"I am Prepared to Die"

Nelson Mandela's statement from the dock at the opening of the defence case in the Rivonia Trial Pretoria Supreme Court !" #pril $%&'
I am the First Accused. I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver ambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on stri!e at the end of "ay #$%#. At the outset& I want to say that the suggestion made by the 'tate in its opening that the struggle in 'outh Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did& both as an individual and as a leader of my people& because of my e(perience in 'outh Africa and my own proudly felt African bac!ground& and not because of what any outsider might have said. In my youth in the rans!ei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. he names of Dingane and Bambata& )intsa and "a!ana& '*ungthi and Dalasile& "oshoeshoe and 'e!hu!huni& were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and ma!e my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. his is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case. )aving said this& I must deal immediately and at some length with the *uestion of violence. 'ome of the things so far told to the +ourt are true and some are untrue. I do not& however& deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of rec!lessness& nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny& e(ploitation& and oppression of my people by the ,hites. I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form -m!honto we 'i.we& and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August #$%/. In the statement which I am about to ma!e I shall correct certain false impressions which have been created by 'tate witnesses. Amongst other things& I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by -m!honto. I will also deal with the relationship between the African 0ational +ongress and -m!honto& and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organi.ations. I shall deal also with the part played by the +ommunist 1arty. In order to e(plain these matters properly& I will have to e(plain what -m!honto set out to achieve2 what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these ob3ects& and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to e(plain how I became involved in the activities of these organi.ations. I deny that -m!honto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organisation& and which have been charged in the indictment against us. I do not !now what 3ustification there was for these acts& but to demonstrate that they could not have been authori.ed by -m!honto& I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organi.ation. I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form -m!honto. I& and the others who started the organi.ation& did so for two reasons. Firstly& we believed that as a result of

4overnment policy& violence by the African people had become inevitable& and that unless responsible leadership was given to canali.e and control the feelings of our people& there would be outbrea!s of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. 'econdly& we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of e(pressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation& and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority& or to defy the 4overnment. ,e chose to defy the law. ,e first bro!e the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence2 when this form was legislated against& and then the 4overnment resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies& only then did we decide to answer violence with violence. But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. ,e who formed -m!honto were all members of the African 0ational +ongress& and had behind us the A0+ tradition of non5violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. ,e believe that 'outh Africa belongs to all the people who live in it& and not to one group& be it blac! or white. ,e did not want an interracial war& and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the +ourt is in doubt about this& it will be seen that the whole history of our organi.ation bears out what I have said& and what I will subse*uently say& when I describe the tactics which -m!honto decided to adopt. I want& therefore& to say something about the African 0ational +ongress. he African 0ational +ongress was formed in #$#/ to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the 'outh Africa Act& and which were then being threatened by the 0ative 6and Act. For thirty5seven years 5 that is until #$7$ 5 it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions2 it sent delegations to the 4overnment in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But ,hite 4overnments remained unmoved& and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the words of my leader& +hief 6utuli& who became 1resident of the A0+ in #$8/& and who was later awarded the 0obel 1eace 1ri.e9 :who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent !noc!ing in vain& patiently& moderately& and modestly at a closed and barred door; ,hat have been the fruits of moderation; he past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress& until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all:. <ven after #$7$& the A0+ remained determined to avoid violence. At this time& however& there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the past. he change was embodied in a decision which was ta!en to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful& but unlawful& demonstrations against certain laws. 1ursuant to this policy the A0+ launched the Defiance +ampaign& in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. his campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. "ore than =&8>> people defied apartheid laws and went to 3ail. ?et there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organi.ing the campaign& but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and non5violence had been stressed throughout. his was the time when the volunteer section of the A0+ was established& and when the word 'Amadela!ufa' was first used9 this was the time when the volunteers were as!ed to ta!e a pledge to uphold certain principles. <vidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case& but completely out of conte(t. he volunteers were not& and are not& the soldiers of a blac! army pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. hey were& and are. dedicated wor!ers who are prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the A0+ to distribute leaflets& to organi.e stri!es& or do whatever the particular campaign re*uired. hey are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.

