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CONTENTS
Vol. 3, No. 3+4: SummerFall 1971
Kathleen Aberle - An Indochinese Conference in Vancouver CCAS - Interview with Chou En-lai Kung Chung-wu - A New May Fourth Movement? William Pomeroy - Source Material on Philippine Revolutionary Movements Ben Kerkvliet - Additional Source Materials on Philippine Radical Movements Columbia CCAS - The American Asian Studies Establishment John K. Fairbank - Comment Moss Roberts - The Structure and Direction of Contemporary China Studies David Horowitz - Politics and Knowledge: An Unorthodox History of Modern China Studies

BCAS/Critical Asian Studies www.bcasnet.org

CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them. CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.
Passed, 2830 March 1969 Boston, Massachusetts

BaDelia of COBC .-Bed AsiaB Scbolan

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"'Double issue: Summer-Fall 1971

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Vol. 3, No. 3-Vol.3, No.4

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From the C.C.A.S. China Trip

Complete Interview

with Chou En-lai

Indochina

Women's Conference
Philippines

Researching the Huks

Special Supplement

MODERN CBINA'
STUDIES

How the Foundations Bought a Field .

$1.50

~~.,1~.

--

LOOK,JANE. SEE DICK.

DICK HAS DISCOVERED ANEW COUNTRY.

DICK HAS DISCOVERED CHINA!

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Kath leen Aberle CCAS Chwtg-wu Kung Wi Uiarn Pomeroy Ben KerkvZiet SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
Co lwwia CCAS John K. Fairbank Moss Roberts

CODleDls

Summer-Fall 1971 / Double Issue Volume 3, Numbers 3 & 4

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31 61 74 83 91 92 104 113 139 169

An Indochinese Conference in Vancouver Interview with Chou En-1ai A New May Fourth Movement? Source Material on Philippine Revolutionary Movements Additional Source Materials on Philippine Radical Movements MODERN CHINA STUDIES The American Asian Studies Establishment Comment The Structure and Direction of Contemporary China Studies Politics and Knowledge: an Unorthodox History of Modern China Studies

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David Horowitz Communications

Editors: Jim Peck/Mark Selden Book Review Editor: Marilyn Young Business Manager: Jon Livingston Graphics: Tom Engelhardt/Jonathan Grant/Steve Hart/Jon Livingston staff for this Issue: John Brockett/Helen Chauncey/Kathy
Hartford/Alan Hitt/Anne Kruze/Felicia Oldfather/ Betty Ragan/Steve Thomas Editorial Board: Kathleen Aberle/Frank Baldwin/Marianne Bastid/ Herbert Bix/Fred Branfman/Noam Chomsky/Edward Friedman/Richard Kagan/Perry Link/Alfred McCoy/ Jonathan Mirsky/Victor Nee/Felicia Oldfather/Ric Pfeffer/Franz Schurmann/Yamashita Tatsuo

BuUetin Correspondance: CCAS, 9 Sutter Street, Room 300, San Francisco, Ca. 94104 Manuscripts:
Mark Selden, Box 1111, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. 63130 Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars national office: CCAS, Building 600 T, Stanford University, Stanford, Ca. 94305. A year's subscription to the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars costs $6, $7 over seas (students $4 everywhere), libraries and institutions $10, foreign second-class airmail $15. A subscription blank is on page 111.

BuLletin of

Conce~ed Asian SchoLars~ Summer-Fall 1971, Volume 3, Numbers 3 & 4. Published quarterly in Spring Summer, Fall, Winter. $6.00; student rate $4.00; library rate $10.00. James Peck, Publisher, 9 Sutter Street, Room 300, San Francisco, Ca. 94104. Application to mail at second-class postage rates is pending at San Francisco.

Copyright (c), Bulletin of Concerned Asian PHOTOGRAPHS: GRAPHICS:

Scholars~

1971.

Page 34, Mao Tsetung in 1919/Page 39, Mao in 1936/Page 54, Mao in 1942. Credit: China Photo Service~ Peking. Inside front cover, Page 131, & Page 168: Credit: Liberation News Service.

An Indochinese Conference iD Vancouver

by Kathleen Gough Aberle
An important conference took place at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, on April 1st to 6th. Six Indochinese delegates met about 600 women from Voice of Women, Women Strike for Peace, Third World, and Women's Liberation groups of western North America. The purpose of the con ference was "to meet and talk in order to get a better understanding and strength en our solidarity so as to put an early end to the war, and to give information to Canadian and U.S. friends on the situ ation in Indochina. "1 Third World dele gates, who numbered about 300, came from Black, Chicano, Asian, and Native Amer
The Indochinese Delegates From the Women's Union of the Demo cratic Republic of Vietnam came Vo Thi The, aged 50, a professor of Vietnamese literature and history, and Nguyen Thi Xiem (40), a medical researcher and obstetrician at the Institute for the Protection of Mothers and Newborn Babies in Hanoi. Delegates of the Women's Union of South vietnam were Phan Minh Hien (31), a teacher, and Dinh Thi Huong (46), a housewife. From Laos came two members of the Executive Committee of the Lao Women's Union, Khampheng Boupha (47) and Khemphet Pholsena (29), both

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ican and Canadian groups. The Indo chinese also talked to G.I. wives, veterans, deserters, and draft resisters, and held public meetings with Canadian citizens. 2 A similar conference followed in Toronto (see The Guardian, New York, April 17, page 5). Because of disunity and, to some extent, differences of interest among them, the three sponsoring groups held separate conferences. Voice of Women (Canada) and Women Strike for Peace (U.S.A.) met on April 1st; Third World women, on April 3rd and 4th; and Women's Liberation groups, on April 5th and 6th. 3 teachers. Three men worked nobly as interpreters: Nguyen Tri (46), a professor of French at the University of Hanoi, Trinh Van Anh (33) from South Vietnam, and Souban Srithirath (34) from Laos. Although invited delegates from Cambodia could not be present, Cambodian news and statements of solidarity reached us from Prince Sihanouk and from speeches of the attending delegates. A spirit of unity, optimism, and determination on the part of the Indochinese peoples permeated the conference. Most remarkable about these women were their gentle dignity, self command, and deep concern for others, both individ ually and as nations. They laughed often

with the women they met, hugged them when they felt common feelings, wept a little as they heard of each other's sufferings, and comforted us when (as too often happened) we ran late with the program or failed with the conference arrangements. Although their competence and dedication awed us, we felt that we, too, might cope better in future, as women and as citizens, for having met them. Personal Stories Before beginning their discussions of political and military matters, each delegate gave us a short life-history. VO THI THE, an impressive woman who frequently led discussions, lives now in He:loi but comes from Hue, the capital of Central Vietnam.
"My father was an old-style intellec

aries and some are now politicians. "When the French invaded again, they entered Saigon. One of my two older brothers joined the army and went south. He gave his life in the first battle. My other older brother decided to join when he heard of his death. He, too, was killed. "I still remember the day we received the news of my second brother's death. Some days after the battle my mother met the soldiers coming from the front, to ask about her son. They tried to avoid her; they didn't want to make her sad, so they drove away. She ran about a third of a mile after the car. Then she sat down on the grass and realized he was dead. My parents and my whole family suffered a great deal, and my heart was aching. After reflecting on her losses, my mother decided to send her other son to fight.

ual, learned in Chinese. to become a mandarin and serve in feudal and colonial conditions, so he stayed at home. We children received a patriotic spirit from him. We saw the difference in living conditions between the Viet namese and the French colonialists. We hated the French for invading our country and oppressing our people. "In 1945 two million Vietnamese died of hunger. The French colonialists and the Japanese fascists burned our stocks of rice. My whole family took part in the August revolution. I was a teacher then at Hue university, but I joined the Women's Union for National Salvation and got my students' support through my subject. Many of them became revolution

In February, 1946, the French in vaded Hue, destroyed our village, and burned our house. They took my father and exposed him in the sun until he be came ill. As a result, he died three months later. This strengthened our hatred of the enemy and our urge to fight. In Vietnam, the family's hatred of the enemy is closely interrelated with that of the nation . "Because of my work in the Women's Union I had to leave my family in 1950, and have not seen my mother since. Since the U.S. puppets divided our country, we have been fighting to re-unify it and our families. We turn our suffering into hatred, so as to fight.

"My mother and some of my brothers

and sisters are s till in South Vietnam. During the uprising there in the spring of 1968, the enemy bombed and strafed Hue and destroyed the area where we used to live. Since then, we have received no news from them. "I have two children aged 17 and 13. They are in school in forests and my husband is in the army, so we rarely see each other. Youth of that age are very eager to join the army. To gain permission they have to reach a certain weight, but many l6-year olds put rocks in their pockets to get accepted ... "Thousands of women who were born in South Vietnam are now living in the North. They long for the place of their youth and childhood; naturally, that is the place that seems most beautiful to everyone. And so these women name their babies after a mountain, a river, or

laughing, woman. In addition to her work in obstetrics, she does research on the treatment of injuries from toxic chemicals, fragmentation bombs, napalm, and diseases introduced to South Vietnam by U.S. troops. Her patients are brought from South Vietnam to Hanoi for treat ment. Xiem told of women's uteruses, bowels and urinary tracts perforated by pellet bombs when they were pregnant, causing miscarriages of malformed births, and of the high frequency of miscarriages and deformed babies resulting from toxic gases and chemical defoliants. Born into a family ~f 12 near Hue, Xiem entered school only at 15, after the August revolution.
"My village had one year of peace. Then the French colonialists came and occupied our province for a second time. My father, two brothers, and some of my sisters joined the army. My mother and

some other place near their old village. I gave one of my children a name that means "We are thinking of you South Vietnam!" The other I named after a river that flowed before our house- we called it "Perfume River". Because so many families are divided in this way, the question of reunification is emotional as well as political. Vietnam is one, her people are one. "That is why we ask you to struggle in your country to have the U.S. troops withdrawn; in order that the people of Vietnam may once again meet their dear ones. " NGUYEN THI XIEM is a slight, often
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we younger children had to disperse into the mountains. Living deep in the jungle, four of my brothers and sisters died of malaria. I joined the Pioneers, a youth organization, and contined my studies." Vo Thi The at one time was her teacher. The French were defeated and the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were signed two years after Xiem had become a teacher and joined the Women's Union for National Salvation. With the "regroupment" of the Viet Minh, "My father, two of my brothers and I went to the North. My mother and her other children remained in South Vietnam. In 1957 I received one letter saying my mother and the others had to move to different provinces be

cause our whole village had been destroyed by bombs and shells. I have not heard of them since then." If living, Xiem's two younger brothers are now of military age. "I don't know whether their minds are clear enough to join the liberation forces, or whether they follow a wrong path and work for the puppet regime. I only hope they are wise enough to serve their country. " "Wi th the care of our people", Xiem entered Hanoi university, graduated from medical college in 1959, and later studied for two years abroad. The Insti ::ute for the Protection of Mothers and Newborn Babies, where she now works, was built with the aid of Women's Unions throughout the world. She hopes it will receive support in future from North American women's anti-war and libera

weighs 86 lbs. To reach North Vietnam in order to depart for Canada, she walked for three months through jungles carrying 44 lbs. of luggage. "The village where I was born is on the bank of a river. I'm fond of flowers and as a child, I used to grow them around my home. We had a lot of fruit trees, too. "The war reached us in 1947. We started fighting, and since then my village has not known one day of peace. "My mother died early and my father sacrificed himself in the first resist ance war. I had two younger sisters, but they died too because of war c..: mditions. My grandfather and many uncles and aunts remained, but I decided to join the resistance. When my grandfather died I couldn't go because my village was encircled b

appy to North Vietnam because it is a country. "I consider it a great honor to protect the health of mothers and babies in our country. To show grat titude to our kith and kin in South Vietn~m, who still have to spill their blood to fight the aggressors, I feel deeply that I must do my job well, raise my political consciousness, and improve my educational and tech nical work. This will help to provide good conditions for people to work in production as well as fighting, to bring peace for every family in Vietnam." PRAN HINH HIEN, of South Vietnam,

Hien is married and has three children. Because her husband is in the army, he had to leave her immediately after the wedding. She saw him again four years later-for half an hour. They have been separated most of the time for the past ten years. Hien had to leave her first child wi th a friend when he was 13 months old, and because of her work, she is now separated from all her children. "Like other mothers I worry about my children-their food and so on. And every time I meet my children they ask me, 'When are you leaving, mother?' Sometimes they make me very sorry, pain ful, because they say, 'We don't know whether we shall see you again or not. '
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That is why I always leave:when they are sleeping. But our children are respon sible to the Fatherland, and know why their parents leave them." Moreover, Hien knows that she is lucky. After all, her husband and children are alive, and so, she says, things seem to go "quite well." After high school in the jungle, Hien attended university evening classes for two years. She chose to study chem istry so that she could help to recondi tion the soil that has been rU.l.ned by the war, and to plant fruit trees again. "While working as a teacher I receive good care and affection from the villagers. We don't have a salary. When we work in the jungle, we get from 9 to 18 kilograms (about 20 to 40 lbs.) of rice or manioc a month. The villagers share everything with us -- even medicine tablets when we fall ill.

she was held for four months and was tortured many times, but found not guilty and released. She was last arrested in 1970. Huong has not heard fro~ her since then. Huong herself was imprisoned from November 1955 to April 1961. She went through eight of South Vietnam's mos t inf amous jails. "I was first detained in Quinhon prison for 16 months. I was tortured. They pushed pins into my finger tips and hannnered them with a stick, so I felt great pain. I was tortured by electricity. They applied electrodes to my ears, fingers, nipples and genitals. Once they tortured me with electricity until I fell unconscious. They left me in the torture room until the afternoon when I regained conscious ness; then they sent me back to the cell.

"I only wish the u.S. troops would get out of Vietnam, so the suffering of Vietnamese, as well as Americans, will be ended. I'd like to rebuild my village, and grow flowers around my home." DINH THI HUONG's story is less pleasant. A widow, she comes from a family of weavers in a village in Binh Dinh province. A shell killed her young er sister and four other women, together with her niece, aged four. Huong's daughter of 19 has been imprisoned four times since the age of 13. The first time she was held for 11 months, found not guilty, and released. The second time, 1968, she was detained in the district capital, but the NLF liberated the town and set her free. The third time
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"Another torture was the water torture. They forced soap mixed with lye and water into my stomach until I fell unconscious. They used their shoes to trample on my belly until the water was out. In that way I vomited blood. They tied my hands behind my back and hung me from the ceiling. After about 50 minutes, I fell unconscious and relieved myself. All my body was black and blue. Wi th this torture, I was paralysed for six months. I could not feed myself or put on my clothes. "I was held in a narrow cell, 3 metres long and 11/2 metres wide (about 10 feet by 5). In this cell they de tained 15 people, or sometimes up to 32. Men and women lived in the same cell;

they were not allowed to have their clothing. In such a narrow cell we had to eat and make water; we relieved our selves in a small pail which we hung from the ceiling. We had room only to stand. "During my imprisonment I was not allowed to take a bath. I had very long hair before I was arres ted. Because of the hard imprisonment, all my hair was soaked with blood and other things, and there were lice. Even when I wanted to cut my hair, they didn't let me. I was given rice with salt, or sometimes only rice. And from time to time they did not give me food for three days running. " . In this cell, every day some prisoners died. Once five prisoners died at about five o'clock in the morning; they were not brought out until eleven o'clock. Most of the people in my cell died; just a few, including me, remained

the latrine pail. rice with decayed Every 24 hours, I a litre of water. allowed to bathe.

Our food was rotten fish, or only rice. received a quarter of Every two months, I was

"At Con Son I saw 98 prisoners. Three were women of 50 to 55, two had little children, and one gave birth in prison. Because she had no money to give birth, this woman cut her hair and sold it for 200 piastres to the soldiers' wives, for her delivery. "Then I was brought to the mainland, to the prison called Thuduc. There I spent 17 months. I was in a small, narrow cell in Thuduc, 1.40 metres by 80 cen timetres. I could not lie down freely, yet still they shackled my hands. In this prison I was allowed one piece of clothing, but no baths. And you know, when the women prisoners menstruated, they were not allowed to have a change

alive. We called the prison there a 'Hell on Earth'. I don't know why, but the healthier the people, the sooner they would die. After five days even healthy men could not bear the torture longer. I myself fell unconscious many times; my friends marvelled that I was still alive. "Then I was sent to the prison at Con Son; it's a small island. There I spent 30 months in an underground cave. The cave was 2 1/2 by 1 1/2 metres; its height was 2 1/2 metres (8' 4"). The cave was painted black; there were only.. two small holes. In it from 15 to 22 prisoners were detained. We ate, made water, and relieved ourselves there; once a week we were allowed to clean out

of clothing. "After this I was sent to another prison, Phu Loi, where they kept me 15 months. Here I was tortured again with electricity, water and beating, exactly as I had been at Quinhon In the cell they tied my hands and legs, and gagged me with a piece of iron. From time to time they tortured me with water, right there in the cell, and they beat me any time they felt inclined. "Before I was released they sent me to a ward with 500 other women prisoners. There were three old women - 70, 73 and 75. The last two were nuns, suspected of participating in the peace movement.
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There were also 16 children, from new born babies up to five years old. These children had many diseases; they were only skin and bones. Many of these children died for lack of air . "In April, 1961, I was found Not Guilty and at last released. Before my arrest I weighed 49 kilograms (106 lbs.), but after it, only 34 kilograms (75 lbs.). They had tortured me because they thought I was a member of an anti-U.S. patriot ic organization, but in fact I was quite innocent. During my imprisonment they commanded me to salute the Saigon flag and shout slogans in favor of the Saigon regime. But I refused to do so simply because, since there was such a regime and such a flag, women of South Vietnam were suffering much . "On release, I was so sick that from time to time I vomited blood and was more or less half dead and paralyzed. They re-

was chosen to visit Canada as an exem plary fighter for her people.) "Dear friends, I would like to say a few words about imprisonment in South Vietnam since Mr. Nixon came to power. I cannot tell you every torture the women prisoners have to suffer - only in Con Son, Cay Dua, and Thuduc. "In the pas t two years the U. S. and the puppets have arrested and perse cuted many patriots. They consider it a means to carry out 'Vietnamization' of the war. For example, Cay Dua prison is on a small island in South Vietnam. In 1967 there were only 2 sections and 2,000 prisoners, but in October 1970 there were 10 s~ctions with 28,000 prisoners. The prison has been fenced with three barbed wire fences, together with electric wires and minefields. There are ten watchtowers with macI-ine-guns round the prison. Five battalions of

leased me in the hope that they could threaten and intimidate the people of my village. Instead my people cared for me, and I have been through many hos pitals. I feel better now, but my health is not recovered as before. "Before my arrest I was in fact a mere civilian, a housewife. But after my im prisonment I felt that I should do some thing to contribute to the struggle of my people. I have had many suffer ings,like other women in South Vietnam. So I joined my people, to fight the Americans and the puppets in Saigon." (Since then, Dinh Thi Huong has been elected to Women's Union committees of her village, province, and zone. She
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puppet troops and four battalions of so called 'civilian guards' have been mobilized to supervise the prisoners. "Here in Cay Dua prison, the most barbarous tortures have been done. Some times they burn the prisone r' s belly with petrol. They slice the prisoners' flesh. They put the prisoners into bags and fill the bags with sand and expose them in the hot sun till they die. They tie the prisoners and throw them in the sea. More barbarous still, they put poison in the food and water. So because of the torture, in 1969 alone, 630 prison ers died. "In Con Son when I was there, there

t.rere 4 wards, but now the number is increased by 7. And now there are 120 tiger cages. Women coming from this prison have told me that 365 women were detained in tiger cages. During 1970, more than 800 prisoners died. Up to 1970, there had been 10,000 prisoners there. "In Thuduc prison in July and Aug ust, 1969, they oppressed the prisoners and hundreds were wounded. Two hundred women were massacred, among them many children. "Dear sis ters and br0thers: "The U.S. and Saigon administra tions have applied most barbarous tortures and repressive means to stop the patriotic movement. The more bar barous the enemy is, the stronger the struggle of the people. Before their arrest many women have been 'innocent'.

after World War II, Khampheng and part of her family withdrew with the resist ance forces into jungles. Her parents, grandfather and two children stayed in the occupied zone. "My father once worked as a councillor to the King. Because he believed in peace and neutrality, he was pushed out by the puppet regime." Khampheng went to the rear as a teacher, and has worked there ever since. She teaches children by day and adults at night, but says it is "terribly difficult because of the bombardment." About 2 ,000 schools in Laos have been destroyed. Even so, from a 55% illiter acy rate under the French, Khampheng claims that 86 percent of children in the liberated zone now go to school. Classes meet in small groups underground or in the jungle, under the shade of trees. "I have five children now, but have no time to be with them. Two of my sons

their arrest, t ey become active in the revolutionary movement. "Thank you and good health to you." When Mme. Huong finished her re cital on April 1st, the audience stood and many wept. But as we left the aud itorium, we heard that President Nixon had just released Lieutenant Calley to his quarters. KHAMPHENG BOUPHA says her personal story is much like that of other Ldotian women- "nothing special". She has taken part in the revolution since it began in 1945. When the French invaded Laos again

are health workers in a hospital, but two live in the puppet zone and have been forced to join the puppet army. One of my nephews had to join the puppet airforce, and died in battle against the liberated zone. "That is my small cont rib'ution to my people--educating the children. I'm proud of my responsibility. "Everybody wishes the National Con cord would be brought to our country. That's why we wish the withdrawal of U.S. troops. But the U.S. imperialists want to carry out their policy of divide and rule, by dividing families and try ing to make them kill each other."
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KHEMPHET PHOLSEN'S son is 10 months old. She has a beautiful voice and sings songs of women in the liberated zone. But her voice trembled when she took the microphone on April 1st. "Today is the eighth anni vers ary of the assassination of my father, Quinim Pholsena, by agents of the CIA.4 My life was closely linked with that of my father. I am determined to follow his road.
"My father was President of the Party for Peace and Neutrality. During 1957, the Neo Lao Haksat negotiated with the opposite forces. My father agreed with the Pathet Lao to form a National Coali tion Government for peace and neutrality. But on the very first day of its forma tion, this government was thrown out by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

thought they could intimidate her to give up her neutral policy. But in stead they only sowed deep hatred in her heart. Although disabled, she took her twelve children and joined the liberated zone. All the other children and I are determined to follow the same policy - peace and neutrality. There are many situations like my own. "I consider my teaching job, though very small, a great honor - a proud contribution to the service of my people." Political and Military Situations In their public meetings, the Indo chinese outlined the situations in their countries. What follows is a much compressed account. 5 Laos

"In 1962 my father again negotiated

with the Neo Lao Haksat for a second neutral government, and in this government he took the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. As such, he followed a policy of strict neutrality, establishing dip lomatic relations with all governments which agreed with our neutrality and supported us without strings. "The U.S. imperialists considered my father an obstacle to their policy of aggression, and so they used the Asian CIA to kill him. In that attack they also wounded my mother, who is still disabled. "By assassinating my father and wounding my mother, the imperialists 10

The U.S. government has carried out aggression against Laos continuously for 16 years, and has used it as a strategically placed neo-colony and military base in Southeast Asia over the past ten years. Inside Laos, the aggres sors have until recently been U.S. advisers and troops, Thai mercenaries, a dwindling Laotian puppet army, and Meo tribesmen employed as Special Forces under U.S. command. U.S. aid to the Laotian puppet regime amounted to $300,000,000 in 1969-70, of which $250,000,000 went for military affairs, including $150,000,000 for the Special Forces. During the Nixon period B-52's have daily rained an average of 3,000 tons of bombs on Laos, killing countless

civilians. In the past two years the equivalent of 4 Hiroshimas a month has been dropped on this country, the most heavily bombed in history. The Lao Patriotic Front has, however, won every ground battle since 1968 and claims to administer two-thirds of the land and about half the population. The recent invasion, said to have been by 20,000 Siagon and U.S. troops (with 25,000 others left in reserve at Khe Sanh across the border) has been de feated. In Laos the invaders were able to move only 3 miles in one month before they were routed. In 43 days of battle, 15,400 Saigon and U.S. troops were reported to have been killed or put out of action, including 200 Americans killed - altogether, three-quarters of the invading troops. One thousand Saigon and American troops were captured, mauy of them officers. Five hundred and ninety-six vehicles were said to have

bodian invasions, the NLF won victories inside South Vietnam. The Saigon puppet troops' morale was s aid to be very low. Even Saigon General Do Cao Tri recently admit ted, "Out of 100 soldiers, 70 have deserted or are attempting to desert, 25 are suffering low morale, and only 5 have any fighting spirit." The Thieu Ky-Khiem regime was said to be now opposed by virtually every sector of the people. In the countryside people are rising up to smash the strategic hamlets. Urban struggles in Saigon, Hue and Danang are now coordinated. In cooperation with Pathet Lao and Cambodian troops, the NLF has inflicted heavy losses at Khe Sanh. During the recent Cambodian and Laotian invasions, the NLF claims to have killed or wounded 8,000 out of 25,000 puppet and U.S. troops at Khe Sanh, two-thirds of whom were Americans. In one night in March they destroyed or shot down 40 planes and put out of action about 100 pilots

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been destroyed, including 444 U.S. tanks. Four hundred and eighty-six planes were shot down, including 306 helicopters an estimated five-sixths of the total planes used in the invasion. One hundred and forty-four pieces of artillery were captured. The Laotians expect Nixon to continue the war in various forms and to pro long the conflagration in Indochina as long as possible. The struggle ahead is still a hard one, requiring the utmost determination by anti-war forces both in the U.S.A. and in Laos. South Vietnam During the recent Laotian and Cam-

Between 1961 and 1969, the U.S. forces dropped on South Vietnam 50,000 tons of herbicides and defoliants, destroyed the vegetation on 43 percent of the cultivated land and on 44 percent of the forest land, and injured 275,000 people, of whom 400 died. More recently, in the two years of President Nixon's adminis tration, "Vietnamization" and saturation bombing have disrupted all normal life in every village of South Vietnam. During Nixon's adminis tration, 2,131,234 tons of bombs have been dropped, and 2,229,155 tons of shells have been used. These have sur passed the total amount of explosions by all forces during the whole of World 11

War II. "My Lais" have been very num erous. In 1970 alone, toxic chemicals destroyed 1,800,000 acres of vegetation, made 618,000 people seriously ill, and killed about 1,000. In one month in Lo Dieu hamlet in Binh Dinh province, 73 persons were killed by toxic chemicals. Sixtyfive of these were children, 8 were adults. In addition, 11 women had miscarriages. In general, very large numbers of preg nant women have miscarried as a result of toxic chemicals; many who do not miscarry give birth to babies who are deformed. The NLF delegates did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons by Nixon in Indochina, but thought that they could only further damage the U.S. situation. They pointed out that the U.S. still has one million puppet troops and 300,000 Americans in Indochina - more than were deployed at the height of the Korean war. HOlv could these escape the

is the most deceitful. 11 On the Calley trial (just before the news of his release) the Indochinese press statement was as follows: "We do not believe that when G. I. 's come to Indochina they intend to commit atrocities. When they come there, in view of their situation and orders, many do commit them and should be punished. But those first responsible for these atrocities are the men of the Johnson and Nixon administrations. These men should be tried by a world court and executed for crimes against humanity." Cambodia In spite of the failure and retreat of the ground invasion of 1970, heavy bombing has been continuous and, of course, the U.S. command again invaded Cambodia with 20,000 Saigon and American

of nuclear weapons? As for the people, the total tonnage of bombs drop ped so far is equal to large numbers of nuclear weapons. "The question is whether the people in the world and the American people will let Nixon use nuclear weapons, or not. Anyhow, we are prepared to face any circumstances, because Mr. Nixon is not a wise man. You know, he is a madman. And you know we are resolved to fight for indepen dence and freedom. We would rather sacrifice everything than to be enslaved. So we don't fear violence, whatever form - even nuclear weapons. ,,6 Delegates stressed the perfidious nature of the Nixon administration and its ability to deceive Americans with lies and promises of withdrawal. "Of all Presidents, Nixon 12
effec~s

troops in February 1971. The Cambodians claim that half the invading troops have been killed or disabled, half their tanks destroyed, and 50 planes shot down. The Cambodian National United Front, under the Royal Government of National Unity, is estimated to have liberated six-tenths of Cambodian territory. Democratic Republic of Vietnam Although the bombing of North Viet nam stopped officially in November, 1968, U.S. bomb tonnage on Indochina as a whole has doubled under the Nixon administration. The cost of the war to the U.S.A. is still increasing and has reached $30 billion a year.

In response to the widening of the war, the Indochinese liberation govern ments agreed at a summit conference in April 1970 to coordinate their strategies to evict the U.S. from Indochina. Their armed forces now cooperate closely, while the political policies of each country remain independent. In spite of announced policy, U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV have never ceased. On November 21 and 22, 1970, U.S. planes bombed and strafed 80 localities in several provinces, including the suburbs of Hanoi. There were also attacks on fishing boats. Nixon's claim that these attacks related to the safety of U.S. prisoners was, of course, false. Arrangements for exchange of prisoners can go forward as soon as the U.S. even sets a date for the withdrawal of all troops and mili tary material and the cessation of bombing throughout Vietnam.

FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U. S. TROOPS AND WAR HATERIAL AND THE ENDING OF ALL BOMBING IN INDOCHINA, AND LEAVE THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. "

**

* **

Workshop discussions ranged over many topics, but in all the conferences three subjects came to the fore: women's liberation, the state of the U.S. anti war movement, and revolutionary pro cesses in Indochina. As there was much repetition, I have culled from several workshops what seemed to be significant statements on these subjects. 7 Women's Liberation Question. How has the revolution changed

I
t

the lives of women, and what is the character of women's organizations in Indochina?

The U.S. government has massed large numbers of troops in the Demilitarized Zone and in March 1971 threatened to invade the DRV. In Feb ruary and Harch of this year B-52's again dropped bombs and toxic chemicals over Ha-Tinh and Kwang-Binh provinces, injuring hundreds of civilians. Since the "official" cessation of bombing in 1968, however, the DRV has been able to build up its military potential. In every village people are ready in case of invasion and can defeat it. The demand of all the Indochinese people, and the message of the con ference, is: "SET A DATE DURING 1971

Answer. (DRV) Formerly our country was under feudalism and colonialism. Women were therefore under two kinds of oppres sion. As women, they were totally dependent on the family - for example, they had no right to go to school. About 90 percent of Vietnamese women were illiterate. Women worked only to look after the family. If a man had a daughter, it was as if the daughter didn't exis t. Even if a family had ten daughters, the father considered that he had no child. When a woman married, her husband could have any number of wives. Men did not respect their wives, and parents-in-law regarded their daughter-in-law as a servant. After the death of the husband, his
13

..

widow could not remarry and at the same time retain her children or any property. In fact, all property was controlled by men and all decisions made by them.
As colonized people, women had no rights of citizenship. That meant they had no right to participate in either the family 2L society. Sometimes, for example, women wanted to leave their families and live independently. But the surrounding society spoiled their Iives.

in ministries and assemblies, as well as in economic life. Formerly we had two or three women doctors; now we have about 5,000 Homen graduates of medicine and engineering. Thirty-seven percent of the graduates of Hanoi University are women, and about half the students now in high schools are girls. .. To give a further idea, we should point out that 60 percent of the members of cooperatives and factories are women, and between 50 and 60 percent of the workers in eciucation and health. Six teen point nine percent of the members of our National Assembly are women, and about half the members of the People's Council. Two-thirds of the members of village administrative committees are women, and out of 5,000 villages, 4,300 have women as village chairmen Women form roughly half the members of district administrative committees, and

When we started the liberation struggle, women began to struggle against male dominance as well. In order to liberate the country we had to liberate the family. When women parti cipate in the national liberation struggle, their prestige goes up and their role becomes more important. Only (political) independence can

remove the family yoke. Women's role is very important in the national struggle we can't win without them. After our independence was achieved in the North, we began socialist con struction. Then came the real equality of men and women. To join our women's movement one must be participating in the liberation of the country. After independence, our government provided facilities for the education of women, and rights to work equally with men. The equality of women is contained in Article 24 of the constitution of our national assembly. Before, women had no place in politics. Now they are fully represented

about 35 percent at the provincial level. We have four women vice-ministers, and the Women's Union is important in government. Throughout Indochina, women play a very active role in fighting. They defend villages, transport ammunition, and form militia units to shoot down planes. In Vietnam about a third of the guerilla leaders in villages are women .. Inequality is not completely wiped out - we still have to eliminate the feudalistic ideology of men. The woman of a family may be a university grad uate, but may still be looked down on by her husband. We call this the "inner

14

struggle" within the family, and it is a very long one. Some branches of activity are espec ially suitable for women, and there they have high priority. In the Insti tute for the Preservation of Mothers and Babies, we give special responsi bility to women, who form about two thirds of the staff. In the process of our long struggle for liberation, male cadres learned to cook, to care for children, and to wash clothes. In this way, husbands learned to help their wives at home. The struggle is not a clash between men and women, but between institutions and ideologies, and between the new govern ment and the old customs. The government has to provide day care, for example, for all children; women simply can't do it individually, given their other tasks.

... With regard to marriage, we now educate married men not to love other women, and vice-versa. Because there are more women than men, some have proposed to return to polygamy, but for the sake of unity and solidarity we do not accept such demands. Instead, we try to educate them, and under the Marriage Law we en force monogamy. (South Vietnam) Since 1945 and the August revolution a great change has taken place. Women have become aware that they were oppressed and that they had to fight, both for the freedom of their country and for their rights. Be fore 1951 no women's organization exist ed, and various scattered activities were taking place allover. Our organization, the Women's Union for National Salvation, was formed then out of the different parts of the struggle. Its motif has been "Peace, Independence, and Women's Righ ts." Since then several other women's

In any offic~ or .responsibility, if a woman is capable, our government's policy is to advance her. Ho Chi Minh always asked how many women were parti cipating in any conference, and asked them to give their opinions first. He severely criticized cadres for backwater and feudalistic ideologies. Husbands and wives who work in the same area belong to the same trade union. The trade union's role is very important: if there is antagonism be tween husband and wife the trade union leader criticizes the husband if he is mistaken, or the wife is she is mistaken. Thus the ideological struggle is always going on; success is possible because socialism is being built.

organ.izations have. been formed- such as the Women's Organization to Defend Women's Dignity and the Women's Move ment for the Right to Live. It is because of their contributions to the national struggle that women now h ave the same stat us as men. Men and women are equal and take part in all aspects of the struggle; for example the majority of machine workers in South Vietnam are women, and there is a Viet namese Women's Army ... Three things we have learned about women's liberation: 1. The system of society (whether imper ialism or socialism) determines whether 15

or not women have equal rights. Imper ialists do not want women doing impor tant work because they are afraid they might challenge them. 2. If women want to enjoy equality with men they must be economically equal. 3. In any period of time, if there is work to do women must help to do it. We can't ask for emancipation and freedom in our country if we don't make any contribution. If we do our job well, they have to admit we are important. ... If women take part in the strug gle it follows that some will have to be given leadership positions. Because we have such a strong women's military force, for example, we need a woman in government to administer those forces. About 75 percent of the people on our village councils are \vomen, and we also have large representation at the district,

Q. What are the facilities for medical

supplies and medical care in the DRV?
A. Formerly we had one hospital per province, for the French and the rich. There were no hospitals in villages, and dysentry and epidemics were rife. After the revolution succeeded, we built a network of health-care from village to district, province and center. Now we can prevent smallpox, polio and other diseases still found in South Vietnam. We do have basic medicines but we need extras. Health service work is very heavy because of the war. That is why we need help from foreign coun tries and from yourselves.

Q. How has the revolution in your coun

t~

affected the family

structu~?

A. (South Vietnam) What we would like to have in Vietnam are very ordinary families. What we have now are families very often separated. But we feel that

I
provincial and regional levels. Our Foreign Minister is, of course, a woman, and so is the Pathet Lao Minister of Social Affairs. Because men now realize that women are capable, especially in villages where the majority of fighters are women, most men dare not belittle women as they did before. a good man is loyal to a wife, and a good woman is a good housewife. We educate women to take care of the family as well as other things. Double responsi bility for the family as well as the organization is our slogan.

Q. Have women the right to obtain abor

tions?
A. (DRV) Women have the right to get abortions with the help of the health service. That is a woman's choice and right. Even if the husband wants more children, if the wife does not, she can come for abortion. To avoid preg nancy, the hospital will give birth control methods freely. 16

Q. Do you foresee a time when the men will take equal responsibility for the children?
A. If the wife is busy with social work in the community the husband must take care of the children, but generally the responsibility rests with women.

Q. How do you edueate children in a

revolutionary society to understand and participate in the revolution?

A. (South Vietnam) We educate the children

with love for their compatriots, the country, and labor. They must respect discipline and be active in study. An organization for Children is very active in fighting and cultural activities, and as soon as they are able to speak our children must be united with other chil dren. Children are expected to produce and to take part in farm activities to bring in food.

The U.S. Anti-War Movement

Q. (After about half an hour of U. S.

and Canadian discussion of the DRV delegates' question, "What are your main prob 1ems ? ") In the U. S. A." there

Q. Are there women who do not want to

enter into the structure of the famiZy and have chiZd:roen~ and are they :roespect ed?
A. (South Vietnam) No, this is not generally true, but because they are so busy fighting and working, women cannot gi ve bi rth to as many children as they would wish. Moreover, because a woman cannot be as active in community life if she has too many children, we limit the number of children a woman may have and encourage women to marry later.

is disunity between the severaZ kinds of anti-war groups~ revoZutionazy groups~ and oppressed groups (Third World peopZes~ unemployed~ poor peopZe" youth~ women's gr-oups) who are strug gling for survival 01' for the improve ment of their conditions. We can't find a basis for unity but we feeZ we shouZd. What is your opinion?
A. (After an hour of private consulta tion within the DRV delegation. Similar answers were given independently by the Laotians and the South Vietnamese.) You have raised the single-issue versus the multi-issue question, to use American terminology. This is our response.

n my country we are suppresse not by men but by the system. That is why we need and wish to relate men in our struggles.
Q.. A:r>e maZe and femaZe chiZdren treat

issues, only the single issue struggle against imperialism. The U.S. administration's aggression has caused suffering not only to the Indochinese people but to the American people. The U.S. imperialists are not our enemies only. They also use the American youth as cannon fodder. Many American families have suffered losses and people are mourning in the U.S.A. The U.S. government has wasted a lot of people and money, and economic and other crises have resulted from the war. The position of the U.S. in the world is declining. Its prestige is very low now, and its honor blemished. We are concerned that the U.S. administration
17

!.

ed differentZy?

b~t

No, this happened in feudal times not now. However, we think that little boys should act like little boys, and little girls like little girls. For example, I bought some toys for my children and I bought a ball for the boy and a doll for the girl.
AZgeYia~ do you think that women wiZZ return to traditionaZ r-oZes after the revoZution is over?

Q. As in

!.

(South Vietnam) No, we think not.

has dishonored the American people. The suffering of both our peoples is stressed by us. Our duty as Indochinese is to fight against aggression. The American people have the task, for their own sakes, to work to stop the war in Indochina. That is the work of the American people. Our two peoples are struggling for their own interests. The two struggles are closely interrelated, the one with the other, and the two can help each other. We and you have to struggle in different ways, but we must both ask: WHO IS THE MAIN ENEMY? and WHO IS CAUSING THE MAIN SUFFERING? Our common enemy is the United States administra tion. In the past the U.S. anti-war movement has had a very big success. It was instrumental in stopping the

of the present nature of American suffering results from the war in Indo china. You can therefore combine the multi-issues in the single issue. Johnson promised you the Great Society, but he could not deliver it because of the war. The Indochinese people are strug gling for their countries. The U.S. people are struggling for their life, liberty and honor, as in the time of Lincoln, a time that we greatly respect.

Q. But U.S. imperialism is involved not

only in Im30china, but throughout much of the wopZd and heI'e at home. It seems that onZy a socialist revolution can put a stop to imperialism.
A. To this we would say that our revolution has been a very long process. We could say i t dates from 1880, and is not yet completed. A revolution is a long and hard task, not an easy task.

bombing of the DRV in 1968, and in the withdrawal from Cambodia in 1970. Nixon is afraid of the anti-war movement be cause it forces him to ponder his strat egies. Yet Nixon will find every way to deceive you. Therefore you must be vigilant and you must strike hard. Our two struggles cannot be replaced, the one by the other, but together we can be success ful. If the American people stop the war, this will decrease the suffering for both our peoples and raise your domestic struggles to a higher level. We under stand that racism, poverty and unemploy ment existed in America before the war and will continue after. Yet the war has greatly increased these conflicts; much 18

It requires struggle from generation to generation, in which children must be prepared for sacrifice. At present the American people have the capacity to mobilize broad unity in order to stop the war.

Q. What do you most need from us? A. We need three things: (1) Your demand that Nixon set a date before the end of 1971 for complete withdrawal of all troops, material and bombing from Indochina. (2) All forms of political work towards this end. (3) MOney, medical supplies and clothing; we can especially use more medical supplies from Canada. These may be sent to the PRG Information Bureau, Box 315101, 24 Stockholm, Sweden.

Q. Many aativities are being planned for

the Spring offensive in the U.S.A. Where is it most effeative to put our energies?
A. (Laos) If we want to reach success in a struggle we must use many methods at the same time. All our actions must be going on continuously. And our actions must move from a low level to a high level. We must also be prepared for all the struggles to take a long time. Actions must go on, but the results may not be seen for a long time. In the past we have followed anti war activities in Canada and the U.S.A. We have taken note of the demonstra tions, petitions, and many other actions. They all help in our struggle against U.S. aggression. The most important thing is to mobilize larger forces to undertake these actions. If we are larg er and more united, we can achieve greater success. We need unity and

Education is very important, explaining to more people how their sufferings are linked with the war , and educating by example. Especially G.I.'s and G.I. families - draft resistance and desertion are very good contributions. Spread the slogan, "Don't go to Viet nam". If they refuse to go, no prison is big enough to hold them. Then, help support their families. Break down the military machine - try to persuade people to stop war production. Let G. I. 's in Indochina know about the movement. They have been told that if they desert to our side, we will kill them. Let them know that the Indochinese policy is to protect them if they desert, and, if they wish not to stay with us, to send them to a foreign country such as Sweden. Veterans and returned pressmen should be encouraged to let the Amer ican people know what is happening. Send

solidarity between the many groups. (DRV) The stronger the action, the more effective, and that means large participation. As Ho Chi Minh said, "Unity, unity, larger unity; success, success, bigger success." The greater the difficulties, the broader must be the force in order to defeat the enemy. The more we consoli date, the more we weaken and divide the enemy. The People's Peace Treaty (which many signed at the conference) is an example. In itself it is only words. If it strengthens th~ movement it is good; it is not good if it weakens and divides the movement. You must find out.

delegations to Indochina to find out. Legal struggles are especially valuable if they increase the movement, as they bring on less repression. A large mobilization on April 24 will be very valuable, and all groups should cooperate provided their demand is total withdrawal. These are not all the specifics - we can't tell you those - but any activity that enlarges the movement.

Q.

Db you see a plaae for revolutionay.y violenae in the anti-war movement in the U.S.A.?

A. (Laos) The struggle in each country mus t be based on an unders tanding of that country. In general we begin by political struggle, moving from low level to high level.

We see that in the developed capi t alist countries there is an apparatus of repression to annihilate popular movements of struggle, in order to pro tect the capitalist system. Therefore many political methods are necessary. If you use only one method, you cannot make them give up their power. In Laos, the Lao Patriotic Front educates and does political work, but it also arms the people. The choice between the use of political or armed struggle, or both, depends on the con sciousness of the people and the nation al and international situations. To make a revolution victorious we must have a just line and a just leadership, an armed force, and a large united front. As for the Lao Patriotic Front, we have a base area in our liberated zone. Everything comes from

Revolutionary force is in two parts: (1) political force and (2) armed force. When we say political force we refer to the consciousness of people; they participate in strug gle. The majority of people do strug gle when they become conscious of the aim. They are determined to struggle, ready to sacrifice thei r life to reach the common goal. You need this political force of people always on the offensive. The force must be large and strong, of people determined and courageous, who can take repression. When one is killed or jailed, another takes the place. Our best example is women in the puppet zones of South Vietnam, what the Americans called the "long-haired army". Such women don't use arms, but they do a great deal. They carry the wounded to

the people. Our struggle is based on the experience of other countries, as well as our own. (DRV) The primary thing is the welfare and support of the people. Always do something that gains sup port. It is not good to destroy some thing if it alienates people, and not good to kill unless we must. Don't launch battle unless it is necessary. You must have support. Try to avoid violence; think of the lives of the people. Instead, try to stop war industry production, and work among the G.I.'s. If there are no soldiers and no guns, there can be no war.
20

towns and demand treatment for them, mobilize demonstrations, and talk to the puppet troops, persuading them not to fight. Political force is very necessary in the U.S. movement. In our struggle we Indochinese have to fight militarily. We need military force to drive out the aggres sors and take the power. In different stages of struggle, sometimes political force is to the forefront, sometimes military force. But always military force must be combined with political force. Our military comes from the people and needs the support and guid ance of the people. Its duty is to the

people. The NLF operates always with

the support of the people.
Isolation in the fight is very
dangerous
We say to you: Be patient. Be
flexible. Be vigilant. And wage a
persistent struggle.

dred and nine cases were tried for refusal to join battle. In Cambodia, soldiers of the 3rd battalion, 4th division, have refused to fight, saying, "We were deceived by Nixon" . Black G. 1. 's have a slogan - "Our war is back home, not here." Soldiers make it hard for officers to command them; therefore, increasingly, officers take a flexible attitude toward soldiers. Most people killed on the battle field are draftees, not volunteers. G.l.'s in the field look forward to news of the anti-War movement. One pilot who was shot down in Laos complained, "We were forced to fight." Revolutionary Processes in Indochina

Q. Should revolutionaries form alliances

with non-revolutiona~ and non-p~gres sive forces to oppose the war? If so 3 how?
A. (DRV): The main question is unity for the common goal - END THE WAR. The more people the better. Divide the enemy - get them fighting among them selves. Exploit to the utmost the splits in the ruling class. Isolate the Nixon administration. Work even with Senators any people - who are willing to end the war. You do not have to decrease your main objective because of their presence

with you.

Q. What is the relationship of your

Q. Can you tell us something about our

C. I. 's in Indochina?
A. (South Vietnam) We know that an unduly large proportion of G.I. 's are "colored", pe rhaps 40 percent, and that "colored" G.I.'s are sent to dangerous situations and don't get many promotions. We don't know the exact numbers by national minority, among the "colored" G.l.' s. Anti-war feeling is increasing among the G.l. 's, especially black G.l. 'so During 1970 at least 500 G.l.'s refused to go into battle, many of them black G.I. 'so In September 1970, near Saigon, 30 G.l. 's refused battle. Five of them were hanged from helicopters. One hun-

national minorities to the revolutionary movement?

A. (Laos): The popul ation 0 f Laos is quite small - about 3 million. The three main ethnic groups are the Lao Lum people of the plains, the Lao Theung of the plateau, and the Lao Xung in the mountains. 8 In general these peoples have united in a community of struggle against the imperialists. Both the French and the U.S. imper ialists tried to carry out a policy of "divide and rule". They gave special importance to the Meo minority (the largest of the Lao Xung tribes), making use of'the Meo as a force of aggression. Meo people are trained and equipped as

21

Special Forces under American advisers; the Special Forces number about 24,000. However, in the course of their attacks on the liberated zone they have sustain ed great losses. That is why they are now forcing 13 to 15 year olds to enroll. Young men pay the chief of their tribe to try to escape taking part in attacks on the liberated zone. In the liberated zone we have placed great emphasis on education for the minorities, and literacy has increased very greatly among them. We have set up 24 schools for minority Children. Out of 160 villages, 15 villages of Lao Xung, including Meo, now have no illiteracy at all. (South Vietnam) In South Vietnam we have 30 national minorities, from 45 villages. During the U.S. occupa tion they have been herded into one place, given poor food, and deprived

an extremely important part in the struggle. Minority people were crucial in the victory at Dien Bien Phu. During the revolution minority people built roads, buried ammunition, and partici pated in every way, so the victory was heavily dependent on minority support. Today, tribal areas are autonomous regions; they elect their own govern ments. Economic construction is going on and there is rapid advancement. In general we have been able to develop deep feelings of affection between the minority and majority populations.

Q. What is meant by a United Front, and how did you form one?
A. (Laos) Our first Front was composed of those who left their families in order to fight the French. It was rather limited. Still, during this time the French imperialists suffered a great setback.

of their means of production. The NLF makes the demand that they be returned to their tribal homes. Their area has been very badly destroyed by the U. S. forces. On one occasion, in three hours, U.S. aircraft killed 350 tribal people and injured thousands of others. The U.S. policy on minorities is the same in Vietnam as in Laos - misusing the minorities. However, we are able to overcome the minorities' problems and to unite all in the struggle for free dom. We educate the minorities about the U.S. policies of divide and rule. (DRV) The base of our revolution
against the French was among the minor
ities in the mountains and they played

22

Then.the Americans came. In the face of this enemy which is the leader of all the imperialists, it was necessary to build a broader front. That is why, in 1956, we formed the Neo Lao Haksat or Lao Patriotic Front. This front contains all the religious creeds and several political parties. Its slogan is "Peace and Neutrality". .. We recognize that there are many tendencies within the opposing forces. We try to win the support of those who are hesitating, who are not die-hard counterrevolutionaries. We distinguish between those who are patriotic and those who are total sell-outs to imperialism. Souvanna Phouma is a concrete example.

