebraeo dicitur pluraliter Elohim. Nos autem non dicimus pluraliter
neque deos neque substantias, ne pluralitas ad substantiam referatur.
[30015] Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen res est de
transcendentibus. Unde, secundum quod pertinet ad relationem, pluraliter praedicatur in
divinis, secundum vero quod pertinet ad substantiam, singulariter praedicatur. Unde
Augustinus dicit ibidem quod eadem Trinitas quaedam summa res est.
[30016] Iª q. 39 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma significata per hoc nomen
persona, non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde, cum sint tres personalitates,
idest tres personales proprietates, in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, non singulariter, sed
pluraliter praedicatur de tribus.

Articulus 4
[30017] Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia
concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, Deus genuit Deum.
Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. Sed hoc nomen
Deus videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est.
Ergo, cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona.
[30018] Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, terminus in subiecto positus non restringitur per
terminum positum in praedicato, ratione significationis; sed solum ratione temporis
consignificati. Sed cum dico, Deus creat, hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum
dicitur, Deus genuit, non potest iste terminus Deus, ratione praedicati notionalis, supponere
pro persona.
[30019] Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si haec est vera, Deus genuit, quia pater generat; pari
ratione haec erit vera, Deus non generat, quia filius non generat. Ergo est Deus generans, et
Deus non generans. Et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo dii.
[30020] Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut se Deum, aut alium Deum.
Sed non se Deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., nulla res generat seipsam. Neque
alium Deum, quia non est nisi unus Deus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum.

80
[30021] Iª q. 39 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus pater,
aut Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si Deum qui est Deus pater, ergo Deus pater est genitus.
Si Deum qui non est Deus pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus pater, quod est falsum.
Non ergo potest dici quod Deus genuit Deum.
[30022] Iª q. 39 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur Deum de Deo.
[30023] Iª q. 39 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen
Deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adiuncto
notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona. Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex
consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod
habetur, et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen Deus, est idem quod deitas. Sed
in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus
significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat divinam essentiam ut in habente
ipsam, sicut hoc nomen homo humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt
quod hoc nomen Deus ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona,
sicut et hoc nomen homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia, ut cum
dicitur, Deus creat, quia hoc praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae,
quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit personam, vel unam tantum, ut cum dicitur,
Deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur Deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur, regi saeculorum
immortali, invisibili, soli Deo etc., I Tim. I.
[30024] Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, licet conveniat
cum terminis singularibus in hoc, quod forma significata non multiplicatur; convenit tamen
cum terminis communibus in hoc, quod forma significata invenitur in pluribus suppositis.
Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat.
[30025] Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit contra illos
qui dicebant quod hoc nomen Deus non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona.
[30026] Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter se habet hoc nomen Deus ad
supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc
nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro
persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum
distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed
solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura
communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species. Sed
forma significata per hoc nomen Deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis
secundum rem. Unde per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adiuncto determinatur
eius suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur, Deus generat, ratione actus notionalis
supponit hoc nomen Deus pro persona patris. Sed cum dicitur, Deus non generat, nihil
additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam filii, unde datur intelligi quod generatio
repugnet divinae naturae. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam filii, vera erit
locutio; ut si dicatur, Deus genitus non generat. Unde etiam non sequitur, est Deus
generans et est Deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personas; ut puta si
dicamus, pater est Deus generans, et filius est Deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod
sint plures dii, quia pater et filius sunt unus Deus, ut dictum est.
[30027] Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, pater genuit se Deum,
quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum. Neque est contrarium quod

81
Augustinus dicit, ad maximum, quod Deus pater genuit alterum se. Quia ly se vel est casus
ablativi; ut sit sensus, genuit alterum a se. Vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert
identitatem naturae, sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus, genuit alterum
simillimum sibi. Similiter et haec est falsa, genuit alium Deum. Quia licet filius sit alius a
patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius Deus, quia intelligeretur
quod hoc adiectivum alius poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est Deus; et sic
significaretur distinctio deitatis. Quidam tamen concedunt istam, genuit alium Deum, ita
quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly Deus appositive construatur cum eo. Sed hic est
improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris.
[30028] Iª q. 39 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum qui
est Deus pater, quia, cum ly pater appositive construatur cum ly Deus, restringit ipsum ad
standum pro persona patris; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est ipse pater, et sic pater esset
genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera, genuit Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si
tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva, sed aliquid esse interponendum; tunc e
converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est Deus
qui est pater. Sed haec est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa
negetur, et negativa concedatur. Praepositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam
affirmativa est falsa. Quia hoc relativum qui in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed
in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum. Unde sensus affirmativae est, quod esse
Deum patrem conveniat personae filii. Negativae vero sensus est, quod esse Deum patrem
non tantum removeatur a persona filii, sed etiam a divinitate eius sed hoc irrationabile
videtur, cum, secundum philosophum, de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse
negatio.