During the Defiance +ampaign& the 1ublic 'afety Act and the +riminal 6aw Amendment Act were passed. hese 'tatutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this& the protests continued and the A0+ adhered to its policy of non5 violence. In #$8%& #8% leading members of the +ongress Alliance& including myself& were arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the 'uppression of +ommunism Act. he non5 violent policy of the A0+ was put in issue by the 'tate& but when the +ourt gave 3udgement some five years later& it found that the A0+ did not have a policy of violence. ,e were ac*uitted on all counts& which included a count that the A0+ sought to set up a communist state in place of the e(isting regime. he 4overnment has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. his allegation has been repeated in the present case& but as I will show& the A0+ is not& and never has been& a communist organi.ation. In #$%> there was the shooting at 'harpeville& which resulted in the proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the A0+ as an unlawful organi.ation. "y colleagues and I& after careful consideration& decided that we would not obey this decree. he African people were not part of the 4overnment and did not ma!e the laws by which they were governed. ,e believed in the words of the -niversal Declaration of )uman @ights& that 'the will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the 4overnment'& and for us to accept the banning was e*uivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. he A0+ refused to dissolve& but instead went underground. ,e believed it was our duty to preserve this organi.ation which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self5respecting ,hite political organi.ation would disband itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say. In #$%> the 4overnment held a referendum which led to the establishment of the @epublic. Africans& who constituted appro(imately A> per cent of the population of 'outh Africa& were not entitled to vote& and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the proposed ,hite @epublic& and a resolution was ta!en to hold an All5In African +onference to call for a 0ational +onvention& and to organi.e mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted @epublic& if the 4overnment failed to call the +onvention. he conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the 'ecretary of the conference and undertoo! to be responsible for organi.ing the national stay5at5 home which was subse*uently called to coincide with the declaration of the @epublic. As all stri!es by Africans are illegal& the person organi.ing such a stri!e must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person& and conse*uently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest. he stay5at5home& in accordance with A0+ policy& was to be a peaceful demonstration. +areful instructions were given to organi.ers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. he 4overnment's answer was to introduce new and harsher laws& to mobili.e its armed forces& and to send 'aracens& armed vehicles& and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the people. his was an indication that the 4overnment had decided to rule by force alone& and this decision was a milestone on the road to -m!honto. 'ome of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact& I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will& I hope& enable the +ourt to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the 0ational 6iberation "ovement. ,hen I went to 3ail in #$%/& the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now !now that this was still so in #$%B. I must return to June #$%#. ,hat were we& the leaders of our people& to do; ,ere we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action& or were we to fight it and& if so& how; ,e had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been ab3ect surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight& but was how to continue the fight. ,e of the A0+ had always stood for a non5racial democracy& and we shran! from any action which might

drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non5violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation& and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this +ourt to understand& but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been tal!ing of violence 5 of the day when they would fight the ,hite man and win bac! their country 5 and we& the leaders of the A0+& had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. ,hen some of us discussed this in "ay and June of #$%#& it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a nonracial 'tate by non5violence had achieved nothing& and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism. It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had& in fact& become a feature of the 'outh African political scene. here had been violence in #$8A when the women of Ceerust were ordered to carry passes2 there was violence in #$8= with the enforcement of cattle culling in 'e!hu!huniland2 there was violence in #$8$ when the people of +ato "anor protested against pass raids2 there was violence in #$%> when the 4overnment attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in 1ondoland. hirty5nine Africans died in these disturbances. In #$%# there had been riots in ,armbaths& and all this time the rans!ei had been a seething mass of unrest. <ach disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out 5 it showed that a 4overnment which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously ma!ing plans for violent forms of political struggle. here now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans& as well as ,hites& if not properly directed. 1articularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Ceerust& 'e!hu!huniland& and 1ondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly ta!ing the form& not of struggle against the 4overnment 5 though this is what prompted it 5 but of civil strife amongst themselves& conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness. At the beginning of June #$%#& after a long and an(ious assessment of the 'outh African situation& I& and some colleagues& came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable& it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non5violence at a time when the 4overnment met our peaceful demands with force. his conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed& when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us& that the decision was made to embar! on violent forms of political struggle& and to form -m!honto we 'i.we. ,e did so not because we desired such a course& but solely because the 4overnment had left us with no other choice. In the "anifesto of -m!honto published on #% December #$%#& which is <(hibit AD& we said9 : he time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices 5 submit or fight. hat time has now come to 'outh Africa. ,e shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit bac! by all means in our power in defence of our people& our future& and our freedom:. his was our feeling in June of #$%# when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the 0ational 6iberation "ovement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did. ,e who had ta!en this decision started to consult leaders of various organi.ations& including the A0+. I will not say whom we spo!e to& or what they said& but I wish to deal with the role of the African 0ational +ongress in this phase of the struggle& and with the policy and ob3ectives of -m!honto we 'i.we. As far as the A0+ was concerned& it formed a clear view which can be summari.ed as follows9