..

We are against him. But if he said a single word indicating he would settle the Lao question by political means, we would agree to that. However, al th.ough he said he would work for peace and neutrality, in reality he has sold himself to U.S. imperialism. The policy of the United Front in Laos is to win more supporters and isolate the administration. It is a tactical policy, a policy of increasing our friends and decreasing the enemy. We do not fight everyone at the same time. We choose the most fierce, and by th~s way we can preserve our strength. .. In Laos almost all the people are Buddhists. The Lao Patriotic Front follows a policy of free religion. There are about 6,000 priests in the liberated zone. They have their own organizations, and there are Buddhist representatives and those of other

robes in order to do propaganda ... The main things in our struggle have beer. clear-sigh ted leadership, a strong rear, and strong armed forces. We use our rear base to consolidate our armed forces. The more we can consolidate the liberated zone, the fas ter we can advance to liberty. We make different demands and use different slogans in the puppet areas from those in the liberated zones, in order to organize people better. For example, we demand that the puppet administration bring home women's husbands, ameliorate living conditions, build schools, and raise the wages of government servants. (Subordinate question): How db you
~solve class-chauvinism in organizing? For example~ the bourgeoisie is an exploiting class~ but the proletariat

religious groups in the Central Committee of the LPF. Many pagodas have been bombed by the U.S. and so the Buddhists sympathize with the LPF. The LPF repre sents the Buddhis ts and helps to re build the pagodas. The priests don't fight, but they help in the struggle by teaching. In the u.S. zone, however, priests are used as tools in the psychological war, and they falsify religiOUS doc trine. The pagodas are made places of pleasure. They have printed a religious study to falsify religious doctrine in order to mislead the people, and they divide people between religions. CIA representatives even wear priests'

is exploi ted.
A. We do say that some only from the exploiting class will agree to end their exploitation and join the revolu tionary forces. The question of bour geoisie versus proletariat is not prominent in Laos, which is an agricultural country. The liberated zone is in the countryside, and there are not many factories. In general our policy is to unite everyone who will go with the revolution voluntarily at any given stage. (DRV) To carry out our revolution, we had to be strong, we had to be a force. Therefore, we had to have a party.

23

To get a broad front we had to unite the peas ants and the working class. The working class was most oppressed, so they were more revolutionary; the peasants also were a very oppressed class. These strong forces created a strong revolutionary army. Under the French the intellectuals and many land lords and capitalists were also oppres sed; therefore we embraced them into the Front. At each stage of the struggle we have to have a main objective and fight for it. In Vietnam, the first stage is to form a front against the imperialists. The second stage, after the imperialists are expelled, is the Fatherland Front to carry out the socialist revolution, com posed of all those who agree with social ism. At each stage we can change the makeup of the front to embrace all who support the main objective.

restricted their exploitation. During the struggle our government decreed 8 new rent law. Formerly the peasant gave two-thirds of the crop to the landlord. Under the new law, the peasant kept two-thirds. We have to educate the land lords. It is not an easy job. During the process of education, they agree to work as peasants. As the revolution succeeds, most become "resis tance land lords", agreeing to complete equality with the peasants. The main point is that we have to raise people's positive sides - especially their patriotism. Thus we unite with them while carrying on the "inner struggle". The purpose of building a front is to reach a common goal. Those who agree with our goal we accept; those who don't, we don't. Then there are those who do not yet know the aim of the struggle. We have to educate them step by step, and

~.

j j

, ~}k .. iJ
when they agree with our common goal we receive them into the Front. If they can agree with us on some main point in order to reach our goal, we can move together with them.

The Front embraces all the polit ical parties, religious creeds and ethnic groups who support the ongoing revolution. Besides the creation of the Front, we make use of the contradictions within the enemy.

Q. How do you resolve the contradiction

An example of how we operate the
Front. During the resistance against the French imperialists, our Front was the Viet Minh. Landlords were in this front. Yet landlords oppress peasants, and peasants are the main force of the revolution. The interests of the classes contradict each other. But one point was agreed upon - independence and patriotism. We accepted the landlords because they wanted to fight against the French. At the same time, we
24

between working W1.derground and building a mass base? Between legal and illegal struggles?
A. In Vietnam, because of the machinery of spying and repression, the nature of the enemy, we have to work underground. We use both open methods (legal) and closed methods (illegal). In both cases we use the methods that can mobilize the masses. For example, after the French

repression came we met in separate groups, sewing groups, sporting groups, drama groups, etc., in order to educate each other. First, we demanded the daily interests of the people: shorter hours in factories, more schools, hospitals, higher wages, freedom of the press. All these struggles were legal and con formed to the interests of the people. Step by step, people participated more and more until it became a question of the final goal - how to take the power. Wherever we can we use legal methods to organize people, while keeping in reserve the "hidden forces". Our lead ers in particular work underground. Protecting the revolutionary forces is very, very important. To do this we must have the support of the masses, to hide the forces and weapons and those who lead the struggle. If the government has a democratic

Cadres are anonymous - they don't stand out. One can know the leader by what he wears, how he touches his ear, his hair-style, etc. The enemy can't discover who the leaders are. We hold our meetings in darkness. You can hear the speaker but not see his face. If i t is a multi-struggle, the cadres have no need to show their faces. One's discre tion makes one more valuable in revolu tion. The work of the cadre is to educate people not to be afraid. For example, under the French repression women were at first afraid to demonstrate. Women ~adres helped them to get over their fears. Cadres work especially among the poor. They must know the people's suffer ing, and organize to aid and resist. Rich people can also be organized and be patriotic, but to work with the poor one

law, we make use of this law. For example, under the French we launched a struggle in the National Assembly, and demanded more schools, hospitals and democratic rights.

must live as the poor. Different groups can undertake different tasks, according to their ability and desires. For example, differ ent people go to pagodas, churches, to make clothes, and to aid pregnant women. Gradually they educate people, raise their consciousness. Step by step they draw them into activity according to their interes ts - to run schools, build new roads, and so on. At all times they must attend to the daily needs of the masses; then they can lead them in strug gle and develop a large number of cadres. We choose those with higher consciousness, to give them new tasks.

Q. HOU) is your aadre system organized? How does it funation~ organize groUPS3 eta.? A. While working underground we divide into groups. Each group knows their own members, and each has a leader. Between two groups, only two people know each other and make decisions. In this way spies can uncover only the one group. In South Vietnam we have organized demonstrations of 100,000 people, through such groups.

25

Cadres are chosen according to their ability, and given tasks suitable to their age and sex. Propaganda work is especially good for the young. The youth are a shock-force. Cadres above all mus t be cautious and vigilant. Under the French we b egan our s t rug gle in the high plateau, among the minority people. They sharpened their teeth,'had different customs from us. Ho Chi Minh had returned after 20 years abroad. We began there because the minorities were most oppressed and willing to struggle. The first step was to let them know who their enemy was, why they were poor, oppressed. Oppres sion was everywhere; that was why the minorities joined with us to defeat the enemy. Our cadres had to live entirely as they did.

experiences and realms of struggle of North American "movement" women. Voice of Women and Women Strike for Peace represent mainly older, middle class, white, liberal anti-war tenden cies. VOW national officers were inval uable in obtaining the visas of the Indochinese guests and accompanying them on their tour, and individual VOW/WISP women performed feats of coor dination and service work. VOW and WISP opened their conference to other dele gates and invited men and women represen tatives of anti-war, labor union and poor people's groups. These meetings were, however, rather poorly attended. The strength of VOW/WISP women was their orderliness and the fact that they never forgot the goal of the conference working to end the war - which some delegates in Women's Liberation seemed to find hard to remember.

One thing is clear: the oppressed join the revolution because the revolu tion will change their life. Cadres must make the masses love them. This is a question of principle. If the masses love the cadres, they will listen to what they say and give them protection. That is why one must be exemplary. One must be exemplary in sacrifices. One must be the first to give one's life, and the last to get rewards . The North American Delegates In contrast to the Indochinese, American and Canadian delegates showed much disunity, reflecting the different 26

Third World women presented a different outlook on the world. Frankly revolutionary, bringing with them an acute sense of day-to-day oppression, most of the Third World groups gave an impression of internal unity, discipline and political seriousness. These qualities, as some of them pointed out, came from their sense that, like the Indochinese, they are struggling for their physical survival and their survival as peoples. Their experiences of racism, together with their concern to preserve their own unity, seemed to make many Third World women mistrust the white delegates and find it hard to socialize with them. At least part of this mistrust was, I think, justified by the anti-war and Women's Liberation groups' earlier

failure to give a central place to Third World women in the conference until they were directly challenged to do so. Nevertheless, bridges were built and good relations es tablished between some white and Third World groups and delegates. Women's Liberation delegates were the most disparate and disorganized. In part this may have resulted from the varying class backgrounds of participants. Delegates, mostly in their teens and twenties, included women on Welfare and clerical and industrial workers as well as students, teachers, and others from professional occupations. More disorgan izing, perhaps, was the ultra-democracy prevalent in much of the white North American Left and the failure of many members to recognize the need for leadership, organization, and conven tions of public as distinct from

tered as women by associating only with women and, as far as possible, avoid ing all forms of institutionalized power or authority. The immediate con cerns of these women were the most re mote from those of the Indochinese. (b) "Anti-imperialist" women see women's issues as part of a larger strug gle against capitalism and imperialism to achieve some form of socialism. These women are divided on tactics, though not antagonistically. Some think the most important work for women can go on in women's gro ups 0 rganized main ly around women's problems such as day care for children, abortion, birth control, women's legal rights and women's employment. Others, like most of the Third World delegates, work chiefly in organizations of both men and women. The most painful conflicts among the socialist women were sectarian ones,

small-group behavior. What emerged is that Women's Libera tion is not presently a political move ment but a collection of local groups. These are linked by concern for discrimination against women, but divided in goals and beliefs. Three main groups appeared: (a) "Radical feminists", including some but not all radical Lesbians, be lieve that the oppression of women is the main oppression in western (or perhaps in all) societies. Apart from female equality, it was not clear what goals these women sought in society at large. They seemed to be trying to solve the problems they had personally encoun

especially between Marxist tendencies. (c) Many delegates had joined women's, poor people's, or other special-issue groups out of a sense of oppression and a need to struggle for particular reforms, or else did not belong to an organiza tion but had been invited in order that as broad a range of women as possible might meet the Indochinese. Most of these women had not yet placed their concerns in a broader perspective, and some were bewildered and alienated by the ideological conflicts they met. Cross-cutting their awn divisions, most Canadian delegates shared a sense that, in their ardor to claim identifi cation with the Indochinese, many U.S. 27

delegates forgot that they were guests in a foreign country. Phrases like "Welcome to our country"9 and "In this country, we " grated on Canadians, who are becomingly increasingly alert to U.S. imperialism in Canada. But in gener al, the serious purpose of the confer ence and the friendship generated by it overrode such feelings. Despite the disunity, there was a widespread .longing for unity and for clarification of goals. The fact that this conference took place twenty miles north of the border, amid fear of repression, and that such diverse groups completed their work success fully, was a great achievement. Women came to learn about the Indochinese and hO\-1 they look at the world. They did learn, and few can have left with out feeling strengthened in their re solve to end the war. Viewed from here,

on April 6th, and an open plenary at UBC on April 2nd. 3. Voice of Women and Women Strike for Peace sponsored a successful but much smaller conference with Vietnamese women in 1969. The 1971 conference was first proposed by American members of Women's Liberation groups, who asked VOW/WISP women to help them to make the arrange ments. Women of Third World organiza tions requested a separate conference on the grounds that they had not been consulted, even though their communities bear the brunt of American imperialism within the U.S.A. and are foremost in the struggle against it. Third World delegates included, among others, members of Los Siete de la Raza, the Soledad and Angela Davis Defense Committees, Los Angeles Asian Involvement, San Francisco Red Guards, and Native Canadian and Chinese Youth Associations in Vancouve~. A message of solidarity from Angela Davis

the size, determination and courage of the U.S. Spring demonstrations suggest that the goal is attainable. Vancouver, B. C. May 1971. NOTES 1. Press statement by the Indo chinese, March 31st. 2. The UBC [University of British Columbia] Student Union provided con ference rooms free of charge, and the Student Unions of Simon Fraser Univer sity and Vancouver City College helped to finance the conference. Teach-ins took place at the latter two colleges
28

was read to the conference. 4. See Wilfred Burchett, The Second Indochina War, International Publishers, 1970, pp. 151-155, for references to Quinim Pholsena and his death. Jacques Decornoy mentions Khemphet Pholsena in "Laos: the Forgotten War", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, April-July 1970, p. 21. 5. Part of the information given is contained in The Indochina Story (Commit tee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Bantam, 1970), which was sold at the conference and which the Indochinese much appreciate. 6. Press conference, March 31st. 7. Unfortunately, workshop discus sions, unlike the personal stories and public meetings, were not taped. I

have reconstructed workshop discussions from extensive notes by several people, but they are not transcribed verbatim. The Canadian press reported that workshops in Toronto had been closed for security reasons. This was untrue in Vancouver and I suspect in Toronto as well. VOW/WISP workshops were open. Third World workshops were open to non-white men and women but closed to white people because Third World women lacked the time and space for the large numbers of white people who would have wished to attend their sessions. Women's Liberation workshops were open only to regional delegates, whose number had been restricted in advance to 200 because of billeting problems and be cause of the wish to keep workshops of manageable size. Personal security was provided for the Indochinese by groups organized by Third World women,

people form about 8 percent of the

population.
9. Spoken by a California delegate who greeted the Indochinese at the opening of the Women's Liberation con ference.

FOUR POINTS AND ONE QUESTION FOR THE AMERICAN ANTI-t~AR MOVEMENT FROM THE P. R. G. The following important points emerged from a July meeting between representa tives of the Provisional Revolutionary .Government of South Vietnam and the CCAS delegation visiting China. We would like to pass them on for the consideration and action of others working to end the war and American involvement in Indochina. 1. Following a lengthy discussion of the U.s. peace movement including analysis of its splits and divisions, the Vietnamese reiterated one over riding theme, "unify, unify, unify." 2. Study the Pentagon Papers in order to gain a deepened understanding of the history of the American aggres sion in Vietnam. 3. Study the PRG's July Seven-Point Peace Proposal and understand its sig nificance in the light of the present stage of the struggle. 4. Learn from the anti-war GI's. They have been there, they have seen the war crimes. They understand the horrors of the war and their understanding leads them to oppose the war in creative ways. Following the lengthy and cordial dis cuss ion, one member of the Vietnamese delegation told the group that in dis cussing the war with many visiting delegations, he had repeatedly asked a single question. "I'll ask it to you," he said, "in hope of getting a response. For the answer would not only end the war but greatly increase the under standing between our t\-'D peoples." His question was this: HOW CAN A S~LL
COUNTRY DEFEA:r A BIG COUNTRY? HOW CAN A WEAK COUNTRY DEFEAT A STRONG COUNTRY?

and separately by the Vancouver police. Workshops groups were divided among the different delegations from Indochina. Where two national delegations are re ported as answering the same question, these answers were taken from separate workshop reports. They were not, there fore, part of the same discussion and did not influence each other. 8. See Burchett, The Second Indo china War, pp. 88-95. Burchett esti mates the Lao Lurn plains dwellers at about one million. They comprise the peasants, artisans, nobles and literati of the Laotian kingdom. The Lao Theung and Lao Xung comprise some 30 different tribes. In Vietnam and Cambodia tribes-

29

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--~-~-------------

lalerview wilh Chou En-Iai

COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS FRIENDSHIP DELEGATION TO CHINA

This text is a transcript of tape recordings made by members of the CCAS Friend ship Delegation to China during their four-hour interview with Premier Chou En-lai on July 19th, 1971, in the Great Hall of the People, Peking. It is as full and complete as possible given the condition of our tapes, which had inaudible words and sentences. Some sections or words were difficult to distinguish: our reconstruction of them was part memory, part guesswork, part translation of the C!l:Lnese when this was audible and the English translation was not.

As for the statements made by Chou En-lai, they are clearly not an official, formal statement of the position of the Chinese government. The interview took place in a relaxed atmosphere of free exchange of views. As Premier Chou En-Iai himself points out, there is lots of room for error and misquotation in an interview of this nature. "Maybe I will say something wrong, or the interpreter might interpret wrong". Therefore, as Premier Chou En-lai expressly stated in the interview: "If you are going to show your recordings when you get back to the United States, you must make a statement at the beginning and say there are bound to be some wrong statements in this recording". CCAS urges that any reference to this transcript con tain mention of these qualifications.
It was clear to us from our extraordinarily warm and friendly reception in China at all levels that the Chinese government and people are very interested in starting what Premier Olou En-lai called "a free exchange of views" with the American people. Rather than simply publishing our own views and interpretations of this interview, we wanted to let Premier Olou En-lai speak for himself directly to the people of the United States. This is not a "classified document." The following transcript is issued by Pacific News Service on behalf of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars.

Members of the Delegation: Anthony Garavente, U.C.L.A. Jean Garavente, Univ. of Washington Kay Johnson, Univ. of Wisconsin (Madison) Dorothy Kehl, Hong Kong Frank Kehl, Columbia University Ann Kruze, Cleveland State University Uldis Kruze, Indiana University Ken Levin, Univ. of Wisconsin (Uadison) Paul Levine, Univ. of Calif. (Berkeley) Paul Pickowicz, Univ. of l.Jisconsin Oiadison) Susan Shirk, H.I.T. Raymond Whitehead, Columbia University Pnea Whitehead, Hong Kong Judy Woodard, Chinese University, (Hong Kong) Kim Woodard, Stanford University 31

Chou: I think there is also a friend of Chinese origin among you. Copies of the tape recordings of this interview are available. Contact Pacific News Service, at 9 Sutter St., #300, San Francis co, CA 94104. 415-986-5690. Dorothy: I'm Cantonese from Kwangtung, but I grew up in Hong Kong. Chou: When did you go to Hong Kong? Dorothy: When I was five. [Chou En-lai is introducing Yao Wen-yuan and Chang 01' un-Ch ' iao] Chou: Both of them have been elected members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee during the 9th Con gress. Comrade Olang 01' un Ch' iao is advice leader of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of Olina. Comrade Yao Wen yuan is also a member of the group. You asked me about the January Revolution of Shanghai and they two are both mem bers of the January revolution of 1967. Because half of their time is spent working in the Central Committee, when you were in Shanghai they were not there, and were not able to have discussions with you. We heard that you would like to meet Comrade Chiang Ch'ing, and she asked me to give you her apology on her behalf because she is not feeling well these few days and she will not be able to come here tonight. She also sends her regards to you. If any of you want to take photo graphs, it's all right. We welcome you. It's a rare oppo.rtu~ity for us to bE!: able to meet so many young American friends. We hear that you are a young generation of scholars. You have all spent some time in Hong Kong, I believe. Did you all go there at the same time? Kay: There are great differences in the time we have spent in Hong Kong. There are some people who have been there for ten years, and some people only for six months. The majority have lived in Hong Kong for about eight months. 32 Chou: Have you ever gone back to your native area? Dorothy: Yes, I went back to my grand mother's hometown, Taishan, for a while. Chou: Taishan people play very good volleyball. We have heard you have said that you think that the present youth movement in the United States is similar to the May Fourth Movement in China, at the present stage. I was also a parti cipant in the May Fourth Movement and meeting you it seems that I have gone back 54 years -- 52 years. But I don't think it's exactly the same. Perhaps you also have a bit of the Red Guard Movement of China in your movement now. So you have something of both eras. Is that so? Kay: I think that's very good analysis. Chou: I heard that you're the liaison officer. And during the May Fourth Move ment in China we also liked to pick young women to be our leaders. There were a lot of instances like that. For instance, my wife, Comrade Teng Ying ch' ao, has done that work. At that time she was only 15. You see at that time, we had a majority of middle school stu dents in the" movement and the college students were only a minority, and now you are all college graduates. Therefore you have entered the Red Guard period. We will have to ask these two comrades to tell you something about the Red Guard movement. The Red Guards called themselves members of the 'ser vice committee', or members of the 'general service committee'. It is also a Red Guard trend of thought that they don't like to be called 'minister' or 'section head' or 'director'. They like

to think that's all bureaucratic and therefore we must do away with the Bureau cratic structure and call ourselves 'service personnel' of the people. And I think that you also have the same idea. We also see that now some of the men wear their hair long and also grow beards to express their dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. There are two men here with large beards. There are not many with long hair. What is your name? Paul: Pickowicz. Chou: During the May Fourth Movement there was a situation which was opposite from your recent situation. That is, there were girls who shaved their heads. During the May Fourth Movement there was also a girl who took part in the movement who was from the Huei nation ality. Her name was Kuo Tung-chen. She sacrificed her life during the civil war period of 1927-37 and she at that time shaved her head clean - during the May Fourth Movement - to express dissatisfaction. During the Red Guard movement there was a differ ent trend. At that time they liked to wear coarse clothes, army uniforms, and armbands, and also clothes that were pat ched that had as many patches as possible. I heard that you were asking why people weren't wearing the colorful cloth produced in the textile mills. It is because it is the custom today to live simply and therefore people like to wear simple clothes, and also as a symbol of discipline. In order to provide a symbol of learning from the PLA, people like to wear army uni forms. And the style of simplicity is also in opposition to bourgeois degra dation. There is a lady here, Comrade Hsieh Ching-yi. Ask her to sit in the front because there happens to be an empty seat. And she works in one of the offices of the Central Committee. She is also a staff member working under the Central Committee. She has been working there for 19 years now. Her name "is Hsieh Ching-yL Perhaps you know he~. She is quite young. Have you met.h~r?

Kay: No. Paul: We haven't met her. Chou: She also likes to learn from the PLA and she likes to wear an army uni form very much, so finally she was issued one. Now she has been welcomed to join the PLA. At the very beginning she was in the army, and then she became a civilian, and now she is ~elcomed back in the army again. You haven't met her. If some of the women would like to learn about the equality in political life between men and women in China, you can have some talks with her. She took part in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and she also made a contribution. She went to a factory to support the left and in the factory she participated in the work to bring about the great alliance. It is a well known printing shop. Perhaps some of your friends might know it. It is the Hsinhua Printing Factory. And then she went to Chinghua University to persuade the students to cease their fighting. Have you heard about that? Have you been to Chinghua University? Group: No, we have been to Peking University. Chou: Thus you know Professor Chou p'ei Yuan and Professor Chou Yi-liang. Both of them have the same surname as I do.
And also comrade Chih Ch'un, also from
Chinghua University, and also from the
PLA. Perhaps you are not so familiar
with the army -- the PLA.
Group: No.
Chou: Have you visited it?
Group: No, we still haven't.
Chou: Then you can visit it; you still
have two days. What about going to
see one [an army unit] before you leave.
I will ask these two comrades to accom
pany you -- one man and one woman.
Group: Good. 33

I ,

I I ,
~

. '~

\
Chou: We fully agree with your op1n1on that you should go among the masses. There is not much to talk about with us [laughter] -- just the same old issues. And once you read the news papers you will see that what Mr. Chou En-lai says has all been printed in the newspapers [laughter] and to listen to it is nauseating. [laughter] Isn't that so? And I support that idea of yours. For instance, you have all been taken to either factories or peoples' conmunes or schools and other people have already been to them. And when you go back you will say "All the news about those places has already been printed in the Hong Kong newspapers -- what interest is there in our reporting about the same things?" I believe it was a lady among you who expressed such feelings. Comrade Hsi: Mrs. Woodard. [laughter] Chou: I believe it and I thank you. And I was happy when I read that statement. That's the right way to do things - criticize us. It is also criticism for our Travel Bureau, and above them there is the Foreign Ministry. So your criti cism hit the right spot. [laughter] So we welcome very much this spiritual help from you. It is "rectifying wrong ideas". That is Chairman Mao's wording. It is not brainwashing, it is rectifying erroneous ideas. I haven't thought of away to wash one's brain yet. In a certain way I would also like to have my brain washed because I also have old ideas in my mind. I have already passed 73, how can it be said that I have no old ideas in my head, because I came over from the old society? Chou: For instance in the old society, I wore a braid, a pigtail. But, of course, you can't see it on me now, nor can you find the old photographs. And also now in China in all the cities and in the great and overwhelming majority of the countryside you can't see that phenomenon anymore. But I cannot dare tell you there is not one. For instance, the old custom of the people of Tibet was to wear their hair in braids. But of course the serfs in Tibet have al ready been liberated, and the old serf system, the aristocratic system, has been overthrown. The laboring people have come to power. But I can't say that there is not a single pigtail left as a manifestation of the old customs, because none of the 3 of us has been there to inspect on that fact as yet. So if you come on your next trip, or if other friends come to visit China and visit Tibet, and you find some person who is still wearing a pigtail, they can take a photograph of that and pub lish it to show that what I have said has not been entirely wrong. And another factor or phenomenon, that is there are a number of women whose feet were bound before. This is also a thing left over from the old society, the old system. For instance, my mother had her feet bound. Of course she passed away. So there are no people in Chinese society who have bound feet now? There still are. This seems a very new exper ience for foreign friends, for instance, our friends from the United States. For instance, if you want to take photo graphs of this, Chairman Mao has said you can take photographs of this. But naturally because that's a phenomenon which the old society should be held responsible for. We are not responsible for that phenomenon. We were the ones who overthrew the old society, the old system. Of course now after liberation we have been persuading people not to bind their feet but what about the old people, their feet have already been bound, and you cannot cut off their feet, nor can they be restored to the original shape because the bones were broken. There is no way to restore it. And if you did not bind the feet after they have been deformed to such a shape then the women would not be able to walk. And we cannot attempt to hide them all at home. If we attempted to do so, that would be a reactionary way of doing things. For instance my mother had bound feet. But if it were not for her, how would I have come to be? And my mother herself cannot be responsible for having her feet bound either; she was also sacrificed by the old society. So when foreign friends take pictures 35

I I r'

l ,

of such things, for instance bound feet, you must investigate to see from what position, from what point of view they conceive of doing so. For instance, if they say that this is something left over from the old system, from the old society, that this is a phenomenon, an old, bad phenomenon left over from the old society, even though the Chinese people have now won liberation and stood up, and they show the picture of bound feet, as a comparison of the old and new society, that is very good. The new society always grows up upon the basis of the old society. If there were not the old, where would the new come from? They are opposites, they are in opposition to each other. It's a dialec tical matter. If this is a philosophical question, I will have to ask these two comrades [Yao Wen-yuan; Chang Ch'un ch'iao]. [laughter] Who are there among you who would like to talk about phil osophy? Later on you can have your say. But I haven't finished yet. [laughter] The question arose from the taking of photographs. If you take photographs of this sort as comparison between the old and new society, that's one thing; for instance when you went to Canton I believe you saw a people's commune. The women there do not have bound feet. Their feet are very large and they go barefoot into the rice fields. They are very healthy and strong, isn't that so? And if you take two photographs, one of each phenomenon, wouldn't that be a comparison between the old and the new society? [to Dorothy Kehl] You're from Hsing Wei, you know that the women go barefoot and their feet are very large, and they carry things on their shoulders. That can serve as evidence. So Chairman Mao does not agree to not allowing people to take photographs. Since you're allowed to go to a place, why should't people be allowed to take photographs of what they see? There fore if any of you want to take photo graphs today you are welcome to do it. Please do so. And if any of you have taken any tape-recorders with you, you can also record the talk here if you want. Since we are meeting you, of course we will
36

speak freely. Maybe I will say something wrong here, or perhaps these other two comrades might say something wrong, or the interpreter might interpret wrong. It doesn't matter. It's a free exchange of views. People should be allowed to say wrong things, isn't that so? Other wise what is the need for exchange? If everyone had the same view, what would be the purpose of an exchange of views? And how would we be ab'le to act about these ideas? So if you are going to show your recordings when you get back to the United States, you must make a statement at the beginning and say there are bound to be some wrong statements in this recording. The Chinese premier also made some erroneous remarks. And the Chairman or the vice-chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee may also make mistakes. What matters is that we stand on the right position; we take the right position and we have the right views, and as for the concrete expression there might be some flaws. Of course we stand on the position of the stand of the proletariat, and you of course are clear about that. As for our views we do our utmost to see that they are in accordance with Marxism Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Perhaps they [pointing at Chang and Yao] are better at this aspect than I am. You say that the youth are better than the older generation. We also agree. We say that those who come later become better. I am much older th an they are, and I talk so much that there's bound to be a flaw, when you talk a lot. So its not a very favorable aspect to be a Premier at such an advanced age. But of course if I did not see you, you would probablY"raise the strongest protest. All right, don't let me be the only one to speak. And so the travel bureau should meet and discuss the two matters that I just now mentioned. They should let you see some places that other people haven't yet seen, isn't that right? And first of all we shall ask these two comrades here -- Comrade Hsieh Ching-yi and Comrade Chih Chun to organize you on a visit to see a PLA unit. That's the first matter. As to the second thing, you can take photo graphs. Of course you will do so from

a position of comparison of the old and new society. At the same time the present phenome na are also in the process of develop ment. There are some progressive aspects and there are also some backward aspects. You can see the two screens here are empty. Do you know why? Because in the past we had red slogans, red background and gold slogans on them, with some quo tations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung. And it was very irritating to the eye, and Chairman Mao did not like it. At the be ginning of the Cultural Revolution, there was a necessity to do so. There was a necessity to make it able for Chairman Mao Tse-tung's thought to be grasped by the broad masses of the people. And in this aspect the vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Comrade Lin Piao, has made a great contribution. He selected some of the best quotations of Chairman Mao and made them into a book of quota tions. At that time Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were opposed to the application of the study of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's thought. So at that time Comrade Lin Piao was the first to do so and to advocate the study of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's thought, and the book of quotations among the PLA. And as the Great Cultural Revolution rose up, the broad masses, the millions of the stu dents and the other sections of the people rose up to participate in the Cultural Revolution. And in the move ment, the overwhelming majority of the masses were able to grasp some of the crucial points of Chairman Mao"Tse-tung's thought in order to solve some of the problems at the time. But by now the Cultural Revolution has deepened; it is already five years since we began. We now call it the stage of struggle, criticism, and transformation, and the time has come for us to study in a deeper way Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse tung thought. And those who have had some education should very conscientious ly study the works of Marx, Lenin, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. And therefore these formalistic things should be cut down a little. And this matter was also written in an editorial in The People's

Daily [Jenmin Jihpao], the PLA paper [Chieh Fang Chun-pao], and Red Flag [Hung Chi]. Have you seen the editorial that was put out on the anniversary of the founding of the party, that was the first of July? And in the editorial the struggle between the two lines in the party from the beginning up to the pre sent day was very comprehensively dealt with in simple words. And from that editorial it can be seen why Chairman Mao Tse-tung has such a high prestige throughout the whole party, the whole people, and the whole army, and why we have been able to mobilize the broad laboring masses throughout the country, and also been able to unite with all the patriotic forces, to fight against the common enemy. The result was that we were able to overthrow the Chiang Kai-shek regime and to drive out the imperialistic forces, and then we established the new People's Republic of China. Chairman Mao is now leading us in the socialist revolution. I suggest that we now put forward questions to these two [pointing to Yao and Chang] on philosophical and literature and art problems, and we can talk at the end about political problems. [Group agrees.] Kay: I would like to say a word first, if I may. We are all most honored that you have taken the time to meet with us. The aim of our trip to China has been to further the friendship and under standing between the Chinese and American peoples. We feel that this meeting is certainly a significant contribution towards that end. We've been traveling in China for t~ree weeks now. We believe that our main task when we return to the United States is to communicate with the American people the tremendous achievements and progress that have been made by the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people. Chou: You must add something to that. You must say that there has been progress made, but there is still a lot to work on. Otherwise the viewpoint would not be complete, would not be an overall view. 37

Kay: But we believe, in that ..

res~onse

to

and we are lazy, and we sit at our desks

and read books, and that's why when we
start moving we get sick.
Chou: You can't be blamed because it is
a very difficult job to come to China,
see things, and take notes, and read
books, and then take them down and
write, and record it all.
Kim: After we came to China, we saw that
the health of the Chinese people was
very good, but heal th was a great
problem for us here, so we have been
eager at every chance to participate in
some labor, because we feel that this
woul d improve our own heal th.
Chou: Did you take part in some work
in Tachai? Didn't Comrade Ch'en Yung
kuei let you do some work?
Paul Levine: We hoed a row.
Jean: They told us we'd spoil the
crops. [laugh ter]
Chou: But have you been to the February
Seventh locomotive plant in Peking?
And did you do some work there?
Kay: We did some work in a commune in
Shanghai, and we picked some tomatoes.
Chou: That's the place that they
[pointing] two took are of, so they
took care of you there.
Kim: But we ate more than we picked.
Chou: That doen't matter. Wasn't it Mr.
Kruze who was going to put forward some
philosophical problems to these two
comrades here?
Yao: Probably when you contacted some
of the masses you probably asked, you
had some discussion with them about
philosophical problems.
Chou: And you also probably have read
some articles.
Uldis: Yes, this is true. I'm very inter
ested in the movement to study philoso
phy. I believe it has great significance,
not only for China, but also for the

Chou: There are also some phenomena which are in the process of moving from the lower to the higher stage. This is the way things develop. And also the standard of some things is being raised in the process of [consolidation ?]. If you only simply say that there has been progress, people won't believe you. Kay: We hope to get a complete and accu rate picture of China, and pass this on to the American people. We feel that this has not been done in the past, and that the American people do have a distorted picture of the Chinese people. We hope that we can give an accurate picture .. [inaudible] and that we can contribute in a small way to our main aim, which is to further the friendship between the Chinese and American people. Chou: Although the contribution which you make may be small at the beginning, its influence will gradually grow. And that's the way all new things develop. Kay: Before [we continue] we would like to say one thing with regard to our Chinese friends with China Travel Ser vice. I feel that we have been treated in a very good way and well taken care of, and it is us that have given them a great deal of trouble, and we hope [inaudible]. And they have worked very hard and gone out of their way [inaudi ble] Chou: We cannot do without troubling them at all, because the Red Guards hold even mope meetings. For instance, we three here met with the Red Guards many times in this Great Hall of the People. And each discussion could be held until dawn. So this cannot be called a trouble. And we should say that you weren't taken good care of because we heard that some of you fell ill. Kay: A minor problem. Chou: Which one of you fell ill? Kay: All of our problems in China have been small. It's because we don't do work,
38

American movement. I'm very interested in the way Marxism-Leninism is practically applied. So I've asked numerous questions about how people apply philosophy in their ordinary lives, and have gotten many answers on how Harxism-Leninism has direct application to their situation. Could I ask either Comrade Chang or Com rade Yao how they particularly study philosophy and how they apply it in their daily work? Chou: I'm going to follow you and take off my coat. Yao: I agree with your idea and your question. That is, that the universal truths of Harxism-Leninism must be com bined with concrete practice. And there are many among the workers, peasants, and the People's Liberation Army who have studied Harxism-Leninism in a much better way than we have. Because through their practice they have come to truly under stand the points and the views of Harx ism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought. They've also summed up their own experience that they have accumulated through their own practice and they have been able to relate these two things. In studying philosophy we study some philosophical works of Marx and Lenin. The aim in studying philosophy is to come to know the world and to transform the world. And in transforming the world there are two aspects: that is, to transform society, and also to transform one's own ideas. As you just now mentioned, "brainwashing," whether you call it "brainwashing" or the transformation of one's world outlook, what we are talking about is about the same, whatever you want to call it. That is, the transformation of one's own ideology. For instance, Chairman Mao Tse-tung put forward a thesis of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this is in itself also a very important philosophical problem. That is to say that in a socialist society there still exist classes, there still exist class contradictions, and there still exists class struggle. There exists the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and
40

also the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road. And personally it has taken me a gradual process to come to understand this ques tion. Throughout the whole process in the beginning of the Cultural Revolu tion and in the present stage of strug gle-criticism-transformation, this pro cess of understanding Chairman Mao's thesis of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat has never ceased. It is such a process, that is, to take part in the class struggle, to have some practice and then to go back to study Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works, and then to summarize one's positive and negative experience in this practice, and to transform; and that is one thing; and then to transform one's world outlook and then to come into contact with new probems, and then to solve them through practice again, and then to study Chairman Mao Tse tung's works again. This is a continuous process of understanding. This is a pro cess of cognition, throughout the whole process of the Cultural Revolution there is the struggle between the two lines, that is, the struggle between Chairman Mao Tse-tung' s revolutionary line and the revisionist line advocated by Liu Shao-ch'i; that is, the struggle between Marxism and revisionism. And there also is the struggle be tween the correct proletarian views and various erroneous views, various right or "leftist" tendencies. And all this in the final analysis is a question of one's world outlook, a question of philo sophy. And if one does not study dialect ical materialism and historical mater ialism in the gradual process, then one would not be albe to make distinctions, clear distinctions between true, genuine and fake Marxism, between Marxism and revisionism. And this is what we call "to study with problems in mind." And in my practice in the revolution the problems that I have come up against most are questions like the ones that I have just now stated, that is, ideologi cal ones. And as I just now said, that my study in this field has not been as good as the advanced elements of the workers, peasants, and PLA, and I

--

--------

should continue to learn from them. To study philosophy one must study the present situation, history, theory, and make the correct analysis and draw out the correct conclusions, and be able to find the laws guiding the development. And when the American friend, Mr. Edgar Snow, came to visit China, Chairman Mao Tse-tung talked with him, and he especial ly asked him if it was possible to go to a factory or a farm in the United States to investigate and study. He also put it very prudently: He said that this is also philosophy because we stand for dialectical materialism, that is, we stand for investigation and study. This view was opposed by Liu Shao-ch'i. So if when you come next time you will be able to tell us something about a factory or a farm or a school, whether it be a university or a high school in the United States, one of the basic units--if you would be able to dissect one of the basic units in the United States, we will be very grateful to you and we will be very happy to learn about these units. Chou: I would also like to ask something of you. I believe there are two among you who come from Harvard. Susan: I come from MIT, not Harvard, MIT. Chou: Isn't there one of you who teaches at Harvard? Group: No. Ray: Could I ask another philosophical question? Chou: You can. Ray: I would like to ask on the question of human nature. I've read some articles on this and I understand that there is a rejection of the theory of human nature as being a revisionist theory, but just now there was a comment about the trans formation of people's ideology, and my question is, is it possible for anyone, any human being, to have his ideology transformed, and if so, does this indi cate some kind of underlying human nature? Just a short simple answer will

be alright.

[laughter]

Yao: I can give you a very simple an swer in one sentence. I will refer you to read an article written by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, his speech at the Yenan Literature and Art Forum. The speech was made in 1942. There is a very long paragraph in the article specially on the question of human nature, and Chairman Mao expounded the theory there in a very detailed way, so it's a very long paragraph; I will refer it to you and give you an answer in a very short sentence. Because if we are going to discuss in detail here I be lieve that there will not be enough time today. And of course we still have a lot of opportunities to discuss in more detail more philosophical questions. Ray: I have read that paragraph but I don't feel that I completely under stand it, but I will reread it again on this advice. Susan: I have a non-philosophical ques tion. The ping pong team came to China and now we are in China and we hear that President Nixon is coming to China. We were very excited about this, especially excited because we are friends of China and we think this is a good thing for China and also because here we are in Peking hearing the news. Chou: Yes, you come at just the right moment. So when you go back you can tell your American friends the news. Because Chairman Mao has already told Mr. Edgar Snow that in inviting friends to China, we should invite friends of all spheres. And there is only one president in the United States now, but there are a lot of young friends like you in the United States, that is, in numbers, and also no matter whether in quantity or in quality you are in the majority. [laughter] And in Chinese society there also are var ious kinds of people, of course the majority supports the Communist Party and agrees with socialism. Susan: Well, I think we are here at a good time and I think it's a good time to ask a question of Premier Chou. 41

!
i

f I

l I

Chou: Is that the end of your question? Susan: My question is how did it happen? What is there that has changed the re lationship between the Chinese and Amer ican people after 22 years of separa tion? And how does Premier Chou see the situation now, what does he think might happen in the future, and what are the biggest problems we still have in de veloping the friendship between the Chinese and American people? Chou: The foremost thing, Miss Susan Shirk, is that the Chinese and American people wish to exchange visits with each other and this strong desire has bro ken through the barriers. And during the Pacific War there had been a lot of opportunities for the Chinese and American people to contact each other. And taking myself as an example, I know a lot of old friends from your country of an older generation. And I've heard that your Committee has two aims. Isn't there one point in your aims, that is that you believe that the older generation of Asian scholars has gotten mixed up with the government? Or that they have become silent? Group: That's right. Chou: First, I agree with your aims, with your idea. But secondly, I must say some words of sympathy for them. That is that they happened to be oppressed in the 50s, during the McCarthy period, and this was a great harm for them. So I recall what I said at the Bandung Conference in 1955. I said that the peoples of China and the United States wish to have con tact with each other, friendly contact. It cannot be said that there was no response to my words. There were some, I believe a few progressive correspon dents wished to come to China, but the Secretary of State at that time, John Foster Dulles, denied them that right. I believe that this issue could be found in the files of the State Department, and I don't think that they should be classified documents. [laughter] And in this way we were separated. But now we have passed through the sixties and entered the seventies. And it's your generation, your era, and you have
42

broken the barriers. And so with one sentence of Chairman Mao's we invited the United States table tennis team that wanted to come to visit China. And so they came! And the barriers were broken through. And so for this we must thank the new forces of your era. Isn't that so? And these new and friend ly contacts are bound to continue. Because we received a very quick answer, and there was no way to stop the visit. And so now you also have come, and of course when you go back you will intro duce new, even more American friends to us. Also some black friends. Of course it you would be able to introduce some minorities of the United States to us, we would be very thankful. Let them all come to China to have a look. Of course, we will also return the visits, because your table tennis team has also invited us to go to the United States, and our table tennis team is also prepared to return the visit. Do you agree that the interpreter who works in the Foreign Ministry should go on the visit with the table tennis team? [laughter and applause] Second ly, your CCAS, the Committee of Con cerned Asian Scholars [this he himself said in English] has also invited us, and since you are so kind, I think that our young Chinese friends should also return the visit. There are a lot of young friends in Shanghai; they should take the lead. Yao: Because you have already been in Shanghai. Chou: Of course, there are a people who would like to go. I believe that you will also not only men, but also women lot of Of course welcome [laughter].

Yao: And complete equality in numbers. I believe that the main thing should be the content. Chou: It would also be a good thing to make it equal in numbers. But even though we are a socialist country, a country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, yet still male chauvinism comes up now and then. Of course subconsciously.

Chang: Today, seated here among the Chinese comrades, the number of men and women are not equal yet. Chou: See, he's criticizing me. Yet I have tried my utmost to pay attention to the fact. I have paid relative atten tion to it. When I invited the comrades from Chinghua University, I invited one man and one woman. The second question . Let's not just talk about the first aspect of this question. That is how the barriers have been broken. But the devel opment of the contact between people, in itself alone, is not enough because in the world of today, the state struc ture of various countries still exists. That is, different states still exist in the world today, and if there is no normalization or no restoration of the relations between the two states then it would be impossible for the contact between the two peoples to develop com pletely unhindered. And the governments of the two countries will bear the main responsibilities for the normalization of relations between the two countries and the restoration of these relations. If Susan Shirk was the president of United States, then the matter would be easy to solve. But the problem isn't so simple. Isn't that so? Our philos ophical friend understands [laughter]. That is, it still takes a process of continuing cognition, that is, there still needs to be a process of practice and understanding. A process of the com bination, the integration of the univer sal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the United States. There still must be such a process before things can develop. It will take process and time. Isn't that so? And your Committee also says so. And I believe that it was also Miss Susan Shirk who said that though the revolu tionary movement in United States is developing, it cannot be said that it would be able to transform the entire system at the present date. For instance, the opinions in your family differ, don't they? So you can see it will take time to transform society. In recent years, Chairman Mao himself has paid attention to the American situation

and he has also asked us all to note the fact that it can be said that the United States is now on the eve of a great storm. But the question of how this storm shall be developed exactly is your task, not ours. We can only tell you about something of our hopes. But now, at the present date, in con tacting your government to normalize relations we must contact those who are in authority in.your country. But in your country, your system is that you have a president, and your president said that he wishes to move towards friendship and he also has said that he hopes to visit China. And of course, naturally we can invite him, in order to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries, and also to discuss questions concerning both sides. And this can promote the solution of the normalization improvement of the relations between the two countries. But what are the obstructions in the improvement of the relations between China and United States? What would you say? Kay: I wouldn't dare say. [laughter] Everybody: Taiwan . Paul L.: Taiwan certainly will be liber ated. Rhea: Indochina . Chou: You have all mentioned the right problems. It shows that you have all studied these things. And you, of course, are quite clear about our posi tion on Taiwan. And I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our stand: The first point, that is, if state rela tions are to be established with China, then it must be recognized that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people. Second, Taiwan is a province of China and it is an inalienable part of China's territory. And after the Second World War Taiwan had already been restored to China. And the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is an internal affair of China
43

which brooks no foreign intervention.

Third, the so-called theory that the

status of Taiwan is yet unsettled, which is the theory that is going about, some people in the world are spreading it, is absurd. That is, towards the end of 19th century, that is, in 1894, China was at war with Japan and China was de feated in that war and after China's defeat, Taiwan was taken away by Japan, but during the Second World War in the Cairo Declaration and later in the Potsdam Proclamation it was reaffirmed that Taiwan should be returned to China. And then in 1945, when Japan surrendered, the Chinese government at the time had already accepted the return of Taiwan to China in taking Taiwan back.

should withdraw att of their present military strength and military installa tions from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. And the defense treaty which was con cluded between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek in 1954 about the so called "defense of Taiwan and Penghu" is illegal, and null and void, and the Chinese people do not recognize that treaty. This is our stand. And we stick to our stand. And our stand has not changed from the beginning of the Ambassadorial Talks between China and the United States that began on the first of August, 1955, first in Geneva, and later on in Warsaw. They began after the Bandung Conference. And our stand has not changed from that time up to the present time. And it shall not change. The question also mentioned very correctly that we are also concerned with the Indochina issue. This question also concerns China and the United States. You have also said that one of your aims is opposi tion to the aggressive policies of the United States in Indochina and Asia. Isn't that so? Group: Yes. Chou: And the aggressive policies of the United States, first the aggression in Vietnam which was later expanded to the whole of Indochina. China has not gone to Vietnam or Indochina to commit aggression. We are assisting the people there to fight against aggression. Isn't that so? I think we should go back to the begin ning. The question began in 1954. At that time during the Geneva Conference we reached an agreement. You friends who are studying various Asian issues probably have already read those docu ments. And on this issue at that time we Chinese, and at the time, also our Vietnamese friends, lacked experience in international subjects. At that time the representative of the United States

Fourth point. We oppose any advocation of a two-China policy, a one-China-one Taiwan policy, or any similar policy. And if such a situation continues in the United Nations, we will not go there. Fifth point. We are resolutely opposed
to the so-called "Taiwan independence lOOvement". Because the people in Taiwan are ~ine8e. Taiwan was originally a province of China. And a thousand years ago it had already become a part of China. The dialect spoken in Taiwan is the same dialect spoken in the area around Arnoy in Fukien Province. Of course there are minority nationalities like the Kaoshan nationality in Taiwan, the minority that lives on the high hills. There is the same case on the mainland. There are also various national minorities on the mainland and we pur sue a policy of national equality. Besides, the "Taiwan Independence move ment" is not a native movement in it self. It is a special movement which has behind it the special manipulation from foreign forces. One of their leaders is P'eng Ming-min who was originally a student at Harvard, who then went back to Taiwan to become a professor, and now is also back in the United States. There are also some elements of them in Japan. They are supported by the Japanese government.