Articulus 5
[30029] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia in
abstracto significata possint supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, essentia generat
essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., pater et filius sunt una sapientia, quia una
essentia; et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia.
[30030] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, generatis nobis vel corruptis, generantur vel
corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed filius generatur. Ergo, cum essentia divina sit in
filio, videtur quod essentia divina generetur.
[30031] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, idem est Deus et essentia divina, ut ex supra dictis
patet. Sed haec est vera, Deus generat Deum, sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, essentia
generat essentiam.
[30032] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid, potest supponere
pro illo. Sed essentia divina est pater. Ergo essentia potest supponere pro persona patris. Et
sic essentia generat.
[30033] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, essentia est res generans, quia est pater, qui est
generans. Si igitur essentia non sit generans, erit essentia res generans et non generans,
quod est impossibile.

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[30034] Iª q. 39 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., pater est principium
totius deitatis. Sed non est principium nisi generando vel spirando. Ergo pater generat vel
spirat deitatem.
[30035] Iª q. 39 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod nulla res
generat seipsam. Sed si essentia generat essentiam, non generat nisi seipsam, cum nihil sit
in Deo, quod distinguatur a divina essentia. Ergo essentia non generat essentiam.
[30036] Iª q. 39 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc erravit abbas Ioachim,
asserens quod, sicut dicitur, Deus genuit Deum, ita potest dici quod essentia genuit
essentiam; considerans quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, non est aliud Deus quam
divina essentia. Sed in hoc deceptus fuit, quia ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet
considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi ut dictum est. Licet autem,
secundum re, sit idem Deus quod deitas, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique.
Nam hoc nomen Deus, quia significat divinam essentiam ut in habente, ex modo suae
significationis naturaliter habet quod possit supponere pro persona, et sic ea quae sunt
propria personarum, possunt praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, ut dicatur quod Deus est
genitus vel generans, sicut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen essentia non habet ex modo suae
significationis quod supponat pro persona, quia significat essentiam ut formam abstractam.
Et ideo ea quae sunt propria personarum, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, non possunt
essentiae attribui, significaretur enim quod esset distinctio in essentia divina, sicut est
distinctio in suppositis.
[30037] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ad exprimendam unitatem
essentiae et personae, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas
locutionis patiatur. Unde huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae, ut
scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, vel etiam per nomina personalia, ut,
cum dicitur, essentia de essentia, vel sapientia de sapientia, sit sensus, filius, qui est
essentia et sapientia, est de patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen nominibus
abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus, quia ea quae pertinent ad actum, magis propinque
se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista, natura
de natura, vel sapientia de sapientia, quam essentia de essentia.
[30038] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in creaturis generatum non accipit
naturam eandem numero quam generans habet, sed aliam numero, quae incipit in eo esse
per generationem de novo, et desinit esse per corruptionem, et ideo generatur et
corrumpitur per accidens. Sed Deus genitus eandem naturam numero accipit quam
generans habet. Et ideo natura divina in filio non generatur, neque per se neque per
accidens.
[30039] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Deus et divina essentia sint idem
secundum rem, tamen, ratione alterius modi significandi, oportet loqui diversimode de
utroque.
[30040] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia divina praedicatur de patre
per modum identitatis, propter divinam simplicitatem, nec tamen sequitur quod possit
supponere pro patre, propter diversum modum significandi. Ratio autem procederet in illis,
quorum unum praedicatur de altero sicut universale de particulari.