a. It was a mass political organi.ation with a political function to fulfil. Its members had 3oined on the e(press policy of non5violence. b. Because of all this& it could not and would not underta!e violence. his must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small& closely !nit organi.ation re*uired for sabotage. 0or would this be politically correct& because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity9 political propaganda and organi.ation. 0or was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organi.ation. c. On the other hand& in view of this situation I have described& the A0+ was prepared to depart from its fifty5year5old policy of non5violence to this e(tent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. )ence members who undertoo! such activity would not be sub3ect to disciplinary action by the A0+. I say 'properly controlled violence' because I made it clear that if I formed the organi.ation I would at all times sub3ect it to the political guidance of the A0+ and would not underta!e any different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the A0+. And I shall now tell the +ourt how that form of violence came to be determined. As a result of this decision& -m!honto was formed in 0ovember #$%#. ,hen we too! this decision& and subse*uently formulated our plans& the A0+ heritage of non5violence and racial harmony was very much with us. ,e felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blac!s and ,hites would fight each other. ,e viewed the situation with alarm. +ivil war could mean the destruction of what the A0+ stood for2 with civil war& racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. ,e already have e(amples in 'outh African history of the results of war. It has ta!en more than fifty years for the scars of the 'outh African ,ar to disappear. )ow much longer would it ta!e to eradicate the scars of inter5racial civil war& which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides; he avoidance of civil war had dominated our thin!ing for many years& but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy& we reali.ed that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. his had to be ta!en into account in formulating our plans. ,e re*uired a plan which was fle(ible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times2 above all& the plan had to be one which recogni.ed civil war as the last resort& and left the decision on this *uestion to the future. ,e did not want to be committed to civil war& but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable. Four forms of violence were possible. here is sabotage& there is guerrilla warfare& there is terrorism& and there is open revolution. ,e chose to adopt the first method and to e(haust it before ta!ing any other decision. In the light of our political bac!ground the choice was a logical one. 'abotage did not involve loss of life& and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be !ept to a minimum and& if the policy bore fruit& democratic government could become a reality. his is what we felt at the time& and this is what we said in our "anifesto D<(hibit ADE9 :,e of -m!honto we 'i.we have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. ,e hope& even at this late hour& that our first actions will awa!en everyone to a reali.ation of the disastrous situation to which the 0ationalist policy is leading. ,e hope that we will bring the 4overnment and its supporters to their senses before it is too late& so that both the 4overnment and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war.: he initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. ,e believed that 'outh Africa depended to a large e(tent on foreign capital and foreign trade. ,e felt that planned destruction of power plants& and interference with rail and telephone communications& would tend to scare away capital from the country& ma!e it more difficult for

goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule& and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country& thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position. Attac!s on the economic life lines of the country were to be lin!ed with sabotage on 4overnment buildings and other symbols of apartheid. hese attac!s would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition& they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting bac! against 4overnment violence. In addition& if mass action were successfully organi.ed& and mass reprisals ta!en& we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries& and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the 'outh African 4overnment. his then was the plan. -m!honto was to perform sabotage& and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start& that on no account were they to in3ure or !ill people in planning or carrying out operations. hese instructions have been referred to in the evidence of '"r. F' and '"r. C'. he affairs of the -m!honto were controlled and directed by a 0ational )igh +ommand& which had powers of co5option and which could& and did& appoint @egional +ommands. he )igh +ommand was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and finance. -nder the )igh +ommand there were @egional +ommands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. ,ithin the framewor! of the policy laid down by the 0ational )igh +ommand& the @egional +ommands had authority to select the targets to be attac!ed. hey had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framewor! and thus had no authority to embar! upon acts which endangered life& or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For instance& -m!honto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally& the terms )igh +ommand and @egional +ommand were an importation from the Jewish national underground organi.ation Irgun Cvai 6eumi& which operated in Israel between #$77 and #$7=. -m!honto had its first operation on #% December #$%#& when 4overnment buildings in Johannesburg& 1ort <li.abeth and Durban were attac!ed. he selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. )ad we intended to attac! life we would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. he sabotage which was committed before #% December #$%# was the wor! of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with -m!honto. In fact& some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organi.ations. he "anifesto of -m!honto was issued on the day that operations commenced. he response to our actions and "anifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. he 4overnment threatened to ta!e strong action& and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. he ,hites failed to respond by suggesting change2 they responded to our call by suggesting the laager. In contrast& the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. 'uddenly there was hope again. hings were happening. 1eople in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes& and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained. But we in -m!honto weighed up the white response with an(iety. he lines were being drawn. he whites and blac!s were moving into separate camps& and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. he white newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so& how could we continue to !eep Africans away from terrorism;