The sixth point. The United States

44

was allowed to not sign the documents and to only make a statement that they would not disturb the agreement. But the reality was not so. How could it be that a country which would not sign an agreement would agree to truly not disturb the agreement? Don't you say that we were lack ing in experience in such matters to allow this? You can criticize me for this. I myself, as one of the delegates on the Chinese side at that meeting, at that conference, accept your criti cism. After that time, France, because of its defeat at Dien Bien Phu, did not wish to continue the war. It was will ing to stop the war. But the U.S. which had begun to assist France -- the Truman government of the U.S. which had begun to assist France in its aggres sion in Indochina, did not wish to end the war. The British representative at that time was Mr. Eden, and he agreed to stop the war, but he wished to draw a line of demarcation and in this way to carve up, to divide the area and also to divide the world by drawing lines of demarcation. This idea of Mr. Eden's was suited to the needs of the brink manship policy of John Foster Dulles. And although there was a clause in the Geneva Agreement that one day after the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement the representatives of the two sides of Vietnam, North and South Vietnam should meet to form an elec tion committee and that a referendum should be held under International supervlsl0n -- although there was such a clause in the agreements, it was actually a false clause because they were not prepared to act upon it. There fore, immediately following the Geneva Agreements, the Manila Conference was held at which SEATO was formed and a line of demarcation was drawn. Of course, SEATO had now broken up by it self; it's now gone bankrupt. But after the Geneva Agreement the elec

tion was not held and the U.s. assist ed Ngo Dinh Diem to overthrow Bao Dai. The U.S. got control of South Vietnam that way. And all those who participated in the Geneva Conference are prepared to say, will admit, that i f an election had been held in Vietnam as stipulated by the Geneva Agreements it would be without question that President Ho Chi Minh would be elected under any case in Vietnam because through the war of resistance against French aggression he had won great esteem, not only among the Vietnamese people but also among the people of the whole of Indochina. But that was not able to come about and the facts were the United States committed aggression first in Vietnam which was then expanded to the whole of Indochina. Now this question lies before us, before the people of the United States, the people of Indochina and us, and the only way to solve this problem is that we show our complete support for the seven point proposition put forth by 11me Nguyen Thi Binh on the first of July on behalf of the Provision al Revolutionary Government of the South Vietnam Republic and the Vietnamese people, and the Chinese government and the Chinese people completely support this proposition. And the Chinese govern ment and the Chinese people also fully support the stand of the delcaration of the four sides and three countries of Indochina which was issued at their summit conference in April last year. I believe our friends have already met our Vietnamese friends and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and I believe that on this issue we have the same stand. And we know that the broad masses of the people of the United States are also opposed to the aggressive war in Viet nam which has now expanded into the whole of Indochina. We believe it is also in accord with your aim, the aim of CCAS to oppose the aggressive policies of the United States in Indochina and the rest of Asia. We are a neighbor of the Indochinese countries. We assisted them, supported them, in their war of resistance against France. And in the same spirit support them in their war of resistance against
45

U.S. aggression for national salvation. This is known to the world. No matter whether in the u.s. itself or abroad, we believe the greatest cry is for the U.S. to withdraw its troops from Vietnam and the whole of Indo china. And the troops of other countries which have followed the United States into Indochina should also be with drawn. I believe that our stand on this is also clear. And we also be lieve that at the present day among the American people this issue is the most outstanding. Isn't that so? Not only for the United States to withdraw its troops from Vietnam but also from the whole of Indochina, not only troops but all military forces and all military installations. It might also be said that this demand is even stronger than the demand to restore relations between the Chinese and American people. Because the people of the United States do not wish to sacrifice the lives of their people in a dirty war. Isn't that so? And therefore we believe that the question to be solved first should be the question of Indochina, and by doing so we would be satisfying not only the interests of the Indochinese people but also of the people of the U.S. But also, we should also mention that Indochina is the Indochina of the Indochinese people and we should respect the stand of the peoples of the three Indochinese countries. And at the summit conference they've already said that the war of aggression waged by the United States has linked them up in a common fight and after they achieve victory in the war, in the war against American aggression, the peoples of the three countries shall solve their own problems in accordance with the borders that they have already recog nized between themselves. And the Chinese people should res
46

pect and support the revolutionary stand of the people and revolutionary governments of the three countries, that is, the governments of the Demo cratic Republic of Vietnam, the Pro visional Revolutionary Government of The Republic of South Vietnam, the government of National Union under the leadership front of National Union of Cambodia, and the patriotic front, the Pathet Lao. They are all victims of aggression and we should respect their stand. And besides these two issues I think that there should be two other issues that are worth your attention. I believe you have seen the friends at the Embassy of the People's Demo cratic Republic of Korea. Perhaps you know less of this isssue, as it has been a long time before, because there was a cease fire in 1953. I should like to bring to your attention the fact that in Korea up to the present day there is only a cease fire, only an armistice agreement was passed. After that there was a meeting held in Geneva, the same Geneva Conference, in 1954. The first stage of that conference was devoted to Korea. I can try to describe the meeting to you. It was com pletely without results. On the final day of that stage, as there was no result whatsoever with regard to the Korean question, we put forward the question, what was the use of our com ing. We said that at least we should adjourn, we should at least set a date for another meeting. At that time the foreign ministers of certain coun tries were persuaded, for instance Mr. Spaak of Belgium. He had worked with the United Nations. The chairman of the meeting at that time was Mr. Eden. At that time he wavered a bit and he tended to agree with this view. And at that time there was an authoritative representative who was seated at the conference and who waved his hand in opposition and the result was that it was not passed. You probably know who he was: the deputy of Mr. John Fos ter Dulles, Mr. Smith. Of course, it might not have been his own personal opinion

but he did so on instructions. He didn't say anything, he couldn't find any words. He just waved his hand. And as a result of this, the meet ing was called off with no results whatsoever. And so now at the 38th parallel in Korea, there is a military armistice commission that meets every week. One side is the American represen tative and the representative of the South Korean puppets, and on the Northem side there is a representative of the Peoples' Army of the Democratic Repub lic of Korea and also a representative of China. They meet once about every two or three weeks. There's only a cease fire, there's no other treaty whatsoever. According to intemational law the state of war has not yet ended and I believe that there must be people among you who study international law. It is the same case between China and Japan. The state of war has not been called off yet. We still have not con cluded a peace treaty. And there are still American troops in South Korea. Democratic Republic of Korea and we have both demanded that the United States should withdraw its troops from South Korea. Probably our friends at the Korean embassy have also talked about this. Because the Chinese Peoples' volunteers withdrew from Korea in 1958. The American troops in South Korea are there under the banner of the United Nations, yet a lot of countries of the United Nations have either withdrawn their troops or have not taken part in this for a long time. For instance the French Parlia mentary delegation which met with me yesterday said that they did not believe that they should have anything to do with the Korean situation and that that was a policy that was set in General DeGaulle's time. And in relation with that there is also the question of Japan. You are a Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars so you are probably also very familiar with the Japanese question. And you can also travel to Japan. Have you seen their movies advocating mili tarism? We should have Comrade Yao Wen-yuan tell you about them.

Yao Wen-yuan: Under the present regime of Sato, the Japanese Government per sonally looked into this matter and put forward a number of films which were on the topic of Japanese militarism. And they laid special emphasis on making propagand3 about the Japanese navy because in the Japanese aggression against other countries they relied upon the navy in the past. So a lot of these militarist films centered on the navy. Because during the wars of aggression the airforce took off from their carriers. And in fact we saw these films even before a number of our progressive Japanese friends. So after we had seen these films we showed these films to our Japanese friends and they also felt like us that these films really showed what was happening. One film is called "Great Sea Battle in the Sea of Japan" and another film was called ''Ya mamoto." And another was called "Our Navy." Another film was called ''War lords." Another film was called ''War and Man," but we haven't completed the translation of that film yet. It is specialized on the war of aggression against China. The whole film hasn't been completed yet. In the films Yamamoto and Our Navy they emphasize the Japanese war in the Pacific. They describe the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. And the common aim of all these films is to distort history. And in actual point of fact it was the Japan ese militarists who launched aggression against China, against Korea, and the Asian peoples; who launched the war of aggression in the Pacific. But they turn all these facts upside down and make out as if this war of aggression launch ed by the Japanese militarists was forced upon them because Japan, they said, lacked resources and they made out as if what they called Manchuria of China was one of their life-lines, and South Asia too was a life-line, and that they were compelled to launch this war of aggression. And this precisely conforms to the propaganda now spread by the Japanese militarists; that is, that expansionism and aggression is reason
47

able. The Japanese militarists are now saying that the Malacca Strait is their life-line. This place is a life-line; that place is a life-line. So on and so forth. And the majority of these films have a deceptive side to them. That is, because for those who did not experience the Second World War, they have not gone through the savagery and reaction of Japanese militarism in the past and so they thought that these militarists portrayed in these films were all per ceived from the position of loyalty and patriotism to the IWtherland; because there was no way out at home, it was reasonable for them to seek a way out abroad. But once we've anal yzed and criticized these films, then these films become very good teachers by negative example not only to the Chinese people, the Korean people, the Japanese people and all sorts of peoples of other Asian countries, to raise our vigil against the revival of Japanese militarism. Dur Korean comrades were rather early in taking note of this and they felt very strongly about the dangers of t~e revival of Japanese militarism. When our Premier visited Korea, in the joint communique issued by the two sides, this point was partic ularly emphasized. This has given rise to the attention of the people of the various Asian countries. The revival of Japanese militarism is being fostered single-handedly by U.S. imperialism. President Nixon also admitted this point in his public statements saying that they are fostering their former enemies. But now Nixon is also saying that Japan is his competitor. And so these films too, reflect these very complicated positions. On the one hand, in order to toady to U.S. imperialism these films help to brag about U.S. imperialism. On the other hand, they portray the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. These films serving as teachers by negative example can help us see the present aims of Japanese militarism. Perhaps you can select some of these films and see them. (Olang Ol' un-ch 'iao and Chou En-Iai interrupt to suggest that it would be best to see Yamamoto, Our Navy and the War-lords which of course portrays Tojo]
48

Frank Kehl: Perhaps Comrade Yao would also be interested to having an oppor tunity to see the film "Tora! Tora! Tora!" which shows from the cooperative American and Japanese side the same kinds of distortions of history. The topic is the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. But precisely this contra diction is what is dealt with. Olou: We haven't yet got a copy of that film, have you seen this film? Frank: Yes, I have. Perhaps the patriot ic comrades in Hong Kong have made an analysis and perhaps they might have ways of getting it. It's special interest is that it was a cooperative film made by both American and Japanese producers and it showed the attack on Pearl Har bor from both sides, but both sides with a distortion of history to suit the present. Paul P.: There was an analysis in the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao. Paul L.: Another small point is that a Japanese admiral, a war criminal had visited America, I believe, or had also in Japan spoken at the same time that the movie came out and there began a lot of publicity in Japan and at the same time, I believe that it was about the same time last year, a secret treaty was signed between Japan and South Korea, a defense treaty. I was wondering if this has given rise to the tension that Comrade Yao Wen-yuan has just mentioned, a certain amount of rise in tension between South Korea and other countries concerned. Chou: Yes, it is a fact that Japanese militarism is being revived because the Japanese economy is developing in a lop-sided way. They lack resources, they must import their natural resources and for markets too they depend on foreign countries. And .after the war they were not burdened by paying repara tions and also for quite some time they spent very little on armaments. How was the Japanese economy developed? There is one characteristic of the develop ment of their economy, that is, they

made a fortune on wars fought by others~ that is, the war of aggression against Korea and the war of aggression against Vietnam. After the conclusion of the Second World War, less than a year after the end of the Second World War the Chinese civil war broke out. The Pacific War concluded in August, 1945, but in July of 1946, the Chinese civil war broke out in full force. You are all aware of the fact that in 1945, in order to maintain peace after the World War, Chairman Mao personally went to Chungking, to have negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. I have heard that you have already read the article on the Chungking negotiations written by Chairman Mao; that proves that you are indeed making a study of Chairman Mao's works. Although there were these nego tiations, and although we did reach an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, but these agreements were all scraps of paper. They did not count at all. All his troops remained in the rear in the war against Japanese aggression and did not take part in the actual fight ing against Japanese aggression. It only turned out to be passive resist ance while our People's Liberation Army fought against the Japanese around their cities and on their main arter ies of communications. And at this point we would like to express our thanks to the American correspondents of the older generation who wrote a lot of articles reporting these battles. And after the conclusion of the Pacific War the American Air Force shifted Chiang Kai-shek's troops from the rear areas to the places which were occupied by Japan to accept the surrender of the Japanese authorities, and did not allow the People's Liber ation Army led by the Chinese Communist Party to accept the Japanese surrender in those pl~ces. So after the surren der of the Japanese war-lords all the Japanese weapons were handed over to Chiang Kai-shek. In particular, Chiang Kai-shek recieved a great amount of military equipment from the United States, especially in the area of lend lease. All the lend-lease equipment in the East was handed over to Chiang Kai-shek. And the Chinese civil war

went on from 1946 to 1949 for two and a half years. The People's Liberation Army had a force of one million and Chiang Kai-shek had a force of eight million and that includes those who replenished Chiang Kai-shek's army later on. But the United States government provided all the military, economic and financial assistance, and military transport also was taken care of by the United States. American forces also guarded many of the air bases and naval ports. As for the transportation base in the rear, the United States mainly went through Japan. So even back at that time Japan already was making a fortune through this war. And then with the Korean war and the Vietnam war and now this war throughout Indochina. Although Japan does not directly take part in these wars and Japan is a defeated power but Japan makes fortunes through these wars. For instance, the United States esti mates that within the past 10 years, 120 billion American dollars was used on the Indochina war. And I believe that out of this Japan made quite a lot of money from the military repairs and transportation costs and costs for vacationing of the U.S. troops and also some means of communication. In all these fields I think Japan made quite a lot of money. And so 25 years after the Second World War, Japan, a defeated power has now become the number two economic power in the Western countries. President Nixon praises Japan as his biggest partner. That was when you were already in China, probably you were in Nanking, when President Nixon made that statement on the 6th of July, in Kansas City. Have all of you seen this statement by President Nixon? It also describes Japan as competitor. That was when President Nixon was going from Washington to the Western White House, and on his way there he stopped over in Kansas City, and made this state ment to the press. And Nixon praised Japan in these terms: that the output of steel in Japan last year already approached 100 million tons. And that is to say, Japan may, either this year or next year catch up with the United States in steel output, because last year the 49

tons.
Chou: More. More than 110 million tons. Now where does this output of steel in Japan come from? Where did Japan get such resources? Where did Japan get these markets? Now on the Amer ican market there are a lot of Japanese cars, and textiles, a lot of Japanese textiles. You are quite clear about that. Paul Levine: Except for the resources, the resources come from Australia. Chou: And not only Australia, also Latin America, India and the African countries, and also Indonesia. And so this lop sided development of Japan, what will issue from it? She needs to carry out an economic expansion abroad. Other wise, she cannot maintain her economy. And so, being in a capitalist system, following this economic expansion, there is bound to com~ with it, mili tary expansion. Isn't that so? And so, precisely because of that, the Fourth Defense Plan is from 1972 to 1976, and they plan to spend more than $16 billion. The total spent by Japan from the Second World War to 1971, the first three defense plans, was only a bit over 10 billion. And some American senators, after visiting Japan, report ed that this fourth Japanese defense plan exceeded the requirements of Japan for self-defense. And according to the present economic capacity of Japan, she does not require 5 years to carry out this 4th plan. As we see it, they may be able to fulfill it in only two or two and one-half years. And in this way, it's all further proof, that the appetite, the ambitions are becoming much greater. And so they are thinking not only of having up-to date equipment, but also thinking of manufacturing nuclear weapons themselves. Now Japan is already cooperating with the United States and Australia in building a nuclear reactor and nuclear power, and Japan is already able to manufacture guided missiles, ground-to air and ground-to-ground guided missiles without a nuclear warhead. So the only
50

u.s.

o~tput

of steel was 110 million

problem remaining is how to manufacture a nuclear warhead to put on these mis siles. So there does exist this danger. But of course, the Japanese people of the present are not the Japanese people of the 30's, or the 40's; they have awakened to a certain extent. And also, what is more, the peoples of the Pacific and first of all the peoples of the Far East are no longer the peoples of the 30's or the 40's; for instance the people of the Democratic Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, and also Indochina. And even those countries where there are now still stationed American troops, such as the Philippines, Thailand; or Australia, Indonesia, and also Malaysia, Singapore, they still have a fairly good memory of the disaster of Second World War. I think the American people too remember the Pacific War. And first of all the Japanese people are aware of the fact that if Japanese militarism is revived, it will not be of benefit to Japan, it will be furthermore, harmful to themselves. And so being the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, you should also pay attention to this question of the revival of Japanese militarism, and its policies of expansion and aggression. That is, I mean the expansion and aggression of a revived Japanese militarism, because you're opposed to the policies of aggres sion. And so when you oppose a policy of aggression, of course you're not opposed only to the policies of aggres sion of the u.S. government but also any policy of aggression of any country of the world. And you are in a more con venient position to contact Japan than . we. Any of you here speak Japanese? Frank: Some of our organization, not
those of us here, but some in CCAS
know Japanese.
Chou: Have you been to Japan? That's a
place where it's well worth your while
to work.
Kim: Because the slaughter continues in
Indochina, of course, this organization
and many organizations among the young
people of America concentrate their
efforts on the question of the war in
Indochina, and the question of the role

of the U.S. military-industrial com plex in the war in Indochina. And yet, of course we recognize that this question of the war in Vietnam, the question of the war in Indo china, is not unrelated to questions of conflict in other parts of Asia. And we cannot separate our opposition to a military industrial complex and its operations in Indo china from our opposition to the opera tion of that complex in other parts of Asia. Chou: The American military-industrial complex now is not only limited to the East coast and to the central part of the U.S. but has also spread to the West coast and the Southern part of United States, that is, all these monopoly capitalists must get their orders. Kim: So, we've come to Olina and we have visited China after the break of rela tions between the people of the U.S. and China that has las ted for over twenty years. The first group that came to the People's Republic of China, the ping-pong team. When they came here, their feelings were so deep with regard to the reunification of the two peoples after such an extended period of time that many of them wept as they came into China, and as they flew from Canton to Shanghai. We also have exper ienced these feelings, of course, on our own. This is a feeling of great joy. And yet our feelings for the Chinese people cannot be a fraction of the feelings of a person from North Vietnam to have a sense of union with the people of South Vietnam, or the feelings of the people of Taiwan con cerning unification with the people of the rest of China. And so when we understand this question of intervention and the question of separation of peoples, in a profound way we see that the various areas of Asia are connected. We also know that these feelings are related very strongly to our own feel ings in America concerning the devel opment of our own society. And so we have to ask ourselves the question if there is so much happiness in store in restoring these various relation ships, why does the world and Asia

continue in its condition of separation? And why do the American youth continue in their feelings of general dissatis
faction towards their society and their government? And we think that we have located the reason, which of course,
is the destructiveness of military
industrial complex in our own country.
And once we have located the source of such large questions we are very stubborn in pursuing the problems. We, here, are only fifteen people -- and most of us are skilled in speaking the Chinese language. There are many people who are like us in our organiza tion, and there are also a great number of people in our country who are also quite stubborn. And the number of people who benefit in the United States from the war in Indochina and the separ ation of Asian countries is really not very large. Unfortunately, they have more than a little money. But we have located the source of the problem and we hope that our friends will under stand that Asian problems cannot be separated from one another. Chou: You're right, neither can these Asian problems be separated from one another, nor can they be separated from the United States either, nor from the world. You have 5,000 in your organ ization. Group: That's all. MOre or less. Chou: And how many in the United States? Group: The great majority. Chou: 4,000 in the United States? Group: Almost all of them are in the United States, almost all 5,000. Chou: Are all of them college graduates? Group: No, the majority are. Chou: They are college graduates in the United States. Group: There are some who are studying in college. Chou: Then in our country, you would be
51

,\
I

I
I ~
:i It I

considered high intellectuals, and you have a heavy responsibility. And it is your responsibility to link the truth, the general truth, with actual prac tice. And so that must be put into implementation through you. Some of you friends have said that foreign exper ience cannot be mechanically brought over to your country. That's right. And Chairman Mao tells us that one must rely on one's own efforts. We cannot impose on you, nor can you just mechan ically copy from us. You can see the American youth is gradually raising their political consciousness. Accord ing to our experience, it is always intellectuals who start out, because it is easier for them to accept revol utionary theory, and revolutionary exper ience from books. But for the movement to succeed, you must go among the workers, because in the United States the working class is the great majority of the people, and the peasantry is quite small. And so to do that, you must go into them deeply. We have only our exper ience, but we are not at all well acquainted with your situation. So that must depend upon your own efforts. Paul Levine: Self-reliance. Chou: Self-reliance proceeds from inde pendence, and taking the initiative in your own hands. Yes, one must go through some arduous process. When you go back to your homes you may read over our article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. That's only a preliminary, a simple swnmary of our fifty years. Paul Pickowicz: I would like to say a word about the process which Premier Chou has talked about, because in the United States, in our struggle, there has been a peculiar process of gain ing information and gaining knowledge. This is the question of knowledge. And Comrade Yao Wen-yuan was talking about contradictions and the struggle of gaining knowledge and gaining exper ience. One of the main contradictions of our process of gaining information about the problems that we deal with 52

is that we were only first awakened by the violent struggle in Vietnam and our learning process then began to go backwards. That is, as we investi gated the origins of the conflict in Vietnam we were taken further and further back. We were embarrassed the other even ing when we were talking with our Korean friends that still yet we do not have a clear understanding of the Korean situation, so we keep on going backwards in our understanding. Chou: The question of Korea was mentioned somewhat in the secret documents recently published, but those mainly dealt with Indochina. Paul P.: We think that our knowledge is imperfect in many ways, that is, we still have very imperfect understanding and knowledge of the origins of the original problems and post war prob lems in Asia, and how the American imper ialist policy was developed. And we also are imperfect in our understanding of the relations of all Asian nations. Our organization has primarily empha sized Southeast Asia, China and Japan and we have an imperfect' knowledge of many other situations, and also we have an imperfect knowledge of the unity of these problems, not only in Asia, but in other countries, in Africa nad Latin America, and so in one sense I think our organization should be criti Cized, because too often we only talk about Asia, and we only talk about the United States, whereas we should begin to work and link up with other groups and talk about Africa and talk about Latin America, because the problems are really the same everywhere. Chou: But you have already begun in this direction. You have this organiza tion of 4 or 5,000, in practically all the industrial cities? Group: Mainly centered in universities. Frank: Yeah, and allover the United States. Chou: Do you have one in New York? In Washington?

c~

Group: Yes. Chou: Boston? Group: Yes. Chou: Chicago? Detroit? Frank: There is not a big university in Detroit. But Michigan has one. But there is one in Ann Arbor. Chou: And on the west coast? Frank: Yes, there are many. Chou: And in the South? Susan: There are relatively fewer. Frank: Not so much because in the South, Asian studies is relatively undeveloped in the universities. Chou: But the industry in the South has developed greatly since the Second World War, isn't that so? Group: Yes, but in the universities they don't look much into Asian matters. They focus more on Latin America. Chou: How about the various research centers in universities? Do they mainly do research about Latin America in the southern universities? Frank: In the southern universities, yes. But there are some important Latin America study centers on the west coast, and also in other parts of United States. Chou: Latin America is well worth study ing, because that's your backyard. [laughter] That is to say, that your backyard is not always tranquil. Frank: There was a group very similar to us who became aware even earlier, called NACLA, North American Congress on Latin America. And they are an organization very similar to CCAS who study American imperialism in Latin America. Chou: Why are they called Congress?

Frank: They call themselves a Congress because they are very wise. Unlike us, they also include newspaper reporters and non-scholars. Chou: So if you use the word scholar, you may limit the scope of your organiza tion. Frank: We are very limited, so we are getting broader in our recruits. Chou: What is the membership of the North America Congress? Frank: I am not sure, probably as large as we are. Chou: Many are from Universities too? Frank: Yes. Chou: Where are their centers? Frank: One in New York, that's the one I'm familiar with, and also my friends tell me, the San Francisco Bay area. Chou: And if our friends from the Con gress would like to visit China, then through your introduction, we would welcome them.
~:

I think it would be a good idea to invite some Latin American people from the United States, some Chicanos and Puerto Ricans.

Chou: Yes, I've mentioned that already about the minority nationalities in your country. These are foreigners living in your country? Ann: Well, they are not foreigners, they are people of Mexican or Puerto Rican parentage who are citizens of the United States, and retain cultural identity with Puerto Rico or Latin Amer ica, especially Mexico, some language and cus toms. Frank: Especially Mexican Americans have lived in the Southwest of the United States for generations and generations. Ann: I would like our Chinese friends
53

ab

to know one thing: while we have short comings, and that is a serious consider ation to us, but we are also aware of our strengths, we do exist as a group. We are aware. We are making progress. We are forming alliances. We are start ing to do something. We will not be moved away from this aim. Yao: That's good. You have hope. And you are very courageous. Because al though youthful in years, but yet you have made very serious study and carried out very serious thinking about the major problems of the world. And so that shows there's hope for you. Chou: Since you have addressed your selves to various problems throughout the world. Yes, indeed, your American friends should have a broad perpsective and have a broad range of knowledge because as you know the United States has extended itself everywhere in the world. [laughter] After the Second World War, it stretched its hands out everywhere in the world. As Chairman Mao said, they look into other people's affairs everywhere in the world. And as a result, they were merely putting nooses about their own necks. And there is a saying in China, that that is like trying to catch ten fleas with ten fingers. When you are trying to catch one flea, another one jumps out. And the result is that all of them escape. And at the most, you can only catch one flea by freeing one of your hands and letting go five fleas instead. That is the predicament that President Nixon is now facing. But it would be fairer to say that it is not only of his own making but also some thing created by the system itself. Because after the Second World War, monopoly capitalism developed to such a tremendous extent. And in some of these things, not only did your presi dent not preconceive it, not even you could preconceive it. As for us, we could even less preconceive of these aspects. So it is well to read that statement of your President on 6th of July in which President Nixon said that to have fallen from such a state of grandeur twenty-five years ago to

the present state of affairs is something which he couldn't even have dreamt of in those days. And the opposite of that is. that people like you are rising up and taking action. But that latter part, referred to by Comrade Yao Wen-yuan, is something which he did not touch upon. Just citing a single figure would be quite surprising which is relevant to every single one of you. The internal debt in the United States now is approaching 400 billion American dol lars. And the interest being paid this year alone is already 19 billion Amer ican dollars. And that is figure of the annual budget prior to the Second World War during the Roosevelt regime, that is, about 20 billion. So how was that conceivable at that time? That is, the American budget from 1940-1941 was that figure only. That was twenty billion. But the amount of interest alone to be paid in one year's time from 1971 to 1972 is 19 billion. That is the change over a period of thirty years. A number of you are apparently not even as old as thirty. Who is the young ~st? And you too are only 26? And so I see these changes over the past thirty years. Were any of you here born in 1945? That was just at the conclusion of the Second World War. At that time U.S. imperialists appeared to be almighty. The world is changing, undergoing tremendous changes. But the American people, you, should not feel any discour agement. There is great hope for the American people. Because you have con tacts with the people throughout the world, and that is a very fine oppor tunity as was already found out by our good friends. What place is there in the world which you have not gone to since the Second World War? You have gone to all places in the world, even to the moon [laughter]. You have such a fine opportunity. [ ... some sentences missed in changing the tape] Chou: The monopoly capitalists are blaming each other for their failure to fully control them. But you have found this as a historical lesson. And you can draw different and new conclu 55

-------=---~.

~-----------------------------------------------------

sions thereby. And also apparently

after some members of your Peace
Corps went to other countries, when
they returned to the States they came
to the conclusion that was wrong.
Paul Levine: That's right. Chou: And now this Peace Corps, there
are fewer now?
Frank Kehl: There are fewer and fewer Peace Corps volunteers, and those that are sent are extremely carefully screened so that all progressives don't get in. That policy began to change about two years ago. Paul: Also, some Danish friends told me that they had organized a peace corps to send to the United States. [laughter] Chou: It would be better a friendship corps than a peace corps. Actually the Peace Corps in itself is a good, nice sounding name but they have misused the name, so that it now has a bad connotation. Anyway, what one should not do is to act in place of the people of that region. No matter what the popu lation of a country, when that country sends people to another country they should go there for the purpose of serving the people of that country and after their work is done they return to their country. They must not demand any special privilege. When they go to that other country, they should have the same living standard as the local people and if they commit offenses against the law they must be dealt with in accordance to the law of the coun try. And I go back to say that the best way is to withdraw of your own accord. If they show that they do not welcome you, then you should speedly return home. And if you die there, do not ask for any special treatment, just have the corpse cremated. And not to set up a plaque in your honor. We are opposed to that. Even now some places do that for our deceased, but we are opposed to it. And when your work of service is done, then speedily return. Even so, it is still-not an easy matter to gain the full confidence of the local people. 56

This is a long-term process, isn't that so? You are a powerful country and you have learned such a huge lesson over the past twenty-five years. We are a country just in the process of development. Anyhow, in our editorial we said we are a country of initial prosperity and if we compare with you, in accordance with the population ratio, then we are far behind you. Although we are a socialist country, we must be Vigilant against ourselves. Since Chairman Mao constantly teaches us that we must at all times be on the alert against committing the mistake of big power chauvinism both at home and abroad. Because in the world there is another country which is learning from you and sending its hand out every where and competing with you. Economic competition is bound to bring with it military competition. Economic develop ment combined with military expansion is bound to occupy various places through out the world. Having carved up the various continental areas and now want ing to carve up the oceans. So the Latin American countries put forward the position that their territorial sea extends out a distance of two hundred nautical miles and that is indeed a great decision on their part --that's quite something. And according to this proposal, the Mediterranean would become the Mediterranean of the Mediter ranean countries, and no other country can use the Mediterranean as open seas. Of course, other countries may be allow ed to pass through the Mediterranean. Friendly countries are still accepted. The point is that the Latin American countries put forth such demands be cause they are compelled to do so by circumstance or compelled to do so to protect their fisheries. As Comrade Yao Wen-yuan said a moment ago, we need teachers by positive example as well as by negative example. Just as if one just had the experience of suc cess without any experience of failure, once one does suffer from a defeat then one will be at one's loss. And so if, after you go back to your country, you are harassed, you should not become discouraged. Now you will also en counter such things. In our revolution, many of our comrades sacrificed their

lives. And Chairman Mao often says that we are those left over from the revolu tionary wars. What should we do then? Continue the revolution. And only so can we stand up to our martyrs, to our people. You have the spirit of pioneers. Almost two hundred years now, isn't that so? Five more years before the two hundredth anniversary, to celebrate your two hundredth anniversary. Chair man Mao often likes to talk about when George Washington rose up to op pose the British Colonial rule with only a population of three million. At that time England had probably a popula tion of Bome tens of millions, twenty million or more -- well, let's say may by around ten times the population of the United States at that time. But you had the pioneering spirit, fearing no difficulties, and the British Colonial Army was beaten by you everywhere. And the Americans at that time precisely carried out guerrilla warfare, firing from this corner and that comer. And you started your struggle in 1775. And. afteIW.ard$ you ~lected Ge,orge Wash ington to be your Commander-in-Chief- you spent your fourth of July in China. [laughter] This is highly significant. And on your 200th anniversary you will come again. At that time you may only see two of us. At that time we will congratulate you. Five years is not a short time. You have, as I have learned, liked to compare your present situation with the May Fourth MOvement in China. Five years after the Chinese ~~y Fourth Move ment great changes had taken place, the great revolution had already begun. And you will recall that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has just now gone into the fifth year. In fact today is precisely the fifth anni versary of Chairman Mao swimming the Yangtze River. But our papers forgot to republish the photo of Chairman Mao swimming the Yangtze River. They try to be creative but yet they've for gotten. Although the time may not be so
long, but if one puts in efforts and
struggles hard, great results will take

place. For instance, when the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 there were only twelve deputies to the First Party Congress, and the total num ber of Communist Party members at that time did not exceed seventy. But only about three years later in 1924, it had changed tremendously. By 1926 our forces were already above fifty thous and. In 1924, Mr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomin tang started cooperation with Comrade ~~o Tse-tung's CCP. Such tremendous changes took place within a period of only five years. What is more, your era is totally different from era of those days. History will not re-enact itself, and while we can make the compar ison, it will not completely re-enact itself. Since we always say that times are advancing, and time will not turn back, so we hope to see you again in five years. [laughter and applause] Chou: Frank Kehl, I didn't apologize to you about that episode of taking photos in Nanking. So .long as .you adopt the attitude of comparison of the present and the past you should be able to take all kinds of phenomena in China, some pro gressive and some backward. Some things may be in the process of development and going to a deeper stage of progress and development. So Chairman Mao al ways tells us when our guests come to visit China, we should let them see all our different facets, all the dif ferent aspects of our society, so they can make a comparison and to see the process of development, and to see the trend of our development, and which are the side currents. And in society we are bound to find some adverse cur rents. And so I am asking for a discus sion with the two PLA, and we will have a discussion on how they support the left in Ch'ing Hua University. It's very interesting. We were asked if people were killed, yes, they were. Even so, the PLA would not fight back. And some of the workers who were there were killed, five of them, and a number were wounded among them, 751 were wounded among them were workers and also PLA, but not one of them hit back and they were able, by mere persuasion, to tum 57

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this into something quite beneficial, and weed out the bad elements. So this was indeed an arduous task during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [pointing to O1ang and Yao]. They were on the spot, so they can say a word about it. [Referring to an incident in which Frank was taking a picture of an old cobbler, and some ordinary Chinese citizens objected] Frank Kehl: I was just going to say that not only is an apology not neces sary, but the incident you refer to was actually a very good opportunity to talk with some of the masses involved, and to understand from them the great concern that they have for their mother land. O1ou: Yes, there is that aspect to it. But from our side, in the aspect of our work, we must examine our short comings, because if we had given prior notice to the people there, and had properly informed t.hem of the situation, then things would be better. And so in visiting us you promote our work. Frank Kehl: I take it that the greater result is that we have learned from the people of their love for the mother land which was expressed in this way. Paul Pickowicz: I would like to make some closing remarks and its very dif ficult to make them, because there is so much to say, in closing of interest and there is not much time. First I want to extend to our friends thanks, to Premier Chou, and comrades Chang and Yao from the Central Commdttee and to our PLA friends that are here and our friends from Peking University and our friends from China Travel Service. And we want to thank all of our friends for meeting with us at this time. Premier O1ou has said that he has many old friends in the United States. Well we can say now that he also has some new friends in the United States. [applause] Unhappily, our visit to China is coming to a close. We have visited Kwangchou, Shanghai, Soochow, Nanking,
58

Peking, Tachai, and Sian, Yenan ... O1ou: Dh yes, Taiyuan . Group: Dh yes, [laughter]. Pickowicz: We have visited People's Communes, and we have visited many factories. On our part, we had a very valuable opportunity and I think a very symbolic one. Since we have come to Peking we have met with foreign friends from Korea, from Vietnam, and from Cam bodia. I can say for all of us this is truly a dream come true. We have come as friends of the Chinese people and we have been warmly received every where as friends of the Chinese people. We know that we want to unite even closer with the Chinese people. We believe that this visit to China and this meeting tonight has been a big step in the direction of uniting closer with the Chinese people~ We also believe firmly that friendship is a two way street. And speaking for the whole group I can say that we are very, very pleased to hear Premier Chou say that he believes that our Chinese friends will accept our invitation for Chinese friends to come to the United States. On the question of unity, we also know that it is very important for us that people who are in the anti-war movement in the United States will unite even closer within our own ranks, for we have many problems to struggle with, and many shortcomings. And we want to say that yes we are representatives of the anti-war movement in the United States, and yes we have done some work in the United States, but we firmly be lieve again that the real heroes of the anti-imperialist struggle in Asia are in fact the Asian people -- the Indochinese people, the Korean people, and the Chi nese people. Chou: Thank you. Paul Pickowicz: And now in closing I would like to present some symbols to our Chinese friends here, similar to what we have presented as gifts every where in China, to friends in all parts

\
of Olina, and in all walks of life. There are two symbols. One is a photo graph of our group. The other one is a button. One both of these symbols is written, "Long live the friendship of the Olinese and American peoples" [Applause] And on both of these sym bols can be found the peace symbol. Olou: That is our final aim. Paul Pickowicz: I would like to present Premier Chou with a photograph of our group which has been signed by members of the group. And I would like to give him a second photograph to present on our behalf to Chairman Mao. Chou: I will surely present him with it. Thank you for your kindness. Paul Pickowicz: I would also like to present our button to Premier Chou , I would like to give him another one to also present to Chairman Mao, and I would also like to present buttons to our other friends who have met with us here tonigh t. Chou: Thank you. You should note the plaque to the martyrs of the revolu tion which is in front of T'ien An Men Square with a word on peoples' revolution, on which it is said that Chairman Mao laid great stress on the importance of the people. [Photograph and pin presented to Premier Chou.]

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A New May Fourth Mo"e..e.l?

by Chung-wu Kung

April 10, 1970, is likely to be re membered as an historical date by over seas Chinese. On that day some 2,500 Chinese students and faculty descended on Washington from allover the United States and Canada. They came not just for another annual spring tour of the cherry trees, but to demonstrate against the policies of three governments- Japan, Taiwan and the United States. For Japan seized the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands from China last November, the United States supported Japan's claim, and the Chiang regime failed to take any effect ive action to get the islands back. The Washington demonstration was the largest ever held by overseas Chinese in the West--much larger, for instance, than the historic Paris demonstration in 1919 to protest the Japanese hold on Shantung province and the Peiyang government's impotent reaction. Unpre cedented also in the postwar period was the degree of political commitment evident among the demonstrators and in the tireless labors of the "Tiao-Yu Tai Action Committees" which have sprung up at major U.S. campuses. The movement has but a single goal: to safeguard China's territorial inte grity and to prevent a new round of the old, familiar game of chipping away at Chinese land, that game in which Japan in the past has earned so many laurels. However, like the May Fourth Movement, the new movement has far reaching implications and may generate wide repercussions. It takes place in the context of the ever-growing Ameri can student opposition to the barbarism in Indochina. More broadly, it illumi nates the decline of a capitalist im perialism which only yesterday dominated all of the Asian land mass, exploited

Chinese natural resources and humili ated the Chinese people at will, but now controls only the island areas along the China coast. Is this new movement a symptom of the impending collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's regime in the same way as the 1919 movement foretold the downfall of the moribund Peiyang government less than a decade later? Only the "opera tions of heaven" can decide. What is certain, however, is that the process of alienation, the rejection of tradi tional myths and the forswearing of traditional allegiances observable among Chinese students today can only be compared to the uncompromising spirit of the May Fourth Movement.

********
The Tiao-Yu Tai incident is a dis pute between Japan and Taiwan over the sovereignty of the Tiao-Yu Islands (known to the Japanese as Senkaku Is lands). As it turns out, the disputed islands are composed simply of eight tiny, uninhabited islets visited only by Chinese fishermen and sea gulls. The main island, Tiao-Yu Tai, has an area of 0.7 sq. miles; the smallest islet is only 0.02 sq. miles. As real estate, these rock-girt islands and lonely reefs lying 120 miles northeast of Taiwan and 570 miles southwest of Japan have little value other than having served as traditional refuge for Chinese fishermen over the centuries. Then why have these worthless islands caused such a sensational international dispute between Taiwan and Japan, with Peking and the United States actively involved? The real issue is oil, a material

61

crucial to modern industry:: and especially to war-making imperialism. An extensive study sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East [ECAFE] from November 1967 to May 1969 concluded that the East China Sea northeast of Taiwan, especially the area around the seabed of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands covering an area of roughly 200,000 sq. miles, could be one of the largest oil-bearing areas in the world. Upon learning this the Japanese govern ment immediately sent a survey team to the areas surrounding the isles and con firmed the existence of sediment a mile and a half deep and 90 to 150 miles wide. The prospect of immense profits is at the root of the Tiao-Yu Tai in cident. According to the Treaty on Continental Shelfs of the United Na tions passed in Geneva in 1958, only the countries close to the continental shelf enjoy the right to develop the natural resources on it. Japan, in cluding the Ryukyus, is far CMay from the area with the ri ches t oil re serves. Therefore, if Japan wants to share the oil, she has to find an island or islands within the area which belong to her. She found the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. If she can possess these islands, she will then be entitled to develop the oil around these is lands within a range of 200 miles. Who, then, really owns the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands? During most of 1968 and 1969, both the Japanese and the Taiwan governments strove to establish their jurisdiction over these islands and the surrounding continental shelf through political means and by rely ing on legal, historical and geologi cal evidence. Politically, the pro spect of oil prompted Japan and Taiwan to take immediate actions. Hoping to effect a fait accompli, in September 1968 the China Oil Company on Taiwan- not the government itself--granted pro specting rights to four American oil companies--Clinton, Gulf, Oceanic and Amoco. In addition, the Nationalist flag was erected on the island by Taiwan re 62

porters and fishermen. As a counter measure, in May of 1969 the Ryukyu government, directed by the Japanese government and with the consent of the U.s. government, set up demarcation tablets on the islands which proclaimed the islands to be part of the Ryukyus. In July 1970, the Taiwan government formally granted to Pacific Gulf, a Tokyo-based subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Company, drilling rights covering a 20,000 sq. mile area of the East China Sea, including the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands. Roughly between June to early September 1970, the Legislative Yuan, the newspapers and magazines on Tai wan, including the party organ Central Daily News, intensively discussed the Tiao-Yu Tai dispute and strongly de nounced the Japanese government. This public outcry, however, could not be long sustained on Taiwan. It was soon effectively silenced by strong pressure from the Japanese government: Chiang was informed that the second Japanese loan to Taiwan was being re considered. Then, as if bent on deliber ately exposing to the world the depth of the revival of Japanese militarism and imperialism, the Sato government turned to force. The Ryukyu authori ties tore down the Nationalist flag on Tiao-Yu Tai and chased CMay the Chinese fishing boats in the area at gunpoint. All this was done in August and September 1970, under orders from the Sato government and with U.S. con sent. In the meantime, the Ryukyu au thorities declared they planned to establish a weather station on the Sen kaku Islands. The Sato government imme diately declared its open consent. Japanese patrol boats were sent in to keep Chinese fishermen out of the area. Suddenly collared in this way, under both economic and military pres sure, high Chinese Nationalis t officials beat a retreat, making only a symbolic and vague claim over the disputed area by cautiously avoiding the question of sovereignty. Taiwan "public opinion,"

almost invariably a faithful reflection of the government's attitude, suddenly calmed down. Thus the Kuomintang govern ment once again took a very soft posi tion towards the crucial question of national sovereignty. Not for the first time, the KMI' government was brought to its knees by its two close "allies "- the U.S. and Japan. The Sato government had outmaneuvered Chiang's regime politi cally and diplomatically. However, historically, legally and geographically, Taiwan is in a very favorable bargaining position. China's historical claim dates back to the early Ming dynasty. The Chinese record ed the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands lthe Shun feng hsiang-sung [~JlJ~. ,Sailing with the Wind] in 14~~1n the Shih 1iu-ch 'iu 1ieh Brief Story of the Mi;~~t~ Ryukyus] in 1534. Numerous other sources contain the name Tiao-Yu Tai. Furthermore, while the Chinese have for centuries fished in the Tiao-Yu Tai area and have habitually used the islands as a sanctuary in bad weather, the Japanese almost never visited the area because of the strong ocean currents between the Ryukyus and the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands. The Japanese government claimed that the Senkaku Islands were dis covered in 1884--450 years later than the Chinese--by a Japanese named Koga Tatsushiro

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terms in its unconditional surrender. Under the 1951 U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty, the U.S. has administered the Ryu kyus, mistakenly including the Tiao Yu Tai Islands as part of the Ryukyus. On the basis of this treaty, the Sato government argued that the residual sovereignty over these islands will remain with Japan when the Ryukyu Islands are returned to Japan in 1972. Therefore, in September 1970, the Japanese foreign minister Kiichi Aichi proclaimed that the Senkaku Islands are "obviously" Japanese terri tory, and there is no need for any ne gotiation, except on questions relating to the continental shelf. On the same day, the U.S. State Department expressed its support of the Japanese claim. This argument of the Sato government can only be seen as pirate's logic: it disregards not only the his tory of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands but also the terms of the international treaties cited above. And it ignores the 1944 ruling of the Japanese Su preme Court that the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands are a part of Taiwan, not the Ryukyus. Geographically, the Japanese ag gression is even more obvious. The Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are separated from the Ryukyus by a thousand-meter-deep trough. Ocean currents in the area are so strong that only with difficulty can unpowered boats sail between the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands and the Ryukyus. On the other hand, the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are a natural extension of the Chinese mainland continent. They are on the Chinese continental shelf. The ocean depth between the coast and the islands nowhere exceeds 200 meters. Hence the fact that the Tiao-Yu Tai area has been used regularly by the Chinese but only rarely by the Japan ese. Furthermore, in the 1958 United Nations Treaty on the Continental Shelf it is stipulated that seabeds at a depth not exceeding 200 meters shall belong to the adjoining nation. Therefore, neither Japan nor Ryukyu has any excuse for claiming the Tiao 63

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China's legal claim is no less clear. In 1896, one year after Taiwan was ceded to Japan at Shimonoseki, the Japanese cabinet included the Senkaku Islands within the Japanese boundary under the Ryukyu jurisdiction. However, in 1944, in regard to a dispute between Ryukyu and Taiwan fishermen, the Japan Supreme Court ruled that the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands be longed to the county of Taipei, not the county of Okinawa. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declara tion repeatedly stipulated that all the territories Japan had stolen from China should be returned to China. In 1945, the Japanese government accepted these

Yu Tai Islands. Accordingly, by any criterion except brutal force the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands belong to China. However, around Septem ber 1970 Taiwan gave in to the strong pressure from the Sato government and the U.S. Since then, the dispute be tween the two parties has been moderated into a compromise humiliating for the Chinese. Neither side raises the question of sovereignty, but both work closely together to develop the oil around the islands. On December 21, after a pre paratory meeting in November at which the crucial issue of sovereignty was ig nored, representatives of Nationalist China, South Korea and Japan met in Tokyo to form the Joint Committee for Ocean Development Research. At this meeting it was decided to carry out joint investigation, research and development of the oil and other min eral resources of the seabed and sub soil of the seas around Taiwan and the islands belonging to it and to Korea. This meeting betrayed the fact that Taipei, incapable of regaining the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands, decided to put oil first and sovereignty second. By doing so, Taipei now finds itself caught in a dilemma: it must choose either to join in developing the oil around the islands together with Japan, Korea and the u.S. without solving the problem of sovereignty, thus selling out Chinese territorial sovereignty and natural resources; or else, to refuse to participate in the development of the oil, leaving Japan and the U.S. to have it all for themselves. In the latter case Taiwan would not only lose immense interests, but would also be condemned as a traitor. Either way, the Taipei government is certain to be the loser in the dispute. Modern technological society is so highly regimented that students become the only social force free to protest against the prevailing social evils and unexpressed political grievances of the larger society. The raging Amer ican student movement of the late 1960s
64

is one measure of this. Inspired by the rich tradition of the Chinese student movement in the Republican era, especially the May Fourth Movement, and living in a climate of widespread stu dent rebellion in America, the Chinese students in the u.S. have been psycho logically prepared to assume an impor tant role in Chinese domestic politics. The humiliating surrender of the KMT regime in its negotiations with the Japanese over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands aroused students in the U.S. and in Hong Kong to action. In November 1970, a group of sensitive Chinese stu dents at Princeton and Wisconsin gather ed together for serious discussion of the issue. A steering meeting was held in December. Resolutions were passed appealing to all the Chinese students in the U.S. to demonstrate, distribute pamphlets and collect donations. Things started moving very fast. Three days later, the Chinese students in New York held a big mass meeting to discuss how to defend the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. They set up an organization called the New York Branch of the Action Committee for Tiao-Yu Tai. With this, the Tiao-Yu Tai student movement was formally set in motion. Universities on the west and east coasts, in the north and in the south, held mass meetings, organized action committees, and prepared to move decisively. k Bookish and liberal-minded, the Chinese students in the New England area were a little slow to respond. Not until Janurary 20, 1971, did New England area students hold their first organizing meeting. During the meeting progressives and conservatives argued bitterly over the position to be taken towards the KMT government. After painful but un doubtedly sincere exchanges of views, they agreed to stress action rather than to attempt to reach agreement on a com prehensive political position. Other regions had similar experiences. So far, the most visible fruits of these efforts have been the organiza

PEACE AND CHANGE

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65

tion of demonstrations in New York, Chi cago, Washington, D.C., Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu on January 29 and 30, 1971, and the unpre cedentedly large April march in Washing ton. This demonstration was so well 'or ganized that it was attended by some 2,500 Chinese intellectuals from all over the country and Canada. A Chinese reporter for the New York Times noted that the 2,000-2,500 turnout in Washington is proportionally equiva lent to a million Americans, if we take into account the size of the Chinese community in this country. Why this sudden burst of activity from a constituency that has main tained its silence for over two decades? Two factors mainly account for the apol itical, apathetic and passive behavior which has prevailed since 1949 among Chinese students in the u.S. First, un remitting indoctrination on the evils of Communism. In Southeast Asia, the u.S. and Taiwan, the enforced consensus is hostile to Communism of any kind, and particularly on Taiwan, Communism is taboo. Accordingly, the Chinese stu dents who have been raised and educa ted in these places have acquired a built-in fear of discussing Chinese domestic politics. Anyone who serious ly criticizes the authorities can be charged with being a Communist agent. Second, lack of a rallying issue: only if an issue arises which has strong ap peal and is beyond partisan strife--does not centrally address the CCP-R}IT cleav age--can the deeply ingrained fear of politics be overcome. Tiao-Yu Tai is such an issue, since it is not a dis pute between the KMT and the CCP but between Chinese governments on the one side and the Japanese government on the other. It is the same issue of national sovereignty which has trad itionally aroused the Chinese people in this country. observed that those It has been who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it. In modern China, Japanese aggression has done
66

great service to the revival of Chinese nationalism. Now the Japanese government has created the Tiao-Yu Tai incident- the latest Japanese aggression against Chinese territory. A theme of deep seated hatred and hostility toward Japanese militarism runs through all the literature and discussions of the Tiao-Yu Tai student movement. People recall the nearly seventy years (from 1874 when Japan invaded Taiwan for the first time to 1945) of Japanese terri torial aggressions and atrocities against the Chinese and are deeply aware of the present Japanese economic penetration of Taiwan. To the Chinese students in the U.S. the issue is not so much one of oil or profit, but kk rather of Chinese territorial integri ty and the dignity of the Chinese people as a whole in the face of re viving Japanese militarism. Therefore, all Chinese students have rallied be hind this common issue and are firmly united, regardless of their political differences. In brief, it is national ism that has removed all the stumbling blocks which have prevented the student movement from rolling ahead. Before they could act, the Chinese students have had to carefully redefine their attitude toward the KMT. Students from Taiwan, bound by KMT indoctrina tion and by family ties, have generally been reluctant to take any political action against the KMT. But students from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia are free of physical and ideological con trol by the KMT. Many of them have been greatly radicalized by the American student rebellion and by China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. A great number of these Chinese students attend universities in Cali fornia--Berkeley, Caltech, UCLA--the fountain head of the present American radical student movement. As a side current of the general American student movement, these Chinese students are quite sympa thetic to Peking, without being Commu nists themselves, and they tend to be critical of the Taiwan regime.

