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ON THE FIGURES OF PREDICATION.

With Special Reference to the Modes of Signifying. (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1. St. Thomas account of the modes of predicating at In III Physic. lect. 5, nn. 14-16.
Being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into species, but according to a diverse mode of being [or manner of existing]. Now the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of some other thing, we say this is that. Hence the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments. Now every predication is made in [one of] three ways. In one way, when that which pertains to its essence is predicated of some subject, as when I say, Socrates is a man, or Man is an animal. And according to this the predicament of substance is taken. But there is another way in which is predicated of something that which is not of its essence, yet inheres in it, which has itself either on the part of the matter of the subject [as when I say, Socrates is six feet tall, or The people in the room are ten], and according to this there is the predicament of quantity(for quantity properly follows the matter: for which reason Plato put down the Great on the part of matter); or follows the form, and in this way there is the predicament of quality [as when I say, Socrates is white, or The plane figure is three-sided], (hence qualities are founded on quantity, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in surfaces); or it has itself with respect to another, and in this way there is the predicament of relation(for when I say, The man is a father, something absolute is not predicated of a man, but a respect which is in him to something extrinsic). But the third mode of predicating is when something extrinsic is predicated in the manner of some denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated of a subject. Yet we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is white. Now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in some way commonly in all things, and in some way particularly in those things which pertain only to man. Now, commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according to the ratio of a cause, or according to the ratio of a measure. For something is denominated as caused or measured from something exterior. But since there are four genera of causes, two of these are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form. And so the predication which can come to be according to these two pertains to the predicament of substance as, for example, if we were to say that man is rational, and man is bodily. But the final cause does not cause something apart from the agent: for to the extent that the end has the ratio of a cause, to that extent it moves the agent. Therefore, only the agent cause remains from which something can be denominated as from something exterior. In this way, therefore, according as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament of passion; for undergoing [or to undergo] is nothing other than to receive something from an agent. But conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament of action; for action is an act from the agent in another, as was said above. Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain one intrinsic: the intrinsic, as each things own length, breadth, and depth. From these, then, something is denominated as from something inherently intrinsic; for which reason it pertains to the predicament of quantity. But the exterior measures are time and place. Therefore, according as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament when; but according as something is denominated from place, there is the predicament where, and situation [or position], which adds beyond where an order of parts in place.

Now it was not necessary for this to be added on the part of time, since the order of the parts in time is implied in the ratio of time; for time is the number of motion according to a before and after. In this way, therefore, something is said to be when or where through a denomination from time or from place. Now there is something special in men. For in other animals, nature has adequately provided those things which pertain to the preservation of life, as horns for defense, thick and hairy skin for a covering, and claws or something of the sort for proceeding without harm. And in this way when such animals are said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, they are not in some way denominated from something extrinsic, but from something of their parts [sc. which is intrinsic]. And so in these things this is referred to the predicament of substance: as, for example, if one were to say that man is furnished with hands or with feet. But things of this kind could not have been given to man by nature, both because they would not have befitted the subtlety of his make-up, and because of the multiformity of the works which do befit man inasmuch as he has reason, to whom certain determinate instruments could not have been accommodated by nature. But in place of all these there is reason in man, by which he prepares things exterior to him in place of those things which are intrinsic in other animals. Hence, when man is said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, he is denominated from something extrinsic that does not have either the ratio of a cause or a measure. Hence there is a special predicament, and it is called a habitus [a having or possession]. But one must bear in mind that this predicament is attributed even to other animals, not according as they considered in their nature, but according as they come under the use of man, as if we were to say a horse is caparisoned, or saddled, or armed. In this way, then, it is clear that although motion is one, nevertheless, the predicaments that are taken according to motion are two, according as predicamental denominations result from diverse exterior things. For an agent is one thing from which, as from something exterior, the predicament of passion is taken in the manner of denomination. And the patient (or one undergoing) is another thing from which the agent is denominated. And in this way the solution to the first difficulty is clear.

2. St. Thomass account of the modes of predicating at In V Meta. lect. 9, nn. 5-10.
According to Aristotle, that those things are said to be according to themselves which the figures of predication signify in whatever way . For one must know that being cannot be contracted to something determinate in this way, as a genus is contracted to its species through differences. For a difference, since it does not share in the genus, is outside the essence of the genus. But nothing can be outside the essence of being which by an addition to being constitutes a species of being. For what is outside of being is nothing and cannot be a difference. And so in the third [book] of this [work], the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus. And so it is necessary that being be contracted to the diverse genera according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows a diverse mode of being, because as often as being is said; that is, in as many ways as something is predicated, so often is being signified; that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. And because of this, those things into which being is first divided are said to be predicaments because they are distinguished according to the diverse modes of predicating. Therefore, since of those things which are predicated, some signify what, i.e. substance; some, what kind [i.e. quality]; some, how much [i.e. quantity], and so on about the others, in each mode of predicating it is necessary that being signify the same thing, as when it is said, man is an animal, being signifies substance; but when it is said, man is white, it signifies quality, and so on about the others.

For one must know that a predicate can have itself to a subject in [one of] three ways. In one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, Socrates is an animal. For Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate [sc. animal] is said to signify first substance, which is individual substance, of which everything [else] is predicated. In the second way, as the predicate is taken according as it is in a subject, which predicate is either in it through itself and absolutely, as following the matter, and in this way it is quantity; or as following the form, and in this way it is quality; or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to another, and in this way it is toward something [sc. relation]. In a third way, as the predicate is taken from that which is outside the subject, and this in two ways: in one way, as it is in entirely outside the subject, which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is predicated in the manner of a habitus [a having or possession], as when it is said, Socrates is shod or is clothed. Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either on the part of time, and in this way there will be when; or from place, and in this way there will be where, the order of the parts in place not being taken into consideration; but being taken into consideration there will be situation [or position]. In another way, as that from which the predicament is taken according to something [that] is in the subject of which it is predicated. And if according to a principle, in this way it is predicated as acting [or to act]. For the principle of action is in the subject. But if according to a term, in this way it will be predicated as in undergoing [or to undergo]. For passion is terminated in the subject undergoing. But since certain things are predicated in which manifestly this verb is is not placed in apposition, lest it be believed that these predications do not pertain to the predication of being, as when it is said, Man walks, therefore, he subsequently removes this, saying that in every predication of this kind something is signified to be . For any verb whatsoever is resolved into this verb is, even the participle. For there is no difference in saying, Man is convalescing and Man convalesces, and so on about the others. And so it is clear that in as many ways as predication is made, in so many ways being is said.

3. The number and sufficiency of the categories as posited by Aristotle according to Simon of Faversham. Cf. Simon of Faversham, Questions of the Categories (tr. John L. Ridgeway):1
Question 12 Next it is asked concerning the part of those which are said according to no complexity, in which the Philosopher posits the number of categories. Therefore we inquire concerning the number and the sufficiency of them. And it seems that there are more than ten, for is one of a pair of opposites is said in several ways, the other is too. But substance and accident are opposites. Since there are nine genera of accidents, there will be nine genera of substances. In the same way it can be shown that there are only two genera, since if one of the opposites is not said in several ways, neither is
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(uwp.edu/~longeway/category.htm [2/1/06])

the other, but substance is only one genus; therefore there will be only one genus of accident, since substance and accident are opposites. Again, it is argued that there are more than ten, since just as acting is distinct from receiving action, so is having distinct from being had, but acting and receiving action are different categories; therefore etc. On the other hand, it is clear through the Philosopher, who says there are only ten categories, namely substance, quantity, etc. It must be said in response to this that there are ten categories and no more nor less. To make this clear it must be considered that all things other than primary substances are either said of primary substances or are in primary substances. If they are said of primary substances they are either said of them according to name, or according to formula, for that is strictly said of another what is said according to name and formula, as the Philosopher says in the text. If, then, another than primary substance is said of primary substance according to name and formula, in this way it is in the category of substance. If they are in primary substances, then, since such things are accidents, they are in them either through something extrinsic or through something intrinsic. If through something intrinsic, they are either in them absolutely or in relation to another. If absolutely, either through the nature of matter, and in this way it is quantity, or through the nature of form, and in this way it is quality, since quality is what informs and denominates. If they are in them in relation to another, in this way it is relation. But if accidents are in primary substances through something extrinsic, that extrinsic thing is related to primary substances either as measure to measured, or as agent to patient, or as something that is had to what has it. If it is related to primary substance as agent to patient, or conversely, in this way two categories result, namely action and passion, for the action of an agent on a patient causes a certain motion, which is called action from the agent, and passion from the patient. If that extrinsic thing is related to primary substance as measured to what is measured, since an extrinsic measure is not unless it is two, namely place and time, therefore an extrinsic accident can be related to a primary substance as place to what is placed in it, and in this way it is the category where. For where is a certain way of being which is caused in what is in a place from the relation place has to itand this is what the author of the Six Principles wished to signify when he said that where is a limiting etc., according to which we say up and down are distinct. But if place is not related to what is located in it, in this way it is the category which is position. For position is nothing except a certain way of being caused in a body located in a place from the relation which place has to it and its parts, according to which we say something is seated or standing because its parts are disposed in the whole differently when it is seated and when it stands. And the author of the Six Principles wished to signify this when he said that position is a situation etc.

If an extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as time to a temporal thing, in this way the category when results. For when is not unless a certain way of being is caused in a temporal thing from the relation which time has to it. And this is what the author of the Six Principles wished to signify when he said that when is what is left etc., according to which manner of denomination something is said to be on one day, or of one year. But if the extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as having is related to what has it, in this way the category of having results. And it is in this way that we say the attire of Socrates is related to Socrates when he is dressed. So the having caused in Socrates when he is dressed from the clothing which he has is said be his habit. And this is what the author of the Six Principles says, that having is of a body and of those round about the body, so that having consists in a certain application of those which are around the body to the bodyand this category of having is not found in animals other than human beings except when they enter into the customs of human beings. Therefore Thomas says on Physics III that being attired and such as pertain to having clothing, as they are said of other animals than human beings that belong to the category of substance, they are in the category of having. In this way, then, the number and sufficiency of the categories is received, so that categories are distinguished into three ways of being: being not in another, being in another, and being in relation to another. Being not in another belongs to substance, being in another merely absolutely belongs to quality and quantity, but being in another and in relation to another is with respect to relation and the other six categories. For the other six are certain relations, or are caused from certain relations. So although it can be granted that depending on another is of the essence of seven categories, still I do not believe is of the essence of quantity and quality. Even though quality and quantity agree in this, that both indicate being in another absolutely, still there is no reality found except in these two. They differ, however, in this, that quantity measures a substance and quality informs a substance. In response to the arguments. In response to the first, when it is argued, if one opposite is said in several ways so are the others, I reply that this is true as far as what is signified is concerned, but as far as supposita are concerned. For if different things are opposites it is necessary that as many as are sig-nified by one opposite be signified by the other. And let the minor premise be granted. Still it does not follow that as many are contained under the subject as are contained under accident. And therefore although accident contains nine genera, it does not follow that substance contains that many; and the reason that there are many genera of accidents is that many things can belong to one thing. Therefore, although there is one genus of substance, there can be many genera of accidents. That many belong to one is obvious, for some belong to substance as dispositions, some as effects, and so on for the rest. And in the same way the second argument is apparent. For it was seen how the proposition is to be understood, for if one opposite etc. In response to the other, when it is argued, just as acting is distinct from suffering action, etc., I reply that it is so in a certain way, and in a certain not. Just as acting is not suffering action, thus having is not being had. Nevertheless, there is not so much difference between having and being had as there is between acting and suffering action, for between acting and suffering action there is enough difference for the distinction of categories, but between having and being had there is not. And the reason for this is that categories are distinguished within ways of being, since they are distinguished within ways of predicating. Because of this substance is distinguished from the others. But ways of predicating arise from ways of being as ways of signifying, and because of this categories are distinguished within ways of being but not within all ways of being but only those ways which agree in nothing, and of

which one does not reduce to the other. Now the ways of being of action and passion agree in nothing, for according to the way of being of action the cause gives being to the effect, and according to the ways of being of passion an effect receives being from the cause. Therefore action and passion are distinguished as cause and caused, but cause and caused are of different primary being, and agree in nothing, nor does one reduce to the other, and therefore from such different categories can arise. From this sort of different ways of being, then, different categories arise, but what has and what is had do not distinguish being in this way, nor do they arise from ways of being which distinguish a being as being; but these ways of being which are of what has and what is had are reduced to other ways of being, and so do not constitute different categories; and this way of being to which what has and what is had reduces is called having.

4. On the division of being into the ten predicaments according to the modes of predicating. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Physic., lect. 5, nn. 14-16 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB3 LC-5N.14 sed restat circa hoc duplex dubitatio. prima quidem quia, si actio et passio sint unus motus, et non differunt nisi secundum rationem, ut dictum est, videtur quod non debeant esse duo praedicamenta, cum praedicamenta sint genera rerum. item, si motus vel est actio vel passio, non invenietur motus in substantia, qualitate, quantitate et ubi, ut supra dictum est; sed solum continebitur in actione et passione. LB3 LC-5N.15 ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. tripliciter autem fit omnis praedicatio. unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico socrates est homo, vel homo est animal; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum substantiae. alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Therefore, in order to clarify these difficulties, it must be understood that being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into species, but according to a diverse mode of being. Now the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of some other thing, we say this is that. Hence the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments. Now every predication is made in [one of] three ways. In one way, when that which pertains to its essence is predicated of some subject, as when I say, Socrates is a man, or Man is an animal. And according to this the predicament of substance is taken. But there is another way in which is predicated of something that which is not of its essence, yet inheres in it, But two difficulties still remain regarding this matter. First, because, if action and passion be one motion and do not differ except in ratio, as has been said, it seems that there ought not to be two predicaments, since the predicaments are genera of things. Again, if motion is either action or passion, motion will not be found in substance, quality, quantity, and where, as has been said above, but will be contained only in action and passion.

quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum quantitatis (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum). tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantiis praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus. denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quidem quodammodo communiter in omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum. communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori.

which has itself either on the part of the matter of the subject,2 and according to this there is the predicament of quantity (for quantity properly follows the matter: for which reason Plato put down the Great on the part of matter); or follows the form, and in this way there is the predicament of quality,3 (hence qualities are founded on quantity, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in surfaces); or it has itself with respect to another, and in this way there is the predicament of relation (for when I say, The man is a father, something absolute is not predicated of a man, but a respect which is in him to something extrinsic). But the third mode of predicating is when something extrinsic is predicated in the manner of some denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated of a subject. Yet we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is white. Now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in some way commonly in all things, and in some way particularly in those things which pertain only to man. Now, commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according to the ratio of a cause, or according to the ratio of a measure.

et For something is denominated as caused or measured from something exterior. But since there are four genera of causes, two of these are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form

cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma:

2 3

As when I say, Socrates is six feet tall, or The people in the room are ten. As when I say, Socrates is white, or The plane figure is three-sided.

unde praedicatio quae posset fieri secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, et homo est corporeus. causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est. mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca.

for this reason the predication which can come to be according to these two pertains to the predicament of substance as, for example, if we were to say that man is rational, and man is bodily. But the final cause does not cause something apart from the agent: for to the extent that the end has the ratio of a cause, to that extent it moves the agent. Therefore, only the agent cause remains from which something can be denominated as from something exterior. In this way, therefore, according as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament of passion; for undergoing [or to undergo] is nothing other than to receive something from an agent. But conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament of action; for action is an act from the agent in another, as was said above. Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain one intrinsic:

intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo unius- the intrinsic, as each things own length, cuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: breadth, and depth. ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis. exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: From these, then, something is denominated as from something inherently intrinsic; for which reason it pertains to the predicament of quantity. But the exterior measures are time and place.

secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a Therefore, according as something is denomintempore, est praedicamentum quando; ated from time, there is the predicament when; secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum ubi et situs, quod addit supra ubi ordinem partium in loco. but according as something is denominated from place, there is the predicament where, and situation [or position], which adds beyond where an order of parts in place.

hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte Now it was not necessary for this to be added on temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in the part of time, since the order of the parts in

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ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse quando vel ubi per denominationem a tempore vel a loco. est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. in aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huius-modi ad incedendum sine laesione. et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel pedatus.

time is implied in the ratio of time, for time is the number of motion according to a before and after. In this way, then, something is said to be when or where through a denomination from time or from place. Now there is something special in men. For in other animals, nature has adequately provided those things which pertain to the preservation of life, as horns for defense, thick and hairy skin for a covering, and claws or something of the sort for proceeding without hurt. And in this way when such animals are said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, they are not somehow denominated from something extrinsic, but from some of their parts [thereby being denominated from something intrinsic]. And so in these things this is referred to the predicament of substance: as, for example, if one were to say that man is furnished with hands or with feet.

sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a But things of this kind could not have been natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati given to man by nature, both because they complexionis eius, would not have befitted the subtlety of his make-up, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accommodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. and because of the multiformity of the works which befit man inasmuch as he has reason, to whom certain determinate instruments could not have been accommodated by nature. But in place of all these there is reason in man, by which he prepares things exterior to him in place of those things which are intrinsic in other animals. Hence, when man is said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, he is denominated from something extrinsic that does not have either the ratio of a cause or a measure. Hence there is a special predicament [for man], and it is called a habitus [a having or possession].