83
[30041] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina
substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero
non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina
substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur
personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque
sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa
suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva
non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus
dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans,
vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro
essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non
generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia.
[30042] Iª q. 39 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod deitas, inquantum est una in pluribus
suppositis, habet quandam convenientiam cum forma nominis collectivi. Unde cum dicitur,
pater est principium totius deitatis, potest sumi pro universitate personarum; inquantum
scilicet, in omnibus personis divinis, ipse est principium. Nec oportet quod sit principium
sui ipsius, sicut aliquis de populo dicitur rector totius populi, non tamen sui ipsius. Vel
potest dici quod est principium totius deitatis, non quia eam generet et spiret, sed quia eam,
generando et spirando, communicat.

Articulus 6
[30043] Iª q. 39 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae non possint
praedicari de nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut dicatur, Deus est tres personae, vel est
Trinitas. Haec enim est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo suppositorum verificari
potest, neque enim Socrates est omnis homo, neque Plato, neque aliquis alius. Sed similiter
ista, Deus est Trinitas, pro nullo suppositorum naturae divinae verificari potest, neque enim
pater est Trinitas, neque filius, neque spiritus sanctus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus est
Trinitas.
[30044] Iª q. 39 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, inferiora non praedicantur de suis superioribus nisi
accidentali praedicatione, ut cum dico, animal est homo, accidit enim animali esse
hominem. Sed hoc nomen Deus se habet ad tres personas sicut commune ad inferiora, ut
Damascenus dicit. Ergo videtur quod nomina personarum non possint praedicari de hoc
nomine Deus, nisi accidentaliter.
[30045] Iª q. 39 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de fide,
credimus unum Deum unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem.
[30046] Iª q. 39 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, licet nomina
personalia vel notionalia adiectiva non possint praedicari de essentia; tamen substantiva
possunt, propter realem identitatem essentiae et personae. Essentia autem divina non solum
idem est realiter cum una persona, sed cum tribus. Unde et una persona, et duae, et tres
possunt de essentia praedicari; ut si dicamus, essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus.
Et quia hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod supponat pro essentia, ut dictum est, ideo, sicut
haec est vera, essentia est tres personae, ita haec est vera, Deus est tres personae.
[30047] Iª q. 39 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, hoc
nomen homo per se habet supponere pro persona; sed ex adiuncto habet quod stet pro

84
natura communi. Et ideo haec est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo supposito
verificari potest. Sed hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod stet pro essentia. Unde, licet pro
nullo suppositorum divinae naturae haec sit vera, Deus est Trinitas, est tamen vera pro
essentia. Quod non attendens, Porretanus eam negavit.
[30048] Iª q. 39 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Deus vel divina
essentia est pater, est praedicatio per identitatem, non autem sicut inferioris de superiori,
quia in divinis non est universale et singulare. Unde, sicut est per se ista, pater est Deus, ita
et ista, Deus est pater; et nullo modo per accidens.

Articulus 7
[30049] Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia
non sint approprianda personis. Quod enim potest vergere in errorem fidei, vitandum est in
divinis, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis. Sed ea
quae sunt communia tribus personis appropriare alicui, potest vergere in errorem fidei, quia
potest intelligi quod vel illi tantum personae conveniant cui appropriantur; vel quod magis
conveniant ei quam aliis. Ergo essentialia attributa non sunt approprianda personis.
[30050] Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, essentialia attributa, in abstracto significata,
significant per modum formae. Sed una persona non se habet ad aliam ut forma, cum
forma ab eo cuius est forma, supposito non distinguatur. Ergo essentialia attributa, maxime
in abstracto significata, non debent appropriari personis.
[30051] Iª q. 39 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium prius est appropriato, proprium enim est de
ratione appropriati. Sed essentialia attributa, secundum modum intelligendi, sunt priora
personis, sicut commune est prius proprio. Ergo essentialia attributa non debent esse
appropriata.
[30052] Iª q. 39 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. I, Christum, Dei
virtutem et Dei sapientiam.
[30053] Iª q. 39 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, ad manifestationem fidei, conveniens
fuit essentialia attributa personis appropriari. Licet enim Trinitas personarum
demonstratione probari non possit, ut supra dictum est, convenit tamen ut per aliqua magis
manifesta declaretur. Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum
rationem, quam propria personarum, quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus,
possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem
in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est. Sicut igitur similitudine
vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum
personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio personarum per essentialia
attributa, appropriatio nominatur. Possunt autem manifestari personae divinae per
essentialia attributa dupliciter. Uno modo, per viam similitudinis, sicut ea quae pertinent ad
intellectum, appropriantur filio, qui procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum. Alio modo,
per modum dissimilitudinis, sicut potentia appropriatur patri, ut Augustinus dicit, quia
apud nos patres solent esse propter senectutem infirmi; ne tale aliquid suspicemur in Deo.
[30054] Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod essentialia attributa non sic
appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur, sed ad manifestandum personas per