American-born Chinese students tend to stay out of Chinese domestic politics, although in an abstract sense they are culturally and racially identified with China. However, as soon as they get in volved politically, they are extremely critical of or even hostile to Chiang's regime. Throughout the whole Tiao-Yu Tai movement, the radical students from Hong Kong and the American-born from Chinatowns in New York and San Francisco, along with a few from Taiwan, have ta ken an active role; the rest, inspired by nationalism, simply follow the trend created by them. How has Oliang' s regime reacted to the new movement? Before January 30, 1971, lacking effective means of re pression and physical control over the students from Taiwan in the U.S., the KMl' was content to wait and watch de velopments. Chiang's regime at first probably underestimated the students' potential and failed to appreciate the depth of their discontent and the other factors behind the movement. However, the movement was developing with astounding speed. Its position at this stage was clearly expressed in the declaration drafted by the New York Action Committee and adopted by many others. The declaration demanded that every effort be made to preserve China's sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands, to oppose the revival of Japan ese militarism, to thwart the U.S. Japanese conspiracy and any other agreement for international resource exploitation unless Chinese sovereign ty is guaranteed. Anti-imperialism and nationalism were the two dominant themes in the declaration and in the mood of those participating in the January 30 demonstration in New York City. The students only mildly criticized Chiang's regime, hoping that i t would immediately remedy its mistakes in negotiating with the Sato government. At the most, the students reminded Chiang's government of the historical scandal of the "Nishihara loans" in 1917 under the Peiyang govern ment, to warn those officials in

charge of the negotiations against any betrayal of alina's rights and dig nity. These demands and petitions were little more than a test of the sin cerity and capability of Chiang's re gime. Only when it revealed its in capacity to act with any vigor did the students carry the movement a step further. After the January 30, 1971, demonstration Chinese students around the country developed more effective organizations and learned to strive for the common national cause in a more unified, conciliatory and dedi cated manner. Streams of publications were turned out and circulated among the Chinese communities in the U.S. These were sent to Chinese in Southeast Asia, Europe and Canada as well. In the literature here and there the students have launched, usually through satire, a more direct attack on Chiang's re gime than would have been possible a few months earlier. A newsletter named Chan pao [~,'lt, Combat] published in Berkeley bo''alJ~a1led on patriots "to remove the domestic national traitors." This could mean the top KMT officials who might betray the Tiao-Yu Tai is lets. The publications of the conser vatives, the conservative organs Ch'ang yen [~~ ,Free Expression] and Hsueh!Tiel: t'ung-hsin Newsletter of Student Uri~tY1, vfrtual mouth pie ces 0 f the regime, fough t back by calling Chan pao "suspicious" and warning that the movement has been mis led. They implied, in other words, that the movement has been used to the ad vantage of "Communis ttl China or even controlled by Communist agents. On Taiwan Chiang's regime broke its silence and began to try to destroy the move ment by relying on a double-edged stra tegy: conciliation and intimidation. A Central Daily News editorial on February 5, 1971, shamelessly argued for J apan ese rearmament, pleading the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation, and warned that any actions or attempts to jeopar dize that cooperation would be seen as Communist-inspired. A month later, the

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67

party organ carried a special article- fabricated under the name of "a group of patriotic students from the west of the U.S." whi ch openly denounced the three editors of ilian pao as "Communist agents." All three editors are from Taiwan. These were the most vicious verbal attacks upon the student acti vists by the repressive Chiang regime. More was to come, however. Like the proverbial Kweichow donkey, reduced to ineptly kicking at its adversary, the KMT had its professional "students" attempt to smear an activist at the University of Chicago. Through the intervention of the Chicago police they accused him of being addicted to drugs. On the other hand, in March the regime sent a special envoy, Yao Shun, to the U.S. to pacify the students' grievances and allay their suspicions. All the above mentioned steps, conciliatory or repressive, were intended to frighten the students alWay from the demonstration scheduled for April 10, in Washington, D.C. or at least reduce the turnout. The students came anyhow. However, the verbal exchanges between the students and their government and its agents between February and April 10 have brought the mutual relations to the breaking point for the first time since 1949. The change in the students' at titude toward the Taiwan government over these two months can be well gauged in the tone of ten demands included in an open letter dated March 12, 1971, and addressed di rect1y to Chiang Kai-shek. The letter was signed by all of the Tiao-Yu Tai Action Committees in the U.S. The Ten Demands are:

aats of aggression by the Japan ese government and lodge a strong protest against the unjustifiable statement made by the U.S. govern ment. 3) Dispatah troops to oaaupy the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands" and send a1'17l ed ships to patrol the surround ing seas thereof" in order to proteat the safety of our fishennen and the integrity of our sovereign territory. 4) Forestall Japan's plans of setting up a meteorologiaal sta tion on the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands and aonfisaate its illegal de maraation tablets. 5) Indefinitely abstain from par tiaipation in the so-aalled '~ino-Japanese-Korean Conferenae on Joint Levelopment of Subsea Resouraes,," and disalose the minutes of the first suah aon ferenae. 6) Publialy disclose the complete contents of the aontraats signed with the four Ameriaan oil aom panies. 7) Publicly disclose reaords of all diplomatia negotiations on the issue of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. 8) Hold responsible" dismiss from office" and duly penali2e all government offiaials who through their aations or statements have been shown to be irresponsible to the Chinese people. 9) Clazify and resaind all state ments detrimental to the interests of China that were made by in competent government offiaials. 10) Terminate government oppres sion of all patriotia movements in Taiwan; restore freedom of speeah and of the press; inform our aountrymen of all develop

1) Issue a pubZia d8alaration and infoPm the governments concerned that China's sovereign rights to the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands ape not to be vio late d. This is to be done prior to Marah 29.
2)

Sternly denounae the barbazia

68

ments in the Tiao-Yu Tai IslandS affaip; publish this Zettep in the Central DaiZy News (domestic and overseas editions)" Hong Kong Times" and other orogans and news papers run by the govePnment of the Republic of China" within five days aftep its receipt.
However, the Taiwan government fail ed either to reply to the students on March 29 or to publish their demands in the prescribed newspapers on the date required. Therefore, the students re quested the Ambassador of the Republic of China to the U.S., Chou Shu-kai (now the foreign minister), to receive the student representatives during the April 10 demonstration and give formal answers to the ten demands. Chou did receive them but gave extremely dis appointing replies. As an experienced diplomat, Chou deliberately avoided the points of the ten demands, either by k saying bluntly "no cODDIlent" or saying that "the government has not received your letters and demands." These re plies from Chou infuriated the crowd wai ting outside. In less than five minutes people underwent dramatic psychological changes and in many cases, years of ideological indoctrination by the KMT suddenly evaporated into no thing. Some lamented: "This is our fu ture foreign minister!" Others called on Cllou to come out and explain him self. There were even some who indig nantly yelled: "I renounce my alle giance to the KMT forever!" Worse still, when the crowd sent another three re presentatives to meet with officials in the Japanese embassy, the latter skilfully rebuffed the students' questions with questions of their own: "What are your government's replies to these questions? Did your government also say 'no comment' as we did?" These replies, expressing the Jap anese officials' attitude of contempt toward the KMT government, shocked the crowd into silence. By now people were fully infuriated. These successive blows, coming like lightning in the dark, awoke the people--especially

the liberals. They brought a sudden and stunning awareness of the corrup tion and incompetence of the Taiwan regime. Gone forever were the old illu sions about the KMl' government and the godlike image of Chiang Kai-shek. That evening, representatives from each center or chapter around the country gathered to review the day's happen
ings. Though the meeting was inconclu
sive, the anti-Chiang mood was preva
lent. Some people even went so far as to suggest sending a petition to the
Peking government. They were, of course, not Chinese Communist agents. Their words were a simple reflection of the fact that the alternatives in this situation are greatly limited: if Chiang can not defend our land, why not ask Mao? The episode suggests partly why the intellectuals--the writers, artists, professors and stu dents--went to Yenan in the 1930s and 1940s from the cities under the KMT influence or control. They joined the struggle led by the CCP against the Japanese and the KMT during the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war. It is another lesson of history that Chiang has chosen to ignore. Is not this subtle psychological change among the "best brains" of Chiang's regime a symptom of its coming demise? Is what happened in China in the 1930s and 1940s being repeated outside China in the 1970s among the Chinese intel lectuals overseas and on Taiwan? This year Chiang's bad luck seems to be endless. His government had al ready repeatedly disgraced itself by demonstrating its own incapacity in the eyes of millions of Chinese. Peking now added fuel to the already raging fire. In late December and January, the Hsin-hua News Agency and the Peking Weekly Review warned strong ly against any plan or attempt to develop the oil on the continental shelf of the East China Sea. Signifi cantly, in this declaration Peking stated that the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are part of China's Taiwan province. The islands and Taiwan are an insep

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69

arable whole. The statement's real implication is that Chiang's regime, not Peking, has the responsibility to regain the islands. Quite in tentionally, Peking put Chiang on the spot. For in Peking it is well known that Chiang's regime is power less to get the islands back. As long as the issue of sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands remains unsettled, the Chinese student movement in the U.S. will persist and cause increased embarrassment for Chiang's regime. Peking's warning had the additional effect of causing the Sato government around mid-March to temporarily with draw from the discussions of the Joint Committee for Ocean Development and Research scheduled for May and October 1971--something Chiang could never achieve. In the meantime, in keeping with the diplomatic thaw between the U.S. and Peking, on April 9 Nixon warned the American oil companies against joining the development of the oil in China's East China Sea and Yellow Sea. However, the State Department officially announ ced that the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands will be returned to Japan with the Ryukyus in 1972. This stab in the back by Tai wan's two close "allies"--the U.S. and Japan--is like throwing a stone at a man already fallen into a well. Closely interwoven with the latest development of the international situation--Peking's "smiling diplomacy" and the favorable response from the U.S. and the Western world--the Tiao-Yu Tai incident will surely become a headache for the KMT regime in the near future.

closely interrelated. Militarily, under the Nixon Doc trine the U.S. encourages Japan to expedite her rearmament in order to take over some of the American military commitment in Asia, as the U.S. with draws forces from Asia. Asians can now kill Asians with the blessings of the u.S. Against this background, according to Sato, the area from South Korea to Taiwan including the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands is indispensable to the security of Japan. The Director-General of Japan's Self-Defense Agency, Yasuhiro Nakasone, has gone so far as to openly list these islands as being within the scope of defence in Japan's fourth military build-up program. In other words, as the agent or watchdog of American imperial ism in Asia, the Japanese militarists feel they have a legitimate right to turn the countries and territories in the area into colonial bases to serve both the U.S. and Japan. What differ ence does it make whether Japan posses ses the disputed Tiao-Yu Tai Islands in her own name or in the name of "collective security"? Either way, Japan gets them and China loses them. Economically, the whole area encompassing Korea, Taiw"an, the Phil ippines, Indochina, Malaysia and Indo nesia is being incorporated into the U.S. and Japanese capitalist system; the Japanese and American capitalists are both competing and cooperating to ex ploit the resources of these countries and regions and dominate their markets. Hence any discovered oil around the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands cannot escape the control of the U.S. and Japanese cap italists. Oil has also been discovered all along the South China Sea area off Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This area, according to preliminary esti mates, may be the richest, the most exciting oil find in the world--richer than Alaska, better than the Middle East. Moreover, this area is much more subject to the control of American and Japanese imperialism than the

***********
Why is the problem of sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands so diffi cult to solve? Three underlying factors add to the complexity of the problem: the expansionist urge of Japanese neo militarism, the strategy of American economic imperialism, and the KMT's overriding concern with U.N. member ship. All these three factors are
70

Middle East, where there is a great deal of disturbance and where the petroleum exporting countries have recently raised the price of crude oil charged to the American and British companies. Hence the American and Japanese oil companies are racing to take over whole areas off the coast of Eastern ASia, stretch ing all the way from South Korea through the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands down to the Philippines and Indonesia. A dozen big American and European oil companies, such as Humble, Gulf, Shell, Mobil and Standard Oil of Cali fornia are snapping up this area as fast as possible. Japan is getting a piece of the action too, but not nearly enough to supply her rapidly growing needs. The Japanese government has de clared its goal to be self-sufficiency in oil by 1985 (i. e., that all the oil Japan uses should be produced by Japanese companies). Sato cannot afford to let the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands go if he wishes to make good this promise. The major American oil companies, for their part, undoubtedly do not relish seeing their traditional near monopoly disrupted. However, their interests are well looked after within the larger Nixon Doctrine framework. First, American corporations have al ready scooped up the lion's share of oil reserves in the vast area off Indo nesia and Indochina. Second, even if the Japanese win the dispute over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands, this will not necessarily affect the principle of joint exploitation of sea bed reserves and hence not prevent American corpor ations from bidding for a substantial portion, if not a majority, of the prospective oil fields off the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. Last, and most fundamental, is the strategy of the Nixon Doctrine itself which seeks to utilize a rearmed Japan as a force to balance off China and Russia. Within this framework American corporate interests have a fundamental stake in maintaining close ~ cooperation with Japanese capitalists. The Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are a part of the deal.

The students clearly understand the link between the Tiao-Yu Tai incident and U.S.-Japanese collusion. Therefore, in addition to protesting against Chiang's regime, they also strongly denounced the revival of Japanese mili tarism and American imperialism. In the process of struggle, the students be came disillusioned not only with Chiang's regime but also the U.S.; the masquerade of so-called Sino-American friendship has been exposed. Hostility toward Japanese militarism and sus picion of American intentions has be come greater than ever before. As for the KMT, it has been forced to make substantial concessions on the Tiao-Yu Tai dispute under Japanese and American pressure. For today not only is the Taiwan economy dominated by the two countries, its very existence depends upon their continued support. Since last year when Peking won a major ity vote in the General Assembly for the first time, the U.N. membership of Taiwan has been in danger. It seems that Peking intends to launch a great diplomatic offensive to isolate Chiang's regime and force Chiang to surrender. Knowing this, Chiang is trying to counterbalance Peking's pressure by inviting other powers to get involved in Chinese domestic politics. The greater the stake that foreign interests have in Taiwan, the more the foreign capitalists will force their govern ments to take the necessary steps, including military, to keep Taiwan from being taken over by Peking. Oil is big bait to the Japanese and Amer ican capitalists. Furthermore, the collective security system which in cludes Japan, Korea and Taiwan will not be tight enough unless there is strong economic cooperation. Oil is a great enterprise. This is the under lying factor responsible for the for mation of the Joint Committee for Ocean Development Research by Japan, South Korea and Chiang with the back ing of American capitalists. Through this economic cooperation, Chiang's regime hopes that the U.S. and Japan
71

will continue to underwrite Taiwan both militarily and in the U.N. This is the reason why Chiang's regime since Decem ber 1970 has disregarded public opinion and acquiesced in developing the oil without settling the question of the sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu Tai Is lands first. Hence all the three par ties--Japan, the U.s. and the Chiang regime--are content with their shares in this deal. Everyone is content ex cept the students, who are intensely concerned about the principle of sov ereignty. The student movement is thus aimed at destroying the collusion of the U.S., Japan, South Korea and Chiang's regime and maintaining the territorial integrity of China.

**************
The Tiao-Yu Tai movement, like the May Fourth Movement, began as a struggle "to remove traitors and fight against foreign powers." And the student acti vists today are now reaching the same conclusion as the May Fourth Movement: the only effective way to defend Chinese territorial integrity and the dignity of the Chinese people is to end the civil war immediately and to unify the country. This sense of the need for a strong and unified China has become more and more obvious in activities after the April 10 demonstration. The need for national unity has been underscored by the current diplomatic thaw between the U.S. and Peking which is seriously erod ing the international status of Taiwan. Like the May Fourth Movemen t, the current movement began as a political struggle and develops to cultural movement. At recent commemorative meet ings of the May Fourth Movement held elsewhere around the U.S., both liberals and radicals declared that the Tiao-Yu Tai movement marks a new era of en lightenment. But they disagreed on the themes of this new cultural movement. The liberals have been brought up to believe that the government in Peking is totalitarian and not a genuine
72

socialist country. Therefore, they ad vocate "democracy and socialism" in the hope that this will help to perfect the social system of mainland China and bridge the gap between the people on Taiwan and overseas and the people on the mainland. However, having rejected the KMT and American view of things, the radicals attack the approach of the liberals as totally unrealistic. The Chinese in Taiwan and abroad, they say, are exiled refugees and as such can no longer play a dominant role in the future of China. Therefore, the radicals contend, the new cultural movement on Taiwan and overseas should aim at awakening the exiled Chinese to this fact and urge them to face this histor ical reality, and thus shorten the path to the unification of China. The debate over unification, with the added compli cation of the dream of the Taiwan inde pendence movement, has just started. Whatever the outcome of this debate, it will not be good news for the old men still clinging to power in Taipei. Sources: The Tiao-Yu Tai student move ment has been extensively covered in Hong Kong in: Ming-pao [Illumination,

Q~ il~

Ta-feng [The Hurricane, -in New York by:

f...-. ~

Tiao-Yu Tai shih-chien

to-k'an [Special Issue on the
Tiao-Yu Tai Incident, 10~" i:t~Jf

~~,I J

Tiao-Yu Tai shih-chien chuan

chi [Special Collection on the ~
Tiao-Yu Tai Incident, ~ t,,~~J..

49

-on Taiwan by:

Chung-yang jih-pao ~ [Central Daily News, Lien-ho jih-pao 1i~ [United Daily News;1

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Ta-hsueh [The Intellectual,

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A QUARTERLY OF NEW IDEAS AND LIVE WORK FIRST ISSUE DECEMBER 1, 1971: GROWING OUT OF THE SIXTIES ART I CLES BY Jan Kott Donald Richie
Richard Gilman Peter Brook Ed Bullins Joe Chaikin R. G. Davis Erika Munk

~~l" J'1J,1tlJ,~'Y l' "(~l,r. J'1J

PERFORMANCE l~:SCRIPTS

first issue October 1. 1971 Donald Kaplan Albert Bermel Michael Roloff Gordon Rogoff Peter Feldman and many others Film Aesthetics Leaving America Playwriting Radical Illusions

~o,);

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the first publication designed to get texts directly to commercial. non-commercial and university theatres all over America

FOR:

the writer. spectator. director. teacher. actor. student, armchair phantasist

WILL INCLUDE:
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ON:

Groping the Audience Shakespeare for the Seventies What's Wrong with Critics Performing Collectives The Avant-Garde and the Media

SPECIAL ISSUES COMING LATER: Sexuality and Performance

Theater after the revolution: Cuba. Chile. Yugoslavia. Algeria Popular Entertainment articles. interviews. reports from abroad photos. diagrams. documents The editors and staff of Performance and SCripts are the same people who until May. 1971. put out The Drama Review.

SOME OF SCRIPTS t CONTRIBUTOR/ PLAYREADERS :

Ed Bullins Rochelle Owens Megan Terry Ronald Tavel Susan Yankowitz Sally Ordway Murray Mednick David Rabe

Jean-Claude van Itallie Sharon Thie Charles Ludlam Adrienne Kennedy Daniel Moore James Lineberger Rosalyn Drexler Sam Shepard

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Soa..ee Male..ials oa Philippiae Bevolalioaa..)' MoveDlenls

by William Pomeroy
For the American Asian scholar, the research and writing of Philippine his tory is still in its virginal stages. Both in the United States and in the Philippines itself the study of that history has progressed little deeper than the officially-expressed record, in which the viewpoint of dominant inter ests has prevailed. Neglected in parti cular have been the revolutionary forces and movements that have played such a central part in the Philippines for the past century. The only movements that have been fairly well-documented and studied are the reformist Propaganda Movement (1882 1892) that campaigned, mainly in exile in Spain, for reforms in the Spanish colonial system, and the revolutionary Katipunan that succeeded it in 1882 and spearheaded the Revolution of 1896 that brought Spanish rule to the brink of destruction. For the Propaganda Move ment a wealth of primary sources pro duced by its participants--historical works, pamphlets, novels, essays, poetry--are available in print, and the files of the Movement's fortnight ly paper, La Solidaridad, published in Barcelona and Madrid and smuggled into the Philippines, are available in Fi1ipiniana collections in Madrid and Manila. For the Katipunan there is much less documentary material, simply be cause not much of it was written and produced in this mass movement of artisans, workers and peasants; a few articles, statements of credo, poems, and two issues of the Katipunan news paper, Kalayaan [Freedom], only one of which was distributed, exist. Added to these are the memoirs and recollections of participants in both movements that appeared in magazines and periodicals in the Philippines 74 over the first decades of this century, particularly in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, when a revival of nationalism occurred. The American conquest of the Philip pines from Spain and from the Filipinos themselves that began in 1898 brought on the next stage of revolutionary struggle. It was conducted by the First Philippine Republic and then by a reor ganized Katipunan. This period had two distinct phases: the first (1899-1902) was led by revolutionary colonial middle class elements who gradually capitulated to United States rule, while the second was a "second wind" revolt by peasants and workers and a sprinkling of the more determined middle-class individ uals (1902-1907). A mass of documents that have bare ly been skimmed exists for the first phase of this period. Mainly they are the papers of the Philippine revolu tionary government headed by Emilio Aguinaldo. Consisting of around 400,000 items, these had been seized and brought to the United States, where they remained in the War Department and then the Army Department until 1953, and with the National Archives until 1957, when the U.S. Congress "donated" them to the Republic of the Philippines. In October 1958, they were finally turned over to the Philippines Bureau of Public Libraries. Here are all the records of a revolutionary government engaged in a war for independence--proclamations, reports, orders, legal decisions, offi cial communications, military decrees for both regular and guerrilla warfare, minutes of meetings, resolutions, as well as diaries and pamphlets. Unfor tunately, these have been badly rifled

by descendents of Filipino families that collaborated unsavorily with the Ameri can regime, in an attempt to expunge the record. This collection has been known as the Philippine Insurgent Records. It is likely that they were microfilmed for the u.s. National Archives before being turned over to the Philippine Govern ment. Other collections, mainly of reproduced excerpts from the Insurgent Records, are in the National Archives and Library of Congress: the compila tion of Capt. Robert H. Noble, that of Capt. John R. M. Taylor, and a collec tion by John R. Thomas, Jr. For the "second wind" phase of the struggle against American conquest, the materials are scattered and large ly uninvestigated. Some may be found in the reports of the American Commission Government in the Philippines. A limited amount of research has been done by Filipino historians and writers. Recol lections of participants and eyewitnesses have occasionally appeared in Philippine magazines, requiring a painstaking search of their files since at least 1910. There are also newspapers that served as the voice of the independence strug gle. The revolutionary government issued its own paper that was printed from September 28, 1898, to October 1899. It was called successively El Heraldo de Revoluci6n, Heraldo Filipino, Indice Oficial, and Gaceta de Filipinas. Printed on a press that tried to be mobile, it suspended publication when the shift to guerrilla warfare was made. More famous was a private paper, La Independencia, edited by Antonio Luna, the Republic's military commander-in chief, who brought some of the leading revolutionary intellectuals onto his staff. Printed on the government press, it was a militant propaganda organ, but its span of life was roughly the same as that of the government organ. Copies or reproductions of these papers may be found in Filipiniana

collections in Manila. Several other papers were published at this time, with brief careers, in different parts of the Philippines, and the contents of some have been preserved. For the latter phase of the period there was no revolu tionary organ of the guerrilla forces, but in Manila a trade union and working class movement that maintained ties with the guerrillas and resisted American occupation put out a number of short lived newspapers. The first of these, La Redenci6n del Obrero-Ang Manggagwa, was the organ of the Uni6n Obrera DemocrAtica and appeared for a time in 1902. In 1903 this federation, under American suppressive pressure, was re formed as Uni6n Obrera DemocrAtica de Filipinas, and from February to May, 1903, it issued an organ, Los Obreros. These papers were suppressed and con fiscated for sedition. By the end of the first decade of the century the Philippine revolution ary movement had been suppressed or stifled. It did not reemerge in other forms until the 1920s. In the after math of World War I, when attempts to gain independence by parliamentary procedure had been frustrated, revo lutionary organizations began to develop among Filipino workers and peasants, on whom the effects of colonial exploitation rested most severely. A National Association of Philip pine Peasants [Kalipunang Pambansang mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas, or KPMP] was organized in 1922. In Manila a Congreso Obrera de Filipinas [Philip pine Workers' Congress, or COF] had been set up as early as 1913, and this be came radicalized in the early 1920s. The COF, after sending delegates to Pan-Pacific trade union conferences in Canton and Hankow in 1925 and 1927, became formally affiliated to the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secre tariat in 1927. The PPTUS was linked with the Profintern, the trade union body of the Comintern. In the same year the KPMP also affiliated with the PPTUS and also joined the Kres 75

11
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tintern, the peasant union. body of the Comintern. These developments hastened the growth of Marxist leadership in the Philippine labor movement and national liberation movement. In 1929 the COF split along ideological lines, the left-wing grouping headed by Crisanto Evangelista seceding to set up the Katipunan ng mga Anak Pawis ng Pili pinas [Proletarian Labor Congress of the Philippines, or KAP]. The labor leaders of the KAP and of the KPMP founded the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1930, and publicly launched it on November 7 of that year. Primary source material on these important events, which created the leadership for Philippine revo lutionary movements from 1930 to the present day, is to be found less in Philippine publications than in peri odicals of the Comintern and its related bodies, to which some of the Filipino Marxists contributed. (There are no published books on the history of the Philippine labor movement. A volume on the Communist Party of the Philippines produced in 1961 by the Philippine Department of National Defense is studded with errors and is quite unreliable. A doctoral thesis by Antonio S. Araneta, Jr., "The Commun ist Party of the Philippines and the Comintern, 1919-1930," which is deposi ted in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, England, is a more authentic source.) The weekly International Press Cor respondence (Inprecor) , a publication of the Comintern, carries many reports from the Philippines from 1925 until the outbreak of World War II. The Pan Pacific Worker, the organ of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, pub lished in Hankow and Shanghai in 1927 1928, and in San Francisco until 1930, has detailed reports of Philippine labor, peasant and anti-imperialist struggles. Its successor, The Pan Pacific Monthly, published from 1929-1930 in San FranciSCO, also 76

has similar reports. The proceedings of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Confer ence in Hankow in May 1927 were pub lished, with a report and resolution on the Philippines. The Red Internation al of Labor Unions magazine for August 1929 has an article by Crisanto Evan gelista on the split in the COF that led to the creation of KAP, and an analysis of Philippine problems re lated to it. Files of these periodicals are in the Marx Library in London, and some are to be found in the library of the American Institute of Marxist Studies in New York. During the 1930s a number of revo lutionary labor and political period icals appeared in the Philippines. The Communist Party, after being outlawed almost from its inception in 1930, achieved a degree of legality in 1938 and, between then and the out break of the Pacific war in December 1941 that brought Japanese invasion, published a newspaper, Kalayaan. In Pampanga province the peasant and labor union, Aguman ding Maldang Tala pagobra [League of Poor Laborers, or AM!], the labor union wing of a Socialist Party that merged with the Communist Party in 1938, produced a newspaper, AMT. The Sakdal movement, a Japanese-financed mainly peasant movement of a millenarian character, had a newspaper, Sakdal, that reflect ed and aroused peasant unrest. A whole new revolutionary period began with the start of Japanese occupation during World War II, last ing from the beginning of 1942 until early 1945. Many guerrilla movements developed on all main islands of the Philippines, but except for the guer rilla force organized by the Communist Party these were of a purely military nature and did not have revolutionary content. The Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon [People's Army Against Japan, or Hukbalahap], the Communist-led move ment, organized popular governments among the people, rent-free production

by the peasants, and a revolutionary out look of liberated areas. A number of periodicals, in mimeo graphed form, were issued by the Huk balahap and by the Communist Party during the war years. In their polit ical content and agitational material, these differed markedly from the sheets put out by other guerrilla groups in the Philippines, which merely reproduced allied news broadcasts. The leading Communist paper and first to appear was Katubusan [Redemption], in August 1942; it had a united front character and sought to appear weekly. A paper for the Hukbalahap armed forces, Hukbalahap, be gan publication in November 1942. Another organizational paper with a united front approach, Patnubay [Guide], made its appearance later in the war, mainly in Manila and the surrounding area. Also in Manila, the Communist Party helped set up a League of National Liberation, with a middle-class base; it had its own organ, United Front. The Hukbalahap gave great attention to propaganda and cultural work. It created a Cultural and Information Department (CID) that organized several drama groups, sending them on tours of villages with the guerrilla troops. With professional writers and actors in their ranks, they produced many full-length plays, agitational skits, songs and poems, in which the problems of the struggle were vividly portrayed. For the historian and researcher, the compilation of this material pre sents a difficult but not impossible task. The writer was able to see and to assemble a large amount of it during and innnediately after the war, and to witness some of the performance of the CID. Although it was published in the name of Lu{s Taruc, as his "autobi ography", the writer was the actual author of Born of the People, which is mainly a history of the Hukbalahap and of the development of the wartime resist

ance to the Japanese into the guerrilla national liberation movement of the postwar period. The writing of Born of the People was not the product of academic scholarship. Material for it was ob tained from the Communist-led under ground movement itself, to which access was gained only because of the organiza tional connections and established trustworthiness of the writer. Much of it was based on a great many interviews with Communist and Huk leaders that could only be obtained by lengthy visits to guerrilla camps in mountains, forests and swamps, while the wartime and post war literature of the movement was acquired piece by piece from individuals. (During 1946 and 1947, however, the Communist Party issued a newspaper printed in Manila, Katubusan.) Philippine independence, handed over by the United States on July 4, 1946, produced a neo-colonial republic. Its first step', to prevent the consolida tion of extensive nationalist opposi tion to the nature of independence, was an armed campaign of suppression against the revolutionary movement that had been greatly strengthened by its experiences in fighting the Japanese invaders. Begun in August 1946, it precipitated a popular armed struggle of resistance that developed into a large-scale national liberation strug gle. The Hukbalahap, by 1948, was trans formed into the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan [Army of National Liberation, or HMB]. Still Communist-led, it embarked on a nationwide guerrilla war and on mass organization of the people around its program. The writer and his Filipino wife (veteran of the wartime Hukbalahap) participated in the postwar liberation struggle, first in the movement's Manila underground from 1947-1950, and then in the guerrilla forces in the mountains from 1950-1952. They were mem bers of the National Education Depart
77

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ment of the movement, which produced all the propaganda, textbooks and other lit erature of the movement. Consequently he is familiar with the materials issued then and subsequently which state the positions of the movement and its inter pretation of contemporary events as well as of their historical background. One of the most useful sets of docu ments produced in this period is the series of Political Transmissions issued for circulation within the move ment as policy guidance. These were in numbered sequence, the first, Political Transmission No.1, appearing in mid 1948. Issued at irregular intervals, about twenty of these were produced up to the mid-1960s. Written at first by Jos~ Lava, general secretary of the Communist Party, until his arrest in October 1950, they were continued by Jesus Lava, who succeeded him in that post, until he was arrested in 1964. They represent, however, a consensus of leadership views, and comprise exten sive analyses of the national and inter national situations and a setting forth of tasks and directives. All of these, at one time or another, fell into the hands of Philippine intel ligence agencies and their American counterparts, along with the minutes of meetings of the movement's Political Bureau (1948-1950) and an extremely de tailed correspondence between all the Communist and Huk leaders carried on in those years. Therefore the original documents or reproductions exist in Philippine and United States govern ment files. This is also the case as far as a vast amount of other literature of the Huk liberation struggle is concerned. The National Education Department of the movement produced the following: --A theoretical magazine, Ang Komunista (despite its Tagalog title i t was issued in English), of which five issues appeared from 1950-1952. Each issue contained from six to ten 78

articles on a variety of questions of the struggle by leading cadres. --A newspaper for general circula tion, Titis [The Spark], which was issued weekly for a time and then irreg ularly from 1948-1954. Also, a news paper for circulation within the Huk armed forces, Mandirigma [Soldier], appearing roughly at the same time as Titis. --A cultural magazine, Kalayaan, containing poetry, stories and essays. --A set of textbooks, entirely prepared by NED personnel, for use in the movement's school system in polit ical training. These included: Political Economy (adapted to Philippine circum stances), Marxist Philosophy, History of the Philippine National Liberation Movement, Strategy and Tactics (in Phil ippine political struggles), Military Strategy and Tactics (especially guer rilla warfare in the Philippines), The Party Constitution and Organizational Principles, The Nature of the State and of Revolution, Proletarian Ethics (ethi cal and moral concepts in an armed liberation struggle). --A series of pamphlets for mass circulation, dealing with issues as they arose, and a series of booklets produced for self-study of Huk soldiers and political cadres on a variety of theoretical subjects.
--A considerable number of policy directive documents.

Between 1946 and 1952, quite a few interviews with Huk leaders, mostly ob tained in the field by enterprising correspondents, were published in the Manila press. Several of these were with Lu{s Taruc (approximate dates of some: April 1947, March 1950). State ments and articles by leading cadres also appeared in the press at times during these years, including a series (cut short by government intervention in May-June 1948 giving the Huk side

I
on negotiations for an amnesty. Details of the so-called "Polit buro Trial" of leading cadres arrested in October 1950 may be found in the Manila press from that date until the trial's conclusion in May 1951. A series of Philippine Supreme Court decisions on the appeals arising out of the in numerable cases of "rebellion complexed with murder, arson, robbery and kidnap ping", the charge under which arrested Huks were tried, with the first deci sion made in 1956, offer significant material. Studies of the Huk liberation strug gle that have been undertaken have re lied mainly on sources emanating from official Philippine or American agencies or have sought a peripheral analysis of materials relating to Philippine conditions. While these sources are essential for fully objective history, they provide only a part, and often a distorted part, of the period and its interpretation. A determined researcher has two possible lines of approach to fill in the gaps: to pry open the files of captured Huk documents (some of which have been made available to researchers with an official cachet), or to search out copies in private Filipino hands,
as well as to interview participants
in the struggle (i.e., those whom the
attritions of armed struggle and pro
longed prison sentences have left
alive)
Since 1963 a recognizably new wave of revolutionary struggles has been developing in the Philippines, along with a growth of nationalist movements. These are producing much literature that needs attention for studies of the present period. One of the seminal publications of the period was started by students and university intellectuals with a Marxist outlook, ProgresSive Review, the first issue of which appeared in June 1963. A printed magazine with ten to twelve articles per issue, it was published irregularly until 1967, ten issues in all. Edited by Jos~ M. Sison, it even tually became identified with a mili tant youth organization, Kabataang Maka bayan [Nationalist Youth]. The Progres sive Review foundered when Sison develop ed what has become known as a Maoist outlook and sought to influence both the magazine and the organization total ly toward that orientation. The last two issues reflect this trend. In the result ing internal friction, the Kabataang Makabayan split, leaving Sison with a majority. Up to this point Philippine popular movements and organizations had been more or less influenced by the Communist Party of the Philippines, which had been Virtually the sole ideological leader of the revolutionary national libera tion movement, and they had had unity. The division precipitated by Sison brought a diversity of trends on the scene, particularly among student groups, each of which has produced publications of varying life-spans. Among them have been: Kilusan [Movement], put out by the majority Marxist group that split from the Kabataang Makabayan and formed the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pili pino [Free Union of Filipino Youth], a printed magazine in Tagalog; Struggle, a mimeographed periodical (it began to appear in printed form in January 1971) issued by the Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, a large and politically active body; Praxis, a magazine connected with the Samahang Demokratong Kabataan [Democrat ic Youth League], a New Leftish split off from the Kabataang Makabayan. There are a host of others, while the regular student newspapers of all the leading universities have been cap tured by militant student groups and converted into organs of revolutionary sounding nationalism. Organizations like the MPKP, the KM and the SDK have the practice of issuing pamphlet- or leaflet-style "position papers" on all the main issues of the day. 79

&

Many of those with a revolutionary outlook were associated with the Movement for the Advancement of Nation alism [Makahansang Adhikaing Nagkakaisa, or MAN], founded in 1967 as an essential ly propaganda and agitational organiza tion. In 1970 MAN started to issue a bi monthly mimeographed periodical, Sang ayon sa MAN [According to MAN], con taining articles and documents; early in 1971 this began to be printed. In January 1971 MAN also started issuing a printed 8-page monthly periodical, Political Review. Many basic documents analyzing Philippine society and condi tions have been issued by MAN, collected in at least two booklets, The Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (1967) and M.A.N. 's Goal: The Democratic Fili pino Society (1969). Another organization that has re leased a program and position documents is the Malayang Samahan Mags as aka (MASAKA), or Free Peasants League. Organized in 1967, the MASAKA is strong ly based in the old Huk base areas of Central Luzon and is the successor of the mass peasant unions on which the former Huk movement was largely found ed. Its material deals with the ques tions of land reform and of anti-imper ialism. At the beginning of 1971 the Com munist Party of the Philippines started to issue a monthly theoretical organ, Ang Komunista. This is turned out in both English and Tagalog editions. Although intended for internal use of the CPP, a researcher could no doubt obtain copies. A researcher has the problem at present of picking his way through a confusion of groups that have followed in the wake of the subsidence of the Huk armed struggle. Despite a shift by the Communist-led Huk movement from armed to legal and peaceful forms of struggle after 1956, armed units were retained in being, chiefly in the countryside. One of these, in Pampanga province, led by a former Huk named Sumulong, turned
80

to banditry and gangsterism, but sought to represent itself in inter views and press statements as the gen uine Huk movement. Such materials may mislead a student of the period. The Sumulong group was largely destroyed in 1970 by conflicts with the genuine HMB forces and government military for ces, and Sumulong surrendered to the government. The HMB armed units' lead ership has issued leaflets on occasion, signed by Commander Diwa. In 1969 the Sison group created its own Communist Party of the Phil ippines and formed an alliance with a discontented lieutenant of Sumulong, Commander Dante, to set up a New People's Army. This existed for a time in the southeast corner of Tarlac pro vince, but when it began killing HMB and MASAKA members in villages, the HMB drove it out of Tarlac in 1970 and it shifted to the mountain pro vinces of northern Luzon. Sison (who employs the pseudonym "Amado Guerrero") has issued a mimeographed publication, Ang Bayan [The People], with the mast head "Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philip pines." Frequently quoted in the Manila press as if it were the spokes man of the established Communist Party, it reprints much material from Chinese periodicals and devotes most of its space to attacks on the long-existing Communist Party, which is an outlawed party whose members and activities are not easily traced by an observer or researcher. This is a period of great ferment, upheaval and motion in the Philippines, and it is likely that many other organ iZations and publications voicing their programs and positions will make their appearance as it develops. In this sense it is probable that it will provide a richer field of research and study than other revolutionary periods of Philippine history. For the American Asian scholar, it is a good time to begin while the print is hot on the pages.

---"..,..,-

..~

ADDENDA The writer would like to call atten tion to the considerable work of re search and historical writing produced at the Institute of the Peoples of Asia in Moscow, USSR, a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This has a Southeast Asia department with a Phil ippines section. It has published a large number of books that are studies in depth of Philippine history and prob lems, perhaps the most impressive body of work on the subject done by any single institution. Among its titles are: Filippinskaia Respub1ika 1898 goda i Amerikanskii Imperializm [The Philip pine Republic of 1898 and American Im perialism], by Academician Alexander Guber, 1961. Filippini mezhdu pervoi i vtoroi

mirovymi voynami [The Philippines Be tween the First and Second World Wars], by Georgi I. Levinson, 1958. Filippini vchera i segodnia [The Philippines Yesterday and Today], by Georgi I. Levinson, 1959. Filippinskaia natsional'naia bur zhuaziia v borbe za nezavisimuiu vneshnuiu torgovliu [The Philippine National Bourgeoisie and the Struggle for an Independent Foreign Trade Policy], by Olga Barishnikova, 1962. Dr. Levinson has a nearly-completed work-in-progress on the Philippine independence movement of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, with emphasis on the revolutionary movement of the time. All the above volumes have been published by the Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow.

INDOCHINA

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tary Service in Vietnam, was the man most responsible for exposing the Tiger Cages of Con-Son island. He also co authored Viet-Nam: The Unheard Voices (Cornell, 1969), and is now conducting a "Mobile Education Project" through the towns and small cities of the Eastern United States. The Center strongly encourages participation by a wide vatiety of specialists on Indochina, wherever you may be located. Also, any requests from local groups for information or assistance will be given high priority. Twice-monthly the Center publishes the Indochina Chronicle, aimed at dis seminating information, translations, analyses, etc. not normally available in the commercial press. Subscriptions are available at $10 per year.

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Provisional Editorial Board HAMZA ALAVI KE ITH BUCHANAN MALCOLM CALDWELL JEAN CHESNEAUX NOAM CHOMSKY
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Additional Soa..ce Mate..ials on

Philippine Radical MovelD.ntl

by len Kerkvliet
William Pomeroy's bibliographical essay is useful for future scholarship. I would, however, like to offer some supplementary information based upon my research and writing about radical peasant movements in the Philippines for the 1944-56 period. l There is a wealth of information to explore, both in the Philippines and in the United States, and there is hope that radical movements in the Philippines will be given the proper recognition they de serve. In particular, the post-World War II Huk movement has been pictured for too long simply in terms of a counter-insurgency problem for the Philippine and United States govern ments. Using alternative sources, the Huks can be seen from the perspective of the participants themselves. The history of the Huk movement is a classic case of peasant unrest esca lating into a rebellion because the severe social and economic conditions became worse while reactions became increasingly harsh. The intense unrest in Central Luzon began at least two decades before the Huk rebellion. The principal causes lay at the foundation of the egrarian society--the relation ship between landlords and tenants. For decades the traditional paternalistic landlord-tenant relationship had been deteriorating. The landlord became less a patron and more a labor contractor. As landlords became more concerned with putting the operations of their large farms on a sounder economic basis, their relationship to their tenants dwindled to a narrow economic tie. Peasants, on the other hand, con tinued to look upon landlords as patron protectors. They still held traditional expectations from a re lationship that, through no fault of their own, had changed. These inconsistencies between ex pectation and reality produced ten sions that in turn, through several intermediate steps, led to unrest. Peasants gradually organized themselves to collectively demand from landlords the goods and services that before had been automatic between any single peasant and his landlord. As the peasant unions became stronger and explored various avenues for reforms, including political ones, the reactions of author ities and landed elites became unfavor able. Worse than that, the reactions became violent and brutal. Eventually peasants reluctantly had to defend them selves. The peasants of Central Luzon shifted to rebellion. Later the Com munist Party [PKP] joined the rebel lion. Up to that point the Party's role had been marginal. Indeed, the PKP had even opposed the peasant organizations' rebellious activities. To be sure, there is little pub lished secondary material concerning radical activities during the 1900 1941 period. Two unpublished works that should be consulted, however, are Renze L. Hoeksema's Communism in the Philippines dissertation [Harvard Uni versity, 1956] and William Mayfield's "The Development of Organized Labor in the Philippines" [MA thesis, Uni ver sity of the Philippines, 1956]. Both also have information for the post-World War II period. Hoeksema's disserta tion is a lengthy, detailed study of the PKP at the national level. It largely excludes, however, what was actually happening at lower levels of the Party and among the peasants and
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laborers that the Party was supposedly organizing. Two other unpublished dis sertations are also valuable for the prewar radical movements: Roy Stubbs, Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-35 [University of Califor nia, Berkeley, 1951], and David R. Stur tevant, Philippine Social Structure and its Relation to Agrarian Unrest [Stan ford University, 1958]. Readers should watch for two forth coming publications. John Larkin's The Pampangans [University of California Press] is an excellent detailed local history of one province in Central Luzon, the core of peasant radicalism in the 20th century. David Sturtevant has an in-depth study of millenarian movements from the l840s to 1941. Several of those millenarian groups were directly or indirectly related to the unrest that eventually gave birth to the post-World War II Huk movement. Both of these forthcoming monographs analyze the social and economic con ditions underlying the unrest; their central theme is the disintegration of the traditional society. These studies are the best so far for under standing the basic causes of Philip pine unrest in the provinces. For primary sources, one should not overlook collections in the Library of Congress. The Bureau of Insular Affairs records are useful (and well organized) for any detailed research on Philippine history prior to World War II, including radical movements. Another source is the Joseph Hayden Collection at the University of Michi gan. More accessible, and perhaps equally useful, are Manila daily newspapers. The Library of Congress has a fairly complete set of newspaper microfilms. In the Philippines, the libraries at both the University of Santo Tom~ and the University of the Philippines (Quezon City) have good newspaper collections for the post 1900 period. This writer was pleasant ly surprised to find considerable coverage of the causes of unrest, 84

labor and peasant activities, and re formist organizations for the prewar period. Through a careful reading of daily newspapers, one can piece to gether a substantial amount of the history of Philippine radicalism. Another primary source for those in the Philippines is interviews with for mer radical leaders and activists. Given proper respect, most will freely discuss their experiences and reminisce about the past.
As Pomeroy points out, the radical movements prior to World War II did have occasional publications of their own--the AMI, Sakdal, and Kalayaan, among others. However, this researcher was unable to track down any issues, even though there are supposed to be copies of the Sakdal in the National Library in Manila. The PKP also had publications prior to the war, the most regular being Titis [Spark]. But none seem to have survived in the Philippines. It is reasonable to suspect that the Library of Congress in Washington and other American gov ernment libraries would have some of these. Crisanto Evangelista, the prewar president of the PKP, does have a book in the National Library: Patnubay sa Kalayaan at Kapalayaan [Guide to Free dom and Liberation, 1941]. The first part is a long speech Evangelista de livered in November 1940 to the Fourth Convention of the PKP. The second is a report of the PKP for 1940.