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sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum. LB3 LC-5N.16 sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis.

But one must bear in mind that this predicament is attributed even to other animals, not according as they considered in their nature, but according as they come under the use of man, as if we were to say a horse is caparisoned, or saddled, or armed.

In this way, then, it is clear that although motion is one, nevertheless, the predicaments that are taken according to motion are two, according as predicamental denominations result from diverse exterior things. For an agent is one thing from which, as from something exterior, the predicament of passion is taken in the manner of denomination. And the patient [or one undergoing] is another thing from which the agent is denominated. And in this way the solution to the first difficulty is clear.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, nn. 5-10 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB5LC-9N.-5 deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Then, when he says, [Those things are said to be] according to themselves , he distinguishes the mode of a being through itself. And with respect to this he does three things. First, he distinguishes into ten predicaments the being which is outside the soul, which is perfect being.

secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum Second, he puts down another mode of being quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et according as it is in the mind only at, But esse significat. further, being signifies. tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse significat et ens. Third, he divides being into potency and act: and being so divided is more common than perfect being. For being in potency is being in a certain respect only and imperfect at, Further, being signifies to be.

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dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. unde in tertio huius probavit philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest. LB5LC-9N.-6 unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi;

So he says first, that those things are said to be according to themselves which the figures of predication signify in whatever way. For it must be understood that being cannot be contracted to something determinate in this way, as a genus is contracted to its species through differences. For a difference, since it does not share in the genus, is outside the essence of the genus. But nothing can be outside the essence of being which by an addition to being constitutes a species of being. For what is outside of being is nothing and cannot be a difference. And so in the third [book] of this [work], the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.

And so it is necessary that being be contracted to the diverse genera according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows a diverse mode of being,

quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid because as often as being is said ; that is, in as praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot many ways as something is predicated, so often modis significatur aliquid esse. is being signified; that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. And because of this, those things into which being is first divided are said to be predicaments because they are distinguished according to the diverse modes of predicating. Therefore, since of those things which are predicated, some signify what, i.e. substance; some, what kind [i.e. quality]; some, how much [i.e. quantity], and so on about the others, in each mode of predicating it is necessary that being signify the same thing, as when it is said, man is an animal, being signifies substance;

13

cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis. LB5LC-9N.-7 sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, socrates est animal. nam socrates est id quod est animal. et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur. LB5LC-9N.-8 secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter. uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco,

but when it is said, man is white, it signifies quality, and so on about the others.

For it must be understood that a predicate can have itself to a subject in [one of] three ways. In one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, Socrates is an animal. For Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate [sc. animal] is said to signify first substance, which is individual substance, of which everything [else] is predicated.

In the second way, as the predicate is taken according as it is in a subject, which predicate is either in it through itself and absolutely, as following the matter, and in this way it is quantity; or as following the form, and in this way it is quality; or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to another, and in this way it is toward something [sc. relation]. In a third way, as the predicate is taken from that which is outside the subject, and this in two ways. In one way, as it is entirely outside the subject, which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is predicated in the manner of a habitus [a having or possession], as when it is said, Socrates is shod or clothed. Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either on the part of time, and in this way there will be when; or from place, and in this way there will be where, the order of parts in place not being taken into consideration;

14

quo considerato erit situs. alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur. et si quidem secundum praedicatur ut agere. principium, sic

but being taken into consideration there will be situation [or position]. In another way, as that from which the predicament is taken according to something [that] is in the subject of which it is predicated. And if according to a principle, in this way it is predicated as acting [or to act]. For the principle of action is in the subject. But if according to a term, in this way it will be predicated as in undergoing [or to undergo]. For passion is terminated in the subject undergoing.

nam actionis principium in subiecto est. si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur. LB5LC-9N.-9 quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum est, et participium. nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis. unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.

But since certain things are predicated in which manifestly the verb is is not placed in apposition, lest it be believed that these predications do not pertain to the predication of being, as when it is said, Man walks, therefore, he subsequently removes this, saying that in every predication of this kind some being is signified. For any verb whatsoever is resolved into the verb is, and the participle as well. For there is no difference in saying, a man is convalescing and a man convalesces, and so on about the others.4 And so it is clear that in as many ways as a predication is made, in so many ways is being said.

LB5LC-9N.10 nec est verum quod avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Nor is what Avicenna says true, that predicates in the genera of accident signify substance principally, and accident per posterius, as when I say white and musical. For white, as it is said in the predicaments, signifies a quality solely.

There is, of course, a grammatical difference, pertaining to the notion of aspect.

15

hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis.

Now the name white signifies the subject subsequently, insofar as it signifies whiteness in the manner of an accident.

unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in And so it is necessary that it include the subject sui ratione subiectum. in its ratio subsequently. nam accidentis esse est inesse. albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est. For the being of an accident is to be in. For whiteness, although it signify an accident, nevertheless does not do so in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a substance. And so in no way does it consignify the subject. For if it were to signify the subject principally, then Aristotle would not have placed accidental predicates under being according to itself, but under accidental being. For this whole which is a white man, is a being according to accident, as has been said.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 13 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB5LC-8N.13 unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura praedicationis, idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi. alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in subiecto existentes. But those things are in one genus which agree in a figure of predication; that is, which have one mode of predicating. For the mode in which substance is predicated is other than that in which quality or action is predicated; But all substances have one mode of predicating, inasmuch as they are predicated as not existing in a subject.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 22, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB5LC22N.-8 alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur secundum diversam figuram categoriae, idest praedicationis entis. alia namque entia significant quid est, alia quale, alia aliis modis, sicut divisum est prius, ubi tractavit de ente. In another way those things are called diverse in genera which are said according to a diverse figure of category; that is, [according to a diverse figure] of the predication of being. For some beings signify what it is, some of what sort, others in other ways, just as they were divided earlier where being was treated.

16

istae enim categoriae nec resolvuntur invicem, quia una non continetur sub alia. nec resolvuntur in unum aliquid, quia non est unum aliquod genus commune ad omnia praedicamenta.

For these categories are neither resolved into each other, because one is not contained under another nor are they resolved into some one thing, because there is not some one genus common to every predicament.

5. Comparison of texts on the modes of predicating.


IN III PHYSIC. LECT. 5, N. 15. Now the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating. IN V META. LECT. 9, NN. 6-8. And so it is necessary that being be contracted to the diverse genera according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows a diverse mode of being, because as often as being is said ; that is, in as many ways as something is predicated, so often is being signified; that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. And because of this, those things into which being is first divided are said to be predicaments because they are distinguished according to the diverse modes of predicating. Therefore, since of those things which are predicated, some signify what, i.e. substance; some, what kind [i.e. quality]; some, how much [i.e. quantity], and so on about the others, in each mode of predicating it is necessary that being signify the same thing, as when it is said, man is an animal, being signifies substance; but when it is said, man is white, it signifies quality, and so on about the others. Now every predication is made in [one of] three ways. In one way, when that which pertains to its essence is predicated of some subject, as when I say, Socrates is a man, or Man is an animal. And according to this the predicament of substance is taken. For one must know that a predicate can have itself to a subject in [one of] three ways. In one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, Socrates is an animal. For Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate [sc. animal] is said to signify first substance, which is individual substance, of which everything [else] is predicated.

For in predicating something of some other thing, we say this is that.

Hence the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments.

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But there is another way in which is predicated of something that which is not of its essence, yet inheres in it, which has itself either on the part of the matter of the subject, and according to this there is the predicament of quantity or follows the form, and in this way there is the predicament of quality, (hence qualities are founded on quantity, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in surfaces); or it has itself with respect to another, and in this way there is the predicament of relation (for when I say, The man is a father, something absolute is not predicated of a man, but a respect which is in him to something extrinsic). But the third mode of predicating is when something extrinsic is predicated in the manner of some denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated of a subject. Yet we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is white. Now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in some way commonly in all things, and in some way particularly in those things which pertain only to man. Now, commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according to the ratio of a cause, or according to the ratio of a measure. For something is denominated as caused or measured from something exterior. But since there are four genera of causes, two of these are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form.

In the second way, as the predicate is taken according as it is in a subject, which predicate is either in it through itself and absolutely, as following the matter, and in this way it is quantity; or as following the form, and in this way it is quality;

or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to another, and in this way it is toward something [sc. relation].

In a third way, as the predicate is taken from that which is outside the subject,

and this in two ways:

18

And so the predication which can come to be according to these two pertains to the predicament of substance as, for example, if we were to say that man is rational, and man is bodily. But the final cause does not cause something apart from the agent: for to the extent that the end has the ratio of a cause, to that extent it moves the agent. Therefore, only the agent cause remains from which something can be denominated as from something exterior. In this way, therefore, according as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament of passion; for undergoing [or to undergo] is nothing other than to receive something from an agent. But conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament of action; for action is an act from the agent in another, as was said above. Now a certain measure is extrinsic, and a certain one intrinsic: the intrinsic, as each things own length, breadth, and depth. From these, then, something is denominated as from something inherently intrinsic; for which reason it pertains to the predicament of quantity. But the exterior measures are time and place. Therefore, according as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament when; but according as something is denominated from place, there is the predicament where, and situation [or position], which adds beyond where an order of parts in place.
5

|In another way, as that from which the predicament is taken according to something [that] is in the subject of which it is predicated. [And] if according to a term, in this way it will be predicated as in undergoing [or to undergo]. For passion is terminated in the subject undergoing. [But] if according to a principle, in this way it is predicated as acting [or to act]; for the principle of action is in the subject.|5

Now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either on the part of time, and in this way there will be when; or from place, and in this way there will be where, the order of the parts in place not being taken into consideration; but being taken into consideration there will be situation [or position].

I have moved this text to its present location and have changed the order of the treatment of action and passion to make them correspond to the order of Thomass treatment of them in the Physics commentary.

19

Now it was not necessary for this to be added on the part of time, since the order of the parts in time is implied in the ratio of time; for time is the number of motion according to a before and after. In this way, therefore, something is said to be when or where through a denomination from time or from place. Now there is something special in men. For in other animals, nature has adequately provided those things which pertain to the preservation of life, as horns for defense, thick and hairy skin for a covering, and claws or something of the sort for proceeding without harm. And in this way when such animals are said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, they are not in some way denominated from something extrinsic, but from something of their parts [sc. which is intrinsic]. And so in these things this is referred to the predicament of substance: as, for example, if one were to say that man is furnished with hands or with feet. But things of this kind could not have been given to man by nature, both because they would not have befitted the subtlety of his make-up, and because of the multiformity of the works which do befit man inasmuch as he has reason, to whom certain determinate instruments could not have been accommodated by nature. But in place of all these there is reason in man, by which he prepares things exterior to him in place of those things which are intrinsic in other animals. Hence, when man is said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, he is denominated from something extrinsic that does not have either the ratio of a cause or a measure. Hence there is a special predicament [for man],
6

|in one way, as it is in entirely outside the subject,

which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is predicated in the manner of a habitus [a having or possession], as when it is said, Socrates is shod or is clothed.|6

I have also moved this text from its original position for the same reason given in the previous note.

20

and it is called a habitus [a having or possession]. But one must bear in mind that this predicament is attributed even to other animals, not according as they considered in their nature, but according as they come under the use of man, as if we were to say a horse is caparisoned, or saddled, or armed.

N.B. For the modes of predicating in the divine, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 3, obj. 2, ad 2:
DS22QU1 AR3- AG2 praeterea, non est nisi duplex modus praedicandi in divinis, scilicet vel substantialiter vel relative. Furthermore, there are no more than two modes of predicating in the divine, namely, substantially or relatively.

sed nomina non possunt diversificari nisi vel But names cannot be diversified except with requantum ad id quod significatur, vel quantum ad spect to that which is signified or with respect to modum significandi. the mode of signifying. ergo videtur quod vel tantum unum debeat esse propter unitatem rei, vel ad plus duo propter duos modos praedicandi. DS22QU1 AR3- RA2 ad secundum dicendum, quod aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum. aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas; univocum vero dividitur secundum differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos. unde cum ens praedicetur analogice de decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. To the second it must be said that equivocal, analogous, and univocal are divided differently. For equivocal is divided according to the thing signified; but univocal is divided according to differences; but analogous is divided according to diverse modes. And so since being is predicated analogously of the ten genera, it is divided into them according to diverse modes. Therefore it seems that either there must be just one by reason of the unity of the thing, or more than two by reason of the modes of predicating.

unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus And so a proper mode of predicating should bepraedicandi. long to each of the the genera. et quia in divinis non salvantur nisi duo genera quantum ad rationem communem generis, scilicet substantia et ad aliquid; ideo dicuntur in divinis duo modi praedicandi. And because in the divine only two genera are preserved with respect to the common notion of the genus, namely, substance and toward something, therefore [only] two modes of predicating are spoken of in the divine.

21

unumquodque autem genus dividitur univoce in species contentas sub genere, et ideo speciebus non debetur proprius modus praedicandi. et propter hoc quamvis quaedam contenta in praedicamento qualitatis dicantur de deo secundum rationem speciei, non tamen afferunt novum modum praedicandi, etsi afferant novam rationem significandi. unde quamvis in deo non sint nisi duo modi praedicandi, sunt tamen plures rationes significandi secundum quas divina nomina multiplicari possunt.

Now each genus is divided univocally into the species contained under the genus, and therefore there ought not to be a proper mode of predicating for [each] species. And for this reason although some things contained in the predicament of quality are said of God according to the notion of the species, they nevertheless do not bear the nine modes of predicating, even if they do bear the nine notions of signifying. And so although in God there are no more than two modes of predicating, still, there are many notions of signifying according to which the divine names can be multiplied.

22

6. On the notion of measure. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS23 QU1 AR1- CO respondeo dicendum, quod in omnibus quae habent regulam et mensuram, eorum bonitas et rectitudo consistit in conformitate ad suam regulam vel mensuram; malitia autem, secundum quod ab ea discordant. prima autem mensura et regula omnium est divina sapientia; unde bonitas et rectitudo sive virtus uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod attingit ad hoc quod ex sapientia divina ordinatur, ut dicit anselmus. I reply that it must be said that in all things which have a rule and measure, their goodness and rightness consists in a conformity to its rule or measure; but their evil in their failure to accord with it. Now the first measure and rule of all things is the divine wisdom; and so the goodness and rightness or virtue of each thing consists in its attainment of this, that it be ordered by the divine wisdom, as Anselm says.