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In #$/> when the famous leader& "asabala& was held in 1ort <li.abeth 3ail& twenty5four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release were !illed by the police and white civilians. In #$/#& more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoe! affair. In #$/7 over two hundred Africans were !illed when the Administrator of 'outh5,est Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog ta(. On # "ay #$8>& eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the stri!e. On /# "arch #$%>& si(ty5nine unarmed Africans died at 'harpeville. )ow many more 'harpevilles would there be in the history of our country; And how many more 'harpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day; And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached; In the long run we felt certain we must succeed& but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country; And if this happened& how could blac! and white ever live together again in peace and harmony; hese were the problems that faced us& and these were our decisions. <(perience convinced us that rebellion would offer the 4overnment limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of 'outh Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to ma!e preparations as a long5term underta!ing to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable& we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favourable to our people. he fight which held out prospects best for us and the least ris! of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. ,e decided& therefore& in our preparations for the future& to ma!e provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare. All whites undergo compulsory military training& but no such training was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be re*uired if guerrilla warfare started. ,e had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to ma!e proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions& so that Africans would be e*uipped to participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so. At this stage it was decided that I should attend the +onference of the 1an5African Freedom "ovement for +entral& <ast& and 'outhern Africa& which was to be held early in #$%/ in Addis Ababa& and& because of our need for preparation& it was also decided that& after the conference& I would underta!e a tour of the African 'tates with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers& and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. raining in both fields would be necessary& even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non5 racial 'tate and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a 'tate. It was on this note that I left 'outh Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the A0+. "y tour was a success. ,herever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of ,hite 'outh Africa& and even in 6ondon I was received with great sympathy by political leaders& such as "r. 4aits!ell and "r. 4rimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius 0yerere& now 1resident of anganyi!a2 "r. Gawawa& then 1rime "inister of anganyi!a2 <mperor )aile 'elassie of <thiopia2 4eneral Abboud& 1resident of the 'udan2 )abib Bourguiba& 1resident of unisia2 Ben Bella& now 1resident of Algeria2 "odibo Geita& 1resident of "ali2 6eopold 'enghor& 1resident of 'enegal2 'e!ou oure& 1resident of 4uinea2 1resident ubman of 6iberia2 and "ilton Obote& 1rime "inister of -ganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Ou3da& the )ead*uarters of the Algerian Army of 0ational 6iberation& the visit which is described in my diary& one of the <(hibits. I started to ma!e a study of the art of war and revolution and& whilst abroad& underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare& I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the ha.ards of war with them. 0otes of lectures which I received in

Algeria are contained in <(hibit #%& produced in evidence. 'ummaries of boo!s on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing& and I ac!nowledge that I made these studies to e*uip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this *uestion as every African 0ationalist should do. I was completely ob3ective. he +ourt will see that I attempted to e(amine all types of authority on the sub3ect 5 from the <ast and from the ,est& going bac! to the classic wor! of +lausewit.& and covering such a variety as "ao se ung and +he 4uevara on the one hand& and the writings on the Anglo5Boer ,ar on the other. Of course& these notes are merely summaries of the boo!s I read and do not contain my personal views. I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organi.e any scheme without the co5operation of the A0+ offices in Africa. I conse*uently obtained the permission of the A0+ in 'outh Africa to do this. o this e(tent then there was a departure from the original decision of the A0+& but it applied outside 'outh Africa only. he first batch of recruits actually arrived in anganyi!a when I was passing through that country on my way bac! to 'outh Africa. I returned to 'outh Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. he attitude of my colleagues in -m!honto was much the same as it had been before I left. hey were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were e(hausted. In fact& the view was e(pressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. his is recorded by me in the document which is <(hibit @.#7. After a full discussion& however& it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would ta!e many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign& and whatever happened the training would be of value. I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the 'tate. But before doing so& I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in 1ort <li.abeth and <ast 6ondon. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro54overnment persons during 'eptember& October and 0ovember #$%/. I do not !now what 3ustification there was for these acts& nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted& then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of -m!honto. One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the A0+ was a party to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already e(plained why this is incorrect but how& e(ternally& there was a departure from the original principle laid down by the A0+. here has& of course& been overlapping of functions internally as well& because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by bannings and house arrests& and by persons leaving the country to ta!e up political wor! abroad. his led to individuals having to do wor! in different capacities. But though this may have blurred the distinction between -m!honto and the A0+& it by no means abolished that distinction. 4reat care was ta!en to !eep the activities of the two organi.ations in 'outh Africa distinct. he A0+ remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the type of political wor! they had conducted prior to #$%#. -m!honto remained a small organi.ation recruiting its members from different races and organi.ations and trying to achieve its own particular ob3ect. he fact that members of -m!honto were recruited from the A0+& and the fact that persons served both organi.ations& li!e 'olomon "ban3wa& did not& in our view& change the nature of the A0+ or give it a policy of violence. his overlapping of officers& however& was more the e(ception than the rule. his is why persons such as '"r. F' and '"r. C'& who were on the @egional +ommand of their respective areas& did not participate in any of the A0+ committees or activities& and why people