85
viam similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis, ut dictum est. Unde nullus error fidei sequitur, sed
magis manifestatio veritatis.
[30055] Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si sic appropriarentur essentialia
attributa personis, quod essent eis propria, sequeretur quod una persona se haberet ad aliam
in habitudine formae. Quod excludit Augustinus, in VII de Trin., ostendens quod pater non
est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, quasi solus filius sit sapientia; ut sic pater et filius simul
tantum possint dici sapiens, non autem pater sine filio. Sed filius dicitur sapientia patris,
quia est sapientia de patre sapientia, uterque enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una
sapientia. Unde pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, sed sapientia quae est sua
essentia.
[30056] Iª q. 39 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet essentiale attributum, secundum
rationem propriam, sit prius quam persona, secundum, modum intelligendi; tamen,
inquantum habet rationem appropriati, nihil prohibet proprium personae esse prius quam
appropriatum. Sicut color posterior est corpore, inquantum est corpus, prius tamen est
naturaliter corpore albo, inquantum est album.

Articulus 8
[30057] Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter a sacris
doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa. Dicit enim Hilarius, in II de Trin., aeternitas
est in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. In quibus verbis ponit tria nomina propria
personarum, scilicet nomen patris; et nomen imaginis, quod est proprium filio, ut supra
dictum est; et nomen muneris, sive doni, quod est proprium spiritus sancti, ut supra
habitum est. Ponit etiam tria appropriata, nam aeternitatem appropriat patri, speciem filio,
usum spiritui sancto. Et videtur quod irrationabiliter. Nam aeternitas importat durationem
essendi, species vero est essendi principium, usus vero ad operationem pertinere videtur.
Sed essentia et operatio nulli personae appropriari inveniuntur. Ergo inconvenienter
videntur ista appropriata personis.
[30058] Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., sic dicit, in patre
est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. Et
videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia una persona non denominatur formaliter per id quod
appropriatur alteri, non enim est sapiens pater sapientia genita, ut dictum est. Sed, sicut
ibidem subditur, tria haec unum omnia sunt propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter
filium, connexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum. Non ergo convenienter appropriantur
personis.
[30059] Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 3 Item, secundum Augustinum, patri attribuitur potentia, filio
sapientia, spiritui sancto bonitas. Et videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Nam virtus ad
potentiam pertinet. Virtus autem invenitur appropriari filio, secundum illud I ad Cor. I,
Christum, Dei virtutem; et etiam spiritui sancto, secundum illud Luc. VI, virtus de illo
exibat, et sanabat omnes. Non ergo potentia patri est approprianda.
[30060] Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 4 Item, Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit, non confuse
accipiendum est quod ait apostolus, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso - ex ipso dicens
propter patrem; per ipsum propter filium; in ipso propter spiritum sanctum. Sed videtur
quod inconvenienter. Quia per hoc quod dicit in ipso, videtur importari habitudo causae