7. On the analogy of measure. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 3. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR2- AG3 praeterea, secundum philosophum, unumquodque mensuratur minimo sui generis, et dicit ibi commentator quod illud ad quod mensurantur omnes substantiae est primus motor, qui, secundum ipsum, est deus. ergo deus est in genere substantiae. DS8QU4 AR2- RA3 ad tertium dicendum, quod mensura proprie dicitur in quantitatibus: dicitur enim mensura illud per quod innotescit quantitas rei, et hoc est minimum in genere quantitatis vel simpliciter, ut in numeris, quae mensurantur unitate, quae est minimum simpliciter; aut minimum secundum positionem nostram, sicut in continuis, in quibus non est minimum simpliciter; To the third it must be said that measure is said properly in quantities; for that is called a measure by which the quantity of a thing is made known, and this is what is least in the genus of quantity, either simply, as in numbers, which are measured by unity, which is the least thing simply or the least according to our imposition, as in the continuous, in which there is no least thing simply Further, according to the Philosopher, each thing is measured by what is least in its genus, and in the same place the Commentator says that that with respect to which every substance is measured is the first mover who, according to him, is God. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

23

unde ponimus palmum loco minimi ad mensurandum pannos, vel stadium ad mensurandum viam. exinde transumptum est nomen mensurae ad omnia genera, ut illud quod est primum in quolibet genere et simplicissimum et perfectissimum dicatur mensura omnium quae sunt in genere illo; eo quod unumquodque cognoscitur habere de veritate generis plus et minus, secundum quod magis accedit ad ipsum vel recedit, ut album in genere colorum. ita etiam in genere substantiae illud quod habet esse perfectissimum et simplicissimum, dicitur mensura omnium substantiarum, sicut deus.

and thus we put down the span of the palm for measuring cloth, or the stade for measuring a road. From this the name measure has been carried over to every genus, such that that which is first in any genus and simplest and most perfect is called the measure of everything which is in that genus; the reason being that each thing is known to have more or less of the truth of the genus according as it approaches it more closely or recedes from it, like white in the genus of color. So also in the genus of substance that which has the most perfect and simplest being is called the measure of every substance, like God.

8. On the notion of modes of being. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU1AR1 CO respondeo. dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens; I reply that it must be said that, just as in demonstrable matters a reduction to certain principles known to the intellect through themselves must take placeso it is in investigating the quid est of each thing; otherwise, in both cases one would go on to infinity, and thus science and the knowledge of things would utterly perish. But, as Avicenna says in the beginning of his Metaphysics, that which the understanding first conceives as most known to it, and in which it resolves all its conceptions, is being. For this reason it is necessary that every other conception of the understanding be taken from an addition to being. But nothing can be added to being as extraneous in the way in which a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject, since any nature is essentially a being.

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unde probat etiam philosophus in iii metaphys., quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur. quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens.

And so the Philosopher also proves in the third book of the Metaphysics that being cannot be a genus. But in accordance with this some things are said to add to being insofar as they express a mode of being which the name being does not express. But this happens in two ways. In one way, as the mode expressed is some special mode of being. For there are diverse grades of being in accordance with which the diverse modes of being are taken; and according to these modes the diverse genera of things are taken. For substance does not add to being any difference which might designate some nature superadded to being; but by the name substance a special mode of being is expressed, namely, being through itself; and so on in the other genera.7 In another way, such that the mode expressed is a general mode following upon every being.8

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, De Natura Generis, cap. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):


CP3divisio autem entis in substantiam et accidens, est divisio entis per se dicti: illa enim per se sunt, quae continentur in figuris praedicationis, ut ibidem dicitur. cum autem ens contrahi non possit, sicut genus contrahitur per differentiam, ut dictum est, oportet quod ens contrahatur ad praedicta per
7

But the division of being into substance and accident is a division of being said per se: for those things are per se which are contained in the figures of predication, as is said in the same place. But since being cannot be contracted in the way in which a genus is contracted by a difference, as has been said, it must be that being be con-

It should be noted that each of these genera, which are the nine genera of accidents, expresses the mode of being in another, ens in alio; for the being of an accident is to be in (inesse). 8 This division manifests the so-called transcendentals, but it is passed over here as not being necessary to our purpose.

25

diversum modum praedicandi. eorum autem quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, quaedam quantum, quaedam quale, et sic de ceteris; ideo oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi esse idem significet: ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam; cum vero dicitur homo est albus, esse significat qualitatem; et sic de aliis praedicamentis, de quorum ortu infra dicetur.

tracted to the things mentioned by diverse modes of predicating. Now of those things which are predicated, some signify a what, some an amount, some a sort, and so on in the remaining cases; therefore, it must be that in each of the modes of predicating being signify the same thing: as when it is said, man is an animal, being signifies substance; but when it is said, man is white, being signifies quality; and so on about the other predicaments, which shall be discussed below.

9. On the division of real being into the ten predicaments according to the modes of being. Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
TR2 CP01 ens autem reale dividitur in decem praedicamenta, quae sunt decem genera rerum. et quia res est fundamentum intentionis, remotum tamen; secundum istam duplicem divisionem possunt dupliciter accipi praedicamenta. ad sciendum autem praedicamenta oportet dividere ens reale. ubi nota, quod licet ens non possit esse genus, quia non invenitur differentia contrahens illud, tamen contrahitur per modos essendi. modus autem essendi alicujus rei potest accipi dupliciter. uno modo, ut est proprietas realis alicujus realiter differens ab eo, sicut dicimus de aliquo, iste habet bonum modum, quia est mansuetus vel concors. constat autem quod mansuetudo et concordia quas diximus modos, res sunt differentes ab eo cujus sunt. secundo modo dicitur modus res concepta: Now real being is divided into the ten predicaments, which are the ten genera of things. And because a thing is the foundation of an intention, in accordance with this twofold division the predicaments can be taken in two ways. Now in order to know the predicaments, it is necessary to divide real being. Where note that, although being cannot be a genus because there is found no difference contracting it, still, it is contracted by diverse modes of being. Now the mode of being of anything can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it is a real property of something really differing from it, just as we say of something, this has a good mode [manner] because it is gentle or agreeable. But it cannot be denied that the gentleness and agreeableness which we have called modes are things differing from that to which they belong. In a second way, mode means a thing con-

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ceived: uno modo respectu suiipsius: alio modo, ut est concepta: qui quidem diversi modi considerandi non sumuntur ex diversis in re existentibus, sed ex habitudine ad diversa, sub qua habitudine res intelligitur: verbi gratia: substantia secundum quod est subjectum accidentium, significatur per modum substantiae, quia substantia dicitur a substando: secundum autem quod a nullo priori dependet cui innitatur, significatur ut ens per se: et isti modi sunt idipsum quod substantia, differentes sola ratione animae concipientis ipsam secundum diversas habitudines: quae ratio non est ficta, sed accipitur a re, ita enim in re est: nam et substantia substat accidentibus et nulli innititur. tamen istae non sunt duae res distinctae, sed distinctio inter ista solum est ex ratione. unde tales modi sunt ens reale, scilicet substantia, quae et substat accidentibus et nulli innititur: distinctio tamen eorum est a ratione. contrahitur autem ens per modos: non quod modus sit aliqua differentia contrahens ipsum: sed quia in ente reali communiter sumpto inveniuntur aliqua entia habentia inter se diver-sos modos essendi, quibus non respondet una et eadem res, nisi forte ipsum ens in universali. primi autem modi quibus contrahitur ens, sunt esse per se, et esse in alio. esse autem per se est modus praedicamenti subin one way with respect to itself: in another way, as it is conceived: which diverse modes of considering are not taken from diverse things existing in a thing, but from a habitude to diverse things, under which habitude the thing is understood. To take an example: substance, insofar as it is the subject of accidents, is signified in the manner of a substance, because substance is socalled from substanding: But insofar as it depends on nothing prior on which it leans, it is signified as a being through itself: and these modes are that substance itself, differing merely by reason of the soul conceiving it according to diverse habitudes: a ratio which is not made up, but rather is taken from the thing; for it exists in the thing in this way: for substance stands under accidents and leans on nothing. Still, these are not two distinct things, but the distinction between them is only from reason. And so such modes are real being, namely, substance, which both stands under accidents and leans on nothing: yet their distinction is from reason. But being is contracted by modes: not that a mode is some difference contracting it: but because in real being taken commonly there are found some beings having among themselves diverse modes of being to which one and the same thing does not correspond, unless, perhaps, being itself taken universally. Now the first modes by which being is contracted are being through itself, and being in another. But being through itself is the mode of the pre-

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stantiae; esse vero in alio est modus aliorum novem praedicamentorum. alio modo adhuc contrahitur ens per duos modos: quorum unus est esse ad se: et iste modus comprehendit tria praedicamenta absoluta; scilicet substantiam, quantitatem et qualitatem. secundus est esse ad aliud; et iste modus comprehendit septem praedicamenta respectiva, scilicet relationem, actionem, passionem, quando, ubi, situm et habere. quae omnia qualiter inter se differant, dicetur infra. notandum est autem quod divisio entis in decem praedicamenta non est divisio univoci, sed analogi: ens enim analogice dicitur de eis: per prius enim dicitur de substantia in qua maxime salvatur sua realitas; de aliis vero dicitur in quantum sunt aliquid ipsius substantiae: quantitas enim est materia extensa, vel extensio substantiae; qualitas vero est ejus affectio, idest dispositio; et sic de aliis: unde de eis praedicatur ens sicut sanum praedicatur de animali, urina et medicina. dividitur ergo ens in decem praedicamenta, quae sunt substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio, actio, passio, quando, ubi, situs et habere seu habitus, de quibus sigillatim dicendum est, et primo de substantia.

dicament of substance; whereas being in another is the mode of the other nine predicaments. Being is contracted in yet another way by two modes, one of which is being toward itself: and this mode comprehends the three absolute predicaments, namely, substance, quantity, and quality. The second is being toward something else, and this mode comprehends the seven respective predicaments, namely, relation, action, passion, when, where, situation, and having. The way in which all these differ among themselves will be discussed below. But it is to be noted that the division of being into the ten predicaments is not a univocal division, but an analogous one: for being is said of them analogously: for per prius it is said of substance, in which its reality is chiefly preserved; but it is said of the others insofar as they are something of [= belonging to] substance itself: for quantity is extended matter, or the extension of substance; but quality is its affectionthat is, its disposition; and so on about the others. And so being is predicated of them just as healthy is predicated of animal, urine, and medicine. Therefore, being is divided into the ten predicaments, which are substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, when, where, situation, and having or habitus, each of which will be treated individually, and first of substance.

10. On the mode of being of substance. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 13 (tr. B.A.M.):

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LB5LC-8N.13 unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura praedicationis, idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi. alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in subiecto existentes. But those things are in one genus which agree in a figure of predication; that is, which have one mode of predicating. For the mode in which substance is predicated is other than that in which quality or action is predicated; But all substances have one mode of predicating, inasmuch as they are predicated as not existing in a subject.9

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR2- AG2 praeterea, substantia est quod non est in subjecto, sed est ens per se. Further, substance is what is not in a subject, but is a being through itself.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB1 LC-5N.-7 exponit ergo primum quod verbum consignificat tempus, per exemplum; quia videlicet cursus, quia significat actionem non per modum actionis, sed per modum rei per se existentis, non consignificat tempus, eo quod est nomen. So he first explains by an example that the verb consignifies time, since (a) run, because it does not signify an action in the manner of an action, but in the manner of a thing existing through itself,10 does not consignify time because it is a name [or noun].

11. On the mode of being of accident. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, qu. 8, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU8AR2 CO omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substantiam est accidens. ratio enim accidentis est inesse.
9

Everything inhering in something beyond its essence is an accident. For the ratio of an accident is to be in.

Since the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating ( In II Physic., lect. 5, n. 15), it follows that the mode of being of substance is that it not exist in a subject. 10 It is evident from the texts already cited that to be a thing existing through itself is proper to substance, from which it follows that to exist in the manner described is to exist per modum substantiae.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB7LC-1N.10 licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint. Now although the mode of being of accidents is not that they be through themselves, but only that they be in.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR3- CO ratio autem accidentis imperfectionem continet: quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, et compositionem facere cum subjecto per consequens. But the ratio of an accident contains imperfection, the reason being that the being of an accident is to be in and to depend, and as a consequence to produce a composition with the subject.

12. On the modes of being of substance and accident. Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
TR2 CP01 primi autem modi quibus contrahitur ens, sunt esse per se, et esse in alio. esse autem per se est modus praedicamenti substantiae; esse vero in alio est modus aliorum novem praedicamentorum. Now the first modes by which being is contracted are being through itself, and being in another. But being through itself is the mode of the predicament of substance; whereas being in another is the mode of the other nine predicaments.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB7LC-1N.-4 secundo ibi, nam quando probat propositum; et utitur tali ratione. quod est per se et simpliciter in unoquoque genere, est prius eo quod est per aliud et secundum quid. sed substantia est ens simpliciter et per seipsam: The second there, (where he says) For when (we say), he proves what he has proposed, and he uses the following argument. In each genus, what exists through itself and simply is prior to what exists through something else and in a certain respect. But substance is being simply and through itself.

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omnia autem alia genera a substantia sunt entia secundum quid et per substantiam: ergo substantia est prima inter alia entia.

But all the genera other than substance are beings in a certain respect and through substance. Therefore substance is first among the other beings.

13. On substance as being through itself. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes I, cap. 25, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 CP25 N.9 potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen substantiae deo proprie convenire non possit, quia deus non substat accidentibus; res tamen significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit in genere substantiae. nam substantia est ens per se: quod deo constat convenire, ex quo probatum est ipsum non esse accidens. LB1 CP25 N.10 sed ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis quod in definitione substantiae non est ens per se. ex hoc enim quod dicitur ens non posset esse genus: quia iam probatum est quod ens non habet rationem generis. similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur per se: quia hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tantum: dicitur enim ens per se ex hoc quod non est in alio; quod est negatio pura. quae nec potest rationem generis constituere: quia sic genus non diceret quid est res, sed quid non est. oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut But to this it must be said from what has been said that being through itself is not in the definition of substance. For from the fact that it is called being it cannot be a genus, since it has already been proved that being does not have the ratio of a genus. Nor likewise from the fact that it is called through itself, since this does not appear to imply anything except negation alone: for it is called being through itself from the fact that it is not in another, which is a pure negation. But this cannot constitute the ratio of a genus, since in this way a genus would not express what a thing is, but what it is not. Therefore the ratio of substance must be understood in this way, that substance is a thing to which it belongs not to be in a subject; but the name of a thing is imposed from the But it might appear to someone that, although the name substance cannot properly belong to God, since God does not stand under accidents, still, the thing signified by the name belongs to Him, and so He is in the genus of substance. For substance is being through itself, which all admit to belong to God, from which it is proved that He is not an accident.

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nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio. hoc autem deo non convenit: nam non habet quidditatem nisi suum esse. unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in genere substantiae. et sic nec in aliquo genere: cum ostensum sit ipsum non esse in genere accidentis.

whatness, as the name being from the act of being; and in this way in the ratio of substance there is understood that it have a whatness to which it belongs not to be in another. But this does not belong to God, for He does not have a whatness except His own act of being. And so it remains that in no way is He in the genus of substance. And so neither is He in a genus, since it has been shown that He is not in the genus of accident.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR2- AG2 praeterea, substantia est quod non est in subjecto, sed est ens per se. cum igitur deo hoc maxime conveniat, videtur quod ipse sit in genere substantiae. DS8QU4 AR2- RA2 ad secundum dicendum, quod ista definitio, secundum avicennam, non potest esse substantiae: substantia est quae non est in subjecto. ens enim non est genus. haec autem negatio non in subjecto nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subjecto, non dicit aliquod genus: quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. To the second it must be said that this definition according to Avicenna cannot be of substance: substance is that which is not in a subject. For being is not a genus. But this negation not places nothing in the subject. And so when I say being is not in a subject, it does not express a genus, because in any genus it is necessary to signify some whatness [i.e. a quiddity], as has been said, of whose understanding there is no to be [i.e. in whose concept existing is not included]. But being does not express a whatness, but only the act of being, since it is its principle; and so it does not follow: it is not in a subject: therefore it is in the genus of substance. Further, substance is what is not in a subject, but is being through itself. Therefore, since this chiefly belongs to God, it seems that He is in the genus of substance.

ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: est non in subjecto: ergo est in genere substantiae.

sed hoc deo non convenit, ut dictum est, loc. But this does not belong to God, as has been

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cit..

said in that place.