such as "r. Bennett "ashiyana and "r. @eginald 0dubi did not hear of sabotage at their A0+ meetings. Another of the allegations in the indictment is that @ivonia was the head*uarters of -m!honto. his is not true of the time when I was there. I was told& of course& and !new that certain of the activities of the +ommunist 1arty were carried on there. But this is no reason Das I shall presently e(plainE why I should not use the place. I came there in the following manner9 #. As already indicated& early in April #$%# I went underground to organi.e the "ay general stri!e. "y wor! entailed travelling throughout the country& living now in African townships& then in country villages and again in cities. During the second half of the year I started visiting the 1ar!town home of Arthur 4oldreich& where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him& I had !nown Arthur 4oldreich socially since #$8=.

2. In October& Arthur 4oldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered me
a hiding place there. A few days thereafter& he arranged for "ichael )armel to ta!e me to @ivonia. I naturally found @ivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. -p to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out under cover of dar!ness. But at 6iliesleaf Hfarm& @ivonia&I I could live differently and wor! far more efficiently. For obvious reasons& I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December& Arthur 4oldreich and his family moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on ## January #$%/. As already indicated& I returned in July #$%/ and was arrested in 0atal on 8 August. -p to the time of my arrest& 6iliesleaf farm was the head*uarters of neither the African 0ational +ongress nor -m!honto. ,ith the e(ception of myself& none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there& no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there& and no activities connected with them were either organi.ed or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at 6iliesleaf farm I met both the <(ecutive +ommittee of the A0+& as well as the 0)+& but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm. ,hilst staying at 6iliesleaf farm& I fre*uently visited Arthur 4oldreich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. ,e had numerous political discussions covering a variety of sub3ects. ,e discussed ideological and practical *uestions& the +ongress Alliance& -m!honto and its activities generally& and his e(periences as a soldier in the 1almach& the military wing of the )aganah. )aganah was the political authority of the Jewish 0ational "ovement in 1alestine. Because of what I had got to !now of 4oldreich& I recommended on my return to 'outh Africa that he should be recruited to -m!honto. I do not !now of my personal !nowledge whether this was done.

B.

7.

8.

%.

Another of the allegations made by the 'tate is that the aims and ob3ects of the A0+ and the +ommunist 1arty are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position& because I must assume that the 'tate may try to argue from certain <(hibits that I tried to introduce "ar(ism into the A0+. he allegation as to the A0+ is false. his is an old allegation which was disproved at the reason rial and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again& I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the A0+ and the +ommunist 1arty and -m!honto and that party.