86
finalis, quae est prima causarum. Ergo ista habitudo causae deberet appropriari patri, qui
est principium non de principio.
[30061] Iª q. 39 a. 8 arg. 5 Item, invenitur veritas appropriari filio, secundum illud Ioan.
XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et similiter liber vitae, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIX,
in capite libri scriptum est de me, Glossa, idest apud patrem, qui est caput meum. Et
similiter hoc quod dico, qui est, quia super illud Isa. LXV, ecce ego, ad gentes, dicit
Glossa, filius loquitur, qui dixit Moysi, ego sum qui sum. Sed videtur quod propria sint filii,
et non appropriata. Nam veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera religione, est
summa similitudo principii, absque omni dissimilitudine, et sic videtur quod proprie
conveniat filio, qui habet principium. Liber etiam vitae videtur proprium aliquid esse, quia
significat ens ab alio, omnis enim liber ab aliquo scribitur. Hoc etiam ipsum qui est videtur
esse proprium filio. Quia si, cum Moysi dicitur, ego sum qui sum, loquitur Trinitas, ergo
Moyses poterat dicere, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos. Ergo et
ulterius dicere poterat, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos,
demonstrando certam personam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia nulla persona est pater et
filius et spiritus sanctus. Non ergo potest esse commune Trinitati, sed est proprium filii.
[30062] Iª q. 39 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in
Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex
creaturis assumit. In consideratione autem alicuius creaturae, quatuor per ordinem nobis
occurrunt. Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quoddam.
Secunda autem consideratio rei est, inquantum est una. Tertia consideratio rei est,
secundum quod inest ei virtus ad operandum et ad causandum. Quarta autem consideratio
rei est, secundum habitudinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec etiam quadruplex
consideratio circa Deum nobis occurrit. Secundum igitur primam considerationem, qua
consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum, sic sumitur appropriatio Hilarii,
secundum quam aeternitas appropriatur patri, species filio, usus spiritui sancto. Aeternitas
enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris,
qui est principium non de principio. Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem
cum propriis filii. Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive
perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive
consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.
Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius
habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris. Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua
expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera. Quantum vero ad
secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris. Unde videmus
quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem. Et
hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera.
Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod quidem
lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit,
tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et
cetera. Usus autem habet similitudinem cum propriis spiritus sancti, largo modo accipiendo
usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in
facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gaudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo
quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est
amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus
ab illo appellatus est. Usus vero quo nos fruimur Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio
spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum. Et hoc ostendit Augustinus cum dicit, est in Trinitate

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spiritus sanctus, genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate nos
perfundens. Et sic patet quare aeternitas, species et usus personis attribuantur vel
approprientur, non autem essentia vel operatio. Quia in ratione horum, propter sui
communitatem, non invenitur aliquid similitudinem habens cum propriis personarum.
Secunda vero consideratio Dei est, inquantum consideratur ut unus. Et sic Augustinus patri
appropriat unitatem, filio aequalitatem, spiritui sancto concordiam sive connexionem. Quae
quidem tria unitatem importare manifestum est, sed differenter. Nam unitas dicitur
absolute, non praesupponens aliquid aliud. Et ideo appropriatur patri, qui non praesupponit
aliquam personam, cum sit principium non de principio. Aequalitas autem importat
unitatem in respectu ad alterum, nam aequale est quod habet unam quantitatem cum alio.
Et ideo aequalitas appropriatur filio, qui est principium de principio. Connexio autem
importat unitatem aliquorum duorum. Unde appropriatur spiritui sancto, inquantum est a
duobus. Ex quo etiam intelligi potest quod dicit Augustinus, tria esse unum propter
patrem, aequalia propter filium, connexa propter spiritum sanctum. Manifestum est enim
quod illi attribuitur unumquodque, in quo primo invenitur, sicut omnia inferiora dicuntur
vivere propter animam vegetabilem, in qua primo invenitur ratio vitae in istis inferioribus.
Unitas autem statim invenitur in persona patris, etiam, per impossibile, remotis aliis
personis. Et ideo aliae personae a patre habent unitatem. Sed remotis aliis personis, non
invenitur aequalitas in patre, sed statim, posito filio, invenitur aequalitas. Et ideo dicuntur
omnia aequalia propter filium, non quod filius sit principium aequalitatis patri; sed quia,
nisi esset patri aequalis filius, pater aequalis non posset dici. Aequalitas enim eius primo
consideratur ad filium, hoc enim ipsum quod spiritus sanctus patri aequalis est, a filio
habet. Similiter, excluso spiritu sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas
connexionis inter patrem et filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter spiritum
sanctum, quia, posito spiritu sancto, invenitur unde pater et filius possint dici connexi.
Secundum vero tertiam considerationem, qua in Deo sufficiens virtus consideratur ad
causandum, sumitur tertia appropriatio, scilicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Quae
quidem appropriatio fit et secundum rationem similitudinis, si consideretur quod in divinis
personis est, et secundum rationem dissimilitudinis, si consideretur quod in creaturis est.
Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum patre caelesti, qui
est principium totius divinitatis. Deficit autem interdum patri terreno, propter senectutem.
Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil
aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. Deficit autem interdum filio terreno, propter temporis
paucitatem. Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum
spiritu divino, qui est amor. Sed repugnantiam habere videtur ad spiritum terrenum,
secundum quod importat violentam quandam impulsionem; prout dicitur Isa. XXV,
spiritus robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem. Virtus autem appropriatur filio et
spiritui sancto, non secundum quod virtus dicitur ipsa potentia rei, sed secundum quod
interdum virtus dicitur id quod a potentia rei procedit, prout dicimus aliquod virtuosum
factum esse virtutem alicuius agentis. Secundum vero quartam considerationem, prout
consideratur Deus in habitudine ad suos effectus, sumitur illa appropriatio ex quo, per
quem, et in quo. Haec enim praepositio ex importat quandoque quidem habitudinem causae
materialis, quae locum non habet in divinis, aliquando vero habitudinem causae efficientis.
Quae quidem competit Deo ratione suae potentiae activae, unde et appropriatur patri, sicut
et potentia. Haec vero praepositio per designat quidem quandoque causam mediam; sicut
dicimus quod faber operatur per martellum. Et sic ly per quandoque non est appropriatum,
sed proprium filii, secundum illud Ioan. I, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; non quia filius sit
instrumentum, sed quia ipse est principium de principio. Quandoque vero designat
habitudinem formae per quam agens operatur; sicut dicimus quod artifex operatur per