14. On the true descriptions of substance and accident. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quodlibetales, n. 9, qu. 3, art ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
N.9QU-3ARRA-2 ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum avicennam in sua metaph., esse non potest poni in definitione alicuius generis et speciei, quia omnia particularia uniuntur in definitione generis vel speciei, cum tamen genus vel species non sit secundum unum esse in om-nibus. et ideo haec non est vera definitio substantiae: substantia est quod per se est; vel: accidens est quod est in alio. sed est circumlocutio verae descriptionis, quae talis intelligitur: substantia est res cuius naturae debetur esse non in alio; accidens vero est res, cuius naturae debetur esse in alio. unde patet quod, quamvis accidens miraculose sit non in subiecto, non tamen pertinet ad definitionem substantiae; non enim per hoc eius naturae debetur esse non in alio; nec egreditur definitionem accidentis, quia adhuc natura eius remanet talis ut ei debeatur esse in alio. To the second it must be said that, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics, being cannot be placed in the definition of any genus and species, the reason being that all particulars [i.e. individuals] are united in the definition of the genus or the species, yet the genus or the species does not exist according to one being in all things. And therefore this is not a true definition of substance: substance is what exists through itself; or accident is what exists in another. rather, it is a circumlocution of a true descripttion, which is understood as follows: substance is a thing to whose nature it is due to not exist in another; but accident is a thing to whose nature it is due to exist in another. And so it is clear that, although accident is not in a subject miraculously, it still does not pertain to the definition of substance. For by this it is not due to its nature not to exist in another; nor does it go out of the definition of accident, because its nature still remains such that it be due to it to exist in another.

15. That every mode of substance is reduced to two things: a quid est or what it is, and to a hoc aliquid or this something, by the quid the essence of substance being understood, by the hoc aliquid, the supposit. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).:
LB7LC-1N.-3 primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, First, he proposes what he intends, that being is said in many ways, as was stated in the fifth book, in which he distinguished the many ways in which names of this sort are said,

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quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc aliquid, idest substantiam; ut per quid, intelligatur essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid suppositum, ad quae duo omnes modi substantiae reducuntur, ut in quinto est habitum. illud vero significat qualitatem vel quantitatem, aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum. et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, idest ens quod significat substantiam.

the reason being that that some being signifies a what it is and a this something; that is, substance, such that by what the essence of substance is understood, by this something, the supposit, to which two every mode of substance is reduced, as is had in the fifth book. But another signifies quality or quantity, or one of the other predicaments. And since being is said in so many ways, it is clear that among all beings the first is that which is; that is, the being which signifies substance.

16. On the two meanings of substance. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU29 AR2 CO respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philo- I reply that it must be said that, according to the sophum, in v metaphys., substantia dicitur du- Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metapliciter. physics, substance is said in two ways. uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam In one way the whatness of a thing is called significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus substance, according as we say that the quod definitio significat substantiam rei, definition signifies the substance of a thing, quam quidem substantiam graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum. which substance the Greeks call ousia, which we may call essence. In another way the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of substance is called substance. And this, taking it commonly, can be named by a name signifying an intention, and in this way it is called supposit.

17. On what substance names. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 2. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR2- RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum, quod deus simpliciter non est accidens, nec tamen omnino To the first it must be said that simply God is not an accident, nor can He be called sub-

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proprie potest dici substantia; tum quia nomen substantiae dicitur a substando,

stance properly in any way, both because the name substance is said from substanding [i.e., from standing under accidents.], and because substance names a whatness, which is something other than its being. And so that division [sc. that everything that is is either substance or accident] is of created being.

tum quia substantia quidditatem nominat, quae est aliud ab esse ejus. unde illa est divisio entis creati.

18. Names related to substance. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU29 AR2 CO nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significantibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem considerationem substantiae sic dictae. secundum enim quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt. secundum vero quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sic dicitur res naturae; sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae. secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, dicitur hypostasis vel substantia. quod autem haec tria nomina significant communiter in toto genere substantiarum, hoc nomen persona significat in genere rationalium substantiarum. It is also named by three names signifying a thing, which are thing of nature, subsistence, and hypostasis, in accordance with a threefold consideration of substance so called. For according as it exists through itself and not in another, it is called subsistence. For we say those things subsist which are not in another, but exist in themselves. But according as it is supposed to [= subject to] some common nature, thus it is called thing of nature, just as this man is a thing of human nature. But according as it is supposed to accidents, it is called hypostasis or substance. But what these three names signify commonly in the whole genus of substances, the name person signifies in the genus of rational substances.

19. That those things are said to subsist which are not in another, but exist in themselves. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU29 AR2 CO secundum enim quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, For according as it exists through itself and not in another, it is called subsistence,

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illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt.

for we say those things subsist which are not in another, but exist in themselves.

20. On the mode of being per se. Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 8, cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
TR8 CP02 tertio modo dicitur aliquid esse per se, quod significat aliquod solitarium, sicut singulare quod est in genere substantiae, ut socrates et plato. album vel ambulans, isto modo non dicitur per se, cum non intelligatur aliquid solitarium per se existens: dicendo enim album, dico accidens et subjecttum; sed cum dico socrates, dico aliquid solitarium, et sic dicitur per se. sciendum est autem quod iste modus non est modus praedicandi per se, sed est modus essendi. In the third way something is said to be per se which signifies something solitary, like the sing-ular in the genus of substance, like Socrates and Plato. White or walking are not called per se in this way, since something solitary existing per se [through itself] is not understood: for by saying white, I say an accident and a subject; but when I say Socrates, I say something solitary, and in this way it is called per se. But it must be understood that this mode is not a mode of predicating per se; rather it is a mode of being.

21. On the mode of being of the nine genera of accidents. Cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR3- AG1 ad tertium sic proceditur. videtur etiam quod alia praedicamenta de deo dicantur. de quocumque enim praedicatur species, et genus. sed scientia, quae est species qualitatis, inventitur in deo, et magnitudo, quae est species quantitatis. ergo et quantitas et qualitas. DS8QU4 AR3- AG2 praeterea, philosophus dicit: unum in substantia Further, the Philosopher states: a unity in subOne proceeds to the third as follows. It also seems that the other predicaments are said of God. For whatever the species is predicated of, so is the genus. But science, which is a species of quality, is found in God, and magnitude, which is a species of quantity. Therefore both quantity and quality [are predicated of God].

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facit idem, in quantitate aequale, in qualitate simile. sed in deo dicitur vere aequalitas et similitudo. ergo oportet de eo dici aliquid per modum qualitatis et quantitatis, sicut scientiam vel magnitudinem. DS8QU4 AR3- AG3 praeterea, natura generis propriissime reperitur in eo in quo primo est. sed deus est primum agens. ergo in eo actio praecipue invenitur. DS8QU4 AR3- AG4 praeterea, quanto aliquid est debilioris esse, tanto magis repugnat summae perfectioni. sed inter omnia alia entia relatio habet debilissimum esse, ut dicit commentator, unde etiam fundatur super alia omnia entia, sicut supra quantitatem aequalitas, et sic de aliis.

stance makes the same, in quantity, the equal, in quality, the like. But equality and likeness are truly said in God. Therefore, it is necessary that something be said of Him through the mode of a quality and of a quantity, just as science and magnitude.

Further, the nature most proper to the genus is found in that in which it first is. But God is the first agent. Therefore action is found principally in Him.

Further, the weaker in being something is, the more repugnant it is to the highest perfection. But among all the other beings relation has the weakest being, as the Commentator says. And so it is also founded on all the other beings, as equality is founded on quantity, and so on in the case of the others.

cum igitur in divinis inveniatur relatio, multo Therefore, since relation is found in the divine, fortius alia praedicamenta. with much greater reason are the other predicaments. DS8QU4 AR3- SC-1 contra, augustinus: omne quod de deo dicitur, aut secundum substantiam aut secundum relationem dicitur; et ita alia praedicamenta non erunt in divinis. hoc etiam habetur ex auctoritate augustini in littera. DS8QU4 AR3- CO respondeo dicendum, quod quidquid inventum I reply that it must be said that whatever is in creaturis, de deo praedicatur, praedicatur found in creatures predicated of God is preTo the contrary, Augustine: Everything that is said of God is said either according to substance or according to relation; and so the other predicaments will not be found in the divine. This is also had from the authority of Augustine cited in the text.

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eminenter, ut dicit dionysius, sicut etiam est in omnibus aliis causis et causatis. unde oportet omnem imperfectionem removeri ab eo quod in divinam praedicationem venit. sed in unoquoque novem praedicamentorum duo invenio; scilicet rationem accidentis et rationem propriam illius generis, sicut quantitatis vel qualitatis. ratio autem accidentis imperfectionem continet: quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, et compositionem facere cum subjecto per consequens. unde secundum rationem accidentis nihil potest de deo praedicari. si autem consideremus propriam rationem cujuslibet generis, quodlibet aliorum generum, praeter ad aliquid, importat imperfectionem; quantitas enim habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subjectum; est enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qualitas dispositio substantiae, et sic patet in omnibus aliis. unde eadem ratione removentur a divina praedicatione secundum rationem generis, sicut removebantur per rationem accidentis. si autem consideremus species ipsarum, tunc aliqua secundum differentias completivas important aliquid perfectionis, ut scientia, virtus et hujusmodi. et ideo ista praedicantur de deo secundum propriam rationem speciei et non secundum rationem generis. ad aliquid autem, etiam secundum rationem generis, non importat aliquam dependentiam ad subjectum; immo refertur ad aliquid extra:

dicated by way of eminence, as Dionysius says, as in all other causes and things caused. And so it is necessary for every imperfection to be removed from what enters into the divine predication. But in each of the nine predicaments I find two things: the ratio of an accident and the proper ratio of that genus, [or the ratio proper to that genus] as in quantity or quality. But the ratio of an accident contains imperfection, the reason being that the being of an accident is to be in and to depend, and as a consequence to produce a composition with the subject. And so nothing can be predicated of God according to the ratio of an accident. But if we were to consider the proper ratio of any genus, any of the other genera, except toward something, implies imperfection. For quantity has a proper ratio in comparison to the subject; for quantity is the measure of substance, quality the disposition of substance, and thus it is clear in all the other cases. And so by the same argument they are removed from the divine predication according to the ratio of the genus, just as they are removed by the ratio of an accident. But if we were to consider their species, in that case some, according to the differences which are completive of them, imply something of perfection, like science, virtue, and the like. And so these are predicated of God according to the proper ratio of the species, and not according to the ratio of the genus. But toward something, even according to the ratio of the genus, does not imply any dependence on the subject; on the contrary, it is referred to something outside:

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et ideo etiam secundum rationem generis in divinis invenitur. et propter hoc tantum remanent duo modi praedicandi in divinis, scilicet secundum substantiam et secundum relationem; non enim speciei contentae in genere debetur aliquis modus praedicandi, sed ipsi generi. DS8QU4 AR3- RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, in corp. art., scientia non praedicatur de deo secundum rationem generis, sed secundum propriam differentiam, quae complet rationem ipsius. unde non praedicatur univoce de deo et de aliis; sed secundum prius et posterius. DS8QU4 AR3- RA2 ad secundum dicendum, quod in divinis quaedam dicuntur habere modum quantitatis vel qualitatis; non quia secundum talem modum praedicentur de deo, sed secundum modum quo inveniuntur in creaturis, prout nomina quae a nobis imposita sunt, modum habent qualitatis et quantitatis: sicut etiam damascenus dicit, quod quaedam dicuntur de deo sicut assequentia substantiam, cum tamen, prout in ipso est, nihil sit assequens. DS8QU4 AR3- RA3 ad tertium dicendum, quod actio, secundum quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab agente, et cum motu; sed in deo non est aliquid medium secundum rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non dicitur agens actione quae est praedicamentum, sed actio sua est substantia. de hoc tamen plenius dicetur in principio

and so it is found in the divine even according to the ratio of the genus. And on this account only two modes of predicating remain in the divine, namely, according to substance, and according to relation. For there ought not to be any mode of predicating of a species contained in the genus, but of the genus itself.

To the first, then, it must be said that, just as has been said in the body of the article, science is not predicated of God according to the ratio of the genus, but according to the proper difference, which completes its ratio, And so it is not predicated univocally of God and of other things, but according to a before and after.

To the second it must be said that in the divine some things are said to have the mode of a quantity or a quality; not because they are predicated of God according to such a mode, but according to the mode by which they are found in creatures, according as names imposed by us have the mode of a quality or of a quantity: as Damascene also says, that certain things are said of God as following substance, but nevertheless, according as it is in Him, there is nothing following.

To the third it must be said that action, according as it is a predicament, means something flowing from an agent, and with motion; But in God there is not in reality some mean between Him and His work, and so He is not called an agent by the action which is a predicament, but action is His substance. And this will be discussed more fully at the

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secundi, dist. 1, qu. unica, art. 2. DS8QU4 AR3- RA4 ad quartum dicendum, quod debilitas esse relationis consideratur secundum inhaerentiam sui ad subjectum:

beginning of the second part (dist. 1, the single question, art. 2).

To the fourth it must be said that the weakness in being of relation is considered according to its inherence in a subject,

quia non ponit aliquid absolutum in subjecto, the reason being that it does not place somesed tantum per respectum ad aliud. thing absolute in the subject, but merely through a respect to something else. unde ex hoc habet magis quod veniat in divinam praedicationem: quia quanto minus addit, tanto minus repugnat simplicitati. And so that it come into the divine predication belongs to it from this because the less it adds, the less repugnant it is to the divine simplicity.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IX Meta., lect. 1, n. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB9LC-1N.-1 dicit ergo primo, quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet de substantia. et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis. et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi. He says first that in the things premised there has been a discussion about the first being, to which every other predicament of being is referred, namely, about substance. And that they are all referred to substance as to the first being is obvious, the reason being that every other being, namely, quality and quantity and the like, is spoken of according to the ratio of substance. For it is called quantity from the fact that it is the measure of substance, and quality from the fact that it is a certain disposition of substance; and likewise in the other cases. And this is clear from the fact that accidents have the ratio of substance, the reason being that the proper subject must be placed in the definition of any accident, just as nose must be placed in the definition of snub. And this is made clear in what has been premised, namely, at the beginning of the seventh book.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 6, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB-1LC-6N.-7

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manifestum est autem, quod illud quod est ens per seipsum, scilicet substantia, est naturaliter prior omnibus his quae non habent esse nisi in comparatione ad substantiam, s icut est quantitas, quae est mensura substantiae, et qualitas, quae est dispositio substantiae, et ad aliquid, quod est habitudo substantiae. et idem est in aliis generibus, quae omnia assimilantur propagini entis, idest substantiae, quae est principaliter ens, a qua propaginantur et derivantur omnia alia genera. quae etiam in tantum dicuntur entia, inquantum accidunt substantiae.

But it is obvious that that which is a being through itself, namely, substance, is naturally prior to everything which does not have being except in comparison to substance, like quantity, which is the measure of substance, and quality, which the disposition of substance, and toward something, which is the habitude of substance. And it is the same in the other genera, all of which are likened to the offspring of being that is, of substance, which is a being principally, from which all other genera are propagated and derived. And these are only called beings insofar as they befall substance [i.e. insofar as they are accidents of substance].

22. On the mode of being of toward something or relation. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Physic., lect. 5, lect. 15 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB3LC-5N.15 aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis; (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsicum). Or it has itself through a respect to another, and thus there is the predicament of relation; (for when I say The man is a father, something absolute is not predicated of a man, but a respect which is in him to something extrinsic).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):


LB5LC-9N.8 vel in est ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. Or it is not in it [sc. a subject] absolutely, but in respect to something else, and thus it is toward something.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, art. 2, ad 12 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU8AR2AG12 praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est ad aliud se habere, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Further, those things are said to be toward something whose being is to have itself toward something else, as is said in the Predicaments.

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esse ergo relationis est in respectu ad aliud, non autem esse substantiae. QU8AR2RA12 ad duodecimum dicendum quod, cum relatio sit accidens in creaturis, esse suum est inesse; unde esse suum non est ad aliud se habere; sed esse huius secundum quod ad aliquid, est ad aliud se habere.

The being of relation, then, is in respect to something else, but not the being of substance.