he ideological creed of the A0+ is& and always has been& the creed of African 0ationalism. It is not the concept of African 0ationalism e(pressed in the cry& 'Drive the ,hite man into the sea'. he African 0ationalism for which the A0+ stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. he most important political document ever adopted by the A0+ is the 'Freedom +harter'. It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution& but not nationali.ation& of land2 it provides for nationali.ation of mines& ban!s& and monopoly industry& because big monopolies are owned by one race only& and without such nationali.ation racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the 4old 6aw prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by <uropean companies. In this respect the A0+'s policy corresponds with the old policy of the present 0ationalist 1arty which& for many years& had as part of its programme the nationali.ation of the gold mines which& at that time& were controlled by foreign capital. -nder the Freedom +harter& nationali.ation would ta!e place in an economy based on private enterprise. he reali.ation of the Freedom +harter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes& including the middle class. he A0+ has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country& nor has it& to the best of my recollection& ever condemned capitalist society. As far as the +ommunist 1arty is concerned& and if I understand its policy correctly& it stands for the establishment of a 'tate based on the principles of "ar(ism. Although it is prepared to wor! for the Freedom +harter& as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy& it regards the Freedom +harter as the beginning& and not the end& of its programme. he A0+& unli!e the +ommunist 1arty& admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was& and is& for the African people to win unity and full political rights. he +ommunist 1arty's main aim& on the other hand& was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a wor!ing5class government. he +ommunist 1arty sought to emphasi.e class distinctions whilst the A0+ see!s to harmoni.e them. his is a vital distinction. It is true that there has often been close co5operation between the A0+ and the +ommunist 1arty. But co5operation is merely proof of a common goal 5 in this case the removal of white supremacy 5 and is not proof of a complete community of interests. he history of the world is full of similar e(amples. 1erhaps the most stri!ing illustration is to be found in the co5operation between 4reat Britain& the -nited 'tates of America& and the 'oviet -nion in the fight against )itler. 0obody but )itler would have dared to suggest that such co5 operation turned +hurchill or @oosevelt into communists or communist tools& or that Britain and America were wor!ing to bring about a communist world. Another instance of such co5operation is to be found precisely in -m!honto. 'hortly after -m!honto was constituted& I was informed by some of its members that the +ommunist 1arty would support -m!honto& and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly. I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom& because the short5term ob3ects of communism would always correspond with the long5term ob3ects of freedom movements. hus communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as "alaya& Algeria& and Indonesia& yet none of these 'tates today are communist countries. 'imilarly in the underground resistance movements which sprung up in <urope during the last ,orld ,ar& communists played an important role. <ven 4eneral +hiang Gai5'he!& today one of the bitterest enemies of communism& fought together with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in +hina in the #$B>s.

his pattern of co5operation between communists and non5communists has been repeated in the 0ational 6iberation "ovement of 'outh Africa. 1rior to the banning of the +ommunist 1arty& 3oint campaigns involving the +ommunist 1arty and the +ongress movements were accepted practice. African communists could& and did& become members of the A0+& and some served on the 0ational& 1rovincial& and local committees. Amongst those who served on the 0ational <(ecutive are Albert 0.ula& a former 'ecretary of the +ommunist 1arty& "oses Gotane& another former 'ecretary& and J. B. "ar!s& a former member of the +entral +ommittee. I 3oined the A0+ in #$77& and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the A0+& and the close co5operation which e(isted at times on specific issues between the A0+ and the +ommunist 1arty& would lead to a watering down of the concept of African 0ationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African 0ational +ongress ?outh 6eague& and was one of a group which moved for the e(pulsion of communists from the A0+. his proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. hey defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the A0+ was formed and built up& not as a political party with one school of political thought& but as a 1arliament of the African people& accommodating people of various political convictions& all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since. It is perhaps difficult for white 'outh Africans& with an ingrained pre3udice against communism& to understand why e(perienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. heoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a lu(ury we cannot afford at this stage. ,hat is more& for many decades communists were the only political group in 'outh Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their e*uals2 who were prepared to eat with us2 tal! with us& live with us& and wor! with us. hey were the only political group which was prepared to wor! with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a sta!e in society. Because of this& there are many Africans who& today& tend to e*uate freedom with communism. hey are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all e(ponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them Dwho are not communistsE under the 'uppression of +ommunism Act. Although I have never been a member of the +ommunist 1arty& I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance +ampaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act. It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field& communist countries have always come to our aid. In the -nited 0ations and other +ouncils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro5Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the ,estern powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid& the communist bloc spea!s out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these circumstances& it would ta!e a brash young politician& such as I was in #$7$& to proclaim that the +ommunists are our enemies. I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist& and I thin! that in the circumstances I am obliged to state e(actly what my political beliefs are. I have always regarded myself& in the first place& as an African patriot. After all& I was born in -mtata& forty5si( years ago. "y guardian was my cousin& who was the acting paramount chief of embuland& and I am related both to the present paramount chief of embuland& 'abata Dalindyebo& and to Gai.er "atan.ima& the +hief "inister of the rans!ei. oday I am attracted by the idea of a classless society& an attraction which springs in part from "ar(ist reading and& in part& from my admiration of the structure and organi.ation of early African