Other primary sources produce rele vant information for prewar radicalism. Perhaps least useful, yet still worth while, are the Historical Data Papers found in the Filipiniana section of the National Library. Varying tremendously in quality, they are intended to be general histories for each province, municipality by municipality, from way back up to the time written, which was about 1951. These papers were written by teachers and other interested resi dents of each municipality. There is at least one volume for most provinces of the country. These papers sometimes

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make references to local peasant or labor groups and unions, sporadic up risings, and millenarian followings. Those for Central Luzon tell of activi ties of the various anti-Japanese guer rilla armies during World War II, especially the Hukbalahap. For the post war period, there is information, al though usually biased negatively, about the activities of the HMB [Huks]. Also found in the National Library are the papers of two late presidents: Manuel Quezon and Manuel Roxas. The Quezon Papers are also on microfilm in the University of the Philippines library and in the University of Michigan library. Having never gone through the Quezon Papers, I cannot speak with much author ity about their utility for research on radical movements. John Larkin, how ever, reported that there were only a few items concerning peasant organiza tions in Pampanga. The Roxas Papers, however, are useful for both pre- and postwar peasant movements. Roxas held high government posts prior to World War II, including Secretary of the Rural Progress Administration. Since this agency was involved in buying, administering and selling some large Church estates, the collection in cludes documents regarding the large peasant unrest that exploded from time to time on these estates. In particular, there are documents concerning the Dumating Na, Handa Na, and Atin Na. The first two were large peasant unions on the Buenavista Estate in Bulacan, while Atin Na was a sister organization on the Bahay Pare hacienda in Pampanga. For the postwar period, there are documents in the Roxas Papers con cerning Huk activities. These, how ever, are not numerous. The best collection of primary materials on the Hukbalahap (during the Japanese occupation) and the HMB-PKp2 (post-Japanese occupation) is still with the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP]. Most documents are housed at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City. Dating from 1944 up

into the 1950s, these materials were confiscated from the Hukbalahap and the HMB-PKP. But since the HMB-PKP move ment had reached a low ebb by about 1955-56, the number of documents after 1952 declined sharply. There are undoubtedly post-1956 documents, but I was not permitted to see them. For years these captured documents were classi fied and absolutely off limits to researchers. Now the documents, at least those pre-1957, are essentially useless to the AFP; they sit idle, collecting dust and becoming a fire hazard. This is not to say that the AFP is re leasing them--on the contrary. The AFP still claims possession, but is more willing to entertain requests by seri ous scholars, Filipino and non-Filipino, to use the documents. This writer was probably the first researcher privi leged to study the pre-1957 documents. Perhaps others will be allowed to follow. 3 Among the documents found there are the HMB-PKP sources cited by Pomeroy. There are also numerous others. Exactly how many is unknown; not even the AFP knows. There is no index for the docu ments or any other bibliographical re cord. The documents are simply gathered into folders according to broad topics- e.g., strategies, tactics, labor, pea sants, education, military, and communi cation. Also, documents covering such topics are filed under names of specific individuals involved in the movement. Again, there is no index of names. This writer studied over one thousand docu ments, which probably did not exhaust the holdings. Most are in Tagalog, but many are in other local dialects (es pecially Pampangan and Ilonggo) and English. Most of those in English ori ginated from the upper organs of the PKP or were instructional materials for top-level education classes. They are among the least interesting and informa tive documents. Roughly speaking, the captured docu ments fall into these categories: pub lications, educational materials, policy
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Foreign Subscription @ $ 6.50 ___________ SPECIAL OFFER @ $7.50 _ _ __

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directives, reports, and personal cor respondences. The bulk of the docu ments examined fell in the 1948-51 period. Roughly 20% were dated 1944-47 and another 20% were 1952-56. Publi cations came from the PKP, HMB, and the PKM [Pambansang Kais&~an ng mga Magbubukid, National Peasants' Union]. Most of the publications, which usually were done underground, are in newspaper format, covering national news, editori als, and feature articles. They provide important information about the activi ties of various radical organizations. Three such publications are Katubusan, Titis, and Mapagpalaya. Titis resumed postwar publication in 1949 and con tinued until about 1954--sometimes on a monthly basis, but more frequently not. Katubusan [Redemption] began as a publication during the Japanese occupa tion and continued after the war, merg ing with two other wartime sheets of the Hukbalahap. It continued to appear, usually monthly, until 1948. It appear ed again in 1954 and 1955, but volume numbers start over with Volume 1, Num ber 1, for March 24, 1954. Another PKP publication of note is the bi-monthly Ang Organizador. In format and content it is similar to Katubusan, but appar ently had a shorter life-span. The first issue is March 15, 1946, and the last to be found among the AFP holdings is July 31, 1946. Mapagpalaya [Liberation] was theo retically an HMB publication, but there was some overlapping, in staff and even articles, with the PKP publications. It was a bi-monthly publication that first appeared in 1949 (Volume 1, Num ber 3 is May 5). The AFP's collection of Mapagpalaya is less complete than for Katubusan and Titis, but apparent ly it ceased publication by mid-1952. Mapagpalaya was published in Tagalog, Pampangan, and possibly other dialects. The HMB central headquarters prepared master copies of the issue which were sent to the various regional headquar ters. Depending on the dialect of the region, the master copy might be trans

lated and additional news pertinent to that specific area would be inserted. Then the regional command ran off copies on portable mimeograph machines. Kalayaan [Freed0m], another HMB publication, was printed in the same fashion. The first issue of this cul tural magazine was June 1951. There are about ten issues in the AFP hold ings, the last being dated September 1955. In format and style, they are similar to vernacular teen magazines sold on newsstands th.:::-oughout the Philippines. The primary difference is that all the love stories, poems, pictures, and songs have an obvious revolutionary moral and the heroes and heroines are in the HMB-PKP movement. In addition to being delightful read ing, Kalayaan especially helps to re mind the researcher that the revolution is not abstract, but rather a human, living endeavor. Not only does the magazine itself show this, but one can easily imagine a tired Huk soldier reading an issue while sitting under a mango tree, laughing at the jokes and sharing the romantic stories with his comrades. The PKM publication was Magbubukid [Peasant]. Unfortunately, this useful paper died quickly, probably because the PKM began going underground by mid 1946. The AFP has only four issues, the last dated July 1946. As the title in dicates, Magbubukid had articles par ticularly relevant to the agrarian con ditions and peasant associations' activities. The above publications are impor tant primarily because of the news items and the general orientations and interpretations projected. To a lesser extent they are also useful for infor mation about the structure of particu lar parts of the movement and the radicals' general expectations and programs. At first the researcher might expect more from these publi cations--more detail and deeper, more

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penetrating analysis--until he reminds himself that the movement had numerous constraints and limitations. Furthermore, it was a young revolutionary movement. Naturally, these dif ficulties are reflected in the quality of the publications. Pomeroy's list of the educational materi als found among the captured documents is far "from exhaustive. Educational materials varied greatly in both quality and scope. Those de signed for young recruits tended to be far less theoretical than those for higher-level cadres. Among the educational materials, two are particularly important for historical background on the HMB-PKP. The first is Milestones of the Communist Party of the Phil ippines written by Jos~ Lava when he was still the Secretary-General of the PKP. This rela tively long document (about 50 pages) is a history of the Party based on notes Lava had compiled and memories and notes of other, long-time Party activists. 4 The second is History of the Peasant and Labor Movement in the Philippines by Guillermo Capadocia, a dedicated Party leader. The version found in the AFP collection is unsatisfactory because it is a poor English translation and parts are missing. Fortunately, a more complete and readable version exists in the Hernandez case exhibits, located at the Court of First In stance [CFI] in Manila. 5 Capadocia's History gives a useful account of the sequence in which various peasant and labor organiza tions were formed. There are far too many policy directives, reports, and personal correspondences to itemize fully here. Pomeroy refers to the Political Transmissions [PTs]. There were actually two series of PTs. The first began in 1948, but lasted for only three or four semi-annual issues. There seems to be only one of these among the captured documents. Then in mid-195l the second series began. Of these, there are ten consecutive numbers among the captured documents, issued semi annually between July 1951 and December 1955. All are in English except the fourth, which is in Tagalog. Originally they prob ably were issued in both languages. The pur pose of the PTs was to provide outlying cadres and HMB commanders with political, 88

social, and economic background about both international and national events and to outline general strategies of the PKP and keep all leaders abreast of decisions and policies of the Politburo and other top organs of the Party. Designed to supplement the PTs were the Organizer's Guides. These were more specific directives about tactics and tended to be more detailed about problems in the movement as learned from the reports cadres and commanders had submitted to the Polit buro. There are ten cons~cutively num bered OGs among the captured documents; Number 1 is dated August 1952 and Number 10 is January 1957. Among other reports and directives are results of Party conferences in the late 1940s and 1950s, minutes of some Regional Command [Reco] and sub Reco meetings, occasional reports on finances, recruiting, political situ ations, military encounters, etc. from field commanders, cadres, and other sub-units of Recos, or from Recos to the national offices of the HMB~PKP organization. Reco and sub-Reco re ports are crucial sources of infor mation about the microcosm level of the movement. Unfortunately, chrono logical consecutiveness for anyone Reco or sub-Reco is limited. But pieced together with other sources, these reports help provide the local perspective so essential for the ana lysis of any revolution. Also useful in this regard are the personal cor respondences. They also keep in the forefront the human quality of the movement. Among the reports and directives are a few from the PKM [National Pea sants' Union] dated 1945-48. These include some helpful provincial and sub-provinCial reports. Perhaps the two most revealing PKM documents among these AFP captured documents are Palawakin ang Kilusang Magbubukid [Ex

,
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J
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,,'
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pand the Peasant MOvement] and Pataka rang Pangkabukiran ng PKM [Agricultural Platform of the PKM]. The first, dated October 1946, is a plan for strengthen ing the PKM at a time of severe repres sion. Patakarang, dated March 20, 1946, is the most complete statement of the PKM's objectives for reforming the agricultural system in the Philippines. The basic theme of that reform is modi fications in the tenancy system: in creased shares for tenants and guaran teed low-interest (or no interest) loans from landlords. One wishes that more PKM documents had survived the ordeal. There are scant few among the AFP's holdings. For tunately, a few turned up among miscel laneous and helter-skelter files at Camp Crame, the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary [PC]. All are from Nueva Ecija for the years 1944-46; thus they provide a vivid picture of the PKM's activities in one place and time. There are also a few PKM documents among the Hernandez case exhibits. Based on what this writer could un cover, Camp Crame is by no means the gold mine of captured documents that the AFP's Camp Aguinaldo is. According to PC officials, most of their captured documents either went into court exhi bits as prosecution evidence or were turned over to the AFP. More accessible than the AFP cap tured documents are the exhibits for the celebrated Jos~ Lava et. al. (Polit buro) trial and the Amado Hernandez trial. These exhibits have documents confiscated from the HMB, PKP, PKM, and CLO [Congress of Labor Organiza tions]. The Hernandez exhibits are par ticularly rich with CLO material, dat ing from about 1946 to 1952. But there are also valuable documents from the other three groups, most of which are not duplicated in the AFP's holdings. Particularly useful is a small Kasay sayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pili pinas [History of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines]6, which complements

Lava's Milestones and Capadocia's History. The Hernandez exhibits also include a fairly complete set of re ports from the Manila-Rizal Regional Command [Marrcom]. Marrcom was the major organ for the PKP's activity in the Manila area during the years 1946-48. Since the Party placed heavy emphasis on labor unions during this period, the Marrcom and CLO documents furnish de tailed information about radical labor union history for this time period. The Lava et. al. exhibits are documents of the same kind found in the AFP holdings; indeed, some are du plicated there. Since they were confis cated in October 1950 during the blitz raids on the PKP's Manila headquarters, most are dated late 1949 and 1950. The documents are important because in 1949 50, the movement was making a concerted effort to strengthen its organization and map out future strategies. Of particular note is the correspondence between the Secretariat in Manila and key leaders in the provinces. (They are scattered through the M and 0 exhibits.) A May 1950 general report, Reco by Re co, of the entire organization gives a concise and candid assessment of the movement up to that point, plus a general list of thin~s to do to remedy critical weaknesses. Appended to the Lava et. al. exhi bits are exhibits from a CFI trial of some suspected Huks and Communists in Iloilo. The originals were in Ilonggo, but all have been translated into English. Their significance lies in pro viding information about the futile attempt of the HMB-PKP movement to build an organization and recruit sup port in the Negros Occidental and Iloilo provinces. Almost all are dated 1950, but since the expansion effort survived only about one year in those provinces, these documents give a fairly complete picture of the problems encountered. They certainly supplement related material about the region found i~ the Lava et. ale exhibits and the AFP s holdings. 89

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The Lava exhibits were originally for CFI, Manila, Criminal Cases 14071, 14082, 14315, 14344, 14270, all of which became Supreme Court Case L 4974 78. The Hernandez exhibits were for CFI, Manila, Criminal Case 15841, which became Supreme Court Case L 6025-26. Originally there were far more exhibits in the Lava et. ale cases than exist today. A fire at the PC headquarters destroyed all the original exhibits. By using duplicates held by either the courts or by the AFP, the exhibits were reconstructed as completely as poss ible. 8 The reconstituted exhibits, which are photostats, were returned to the CFI, Manila, where they can be found today with the Clerk of Court. The Hernandez exhibits are suffering a difficult fate: slowly rotting away due to water seepage in the CFI's store room at City Hall. Lack of space and little appreciation of their importance have left these Hernandez documents im properly stored and neglected. However, now the University of the Philippines library is microfilming all the Lava et. ale exhibits and all those salvage able from the Hernandez exhibits. Thus, in the near future researchers can conveniently read them on microfilm at the UP library. More importantly, these artifacts of Philippine history will be forever preserved. NOTES 1. I am grateful to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program and the Mid-West Universities' Consortium for research grants for my study. 2. HMB=Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bay an [People's Liberation Army]. 3. This writer had no connection with either the Philippine or United States government, nor did the United States government or any official repre sentative intervene on my behalf to help arrange for the documents. Such arrangements were made between the mili tary authorities and myself. No stipula tions were imposed except 1) I would study no documents beyond 1956, and 90

2) notes were allowed but documents could not be xeroxed, photographed, or removed from the building. Informally, I was politely requested to donate a copy of my finished dissertation to the library at Camp Aguinaldo. 4. Pomeroy himself made some com ments for corrections and additions after he had read the first draft of Lava's Milestones. His comments are found in a letter to Gaston [Jos~ Lava] from Bob [William Pomeroy], July 9, 1950. (Exhibit 0 345-46, Lava et. al., Criminal Case 14071, etc., Court of First Instance [CFI] , Manila.) There is another copy of Milestones in the library of Ateneo University, Quezon City, Philippines. 5. Exhibit W 167-218, Hernandez, Criminal Case 15841, CFI, Manila. 6. Exhibit W 411, Hernandez, Criminal Case 15841, CFI, Manila. 7. Pangkalahatang Ulat Pang-or ganisasion [General Organizational Report], Exhibit 0 1049, Lava et. al., Criminal Case 14071, etc., CFI, Manila. 8. Cf. Hearings on Reconstitution of Politburo Exhibits, 1959; and Report of Commissionaire Bienvenedo Ejerceto. Supreme Court, Records Branch, Manila.

S.ECIIlL SUPPLEMENT Mode... Chi.a Siadies

Th. A.....ica. Asia.

Sladi.s ESlablish....1

by Columbia University CCAS

I. PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE FOR AN INQUIRY INTO A MILITARY-ACADEMIC SYNAPSE: THE F.A.R. AND THE J.C.C.C.: SUMMARY OF POINTS Subsequent to a u.S. Army Symposium on its Limited-War Mission (1962), an or ganization called the Foreign Areas Research Coordinating Group [FAR] was formed under the State Department to coordinate foreign areas research and to recruit the interests of social scientists to the conduct of research relevant to the needs of FAR's member agencies: Army, Air Force, Navy, CIA, ACDA, etc. FAR's first step was to set up in 1964 a FAR China Subcommittee, chaired by Dr. Allen Whiting, and man dated to serve as a catalyst for the stimulation of research both in and out of government. In May 1965 the FAR China Subcommittee produced a "Statement of External Research Priorities" re flecting the needs of its member agen cies. The Statement was communicated to the Joint Committee on Contemporary China [JCCC] of the Social Science Re search Council [SSRC] and the American Council of Learned Societies [ACLS]. While the response of the JCCC to this Statement is still unclear, there is, prima facie, considerable correspondence between it and the work sponsored by the JCCC and, in fact, the work in the contemporary China field in general. We therefore demand access to the files of the FAR China Subcommittee to assess the extent of such correspond ence, if any. The JCCC came into being under a dubious mandate. It operates as a closed, top-down organization, anti thetical to the pluralistic spirit of

open academic inquiry, with members appointed by the SSRC, an exclusive organization funded mainly by the Ford Foundation. The JCCC has rejected reasonable requests for making its operations more open to the profession if not the public and thus disavowed its responsibility to be open about its deliberations. It is imperative for the integrity of the field that we determine whether there is anything inherent in the structure of the JCCC that makes it a possible counterpart to the FAR China Subcommittee. We therefore propose that a truly repre sentative, independent standing commit tee of the AAS (including CCAS) be constituted to undertake a complete and thorough inquiry into the JCCC, the SSRC, the East Asia division of the Ford Foundation, and in addition establish contact with those in other area studies (Africa, Latin America, etc.) concerned with these problems. The standing committee should report back to the profession via an AAS (or AAS-CCAS) panel at the 1972 annual convention. Genesis of FAR
As the broad strategy of the Cold War began ~o shift from Massive Retali ation to Counter-insurgency, towards the late fifties, the social or ethnographic sciences attained an im portance in the eyes of military planners not far below that of atomic weaponry. In the words of Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, "If we are better in formed .. about the cultural, political, and economic aspects of a nation we are in a better position to determine what

92

effects, if any [sic], the introduction of military force would have on the par ticular problem of concern. "1 Three years earlier, much the same appraisal of social science research is made, here by General Dick, Chief of Research and Development fo r the Army: "So cial science research provides an essential input to Army planning. "2 He also stated that "In doing this sort of thing [fight ing insurgency] I think we cannot know too much about the social pattern and stresses within the foreign country. It might be, for instance, advantageous not to even try to go after an identified group of insurgents merely because of the fact that they are resting within a Buddhist temple, something of this na ture. "3 These statements at Congres sional hearings go back to a concerted effort by the Army in 1962 to recruit social science research work. In his prepared statement to the Fascell Sub committee, Gen. Dick wrote, under the heading "Coordination of Behavioral and Social Science,"

meahanism for this purpose. Subsequently" the Offiae of Ex ternal Researah" Dept. of State" took the initiative in the estab lishment of an interdepartmental Foreign Areas Researah Coordina tion GTOUp [FAR]. The U.S. Army was among the partiaipating agen aies. 5
The FAR was formed in April 1964 to integrate research being done within government bureaus, in "quasi-nongovern ment al" think tanks, and in the univer sities. It fed initially to eleven and eventually some twenty-odd government agencies such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, ACDA [Arms Control and Dis armament Agency], and ARPA, but also the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Af fairs and the National Science Founda tion. FAR's cross-distrihution function would make research done for any parti cipating agency available to any other and relevant research done in the "pri vate community" available to all. In the traditional State Department intelli gence hierarchy FAR stands fourth: SD- INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] --XR [Office of External Research]--FAR; however, since at the beginning all but two of its member agencies were from the Dept. of Defense, it would appear that one bureaucratic rationale for FAR was to provide a service that would bring order to the State-Defense rivalry that flared up after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The scope and purpose of FAR are outlined in a State Department pamphlet: "Hore than a score of agencies have voluntarily joined under XR in forming FAR to compare and coordinate their plans for research contracts and to concert with private research groups the planning of research programs. ,,6 It should be stressed that FAR member agencies were keenly aware of their "dependence on universities ... for much of the knowledge and analysis needed in carrying out their missions. "7 Accor ding to a 1967 government publication,
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In 1962 the Army sponsored a symposium" 4 condUated by the Speaial Operations Researah Of fiae [SORO-framer of Projeat Camelot] on the subjeat of re searah needs in the soaial sai enaes relevant to the U.S. Army's limited war needs. The primary purpose of the symposium was to aaquaint the saientifia commun ity with the Army's needs for and interests in soaial saienae infor mation" and to rearui t their in terests to the oondUat of resea~h relevant to military needs. Aative partiaipation in and attendanae at the symposium aame fTOm the State Dept." AID" USIA" as well as from the mi Zi tary and fTOm the aaademia and saientifia aorrun unity at large. A primary aon alusion drawn from the disaussions was that interdepartmental aoordi nation of suah researah is of major importanae and that aonsider ation should be given for the establishment of an appTOpriate

Muah of the substantive work of the FAR takes plaae in the various subaommittees whiah are devoted to researah planning in a speaifia geographia or funational area: Afriaa, Latin Ameriaa, Southeast Asian development, international e dUaati on, behavioral saienae, and dOCMr/entation. Eaah small working group of professionals has a aommon researah interest and represents the relevant agen cies; it undertakes as one of its prinaipal tasks the identifiaa tion of researah priorities in its field. The subaommittees endeavor to maintain strong ties with mem bers of the private I'esearah aom munity to determine where gaps exist and where they aan be filled by govemment sponsorship of I'esearah. 8
FAR and the China Field The first meeting of FAR took place on April 9, 1964. This meeting focused on the substantial research problems and the priority needs of research on Commun ist China. 9 For the occasion the XR staff prepared a special inventory of govern ment-sponsored research on Communist China. Then, Dr. Allen S. Whiting, Direc tor of the State Department Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, summarized trends in China research for the thirty-five research administrators and specialists from twenty different agencies attending. These administra tors and specialists "agreed that Mr. Whiting's analysis of the history, current direction, and Government/aca demic resource map shed new light on the choices facing government in its search for more comprehensive knowledge of Communist China. Recognizing the need for a smaller working committee to follow up substantively some of the pressing questions raised at the first meeting, the group established a FAR China Subcommittee. Allen Whiting was appointed subcommittee chairman. "10 The purposes of this subcommittee were "1) to prepare recommendations 94

concerning long- and short-term govern mental research needs; 2) to serve as focal points of contact with the private research community; 3) to serve as catalysts for the stimulation of re search both in and out of government; 4) to present to FAR specific recom mendations regarding any and all aspects of research on their geographic area. "11 During the next year the FAR China Subcommittee sought to develop Dr. Whiting's suggestion that "Government contract research administrators should be aware of the types of China research best done within government, and that contract research funds ought to be spent only on 'researchable areas of inquiry,' avoiding those areas where our governmental strengths are most evident."12 This reference to a screen ing process within the context of the origin and development of the FAR China Subcommittee raises a basic question: are we dealing here with a continuum that breaks down into three main segments: 1) research within government agencies; 2) contract re search in think tanks and universi ties; 3) research conducted within formal academic structures, conferences, individual grants, dissertations, semi nar papers, etc.? Would such segmenta tion correlate with the broad distinc tion between "mission-oriented research" and ''basic research"? Is there overall organizational coordination of the whole? Something of the tension between "missions" and ''basic'' or "academic" research is communicated in the FAR newsletter: "Mr. Marvel listed .. major problems affecting foreign area re search: difficulty in finding a middle ground between mission-oriented re search and the highly theoretical work that a scholar often prefers. "13 The phrase "middle ground" should remind us that we know far too little about the relationship between basic and mission oriented research and that the way the FAR China Subcommittee defined "re searchable areas of inquiry" is uncer tain at this time. However, the words of Dr. Henry Riecken, currently presi

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dent of the Social Science Research Council,14 when he addressed the U.S. Army's Limited War Symposium as the Assistant Director for Social Sciences, National Science Foundation in 1962 are worth bearing in mind:
01

The Department of Defense is listed in the NSF figures as disbursing somewhere in the neighborhood of $15 million in psyahology and the other soaial saienaes, with psy ahology reaeiving over $14.5 million . . For what will these swns of nrmey be spent? They will be spent for a variety of aativities whose names sound quite distant from guerilla aativities or cold warfare ... We will be talking about problems of info~ation diffusion, deaision making and probZem solving, aom muniaation, ... and latent attitude analysis. 15
Returning to the State Department document prepared for the Fascell Sub committee to describe FAR, we read that "In order to spell out just what these researchable areas might be, the Sub committee determined very early to draw up a list of external research topics which would reflect the priority needs of all FAR agencies engaged in research on China... The findings of the Subcom mittee were issued [5/65] as the State ment of the Position of the FAR China Subcommittee on External Research Prior ities ... The Statement is now under dis cussion in the Joint Committee on Con temporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Coun cil of Learned Societies." 16 It is noteworthy that almost simultaneous with the issuance of the Statement, the Ford Foundation, primary funder of university foreign areas research, added a $1 mil lion grant to the SSRC for the JCCC to expand its research efforts on China. While a portion of this new funding went for studies in Republican China (19ll-l949, an enlargement of the

JCCC's scope which to this point had included post-1949 China only), the question should be raised: to what ex tent, if any, was the JCCC receptive to this overture from the FAR China SUb committee? It should be borne in mind that the JCCC is the leading academic organization in the Contemporary China field, and together with its subcommit tees and the para-Committee on the Eco nomy of China (all of SSRC) , administers corporately or via its membership (key professors from Columbia, Harvard, Berk eley, Seattle, Cornell, Michigan) most of the research in the field. There is no alternate organization or source of funds. In order to determine the degree, if any, to which the conferences and research sponsored by the above-men tioned committees have corresponded to the interests of the FAR member agencies, the files of the FAR China Subcommittee will have to be opened to the public. Prima facie, the corres pondence is considerable. A second contact between FAR and the JCCC is described in the 1968-1969 Annual Report of the SSRC (p.35). "To extend the review of the status and prospects of Chinese studies in the U.S . it [JCCC] held a conference in Washington on October 3-4 with repre sentatives of FAR [see appendix for roster]. The conference reviewed matters of mutual interest to China specialists in universities and in the federal government: optimum ways of sharing scarce dat a on Communis t China; develop ment of specialized technicians; rela tions of mission-oriented research to intellectual interests of scholars; and difficulties of universities with respect to acceptance of research con tracts from government agencies for re search on Communist China." It has been claimed that the purpose of this FAR JCCC meeting was to increase the flow of government-held materials to the private research community. This account from the Annual Report as well as the over whelming military intelligence repre sentation on the roster suggest a 95

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very different dynamic. Again, we are left with the question: was the FAR China Subcommittee fulfilling its mandate lito serve as a catalyst for the stimu lation of research l l ? Another compo.nent in this complex is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. Since the middle sixties this agency has financed research at a number of Olina studies centers. For ex ample, it has sponsored research at Columbia on differences and internal divisions among leadership groups in Olina; at Harvard on Olinese inter pretations of treaties and doctrine re lating to international organizations; at Michigan on the competition between defense requirements and economic develop ment. 17 ACDA is sponsoring strategic research at other centers and in other fields of Asian studies as well. The influence of these contract funds on the values, career goals, and promotion patterns of instructors and students needs to be investigated. Two noteworthy points: 1) IIACDA research in foreign attitudes towards arms control problems is closely coordinated with FAR which is charged with the systematic coordination of all government-sponsored research in the social sciences. "18 2) The Olina Arms Control Conference held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, in July of 1964 (transcript of proceedings is available) was chaired by the Olairman of the JCCC. At this conference much of the research ACDA funded was pre figured. In the light of the foregoing, it would seem proper that leading and senior China scholars, indeed the com munity of all students of Asia, lend their efforts towards making the re cords of the FAR China Subcommittee and the JCCC (plus sub- and para-committees) available to the community so that the perturbing questions herein may be con clusively settled. . .. Follow-up The preceding text (now revised in
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minor ways) was circulated first at the Asia Scholars to End the War [ASEW] Conference held in Washington in May of 1970. Since that time we have had one minimally satisfactory communication from Prof. John Lindbeck, Chairman of the JCCC since 1965 and Chairman of the July 1964 China Arms Control Con ference at Airlie House sponsored by ACDA. We have had one brief rejection of our request for further information from Dr. Allen Whiting. And we have had one lengthy rejection of our request to examine the JCCC files from Prof. Ezra Vogel. Finally, a letter was writ ten to Mr. John Holdridge of the Nation al Security Council Staff who succeeded Dr. Whiting as chairman of the FAR Olina Subcommittee in 1967; the letter, re questing an interview, has gone un answered. The above correspondence dates from the spring and summer of 1970. Dr. Lindbeck's letter, dated August 1, 1970, is a wide-ranging and helpful one and represents a first step in responding to the issues. On the ques tion of the FAR-JCCC relation he writes that Dr. Whiting's testimony that the FAR Statement was "under discussion in the JCCC" was mistaken. "The Statement . was sent on April 29, 1965, to me as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Con temporary China by Wm. J. Nagle, Olair man, Foreign Area Research Coordination Group [FAR]. The agenda for the meetings of the JCCC are often very full and for various reasons, I decided not to place Mr. Nagle's letter and its attached documents before the JCCC. Therefore the JCCC did not consider nor in fact have an opportunity to consider the statement " Our difficulty with his explanation is threefold. 1) Dr. Whiting's testi mony was not in the give-and-take of question and answer but rather in a written statement prepared beforehand for the record. 2) The fact that the JCCC did not formally consider the FAR Statement as an agenda item would not preclude other channels. 3) Was there something in the very organizational

nature of the JCCC that made Mr. Nagle, presumably at Dr. Whiting's suggestion, feel it was appropriate to approaCh the JCCC; and who are the members of the FAR China Subcommittee? Two weeks later, in mid-August, we were invited to Dr. Lindbeck's office to examine a sheaf of papers containing a copy of the FAR Statement, Mr. Nagle's letter of transmittal, and two brief memos exchanged between Dr. Lindbeck and Prof. John K. Fairbank. There was, notably, no reply to Mr. Nagle included in the sheaf. We were permitted only to read these documents and so must reconstruct from memory. The FAR Statement was a one or two page outline of basic research topics of such simplicity that a college student could easily have composed it. The Statement of 1/69 reproduced in the appendix is an amplification and sophistication but not an alteration of the 1965 State ~. In his memo to Prof. Fairbank, Dr. Lindbeck did not express a very high opinion of the intellectual value of the Statement. Prof. Fairbank agreed that it was too much of a "giveaway" and suggested that it not be channeled through the JCCC but rather referred back to the university-based Olina re search committees. Our reply to Dr. Lindbeck, dated August 18, 1970, con tained this question: "When Mr. Nagle's letter, together with the FAR Statement, reached you, and was discussed by you and Prof. Fairbank, was any formal re ply made to Mr. Nagle, either by you or Prof. Fairbank? Particularly, I would like to know if Prof. Fairoank's sug gestion to refer the FAR Statement to the university-based Modern China Committees was implemented." There was no answer, though a. carbon copy was sent to Prof. Ezra Vogel who had earlier interested himself in our work. On June 5, 1970, a letter was written to Dr. Whiting asking for a copy of the FAR Statement and a roster. of the participants in the founding sessions of the FAR Olina Subcommit tee in April 1964. Dr. Whiting replied

that he regretted that he could not assist us "in any way" as he had no files from his government service. The possibility of opening the JCCC files to a committee of three (a suggestion Prof. Fairbank made at a CCAS panel in San Francisco, April 1970) was explored in correspondence with Prof. Vogel. In a letter to Dr . Lindbeck which he sent to us Prof. Vogel acknowledged "a responsibility to the field as a whole to be open about our deliberations." [dated 5/28/70] But in a letter to us dated June 23, 1970, he wrote that the JCCC had considered at a recent meeting various possibilities for making its work "more available to a wider public." He said that the pro posal of Prof. Fairbank "of having a three-man outside committee go through the files" was rejected by the JCCC. II. THE FORMATION OF THE J.C.C.C. OUT OF THE GOULD HOUSE CONFERENCE No field of study better exempli fies the invasion of the academic sanc tuary by political power than that of Chinese studies. The purge of the China staff of the State Department, the Mc Carthyite assault on the academicians, the refusal of the Rockefeller Founda-' tion to maintain the Institute of Pacific Relations [IPR] and defend the integrity of the field--all these events in the wake of the Chinese revolution left a once-healthy field in disarray in the mid-fifties. Then, in the late fifties, a decision was made within the Ford Foundation to resuscitate the China field with an infusion that amount ed to at least $30 million over the next decade. An official account offers the following historical sketch:

..

PinaZZy, in the Zate fifties there was a series of specific initiatives by the Ford Founda tion that Zed to many of the dEvel opments in studies of aontemporary China 0 ve r the pas t ten years . In 1959 the Ford Foundation madE 97

a decision to invest substantiaZ Zy in the China fieZd. The in vestment strategy 'Was based on the modeZ designed just after WorZd War II by cooperation on the part of the Carnegie Corpor ation of New York and the Rock efeZZer Foundation in supporting Soviet studies, initiaZZy and pl'incipaZZy through grants to CoZurribia and Harvard Universi ties, and nearZy simuZtaneous Zy, through providing funds for grants to indi viduaZs, oonfer ences and other activities by the Joint Committee on sZavic Studies, appointed by the Amer ican Counci Z of Learned Soc ieties and the SociaZ Science Research CounciZ. With this strategy in mind, the Ford Foundation convened a meet ing in the autumn [? June) of 1959 at GOuZd House, neal' New York City. At this meeting it 'Was found possibZe, after considerabZe debate, to estabZish modes of coZZaboration among s cho Zal'S . .. with this essentiaZ base, the two Counci Zs were ab Ze to appoint the Joint Committee on Contemporary China, and the Foundation decided to give substantiaZ financiaZ support to the 'Work of the Joint Committee, and initiaZZy, to centers of Chinese studies at foul' univel'Sities: University of CaZifornia, BerkeZey, CoZumbia, Harvard, and University of Wash ington (SeattZe).19
At Gould House a group of 16 profes sors, four Ford Foundation representa tives, one State Department represen tative, and one RAND representative (see appendix) met to deliberate and to con ceive a national committee that would help to fill "the basic need felt by the Conference members for raising the intel lectual standard of Chinese studies as a whole for both mature scholars and for students. "20

The b road areas of agreement the founders of the JCCC shared indicate the lines along which the field was designed to develop: the close assoc iation of social science methodology and China expertise, of China studies and Communist studies in general ("WALKER, WILHELM, and LOCKWOOD pointed to our be ing able to learn much from the approach of the Joint Committee on Slavic Stud ies") ,21 the implicit subordination of the Sinological tradition to stra tegic concerns. When one thinks of how deeply Soviet studies at Harvard and Columbia were enmeshed with cold war scholarship of all sorts, it is not surprising that in following the strategy the Ford Foundation had "in mind" the JCCC would make no place for skeptics about the cold war, nor, a fortiori, for scholars who might regard the Chinese revolution in a relatively favorable light. But now we are ahead of the story. The one issue over which the Confer ence members vigorously differed was auspices. While, as we have seen, there was some sentiment for situating the committee-to-be within the Social Science Research Council, the prevailing senti ment was for situating it within the Association for Asian Studies [AAS). To get a sense of the two sides of the question it seems best to quote the Conference Report at length:

The major points in support of the WiZbur pl'OposaZ for AAS auspices centered around AAS [ZexibiZity, previousZy seen in the good work of its South Asia and Library Resource committees (STEINER, BIGGERSTAFF, NUNN); AAS existence as the principaZ professionaZ association in the fieZd and the need for Ziaison 'With it (LOCKWOOD); the extent of independence of action and direction under AAS auspices (STEINER) which outweighed, for some, any prestige to be gained

98

froom joint SSRC/ACZS sponsorship (SCYWARTZ); the need to satisfy the interests primarily of those in the field (STELNER); ... Above all, FAIRBANK felt that AAS proo vided the requisites of represen tativeness and continuity. The alternative resolution pro posed by .MICYAEL read as fo llows : 'It is proposed that the Conf erence designate representatives froom four or five major centers to represent the COnference as a committee to e~plore the willing ness of the ACZS and the SSRC to organize a Joint Committee on COntemporary Chinese Studies ... ' Supporters of the alternative MICHAEL proposal stressed the narrowness of the professional association and the need to touch the fields of other leamed soc ieties not represented in the AAS, especially those in Soviet studies and social science fields (WALKER, MICHAEL). HALPERN voiced a plea to break out of the China isola tion. Organization under joint SSRC/ACLS auspices was fel t like ly to allow more independent im petus and drive and freedom of activity (WALKER, MICYAEL), and also to have higher national and international prestige value (BOORMANJ ... in conclusion MTCYAEL voiced the sentiment that AAS sponsorship was both too large and too small and would give an inadequate relationship to institutions as well as affect the complerion of any corrmi ttee in a way which he did not favor [sic] . Under pressure of time, the grooup finally decided by a vote of 13-4 (with 1 abstention) on the necessity of trying by a vote to secure a conference consensus or preference for one of the two prooposals concerning the auspices. The group then voted 9 to 2 (with 4 abs tentions and 3 ''wi thdrC11J)als"

before the vote) in favor of a Project COmmittee under the AAS, as proposed in the Wilbur resolu tion. 2"2
Then an apparent contravention of demo cratic procedure occurred when the Or ganizing Committee for the Gould House Conference, Fairbank, Wilbur, and Steiner (who "departed for Asia before seeing the final report"), drafted a memorandum dated July 20, 1959, to Prof. William Lockwood, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Research and Development of the AAS, instruct ing him to arrange for SSRC auspices. The operative clauses of that memo follow:

The Conference failed to reach agreement only on the question of the auspices or sponsorship for a new nation-wide committee on Study of Contemporary China. Our difficulty in taking this essen tial procedural step toward practical action should not be allowed to obscure the high de gree of unanimity which the Conf erence otherwise achieved .. One major argument for establish ing the new Committee under AAS auspices was the feasabiZity of doing so within the current year and achieving action without de lay. Against this was the argument that broader interests than those of AAS should be integrally re presented on such a committee, especially Soviet studies and the social sciences. While a majority voted for AAS auspices, we believe this did not actually settle the issue of auspices. We therefore recommend that this issue be referred by you to the ACLS and the SSRC, bearing in mind that they provide auspices in a somewhat similar field for the Joint COmmittee on Slavic Studies. Your referring the question of auspices to ACLS-SSRC would, we
99

beZieve, represent the interest of the AAS membership in the deveZ opment of studies of aontemporary China. 23
Follow-up In a letter dated January 5, 1971, we requested clarification of the rever sal of the vote from Prof. John K. Fair bank, presumably the author of the July 20, 1959 memorandum to Prof. Lockwood. Prof. Fairbank has generous ly cont ributed a "reminiscence" [1/14/71] of the events that adds greatly to our understanding. He explains that while he had supported AAS auspices as Cllairman of the Gould House Conference he found the lack of consensus (9 for, 2 against, 7 abstaining constituting a split vote) with which the Conference ended frus trating. He says that he realized that there were inherent difficulties in the AAS structure: its rapid rotation of officers would mean little continuity and the danger of shifting goals. On the other hand, the SSRC could provide stable management experienced in handl ing funds and able to follow a consistent line; moreover, it was necessarily out side the field and committed to effic iency and proper representation within the field. Therefore, he says, he changed his mind and went to con sult with Dr. Pendleton Herring, president of the SSRC, to see if the SSRC would undertake the job of backing the committee. Since part of the lack of consensus arose from the estrange ment of the Northwest coast from the East coast, he arranged with Dr. Herring at the same time to invite Prof. George Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, to join the new committee and serve as chairman. Prof. Fairbank's account presents several difficulties. 1) Procedurally, there is some variance with customary vote-counting that requires further ex planation; the unusually large number of abstentions could mean that not a few were uncertain of or uncomfortable with the whole situation. 2) There is an impli cation here (confirmed in a second 100

letter dated 3/15/71) that the field, organized only in the AAS form, was incapable in and of itself of framing and carrying through long-term re search work and therefore had to turn to an organization outside the field (what was there besides SSRC?) for administrative efficiency. This is a perturbing concept, potentially anti thetical to the pluralistic spirit of academic inquiry, that seems to serve the intention of the Ford Foundation to shape the field after the Soviet studies model. 3) Prof. Fairbank spoke in his reminiscence of the need to heal the breach in the field caused by McCarthyism. But the appointment of Prof. Taylor to the influential chair manship (a position normally reserved for moderate or consensus figures) seems self-defeating, especially with the conspicuous absence of any counter balancing figure. Recently we learned that Prof. Taylor has drafted an in house history of the JCCC. In the con text of some eighteen months' hard work by Columbia's CCAS, at times under duress, and the rejection of our re quests for substantive information and documentation by the JCCC, it is hard to believe that Prof. Taylor's work will prove more than a case of special pleading. It is imperative for the in tegrity of the field that a critical independent inquiry into the structures through which research money flows in the China field (and all the foreign area fields), JCCC-SSRC-Ford, be made. NOTES 1. Defense Department Sponsored For eign Affairs Research, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, May 9, 1968, p. 18. 2. Behavioral Sciences and the National Security, Report No. 4 toge ther with Part IX of the hearings on Winning the Cold War: the U.S. Ideologi cal Offensive, by the Subcommittee on International Organization and Move ments of the Committee on Foreign Af fairs, House of Representatives, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 33 (hereafter cited as Fascell [Chairman of the proceedings]).

3. Ibid., p. 41. 4. See Lybrand, William A., Proceed ings of the Symposium on the U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, June 1962. There is a classified supplement. 5. Fas cell, pp. 29-30. 6. "Research in Action," by Allen
Evans, State Department pamphlet dated
August 30, 1965, pp. 9-10.
7. FAR Horizons [the FAR newsletter], vol. 1, no. 1. 8. Foreign Affairs Research: A
Directory of Governmental Resources,
State Department publication #8277,
1967, p. 16.
9. Fascell, p. 198. 10. Fascell, p. 198. 11. Fascell, p. 199. 12. Fascell, p. 199. 13. FAR Horizons, Jan. 1969. 14. Dr. Riecken became vice-presi dent of the SSRC in 1966 and succeeded Dr. Herring as president in 1969. He was an Air Force consultant (1952) and a consul tant to the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation (1953). He is co-author of the confidential Air Force report on Psychological and Political Effect of Military Postures, with Pool and Davison. 15. Lybrand, Ope cit., p. 300. Dr. Riecken was Assis tant Director for the Social Sciences in the National Science Foundation at this time, March 1962. 16. Fascell, pp. 199-200. 17. ACDA Seventh Annual Report, p. 25. 18. Ibid., p. 37. 19. Joint Committee on Contemporary China, Report on the Conference on The Status of Studies of Modem and Contemp orary Ulina, New York City, March 15 16, 1968, Summary of Discussions, p. 2 (made available by Bryce Wood) . 20. Report on the Conference on Studies of Contemporary Cllina, held at Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, New York, June 19-21, 1959 (Summary notes on discussion sessions prepared by Donald J. Munro and Ann P. Munro, joint rap porteurs), p. 2. 21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 23. Memorandum in two pages (made available by Dr. Lindbeck), p. 1. APPENDICES Appendix 1: Government Research Needs [FAR] In carrying out its central objective- the coordination of Government-sponsored foreign area and international affairs research in the social and behavioral sciences--the FAR relies heavily on its subcommittees both to prevent duplica tion and exchange information and to identify and call attention to those areas in their fields of competence which they believe need more research. The FAR Subcommittees on China and on Latin America recently considered the state of Government-sponsored re search in those fields and decided that a number of subjects required additional attention. They then prepared lists of research needs and circulated them to the Government agencies and departments which are members of the FAR. The lists were circulated as the Subcommittees' recommendations and were designed to assist the member agencies in their research planning. The Subcommittees' lists, although primarily intended for Government use, may be of interest to the private re search community as an example of think ing in Government about these fields. (A similar list of research needs relating to Africa appeared in FAR Horizons, November 1968, page 5.) .. COMMUNIST CHINA: RESEARCH TOPICS OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST 1. Analysis of the personal and political relationships among senior Cllinese Communist leadership personnel, lower-ranking political and government al leaders, the PLA high command, and military leaders at the lower echelons. (Separate studies of the dynamics of each group would also be useful.) Stress should 101

be laid on the attitudes of different elements within the power structure to ward the key political, economic, social and ideological issues in China. 2. A study of overlapping areas of Chinese and American national inter est. 3. A continuing study of the foreign policy ramifications of the Cultural Revolution., changes in strategy and tac tics, objectives and capabilities. 4. A continuing analysis of develop ments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and its implications for United States policy toward the Soviet Union, mainland China, other countries where the Chinese and the Soviets are competing for favor, and international organizations. 5. A description and analysis of the Chinese Communist foreign affairs apparatus, before and during the Cul tural Revolution, with projections for the future conduct of Chinese Communist diplomacy. 6. A continuing study of how China's educational system has fared under the Cultural Revolution, focusing in part on the long-range implications of dev~lopments and containing a quali tative analysis of published materials on education. 7. A continuing study of the eco nomic implications of the Cultural Revolution. S. Biographic studies of new fi gures appearing in the Chinese Com munist leadership structure at the top and middle levels. 9. Analysis of the development of science and technology in Communist China to include a qualitative analysis of scientific materials published. 10. A study of the economic levels required to sustain mass production of strategic nuclear weapons, and the ex tent to which Connnunist China has reached these levels. 11. A study of the effect of the Cultural Revolution on the political legal-public security system in Com munist China. Efforts should be made to ascertain the degree to which the re gime's hold on its people, and the discipline of society, have slipped as 102

a result of the disruptions of the pas t two years. 12. A catalog and analysis of the current attitudes of the younger gen eration in mainland China on key pol itical, economic, social, and ideologi cal issues. 13. A catalog by province and city of all factional organizations known to have existed during the Cultural Revo lution, accompanied by an analysis of the role that mass factions have played and continue to play in local and nation al politics. 14. An analysis of Chinese Communist perceptions of the U.S. including a study of the various channels of com munications through which they receive and disseminate information and the distortions to which those channels are subject. RESEARCH TOPICS OF LONGER-RANGE INTEREST 15. Analysis of the shifting pattern of loyalties amongst family, village, province, personal associations, and State. 16. Analysis of the role and status of middle-echelon bureaucrats, techni cians, and managers. 17. Evaluation of the status of the social sciences in China. IS. Analysis of the psychological basis of Chinese behavior, with special emphasis on the adjustment of individuals to various economic and political pres sures. 19. Analysis of the monetary and banking system in Communist China. 20. Identification of an "opera tional code" useful in explaining Chinese Communist elite behavior. 21. Analysis of the system for the allocation of human resources in Com munis t China. 22. A study of communication in Communist China, focusing on the varying methods by which information is passed in the society, ranging from the propa ganda apparatus to the less formal "grapevine." At tention should be paid to the techniques that the Chinese use for screening their own public media,

the signals they look for, and the

conclusions they draw.
23. A study of mainland policies
toward overseas Chinese; treatment of
returned overseas Chinese in the main
land; and the attitudes of overseas
Chinese regarding developments in
Communist China.
24. Compilation of annotated bib
liographies of publications in Com
munist China in non-Western languages.
25. Compilation of an up-to-date
atlas of contemporary China.
26. Compilation of a comprehensive
physical geography of China.
27. Preparation of a detailed study of ethnic groups, particularly those in the border areas of China. 28. Compilation of handbooks on the foreign relations and economic relations of China. 29. Preparation of a systematic dictionary of Chinese Communist pol itical and economic terminology. 30. Wi th a view to future arms control measures, a study of the simi larities and differences of the Chinese and Soviet approaChes to security to provide a basis for the evaluation of possible Chinese reactions to various verification proposals. Appendix 2: Gould House Conference Roster
Oscar Armstrong, State Department
Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell Univ.
Howard Boorman, Columbia Univ.
John K. Fairbank, Harvard Univ.
Norton S. Ginsbur Univ. of Chicago
A.M. Halpern, RAND Corp.
Choh-ming Li, Berkeley
John M. H. Lindbeck, Columbia Univ.
William Lockwood, Princeton Univ.
Franz MiChael, Univ. of Washington
Ray Nunn, Univ. of Michigan
Lucian Pye, M.I.T.
Franz Schurmann, Berkeley
Benjamin Schwartz, Harvard Univ.
H. Arthur Steiner, UCLA
RiChard Walker, Univ. of South Carolina
C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia Univ.
Helmut Wilhelm, Univ. of Washington

FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVES: A. Doak Barnet t John Scott Everton John Howard C1eon Swayzee Appendix 3: Roster for Meeting of JCCC and FAR [October 3-4, 1968, Cosmos Club and Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.] John Aird, Census Bureau Robert Barendsen, HEW Leo Brachtenbach, U.S. Air Force Alexander Eckstein, Univ. of Michigan A.J. Esquibel, Nat. Inst. of Mental Health Daniel Fendrick, INR-XR-oD, State Dept. Albert Feuerwerker, Univ. of Michigan John Holdridge, INR-REA-oD, State Dept. Chalmers Johnson, Berkeley John Kerry King, CIA Paul Kreisberg, EA-CIA, State Dept. Richard Lieban, NSF John Lindbeck, Columbia Univ. Dwight Mason, INR-XR-ICD-FAR, State Dept. Mark Miller, USIA Frederick Mote, Princeton Univ. Kent Parrot, ACDA Luigi Petrul10, Off. of Naval Research George Taylor, Univ. of Washington Ezra Vogel, Harvard Univ. Bryce Wood, SSRC

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103

CODlDlenl

by John K. Fairbank

In general, this report raises an issue of conspiracy rather than an issue of values. An issue of values might question to what degree the research interests and institution-building efforts of the 1950s and early 1960s (often now called "the cold war era") were valid, justified, wise, or appropriate. Such an issue of values could be debated in retrospect; and judgments, assumptions, attitudes, priorities, and concepts of the cold war era could be called into question as actually unjustified, unwise, or the like. This might produce a useful discussion of past inadequacies as a basis for doing better in the future. This kind of critique has been offer ed by Jim Peck, and it can start a meaningful dialogue. On the contrary, the main tenor of the Columbia CCAS "Report" is to raise an issue of conspiracy. This is done in two stages: The first stage is to accept a bundle of implicit assump tions, which may be inferred to include the propositions that the cold war era was characterized by immoral and indeed evil tendencies, that these tendencies were inherent in the federal government and in the east coast establishment, and that they led to American imperial ism and the Vietnam war. In other words, the values of the cold war era are not here debated but have already been judged to have been evil in toto, un worthy, and productive of disaster. The second stage in raising the issue of conspiracy logically follows: re search support from government, contact between government and academia, and the normal work of established founda tions and committees are all tainted with evil; such connections are properly 104

suspect and should be "investigated" in order to ascertain the extent of the evil. Let me illustrate: the Report sees "prima facie, considerable evi dence between [a government statement of research priorities] and the work sponsored by the JCCC and, in fact, the work in the contemporary China field in general. We therefore demand access to the files . to assess the extent of such correspondence." Why? The only reason must be that the government is evil. So the question is, has its evil influence spread to JCCC and to the field in general? The equally logical and rather plausible alternative would be that the influence on balance went the other way, and that government researchers raised questions that stemmed from the contemporary China field in general, of which they were intellectually a part. But this alternative basis for the "prima facie correspondence" is ruled out by the Report's prior and implicit assumption that the government is evil and its evil spreads through contact. This frame of mind is less rational than emotional. It rules out the idea that disasters like Vietnam may arise from a mix of circumstances, and assumes that they are due less to hones terror than to evil intent, that there are culprits and they should be exposed. To be sure, one may view history as a moral drama, a struggle for the right, rather than as a diffuse, impersonal process of growth and technological institutional-intellectual change. Many eminent revolutionaries and unsung muckrakers have inclined to the moral

struggle view. But this Report pushes it to the conspiracy level, questioning motives, implying collusion, and thereby making personal attacks. Let me illustrate again: the work
of the Joint Committee on Contempo rary China is in my view one of the
success stories of our time, and I am
proud to have been instrumental in
getting it set up. Publication of
the extensive summary of its work by
George Taylor will indicate how much
was accomplished. I shall not attempt to do so here. The Columbia CCAS Re port, however, depreciates the Taylor summary, sight unseen, as "special pleading" and casts various aspersions on the JCCC as "a closed top-down organization exclusive antitheti cal to open academic inquiry, [it has] rejected reasonable requests . and thus disavowed its responsibility." Such charges show a remarkable ig norance of the nature of the private sector in American academic life. The American educational structure, like the economic structure, is a mixed system in which local and state govern ment education is combined with edu cation by private or at least non government corporations, including pri vate institutions like Columbia and Harvard and non-government foundations. The Association for Asian Studies and the Committee of Concerned Asian Schol ars and their publications are also non governmental, financed from private sources, and so are not creatures of the state bureaucracy. So too, the CCAS is able to function because it also is a private, top-down, and somewhat ex clusive organization. By pursuing a sound idea (that Vietnam warrants our closely examining ourselves) some CCAS members, by creating a private-enter prise, self-selected organization, have actually (and I think deservedly in most cases) got a hearing and had an impact quite out of proportion to their age or experience. This shows the vitality of American academia and the flexibility of our system. In short, our educational structure is a

wonderfully complex thing, not easily to be understood in black and white terms, and before we knock it, we should find out how it has evolved and how it works. Of course its working can be im proved, and that should be the subject of our discussion, how to keep on creating and building up institutions to meet our needs. The Columbia CCAS Report, however, in pursuit of conspiracy sees the crea tion of the JCCC as an "implicit sub ordination of the sinological tradition to strategic concerns the JCCC would make no place for skeptics about the cold war, nor a fortiori, for scholars who might regard the Chinese revolution in a relatively favorable light." This is utter nonsense. It is of melancholy interest to think what one JCCC member, Professor Mary Wright, would reply to this if she were still with us.
As I s aid to the AAS panel in Washington on March 30, this Report offers striking parallels to the McCarran committee "investigation" of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the height of the Joe McCarthy era in 1951-52: there is the same set of pre judgments that the evil assumed (sup port of communism then, of cold war now) was simply all bad, included everyone, and need not be discussed; that the great bulk of the evidence (the 1200 publications of the IPR, the many programs ai ded by the JCCC) can be disregarded as peripheral or even irrelevant to the search for culpa bility; that the fact of associations and contacts are positive proof of the spread of evil; that the normal pri vacy of any organization's files is a guilty attempt to withhold evidence and cover up evil; and that the investi gators' self-assumed mandate to chas tise evil by exposing it is beyond reproach and jus tifies publication of any and all insinuations, if only to "smoke out" hidden malefactors. When controversy results, as Senator Mc Carthy used to say, "Where there~s so much smoke there must be some f~re. , guilty, s h ow us your If you aren't