88
artem. Unde, sicut sapientia et ars appropriantur filio, ita et ly per quem. Haec vero
praepositio in denotat proprie habitudinem continentis. Continet autem Deus res dupliciter.
Uno modo, secundum suas similitudines; prout scilicet res dicuntur esse in Deo, inquantum
sunt in eius scientia. Et sic hoc quod dico in ipso, esset appropriandum filio. Alio vero
modo continentur res a Deo, inquantum Deus sua bonitate eas conservat et gubernat, ad
finem convenientem adducendo. Et sic ly in quo appropriatur spiritui sancto, sicut et
bonitas. Nec oportet quod habitudo causae finalis, quamvis sit prima causarum,
approprietur patri, qui est principium non de principio, quia personae divinae, quarum
pater est principium, non procedunt ut ad finem, cum quaelibet illarum sit ultimus finis;
sed naturali processione, quae magis ad rationem naturalis potentiae pertinere videtur.
[30063] Iª q. 39 a. 8 ad 1 Ad illud vero quod de aliis quaeritur, dicendum quod veritas, cum
pertineat ad intellectum, ut supra dictum est, appropriatur filio, non tamen est proprium
eius. Quia veritas, ut supra dictum est, considerari potest prout est in intellectu, vel prout
est in re. Sicut igitur intellectus et res essentialiter sumpta sunt essentialia et non
personalia, ita et veritas. Definitio autem Augustini inducta, datur de veritate secundum
quod appropriatur filio. Liber autem vitae in recto quidem importat notitiam, sed in obliquo
vitam, est enim, ut supra dictum est, notitia Dei de his qui habituri sunt vitam aeternam.
Unde appropriatur filio, licet vita approprietur spiritui sancto, inquantum importat
quendam interiorem motum, et sic convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est
amor. Esse autem scriptum ab alio, non est de ratione libri inquantum est liber; sed
inquantum est quoddam artificiatum. Unde non importat originem, neque est personale, sed
appropriatum personae. Ipsum autem qui est appropriatur personae filii, non secundum
propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti, inquantum scilicet in locutione Dei ad Moysen,
praefigurabatur liberatio humani generis, quae facta est per filium. Sed tamen, secundum
quod ly qui sumitur relative, posset referre interdum personam filii, et sic sumeretur
personaliter, ut puta si dicatur, filius est genitus qui est; sicut et Deus genitus personale est.
Sed infinite sumptum est essentiale. Et licet hoc pronomen iste, grammatice loquendo, ad
aliquam certam personam videatur pertinere; tamen quaelibet res demonstrabilis,
grammatice loquendo, persona dici potest, licet secundum rei naturam non sit persona;
dicimus enim iste lapis, et iste asinus. Unde et, grammatice loquendo, essentia divina,
secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc
pronomine iste; secundum illud Exod. XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum.

See also:

MARCUS BERQUIST ON THE ART AND SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR.

(http://www.scribd.com/doc/147351899/Marcus-Berquist-on-the-Art-and-Science-of-
Grammar)

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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