To the twelfth it must be said that, since relation is an accident in creatures, its being [or to be] is to be in; and so its being is not to have itself toward something else; but to be of this [i.e. to belong to this] according as it is toward something, is to have itself toward something else.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Potentia, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU8AR2 CO ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod inter novem genera quae continentur sub accidente, quaedam significantur secundum rationem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est inesse; et ideo illa dico significari per modum accidentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri, sicut quantitas et qualitas; quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est, et similiter qualitas. ad aliquid vero non significatur secundum rationem accidentis: non enim significatur ut aliquid eius in quo est, sed ut ad id quod extra est. et propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis, sed scibilis. For the evidence of this, then, it must be understood that among the nine genera under which accident is contained, some are signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that those things are signified in the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another, like quantity and quality; for quantity is signified as of [= belonging to] that in which it is, and likewise quality. But toward something [= relation] is not signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for it is not signified as something of [= belonging to] that in which it is, but [it is signified] as to that which is outside. And on this account the Philosopher also says that science, to the extent that it is a relation, is not of the knower, but of the knowable.

23. On names relativa secundum esse and relativa secundum dici. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, qu. 13, art. 7, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU13 AR7 AG1 ad septimum sic proceditur. videtur quod nomina quae important relationem To the seventh one proceeds as follows. It seems that names which imply a relation to

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ad creaturas, non dicantur de deo ex tempore. omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. unde et ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina substantia, et creator significat dei actionem, quae est eius essentia. sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed aeterna. ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de deo ex tempore, sed ab aeterno. QU13 AR7 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse.

creatures are not said of God from time. For every name of this sort signifies the divine substance, as is commonly said. And for this reason Ambrose says that the name Lord is the name of a power, which is the divine substance, and Creator signifies the action of God, which is His essence. But the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore, names of this sort are not said of God from time, but from eternity.

To the first, then, it must be said that certain relatives are imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes* themselves, like Lord, servant, father, and son, and the like, and these are called relative according to being. * It is clear from the argument that a relative habitude is what is also called toward something, or relation proper.

quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. et huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. quaedam vero significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant actionem dei, quae est eius essentia.

But some are imposed in order to signify the things which certain habitudes follow upon, like mover and the thing moved, head and the thing having the head, and others of the sort, which are called relative according to being said. In this way, then, this difference is also to be taken into consideration in the case of the divine names. For certain ones signify the very habitude to the creature, like Lord. And names of this sort do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as they presuppose it, just as Lord presupposes power, which is the divine substance. But some signify the divine essence directly, and imply the habitude subsequently; just as Savior, Creator, and the like, signify the action of God, which is His essence.

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utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.

Still both names are said of God from time with respect to that habitude which they imply, whether principally or subsequently, but not with respect to the fact that they signify the essence, whether directly or indirectly.

24. That action, according as it is a predicament, means something flowing from an agent, and with motion. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, qu. 4, art. 3, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU4 AR3- RA3 ad tertium dicendum, quod actio, secundum quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid fluens ab agente, et cum motu; sed in deo non est aliquid medium secundum rem inter ipsum et opus suum, et ideo non dicitur agens actione quae est praedicamentum, sed actio sua est substantia. de hoc tamen plenius dicetur in principio secundi, dist. 1, qu. unica, art. 2. To the third it must be said that action, according as it is a predicament, means something flowing from an agent, and with motion; But in God there is not in reality some mean between Him and His work, and so He is not called an agent by the action which is a predicament, but action is His substance. And this will be discussed more fully at the beginning of the second part (dist. 1, the single question, art. 1).

25. That esse and vivere are predicated in the manner of an act. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
DS8QU2 AR1- RA3 ad tertium dicendum, quod vivere et esse dicuntur per modum actus; et quia cuilibet actui respondet mensura sua, ideo oportet ut divino esse et vitae divinae intelligatur adjacere aeternitas, quasi mensura; quamvis realiter non sit aliud a divino esse; et quia vivere magis habet rationem actus quam esse, ideo forte definit aeternitatem per vitam potius quam per esse. To the third it must be said that living and being are predicated in the manner of an act; and because to any act there corresponds its measure, therefore eternity must be understood to lie adjacent to the divine being and the divine life as a measure, although in reality it is not something other than the divine being. And because living has the ratio of an act more than being does, therefore he boldly defines eternity by life rather than by being.

Note that esse taken concretely as a participle means being; taken in the abstract as a verb in the infinitive mood means to be. Hence vivere means both living and to live. 26. That action can be signified in three ways. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

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LB1 LC-5N.-5 potest autem actio significari tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, velut quaedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut cum dicitur actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et similia; alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per verba aliorum modorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis. sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia actionis potest apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut verba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi res quasdam. But action can be signified in three ways: in one way, per se [or as such] in the abstract, as a certain thing, and in this way it is signified by a name [or noun], as when it is said, action, passion, (a) walk, (a) run, and the like. In another way, [it can be signified] in the manner of an action, namely, as going out from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; and in this way it is signified by verbs of the other moods, which are attributed to predicates.11 But because the very process or inherence of an action can also be apprehended by the understanding and be signified as a certain thing, it follows that verbs in the infinitive mood, which themselves signify the very inherence of an action in a subject, can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names [or nouns] according as they signify as certain things.

N.B. In order to understand the modes of signifying, one must first be clear about the meaning of mode, a subject to which we turn next.

11

The phrase quae attribuuntur praedicatis here presumably means the same as they are put down on the side of predicates, and this would be proper to verbs of the other moods insofar as they are always an indication of those things which are predicated of another.

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27. On modus. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Propositionibus Modalibus (init.) (tr. B.A.M.):
Because a proposition is called modal from mode, in order to know what a modal proposition is, one must first know what a mode is. Now a mode is a determination lying next to a thing, which, in fact, results from the placing next to of an adjectival name, which determines a substantive, as when it is said A man is white, or by an adverb, which determines a verb, as A man runs well.12

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
Properly, quality implies a certain mode of a substance. However, as St. Augustine says (Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure predetermines [praefigit], and so it implies a certain determination according to some measure. 13

28. Notes. A measure praefigitthat is, predeterminesa mode. But a mode consists in the determination or commensuration of a things principles, whether material or efficient. Hence a measure fixes or determines a things principles, whether material or efficient. That is why it is said that a mode is a determination lying next to a thing. In speech, a mode or determination lying next to a thing results when an adjectival name, or adjective, is placed next to a substantive, or when an adverb determines a verb. An example of the first case is when it is said Homo est albus, A man is white. An example of the second is when it is said Homo currit bene, A man runs well. 29. Definitions. MODUS (MODE). (1) A mode is a determination lying next to a thing ( modus est determinatio adiacens rei, St. Thomas Aquinas, De propositionibus modalibus); (2) a mode is what a measure predetermines ( modus autem est quem mensura praefigit , St. Augustine, Super gen. ad litteram); (3) a mode is a certain determination according to some measure (est autem modus quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1).
12

by form and matter: a determination lying next to a thing by causal predication: what a measure predetermines (a measure being a cause of a mode) by genus and difference: a certain determination according to some measure

quia propositio modalis a modo dicitur, ad sciendum quid sit propositio modalis oportet prius scire quid sit modus. est autem modus determinatio adiacens rei, quae quidem fit per adiectionem nominis adiectivi, quod determinat substantivum, ut cum dicitur homo est albus, vel per adverbium, quod determinat verbum, ut homo currit bene. 13 proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram.

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30. On the modes of real being. If a mode is a determination lying next to a thing, then a mode of being is a determination lying next to being. The determination lying next to the being which is substance is that it exist through itself; of an accident, that it exist in another; of a quantity, that it be the measure of substance; of a quality, that it be the disposition of substance; of a relation or toward something, that it be the habitude of substance. Again, the mode of a relation is that it be in something not absolutely but with respect to something else; that is, that it be a respect which is in a thing toward something extrinsic. An accident is what has being only in comparison with substance as (or which has a proper ratio in comparison to its subject as): its measure (quantity) its disposition (quality) its habitude (toward something, or relation) its extrinsic measure from time (when) from place (where) from an order of parts in place (situation or position) neither its extrinsic cause nor measure, but what is entirely outside the subject (habitus, having or possession) its extrinsic cause as the agent which is denominated from its effect (action) as the agent from which its effect is denominated (passion) 31. A division of real being into its modes. to be through itself and simply (substance) not through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect, which is to be in another (accident, the remaining nine genera) to be through itself and simply (which is to subsist) as substanding, or standing under, accidents (first substance) as not standing under accidents (which is to subsist only) (second substance) to be through itself and simply as not standing under accidents (which is to subsist only) 47

as having differentiae and not differentiated (second substance most particular species) as having differentiae and differentiated (second substance both species and genus) as not having differentiae, but differentiated (second substance highest genus) to be in another as intrinsic as extrinsic, or as entirely outside it to be in another as intrinsic absolutely not absolutely, but through a respect to something else (relation or toward something) to be in another as intrinsic absolutely and through itself on the part of the matter (quantity) not through itself, but as following the form (quality) to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as either its measure or cause as neither its measure nor cause (having or possession) to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure as its cause to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from time (when) from place (where) from an order of parts in place (situation or position) to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its agent cause [as its final cause14] to be in another as extrinsic as entirely outside it as its agent cause denominated from its effect (action) from which its effect is denominated (passion) 32. The modes of signifying taken according to the modes of real being. to signify as being through itself and simply (substance) not through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect, which is to be in another (accident, the remaining nine genera) etc.

14

Not applicable because it does not cause something apart from the agent.

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33. Some modes of signifying found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) j) k) l) m) in the manner of a substance in the manner of an accident in the manner of a quantity (or quality, etc.) in the manner of a form in the manner of a nature in the manner of an essence in the manner of inhering (or something inherent) in the manner of concretion in the manner of abstraction in the manner of an act in the manner of a motion in the manner of a supposit in the manner of a subsistent thing

34. Some other modes: a) in the manner of change b) in the manner of making c) in the manner of participation per modum substantiae per modum accidentis per modum qualitatis per modum formae per modum inhaerentis per modum actus per modum suppositi per modum mutationis per modum concretionis per modum abstractionis per modum factionis per modum participationis ut inhaerenter ut inhaerens ut inhaerentem

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35. On the modes of predicating, the modes of being, and the modes of signifying: a schema of correspondences:
The Mode of Predicating (a) every predication is made in [one of] three ways (b) a predicate can have itself toward a subject in [one of] three ways (a) in one way when that which pertains to its essence is predicated of some subject (b) in one way when it is that which the subject is (a) but there is another way in which is predicated of something that which is not of its essence, yet inheres in it (sc. in the subject) (b) in the second way, as the predicate is taken according as it is in a subject (a) which has itself either on the part of the matter of the subject, and according to this there is the predicament of quantity (b) which predicate is either in it through itself and absolutely, as following the matter, and in this way it is quantity (a) or follows the form, and in this way there is the predicament of quality (b) or as following the form, and in this way it is quality (a) or it has itself with respect to another, and in this way there is the predicament of relation (b) or is not in it absolutely, but in respect to another, to be in the manner of a relation, which is to be in another as intrinsic not absolutely, but through a respect to something else to be in the manner of a quality, which is to be in another as intrinsic absolutely and not through itself, but as following the form to signify in the manner of a quality, which is to signify as being in another as intrinsic absolutely and not through itself, but as following the form, which is also to signify (or be signified) as of something in which it is; that is, to be signified as inherent to signify in the manner of a relation, which is to signify as being in another as intrinsic not absolutely, but through a respect to something else, which is not to be signified as something of that in which it is, but as to that which is outside it, which is the way in to be in the manner of a quantity, which is to be in another as intrinsic absolutely and through itself on the part of the matter to be in the manner of an accident, which is not to be through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect, which is to be in another to signify in the manner of an accident, which is to signify as being not through itself and simply, but through something else and in a certain respect, which is to signify (or be signified) as being in another to signify in the manner of a quantity, which is to signify as being in another as intrinsic absolutely and through itself on the part of the matter, which is to signify (or be signified) as of something in which it is; that is, to be signified as inherent to be in the manner of a substance, which is to be through itself and simply to signify in the manner of a substance, which is to signify (or be signified) as being through itself and simply The Mode of Being The Mode of Signifying

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and in this way it is toward something (a) but the third mode of predicating is when something extrinsic is predicated in the manner of some denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents are predicated of a subject; (b) in a third way, as the predicate is taken from that which is outside the subject (a) now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in some way commonly in all things, and in some way particularly in those things which pertain only to man; now, commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according to the ratio of a cause, or according to the ratio of a measure; (b) and this in two ways (a) but the exterior measures are time and place (b) now if it be its measure, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place (a) therefore, according as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament when (b) the predicament is taken either on the part of time, and in this way there will be when (a) but according as something is denominated from place, there is the predicament where (b) or from place, and in this way there will be where, the order of the parts not being taken into consideration (a) and situation (or position), which adds beyond where an order of parts in place

to be in the manner of something extrinsic or as entirely outside it, which is to be in another as extrinsic, or as entirely outside it

which a relation is said to have itself toward something else to signify in the manner of something extrinsic or as entirely outside it, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic, or as entirely outside it

to be in the manner of something extrinsic, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as neither its measure or cause, or to be in another as extrinsic or not entirely outside it as its measure or cause

to signify in the manner of something extrinsic, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as neither its measure or cause, or as being in another as extrinsic or not entirely outside it as its measure or cause

to be in the manner of something extrinsic, or as entirely outside it, as its measure from time or place

to signify in the manner of something extrinsic, or as entirely outside it, which is to signify as being in another as entirely outside it as its measure from time or place to signify in the manner of a when, which is to signify in the manner of being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from time

to be in the manner of a when, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from time

to be in the manner of a where, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from place

to signify in the manner of a where, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from place

to be in the manner of a situation or position, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its measure from an

to signify in the manner of a situation or position, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its

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(b) but being taken into consideration there will be situation (or position) (a) hence, when man is said to be armed, or clothed, or shod, he is denominated from something extrinsic that does not have either the ratio of a cause or a measure; hence there is a special predicament (for man) and it is called a habitus (a having or possession) (b) in one way, as it is entirely outside the subject, which, if it not be a measure of the subject, is predicated in the manner of a habitus (a having or possession), as when it is said, Socrates is shod or is clothed (a) therefore, only the agent cause remains from which something can be denominated as from something exterior; in this way, therefore, according as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament of passion; for undergoing (or to undergo) is nothing other than to receive something from an agent (b) in another way, as that from which the predicament is taken according to something (that) is in the subject of which it is predicated; and if according to a term, in this way it will be predicated as in undergoing (or to undergo); for passion is terminated in the subject undergoing (a) but conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament of action; for action is an act from the agent in another

order of parts in place

measure from an order of parts in place to signify in the manner of a having, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as neither its measure nor cause (having, rather, the ratio of those things which pertain only to man)

to be in the manner of a having, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as neither its measure nor cause (having, rather, the ratio of those things which pertain only to man)

to be in the manner of an undergoing, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its agent cause from which it is denominated (to exist in the manner of a passion is to exist as coming into a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to exist as flowing into a patient, and with motion)

to signify in the manner of an undergoing, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its agent cause from which it is denominated (to signify in the manner of a passion is to signify as coming into a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to signify as flowing into a patient, and with motion)

to be in the manner of an acting, which is to be in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its agent cause denominated from its effect (to exist in the manner of an action is to exist as going out from

to signify in the manner of an acting, which is to signify as being in another as extrinsic or entirely outside it as its agent cause denominated from its effect (to signify in the manner of an action is to signify as going out

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(b) but if according to a principle, in this way it is predicated as acting (or to act); for the principle of action is in the subject

a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to exist as flowing from an agent, and with motion)

from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to signify as flowing from an agent, and with motion)

36. Some notes on the modes of signifying based on the Modi Significandi of Martin of Denmark. The modes of signifying are taken from the modes of understanding, which are taken from the modes of being. The modes of signifying distinguish the parts of speech. The modes of being, as they are understood, become the modes of understanding. But whatever it is possible to understand, it is also possible to signify. Hence the modes of signifying are taken from the modes of understanding. In order to signify our concepts we put them into voice; that is, we fashion a vocal sound and place it upon the concept in order to signify it to another. Thus, through this imposition the modes of understanding become modes of signifying. For example, if the intellect understands something as a substance, it signifies it as a substantive. The modes of being are in a thing as in a subject. The essential modes make a thing different in kind; the accidental do not. The modes of signifying are the principles of the science; they are that in virtue of which the parts of a sentence go together. The modes of signifying are consignifications 15 and are the proper concern of the grammarian. The modes themselves are the properties of a thing as they are consignified through the voice. Consignification is something that happens to a voice that is already a sign. It adds a further signification to the sign by conveying the properties of the thing. Each part of speech consignifies its proper mode. The following is a list of the principle parts of speech together with their modes of signifying according to Martin:
15

On consignificaion, see The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction Among the Parts of Speech (Papers in Poetics 10).