I I
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1

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105

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records. " Before we go along this road again, I suggest we pause to observe our moti vations. In these situations, which are not infrequent in our national life, in quisitors and inquisited become locked in a ritual. The inquisitorial approach stems from the following propositions: 1) disaster has befallen us, severe, pervasive, and dangerous. 2) This great disaster is due to human error, at the least to misjudgment and possibly to evil intentions [this of course is a non-sequitur]. 3) Who did it? What was the conspiracy? How was it accomplished? 4) Obviously i t was done by the people in power who exercised their great power unwisely or evilly. 5) By what right had they such power? They had no right! The whole situation should be exposed [which of course is a form of punishment]. In this case where an older genera tion of academics is involved, the psy chology of the inquisited is somewhat as follows: 1) teachers are naturally in a paternal-benvolent role and in fact become teachers partly because they en joy the superior status of this paternal benevolence. 2) They are therefore natural targets for the Freudian im pulse on the part of their juniors to destroy and supplant the father. 3) Since they have their own emotional interest in their paternal status, they react vigorously against attack or even criticism with feelings of hurt or even outrage. The psychological ingredients are thus available for a great alterca tion, which may be quite counter-product ive for scholarship. However, it is a poor can of worms that has no value for something, and in response to this Columbia Report I have looked at my own files to try to re create the situation and mood of the Gould House Conference of 1959. I am appalled at the amount of correspondance and general busy work that has accom panied the growth of East Asian studies. All Americans seem to be multiple committee members. The total record

must be ovelWhelming, far beyond what the IPR record ever was. I have changed my mind about the desirability of a formal investigation by a commit tee of the AAS or any other group. The cost could not be worth it. Lacking the Congressional funds of several hundred thous and dollars required to produce the 14 volumes of IPR testi mony in 1951-52, I think AAS would do better to continue to have panels on subjects of controversy in this field and I favor discussions at all levels by everyone interested, in which I shall be glad to participate. But I see no way to secure the money or the talent for formal investigation. More important, it is impossible to find enough in the picture thus far visible to warrant all the cost and effort of an investigative procedure. Copying and distribution of documents alone would cost many thousands of dollars. The genuine issue is not whether to day's generation can prove dirty work on the part of their teachers and elders. Despite the similarity of attitude between this Report and Senator McCarran in the search for a secret conspiracy, the real issue is not whether a subversive organization was at work but whether decision makers of the 1950s in the China field had inadequate ideas or undesirable values. Seeking a conspiracy is in my view a waste of time, whereas discus sion of pas t ideas, assumptions, and values is desirable. What we need is not investigation of one generation by another but discussion between them. The Gould House Conference of 1959 First, this was not a representative body in the electoral sense but an ad visory body of persons judged to be "representative" of the various ele ments and aspects of the China field at the time, according to a mix of consider ations concerning disciplines, geography, institutions, political views, age, per sonality, availability, and the like. I was the chairman mainly because I was the outgoing president of AAS and had been active in getting various 107

committees set up under AAS such as the Committee on Chinese Thought, the Con ference on Modern Japan, and the Ming Biographical History project, for all of which we got some foundation support. We were also seeking foundation support of the AAS secretariat, Journal of Asian Studies, and other services. At Gould House we all agreed on most things but could not agree on the auspices of the proposed committee on Contemporary China Studies. Factors in the disagreement included personality clashes and political views, but the principal issue was really a constitu tional-structural one, whether the AAS form of organization could do the job. I entered the conference assuming it could, and indeed had set up the agenda to provide for formation of an AAS pro ject committee on Contemporary Olina. After the Gould House conference I changed my mind. The conference dis agreement in itself had proved that an AAS committee could not do the job that needed to be done.

ledge of the field and wisdom ac quired through experience are price less ingredients. It was crystal clear to me that the long-term funding of the many developments that seemed necessary in the China field could not and would not be entrusted by any responsible donor to a shifting group of persons whose membership changed so rapidly. In order to meet this need for continuity and stability as a basis for long-term responsibility on the part of AAS, I tried as vice-president and president to build up the AAS Committee on Research and Development by making it only "Advisory" (it is still called ACRO) to obviate its becoming too powerful but nevertheless insuring some knowledge and persistence in it by having its members serve for six years. This group could keep track of AAS pro ject committees, screen and advise on projects, and provide a focus of respon sible continuity of thought and planning in the otherwise kaleidoscopic AAS picture. This could in turn provide some reassurance to foundations that in 1959 were ready to help East Asian studies but wanted something more than a revolving-door board of constantly new and uninformed directors to deal with. Here is a section of the minutes of the AAS directors' annual meeting, March 22, 1959:

As AAS president in 1958-59, I had been impressed with the extreme fluid ity of personnel in the three-year ro tation on the Board of Directors. This meant that if a project was developed by a group during say 1960, and its project for say a three-year program was put through AAS and foundation channels and got funded in 1961, then it would function in 1962, 1963, and 1964, by which time there would long since have ceased to be on the AAS board or high command anyone with any recollection of how the project got started. Indeed if rotation occurred on the project committee, it also might have changed personnel and even its direction of interest before it ended. This statutory discontinuity of personnel is tolerable, perhaps desirable for annual program committees, for the annual meeting, and other ser vice functions of a membership organi zation like AAS. It is no way to achieve long-term development on a responsible planned basis where know
108

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. Professor Fairbank read the brief SUJmlary report of the Advisory Corrmittee in which he defined the functions of the ACRD as assisting project aorrmittees and others in developing their requests for foundation support, advising the Board on priorities among the various Assoaiation projects pro posed for foundation requests, providing through the six-year terms of its membership more con tinuity to the Board in overseeing its long-te~ projects, afford ing the Board a greater degree of perspective, both geographicaZ

and disaiplinary, than is assuraed by the normal proaess of nomina tion and eleation, and maintaining contaat with foundation personnel from year to year. He then pre sented the reaormzendation of the Exeautive COmmittee that the pres ident, viae-president, se~etary and treasuraer be voting membe1'8 of the Advisory Committee. The two editors would also be membe1'8 on an optional basis if they so wished. Mr. Fairbank then outlined the priorities of grants now held by the Assoaiation and those pending for aonsideration and stated the reaorrunendations of ACRD in hancIling new raequests from foundations.
The Gould House Conference of June 1959 was called by the ACRD, which appointed the organizing committee that I chaired. However, the very next year when I was abroad on leave the egali tarian spirit of AAS prevailed over my vain hope that ACRO could provide a de gree of managerial continuity. The minutes of the AAS executive committee meeting of April 9, 1960, include this item:

to funation effeatively.
Muah disaussion followed rega:l'd ing the committee inaluding the possibility of dissolution of the corrunittee or raeconstituting it as one of the proposed Boazrd aommittees.

In short, the issue of the auspices of the new committee on Studies of Contemporary China, which produced the disagreement at Gould House, involved basically the question how to find a responsible managerial capacity. If you want to ask for money to use, you must have someone who is actually going to handle and dispose of it. Funds cannot be given to a group of people as yet unknown because not yet elected or appointed. In the years since 1959 the build-up of the AAS secretariat struc ture has helped to meet this problem, but the AAS one-layer structure of elected personnel lacks the capacity of the two-layer structure of elected-and appointed personnel to be found in the research councils. All of us who had been in the China field in the 1930s were acquainted with the work of the two research councils. We had made a lengthy effort in AAS during 1958 to get a grants-in-aid program set up under the auspices of the research councils, either the American Council of Learned Societies or the Social Science Research Council, as bodies well equipped and experienced to carry on that kind of work. This effort, after much drafting and nego tiating, in 1958 resulted in the ACLS handling a program of "Grants for Re search on Asia" funded by the Ford Foundation. In going into the Gould House Con ference I was thus aware of the more stable managerial structure that the research counci~s had developed since the 1920s. All of us had known the pioneer developer of Chinese studies in the United States, Dr. Mortimer Graves of ACLS, and in the 1930s we 109

FUTURE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. The history of ACRD was reviewed briefly and it was pointed out that it was originally John Fairbank's idea. Professor Oakwood, the retiring ahairman, feels that ACRD should be tied in more alosely with the Exeautive COmmittee. Disaussion ~evealed a aonsensus of opinion that the whole status and funation of the aommittee should be reviewed. It was decided that the new chairman should db the following i ACRD is to aontinue: 1. Mea statement of its saope, funation and pu1'pos.e. 2. Provision should be made for ACED to meet twiae a year in ordEr to define its soope properly and

had looked to ACLS for leadership; my wife had worked in the ACLS office for a time in 1941. Nevertheless, in the first half of 1959, having worked on AAS problems, I was still assuming that contemporary China studies would best be developed under AAS auspices. The above-mentioned minutes of March 1959 record this item:

The essence of the constitutional situation is this: the research councils and their committees operate by a divi sion of powers, not unlike that in the federal government. A) The research council director and staff secure advice from all sides, select and invite the committee members on an annual basis, appoint the chair man, rotate some off and others on, keep records, payout the money, account for it, and generally provide a stable man agement. The committee members suggest anything and everything they want to about management but do not have to make the final management decisions or take responsibility for them. B) The committee members make all the substantive-technical-content types of decisions about the relative value of individual projects, the relative capacities of applicants and how the money should be spent. This involves a great deal of uninhibited discussion in committee and a full exchange of differ ing views, leading usually to agreed decisions. C) The third element in this three-way division of powers is the foundation that supplies funds after evaluating the prospective worth of the program and the efficiency and wisdom of the council's management. This th ree-way balance of powers is all in the private, as opposed to the government, sector of American life. It is a flexible, imaginative, and respon sive system, less bureaucratized than government, and despite the size of some foundations, it is not a monopoly system nor a political one but a plural istic system with some play left in it and some chance for the individual. The AAS lacks a similar division between stable management and substantive commit tee actions. AAS committees consequently waste much of their time in routine management tasks. SSRC also gave contemporary Chinese

CONTEMPORARY CHINESE STUDIES. Mr. Fairbank info1'Tr/ed the Boa:rod of interest in aonterrrporaPy Chin ese studies which would include COTml'unist China as we l l as Taiwan and hoped that there would be action in the future to establish this as one of the projects of the Association.
The Gould House conference agreed on some eight major projects on which studies and proposals had been worked up. About half of these were subse quently pursued under AAS auspices: for example, the securing of microfilms from Hong Kong, compiling of a biblio graphical guide, publication of items on contemporary China studies in a newsletter, and the dissemination of Chinese materials. The only real con troversy was whether the new committee on contemporary China should be under AAS or under one of the research coun cils. Opinion became sharply divided. Of 18 voting conference members, 9 favored AAS and 9 either abstained, withdrew, or voted negative. Such an even split provided no possible basis for AAS auspices. The organ1z1ng committee of which I was chairman tried to learn from experience. After much discussion we recommended that the question of auspices be referred to the ACLS-SSRC level. This was done and produced their Joint Committee on Contemporary China. The wisdom of this decision has been demonstrated by what the JCCC has accom plished, most of which seems to be un known or ignored by the Columbia in vestigators. 110

studies a much readier access to the social scientists across the country and b rough t China more into the main stream of academia, as George Taylor describes in his history of JCCC. The one thing most amazing about the Columbia CCAS Report is its s im
,

plicity of thinking. It assumes that since American studies of contempo rary China got started during the cold war era, therefore they caused or per petuated it. On the contrary, they were an mportant means for bringing it to an end.

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I

SOME PROBLEMS OONCERNING THE STRUCTURE AND DIRECTION OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA STUDIES - A REPLY TO PROFESSOR FAIRBANK

by MOil Roberti
Since fall 1969, a subcommittee of the Columbia University CCAS has been researching the institutional struc ture of the Asian studies field, with special reference to the development of Chinese studies in the U.S. since 1959. Our first findings, under the title Report on an Investigation of the American Asian Studies Establishment, were presented at the 1970 CCAS National Convention. Research continued the following year and led to an invitation to participate in the 1971 AAS Presi dential Panel Impact of American Organ izations on Asian Studies. For that occasion some 400 copies of a revised Report were distributed. Although the Report was intended to be a file of "preliminary working papers", since it is the subject of Professor Fairbank's Comment, we have asked the Editor to reprint it here for the convenience of the reader. Beginning with the exposure of Pro ject Camelot in 1965, there has been a series of revelations, largely through Congressional hearings, concerning the involvement of academic personnel and institutions in government foreign areas research projects. These involvements have been highly political, in some cases supportive of military operations, and thus incompatible with the tradi tional scholarly vocation. Within the academic community during this time, much critical study has been devoted to assessing the implications of government-academic relations and to

re-defining the role of the scholar. The Columbia CCAS study is a part of this process of inquiry into the poli tical dimensions of academic work and grows out of the conviction that it is the intellectual responsibility of the professional membership to inform itself of the purposes and procedures of extra-disciplinary funding agencies and to participate actively in the governance of the field. The dominant organization in the field of Chinese studies is a nation al committee called the Joint Commit tee on Contemporary China [JCCC]. It was created at the Gould House Confer ence of 1959 and is sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies [SSRC/ACLS] with Ford Foundation funds. The JCCC exerts enormous influence through its power to convene prestigious conferences which establish directions and indicate opportunities for research in the field. The JCCC has convened inaugural research conferences on the economy of China, Chinese sociology and anthropology, Chinese Law, and the govern ment and politics of China. Each con ference resulted in the formation of a JCCC satellite committee to institu tionalize research in its respective specialization. The members of the JCCC and the satellite committees are professors appointed through the SSRC; they hold concurrently executive positions in the centers and institutes of Chinese studies funded by Ford at Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, Seattle, and Michi gan. Thus the JCCC concentrates within itself both local and national leader ship over an establishment that has received nearly $30 million in primary 113

funds from Ford since 1959. Yet the appointments and operations of the JCCC are subject to no critical review by the profession. Indeed, the JCCC has rejected the most modest and reason able requests that it be more open about its deliberations. Our concern has been directed, however, not only to the exclusive and elitist character of this SSRC Committee but also to the prominence within the SSRC and the Ford Foundation of academic administrators oriented more to questions of policy and even intelligence than to academic scholar ship. This observation made an inquiry seem all the more imperative. In the following pages we will reply to Professor Fairbank's Comment on our Report and present the most recent findings of the research project. I THE NEED FOR FORMAL INVESTIGATION In his Comment on the Columbia University CCAS Report, Professor Fairbank raises a number of contextual and interpretive matters: the Amer ican Vietnam War and the Cold War, morality and the interpretation of history, the imputed ideology and "infer red assumptions" of the Columbia Report, and so forth. No doubt there is much to be gained from broadening our discussion in this way, but care should be taken in doing so not to pass over the immediate matters at hand: the general problem of military academic liaison in the Asian studies field, the kinds of foundations and research councils through which aca demic energies are mobilized, the background and perspective of the key administrators in these organizations and their relationship with the aca demic experts. The AAS membership recognized the general concern of these matters when, at the 1971 Business Meeting, it passed a motion instructing the Board of Directors to consider con stituting a joint CCAS-AAS Committee
114

mandated to investigate the JCCC, the SSRC, and the Ford Foundation with reference to the problem of government academic liaison. Now it may be that, if constituted, such a committee would regard the larger, contextual questions Professor Fairbank raises as a fruit ful extension of the original concerns. But in his Comment, Professor Fairbank not only fails to engage these concerns in a substantive way but publishes his opposition to the CCAS-AAS Investi gative Committee in the context of a strong adversary pleading. Thus he would dispense with an appropriate means for resolving the immediate problems concerning the organization of the field. These problems bear keenly on the integrity and the work of the profession in that they engage fundamental issues of academic freedom: (1) freedom from improper influence of governmental or private administrative agencies, and (2) freedom to conduct the research necessary for an independent, critical study of the evolution of Asian studies in the U.S., including freedom of access to all pertinent documentation. Thus for such a review it seems entirely appropriate that a joint CCAS-AAS Committee, broadly representative of the field, be constituted, and the discussion removed from the realm of polemics. Once an impartial procedure for review is determined and the immed iate issues engaged openly and substan tively, the way would be open for consid eration of the contextual and interpre tive aspects of the problem. Nothing better illustrates the need for formal means to assure efficient and orderly procedure for an inquiry than Professor Fairbank's persistent resort to unwarranted allegations and capricious arguments; e.g., that the Columbia Report elaborates a "conspir acy theory", that it presupposes an "evil" Government, that it is an exercise in Left "McCarthyism", that CCAS is as closed and elitist as the JCCC, and both, being "private", are immune from accountability, that "values" may be profitably debated but not organization, and, finally, that the costs and effort

ags:z

the inquiry would require make it im practical. Let us consider these conten tions one by one. The Comment contends that the Colum bia Report offers a "conspiracy theory" instead of a "meaningful dialogue" about "values". The implication is that the Report's argumentation is merely ad hominem and thus undeserving of formal consideration. This emotion-laden charge has become a fashionable means by which attention can be deflected from the decision-making process on the pretext that personal attacks are being made. In the language of social organization theory, this would entail a shift from an issue of "role" to an issue of "per sonality". But the former is a permanent and prevailing matter, the latter a fortuitous and even a sentimental one. Roles are activated within institutions, and the main focus of the Columbia Report is institutional. Institutions and their decision-makers are the form and agents of rule and constitute a more meaningful subject for inquiry than conspiracies. The Comment, however, uses the term "conspiracy theory" so loosely and frequently that it seems less an analytical concept for describing a special type of deci sion-making than a blanket pejorative for deriding critical inquiry into the decision-making process. An institutional analysis places matters of "values" in a very differ ent light. If a field is shown to be largely unstructured and decentral ized with ample resources for diverse scholarly initiatives, then "values" would play a correspondingly greater part in determining scholarly behavior. If, to the contrary, the field is shown to be highly centralized and structured in such a way that pressure is brought to bear on behalf of certain research priorities, then "organization" rather than "values" would figure as the prin cipal determinant of scholarly behavior. This is an empirical question, a sub ject for investigation.
As with the "conspiracy theory" so with the "Government is evil" theory -

these are propositions Professor Fair bank is quick to ascribe to us. But we seek to open up the files of the FAR China Subcommittee, and the rele vant files of the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the JCCC and its para- and subCOmmittees, not because the "Government must be evil" but in order to pursue questions that are necessary, proper and relevant for the profession: (1) Have the funding agencies sought to influence the topiCS, methodology, or political perspectives of academic scholarship? (2) Has the profession been in a position to per ceive any such influences and to approve, amend, or cancel them according to its own independent criteria? (3) In partic ular, has the field been induced to respond favorably to the well-documented demand of military and other governmental agencies for information and analysis of a social scientific nature for use in furthering the objectives of u.S. foreign policy in Asia? (4) What steps, if any, should the profession take to safeguard, strengthen, or re-establish its independence? We submit that no one sincerely concerned for the self respect of the profession and the well being of the peoples whose cultures we study can ignore these questions or move to dismiss them frivolously. The right of the profession to safeguard its integrity must prevail over diversionary or intimidatory man euvers as well as over false pretences of "sovereignty". The alleged "private" character of the foundations, councils, and committees is belied not only by the preponderance of former national security and policy officers at their command posts but also by their wide spread public influence. Here is the main objection to the claim of "pri vacy". The Ford Foundation, through the research councils, has used its money, in the tens of millions, to affect in a decisive way Chinese studies pro grams in major educational institutions, public and private, across the country. This influence has radiated to the government in the form of expert advice and Congressional testimony and to the public in the form of books and articles 115

,
\

as well as committees such as the National Committee on US-China Relations, a Ford sponsored group. An indirect channel of this influence is the mass media (from TV presentations to public school texts) which draw on the expertise developed within the Chinese studies programs. Indeed, the public character of the Foundation and the organizations i t funds is too obvious to require bela boring. This means that the Foundation's activities are legitimately matters of public interest and the direct concern of the Asian studies profession. The foundations, councils, committees, etc. must be held responsible and accountable for their activities no less than "private" industry is in theory so held for the safety of its products, the sanitariness of its pro cesses, and the truthfulness of its advertising. Accountability is a wholesome and proper "check and balance" against the activity of any elite group. As John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in the June 17, 1971 New York Times [letters], in connec tion with the Pentagon study of the Viet nam War, "The worst policy is one made in secrecy by the experts. Our safety lies, and lies exclusively, in making public decisions subject to the test of public debate. What cannot survive pub lic debate .we must not do." One would have thought that a primary concern of the profession would be the instituting of measures to ensure account ability. Considering the enormous sums that have been channeled into the field for purposes arbitrarily arrived at, considering the extravagant conferences in Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, Banff, etc., where the chosen participants have their travel and living expenses picked up by the Social Science Research Council, there is something unconvincing in Professor Fairbank's calculation that the costs of an investigative committee would not be "worth it." But whether such a committee is formed this year or not, an in-house history of the JCCC by George Taylor, himself a principal subject of the inquiry, can in 116

no way substitute for the inquiry. Until there is full and free access to all the documentation available to Professor Taylor, his history will repre sent a perpetuation of the elitism and secretiveness that is the source of so much concern. We come to the last point with no little regret. Professor Fairbank has suggested that a CCAS-AAS investigative committee would be in some sense a re plication of the McCarren Committee of the US Senate which carried out an inquiSition in 1951-1952, The Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings. Perhaps a little primer on the historical record is in order here. The origins of the McCarthyist offensive are to be located not in the academic profession but in the lUIT and its Amer ican confederates who, through the 19408, developed powerful governmental and pri vate support. The 11cCarthyists' interest was wholly political and in no way aca demic, though they created a context within which such academics as George Taylor and David Rowe could add their voices when the offensive culminated in Congressional hearings. The McCarran Committee Hearings were animated in every respect by a malevolent political motive which ren dered futile its victims' attempts to come to grips with the case on its merits, through appeals to fact, reason, judge ment and decency. Operating as an arm of the State, the HcCarran Committee couched its maneuvers in threats of treason charges, imprisonment, perjury and contempt charges, and the like. Thus the analogy to an AAS-CCAS commit tee seems less than apt. Moreover, it should be stressed that a primary responsibility for the dislo cation of the field must rest with the Rockefeller Foundation, the major source of the IPR's funds. Meeting in 1952, the officers of the Rockefeller Founda tion capitulated to McCarthyism and voted to deny future funds to the IPR. The Foundation had failed to defend the in tegrity of the IPR experts, whose great

est offence was having remonstrated

against tying US policy too closely to
the KMT after World War II. By 1953,
the IPR had been reduced to a minimal
budget. It all but expi red in 1957.
The role of the Rockefeller Founda tion in the rise and fall of the IPR is of particular relevance to the proposed investigation because of the extent to which the field today is dependent on another such patron, the Ford Foundation, which is a virtual replica of the Rocke feller Foundation. These foundations are headed by men like John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy, all of whom have been deeply involved in us policy making for Asia. One of our con cerns is whether the field is again vulnerable to pressures deriving from the political interests these former policy officers represent. The Columia Report throughout its research has confined itself to the con ventional categories of social science, the decision-making process, organiza tional articulation, and elite forma tion. To a great extent this is the very methodology the foundations themselves have singled out for support. When such research is unexpectedly and unaccount ably branded as "Left HcCarthyism" one cannot help feeling that one has run afoul of some concealed commandment, like the innocent mariner, who with neither purpose nor cunning, brought down an albatross. In the following pages we shall try to clarify and develop some of the points raised in the first Report. We begin with a further discussion of the Gould House Conference, where a contemporary China studies committee was inaugurated after a sharp conflict over the choice of aus pices: the Social Science Research Council versus the Association for. Asian. Studies. Th~ imposition of a highly cen tralized committee structure on a rela tively decentralized field is examined from two standpoints: (1) functional: the organization of the major activities of the field through a single group selected by the SSRC and not account able to the profession; and (2) political: the development of substantial relation

ships between the profession and such

governmental agencies as the State
Department, the CIA, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and the quasi
governmental RAND Corporation.
II. THE GOULD HOUSE PUZZLE

The Gould House Conference of June 1959 was convened with the support of the Ford Foundation for the purpose of bringing forth a national committee to promote contemporary China studies. The Conference Organizing Committee, Professors Fairbank, Wilbur, and Steiner, selected the membership, a group of scholars representative of the field geographically and institutionally and reflecting the right-to-center political spectrum of the profession at the time. The Ford Foundation, State Department, and the RAND Corporation were also represented. The membership shared broad agreement on the importance of developing in the China field a social science methodology with emphasis on the "comparative communist" perspective. However, when the question of organiza tional implementation was called, the group voted 9-2 (with 3 abstentions and 4 withdrawals) for the professional association, the AAS, to sponsor the new national committee, rejecting the alter native, joint sponsorship by the Social Science Research Council and the Amer ican Council of Learned Societies. This critical decision was taken at the last session of the conference, June 21, 1959, and was the only occasion of "vigorous" debate, according to the Conference Report. A month later, the Organizing Committee took steps to ar range for joint SSRC/ACLS auspices, re versing the vote and contravening the decision of the conference membership. Thus the Joint Committee on Contemporary China [JCCC] was created. On January 5, 1971, we wrote to Professor Fairbank to ask his view of the auspices question. In a reply to us dated January 14, 1971, he offers a "reminis cence" of the events. Professor Fairbank has kindly granted us permission to quote from his let ter:

At the GouZd House

Conference~

we

117

had a general agreement on the need for aation and the seau:l'ing of sup port for China researah. Having just been in the management of the AAS, I assumed that it would be most app~priate to set up a aommittee under it as a ahannel for the use of foundation funds for this pur pose. As chaiman, I was able to push for this and got a majority vo te, but opposition arose f~m three or four experienaed researchers who beZieved that the Social Sci enae Researah Counail would be a better channel for setting up of a aorrunittee and the seauring of funds. The result was that we had no aon sensus in the end as to practiaal aation, and the Conferenae ended on this note 0 f frustration. Thinking it over afteruard, it strruak me that I had been aating on an uninvestigated assumption in prefernng AAS to SSRC as a ahannel. Because I knew rrr>re about the AAS, I was (]J.Jare 0 f the di ffi culties embedded in its strruature, particularly the faat of rapid ~ tation of officers so that there aould be little continuity of know ledge and therefore some danger of shifting goals ... On the other hand, the SSRC had a stab le management which is experienced in handling fUnds and can folZow a consistent Zine once it is agreed upon. I therefore switched my thinking and arronged to go and see Pendleton Herring, the head of SSRC, whom I had known briefiy when he was at Harvard. I expZained to Dr. Herring that the GouZd House Conference had aome to no practical concZusion because it Zacked a consensus. The door was therefore open to an ini tiative by the SSRC if it wanted to take on the job of backstop ping a p~motion committee ...
Professor Fairbank dwells here, as in his Comment, on the managerial capa bilities of the SSRC, which, he claims, will guarantee administrative efficiency through continuity of leadership on its
118

committees. He also claims that the rapid rotation of officers in the AAS made it susceptible to discontinuity and thus a less desirable choice. Yet, strangely enough, in the Gould House discussions there is no indication whatsoever that the participants were concerned by or even aware of admini strative "difficulties embedded" in the AAS. To the contrary, they seem quite prepared to shoulder their administra tive tasks within the professional association. As the Conference Report says:

ResponsibiZity and authority ... The Committee shaH have the au thori ty to advise learned socie ties, foundations, the U.S. Government, and other bodies on the promotion of the study of con tempora.:rry China ... shal l have au thority to solicit, to receive, and to expend money under the reguZations of the sponsoring agenCJY [AAS vs. SSRC undecided at this point] .. The Committee may arrange for and supervise projects, hoZd aonferences, publish books ... and carry on other activities to promote the study of conterrrporaPy China. 1
That the identical program was incorpor ated into Professor C.M. Wilbur's resolu tion for AAS auspices shows how little reluctance or uncertainty the conference membership had about "handling funds" and otherwise managing the committee's affairs within the AAS. Thus, Professor Fairbank's contention that "rapid rota tion of officers" would mean organiza tional discontinuity rendering the AAS dysfunctional as sponsor for the JCCC lacks corroboration. The unlikely malady Professor Fairbank ascribes to the AAS is nowhere alluded to presumably because the membership was confident, and sensi bly so, in the professional organization as the sponsoring agency. The points on which the membership did join the aus pices issue were: that AAS would mean a committee primarily of the field, the alternative favored by the less conser vative members, Professors John Fairbank, Benjamin Schwartz, and Arthur Steiner, etc.; while SSRC would mean a committee

with greater national and international

visibility as well as extra-disciplinary
representation, the alternative favored
by a more conservative minority, Pro
fessors Richard Walker and Franz Michael
as well as RAND representative A.li.
Halpern. The opponents of SSRC auspices
stated their position as follows:

j ect on "Source Materials for Mainland China." The resulting scholarship con formed to the al.readY existing research interests of Harvard faculty members. During the three years of the program, 1956-1958, the emphasis was on nine teenth century China with only a few projects on the post-revolutionary period. In 1958 the American Council of Learned Societies [ACLS] was preparing to administer Ford funds for humanistic research in Asian studies on a nation wide basis. $200,000 was made available in 1959 for individual grants, and SSRC was to administer a parallel program in the social sciences. In 1958, Professor Fairbank, as president of the AAS, wrote an advisory brief [Statement to ACLS from AAS on Grants-in-Aid, August 1958] to the ACLS:

The major points in support of the WILBUR proposal. for AAS auspiaes aentered around. the extent of independenae of aation and direation under AAS auspiaes (STEINER) UJhiah outUJeighed, for some, any prestige to be gained from joint SSRC/ACLS sponsorship (SCHWARTZ); the need to satisfy the interests primaril.y of those in the field (STEINER) . Above aU, FAIRBANK fel.t that AAS provided the requisites of repre sentativeness and aontinuity.~
Thus, the auspices question was regarded as a substantive if not a political issue rather than a procedural or admini strative one. There is no available docu mentary support for Professor. Fairbank's statement that "the principal issue was really a constitutional-structural one." [Comment, also in this Bulletin.] A corollary of the "administrative efficiency" argument is the "consistency" argument, "the SSRC has a stable manage ment which can follow a consistent line." It is not immediately evident why this is preferable to changing or differ ing 1ines--either administratively or po1itical1y--from the standpoint of the development of the academic field or from the standpoint of the Ford Founda tion. However, looking back to the re search councils' funding programs for Asian studies prior to Gould House, we do discover one sense in which the field lacked "consistency": it was decentral ized. In the mid-fifties, after the fevers of McCarthyism had abated, foundation interest in China studies began to revive. One of the first programs was at Har vard, called "Chinese Economic and Pol itical Studies." Through this program, Ford and Carnegie subsidized individual. research projects and one library pro-

It is the vieUJ of the AAS offiaers and direators that the first pri ority, in aiding Asian studies in the U.S., should go to grants-in aid programs. This is beaause. they aan reaah the greatest variety of pe~ons on the least aentralized basis, al.l.OUJing the greatest di versity of effort in this neUJly devel.oping fiel.d....
The SSRC was to follow the same pattern in awarding grants. The Gould House Conference, however, aimed to create a national committee, an organizational novelty, for the China field. Awarding individual grants, rein forcing rather than reshaping the field, would be the least significant of the new committee's functions. Rataer, through conferences which set models for research and through the influence of its members (and subcommittee mem bers) in the university-based China centers, the JCCC was to govern a highly centralized structure which terminated both the diversity of the field and its insulation from extra-disciplinary interests. The conference membership spoke to these problems in their debate on the auspices issue. In its terms, it was a 119

reasonable if deeply felt disagreement. But for Professor Fairbank to contend that the disagreement in itself somehow disqualified the AAS is not only non sequitur but traduces the substantive positions of the majority. "After the Gould House Conference I changed my mind. The Conference disagreement in itself had proved that an AAS commit tee could not do the job that needed to be done." [Cormnent] In a letter dated March 8, 1971, we put the following question to Professor Fairbank:

Fairbank in reversing the vote of the Conference membership for AAS auspices. At this juncture there is a techni cal matter to be considered. In the Comment, Professor Fairbank claims that the Gould House proceedings were "advi sory." Therefore reconmendations that emerged from the Conference were not binding. This does not so much explain or justify the reversed vote as shift the question to a higher level. If the Conference was advisory, who was the advisee? And what did "they" find wrong with the advice on auspices? If "administrative efficiency" and "consistency" do not stand as exclusive and convincing justification for forcing the auspices issue, then what besides "efficiency" did SSRC have to offer? Were political considerations involved in the switch? Was the Ford Foundation the mysterious "advisee," and did it predicate support or extent of support for a China studies committee on SSRC auspices? Before engaging these institutional questions, we should attend to one last decision taken after the Gould House Conference: the awarding of the first chairmanship of the JCCC to Professor George Taylor, Director of the Far Eastern Institute, University of Wash ington. In his letter to us of Jan uary 14, 1971, Professor Fairbank writes:

You say that the SSRC meant admini strative efficiency in p~viding "stable management" that can "fol low a consistent line,," while AAS would have meant "rapid rota tion of officers" and the "shift ing of goals. " Frankly" the fo~er seems antithetical to the pluralistic spirit of academic inqui~ and therefore of question able intellectual and scholarly justiii(!ation. Are we to infer that the fie ld was incapab le in and of itself of framing and car~ ing th~ugh long-term research work?
In a letter dated March 15, 1971, Professor Fairbank offered the following.reply:

As for your other question" "Are we to infer that the field was in capable in and of itself of framing and carr-ying through long-te~ research work?" I would suggest that the answer is definitely affirmative if you mean by this a "field" of people inter ested in the subject but other wise unorganized or organized only in the AAS form. 3
There is a Jamesian disingenuousness here. Left unexplained is how Professor Fair bank's conviction of June 21, 1959, that AAS auspices for the Committee were pref erable got demoted within a month to an "uninvestigated assumption" (his letter of January 14) or where in all this we are to find a mandate to justify the action of Pendleton Herring and Professor 120

Part of the lack of consensus [at Gould House] had been due to the estrangement of the Northwest coast f~m the East coast" a feeling that the Eastern estab lishment was ten~ng to monopol ize management in the China field. It also happened that George Taylor" who was a close friend of Herring and whom I had known for 20 years" had been absent from the Gould House Conference" in Eng land. When Herring was agreeable" I therefore phoned George Taylor in Seattle to ask if he would join the rest of us in an SSRC Corrunittee and be the chairman. MY objective

in this was to heal the personnel breach in the field, which has arisen partly geographically and partly been inherited from the McCarthy era.
The procedure described here, while not democratic, is not exceptional. But Professor Taylor is on all counts a surprising choice as the JCCC's first chairman. During the McCarran inquisi tion he was a witness for the offense, alleging Communist infiltration of the IPR. His testimony was widely disdained in the field. In the two decades since the Hearings, Professor Taylor has shown himself to be an extreme cold warrior. In 1948 he was on the faculty of the National War College and since then has frequently lectured there as well as at the Air War College and the Army War College. He was a major advisor on China research to the Asia Foundation, which was exposed in 1967 as largely supported by the CIA. Also, the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington received approximately $40,000 from the Asia Foundation during Professor Taylor's tenure as Director. Professor Taylor has served as a Govern ment delegate to SEATO in 1957 and to a NATO Conference on Asian and African Languages in 1958. If Professor Fairbank and Dr. Herring sought to ''heal the breach in the field" or, perhaps, preempt right-wing criticism of the new committee, surely the inclusion of Professor Taylor should have sufficed. But his selection as chairman in the con text of SSRC/ACLS auspices meant not only bringing together in the national committee divided elements of the field, but also bringing together the national committee with the Government. The cooperation with the Government that developed early in the life of the JCCC is strikingly revealed in a letter dated July 5, 1961, from Professor George Taylor to Dr. Paul J. Braisted, Presi dent of the Hazen Foundation. 4 In 1960 Professor Taylor had negotiated finan cial support from the Hazen Foundation for a study called Scholarly Communica tion with Mainland China, made on behalf of the JCCC by Professor Herbert Passin. On July 5, 1961, Professor Taylor wrote to Dr. Braisted:

May I thank you for sending me a copy of the Hazen Foundation Re port for 1959 and 1960. You have an interesting program. I thought you might be interested to know that the JCC [sic], at its recent meeting in New York, had the question of cultural relations with Comrrrunist China as the first item on the agenda. The Committee asked me to thank you for the help which you gave us in prepar ing a data paper for this discus sion. We aU felt that Professor Passin's data paper was a very helpful document indeed and that a sophisticated discussion of the problem would help other policy making agencies as well as the Joint Committee. We reaognize that in its resent or,m the document should not be istributed widely. The author, of course, had indi cated this in his preface and we saw no particular value in having the report published as a Commit tee dbcument. Even the present version wiU be modified in parts, as indicated by various members of the Committee, but there will still be plenty of names in it as it is difficult to have a sensible discussion of the problems without mentioning names. So we have reaom mended that the data paper be given to several government agencies and that Professor Passin be encour aged to use various chapters in it for the publication of articles in national magazines. In all copies any reference to your Foundation or to the Joint Committee are removed. The Corrmi ttee reached a very large measure of agreement on the prob lem and I have been ins tructed to transmit our views to the State Department in person. I would say that this exercise has produced several results which are well worthwhile. In the first pZace, we have at hand an extensive oompara
121

tive stuchj., and anyone who reads it is bound to have a much clearer idea of the dimensions of the prob lem. I do not know of any other document like this., and I aonsi del' the material in this document sufficient justification in itself for the whole exercise. In the second place., the Committee has come to realize that it has a verY serious responsibility in this field., and that it is very impor tant for the GOvernment to know that it can turn to a responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for some indi cation of how they feel. In the third place., the Committee realizes the importance of working dosely with the Inter-University COmmit tee on Travel Grants that has been handling the Soviet exchanges. Fourth., I think that the initia tion of this stuchj had a great deal to do with heading off the IIE from rash action. Last., I think that a process of political educa tion has gone on in the Committee which I trust is deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China. In other words., I think that the help you gave us in preparing this document has made it possible to put a vexy important and poten tially volatile subject into a different frame of reference. Passin's stuqy has had a sober ing effect on several merribers of the Corrmittee., but it has also helped to indicate., by analyzing the experience of 0 thers., what we can realistically aim at. If a study such as this had been made before the writing of the Exchange Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union., the Depart ment of State might not have been so naive as to think that an ex change between American univer sities and Soviet universities was an equal exchange. They would have known from the experience of other countries that the exchange
122

should have been with Soviet institutes.and academies rather than universities. [emphasis added]
This letter raises very grave ques tions: (1) " .we have recommended that the data paper be given to several govern ment agencies ... " " .. I have been in structed to transmit our views to the State Department in person." Was the profession informed of the active rela tionship that the JCCC developed with the Government? Did the Committee discuss the propriety of forming such a relation ship? Did the Committee consider the uses to which "various government agen cies" might put "Professor Passin's data paper"? (2)" ... the Committee has come to realize that it has a very serious res ponsibility in this field, and that it is very important for the Government to know that it can turn to a responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for some indication of how they feel." By what right did the JCCC presume to appoint itself the representative of American scholars in any .case, let alone to the Government? Has this "serious responsibility" in the field been fulfilled continuously over the past decade? If so, what "indica tions" has the JCCC been giving the Government about how the problem "feels"?
(3) "I think that a process of polit ical education has gone on in the Commit tee which I trust is deep enough to pre vent ill-considered political statements being made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China " "Passin's study has had a sobering effect on several members of the Committee ... " In making Professor Taylor chairman of the JCCC, did the SSRC and the ACLS in tend that he should organize internal political education? Is such a process a legitimate function of the JCCC? How can a Committee which claims to be non political justify undergoing political education corporately? Does Professor Taylor's conception of an "ill considered political statement" cor respond to the views of the other

I
,

Committee members? Is it appropriate for a group claiming to be academic to gear its statements according to the oppor tunistic criterion of "getting into China"?
(4) "In all copies [of the Passin

any reference to your Foundation or to the Joint Committee are removed." Why was it necessary for the Joint Cotmnit tee to conceal its sponsorship of the Passin Report and the source of funding as well?
(5) "We recognize that in its present

~port]

lands, Australia, and Poland. Professor Passin sketches in the general diplo matic situation in each case, makes observations on the political views of the various individuals, groups, and delegations that have gone to China, and assesses the reception, the results and the diplomatic implications. For example, in discussing Japanese sino10 gists, he reports that

form the document should not be distri buted widely." Is censorship of the re search it sponsors an appropriate function of the JCCC? Was the Passin Report itself an appropriate research activity for the JCCC to sponsor? Indeed, is it poss ible to sponsor such a proj ect under such conditions and at the same time ful fill the prerequisites and obligations that legitimate representation of Amer ican scholars would entail? The Hazen Foundation, it should be noted, though privately established, borrows much of its top administrative personnel from the Ford Foundation. It is largely concerned with student ex change programs with Third World coun tries and has also funded studies of oollege student activism. For example, in the early sixties, the Foundation, prompted by a concern that Its tudent action has at times 1ed to divi sive crises affecting campus morale," gave financial support to Western Per sonnel Institutes (now 00llege Student Personnel Institute) for an "inquiry conducted by an 'observer' acting as an explorer seeking to find the common characteristics of the various inci dents " This sU,rvey was "designed with unusual care because of the sen sitive nature of many issues which are involved." [Annual Report, 1961-2,
p. 6]

The "fair-haired boy" of the Chinese is Hirano Yoshit~~ head of the privately-supported China Research Institute. Hirano~ an old China hand~ is a very promi nent leftist~ and his aative Institute is the aenter for leftist saholars. [po 176]
Discussing the French sino10gist and historian Professor Jean Chesneaux, Passin writes:

Jean Chesneauz~ a Sinologist. NOIJ) working at the Recherahe Saienti fique~ Chesneaux is strongly P1'O aommunist~ to the point (as he explained to me) that "naturally" the Chinese aommunists would let him do researah there. [po 76]
In correlating a person's political views with his chances for a productive visit to China, Professor Passin writes:

The report by Professor Passin, Scholarly Exchange with Mainland China, is largely a dossier on the visits to China of hundreds of individuals and . groups from seven nations, Japan, England, France, Germany, the Nether

Let me take an extreme example to illustrate the aharaater of the p1'Ob lem. If you are Joseph Needham~ a distinguished world saientifia figure and at the same time a great friend of the communist aause--Stalin Peaae Prize winner~ merri:Jer of the World Peaae Counail~ merri:Jer of the intemational aom mission that ' aonfirmed' the germ-warfare charges against the United States~ eta. --and if you are working on a problem that is reTTr)te from aurrent ideologiaal preoaaupations~ and if the prob ability is extremely high that what you produae will be favorable to the regime and bring aredit to it~ then you are likely to be able to do YoUl":researah in China free ly and with maximum aooperation
123

I l

fPOm the authorities. If, on the other- hand, to take the opposite extr-eme, you ar-e Kar-l-Auguste Wittfogel, your- chances of doing so ar-e virttually nil. The pPOblem, of cour-se, almost always lies be ~een these two extr-emes. Most scholar-s are neither jUlly-commit ed suppor-ter-s nor opponents. The question is what possibilities pr-esent themselves in the inter- mediate cases. Quite obviously, the closer one appPOaches the Needham pole, the easier- it will be; the closer one app~aches the Wittfogel pole, the mor-e difficult it will be. [po 189]5
These citations from the original Passin Report raise a number of addition al questions: Is it appropriate for the JCCC to sponsor the gathering of information on colleagues and others of a political nature and then to author ize its transmission to US governmental agencies? Is it appropriate to sponsor a study which paints individuals with a broad brush, e.g., characterizing Dr. Needham as a "fully committed sup porter" on one "extreme" and Dr. Witt foge1 as a "fully committed opponent" on the other "extreme"? Is it appro priate to sponsor a study which refers to Hirano Yoshitaro as the "fair-haired boy" of the Chinese? Have the subjects of Professor Passin's thumbnail por traits consented that information on them be transmitted to US governmental agencies? In gathering this informa tion, did Professor Passin make his pur poses known both to his subjects and to the "several score" "informants and collaborators" most of whom "specifi cally asked to remain anonymous"? [introduction to the Report] These are questions of professional ethics and academic integrity that call for clarification by the JCCC and its spon soring agencies. A secondary purpose of Professor Passin's study of scholarly exchange is to formulate guidelines for "serious visiting" in the People's Republic of China: 124

The problem for- the serious visito!' then, is to br-eak away from the ~ orr;anized-tour routine as quickly as possible and to establish a meaningful relation to some area of ~inese life with which he has a natur-aZ affinity. [po 129]

What we want, then, is the ideal

observer- in the ideal conditions. He will be a highly-trained stu dent of Chinese pPOblems and a fluent speaker of ~inese; he will have lived in China befor-e and have many personal contacts with Chinese people; he will have many points of depal'f;ur-e of comparative judg ment--knowledge of other- aountries, technical qualifications, etc. And in China he will be able to spend a long time, traveUing freely and with free access to persons, places, and informa tion. [po 1.3'0]
Although there is more "take" than "give" in this prescription, there is nothing inherently objectionable in such ex change except that the close connection between the Report and government agen cies raises questions about the identity of the "we." For the Government, too, is interested in "serious visitors" with "technical qualifications, etc." as we may see from the remarks of Richard Bissell, Jr., former Deputy Director of the CIA, to a discussion group of the Council on Foreign Relations:

As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espio nage has been of declining rela tive imporlance as a means of learning about observable deve lopments, such as new construction, the characteristics of transportt systems ... because reconnaissance has become a far- mor-e effective collection technique and, except in ~ina, travel is freer- and more extensive than some years ago . With r-espect to ... tech noZogy . the published literatur-e and direct p~fessional contacts with the scientific community [emphOfJis added] have been far richer- sour-ces ... Technology is

just too diffiault for agents~ who are insufficiently trained to com prehend what they observe ... [Intel ligence and Foreign Poligy, Dis aU8sion Meeting Report~ January 8~
1968~

p. 6]

In view of the fact that the SSRC and the ACLS have already established such commit tees as the Joint Committee on Scholarly Exchange with Mainland China, it would appear incumbent on the profession to move corporately and democratically to safeguard the independence and inte grity of exchange programs and facilities in which scholars put their trust. The concern is heightened when one finds the ACLS, in its recent Newsletter, treating the sensitive subject of scholarly exchange in the context of Cold War strategy. Gordon Turner, reviewing the ACLS Committee on Studies of Chinese Civilization in the March 1971 ACLS Newsletter, writes:

It is therefore essential that we begin preparing n07.J to have a strong cadre of persons who pos sess genuine competence in the language, capable of making effective judgments on how to deal with Chinese on Chinese soil, and whose research interests center in China's past or in non-sensi tive areas of the present. And if this future exchange program is not to die before it is scarcely under way, those who manage it and those who are participants must possess sensitivity and per ception in dealing with their Chinese counterparts and with the Chinese scene.
For many. years humanistic studies have been forced, through ACLS manage ment, to sell themselves to the Ford Foundation in terms of contemporary relevance. But there are degrees of and limits to "relevance." The Cold War premises and ulterior purposes of the research cotUlci1s and the Ford FotUldation have opportunistic and even exploitative aspects that may not accord with legitimate and disinter ested scholarly purposes. Witness the Passin Report. In becoming ACLS "cadre," humanists may find themselves compro mising the trust of the vocation and the credibility of the profession. Before this happens, the kind of sponsorship offered by the Ford FotUlda tion and the research councils should' be subjected to a scrupulous review. In the light of the foregoing dis cussion of the work of the JCCC on cultural relations and scholarly ex change, the words of those Gould House conferees who favored AAS auspices and opposed ACLS/SSRC auspices for the new Committee on China Studies take on a deeper significance.

It is, of course~ essential in the long-term national interest that we acquire a basic under stariding of China because the difference bet7.Jeen her values and ours is probably a greater danger to us than the fact of her potential power. What matters is not power per se~ but whether there is a desire to use it and for what purposes ... It is there fore crucial that we nurture the historians and humanists who have a nation's values as their spec ial province. Other events ... give us reason to believe that the 1970's may see some re-opening of the Chinese door to Americans~ and, if we have sufficient skill in management~ the decade may bring a fUll-scale Sino-American scholarly exchange program... the Chinese will undoubt edly raise barriers against schol ars who wish to conduct research on contemporary topics ... while historians and humanists whose work will be in non-sensitive areas will be likely to receive entree.