societies in this country. he land& then the main means of production& belonged to the tribe. here were no rich or poor and there was no e(ploitation. It is true& as I have already stated& that I have been influenced by "ar(ist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent 'tates. 'uch widely different persons as 4andhi& 0ehru& 0!rumah& and 0asser all ac!nowledge this fact. ,e all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of e(treme poverty. But this does not mean we are "ar(ists. Indeed& for my own part& I believe that it is open to debate whether the +ommunist 1arty has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. he basic tas! at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom +harter. In so far as that 1arty furthers this tas!& I welcome its assistance. I reali.e that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle. From my reading of "ar(ist literature and from conversations with "ar(ists& I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the ,est as undemocratic and reactionary. But& on the contrary& I am an admirer of such a system. he "agna +arta& the 1etition of @ights& and the Bill of @ights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. I have great respect for British political institutions& and for the country's system of 3ustice. I regard the British 1arliament as the most democratic institution in the world& and the independence and impartiality of its 3udiciary never fail to arouse my admiration. he American +ongress& that country's doctrine of separation of powers& as well as the independence of its 3udiciary& arouses in me similar sentiments. I have been influenced in my thin!ing by both ,est and <ast. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula& I should be absolutely impartial and ob3ective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the ,est and from the <ast . . . here are certain <(hibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad& and I wish to deal with this *uestion. Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources 5 from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. ,henever we had a special campaign or an important political case 5 for e(ample& the reason rial 5 we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organi.ations in the ,estern countries. ,e had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources. But when in #$%# the -m!honto was formed& and a new phase of struggle introduced& we reali.ed that these events would ma!e a heavy call on our slender resources& and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lac! of funds. One of my instructions& as I went abroad in January #$%/& was to raise funds from the African states. I must add that& whilst abroad& I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them& in areas which had still not attained independence& had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries& as well as from the ,est& including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well5!nown African states& all of them non5communists& and even anti5communists& had received similar assistance.

On my return to the @epublic& I made a strong recommendation to the A0+ that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the ,estern countries& but that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed. I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent& but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went& nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organi.ations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so. As I understand the 'tate case& and in particular the evidence of '"r. F'& the suggestion is that -m!honto was the inspiration of the +ommunist 1arty which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enrol the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom& but in reality was fighting for a communist state. 0othing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. -m!honto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. +ommunists and others supported the movement& and we only wish that more sections of the community would 3oin us. Our fight is against real& and not imaginary& hardships or& to use the language of the 'tate 1rosecutor& 'so5called hardships'. Basically& we fight against two features which are the hallmar!s of African life in 'outh Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we see! to have repealed. hese features are poverty and lac! of human dignity& and we do not need communists or so5called 'agitators' to teach us about these things. 'outh Africa is the richest country in Africa& and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of e(tremes and remar!able contrasts. he whites en3oy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world& whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and& in some cases& drought5stric!en @eserves& where soil erosion and the overwor!ing of the soil ma!es it impossible for them to live properly off the land. hirty per cent are labourers& labour tenants& and s*uatters on white farms and wor! and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the "iddle Ages. he other B> per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. ?et most Africans& even in this group& are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living. he highest5paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. ?et their actual position is desperate. he latest figures were given on /8 "arch #$%7 by "r. +arr& "anager of the Johannesburg 0on5<uropean Affairs Department. he poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg Daccording to "r. +arr's departmentE is @7/.=7 per month. )e showed that the average monthly wage is @B/./7 and that 7% per cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to !eep them going. 1overty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. he incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. uberculosis& pellagra& !washior!or& gastro5 enteritis& and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. he incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the "edical Officer of )ealth for 1retoria& tuberculosis !ills forty people a day Dalmost all AfricansE& and in #$%# there were 8=&7$# new cases reported. hese diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body& but they result in retarded mental conditions and lac! of initiative& and reduce powers of concentration. he secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of wor! performed by African labourers. he complaint of Africans& however& is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich& but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. here are two ways to brea! out of poverty. he first is by formal education& and the second is by the wor!er