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Noun a) the mode of habit and rest (material) b) the mode of determinate apprehension (formal) The mode of signifying here is composite. Form signifies the essence apprehended by the intellect. Matter signifies the subject in which the form inheres. The material aspect is taken from the mode of being of matter; the formal aspect, from the mode of being of form. Example: Peter runs. Verb a) the mode of becoming (material) b) the mode of standing apart (formal) Example: Peter runs. The action is signified as coming from an agent. Pronoun: the mode of habit and rest (formal and completive) The pronoun is so-called from standing for a noun (pro nomen) Example: He was Peter. Adverb: the mode of determining another, or of being adjacent to another Example: Peter ran swiftly. Participle: the mode of becoming not standing apart from substance Example: Peter running. The action is signified as being in an agent. Conjunction: the mode of joining Example: And another thing, Peter. Interjection: an adverb with the mode of emotion Example: Oh, Peter. Division of the Noun: The noun is divided into the mode of the common and the mode of the proper. Example: man (the mode of the common) Socrates (the mode of the proper) Man is predicable of many; but Socrates designates this particular man. The mode of the common makes the appellative noun, which has the mode of being applicable to many. Man signifies indeterminately insofar as it is not determined more toward Socrates than Plato. 54

The mode of the common is divided into the mode of standing by itself and the mode of the adjacent. A substantive noun [e.g., green] signifies through the mode of standing by itself. The adjectival noun [e.g., musical] signifies through the mode of the adjacent. The substantive noun is itself divided into a) the abstract noun, and b) the concrete noun. The abstract noun has its being essentially distinct against the subject. The concrete noun has its being not as essentially distinct, but as accidentally making one with its subject. The concrete noun is twofold: 1) the substantive noun, as man, and 2) the adjectival noun, as white. 37. Peter of Spain on matters relevant to the modes of signifying. (a) On composition. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, pp. 17-18):
Composition is the union of possible components resulting from a proportion of act and potency: for every composition requires act and potency, and along with this a union of these to each other which is caused by a tendency of act toward potency. Compositions, however, are real or logical. A real composition is one whose extremes are distinct from each other. This composition is of four kinds: one kind is the composition of integral parts; another type is that of essential parts; another kind is that of capacities, as the composition of the capacities of the soul in relation to one another or with the soul [itself]; another is that of an accident with a subject, as of whiteness with the wall of a house. A logical composition is one whose extremes are dis- [17-18] tinguished by reason alone, whether they are real or not, as is the composition of a quality with a substance in a noun or of a genus and a differentia in a species. As regards logical composition, some are signified in a word; others, however, in a proposition. Certainly that which belongs to a word is a composition of the essential and accidental modes of signifying ( modorum significandi) of the eight parts of speech, to treat of which at length belongs to the grammarian. In relation to what has been proposed we discuss only the composition of the modes of signifying of a noun, a verb, and a participle, through whose negation an infinite term can come into existence, and the composition of a perfect proposition through whose negation a negative proposition comes into existence.

(b) On the composition of the noun, the verb, and the participle. Cf. ibid., pp. 19-20):
Therefore one must note that the composition of a noun is twofold. One is the composition of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a substantive noun, as man has for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a quality of it. The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists in the case of adjectival names; for example, white signifies an accident in relation to an indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a quality. And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded

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with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency which it has toward the substance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in which they are. For if such a composition be other than and distinct from the quality and from the substance, it would be united with them, and, therefore, without an intermediate. And then for the same reason it will have to be determined in the first way or through an intermediate. However, once should ask about that intermediate through which it would be united with the extremes. The process then would be infinite unless something were naturally united with another. In a verb, however, there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as for example, He is running (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running; and the thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act. The reason for this is that although a verb signifies an act concretely, it necessarily implies an indefinite substance. This is the substance united in the verb. But that substance does not function as a subject in the proposition. Rather it is predicated in the proposition, as when one says: Sortes is running, running is not predicated absolutely and abstractly but rather the reality is predicated under the aspect of running; just as is clear that in saying, Sortes is white, the sense is not Sortes is whiteness, rather it means: Sortes is a thing having whiteness. This intrinsic composition of the verb is the union of an act implied by the verb with an intrinsic substance. [19-20] Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united substance, as for example, reading only signifies the same as who reads. Whence who affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and reads affirms a determinate act. From this it is clear that a verb and a participle do not differ so far as the signified is concerned because each signifies an act conjoined with an intrinsic substance. Therefore Priscian 3 says that a participle has reference to that which is signified by a verb under the accidents of a noun. However, verb and participle differ in the mode of signifying. A verb signifies an act or movement in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in the manner of going into a substance in the case of passion, by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a proposition. A participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense of going into a substance or of going out of a substance.
3

Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae. Books I to xiii are edited by Henry Keil from an edition by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1855), volume I. Books xiii to xviii are edited by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1859), volume II. All references are to these editions of Priscian, ix, I. 9.

(c) In sum: The composition of a noun is twofold. (1) One is the composition of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a substantive noun, as man has for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a quality of it. (2) The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists in the case of adjectival names; for example, white signifies an accident in relation to an indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a quality. And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency [= an aptitude] which it has toward the substance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in which they are. 56

(d) The composition of the verb. In a verb, however, there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as for example, He is running (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running; and the thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act. (e) The composition of the participle. Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united substance, as for example, reading only signifies the same as who reads. Whence who affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and reads affirms a determinate act. (f) Summary of Peters teaching. In the substantival noun there is a composition of an essential quality with a substance, as man has for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a quality of it. In the adjectival noun there is a composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as white signifies an accident in relation to an indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a quality. In the verb there is a composition of an act with an intrinsic substance, as for example, He is running (currit) signifies a thing combined with the act of running; and the thing is regarded as a substance and the running as an act. In the participle there is a composition of a united act with a united substance, as for example, reading only signifies the same as who reads. Whence who affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and reads affirms a determinate act. In the case of a noun there is a composition of a quality with a substance. A verb signifies an act or movement, in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in the manner of going into a substance in the case of passion, by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a proposition. A participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense of going into a substance or of going out of a substance.

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38. Supplement: On substantives and adjectival names. St. Thomas Aquinas The Summa Theologica (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES) Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other. As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person? (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence? (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular? (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense? (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract? (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names? (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person? Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 1 [<< | >>] Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or suppositum, there can be only one suppositum of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (Question [28], Article [3]; Question [30], Article [2]). Therefore essence is not the same as person. Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of

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person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same. Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called suppositum or hypostasis. Therefore person is not the same as essence. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father. I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question [3], Article [3]) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as suppositum, which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), relation multiplies the Trinity of persons, some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be adjacent; considering only in the relations the idea of reference to another, and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question [28], Article [2]) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (Question [29], Article [4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons. Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of suppositum in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the supposita; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence. Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other. Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (Question [13], Articles [1],3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called subjects, supposita, or hypostases. So the divine persons are named supposita or hypostases, but not as if there really existed any real supposition or subjection. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>]

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Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 2 [<< | >>] Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence? Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony. But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence. Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted. Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature. Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence. Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are from one essence [ex una essentia], lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are of one essence [unius essentiae]. Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two. Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word {homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence. I answer that, As above explained (Question [13], Articles [1],2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the suppositum of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: That woman is of a handsome figure, or: This 60

man is of perfect virtue. In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form. Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the hypostasis, and not for the essence. Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30), and I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38); and there are many other texts of the same import. Reply to Objection 3: Because nature designates the principle of action while essence comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of one essence which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are of one essence, than by saying they are of one nature. Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say the virtue of Peter. On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis], or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, he is a man of bloodthat is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the divine essence; or, the three persons are of one essence. Reply to Objection 5: The preposition from or out of does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, three persons of one essence, taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, three persons from the same essence. Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>]

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Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 3 [<< | >>] Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons? Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name God, should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as man signifies one that has humanity, so God signifies one that has Godhead. But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are three Gods. Objection 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the Hebrew original has Elohim, which may be rendered Gods or Judges: and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are several Gods, and not one God. Objection 3: Further, this word thing when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons. Objection 4: Further, as this word God signifies a being who has Deity, so also this word person signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are three Gods. On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God. I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their supposita. In creatures, one form does not exist in several supposita except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (Article [2]), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (Question [3], Article [7]; Question [11], Article [4]). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are three men; whereas we do 62

not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three Gods, but one God; forasmuch as in the three supposita of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of supposita. For we say there are three existent or three wise beings, or three eternal, uncreated, and immense beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say one uncreated, immense, eternal being, as Athanasius declares. Reply to Objection 1: Though the name God signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name God is used substantively; whereas having Godhead is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are three having Godhead, it does not follow that there are three Gods. Reply to Objection 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of supposita the Greeks said three hypostases, so also in Hebrew Elohim is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to God or to substance, lest plurality be referred to the substance. Reply to Objection 3: This word thing is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that the same Trinity is a thing supreme. Reply to Objection 4: The form signified by the word person is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalitiesthat is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghostit is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 4 [<< | >>] Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person? Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say God begot God. For, as the logicians say, a singular term signifies what it stands for. But this name God seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (Article [3]). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person. Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, God creates, this name God stands for the essence. So when we say God begot, this term God cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.

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Objection 3: Further, if this be true, God begot, because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, God does not beget, because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods. Objection 4: Further, if God begot God, He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), nothing begets itself. Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, God begot God. Objection 5: Further, if God begot God, He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that God begot God. On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, God of God. I answer that, Some have said that this name God and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He who possesses and what is possessed be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word God signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name man signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word God, from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word man. So this word God sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say God creates; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, God begets, or for two, as when we say, God spirates; or for three, as when it is said: To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, etc. (1 Tim. 1:17). Reply to Objection 1: Although this name God agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several supposita. So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies. Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the word God does not naturally stand for person. Reply to Objection 3: The word God stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word man does; for since the form signified by this word manthat is, humanityis really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the personthat is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term man does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, man is a species; whereas the form signified by the name Godthat is, the divine essenceis really one and common. 64

So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, God generates, by reason of the notional act this name God stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, God does not generate, there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, God begotten does not beget, is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a God generator, and a God not generator; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, the Father is God the generator and the Son is God the non-generator and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (Article [3]). Reply to Objection 4: This is false, the Father begot God, that is Himself, because the word Himself, as a reciprocal term, refers to the same suppositum. Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that God the Father begot another self [alterum se], forasmuch as the word se is either in the ablative case, and then it means He begot another from Himself, or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, He begot another most like to Himself. Likewise also it is false to say, He begot another God, because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (Question [31], Article [2]), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is another God; forasmuch as this adjective another would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition He begot another God is tolerated by some, provided that another be taken as a substantive, and the word God be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error. Reply to Objection 5: To say, God begot God Who is God the Father, is wrong, because since the word Father is construed in apposition to God, the word God is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, He begot God, Who is Himself the Father; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, He begot God Who is not God the Father. If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, He begot God Who is God Who is the Father. Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative Who in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the suppositum; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the suppositum. Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that to be God the Father is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that to be God the Father, is to be removed from the Sons divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>]

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Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 5 [<< | >>] Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person? Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person , so that this proposition is true, Essence begets essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence. Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated. Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (Question [3], Article [3]). But, as was shown, it is true to say that God begets God. Therefore this is also true: Essence begets essence. Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets. Objection 5: Further, the essence is a thing begetting, because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be a thing begetting, and not begetting: which cannot be. Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead. But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): Nothing begets itself. But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence. I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say God begot God, so we can say Essence begot essence: considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (Article [4]). Now although God is really the same as Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word God signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, God, as, for instance, we can say God is begotten or is Begetter, as above explained (Article [4]). The word essence, however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the supposita. 66

Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find essence from essence; or wisdom from wisdom; we should take the sense to be, the Son who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to supposita. So nature from nature, and wisdom from wisdom are less inexact than essence from essence. Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally. Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them. Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular. Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names consists in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of suppositum, whereas the adjective indicates something added to the suppositum. Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the suppositum implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the essence is begetting; yet we can say that the essence is a thing begetting, or that it is God begetting, if thing and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that essence is a thing begetting, and a thing not begetting; because in the first case thing stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence. Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several supposita, it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead, the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration. 67

Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 6 [<< | >>] Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms? Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, God is three persons; or God is the Trinity. For it is false to say, man is every man, because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, God is the Trinity, cannot be verified of any one of the supposita of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, God is the Trinity, is false. Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, animal is man; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name God as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name God, except in an accidental sense. On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity. I answer that, As above explained (Article [5]), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. And because this word God can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (Article [4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, The essence is the three persons; so likewise it is true to say, God is the three persons. Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term man can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, Man is every man; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word God can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the supposita of the divine nature, God is the Trinity, is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction. Reply to Objection 2: When we say, God, or the divine essence is the Father, the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, The Father is God is of itself true, so this proposition God is the Father is true of itself, and by no means

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accidentally. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 7 [<< | >>] Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons? Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, careless words involve risk of heresy [*In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons. Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons. Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons. On the contrary, the Apostle says: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24). I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the Trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (Question [32], Article [1]), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Question [32], Article [1]). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called appropriation. The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as

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power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth. Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence. Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to white body, considered as white. Index [<< | >>] First Part [<< | >>] Question: 39 [<< | >>] Article: 8 [<< | >>] Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors? Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift. In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the Father, the name Image proper to the Son (Question [35], Article [2]), and the name Bounty or Gift, which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Question [38], Article [2]). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For eternity imports duration of existence; species, the principle of existence; and use belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity. This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as

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above explained (Question [37], Article [2], ad 1). But, as he subjoins, All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost. The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons. Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed power, to the Son wisdom, to the Holy Ghost goodness. Nor does this seem fitting; for strength is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father. Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): What the Apostle says, From Him, and by Him, and in Him, is not to be taken in a confused sense. And (Contra Maxim. ii) from Him refers to the Father, by Him to the Son, in Him to the Holy Ghost. This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words in Him seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is the principle from no principle. Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life; and likewise the book of life, according to Ps. 39:9, In the beginning of the book it is written of Me, where a gloss observes, that is, with the Father Who is My head, also this word Who is; because on the text of Is. 65:1, Behold I go to the Gentiles, a gloss adds, The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am. These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude. So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the book of life seems proper to the Son, as signifying a thing from another; for every book is written by someone. This also, Who is, appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, I am Who am, the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you, so also he could have said further, He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you, pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son. I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which eternity is appropriated to the Father, species to the Son, use to the Holy Ghost. For eternity as meaning a being without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is a principle without a principle. Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the 71

Son. For beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): Wherethat is, in the Sonthere is supreme and primal life, etc. The second agrees with the Sons property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality, etc. The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God, etc. Use has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the use be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of to enjoy; according as to use is to employ something at the beck of the will, and to enjoy means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So use, whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him (Hilary). But the use by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth. Thus it is clear how eternity, species, and use are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. The second consideration of God regards Him as one. In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, concord or union to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For unity is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the principle without principle. Equality implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the principle from a principle. Union implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now unity is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find 72

equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united. According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of power, wisdom, and goodness. This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For power has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. Wisdom has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. Goodness, as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall. Strength is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. According to the fourth consideration, i.e. Gods relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom. For this preposition from [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition by [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works by a hammer. Hence the word by is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, All things were made by Him (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as the principle from a principle. Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form by which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression by Whom. The preposition in strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression in Him should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression in Him is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is goodness. Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is the principle without a principle: because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.