The major points ... for the AAS auspices centered around... the extent of independence of action and direction under AAS auspices, which out7.Jeighed, for some, any prestige to be gained from joint SSRC/ACLS sponsorship; the need to satisfy the interests primar
125

ily of those in the field... [Confer ence Report" p. 10]

In the following section we shall show that the relationship with govern ment agencies that the JCCC developed in the course of its work on scholarly exchange did not arise accidentally from the nature of the Passin project but structurally from the institutional context of the JCCC. III. THE WAVERING LINE

increasing interest of students of public affairs and public ad ministration in the UJhole area of security affairs. Courses on military history and military policy are appearing in college catalogs. Excellent books and articles are coming into print . The SSRC and the Council on For eign Relations have recently be gun to concentrate attention on the importance of these problems .. [Hearings" Organizing for the National Security" p. 287]
The separation of functions between academic and government, while not codified as is that between Church and State, has nevertheless served as an important underpinning of the plur alist theory of Anerican society. Setting up of governmental or quasi governmental think tanks like RAND has been the traditional means for recruit ing intellectual workers for national purposes. The mobilization of academic research by agencies where the scholar ly funtion is seen as something appli cable to policy portends a trespass on the traditional role of the univer sity. A deep concern with the military utility of social science scholarship is expressed by SSRC President Pendle ton Herring in his testimony of July 20, 1966, before the Harris Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Operations:

The RAND Cozrpomtion" for example" has been highly successful in oper ating along that UJavering line be ween intelligence studies and.. scholarly research ... [William Marvell" President" Education and World Affairs]
Into what kind of an institutional matrix was the JCCC set through SSRcl ACLS auspices? What are the operative lines of authority--intellectual, finan cial, professional--between the SSRC and the Committees, and between. the Commit tees and the profession? These questions' may be of concern to scholars in other fields since SSRC provides auspices not only for the world area committees but also for professional associations of sociologists, psycholo gists, historians, economists, political scientists, and anthropologists, and in all cases but one administers the funds for these associations. The degree to which SSRC's influence is commensurate with its presence needs to be deter mined individually in each field. But from Carnegie Corporation Vice-presi dent James Perkins' testimony on April 25, 1960, before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Commit tee on Government Operations, we get a general sense of the strategic position of the SSRC:

I UJould just like to say that since I have follOUJed GOvernment rela tions UJith the social sciences over the years, there UJas a time UJhen UJe, in the social sciences" tried to interest the military services in social science re search. One can recall those days UJhen people used to talk about the 'military mind. ' NOb) UJe have reached the point UJhere the military are using the social science disciplines and this is a very great advance. I think they are usin~ these fields UJith greater congen~ality than the State Department because they are accustomed to dealing UJith

... O~anizationally UJe are in far better shape than at any time in our history to deal effectively UJith the broad and complex matters of national security policy and planning. Additional encourqgement comes from the
126

scientists. They are accustomed to experimentation. They are accus tomed to things that don't al ways pan out, and they are ven turesome-minded. And I would like to pay tribute to the men in DOD who have led in this work. I think of the Office of Naval Research, for example. It has done a great deal of impor tant basic work. The Air Force Office of Scientific Research in its Behavioral Science Division is also doing a fine job. I think it is difficult to accept that sort of money for work abroad because it leads to misunderstand ing, but while we note that, the fact that these fields are now an ongoing part of the ~Zitary Estab lishment is something that we must not disconnect because of these other procedural problems that have arisen. [International Social Sci ence Research, Hearings, p. 225]
It should be noted that Dr. Herring's remarks about "procedural problems" refer specifically to academic social scien tists cooperating with the military on Project Camelot, a counterinsurgency program for Chile and other count ries devised by the Defense Department's Special Operations Research Office in conjunction with The American Univer sity. Disclosure of the project in Chile, however, led to an international flap, cancellation of the project, and Congressional investigation. This is the context of Dr. Herring's statement. The moral dimensions of the project as well as the implications for the aca demic community are thoroughly explored in Professor Irving Horowitz's thought ful compilation The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot. In 1966 Dr. Herring was succeeded as President of the Social Science Re search Council by Dr. Henry Riecken, Assistant Director of Social Sciences, National Science Foundation. Dr. Riecken was one of the few non-military admini strators to participate in the partly classified US A~ Symposium on Limited

War of 1963. There he spoke on the techniques of psychological warfare: the classes of belief and opinion and the means for reinforcing or changing them. Dr. Riecken has been a consultant to the Air Force, the Army, and the Ford Foundation. He is still SSRC president. Checking briefly the command posts in the Ford Foundation itself, we find H. Rowan Gaither, RAND's Chairman of the Board since 1948, as president at the time of Gould House; McGeorge Bundy, one of the chief architects of the Viet nam War, as current president; and David Bell, formerly head of AID, as Ford's Director of International Pro grams. It can be shown that the political background of these SSRC and Ford Foundation administrators has been re flected in the China field through the JCCC and thus when Professor Fairbank and Dr. Herring took together the crit ical step of ruling out the field "or ganized only in the AAS form" for JCCC auspices and substituting SSRC auspices, they not only set aside basic democratiC procedure but also opened a Pandora's box of political consequences. The first chairman of the JCCC was Professor George Taylor, whose political role has already been discussed. Other members of the original JCCC not primar ily to be identified as academics in the Chinese studies field were Philip Mosely, head of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and Director of Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations, A.M. Halpern of the RAND Corporat~on, and Professor Walter Galenson, a specialist in Soviet industrial relations. In 1961 Zbigniew Brzezinski joined the JCCC for a year. The first major overt activity of the JCCC was to convene a conference in New York in September of 1960 on Re search on the Economy of China. After the conference an independent SSRC Com mittee on the Economy of China was formed, and Professor Walter Galenson was appointed Director of Research. The Committee was provided with a separate
127

budget of $910,000 by the Ford Foundation. In'1959, before the Committee on the Economy of China was formed, Professor Ga1enson, as Olairman of the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley, brought to the Center a major research project on the economy of China funded by the CIA. The origins of the project, "Agriculture of Communist Olina," are described in the minutes of the Executive Committee of the Center dated November 21, 1958:

sum could be consumed in a thorough pro secution of the research problems. And, in fact, not only did the project con tinue at Berkeley beyond the year al10ted in the original agreement with the CIA, it was continued also in academic work supported by the Committee on the Economy of Olina. Professor Galenson, writing in the SSRC newsletter Items for March 1970, informs us that the Committee on the Economy of China

Mr. Galenson. reported to the

Committee on the .. proposal for a one-year contract in the amount of $JO,OOO to establish in the Center a research p~ject on the agriaulture of Communist China, The donor of the funds prefers to remain unidentified.
The Research Project description names Professor Galenson as the Faculty Invest igator and states the purpose of the study as follows:

also has made available inform ally a second volume, P~vincial Agricultural Statistics [or Corrmunist China. This volume re presented an attempt to assemble all available provincial agri cultural statistics emanating from Communist Chinese sources. The data were collected originally [by the China agriaulture p~ject at Berkeley]; they were collated and supplemented by research work ers under Kang Chao ..
And in 1970 Kang Chao's book on Chinese agricultural statistics was published with support from the Committee on the Economy of China.
As Director of Research for the Committee, Professor Ga1enson had con siderable influence not only because of the enormous funds at the Committee's disposal, but also because the Committee solicited research according to a pre scribed series of topics. As Items [March 1970] puts it, the Committee was

... to determine by regions (p~ vinces) the distribution of c~p acreage, by specified crops, as fo Hows: (1) basic cultivated area .. (2) Sown area .. (J) Area of multiple cropping ... (4) Area of dry-land farming .. . (5) Irri gated areas.
The Berkeley Center was to cooperate with the "donor" not only in providing space and personnel but also expected

to secure the pub Zication of those portions of the report which are considered to be of general inter est. [Research P~ject, p. 4]
The "unidentified donor" has been au thoritatively identified as the CIA. Moreover, the Olina agriculture project may have involved the use of classified documents (provincial newspapers) as several fellows of the Center attest that the materials were kept under lock and key. One further point: for a province by-province crop survey with no library and few prior studies, $30,000 is hardly more than seed money. Five times that
128

not to be a passive dispenser of grants, but rather to seek out potential research personnel and to encourage the undertaking of specific p~jects in line with a coordinated plan.
Thus, just as the JCCC was given in George Taylor a chairman with reliable and proven access to government, so was the amply-funded Committee on the Economy of China assigned a research director whose own such access is firmly demonstra ted by the CIA contract he brought to his center at Berkeley. Professor Galenson was a specialist in Soviet industrial re lations. Professors Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets, two distinguished econ

ap

omists whose fields of competence include Soviet studies (but not Chinese), occu pied other high offices on the Committee, thus linking the Committee's perspective inevitably to the Russian studies model. MOreover, impatient with the clumsy pluralism of academic tradition, the Committee drew up a central plan of re search and attempted to purchase its fulfillment, thus asserting the sub stantial monopoly power which derived flOm its $900,000 grant. It could of course be argued with some validity that the state of Chinese economic studies was so undeveloped in 1960 that competent leadership could not have been found within the field it self, and that the national income and sectoral studies commissioned by the Committee were on the whole so basic as to be prerequisites for better under standing of the subject, regardless of the political objectives of the reader. However, this argument ignores the fact that the particular leadership chosen viewed the subj ect from a particular perspective--the Soviet studies-com parative communism model. Alternative perspectives--such as the highly ar ticulated one of development economics- were largely neglected both in choosing the Committee and in the approach to research subsequently followed by the Committee. What is the process by which such important choices, affecting the very nature of this field or studies over the past decade, were made? What were the criteria for making them~ These are reasonable and important questions, and the fact that they have to be asked at all is further evidence of the need to change the structure of decision making in modern Chinese studies. Concretely speaking, what kinds of research programs are devised by government intelligence officers, and what kind of relationship develops be tween these officers and academics in vited to participate in these programs? We may begin to shape out an an swer to these questions by examining letters written in 1962 to Professor Franz Schurmann by Allen Whiting, then at the Bureau of Intelligence and Re

search [INR] of the Department of State. At this time Dr. Whiting was initiating a new program of Policy Research Studies as head of a Special Studies Group in INR. His letters have been made avail able to us by Professor Schurmann who kindly permitted us access to his files. In a letter dated January 9, 1962, Dr. Whiting wrote:

In the hope that all pending matters pursuant to your becom ing a consultant to the Depart ment of State will be satisfact orily resolved, I thought it might be well to acquaint you with the first External Research project which we have scheduled for Com munist China and to solicit your estimate on how and when you would be ab le to contribute to this study.

u.S. policy will face new oppor tunities as well as old problems
when Mao Tse-tung passes from the
scene. Experience with post Stalin Russia has shown the im portance of anticipating succes sion crises in communist countries
and especially of understanding
f the significance of their out come in tenns of changes in com munist policy. There is prima I facie evidence pointing to the existence of differing groups in l i the Chinese Communist leadership, but inadequate attention to this problem has left us with no firm picture of attitudes held by com peting groups on such key questions as the allocation of resources for f industrial, military, and agri cultural development, the handling t of non-aommunist scientists and bureaucmts, and the role of the armed forces for advancing China's goals in Asia. Peking's marked shifts in these policy areas during 1955-61 together with the surfacing and. submerging of key figures in the regime suggests that research may reveal the range of policy options to be expected given the ascendancy of one or another clique in the struggle for power that is likely to follow
129

Mao's death. There is a reservoir of accumu lated research in gove~ent files which will provide an excellent basis for this study. Past papers have not focused on this question as such, but their examination of poZiay problems in Communist China has, inter alia, turned up much relevant infor.mation which can be recast and synthesized within the framework of this inquiry. In addi tion, biographical files will pro vide an important factual base for tracing the repercussions of clique struggles at lower levels in the civil and militarry bureau cracies of Corrrnunis t China. Your associates in this project will include Donald Klein, Alex Eckstein, Richard Mborsteen, Howard Boorman, and John Lindbeck, as well as several knowledgeable persons in the Department and other government agencies. Such persons, together with the classified stud ies which can acquaint you with what has alpeadY been done in your area of speciaZization, make Wash ington a logical point of resi dence for at least one month, if not longer ... You will be reim bursed for al l travel expenses with an additional per diem of $16. Your honorariwn wiZZ be approx imately $50 per day. Finally, we have funds for reseapch assistance, secretarial services~ and supplies. I hope that we can start this studY as soon as your clearance is avail able .. You will note the absence of any military expert. This will be remedied by utilizing govern ment personnel and by informal con sultation with Mrs. Alice Hsieh of the RAND Corporation. I would like to have draft manu scripts available for circulation by August 15, 1962. These will be reviewed critically by the group.. The final job of synthesis and dY'-:,Jing of poliay inferences will
130

be my own, subject, of course, to the same cri tical review given the various papers .... While I can give no promise as to the declassification of any con tribution to this project, I can assure you that every effort will be made to make its findings available to the widest possible audience . ... Let me close by saying that an inventory of present and planned research in the government and in the country at large shows no pro ject paralleling this one in terms of merging the best available re sources. This study has received encouragement alreadY at higher levels in the Department, and it promises to be a major contribu tion to our poliay needs of the immediate future. Finally, we hope it wi l l serve as the basis for continuing reference and research in the government on this impor tant subject of leadership in Communist China.
In a second letter dated March 26, 1962, Dr. Whiting elaborates on the specific features of the Special Stu dies Group's research program:

The utility of this study lies not only in the obvious, and perhaps overworked, area of speculation on personnel changes following Mao's pemoval from leadership. If successful even to a moderate de gree, it will provide an invaluable starting point for interpreting the significance of developments after Mao's passing from the scene, even should predictive est imates of ''who-whom'' relationships prove completely wrong. In short, we are not trying to pick a horse, op even come up with a win-place show sheet. Ins tead, we. are try ing to determine the actors and the units of action in the Chinese Communist decision-making process, probing the points of tension and cohesion, assessing the range and

consequences of dissent~ and where possible~ providing pol itical character profiles for indi viduals and 0 rganizations. This is too ambitious and gen eral a scheme to be dignified with the term "research design." Our conference should bring it within such bounds. I offer it only to sugges t the breadth--and depth- permitted by our terms of refer ence. ~ earlier letter suggested taking a slice through particular problems that have confronted the Chinese leadership over the past five years. We may wish to isolate one or two of the more salient ones~ or fix on a juncture which embraces a host of interlocking decisions. Some aspects~ such as possible cleavages between gener ational levels of CCP membership or among local~ regional~ and central organs or party and/or governmental authority~ may re quire a wholly different approach. MY concern at this point is not to narrow your perspective except within the requirement that our work contribute to undeY'S tanding the dynamics of Chinese Communist political behavior at leadership levels . .. It is within this general framework that we would like to undertake an integrated study of the Chinese Communist leadership. We hope to provide the best available outside specialists in biographical intel ligence~ political science~ eco nomics~ and military affairs with full access to finished government studies and rCllJ information per taining to their respective fields of interest ... This is not to be a "quickie;r study for intel ligence purposes. Rathel' it is to provide a synthesis of the best available knowledge which can serve both prospective policy needs in the neal' future and as a foun dation for ongoing research and revision in subsequent years. Therefore we would like to pro duce a scholarly and sophisti cated doeument~ utilizing the
132

bes t avai l ab le

resources ...

Let me close by expressing my genuine appreciation for what ever help you can give at this point. This is likely to be a critical time for undertaking this study~ if our prognosis of developments on mainland China is correct. We have been assured com plete cooperation with other sect ors of the government~ so deep is interest in this project ..
These letters afford us but a glimpse of the research interests of governmental agencies. Other communications would reveal more. The letters cited above emphasize the question of succession crisis after the death of Mao, the ques tion of leadership dynamics in connection wi th institutional base (" actors and the units of action") and the question of policy shifts as a potential function of changes in the leadership. We can identify at least two ways in which important parts of the Whiting China research program were reflected in the academic community: (1) the 1966 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] grant to Columbia University for a study entitled Leadership in Communist China: Trends and Charac teristics. (2) the Greyston Confer ence on Research on the Government and Politics of Contemporary China convened by the JCCC in April 1964. In the summer of 1964, the late Dr. John Lindbeck, then Associate Director of the Eas t Asian Research Center at Harvard, chaired a conference convened by ACDA for the purpose of bringing to gether government research administra tors and academics influential in the SSRC China committees and/or the univer sity-based centers. Almost all the China people from Whiting's Special Group, Lindbe~k, Eckstein, Moorsteen, Hsieh, and Schurmann, and Whiting himself, par ticipated; indeed, this group, together with Professor George Taylor, constituted the nucleus of the ACDA conference. ACDA officers were seeking expertise rele vant to the agency's arms control mis sion and other foreign policy questions. The academics were seeking money for

''basic'' research on contemporary China. At the conference it was understood, at least by Professor Schurmann, that

. the government peopZe have a kind of ooordinated ea:temaZ re search oommittee with a number of agencies represented. [this can onZy be FAR] NOW, certainZy the academic peopZe of the joint com mittee and through individuaZ universities, are aZZ doing their best to get that research going in this fieZd. Eve~ major center that is represented here is reaZZy t~ing ve~ hard. [Transcript of Proceedings" China Arms ControZ Conference, JuZy 19, 1964, p. 66]
At the time Professor Schurmann was chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley. His expectation is bome out by an important ACDA pro ject, "Leadership in Communis t China," which was established in the East Asian Institute of Columbia University in 1966. The Columbia Project's statement of general objectives is perfectly con sonant with Whiting's program:

groups, with differing e~erien ces, preoccupations, responsibiZi ties, and viewpoints, who e:cert at Zeast some influence on poU~. The emergence of individuaZs and groupings with differing outZooks and poZicy preferences is ZikeZy to become even rrrnte important in the reZativeZy near future, since Communist China is now on the verge of a massive generationaZ change of Zeadership which wiZZ affect aZZ ZeveZs of the regime. [Pro posaZ for a Research Project, Leadership in Communist China,
p. 1]
Columbia University's original pro posal to ACDA requested $622,000 over a four-year period. We do not know the final terms, but the Leadership Project was established in the East Asian Insti tute at Columbia in the academic year 1966-67. It is described in the 1967 Annual Report of the EAI as "the first major coordinated research project ini tiated" by the Contemporary China Stu dies Committee of the EAI. This Committee was chaired by Professor A. Doak Bar nett, who assumed over-all responsibi lity for the research. The ACDA Leadership Project at Columbia, like the Agricultural Project at Berkeley, had influence on research conducted in the contemporary China field. At Columbia, the prestige accru ing to the Project from its sponsorship by the Contemporary China Studies Com mittee attracted both student and faculty interest in research on China's leader ship. In addition to the Leadership Project, ACDA has contracted for other strategic projects with the East Asian and South Asian Institutes at Columbia. Another route by which important parts of Whiting's Special Research Pro gram reached the profession was through the Greyston Conference on Research on the Government and Politics of Contemp orary China convened by the JCCC in April 1964. For the Conference, a study by A.M. Halpern of the RAND Corporation, Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," was distributed be fore the Conference to form a basis for

COTTlTl1UJ1,ist China today is on the verge of an historic transitionaZ period when the first generation of revoZution~ Zeaders wiZZ pass from the scene and be succeeded by new men, whom Mao has caZZed the ''heirs of the revo Zution," with consequences which, while not cZearly predictabZe, oould have a pro found impact on the Chinese Communist regime. In many respects, during the per iod of Mao Tse-tung's dominance, the leadership of the Chinese Com munist regime has shown a remark able degree of unity as well as longevity. H~ever, there are reasons to believe that even under the seemingly monolithic leader ship dominated by Mao, there has been a slow but steady develop ment, over time, of significant differentiation among Communist China's leaders and the emergence of a variety of individuaZs and

133

the diseussions. In this paper Halpern outlines research priorities that are very similar to those of the Whiting Group. At the time of Greyston, Halpern, a charter JCCC member, had tlDved from his senior staff position at RAND to the Council on Foreign Relations' China Project. Whiting himself had moved to the State Department from RAND. And Alice Hsieh of RAND was the China person on the Social Science Advisory Board of ACDA. In general, RAND personnel have tlDre visibility in the operations of the SSRC China committees than personnel of government agencies pep see Therefore it might be useful to characterize the RAND Corporation at this point since it is not strictly speaking a government agency. The authoritative description of the RAND Corporation quoted at the beginning of this section was provided by William Marvel, President of Education and World Affairs, when he testified on July 19, 1966, before the Harris Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Operations:

his stimulus we pulled ourseZves together at Harvard to under>take a smal l researah progmm using small fundS [POm the Carnegie COPpOration [or Chinese poZitiaaZ 8 tudies and a smal l fund [rom the Ford Foundation [or Chinese eao nomia studies.
Let us now proceed to consider the role of A.M. Halpern of RAND at the JCCC's Greyston Conference on Research on the Government and Politics of China held in April 1964. During the two years before the Conference, a small group of political scientists, George Taylor, John Lind beck, Lucian Pye, Harold Lasswell, and A.M. Halpern, had been meeting inform ally. Two of these meetings were spon sored by the JCCC, and Halpern's arti cle, "Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," [World Politics, April 1963] was based on discussions at these informal meetings. A confer ence was then proposed by A.M.Halpern in a memorandum to the JCCC dated April 17, 1963, according to the late Dr. Lindbeck in his letter to us of August 1, 1970. The Conference itself was arranged by Professors Taylor, Barnett, and Lindbeck, the planning group and the first three chairmen of the JCCC. Par ticipating from the government side were Allen Whiting, Department of State, and Harold Hinton, Institute for Defense Analysis. (At the time Dr. Lindbeck was consultant to the Depart ment of State and the Institute for Defense Analysis.) Participating from RAND were William Dorrill and David Mozingo. With over thirty participants in all, the Conference was one of the two or three most important of the JCCC since it was intended to establish directions in research and to create a subcommittee which would in turn sponsor further conferences on the subject of Chinese political science. The Conference was organized in the following way. The Halpern article cited above was distributed to the partici pants, together with papers by William Dorrill, Glenn Paige, Chalmers Johnson,

The RAND COPpOration, fop exam ple, has been highly suaaessful in opepating along that wavePing line between inteZZigenae studies and alassi[ied projeats, on the one hand, and saholaply reseapaft and open puhZiaation, on the other. [International Soaial Saienae Reseapch, HeaPings, p. 165]
It should also be observed that the Chair man of the Board at RAND, H. Rowan Gaither, was concurrently President of the Ford Foundation at the time of the Gould House Conference, and that the initial scouting of the universities prior to Gould House was done by a RAND consul tant, Dr. Paul Langer. In his letter to us of January 14, 1971, Professor Fairbank relates that:

One baakground [aator> is that the Ford Foundation had begun in the mid-'50's to take an interest in the support of Chinese studies . they employed Dp. Paul Langer to go around and see people, and with
134

and James Townsend. These five papers

constituted the program of the Confer
ence. However, Dorrill, Paige, Johnson,
and Townsend were all of junior status,
while Halpern had senior status and his
article was already published. fure im
portant, Halpern was a charter member
of the JCCC and had left the Committee
only a short time before when he joined
the China Project 0 f the Council on
Foreign Relations.
A few citations from Halpern's pro
gram should suffice to establish its
consonance with Whiting's program:

tween the regime and the remnant bourgeoisie ... [po 370]
Whiting had drawn attention to "possible cleavages between generational levels of CCP membership or among local, regional, and central organs or party and/or governmental authority " It is interesting to note that there seems to have been a moment of self knowledge at the Greyston Conference when the question of the intelligence potential of part of the program was raised:

We lack a coherent theory of the present nature of the sources of power and the distribution of these sources of power arrrmg the various newly constructed institutions developed for the purpose of using it. There is ... evidence that re sistance has taken place at almost all points in this revolutionary process but we have no coherent theory concerning the nature of this resistance. [po 366]
This conforms to Whiting's plan for study ing the "att it udes 0 f compet ing groups on industrial, military, and agricultural allocation" and for "probing the points of tension and cohesion" in the decision making process. Halpern states that

Although the fourth of these topics [civil-military relations especially as related to the prob lem of succession after Mao] was questioned as possibly falling within the category of intelligence~ rather than that of social sci ence research~ it was felt that social scientists outside of government~ while eschewing Krem linology~ might be able to provide a framework against which the logic of short-range research might be tested by officials. [Conference Report~ p. 3]
However, no sooner was the poten tially unsettling question of the intel ligence value of this research raised, than it was comfortably circumvented by proposing a division of labor be tween the social scientists ("provide a framework") and officials ("short range" or mission-oriented work) Such treatment, which of course speaks openly to the problem of appear ances, nevertheless implicitly settles the real, substantive question as well in favor of unquestioned academic ser vice to the policy makers. The Confer ence Report contains no hint that any one expressed reservations about the propriety of this academic posture. Indeed, one of the characteristics of such a conference, whose leadership is so closely associated with government policy and service, is that fundament~l questions of a methodological and pol1t ieal nature are not apt to be raise~ ~s it is very difficult for other part1c1 135

The indicated research problem is the determination of what the actor roles are~ who occupies them ~ and What kinds and degrees of influence the actors have over what resources. [po 370]
This conforms to Whiting's objective "to determine the actors and the units of action in the Chinese Communist decis ion-making process" and his recognition that "biographical files will provide an important factual base for tracing the repercussions of clique struggles . " Halpern states that

Ideological writings may help lo cate the axes of political con flict--within the party~ between party and state apparatus~ be

pants to adopt a critical and indepen dent stance.

**********
In concluding this exploratory essay on the organization of Chinese studies in the US, we wish, in particular, to thank Professors Franz Schurmann and George Beckmann for granting us access to the documentation in their files. This commendable sense of responsibility to academic colleagues and the community as a whole has made possible the solu tion of a number of important problems that we encountered in the course of our research. We submit that there is sufficient justification for the fonnation of an AAS-CCAS Investigative Committee and that such a Committee could play a role in safeguarding the profession from the improper influence of organizations whose purposes are at variance or even antithetical to the scholarly vocation. However, whether the Committee is con stituted or not, CCAS will continue to conduct research into these professional problems and will continue to seek the advice and assistance of other members of the profession. NOTES 1. Report on the Conference on Studies of Contemporary China, held at Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, New York, June 19-21, 1959, p. 16. 2. The debate is reproduced verba tim in the original Report. 3. In his letter of June 22, 1971, granting us permission to print his letters to us, Professor Fairbank re quested that we include the following clarification of his point: "Your term 'the field' requires more precise defi nition, and your phrase 'framing and carrying through' also needs to be amplified. The problem involved is, how to promote development of academic training and research. If you take all the people in Chinese studies as con stituting 'the field', then by defini tion they are not able to carry out concrete action en masse .. " 136 '

4. This letter is in the files of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington at Seattle. The files are maintained on an open basis by the Director, Professor George Beckmann. 5. The Passin Report was published
in 1963 in ad edited version by Praeger
as China's Cultural Diplomacy. Cf. pages
48, 74, and 108 for the public version
of the quotations.
6. During the mid-sixties one of the staff men on this Committee was Robert Sheeks, former Acting Director of Review and Development at the Asia Foundation. APPENDICES Appendix 1: Joint Committee on Contempo rary China A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University,
1963-64, 1965-67 (chainnan 1963-64)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia Univer sity, 1961-62
Alexander Eckstein, University of Roches
ter, University of ~lichigan, 1959-67
John K. Fairbank, Harvard University,
1959-67
Albert Feuerwerker, University of Michi
gan, 1966-69
Walter Galenson, University of California,
Berkeley, Cornell University, 1959-69
Norton Ginsburg, University of Chicago,
1959-63
A.M. Halpern, RAND Corporation, 1959-63
Chalmers Johnson, University of Califor
nia, Berkeley, 1968-69
John M.H. Lindbeck, Harvard University, Columbia University, 1959-69 (chair man 1964-69) Philip E. Hosely, Council on Foreign Re
lations, 1959-60
Frederick W. Mote, Princeton University,
1967-69
Robert A. Scalapino, University of Cal
ifornia, Berkeley, 1964-68
G. William Skinner, Cornell University,
Stanford University, 1962-65
George E. Taylor, University of Washing
ton, 1959-69 (chairman 1959-63)
Ezra F. Vogel, Harvard University,
1967-69
C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia University, 1959-63
Hellmut Wilhelm, University of Washing

ton, 1959-61
Arthur B. Wolf, Cornell University,
1966-67
Mary C. Wright, Yale University,
1964-66
Staff: Bryce Wood, Social Science
Research Council, 1959-69

Clarence Morris, University of Pennsyl vania, 1965-69 Appendix 5: Committee on the Economy of China A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University, 1961-63 Abram Bergson, Harvard University, 1961-69 Alexander Eckstein, University of ~ich igan, 1963-69 Walter Galenson, University of California, Berkeley, Cornell University, 1961-69 Joseph A. Kershaw, Williams College, 1961-65 Simon Kuznets, Harvard University, 1961-69 (chairman 1961-69) Ta-chung Liu, Cornell University, 1963-69 S.C. Tsiang, University of Rochester, 1966-69 Staff: Paul Webbink, SSRC, 1962-69

The Current Membership:

A. Feuerwerker, Michigan (chairman) Thomas Bernstein, Yale Chalmers Johnson, Berkeley Dwight Perkins, Harvard James Townsend, U of Washington Ezra Vogel, Harvard Arthur Wolf, Stanford Staff: Bryce Wood, John Campbell Appendix 2: Subcommittee on Research on Chinese Society Maurice Freedman, London School of Eco nomics and Political Science, 1965-67 Morton Fried, Columbia University, 1961-63, 1964-69 (chairman 1962-63) John C. Pelzel, Harvard University, 1961-64 (chairman 1961-62) G. William Skinner, Cornell University, Stanford University, 1961-69 (chairman 1963-69) Irene B. Taueber, Princeton University, 1962-69 Ezra F. Vogel, Harvard University, 1967-69 Appendix 3: Subcommittee on Chinese Government and Politics A. Doak Barnet t, Columbia University, 1965-69 John W. Lewis, Cornell University, Stanford University, 1967-69 John ~f.H.Lindbeck, Harvard University, Columbia University, 1965-69 Robert A. Sca1apino, University of California, Berkeley, 1965-69 (chairman 1965-69) George E. Taylor, University of Washington, 1965-69 Appendix 4: Subcommittee on Chinese Law Jerome A. Cohen, Harvard University, 1965-69 (chairman 1965-69) Dan F. Henderson, University of Washing ton, 1965-69

CORRECTION To Jon Halliday's article on Korea in the Fall 1970 issue: The second sentence of the last para graph on page 98 should read: "Sub I S method is to try to isolate Kim from a putative 'mainstream''', not "to isolate Kim for a ... !1 In the preceding paragraph, it should read " Suh presents t h e ... process .. " instead of "Sub understands" Pak, the present dictator, should always be written Pak--and not Park, which is his own imperialist orthography. Finally, certain misspe11ings--Obata Iatsuo, Pak, Beckmann--were our mistakes (ed. ) . 137

COLLE(:T
S~OO.OO SALARY

AS YOU PASS

Politics aad :Bao_ledge : AD Uaollhodox Bislo..)' of Mode... Chi.a Siadies

by David Horowitz

I think we TTlU8t pZC1I:J a Zong game for

China. We have got to pZC1I:J it for the
Zong tem.
John King Fairbank, Proceedings of a confiden tial rolttldtable, held in the Department of State, October 1949.
I. INTRODUCTION

In the investigation of social phen omena -- and the social organization of intellect is no exception -- consid eration of context is the crucial start ing point for analysis. Professor Fair bank's comment on the CCAS Report, which he has duplicated for private circulation, and which is reprinted at his request in this journal, is not merely the expression of an intellectual position, but a political act. Like other professional fields, China studies are organized in an intensely hierarchical and centralized fashion. The professional disapproval of a senior member of the field, par ticularly one bearing the prestige of Harvard's East Asian Research Cen ter, is not an event that others can afford to ignore -- if they have thoughts for their academic futures. The authors of the CCAS Report comprise just such a group of untenured professors and lttlcre dentialled graduate students, lacking professional clout or a secure insti tutional base. In the circumstances, the implications of Professor Fairbank's censure are severe. Olarges of conspiracy hunting and left McCarthyism provide the framework of Professor Fairbank's attack on the

CCAS document. By no mere coincidence, these are the principal tenns in which the status anxieties of academic intel lectuals are expressed nowadays and in which the equivalent of an academic anathema is pronounced on academic heretics. The tenets of academic free dom do not permit excommunications for political views; but the collegial pro tection of the professional fraternity can be swiftly withdrawn for alleged "attacks" on academic freedom, that is, for the anti-intellectualism and para noia usually associated with conspir acy theories and McCarthyism -1 "whether of the left or of the right." Ludicrous as Professor Fairbank's comparison of the CCAS Report to the McCarran investigations appears to an outside observer, his anxiety would seem more consistent if he himself had been a strong defender of academic freedom in the past. But far from stand ing out as an opponent of political investigations into the field by witch hunting committees like McCarran's, Professor Fairbank seemed, at the time, publicly to acquiesce in their enter prise. 2 His position was that such Senatorial inquisitions were justified in principle, but that he himself was being slandered (Louis Budenz had iden tified him as a CoDlDlttlist) and that this was bad because i t hampered his own ability to fight communism. It was apparently all right to expose real communists and communist sympathizers, who were doing intellectual work on China, to public villification and pillory. In the present situation, by con . trast, Professor Fairbank is not at all
139

concerned with the details of the inves tigation, with possible misstatements or slanders in the CCAS Report, but wishes, rather, to declare the whole line of inquiry out of bounds. What is this line of inquiry? In Professor Fairbank's presenta tion there are only two possible alternatives for studying the China field: "issues of conspiracy" on the one hand, and "issues of values" on the other. But of course the proper complement to an analysis of the values dominant in China studies (such as that undertaken by Jim Peck) is an analysis of the structures of the field, which may help to explain why some values and not others achieve pro fessional dominance. It is this line of inquiry that the CCAS Report takes, and that Professor Fairbank finds so threatening. Of course, individuals do act together (conspire) to create the structures, and individuals do wield the prestige, power and influence that the structures inevitably confer. Whether such individuals have also conspired is a question that can hard ly ae decided apriori, but only by the concrete evidence as it is presented. On the other hand, the inquiry into organization, structures, and the groups that may dominate them, is not only legitimate, but one would think essen tial for a profession that has regard for its own standards and integrity. The question of whether there are fun damental conflicts of interest in the field (political vs. academic for exam ple) can hardly be resolved by confin ing inquiry to the wisdom of judgments, assumptions, attitudes, priorities and concepts as Professor Fairbank would prefer. It is not the isolated opinion of a judge or legisiator that determines a conflict of interest, but the context in which the opinion is made, the circum stances, forces, pressures and poten tial rewards that tend to influence judgments and viewpoints beyond consid erations of evidence, principle and val ue. Surely the academic profession will not shrink from the minimal tests that the judicial and legal professions 140

impose on their members. There is only one concrete refer ence to the conspiracy theory alleged to run like a red thread through the CCAS Report, in Professor Fairbank's "Comment." This is a passage to the effect that there is considerable correspondence between a government statement of research priorities and the research sponsored by the JCCC in the academic China field. The CCAS Report then demands access to the JCCC files to determine whether the correspondence between the government statement of intelligence priorities and the research priorities of the academic community is merely fortuitous or whether their linkage has a more substantial reality behind it. Fairbank asks why CCAS should want such access: "The only reason must be that the government is evil. So the question is, has its evil influence spread to JCCC and to the field in general. The equally logical and rather plausible alternative would be that the influence on balance went the other way ... " [Comment] This statement is so mired in non-sequitur that it is difficult to know where to begin a response. Wheth er the government is evil or not is surely immaterial to the question of whether the research priorities of the China field are being set by the military, the government, the Ford Foundation or any other agency or interest group which is non-academic in sturcture and commitment. The question is: are they being set by outside agen cies with extra-intellectual and per haps even anti-intellectual interests? The fact that some of the agencies in question are aiding in a genocidal war in Asia today emphasizes the impor tance of finding out whether the academy is working for the government instead of maintaining its intellectual commit ment and independence. But the struc tural question of how the China field is organized in relation to outside interests, and whether its research guidelines are not really intelligence

s
guidelines set by outside forces, is certainly independent of the question of whether those forces are evil, good or morally indifferent.
As for Fairbank's "logical and rather plausible alternative" that the influence went the other way, one may ask how such a conclusion could be substantiated except by supplying answers to the CCAS questions: how was the China field set up, and by whom? who sponsored and shap ed its research interests and laid down its intellectual guidelines? Hired ad visors also influence their employers; China specialists within the State Department or Intelligence agencies make a contribution to foreign policy and military decisions. That's what they're paid for. But, in theory at least, there is still a distinction to be made between an intelligence expert and an independent university scholar. It is a question whether there is such a difference in practice in the contem porary China field, and if so, to what extent? That is a valid subject of inquiry

follow of course, that such an inquiry leads to reassuring conclusions. An historical perspective which takes into account not only the evolution of inter national studies, but their relation to the institutions and policies of an expanding world power, provides an indispensable framework for understand ing the issues at hand. Before embarking on an hiotorical analytical account of these develop ments it is important to make two preliminary observations about plural ism. The first is that while there may be a wonderfully complex plurality of organizations operating in American society, organizational power is dependent either on mass participation and politicization, or (what is almost invariably the case) large-scale fund ing combined with access to existing power institutions and influence. The AAS has neither, though it is certainly the largest and most presti gious body in the Asian field, it has virtually no funds, meets only once a year, and lacks the cohesiveness to act as a political force. Consequently, beyond performing in an "ad hoc" advis ory capacity, it has played a role of virtually no importance in shaping the contemporary China field. The second preliminary observation that needs to be made is that within the pluralism of organizations in Amer ican society, there is also -- for individuals with time, money and access a plurality of assumable roles. This kind of pluralism is especially avail able to cohesive upper class elites, whose purposes are immeasureably strengthened by a structural diversity which conceals its presence and divides and disarms the uninitiated and unanoint ed. Professor Fairbank, who wore three hats in the u.S. Embassy in China during the war -- one for the diplomatic ser vice, another "purely'' cultural, and a third, not so readily displayed, for the OSS (intelligence), well understands the prevalence and purposes of this phenomenon.3 (His recent defense of the circulation of CIA personnel through the
141

Underlying Professor Fairbank's impatience with the idea of such an inquiry and with what he terms the "amazing .. simplicity of thinking" exhibited in the CCAS Report is a set of assumptions about the pluralistic structure of American society and its educational institutions which would seem to rule out any possibility of the kind of subordination of organized intel lect to power intimated in the CCAS documents. The university system offers a decentralized and diverse prospect of private and public institutions, non government foundations, independent research councils, professional and cul tural voluntary associations, etc. "Our educational structure is a won derfully complex thing, not easily to be understood in black and white terms, and before we knock it, we should find out how it has evolved and how it works." [Comment] This is an admirable suggestion and one that had occurred to some of us before; it does not necessarily

I I
I
I

! I

faculty and student body of Harvard is certainly consistent with this mode of pluralism. ) II. FOUNDATIONS OF PLURALISM In the course of its expansive development during the twentieth cen tury, American foreign policy has been firmly in the control of a cohesive upper-class elite, popularly referred to as the Eastern Establishment be cause of its geographical roots in the traditional centers of American mercan tile capital (Boston, New York and Philadelphia). From the outset, the development of university studies in international relations and areas has been dominated by this elite and shaped to the requirements of its ex panding foreign policies and economic investment patterns. This accomodation of the academic mind to the needs of policymakers and businessmen has not been accomplished in the main by direct interventions into the academic sanc tuary but by the mediation of the great philanthropic foundations - Rockefeller, Carnegie and (for the post-war period) Ford. Together these three foundations have sponsored virtually every major development in the international stud ies field since the turn of the cen tury.4 If China studies are centralized today, if a few elite institutions are the focus of most of the investment in the field, if the thrust of most con temporary China research is to provide information to policymakers and adminis trators, it is principally a consequence of the central initiating role of the foundations. And it is true as well in a stunning variety of other fields during the last seventy years. All the major university-based research cen ters in foreign affairs have been fund ed or initiated by these three founda tions. So have all the important non university research centers and "volun tary associations" from the Social Science Research Coun d.l to the Council on Foreign Relations. And it is the significance of this network and its base which should begin to be apparent.
142

These foundations will not be understood if they are looked on as genial philanthropists, responding intuitively and generously to requests from needy supplicants. They are high ly organized, highly planned institu tions, involved in their own eyes in strategic sociaZ investment. Just as John D. Rockefeller thought of his dispensations in politics, religion, education and science as ''benevolent investments" to improve the social environment in which his Standard Oil Company developed and thrived, so the present-day executives of the foundations regard themselves as "social entrepre neurs" controlling the "venture capital of social progress", and thereby provid ing the protective vanguard of free enterprise democracy. The same instincts for coordination, centralization and cost-efficient production which motivated the old monopolists (and which they too defended as the pragmatic price of progress and freedom), have also charac terized the organizers of these social investment banks from the outset. 5 While centralization has been a standard objective since their incep tion, foundations, paradoxically, regard themselves as the pillars of plural istic democracy. Recognizing that outside of government there are no significant funds available (from corporations or individuals) to create strong intellec tual and cultural institutions and "voluntary associations," foundations see their role as providing the indispens able sponsorship for the multiplicity of groups that are allowed to come into being and survive. But if the few sponsor the many (and there are only a handful of foundations of any real signi ficance) and if coordination and economy are their shared imperatives, then the pluralism that results will inevitably be more apparent than real. Of twelve major university centers of Foreign Affairs research described in a recent State Department directory (1968), eleven are financed in whole or part by the Ford Foundation. But even this is a more pluralistic situation than that presented by the contemporary China field which was created in its present

>

form by the grace of Ford alone. Another important point to under stand is that the foundations of Rocke feller, Carnegie and Ford are aZass rather than family institutions. Their founders and trustees are international ists not only philanthropically but in their roles as the leaders of Amer ica's international business establish ment. For them, the promotion of an "open door" culturally and scientifically goes hand in hand with the pressure for an open economic door in the under developed world. This "open door" has functioned historically as the strategic emblem of America's imperial mission precisely because the superiority of American technical expertise and corpor ate finance has resulted in American hegemony in any sphere that allows it self to be subjected to "open" competi tion. In the early development of the foundations there is already apparent that dedicated internationalism and elaborate pluralistic involvement which is so noticeable today. Andrew Carnegie, who as steel master of Pittsburgh had a special interest in high tariff walls against the German and English competi tion, was a notorious cultivator of the good company of U.S. Secretaries of State~ and in his philanthropic phase appointed them to trusteeships of his burgeoning charitable trusts. 6 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, established in 1910, was the first cultural and research institu tion specifically devoted to inter national affairs. Among the original Carnegie appointed trustees were three former Secretaries of State -- John W. Foster, Robert ,Ba.con and Elihu Root -- the latter of whom was Carnegie's personal lawyer and advisor in creating his philanthropies, as well as being a principal counsel for America's premier international banker, J.P. Morgan & Co. A pivotal figure in the Endowment for Peace during its first four decades was Nicholas Murray Butler, President

of Columbia University, who was a rabid jingoist in World War I, though a "pacifist" earlier. Butler's attitude typified that of the endowment and its sponsors: "peace", realistically speak ing, meant stability and the preserva tion of the status quo, rather than anything so idealistic as non-violence or an end to war. Another Carnegie head, Henry S. Pritchett, one of the major shapers of modern higher education,7 at the time of the Endowment's creation was writing an introduction to Alfred Thayer Mahan's plea for an imperial navy, while Carnegie himself, though an outspoken opponent of political colonial ism, was warmly advocating a non-colonial economic empire. John D. Rockefeller was also an early internationalist and pluralist in the Carnegian vein, who engaged his rival in a friendly competition in benevolent investment at the turn of the century, particularly in institu tions with a global reach. Reminiscing about men and events in 1909, a decade after Carnegie's old friend John Hay had issued his seminal call for an "Open Door" to the markets of China, Rockefeller took strong issue with those critics who had charged that his Stan dard Oil Company "crushed out its competitors." Nothing could be further from the truth: "The Standard is always fighting to sell the American product against the oil produced from the great fields of Russia, which struggles for the trade of Europe, and the Burma oil, which largely affects the market in India. In all these various countries we are met with tariffs which are raised against us, local prejudices, and strange customs. In many countries we had to teach the people -- the Chinese, for example -- to burn oil by making lamps for them; we packed the oil to be car ried by camels or on the backs of runners in the most remote portions of the world; we adapted the trade to the needs of strange folk. "8 As even at this early date "more than half the product that the company makes is sold outside the U.S.", it was only natural that Rocke feller should be an early appreciator
143

of the need for information about the local prejudices and customs of "strange folk:: and that under his philanthropic hat he should become one of the pioneers in developing academic research in these areas. 9 Complementing Rockefeller's sensi tivity to the educational needs of his COtmtry was a dedicated patriotism and a keen sense of his company's service to the nation, and of the nation's service to Standard. "Every time we succeeded in a foreign land, it meant dollars brought to this country, and every time we failed, it was a loss to our nation and its workmen. One of our greatest helpers has been the State Department in Washington. Our ambassa dors and ministers and consuls have aided to push our way into new markets to the utmost comers of the world." Liberally aware of the rewards that a partnership between business and govern ment could bring, Rockefeller, like Carnegie, began a tradition of appoint ing Secretaries of State to his philan thropic boards.10 The entry of the United States into the European War in 1917 marked a water shed in America's relations with the world and precipitated a domestic response which has dominated the inter nal dynamics of American foreign policy making ever since. On the one side, there was an "isolationist" revulsion at the hypocritical idealism of the intervention and the enormous price in blood that was paid not to make the world any safer for democracy, but to pave the way for yet another imperial division of the international political and economic map. This "isolationist" opposition was centered in Congress (the branch of govemment mst sensitive to populist forces) and reached a kind of climax in the Nye investigations of the thirties, which suggested that U.S. entry had more to do with Wall Street and the military-industrial complex, than with any desire to end all wars, or to defend a popularly accepted concept of the national interest. Support for the new internationalist

posture, on the other hand, centered in the Eastern Establishment and was repre sented politically in the Executive branch of government, which it tradi tionally controlled. It also began to be voiced by a series of new e1ite sponsored associations and institutions, supported by the PDckefe11er and Car negie Foundations, and concerned with promoting a sense of America's new intemationa1 "responsibilities" and filling the gaps in information and training as experienced by the strate gists of the new American world order. Among these were the Foreign Policy Association (1918), the Cotmci1 on Foreign Relations (1921) and, an organ ization with a somewhat broader compo sition, in keeping with its academic thrust, the Institute of Pacific Rela tions (1925). Of these associations, the Council on Foreign Relations occupies a primary place of interest. The Council was formed in 1921 with Elihu Root as honorary president and Carnegie-Rockefeller back ing)l (Its moving organizational spir it, Whitney Shephardson -- a linear descendant of the Standard Oil Whitneys was also a charter trustee of the Rocke feller's International Education Board, when it was founded in 1923.) Composed of the leading figures of the wor1d oriented U.S. corporations and financial institutions, the CFR has become over the years the most important long-range foreign policy formulating organization, inside or outside the government. Indeed, the very terms "~,.;vernment," "non-govern ment" lose their significance in respect to the CFR as they tend to, generally, with the research and policy-oriented elite associations, because of the pervasive overlap of personnel. All the most strategic figures in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy since World War I, including the Stimsons, the Du11eses, the McC10ys, the Harrimans and the Rockefe11ers, have been central figures in the Council. And they themselves are the inheritors of a venerated tradition of aristocratic business control of U.S. Foreign policy symbolized by the Cotmci1' s first permanent official, Hamilton Fish Armstrong (later editor of the Cotmci1's