ac*uiring a greater s!ill at his wor! and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned& both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation. he present 4overnment has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts& after coming into power& was to stop subsidies for African school feeding. "any African children who attended schools depended on this supplement to their diet. his was a cruel act. here is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents& be they rich or poor. 'imilar facilities are not provided for the African children& though there are some who receive such assistance. African children& however& generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to figures *uoted by the 'outh African Institute of @ace @elations in its #$%B 3ournal& appro(imately 7> per cent of African children in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school& the standards are vastly different from those afforded to white children. In #$%>5%# the per capita 4overnment spending on African students at 'tate5aided schools was estimated at @#/.7%. In the same years& the per capita spending on white children in the +ape 1rovince Dwhich are the only figures available to meE was @#77.8A. Although there are no figures available to me& it can be stated& without doubt& that the white children on whom @#77.8A per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than African children on whom @#/.7% per head was being spent. he *uality of education is also different. According to the Bantu <ducational Journal& only 8&%%> African children in the whole of 'outh Africa passed their Junior +ertificate in #$%/& and in that year only B%/ passed matric. his is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present 1rime "inister said& during the debate on the Bantu <ducation Bill in #$8B9 :,hen I have control of 0ative education I will reform it so that 0atives will be taught from childhood to reali.e that e*uality with <uropeans is not for them . . . 1eople who believe in e*uality are not desirable teachers for 0atives. ,hen my Department controls 0ative education it will !now for what class of higher education a 0ative is fitted& and whether he will have a chance in life to use his !nowledge.: he other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial colour5bar under which all the better 3obs of industry are reserved for ,hites only. "oreover& Africans who do obtain employment in the uns!illed and semi5s!illed occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial +onciliation Act. his means that stri!es of African wor!ers are illegal& and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the better5paid ,hite wor!ers. he discrimination in the policy of successive 'outh African 4overnments towards African wor!ers is demonstrated by the so5called 'civili.ed labour policy' under which sheltered& uns!illed 4overnment 3obs are found for those white wor!ers who cannot ma!e the grade in industry& at wages which far e(ceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry. he 4overnment often answers its critics by saying that Africans in 'outh Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not !now whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost5of5living inde( in such countries. But even if it is true& as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries& but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own country& and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance. he lac! of human dignity e(perienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. ,hite supremacy implies blac! inferiority. 6egislation designed to preserve white

supremacy entrenches this notion. "enial tas!s in 'outh Africa are invariably performed by Africans. ,hen anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will loo! around for an African to do it for him& whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude& whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. hey do not loo! upon them as people with families of their own2 they do not reali.e that they have emotions 5 that they fall in love li!e white people do2 that they want to be with their wives and children li!e white people want to be with theirs2 that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly& to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what 'house5boy' or 'garden5boy' or labourer can ever hope to do this; 1ass laws& which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in 'outh Africa& render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in 'outh Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. )undreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into 3ail each year under pass laws. <ven worse than this is the fact that pass laws !eep husband and wife apart and lead to the brea!down of family life. 1overty and the brea!down of family life have secondary effects. +hildren wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to& or no money to enable them to go to school& or no parents at home to see that they go to school& because both parents Dif there be twoE have to wor! to !eep the family alive. his leads to a brea!down in moral standards& to an alarming rise in illegitimacy& and to growing violence which erupts not only politically& but everywhere. 6ife in the townships is dangerous. here is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. 1eople are afraid to wal! alone in the streets after dar!. )ousebrea!ings and robberies are increasing& despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore. Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform wor! which they are capable of doing& and not wor! which the 4overnment declares them to be capable o Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain wor!& and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they wor!& and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population& and not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they wor!& and not be forced into an unnatural e(istence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their menfol! and not be left permanently widowed in the @eserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o'cloc! at night and not to be confined to their rooms li!e little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to see! wor! where they want to and not where the 6abour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a 3ust share in the whole of 'outh Africa2 they want security and a sta!e in society. Above all& we want e*ual political rights& because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I !now this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country& because the ma3ority of voters will be Africans. his ma!es the white man fear democracy. But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. 1olitical division& based on colour& is entirely artificial and& when it disappears& so will the domination of one colour group by another. he A0+ has spent half a century fighting against racialism. ,hen it triumphs it will not change that policy.

his then is what the A0+ is fighting. heir struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people& inspired by their own suffering and their own e(perience. It is a struggle for the right to live. During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination& and I have fought against blac! domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with e*ual opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be& it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

On 11 June 1964, at the conclusion of the trial, Mandela and seven others - Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ra !ond Mhlaba, "lias Motsoaledi, #ndre$ Mlan%eni, #h!ed &athrada and 'enis Goldber% - $ere convicted( Mandela $as found %uilt on four char%es of sabota%e and like the others $as sentenced ro life i!)rison!ent( Amadela!ufa9 those who are prepared to ma!e sacrifices. 'aracen armoured vehicles9 British5made military troop carriers. 'tate witnesses in the trial whose names were withheld for their protection. Arthur 4oldreich was among those arrested in connection with the @ivonia case. 6ater he and three others in custody escaped from 3ail by bribing a guard& and fled the country. 6iliesleaf was the name of the farm in the district of @ivonia on the northern outs!irts of Johannesburg where the arrests too! place. At the time it was let to Arthur 4oldreich. he Junior +ertificate e(amination was generally ta!en by white children at the age of #8 and they could not normally leave school before this. "atriculation was ta!en two years later and *ualified students for higher education. he educational system& however& ensured that very few Africans reached Junior +ertificate level& so that what represented a basic standard for whites was one of achievement for Africans. <ven fewer attained matriculation level.