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Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since truth belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Question [16], Article [1]), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The book of life directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Question [24], Article [1]), it is Gods knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression Who is is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in Gods word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word Who is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, The Son is the begotten Who is, inasmuch as God begotten is personal. But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun this [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, this stone, and this ass. So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word God signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun this, according to Ex. 15:2: This is my God, and I will glorify Him.

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Quaestio 39 Prooemium [29984] I q. 39 pr. Post ea quae de personis divinis absolute tractata sunt, considerandum restat de personis in comparatione ad essentiam, et ad proprietates, et ad actus notionales; et de comparatione ipsarum ad invicem. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, octo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum essentia in divinis sit idem quod persona. Secundo, utrum dicendum sit quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Tertio, utrum nomina essentialia praedicanda sint de personis in plurali vel in singulari. Quarto, utrum adiectiva notionalia, aut verba vel participia, praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretive acceptis. Quinto, utrum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus in abstracto acceptis. Sexto, utrum nomina personarum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretis. Septimo, utrum essentialia attributa sint approprianda personis. Octavo, quod attributum cuique personae debeat appropriari. Articulus 1 [29985] I q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona seu suppositum, oportet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturae, ut patet in omnibus substantiis separatis, eorum enim quae sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest, quin multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona. [29986] I q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona, nam persona est distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem. [29987] I q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil subiicitur sibi ipsi. Sed persona subiicitur essentiae, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod essentia. [29988] I q. 39 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum dicimus personam patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris. [29989] I q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem, quaestio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra quod divina simplicitas hoc requirit, quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum; quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod, multiplicatis personis divinis, essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, relatio multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem; et tamen quod personae realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat relationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata, non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personae.

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[29990] I q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in creaturis non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes, et ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita. Neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia. [29991] I q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno, quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod, supposito uno, non supponatur alterum. [29992] I q. 39 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus secundum modum rerum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturae rerum creatarum individuantur per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei, inde est quod individua dicuntur subiecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio secundum rem. Articulus 2 [29993] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum tres personas esse unius essentiae. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum . Sed substantia Dei est eius essentia. Ergo tres personae non sunt unius essentiae. [29994] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, non est affirmandum aliquid de divinis, quod auctoritate Scripturae sacrae non est expressum, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Sed nunquam in Scriptura sacra exprimitur quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unius essentiae. Ergo hoc non est asserendum. [29995] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura divina est idem quod essentia. Sufficeret ergo dicere quod tres personae sunt unius naturae. [29996] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, non consuevit dici quod persona sit essentiae, sed magis quod essentia sit personae. Ergo neque convenienter videtur dici quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. [29997] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod non dicimus tres personas esse ex una essentia, ne intelligatur in divinis aliud esse essentia et persona. Sed sicut praepositiones sunt transitivae, ita et obliqui. Ergo, pari ratione, non est dicendum quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. [29998] I q. 39 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, id quod potest esse erroris occasio, non est in divinis dicendum. Sed cum dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae vel substantiae datur erroris occasio. Quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., una substantia patris et filii praedicata, aut unum qui duas nuncupationes habeat, subsistentem significat; aut divisam unam substantiam duas imperfectas fecisse substantias; aut tertiam priorem substantiam, quae a duobus et usurpata sit et assumpta. Non est ergo dicendum tres personas esse unius substantiae.

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[29999] I q. 39 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro II contra Maximinum, quod hoc nomen homousion, quod in Concilio Nicaeno adversus Arianos firmatum est, idem significat quod tres personas esse unius essentiae. [30000] I q. 39 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus noster res divinas nominat, non secundum modum earum, quia sic eas cognoscere non potest; sed secundum modum in rebus creatis inventum. Et quia in rebus sensibilibus, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam capit, natura alicuius speciei per materiam individuatur; et sic natura se habet ut forma, individuum autem ut suppositum formae, propter hoc etiam in divinis, quantum ad modum significandi, essentia significatur ut forma trium personarum. Dicimus autem in rebus creatis formam quamcumque esse eius cuius est forma; sicut sanitatem vel pulchritudinem hominis alicuius. Rem autem habentem formam non dicimus esse formae, nisi cum adiectione alicuius adiectivi, quod designat illam formam, ut cum dicimus, ista mulier est egregiae formae, iste homo est perfectae virtutis. Et similiter, quia in divinis, multiplicatis personis, non multiplicatur essentia, dicimus unam essentiam esse trium personarum; et tres personas unius essentiae, ut intelligantur isti genitivi construi in designatione formae. [30001] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia sumitur pro hypostasi; et non pro essentia. [30002] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet tres personas esse unius essentiae non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura per haec verba, invenitur tamen quantum ad hunc sensum, sicut ibi, ego et pater unum sumus; et, ego in patre, et pater in me est . Et per multa alia haberi potest idem. [30003] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia natura designat principium actus, essentia vero ab essendo dicitur, possunt dici aliqua unius naturae, quae conveniunt in aliquo actu, sicut omnia calefacientia, sed unius essentiae dici non possunt, nisi quorum est unum esse. Et ideo magis exprimitur unitas divina per hoc quod dicitur quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae, quam si diceretur quod sunt unius naturae. [30004] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma, absolute accepta, consuevit significari ut eius cuius est forma, ut virtus Petri. E converso autem, res habens formam aliquam non consuevit significari ut eius, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare formam. Et tunc requiruntur duo genitivi, quorum unus significet formam, et alius determinationem formae, ut si dicatur, Petrus est magnae virtutis, vel etiam requiritur unus genitivus habens vim duorum genitivorum, ut cum dicitur, vir sanguinum est iste, idest effusor multi sanguinis. Quia igitur essentia divina significatur ut forma respectu personae, convenienter essentia personae dicitur. Non autem e converso, nisi aliquid addatur ad designationem essentiae; ut si dicatur quod pater est persona divinae essentiae, vel quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. [30005] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec praepositio ex vel de non designat habitudinem causae formalis, sed magis habitudinem causae efficientis vel materialis. Quae quidem causae in omnibus distinguuntur ab his quorum sunt causae, nihil enim est sua materia, neque aliquid est suum principium activum. Aliquid tamen est sua forma, ut patet in omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Et ideo per hoc quod dicimus tres personas unius essentiae, significando essentiam in habitudine formae, non ostenditur aliud

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esse essentia quam persona, quod ostenderetur, si diceremus tres personas ex eadem essentia. [30006] I q. 39 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., male sanctis rebus praeiudicatur, si, quia non sanctae a quibusdam habentur, esse non debeant. Sic, si male intelligitur homousion, quid ad me bene intelligentem? Sit ergo una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate, non sit autem ex portione, aut ex unione, aut ex communione. Articulus 3 [30007] I q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia, ut hoc nomen Deus, non praedicentur singulariter de tribus personis, sed pluraliter. Sicut enim homo significatur ut habens humanitatem, ita Deus significatur ut habens deitatem. Sed tres personae sunt tres habentes deitatem. Ergo tres personae sunt tres dii. [30008] I q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, ubi dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, Hebraica veritas habet Elohim, quod potest interpretari dii, sive iudices. Et hoc dicitur propter pluralitatem personarum. Ergo tres personae sunt plures dii, et non unus Deus. [30009] I q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, hoc nomen res, cum absolute dicatur, videtur ad substantiam pertinere. Sed hoc nomen pluraliter praedicatur de tribus personis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Doctr. Christ., res quibus fruendum est, sunt pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo et alia nomina essentialia pluraliter praedicari possunt de tribus personis. [30010] I q. 39 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat habentem deitatem, ita hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura aliqua intellectuali. Sed dicimus tres personas. Ergo, eadem ratione, dicere possumus tres deos. [30011] I q. 39 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est. [30012] I q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nominum essentialium quaedam significant essentiam substantive, quaedam vero adiective. Ea quidem quae substantive essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis singulariter tantum, et non pluraliter, quae vero adiective essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis in plurali. Cuius ratio est, quia nomina substantiva significant aliquid per modum substantiae, nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis, quod inhaeret subiecto. Substantia autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem, unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subiecto, ita ex subiecto suscipiunt unitatem et multitudinem, et ideo in adiectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita. In creaturis autem non invenitur una forma in pluribus suppositis nisi unitate ordinis, ut forma multitudinis ordinatae. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint substantiva, praedicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adiectiva. Dicimus enim quod multi homines sunt collegium vel exercitus aut populus, dicimus tamen quod plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum formae, ut dictum est quae quidem simplex est et maxime una, ut supra ostensum est. Unde

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nomina significantia divinam essentiam substantive, singulariter, et non pluraliter, de tribus personis praedicantur. Haec igitur est ratio quare Socratem et Platonem et Ciceronem dicimus tres homines; patrem autem et filium et spiritum sanctum non dicimus tres deos, sed unum Deum, quia in tribus suppositis humanae naturae sunt tres humanitates; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. Ea vero quae significant essentiam adiective, praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim tres existentes vel tres sapientes, aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos, si adiective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum et aeternum, ut Athanasius dicit. [30013] I q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Deus significet habentem deitatem, est tamen alius modus significandi, nam Deus dicitur substantive, sed habens deitatem dicitur adiective. Unde, licet sint tres habentes deitatem, non tamen sequitur quod sint tres dii. [30014] I q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod diversae linguae habent diversum modum loquendi. Unde, sicut propter pluralitatem suppositorum Graeci dicunt tres hypostases, ita et in Hebraeo dicitur pluraliter Elohim. Nos autem non dicimus pluraliter neque deos neque substantias, ne pluralitas ad substantiam referatur. [30015] I q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen res est de transcendentibus. Unde, secundum quod pertinet ad relationem, pluraliter praedicatur in divinis, secundum vero quod pertinet ad substantiam, singulariter praedicatur. Unde Augustinus dicit ibidem quod eadem Trinitas quaedam summa res est. [30016] I q. 39 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod forma significata per hoc nomen persona, non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde, cum sint tres personalitates, idest tres personales proprietates, in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, non singulariter, sed pluraliter praedicatur de tribus. Articulus 4 [30017] I q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, Deus genuit Deum. Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. Sed hoc nomen Deus videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo, cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona. [30018] I q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, terminus in subiecto positus non restringitur per terminum positum in praedicato, ratione significationis; sed solum ratione temporis consignificati. Sed cum dico, Deus creat, hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum dicitur, Deus genuit, non potest iste terminus Deus, ratione praedicati notionalis, supponere pro persona. [30019] I q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si haec est vera, Deus genuit, quia pater generat; pari ratione haec erit vera, Deus non generat, quia filius non generat. Ergo est Deus generans, et Deus non generans. Et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo dii. [30020] I q. 39 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut se Deum, aut alium Deum. Sed non se Deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., nulla res generat seipsam. Neque alium Deum, quia non est nisi unus Deus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum. 79

[30021] I q. 39 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus pater, aut Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si Deum qui est Deus pater, ergo Deus pater est genitus. Si Deum qui non est Deus pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus pater, quod est falsum. Non ergo potest dici quod Deus genuit Deum. [30022] I q. 39 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur Deum de Deo. [30023] I q. 39 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adiuncto notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona. Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod habetur, et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen Deus, est idem quod deitas. Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen homo humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut et hoc nomen homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur, Deus creat, quia hoc praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae, quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit personam, vel unam tantum, ut cum dicitur, Deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur Deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur, regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo etc., I Tim. I. [30024] I q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, licet conveniat cum terminis singularibus in hoc, quod forma significata non multiplicatur; convenit tamen cum terminis communibus in hoc, quod forma significata invenitur in pluribus suppositis. Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat. [30025] I q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit contra illos qui dicebant quod hoc nomen Deus non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona. [30026] I q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter se habet hoc nomen Deus ad supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species. Sed forma significata per hoc nomen Deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis secundum rem. Unde per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adiuncto determinatur eius suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur, Deus generat, ratione actus notionalis supponit hoc nomen Deus pro persona patris. Sed cum dicitur, Deus non generat, nihil additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam filii, unde datur intelligi quod generatio repugnet divinae naturae. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam filii, vera erit locutio; ut si dicatur, Deus genitus non generat. Unde etiam non sequitur, est Deus generans et est Deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personas; ut puta si dicamus, pater est Deus generans, et filius est Deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod sint plures dii, quia pater et filius sunt unus Deus, ut dictum est. [30027] I q. 39 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, pater genuit se Deum, quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum. Neque est contrarium quod

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Augustinus dicit, ad maximum, quod Deus pater genuit alterum se. Quia ly se vel est casus ablativi; ut sit sensus, genuit alterum a se. Vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert identitatem naturae, sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus, genuit alterum simillimum sibi. Similiter et haec est falsa, genuit alium Deum. Quia licet filius sit alius a patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius Deus, quia intelligeretur quod hoc adiectivum alius poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est Deus; et sic significaretur distinctio deitatis. Quidam tamen concedunt istam, genuit alium Deum, ita quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly Deus appositive construatur cum eo. Sed hic est improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris. [30028] I q. 39 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum qui est Deus pater, quia, cum ly pater appositive construatur cum ly Deus, restringit ipsum ad standum pro persona patris; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est ipse pater, et sic pater esset genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera, genuit Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva, sed aliquid esse interponendum; tunc e converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est Deus qui est pater. Sed haec est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa negetur, et negativa concedatur. Praepositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam affirmativa est falsa. Quia hoc relativum qui in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum. Unde sensus affirmativae est, quod esse Deum patrem conveniat personae filii. Negativae vero sensus est, quod esse Deum patrem non tantum removeatur a persona filii, sed etiam a divinitate eius sed hoc irrationabile videtur, cum, secundum philosophum, de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse negatio. Articulus 5 [30029] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia in abstracto significata possint supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, essentia generat essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., pater et filius sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia; et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. [30030] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, generatis nobis vel corruptis, generantur vel corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed filius generatur. Ergo, cum essentia divina sit in filio, videtur quod essentia divina generetur. [30031] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, idem est Deus et essentia divina, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed haec est vera, Deus generat Deum, sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, essentia generat essentiam. [30032] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid, potest supponere pro illo. Sed essentia divina est pater. Ergo essentia potest supponere pro persona patris. Et sic essentia generat. [30033] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, essentia est res generans, quia est pater, qui est generans. Si igitur essentia non sit generans, erit essentia res generans et non generans, quod est impossibile.

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[30034] I q. 39 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., pater est principium totius deitatis. Sed non est principium nisi generando vel spirando. Ergo pater generat vel spirat deitatem. [30035] I q. 39 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod nulla res generat seipsam. Sed si essentia generat essentiam, non generat nisi seipsam, cum nihil sit in Deo, quod distinguatur a divina essentia. Ergo essentia non generat essentiam. [30036] I q. 39 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, asserens quod, sicut dicitur, Deus genuit Deum, ita potest dici quod essentia genuit essentiam; considerans quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, non est aliud Deus quam divina essentia. Sed in hoc deceptus fuit, quia ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi ut dictum est. Licet autem, secundum re, sit idem Deus quod deitas, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique. Nam hoc nomen Deus, quia significat divinam essentiam ut in habente, ex modo suae significationis naturaliter habet quod possit supponere pro persona, et sic ea quae sunt propria personarum, possunt praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, ut dicatur quod Deus est genitus vel generans, sicut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen essentia non habet ex modo suae significationis quod supponat pro persona, quia significat essentiam ut formam abstractam. Et ideo ea quae sunt propria personarum, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, non possunt essentiae attribui, significaretur enim quod esset distinctio in essentia divina, sicut est distinctio in suppositis. [30037] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ad exprimendam unitatem essentiae et personae, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas locutionis patiatur. Unde huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae, ut scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, vel etiam per nomina personalia, ut, cum dicitur, essentia de essentia, vel sapientia de sapientia, sit sensus, filius, qui est essentia et sapientia, est de patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen nominibus abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus, quia ea quae pertinent ad actum, magis propinque se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista, natura de natura, vel sapientia de sapientia, quam essentia de essentia. [30038] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in creaturis generatum non accipit naturam eandem numero quam generans habet, sed aliam numero, quae incipit in eo esse per generationem de novo, et desinit esse per corruptionem, et ideo generatur et corrumpitur per accidens. Sed Deus genitus eandem naturam numero accipit quam generans habet. Et ideo natura divina in filio non generatur, neque per se neque per accidens. [30039] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Deus et divina essentia sint idem secundum rem, tamen, ratione alterius modi significandi, oportet loqui diversimode de utroque. [30040] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia divina praedicatur de patre per modum identitatis, propter divinam simplicitatem, nec tamen sequitur quod possit supponere pro patre, propter diversum modum significandi. Ratio autem procederet in illis, quorum unum praedicatur de altero sicut universale de particulari.

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[30041] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans, vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia. [30042] I q. 39 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod deitas, inquantum est una in pluribus suppositis, habet quandam convenientiam cum forma nominis collectivi. Unde cum dicitur, pater est principium totius deitatis, potest sumi pro universitate personarum; inquantum scilicet, in omnibus personis divinis, ipse est principium. Nec oportet quod sit principium sui ipsius, sicut aliquis de populo dicitur rector totius populi, non tamen sui ipsius. Vel potest dici quod est principium totius deitatis, non quia eam generet et spiret, sed quia eam, generando et spirando, communicat. Articulus 6 [30043] I q. 39 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae non possint praedicari de nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut dicatur, Deus est tres personae, vel est Trinitas. Haec enim est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo suppositorum verificari potest, neque enim Socrates est omnis homo, neque Plato, neque aliquis alius. Sed similiter ista, Deus est Trinitas, pro nullo suppositorum naturae divinae verificari potest, neque enim pater est Trinitas, neque filius, neque spiritus sanctus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus est Trinitas. [30044] I q. 39 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, inferiora non praedicantur de suis superioribus nisi accidentali praedicatione, ut cum dico, animal est homo, accidit enim animali esse hominem. Sed hoc nomen Deus se habet ad tres personas sicut commune ad inferiora, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo videtur quod nomina personarum non possint praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, nisi accidentaliter. [30045] I q. 39 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de fide, credimus unum Deum unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem. [30046] I q. 39 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, licet nomina personalia vel notionalia adiectiva non possint praedicari de essentia; tamen substantiva possunt, propter realem identitatem essentiae et personae. Essentia autem divina non solum idem est realiter cum una persona, sed cum tribus. Unde et una persona, et duae, et tres possunt de essentia praedicari; ut si dicamus, essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Et quia hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod supponat pro essentia, ut dictum est, ideo, sicut haec est vera, essentia est tres personae, ita haec est vera, Deus est tres personae. [30047] I q. 39 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, hoc nomen homo per se habet supponere pro persona; sed ex adiuncto habet quod stet pro

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natura communi. Et ideo haec est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo supposito verificari potest. Sed hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod stet pro essentia. Unde, licet pro nullo suppositorum divinae naturae haec sit vera, Deus est Trinitas, est tamen vera pro essentia. Quod non attendens, Porretanus eam negavit. [30048] I q. 39 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Deus vel divina essentia est pater, est praedicatio per identitatem, non autem sicut inferioris de superiori, quia in divinis non est universale et singulare. Unde, sicut est per se ista, pater est Deus, ita et ista, Deus est pater; et nullo modo per accidens. Articulus 7 [30049] I q. 39 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia non sint approprianda personis. Quod enim potest vergere in errorem fidei, vitandum est in divinis, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis . Sed ea quae sunt communia tribus personis appropriare alicui, potest vergere in errorem fidei, quia potest intelligi quod vel illi tantum personae conveniant cui appropriantur; vel quod magis conveniant ei quam aliis. Ergo essentialia attributa non sunt approprianda personis. [30050] I q. 39 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, essentialia attributa, in abstracto significata, significant per modum formae. Sed una persona non se habet ad aliam ut forma, cum forma ab eo cuius est forma, supposito non distinguatur. Ergo essentialia attributa, maxime in abstracto significata, non debent appropriari personis. [30051] I q. 39 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium prius est appropriato, proprium enim est de ratione appropriati. Sed essentialia attributa, secundum modum intelligendi, sunt priora personis, sicut commune est prius proprio. Ergo essentialia attributa non debent esse appropriata. [30052] I q. 39 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. [30053] I q. 39 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, ad manifestationem fidei, conveniens fuit essentialia attributa personis appropriari. Licet enim Trinitas personarum demonstratione probari non possit, ut supra dictum est, convenit tamen ut per aliqua magis manifesta declaretur. Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem, quam propria personarum, quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est. Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa, appropriatio nominatur. Possunt autem manifestari personae divinae per essentialia attributa dupliciter. Uno modo, per viam similitudinis, sicut ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, appropriantur filio, qui procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum. Alio modo, per modum dissimilitudinis, sicut potentia appropriatur patri, ut Augustinus dicit, quia apud nos patres solent esse propter senectutem infirmi; ne tale aliquid suspicemur in Deo. [30054] I q. 39 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod essentialia attributa non sic appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur, sed ad manifestandum personas per

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viam similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis, ut dictum est. Unde nullus error fidei sequitur, sed magis manifestatio veritatis. [30055] I q. 39 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si sic appropriarentur essentialia attributa personis, quod essent eis propria, sequeretur quod una persona se haberet ad aliam in habitudine formae. Quod excludit Augustinus, in VII de Trin., ostendens quod pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, quasi solus filius sit sapientia; ut sic pater et filius simul tantum possint dici sapiens, non autem pater sine filio. Sed filius dicitur sapientia patris, quia est sapientia de patre sapientia, uterque enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una sapientia. Unde pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, sed sapientia quae est sua essentia. [30056] I q. 39 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet essentiale attributum, secundum rationem propriam, sit prius quam persona, secundum, modum intelligendi; tamen, inquantum habet rationem appropriati, nihil prohibet proprium personae esse prius quam appropriatum. Sicut color posterior est corpore, inquantum est corpus, prius tamen est naturaliter corpore albo, inquantum est album. Articulus 8 [30057] I q. 39 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter a sacris doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa. Dicit enim Hilarius, in II de Trin., aeternitas est in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. In quibus verbis ponit tria nomina propria personarum, scilicet nomen patris; et nomen imaginis, quod est proprium filio, ut supra dictum est; et nomen muneris, sive doni, quod est proprium spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Ponit etiam tria appropriata, nam aeternitatem appropriat patri, speciem filio, usum spiritui sancto. Et videtur quod irrationabiliter. Nam aeternitas importat durationem essendi, species vero est essendi principium, usus vero ad operationem pertinere videtur. Sed essentia et operatio nulli personae appropriari inveniuntur. Ergo inconvenienter videntur ista appropriata personis. [30058] I q. 39 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., sic dicit, in patre est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia . Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia una persona non denominatur formaliter per id quod appropriatur alteri, non enim est sapiens pater sapientia genita, ut dictum est. Sed, sicut ibidem subditur, tria haec unum omnia sunt propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, connexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum. Non ergo convenienter appropriantur personis. [30059] I q. 39 a. 8 arg. 3 Item, secundum Augustinum, patri attribuitur potentia, filio sapientia, spiritui sancto bonitas. Et videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Nam virtus ad potentiam pertinet. Virtus autem invenitur appropriari filio, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem; et etiam spiritui sancto, secundum illud Luc. VI, virtus de illo exibat, et sanabat omnes. Non ergo potentia patri est approprianda. [30060] I q. 39 a. 8 arg. 4 Item, Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit, non confuse accipiendum est quod ait apostolus, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso - ex ipso dicens propter patrem; per ipsum propter filium; in ipso propter spiritum sanctum . Sed videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia per hoc quod dicit in ipso, videtur importari habitudo causae

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finalis, quae est prima causarum. Ergo ista habitudo causae deberet appropriari patri, qui est principium non de principio. [30061] I q. 39 a. 8 arg. 5 Item, invenitur veritas appropriari filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et similiter liber vitae, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIX, in capite libri scriptum est de me, Glossa, idest apud patrem, qui est caput meum. Et similiter hoc quod dico, qui est, quia super illud Isa. LXV, ecce ego, ad gentes, dicit Glossa, filius loquitur, qui dixit Moysi, ego sum qui sum . Sed videtur quod propria sint filii, et non appropriata. Nam veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera religione, est summa similitudo principii, absque omni dissimilitudine , et sic videtur quod proprie conveniat filio, qui habet principium. Liber etiam vitae videtur proprium aliquid esse, quia significat ens ab alio, omnis enim liber ab aliquo scribitur. Hoc etiam ipsum qui est videtur esse proprium filio. Quia si, cum Moysi dicitur, ego sum qui sum, loquitur Trinitas, ergo Moyses poterat dicere, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos. Ergo et ulterius dicere poterat, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos, demonstrando certam personam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia nulla persona est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Non ergo potest esse commune Trinitati, sed est proprium filii. [30062] I q. 39 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit. In consideratione autem alicuius creaturae, quatuor per ordinem nobis occurrunt. Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quoddam. Secunda autem consideratio rei est, inquantum est una. Tertia consideratio rei est, secundum quod inest ei virtus ad operandum et ad causandum. Quarta autem consideratio rei est, secundum habitudinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec etiam quadruplex consideratio circa Deum nobis occurrit. Secundum igitur primam considerationem, qua consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum, sic sumitur appropriatio Hilarii, secundum quam aeternitas appropriatur patri, species filio, usus spiritui sancto. Aeternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio. Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii. Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris. Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera. Quantum vero ad secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris. Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem. Et hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera. Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod quidem lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit, tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et cetera. Usus autem habet similitudinem cum propriis spiritus sancti, largo modo accipiendo usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gaudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus ab illo appellatus est. Usus vero quo nos fruimur Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum. Et hoc ostendit Augustinus cum dicit, est in Trinitate

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spiritus sanctus, genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate nos perfundens. Et sic patet quare aeternitas, species et usus personis attribuantur vel approprientur, non autem essentia vel operatio. Quia in ratione horum, propter sui communitatem, non invenitur aliquid similitudinem habens cum propriis personarum. Secunda vero consideratio Dei est, inquantum consideratur ut unus. Et sic Augustinus patri appropriat unitatem, filio aequalitatem, spiritui sancto concordiam sive connexionem. Quae quidem tria unitatem importare manifestum est, sed differenter. Nam unitas dicitur absolute, non praesupponens aliquid aliud. Et ideo appropriatur patri, qui non praesupponit aliquam personam, cum sit principium non de principio. Aequalitas autem importat unitatem in respectu ad alterum, nam aequale est quod habet unam quantitatem cum alio. Et ideo aequalitas appropriatur filio, qui est principium de principio. Connexio autem importat unitatem aliquorum duorum. Unde appropriatur spiritui sancto, inquantum est a duobus. Ex quo etiam intelligi potest quod dicit Augustinus, tria esse unum propter patrem, aequalia propter filium, connexa propter spiritum sanctum. Manifestum est enim quod illi attribuitur unumquodque, in quo primo invenitur, sicut omnia inferiora dicuntur vivere propter animam vegetabilem, in qua primo invenitur ratio vitae in istis inferioribus. Unitas autem statim invenitur in persona patris, etiam, per impossibile, remotis aliis personis. Et ideo aliae personae a patre habent unitatem. Sed remotis aliis personis, non invenitur aequalitas in patre, sed statim, posito filio, invenitur aequalitas. Et ideo dicuntur omnia aequalia propter filium, non quod filius sit principium aequalitatis patri; sed quia, nisi esset patri aequalis filius, pater aequalis non posset dici. Aequalitas enim eius primo consideratur ad filium, hoc enim ipsum quod spiritus sanctus patri aequalis est, a filio habet. Similiter, excluso spiritu sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas connexionis inter patrem et filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter spiritum sanctum, quia, posito spiritu sancto, invenitur unde pater et filius possint dici connexi. Secundum vero tertiam considerationem, qua in Deo sufficiens virtus consideratur ad causandum, sumitur tertia appropriatio, scilicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Quae quidem appropriatio fit et secundum rationem similitudinis, si consideretur quod in divinis personis est, et secundum rationem dissimilitudinis, si consideretur quod in creaturis est. Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum patre caelesti, qui est principium totius divinitatis. Deficit autem interdum patri terreno, propter senectutem. Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. Deficit autem interdum filio terreno, propter temporis paucitatem. Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum spiritu divino, qui est amor. Sed repugnantiam habere videtur ad spiritum terrenum, secundum quod importat violentam quandam impulsionem; prout dicitur Isa. XXV, spiritus robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem . Virtus autem appropriatur filio et spiritui sancto, non secundum quod virtus dicitur ipsa potentia rei, sed secundum quod interdum virtus dicitur id quod a potentia rei procedit, prout dicimus aliquod virtuosum factum esse virtutem alicuius agentis. Secundum vero quartam considerationem, prout consideratur Deus in habitudine ad suos effectus, sumitur illa appropriatio ex quo, per quem, et in quo. Haec enim praepositio ex importat quandoque quidem habitudinem causae materialis, quae locum non habet in divinis, aliquando vero habitudinem causae efficientis. Quae quidem competit Deo ratione suae potentiae activae, unde et appropriatur patri, sicut et potentia. Haec vero praepositio per designat quidem quandoque causam mediam; sicut dicimus quod faber operatur per martellum. Et sic ly per quandoque non est appropriatum, sed proprium filii, secundum illud Ioan. I, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; non quia filius sit instrumentum, sed quia ipse est principium de principio. Quandoque vero designat habitudinem formae per quam agens operatur; sicut dicimus quod artifex operatur per 87

artem. Unde, sicut sapientia et ars appropriantur filio, ita et ly per quem. Haec vero praepositio in denotat proprie habitudinem continentis. Continet autem Deus res dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suas similitudines; prout scilicet res dicuntur esse in Deo, inquantum sunt in eius scientia. Et sic hoc quod dico in ipso, esset appropriandum filio. Alio vero modo continentur res a Deo, inquantum Deus sua bonitate eas conservat et gubernat, ad finem convenientem adducendo. Et sic ly in quo appropriatur spiritui sancto, sicut et bonitas. Nec oportet quod habitudo causae finalis, quamvis sit prima causarum, approprietur patri, qui est principium non de principio, quia personae divinae, quarum pater est principium, non procedunt ut ad finem, cum quaelibet illarum sit ultimus finis; sed naturali processione, quae magis ad rationem naturalis potentiae pertinere videtur. [30063] I q. 39 a. 8 ad 1 Ad illud vero quod de aliis quaeritur, dicendum quod veritas, cum pertineat ad intellectum, ut supra dictum est, appropriatur filio, non tamen est proprium eius. Quia veritas, ut supra dictum est, considerari potest prout est in intellectu, vel prout est in re. Sicut igitur intellectus et res essentialiter sumpta sunt essentialia et non personalia, ita et veritas. Definitio autem Augustini inducta, datur de veritate secundum quod appropriatur filio. Liber autem vitae in recto quidem importat notitiam, sed in obliquo vitam, est enim, ut supra dictum est, notitia Dei de his qui habituri sunt vitam aeternam. Unde appropriatur filio, licet vita approprietur spiritui sancto, inquantum importat quendam interiorem motum, et sic convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Esse autem scriptum ab alio, non est de ratione libri inquantum est liber; sed inquantum est quoddam artificiatum. Unde non importat originem, neque est personale, sed appropriatum personae. Ipsum autem qui est appropriatur personae filii, non secundum propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti, inquantum scilicet in locutione Dei ad Moysen, praefigurabatur liberatio humani generis, quae facta est per filium. Sed tamen, secundum quod ly qui sumitur relative, posset referre interdum personam filii, et sic sumeretur personaliter, ut puta si dicatur, filius est genitus qui est; sicut et Deus genitus personale est. Sed infinite sumptum est essentiale. Et licet hoc pronomen iste, grammatice loquendo, ad aliquam certam personam videatur pertinere; tamen quaelibet res demonstrabilis, grammatice loquendo, persona dici potest, licet secundum rei naturam non sit persona; dicimus enim iste lapis, et iste asinus. Unde et, grammatice loquendo, essentia divina, secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc pronomine iste; secundum illud Exod. XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum. See also: MARCUS BERQUIST ON THE ART AND SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR. (http://www.scribd.com/doc/147351899/Marcus-Berquist-on-the-Art-and-Science-ofGrammar) (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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