144

journal Foreign Affairs); "Hamil tons , Fishes and Armstrongs", as G. William Domhoff observes, ''have been involved in American foreign policy since the beginnings of the Republic." The peerless position of the Coun cil can be appreciated by the fact that although it is limited to 1 ,400 members, 63 of the first 82 names on a list pre pared for John F. Kennedy for staffing his State Department were CFR members, and among the final appointments, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, seven assistant and undersecretaries of state, four senior members of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury and presiden tial advisors Schlesinger and Bundy were all CFR memb ers .12 Two features of the council are especially important for the present line of inquiry. The first is its concern with long-range planning. The initiative for forming the coun cil actually came from the State Department -- then headed by Rocke feller Trustee Charles Evans Hughes- because the government could not it self undertake such planning. The Council's importance as a long-range policy planning body was dramatically demonstrated during World War II. In 1939, at the request of the Secretary of State, the Council -- with aid from the Rockefeller Foundation -- had estab lished four planning groups. "In 1942, the whole apparatus with most of the personnel, was taken into the State Department as the hub of its Advisory Committee on Postwar Planning Problems."13 Recent evidence of the Council's effectiveness in the foreign policy area is afforded by the virtually unpro tested abandonment this past spring of the twenty-year U.S. policy of isolating China, by a President whose political career was launched on McCarthy's coat tails, and who has long been the most politically eminent stalking horse of the China Lobby. Those with memories extending back to the split over China policy in the late forties and early fifties (perhaps the deepest and most virulent split of its kind in u.S. history) will understand the impressive character of the bi-partisan unity and calm during these developments, as well as the uncharacteristic sophistication shown by Nixon in formulating the new lines. But that is because they will probably have been unaware of the elab orate and careful preparations that preceded it. Among these was a three-year, II-volume Council on Foreign Relations study project, which began in 1962 and covered every aspect of U.S.-China relations. 14 The steering committee for the CFR group (which was funded by a half-million-dollar Ford grant) was headed by Allen Dulles, just retired director of the CIA, and included Hamilton Fish Armstrong, A. Doak Bar nett, Arthur H. Dean (law partner of Dulles, Carnegie trustee and top government policymaker), Joseph E. Johnson (formerly of the State Depart ment and presently head of the Carnegie Endowment), Grayson Kirk (Columbia preSident, Standard Oil director, Car negie and Asia Foundation Trustee), John J. NcCloy and Lucien Pye. The actual proj ect was run by Robert A. Blum (for mer AID director and CIA agent in Indo-China, and former President of the CIA-funded Asia Foundation), whose "summing up" volume took the cautious but strategically rational position that "American obj ectives in Asia and the stability of the area will be difficult to achieve if the gulf between the United States and Communist China continues to be as wide as it has been. illS The meetings held by the CFR study group, the meetings sponsored, the vol umes produced16 and the activities "spun off" went a long way towards re-forming the consensus on which a new China pol icy could be built. In 1966, when the study group had run its course, Ford sponsored a new organization, a public lobby for the new policies: the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The first "national convocation" of this group, which was held on March 20-21, 1969, was a headline-making gala at the New York Hilton, and included speeches by Senators Edward Kennedy (Dem.) and l4S

Jacob Javits (Rep.), professors Fairbank, Barnett, Walker, ~achael, Eckstein, banker Robert V. Roosa and all-around Sinophile John D. Rockefeller III. The Committee itself was a gem of political consensus-making. Its board of directors included a Rabbi, a Reverend and a Mon seigneur, a banker, an industrialist, the inevitable Sullivan and Cromwell partner 17 and academic representatives of all parts of the political spectrum, including George Taylor (CFR-right), John K. Fairbank (CFR-liberal) and Richard Pfeffer (token-left). Robert Scalapino (CFR-liberal) was the first chairman, A. Doak Barnett (CFR-liberal) the sec ond. Vice chairmen included John M.H. Lindbeck, Lucien Pye and Alexander Eckstein. Two months before the convocation, a new Administration had taken office in Washington and had placed at the center of foreign policy-making an exemplary CFR protege, Henry M. Kissinger. Kissin ger began his career as a student of Harvard Professor (and CFR menDer) McGeorge Bundy, who had begun his career as a protege of CFR eminence grise Henry Stimson. Kissinger became a foreign policy expert for the Rockefeller Bro thers Panel Reports in the mid-fifties and a key CFR study group leader and author (on nuclear weapons strategy, the then-critical foreign policy issue). He was also Nelson Rockefeller's personal foreign policy advisor in the '64 and '68 campaign. Nixon's appointment of his rival's personal expert to manage his administration's "national security" affairs is eloquent testimony to the monopoly position exercised by this eastern-based, ruling-class elite in the making of American foreign policy. This monopoly position is based, as should be evident, on a far-ranging structural eminence: they are dominant, in short, because they have the exper tise, the information, the tradition and personnel for foreign policy man agement, as well as (or more properly as a consequence of, and in addition to) their possession of the raw eco nomic, political power and interest. The Council's program of co-opting 146

selected members from the academic com munity as experts to participate in Council study committees flows directly from its preoccupation with long-range planning. Some of these academic parti cipants, often of upper-class origins themselves but also possessing a useful combination of administrative talent, academic prestige, and intelligence or State Department experience, are made Council members themselves and thereby gain entry, if not admission, to the charmed circles of the upper class. In this way, academics provide essential service to the men of power. As a result, men of power have developed a sophisticated interest in education and intellect. Turning to the contemp orary China field, it is striking to note that virtually without exception the shapers of the new disciplines and the administrative lords of the new institutional fiefs, including Fairbank, Taylor, Barnett, Lindbeck and Wilbur, are all Council members. And if one were to look at the other contemporary area studies fields -- for example, in Asia (where Reischauer, Borton, Pye and Scala pino are all Council members) and also in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America -- one would find the same pat tern among the "academic" personnel. For they are all products of the same overarching plans for international training and research -- designed, implemented and funded by the same upper-class elite in its plural mani festations. III. AMERICA IN CHINA

The professors and private business men of nvdem China roepresent our groeatest human stake there .. The key to ouro posi tion in China has been China's modem liberoal class, the professional men troain ed in this count~, the students in the Christian colleges in China, the Shanghai business men who believe in froee entero prise undero the proactice of lCJ1J).
John King Fairbank, "Can We Compete in China?" May 19, 1948, Far Eastern Sur vey [IPR publication] Although it was created as an inde

pendent institution outside the univer

sity framework, tqe proper ancestor of
the post-war centers, particularly in
the Asian field, was the Institute of
Pacific Relations. Created in 1925 as an
international body with national and
local affiliates, it was for the next
twenty-five years the center of organ
ized research on the Far East.
The initial capital for the Institute was provided by the Rockefeller Founda tion, as was the substantial core (37%) of the subsequent financing (A Rockefeller trustee was accordingly made Chairman of its board). When, following the McCarran investigation, the Rockefeller Founda tion stopped the flow of funds, the Institute virtually collapsed. Just before deciding the Institute's fate, the Foundation convened a meeting of the trustees in whom it placed its own ulti mate trust. This was, therefore, a sig nificant list of the guardians of the Asian field at that time, and typically included a corporate attorney for Stan dard Oil, Arthur H. Dean, a vice-presi dent of Standard Oil (Far East divi sion), and a banker for Standard Oil, William H. Draper Jr. In addition to the researchers of the IPR, there was an "activist" com ponent of America's cultural interest in China during the interwar years, a net work of Christian missionaries, public health, medical and agricultural ex perts who had a significant impact on alina's internal politics, and who, as America's representative presence in China, had a major influence on the ideological and political response of the United States to the Chinese revo lution. In technologically backward and poverty-ridden China, this group of Americans constituted a vital nucleus. Backed by considerable individual and institutional wealth, they occupied a commanding position in the develop ment of China's technical expertise. The majority of China's pre-war elite had been trained in America's domestic and overseas educational programs, and American "technical" advisors were to be found throughout the KMl' admini stration. Chiang's chief advisor on

agrarian reform, the critical issue of the political struggle, was typically a Christian missionary, George Sheppard. James C. Thomson, in his recently published account While China Faced West, has described the American effort as a "gradualist alternative" to Communist revolution in these turbulent years.18 The effort was spearheaded by Christian missionary groups, with the institutional backing of the national universities (which Thomson recognizes as "the maj or channels of Western influence") and feeding into domestic political forces like James Yen's Mass Education Move ment. Yen, a YMCA-sponsored Yale grad uate, had organized -- with foreign backing -- the National Association of the Mass Education Movement in 1923. Less than a decade later, Chiang Kai shek invited Yen to the capital and praised his rural reconstruction program as a model for China's "revolution". Noting that the American-sponsored rural reconstruction effort -- which was organized around public health, educational and agricultural programs was the work of several groups, includ ing "American Protestant missionaries, their Chinese fellow Christians, other Western~trained Chinese, foundation personnel, and visiting American ex perts," Thomson concludes that "the effort reflected the pluralism of the society from which it sprang." Yet, while the institutional instruments of the effort were indeed varied, includ ing "Christian colleges, the National Christian Council, the YMCA, private Chinese institutions, international relief agencies and a multi-million dol lar foundation," Thomson admits that "to a notable extent the institutional directorates interlocked." Thus, "a YMCA official might also serve as a member of the NCC, a trustee of a Christian college, a director of a famine relief commis sion, a contributor to a Chinese rural experiment, an advisor to an American foundation. " This interlocking character of the religious, academic and political. thrust of non-government Americans in Ch1na
147

could be seen in the Institute of Pacific Relations itself, which had been created at a YMCA conference in Hawaii. Its Secretary-General was not only a top YnCA official, but the Chairman of the American Council of the Mass Education Movement of James Yen. Horeover, this interlock itself was based on yet another, more basic level of homogeneous interest. For the chief funder of the IPR, and a principal financial angel of the YMCA, the Protestant missions, and private Chinese institutions and the Chinese famine relief was John D. Rockefeller Jr. , whose father half a century earlier had begun the "cultural" investment in China by creating the chief source of the rural reconstruction efforts" public health expertise: the Peking Union Medi cal College, beneficiary of an incred ible thirty-million-dollar Rockefeller largesse up to that time, and as a result the premier institution of its kind on the Asian mainland. The strategic conception behind the rural reconstruction effort in its inte grated form also came from the Rockefeller Foundation and its advisor Selskar Gunn. This was inevitable because only the Foundation had the financial means and the necessary interest (as a result of the pluralistically various projects in which its sponsors were involved in China) to integrate the academic, pol itical, religious and governmental com ponents of such a project. As Thomson puts it, the first series of grants under the Foundation's China Program "was note worthy for the variegated character of the recipients -- three government bur eaus, one private nonmission university [Nankai 1, one Chinese association [Yen's Mass Education Movement1, and two mis sion universities [Yenching and Nanking]." The funding was mainly to make available technical experts and expertise for the programs in agriculture and public health. For the Chinese reformers in the field, the integrated program of rural reconstruction became "the vital core of a political and social credo." While this program of modernization without revolution failed in China (it

was too little and too late), it subse quently became a model for intervention by American academic experts and AID funded agencies in the underdeveloped world. In summing up the significance of the Rockefeller effort, James Thomson writes:

If indeed, there ever was a grad ualist altePnative to violent revo lution in the Chinese aount~side, the program of the Roakefeller Foundation aame al.oser to it than any previous effort by the many would-be refo~ers in Kuomintang China. It esahewed sodal revo lution -- and most notably was silent on the issue of land re form. But it provided unique support for those who sought to ahange the aondi tions of life in village China. Yet grad ualism required time; and time was the one element denied to the rural reaonstruationists by extern al aggressor and intePnal rebel alike.

The significance of these events for our purposes is not that they expose a Machiavellian Fnckefeller conspiracy behind the gradualist alternative to Communist revolution in pre-war China, but that they illustrate the underlying patterns of America's cultural-scienti fic presence in China and the underdevel oped world generally. In short, the vaunted pluralism of American academic, philanthropic, religious, economic and government institutions in China, as in other: underdeveloped countries, is largely an optical illusion. Behind the institutional penetration of countries like China, there has always been a high degree of organizational coordination and centralization based on a pattern of common funding, elite planning and homo geneous class interest. This centraliza t ion is not anchored in one family, as the brevity of the preceding sketch (and the unique character of the Rockefel ler philanthropies) may tend to suggest, but as already noted, its ultimate foun dation is not very much wider than the

148

extended family of oil and financial

aristocrats centered in the Eastern
seaboard of the United States.
In the second place, the coordina tion and centralization of the various cultural interests in China, as else where in the underdeveloped world, is ultimately political; its political reference point is focussed somewhere along the spectrum between "external aggressors" (imperialist competitors) and "internal rebels" representing the non-gradualist threat to property and "individualism," 1. e., in Co1llllunist (or extreme nationalist) revolutionaries. This implicit political direction is a function of the hegemony of the imper ial vested interests in the entire plurality of America's international oriented policy and researCh associa tions. A few isolated individuals invol ved in "private" and government cul tural programs abroad may attempt to function independently of the process of imperial expansion and domination, but on any long-term basis they are bound, by the very nature of the organ izational structure in whiCh they are enmeshed and to whiCh they are profes sionally committed, to serve purposes whiCh are political in their essence and over whiCh they as individuals have no control. 19 As Professor Fair bank observed in the hours before China'a revolutionary victory and independence:

Roger N. Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions The war, which cut short the Rocke feller-missionary effort in China, marked a major watershed in America's relations with the world. In many ways, the profoundest consequences even of the conflict in Europe were felt in the southern half of the globe. England, France, the Nether lands -- all recovered from the war: their colonial empires in Africa, Latin America and Asia did not. "The [se] Euro pean empires, whatever their iniquities, did provide frameworks within which diverse and distant peoples could live and work together," one of the archi tects of America's early postwar pol icies noted years later. 2l Into the historic vacuum created by the imperial collapse, America extruded her mili tary, economic and political power and created a "free world" system of military alliances and economic com pacts. In the space of a few short years, Pa:x Britannica had given way to the new American Century. This sudden transformation of world roles had profound consequences for America's internal social order, and particularly its government, military and educational institutions. For the apparatus to plan, maintain, service and police a global empire did not exist prior to World War II in the Uni ted States, or existed only in embryonic form. The British imperial service, and the naval arm to back it up, was created in the course of centuries. While the groundwork for an international secur ity and trade system had been laid in some respects before World War II, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the American empire together with the necessary teChnicians, experts and administrators to manage it was created overnight. One aspect of this development was described in 1952 by former State Department official and Rockefeller Foundation President Dean Rusk, in his 149

lIntil very recently the United States has had an infiuence and a pres tige among the educated class in China such as no nation has ever had before: this ~as the stuff for po~er politics in the most fundamental sense . ~O
IV.

When OSS, America's ~artime secret intel ligence service, ~as set up in 1941, one of the basic ideas behind it ~as the novel and alTTr:Jst impish thought that scholars could in some respects take the place of spies.

testimony before the Cox committee:

It is often remarked in efforts to

I was in the and the~ came a point where it was of the greatest importance for us to en courage concentrated attention on what was then caZZed the weird languages ~ such languages as Indo nesian~ BUT'I1Iese~ some of the Indian dialects~ some of the languages of Indochina. .. I doubt ~ for example ~ that up until a year ago there were more than a half dozen Amer icans in the entire country who knew very much about Indochina~ and the~ were perhaps not a dozen who had much of a knowledge of a country like Indbnesia~ except businessmen who migh t have been established in plantations rather isolated and remote f~m the great stream of Indbnesian Ufe. So~ we have attached considerable impor tance to these area studies [i.e. the postwar university programs funded by the RockefeZZer Founda tion]. 22
Into the wartime gap in the govern ment's knowledge of "weird languages" and areas were thrust the existing aca demic experts and available research institutions. Speaking as a former mili tary intelligence officer with responsi bility for the Pacific islands, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, and Burma, Rusk noted the "desert of information" about these areas at the time and recalled that in this situation "the intelligence agencies of the Government had leaned heavily on the Institute of Pacific Re lations for help in supplying informa tion :about the Pacific." In fact, in 1945 the IPR had received the Navy Certificate of Achievement for providing intelligence on the Pacific Theatre of operations. The IPR also provided agents and operatives to the government ser vices. These included the pioneers of the postwar area studies programs, John King Fairbank, his wartime boss George Taylor, his co-organizer of area studies at Harvard, Edwin O. Reischauer, and C. Martin Wilbur, John Lindbeck and Hugh Borton of Columbia's future East Asian Institute. 150

1942~ when ~litary Intelligence~

In 1941 and

dismiss the significance of such facts, that "everyone" was in the OSS during the war. However that may be, "every one" was not in the upper echelon of OSS (and the Office of War Information) as were Fairbank, Taylor, Reischauer and their cOlmterparts, nor did "every one" go on to comparable posts in the State Department and then to commanding positions in the institutional structures of the postwar international studies field. The OSS was headed by a Wall Street lawyer, but in keeping with the by now traditional partnership between academic and economic elites, it Chief of Re search and Analysis was a Harvard pro fessor (Fairbank's and Reischauer's senior in the History Department), William L. Langer, a founding member of the COlmcil on Foreign Relations who had been performing intelligence functions for the military at least since the early thirties. After the war, Langer received a $150,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to write a treatise for the Council on US entry, which would pro vide an historical underpinning for "internationalist" policies and pro vide a strong case against future revisionist claims that powerful international-oriented economic interests might have maneuvered Washington into the conflict with Japanese imperialism.23 As the war drew to a close, Langer - whose career pattern is typical of the core imperial elite (from Colmcil on Foreign Relations membership to a trus teeship of the Carnegie Endowment)- transferred to the State Department, joining Taylor, Fairbank and Reischauer, then back to Harvard, to Washington in 1950 for a stint as Assistant Director of National Estimates for the CIA, back to Harvard, and to Washington as a member of the President's Foreign In telligence Advisory Board (overseeing the CIA). While the handful of academic man darins with a knowledge of foreign areas and the proper elite connections were running the OSS and the Office of War Information, steps were taken to develop crash programs for military personnel in

Dean Rusk's ''weird languages." After the war, this military-trained language group eventually provided the vast majority of second-generation academic scholars in the field. Indeed, the war was hardly over when a concerted effort was launched to create an aca demic infrastructure embracing the con cept of strategic area studies found to be so useful in the conflict. Not surprisingly, a major promoter of this effort was the Council on Foreign Re lations (then headed by Allen Dulles), which organized a series of six regional conferences in 1946 on "teaching and research in international relations. "24 Resistance to the new "area studies" concept in the traditional academic faculties, however, was very strong. University studies in Chinese, at the time, were mainly confined to philology, literature and ancient history and were carried on by isolated individuals in a handful of departments of "Oriental Languages." An academic specialty in the Chinese or Russian "area" would have been incomprehensible to most of these scholars. The State, intelli gence, and military agencies of the government may have experienced needs for" area experts" during the Second World War, but few self-respecting academic departments could relate to such a policy-generated intellectual category.25 Since experience had shown that to override academic prerogatives and revolutionize existing academic departments from within was virtually impossible, it was necessary to create a whole new institutional complex as a base from which to overpower the traditional university and make it responsive to the research needs and training imperatives of an imperial world strategy. This was accomplished by a massive intervention on the part of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Founda tions (later joined by Ford) and their satellite creations, the American Coun cil of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. The role of these foundations in creating institutes of Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese Studies can hardly be underestimated, since there was

neither money nor enthusiasm for the new development within the universities themselves.2 6 In the words of the US Office of Education Report on Language and Area Centers,

It must be noted that the signi ficance of the money granted (for these programs) is out of aZ Z pro portion to the amounts invoZved since most universities wouZd have no center program had they not been subsidized. Our individuaZ inventories indicate cZearZy the Zack of enthusiasm as weZZ as of cash on the part of most coZZege administrations for such ppograms.
As for the faculties, those traditional departments which failed to go along with the new developments -- particu larly in the Oriental field -- were shunted aside and left to wither for lack of funds.
While the foundations poured money into the new institutes, the ACLS and SSRC acted as coordinators and were particularly effective in facilitating the recruitment and placing of person nel. A joint program of "de-mobilization fellowships" sponsored by these councils eased the way for intelligence and State Department specialists to re establish themselv~s in the academic world and in particular in the new foundation-sponsored "area" institutes. In Joint Committees on World Area Re search, on International Exchange of Persons, on Slavic Studies, and even tually on Chinese, African and Latin American Studies, these two councils provided the indispensable coordination and integration of effort to create a national system for training future experts and administrators in the re quired "areas." Conferences sponsored by the Joint Committees provided im portant direction to academic and re search efforts, and timely fellowships spurred on the careers of the new breed of "area specialists." The ACLS and SSRC were not them selves new creations, but had a twenty year tradition of interest and activ ity in academic projects: "All of us

151

who had been in the China field in the 1930 's," reminisces Professor Fairbank, "were acquainted with the work of the two research councils . All of us had known the pioneer developer of Chinese studies in the United States, Dr. Morti mer Graves of ACLS [if the name is un familiar, it is because Dr. Graves was a "pioneer" by virtue of his access to funds, rather than any intellectual contribution to Sino10gica1 research], and in the 1930' s we had looked to ACLS for leadership; my wife had worked in the ACLS 0 ffice a time in 1941. "27 Unlike the impoverished AAS, the ACLS and SSRC are not professional associations, but are more appropriately regarded as secondary foundations, or conduits for" foundation funds. The key to understanding the ACLS and the SSRC is that their intellectual power and influence flow directly from their ac cess to funds. They are intermediary organizations, possessing an aura of academic legitimacy, a specialist orien tation and surface independence that makes them more efficient from the foun dations' point of view for managing the funding process. Since they are essen tially channels and coordinators, and without foundation funding would cease to have any function at all, the signi ficant power within the councils is that wielded by permanent bureaucrats who possess the necessary access and make the necessary connections. The academic directors and constituent professional associations of the coun cils function in an advisory capacity insofar as they function at all. Academics constitute the material which the councils organize, but the organizing functions of initiation and seiection reside firmly in the coun cil staffs, or in reliable academics co-opted by the council powers. Thus when George Taylor points out that the legitimacy of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China "derives not from the AAS" but "from a decision to accept that responsibility made by the representatives of the (40) profession al associations which compose the ACLS and the SSRC," there is less substance than meets the eye. Just how far from any base in the 152

academic world these councils can develop and still function as immensely influ ential agents, can be glimpsed in the following quasi-official account of the ACLS by its treasurer Whitney Oates.

Founded in 1919~ . .. the [ACLS] grew sZowZy in the next deaade~ and in the years up to WorZd War I I was supported virtuaUy aompleteZy by grants from the HoakefeZZer Founda tion .... The war period~ with extra grants made to proaure the lang uage materials~ was a aomfortable one for the ACLS from the finan aiaZ point of view. But~ with the aessation of suah grants~ the busi ness of the ACLS aontraated and the organization reaeived aZmost a lethaZ bZow when the HoakefeZZer Foundation announaed that its sup port would te~inate at the end of the ensuing three years. The foundation's deaision was based on its aonviation that it was essen tiaUy unsound for the ACLS if it were dependent upon a single sourae for its support. The ACLS staff protested and even saoZded in print the Hoakefeller Foundation for the laak of wisdom it dispZayed in making this deaision. However~ it beaame evident that somehow the ACLS had Zost aontaat with its aonstituent soaieties and their members. One foundation offiaial. .. peported that he expeated a flood of protests from irate humanis ts upon the announaement of the te~i nation of the RoakefeZZer subven tion~ but he reaeived not a single Zetter nor a singZe telephone aall. 28
Such was the representative character of the ACLS with its thirty or ~Dre constituent learned societies and thou sands of scholarly "members," when it engineered and supervised a major trans formation of American university pro grams The ACLS was revived in the mid fifties after suitable reorganization and search for new financial supporters. This time its sponsors were sufficiently broader for Rockefeller backing. "Suffice it to say that in 1957 there were two

rants by the Carn:egie Corpo ome ...crls g ' ' ch a t10n, wh 1 . d the Ford Foun d r.1C110 an d in 1961. ,,29 Encouraged by lit re renew e 'h k , .1 11'sm in fund1ng, t e R <DC e ':l1S ..... ura , d' ;~ller Foundation in 1961 ch1ppe 1n 51,OOO,WO for ACLS support. The im ;>orcan ce of the ACLS in organizing ':lcernati':>oal programs, like modern ;ina stuGies, was also recognized in t!le appointment of its new president in 1957, Frederick H. Burkhardt, a =el!i:Jer of the Council on Foreign Re lations (Century and Cosmos clubs) with a familiar background in the as S (Cent ral European Division), in the State Depart ment as Acting alief of the European Division (1945-6), and in John J. McCloy's High Commission in Germany in 1950. 30 Of these two agencies, however, the
Social Science Research Council is by far

to exert a dominant influence on the academic social sciences. Not only did these men conceive behavioral science (or "scientific politics") as an instrument for the management of social orders and the containment of social revolution, but as administrators and coordinators of funds and personnel, they themselves were pioneers in bring ing the new science to the attention of often recalcitrant government and mili tary agencies. Their intellectual pro ject was in short a political program embracing a management- and policy oriented methodology (now orthodox in the university system), and a program of structural links between the admini strative bureaucracies of business, state, and the academic community. To put the development of the modern China field under the auspices of a Joint SSRC-ACLS Committee was, in short, a political act with large implications for the research bias of the field. As George Taylor in his quasi-official ac count of the Committee observes,

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the IOOre important. Like the ACLS it received virtually all of its funding from its inception in 1923 to the postwar period -- from th~ Rockefeller Founda tion (and after that from Carnegie and Ford). Like the ACLS its executive staff and significant personnel repre sent a social elite (their preferred clubs seem to be the Cosmos, University and Century) snugly interlocked with the parent foundations, the Council on For eign Relations and the various govern ment branches (State, intelligence, defense) which represent the traditional preserve of the eas tern aris to cracy. But historically the SSRC has been a far llX>re substantial agency than the ACLS - and not only in respect to its funding. The SSRC was founded in 1923 by Beardsley Ruml, representing the Rocke feller millions, and Charles E. Merriam, a politician-academic who, with P~ckefeller-SSRC support, went on to become the father of modern political science. The council was from the outset a vehicle for Merriam's program in the Social sciences, which was behavioralist, administration-oriented, and liberal in the corporatist tradition. It also be came the instrument by which his disci ples and associates including Harold Lasswell (CFR, Cosmos, University), David Truman (CFR, Century), Pendleton Herring (CFR, Cosmos, Century) and others came

The JCCC .... decided to throw the main responsibility for the,study of China on the major social sci ence disciplines ... [instead of fostering the development of the existing Sinological tradition]. For the implementation of this policy the Councils were the natural vehicle 3 whereas a profes sional membership association such as the AAS which specialized in Asian studies migh t well have found this task rore difficult to accept or accomplish.
Already in the major institutes, more and more of the positions are being occu pied by social scientists with a "China specialty" and a behavioral persuasion, a fact which in not unconnected to their principal funding source, the Ford Foun dation, which has played a historic entre preneurial role in the development of behavioralism as a managerial instrument in business and politics. 31 While the ACLS-SSRC joint committees managed the flow of personnel, and work 153
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ed to create a more favorable intel lectual climate for the new area disci plines, the main framework for the growth of international studies was the series of institutes and programs spon sored by the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations on a number of select campuses. Since the primary strategic interest in these early cold war years was Russia, it was only natural that the main area program favored by the Founda tions should be Slavic Studies. The focal point for the initial investments were the SChool for International Affairs at .col,umb.ia ed its R~ss.i~..Ins titute, batil:'of .widcit' 'were" wid~ly acknowledged as prototypes for subsequent institution al area research. Indeed, Professor Taylor's history of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China not only invokes the Slavic Studies precedent, but draws attention to the fact that Philip E. Moseley (second Director of the Russian Institute and Chairman of the Joint COmmittee on Slavic Studies, and for many years after Director of Studies for the CFR) was invited at the outset to become a special advisor to the JCCC and one of its charter members. What can we l!earn from this proto type? The SChool of International Af fairs was a direct outgrowth of the Naval SChool of Military Government and Administration, which had been set up in 1942 to train personnel from business and the military to administer occupied territorie~. 32 Key figures in the Naval SChool and its successor were its Director and Assistant Director, Schuyler C. Wallace (CFR, Century, COsmos), who later became a Ford Founda tion executive, and Philip C. Jessup (CFR, Carnegie, Century, Cosmos), who was also a central personality in the IPR, and later a key State Department official concerned with the Far East. 33 The Russian Institute of the School of International Affairs was created in 1945, after consultation and aid from the Rockefeller Foundation. The first initi ative for the creation of the Institute came fro~ its first director, Geroid T. Robinson (CFR, Century), when he was 154

Chief of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, USSR Division. Of the entire original five-man steering committee, only Robinson had any prior connection with Columbia University, but four had been associated with the OSS or the State Department, as chiefs or deputy chiefs of various divsions, three were members of the Council on Foreign Rela tions, and three of the Century Club. Robinson and Uoseley (a former State Department division chief, and a direc tor of the CIA's Radio Free Europe) were also members of the World Area Pesearch committee of the SSPC (along with George E. Taylor); in addition, Moseley was the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, which included Robinson and two other members of the Institute steering committee, and first Chairman of the Committee on Area ResearCh Per sonnel of the SSRC.34 In short, with the help of the PDckefeller Foundation and the Joint Committees of the ACLS SSRC, these upper-class intelligence officials quickly assumed a commanding position in the new academic field of Russian and East European Area Studies. The question naturally arises as to whether these entrepreneurs of inter national studies were on an academic or intelligence mission in pursuing their university projects. The evidence avail able does not afford a definitive answer to the question, but it is clear that the School of International Affairs and the Russian Institute were primarily training centers for the military, State Department and intelligence ser vices. 35 (As late as 1960 a school pam phlet listed the CIA as the first em ployment opportunity for its graduates, with the State Department second, AID third, the USIA fourth, the National Security Agency fifth, followed by inter national corporations in banking and oil. )36 Moreover, a large part of the actual research conducted at these and other similar centers was either directly funded by military or intelligence sources, and was structured in ways likely to be useful to military or intelligence agencies. The Refugee In terview Project, which Clyde Kluckholn.

di':'ected for Harvard's Carnegie-funded Rus.ian Research Center, for example, was ~ valuable intelligence gathering operation, contracted by the Air Force. (This project later served as a proto type fer a similar one in Hong Kong, conducted under JCCC auspices.) Perhaps MIT's Advisory Board on Soviet Bloc Stud ies best typified the scholarly approach to area research pioneered by the foun dations and ACLS-SSRC: its four members
were Charles Bohlen of the State Depart
ment, Allen Dulles (President of the
CFR, Century, Deputy Director of the
CIA), Philip Moseley of the Columbia
Institute, and a retired Vice Admiral.
The executive figures in the Center
itself were W.W. Rostow (OSS, CFR,
Cosmos) and Max Milliken (OSS, CFR,
Cosmos), who came to the post from an
Assistant Directorship in the CIA.

V. McCARTHYISM AND THE CHINA SPLIT

Peking, and on October 6, 7, and 9, a classified roundtable discussion was convened in the Department of State 37to discuss American policy in the new situ ation. The discussion was chaired by Fosdick of the Rockefeller Foundation and included the leading experts on Olina and the Far East: Fairbank, Latti more, George Taylor, Reischauer, and John D. Rockefeller III, among others. As could be expected from so sophisti cated a group, the strategies proposed for dealing with China and maintaining US hegemony in the Pacific were them selves quite realistic and subtle, and if domestic politics had not intervened to delay their implementation, would have meant a far more successful US foreign policy in Asia over the next decade. For present purposes, however, it is the observations made on the potential use of intellect in the struggle for China and Asia that are most interesting, not only for their insight into the future programs that the foundations and government were to stimulate in the universities, but also for the light they throw on the perspectives and moti vations of such leading "academic" figures in this movement as George Taylor and John K. Fairbank.

While Carnegie, Rockefeller, the ACLS-SSRC committees, the Air Force and other interested agencies fostered the growth of Slavic Studies to the increasingly bellicose tunes of the European cold war, the study of modern China remained in a fairly emb ryonic state. Then in 1948, the armies of ~~o Tse-tung swept through the major cities of China climaxing one of the major revolutionary upheavals in modern hist ory. On July 27, 1949, with the Chinese Communists in control of half of the main land, Secretary of State Dean Acheson (CFR, Century) announced the creation of a three-man board to undertake a re view of US policy towards China. The three men charged with great respon sibility were Philip C. Jessup, who was appointed chairman, Raymond B. Fosdick (CFR, Century), President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Everett Case, formerly the treasurer of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a member in good standing of the foreign policy-social elite (CFR, Century, University). On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was established in

TAYLOR: .. I dOn't think we should disanm, far from it, but for heaven's sake, let us arm ourselves with the best things we have. We have the best soaial saienae in this world, and the first job for the US outfit it seems to me is to stuay. What is China today? Nothing like it used to be. What will it be under the Communists? We don't know how a system like this breaks down. We dbn't know how aleavages an4 lines :run. and the ahanaes of overthrowing it in my mind are almost negligible, but you aan perhaps make it -- perhaps if war should oome you aan perhaps do things with it. We have got to do things with it) but the first thing is to un de 1'stand it .... [emphasis added] FAIRBANK: Could I just support ' evezrything Mr. Taylor has said. I think it is vezry muah on the beam
ISS

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and ought to be looked at wi th care. For the record, also, the line of anti-Corrmunism in Asia is not a very good line. It is a subjective projection of our own view. The main question, it is much better to be anti-Russian and a few other things to be "Anti." That is just an exampl,e of what Mr. Taylor was talking about. 38
The most intriguing aspect of these re marks, and they are wholly characteristic of the discussion, is that as these gentlemen speak of the need for study of modern China, they speak not in the accents of professors and scholars, but experienced intelligence and pro paganda experts. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Professor Fairbank in remarks that prefigure the notorious CIA-front programs of the fifties and early sixties, urging at this same roundtable that the univer sities and other non-political cultural institutions be used as an arm of the American State in coping with its Asian counter-insurgency problem:

I would say further that our objective there is to formul,ate an alternative to the Marxism which provides them with a worl,d view spiritual dynamic" or the like . ... To carry out this project of per sons who can put the Asiatic revolution in terms that make sense both in terms of the Asiatic and to use these personnel must have nonofficial, status first of aU" it seems to me. They must be in these regions not with the respon sibilities of government status" and of course they must have on the-spot operational contact" be there not much as students wander ing about, but doing something with the local, people. Further" they must have freedom to think and develop their ideas in any way that the situation seems to cal,l for. Perhaps in a very cri tical way toward our own Government we need that ... . Continually if we want people in this kind of free contact in Asia it seems to me we must l,ook to private agencies in this country and that we very prac tical,l,y coul,d ask a nurriber of sped-fic private agencies what might be proposed as a personneZ program; educational, institutions" for exampl,e" can develop a very extensive contact" a youth organ ization, a YMCA" that sort of thing might be tried and possibl,y devel,op personnel programs .... TAYLOR: I am sure that Mr. Fairbank woul,d agree with an addition to his list of people who might be used" and that woul,d be peopl,e from the l,abor unions of this country ..
Fairbank's vision was sophisticated, bold and confident, but the very events which he was analyzing for his govern ment were already producing a reaction that would shortly deprive him of his base and influence in Washington. The domestic failure of the US intervention in China had an explosive effect on the domestic political scene -- which was already beginning to be dominated by

... Now to contrast this problem of personnel very briefly, we have to seek personnel to conduct relations with revolutions, not relations with governments. We are dealing with revolutionary situa tions, .as we have all said. That requires, I think, a new approach to the problem of personnel. Very briefly, a man who is to deal with a revolution, to have ideas about our relations with it, must of course begin with the local language. That is very difficult to come by in Southeast Asia. Further, he must know the local culture, really how the people live and think, he must, in other wordS, live and think with them as a Cominform agent would do. Third" he must know the local personalities so he can really look at the pol itics in operational terms and he must know local conditions from oontact . ...
156

Joseph R. McCarthy 1 In 1950 one of the

most outspoken critics of Chiang Kai
shek among the State Department's China
advisors, Owen Lattimore, was denounced
as the chief Soviet agent in America.
The Institute for Pacific Relations
itself was already under assault and
the purge of the liberal policymakers
had begun. In the critical events that
followed, George Taylor and John Fair
bank, who had worked together in the OSS, in OWl, in the State Department and in the fraternity of professional China scholars, came out on opposite sides of the political fence. Taylor's aggres sive role in a witchhunt, which destroyed the careers of more than a few of the country's most eminent Olina experts, will not be forgotten by his colleagues at the time. Fairbank, who had been named as a Communist and denied it under oath, cut a weak figure by contrast. "I am a loyal American," he assured the witchhunters, and -- as if that were not enough to appease them -- a capitalist as well: "I am engaged in one form of American free enterprise. My university is a private American corporation " [Hearings, p. 3725] But Fairbank's pleas for rationality on the part of the Committee and his pre vious service to American state policy in Asia were to no avail, and by an irony which may have amused his opponents in the bureaucracies of Moscow and Peking, this enthusiastic servant of American power was condemned by McCarthyism to years of exile as a mere academic at Harvard. So vindictively effective was Fairbank's banishment from Wash ington that as late as 1965, when he was invited to an advisory session with State Department officials, he was pre vented from actually entering the State Department offices and was forced to meet the officials in an apartment thoughtfully provided by John D. Rockefeller IV, the most recent member of the family to take an interest in the Asian field. Fairbank's '~anishment" to Harvard underscores an important point in regard to the McCarthy attack on the China field, namely, that it was not, as is often implied, an invasion of the academic enclave by political forces, so much as an intra-bupeaua~tia struggZe within the government~ and specifically within those agencies of the state charged with responsibility for China policy. The principal targets of the assault (espe cially Jessup) were deeply and official ly involved in the making of US China policy. Ranged on one side of the dispute were policy officials like Am bassador Bu11itt who wanted a larger military and economic intervention in behalf of Chiang, and on the other those like Fairbank who argued that no amount of military and economic aid to Chiang could save his regime, and that such aid as was sent -- while US policy was tied to his regime -- "plays into communist hands. "39 The first rumblings of the loyalty issue, as Dean Acheson reminds us in his recent memoirs, occurred in 1945 with AnDassador Hurley's resignation and blast at the China po1icymakers and with the concurrent struggle over the shift of OSS to the jurisdiction of the State Department, and the plans to use it as the nucleus of a Central Intelligence Agency. These plans for a civilian controlled, centralized, "professional" intelligence service based on the old OSS ran into opposition from the mili tary, Congress and factions in the State Department itself, led by Spruille Braden. Later Braden denounced these experts whom he called "alphabet men," to a Senate Subcommittee on "interlock ing Subversion": ''We res is ted these swarms of peop1e, mostly collectivists and 'do-gooders" and wh at' nots." It was, he said, "a knockdown, drag-out fight." The "loss" of China in 1949 brought these ongoing struggles between liberal and conservative expansionists in the govern ment bureaucracies into the openAO That some of the State Department ex perts attacked by McCarthy were also professors explains how intellectual issues became involved; but they were attacked because they were intelligence agents and policymakers during an un successful intervention in an epoch making civil war, not because they 157

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VI

Army War Colleges and acting as an offi

For most of the 1950's, after the attaoks by Senator Joseph MoCarthy of Wisoonsin on the ~ina experts in State, very little was done to replaoe the oasualties of McCarthy's raids, but in Z959 a confer ence of ~ina scholars including John Fairbank of Harvard, Doak Barnett of COlumbia and the late John Lindbeck met in a GOuld House conferenoe to dramatize the need to restore the old tradition of ~inese soholarship. James Reston, New York Times, May 12, 1971
After the McCarthy purges, Fairbank and Taylor were the only two significant China experts to survive and retain pOSitions of power in the university. In the ensuing years, Fairbank swung right with the political tides and applied his considerable administra tive and entrepreneurial skills to the development of a new generation of O1ina scholars, for whom he became a kind of guardian sponsor and promoter. While Washington remained off-limits, Harvard was itself a veritable center of intel ligence and other governmental activi ties and Fairbank was not neglected by the more sophis ticated wings of the permanent elite. In 1955, he was able to set up an East Asian Research Center at Harvard with several hundred thousand dollars from Ford and Carnegie for studies of China's present-day economy and politics. When in 1958 he was elected President of the Association for Asian Studies, it was an accurate recognition of his influence and consequent standing in the China field. While Fairbank was building up a wide academic following, and staffing the Oriental departments of the major universities with his students, George Taylor was creating an important center of Chinese studies in Seattle, built around scholars like Karl Wittfogel (who had played an even worse role in the purges). Taylor, of course, did not experience the Washington cold as Fairb ank did and was able to render such services as lecturing at the Air War and
158

cial US delegate to SEATO in 1957. On the other hand, because of his role at the hearings, and his right-wing views, Taylor was isolated from his aca demic colleagues in the major centers of higher learning across the country. This situation created a serious gap in the organization of China expertise from a long-range planning point of view. The most powerful administrative figure in academic China studies was, despite his continuing loyalty to the flag and the free enterprise system, persona non grata in Washington and was tarred with a reputation (somewhat unjust in view of his more recent attitudes) of being soft on Communism and Mao, while his principal counterpart, who was welcome in government circles, was per sona non grata in the academic profession, and also overcommitted to Chiang from a long-range perspective. Fairbank and Taylor represented, in short, the political exhaustion of a generation. If they joined hands in a gesture of unity, they could pave the way for a new alignment of forces in the China field. It was increasingly ur gent, from a policy point of view, to heal the breach and forestall possible new splits over the charged issue of China policy. Such a peace was further essential in view of the need to re establish intelligence channels from the government to academia and to regular ize the cooperation between organized intellect and the state. The cooper ation of these two professors -- Fair bank in particular -- was essenti.a1, moreover, on the academic side in making the effort a success. But Taylor and Fairbank could not themselves be on the steering committee, as it were, within the foreign policy elite; they could not be the key operatives moving between government, foundation and campus in setting up the new networks and structures. That was a role for men less identified with the bitter policy strug gles of the past, less vulnerable to attack from political dissidents but thoroughly integrated into the CFR policy elite: A. Doak Barnett and John M.H. Lindbeck, for example .

A. Doak Barnett was born in China, the son of a missionary who rose in the YMCA hierarchy to become the senior secretary of the International Commis sion for China in the interesting period 1925-1937. Almost fifteen years younger than the Fairbank-Taylor-Lattimore group, Bamet t was not involved in the <l1ina policy debacle, although his older brother Robert was a member of IPR and a career officer in the State Department at the time. (Robert Barnett remained a at State and rose through various posts, mainly in the Asian theater, to become Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1963.) After receiving an M.A. in political science from Yale in 1947, Doak Barnett went to China and the Far Eas t as a correspondent for the <11icago Daily News and a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. In 1949 his brother was put in charge of Western European eco nomic affairs and the following year Doak joined the Economic Cooperation Administration, then headed by Paul G. Hoffman and Richard M. Bissell (who went on to Ford and the CIA, later of Bay of Pigs fame). In 1952 Barnett re turned to the Far East as a public affairs officer attached to the US consulate in Hong Kong and spent another two years there as an assoc iate of the American Universities Field Staff. In 1956, in a step which augured things to come, he joined his brother in the State Department as head of the department of foreign area studies at the Foreign Service Insti tute. The following year, he was called on by the COuncil on Foreign Relations to head the first CFR study group' on China policy since the revolution. The CFR study group on "Communist China and United States Policy in Asia," which met during 1958 and 1959, included such figures as Rob ert R. Bowie, who had been a special advisor to McCloy in Germany and had just completed terms as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department (1953-55) and Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (1955-57), Maj.or General Paul W. Caraway, Assistant Chief of Staff, Far Eastern Command (1956-57), and

currently a member of the joint stra

tegic survey council of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, William Hollister, CIA, and
Dean Rusk, then President of the P~cke
feller Foundation. Also present were
RicL'lrd L. Walker, C. Hartin Wilbur,
head of Columbia's East Asian Insti
tute, and John ~1.H. Lindbeck.
The pivotal significance of the
CFR study group on <11ina, which resulted
in a large volume by group director
Barnett (Communist China and Asia: Chal
lenge to American Policy) can best be
seen in the events that followed.
In 1959 the AAS's Advisory Committee on Psearch and Development (chairman: William Lockwood, CFR)41 appointed a special three-man committee headed by AAS President John Fairbank and in cluding C. Martin Wilbur, to organize a Ford-funded meeting of China scholars at Gould House to discuss the future of China studies, the possible investment of large funds, and the creation of a committee (eventually the JCCC) to centralize standards, and inevitably directions, for the field. Present at the conference from the academic side were sixteen China scholars" including Fairbank, Lockwood, Boorman and Pye of the CFR, and from the study group
itself, Richard Walker, C. Martin Wilbur
and John M. H. Lindbeck. RAND' had one
representative pres~nt, A.M. 'Halpern,' ,
the State Department had one, and the'
Ford Foundation had a team ,of four, which included a new '''program assoc
i'ate": A. Doak Barnet t,. , '
, Barnett was nO,t just one of several Ford representatives at 'Gould House. Together with John B. Howard (CFR, Director of International Training and Research at Ford and previous1'y a regional planning advisor in the State Department), who was also present at Gould House, Barnett subsequently "drew up [the] memoranda on research and training on O1ina for action by the trustees of the Ford Fotmdation."42 The action then taken by Ford on the basis of these memoranda was on a scale, for a specific field, without parallel in the history:of educational investment. "In this decade (1959-1969) the Ford 159

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Foundation expended about $28 million in the United States and $2.5: million abroad to achieve the objectives i t set itself in 1959." 43 While the Ford lOOney was the criti cal factor in creating the structures and setting the directions of the field, financially speaking it was just the beginning. As Jacques Barzun has ob served in another context,

because there is probably no limit, or one so minor as to be insignificant. According to George Taylor's history of the JCCC, the Ford Foundation made two key structural decisions in funding the field:

The main feature of foundation grants is that they are pump priming. A sum is given for three, five~ at most ten years of estimated cost for a specified purpose, usu ally research, teaching, or a com bination of both. Every time the university accepts such a grant the university is expected to do two things: carry the overhead and find the money to continue the work after the end of the grant. In short, by taking a grant the university has incur red present and future expenses of indefinite amount -- an amount bound to increase, for overhead rises by inflation and al l salaries go up with length of service. 44
So i t is not surprising to find that universities are estimated to have spent another $15 to $20 million during the decade in support of the foundation sponsored projects in the China field. 45 To this can be added $15 million in NDEA funds for language training, and another $8 million from "other govern mental and private agencies II for re search generally of a policy-oriented character. In short, about $70 million (and estimates less conservative than these run as high as $100 million) was expended in a single decade on a field so small that at the beginning of the period in question there were only 100 graduate students in it in the entire country. In the circumstances it is probably futile to speculate on the extent to which the funds (and their controllers) exerted an influence on the direction of China studies, the kind of research undertaken, and the political and methodological biases prolOOted simply

Of crucial importance was the Foundation's decision to support a scholarly committee, not neces sarily a corrrnittee of the Councils, in order to help plan, organize, coordinate, advise, and stimulate activities on a national level. This the Foundation has done, and the [JCCC] has indeed played a major role in helping to achieve those objectives listed in the Foundation's program with which it agreed.... The second major objective, which was to support the develop ment of training and research pro grams at the universities, was carried out by the Foundation it self. Primary attention was given to developing programs at four universities which had strength in both Chinese and Russian studies - Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, and the University of Washington .... 46
Thus, while the JCCC and its spin-off coinmittees provided an essential means for coordinating research at the nation al level, the bulk of funds and the principal bases of influence were lodged in the four privileged university institutes, particularly the largest and most prestigious of these, Harvard and Columbia. Accordingly, in 1961, Doak Barnett left Ford to become a full professor of political science at Colum bia and Chairman of the Contemporary China Studies Committee there.
As head of contemporary 'China ,studies at Columbia, Barnett had as many as fifty graduate students working under him at a single time. Combined with his access to Ford funds and his ent ree to the upper circles in Washington and New York, this would have enabled Barnett to wield unusual power in any academic field. But in Chinese area studies, which had only 700 graduate students by the end of the decade, 47 Barnett's position was

160


virtually unique. He utilized this power to develop a research and training pro gram strongly directed toward US policy and intelligence needs and to advance students with a clear service orienta tion to positions of academic respon sibility and power. Barnett's leap from Ford to Columbia wa an impressive one for a man with little academic background and no Ph.D. or scholarly publication to speak of, but then Ford eased the passage with a $1 million endowment to create a chair especially for the occasion. The admini strative authorities at the university, President Grayson Kirk and Schuyler Wal lace, themselves important members of the Council on Foreign Relations elite, were mre than understanding. In that same year, Barnett became a member of the new Committee on the Economy of China, an important spin-off from the JCCC, and in 1963, continuing his dis dain for intermediate steps, he became a member and Chairman of the JCCC at the same time. There he joined his colleague in the Council on Foreign Relations, John Lindbeck. In the interim, Lindbeck and Barnett had played roles of such perfect com plementarity and (in terms of academic tradition) strong improbability that it would be surprising if they were not planned that way. In contrast to Barnett Lindbeck possessed a doctorate in divin ity and academic ~xperience, beginning as a lecturer at the Princeton School of Military Government and advancing to an assistant professorship at Yale before going to the State Department in 1950. But nothing in his performance prior to the Council on Foreign Relations study group in 1958 would have suggested the instant academic eminence in store for him during the Ford decade. Lindbeck began his second academic career in 1958 as Deputy Diretor of the Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China, headed by CFR memb er and former State Department officer Howard L. Boorman. 48 In 1959, as Barnett moved to Ford to set up the China program, Lindbeck left Columbia to become Associate Director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center, and a charter member of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China. It was not only in the choice of institutions that the com plementarity of the two careers manifested itself, but in the functional roles as well. Lindbeck made no attempt to assem ble at Harvard the kind of student fol lowing <or cadres in training) that Barnett was to forge at Columbia. Lind beck probably did not have the talents to fill such a role in any case; in a full decade at the top of his field, he did not even make the pretense of an intellectual contribution. But he did have a talent for administration and liaison, and it was as the "academic" link man in contemporary China studies that Lindbeck's career ultimately establishes its contours. In 1966 Fairbank explained:

Since 1959, Dr. John M.H. Lind beck, as associate director of this center, while participating in instruction at Harvard, has carried the main burden of (xmtact with government agencies and, in large part, with the foundations and the national committees they support. 49
Four years later, at Lindbeck's funeral, this was the principal if not the sole theme of the eulogists' remarks:

There is no other individual who played as important, seminal, or decisive a ~le in the development of Chinese studies during the last decade. Whatever activity, what ever development, whatever commit tee or endeavor concerned with the advancement of Chinese studies in the Zast ten years, John was there., John was involved, and he made his influence feU. He was one of the founders and builders of the Joint Corrmittee on Contemporcaru China and guided it as chai1"l17an f~m 2.964 until very recentZy. He was one of the founders and. the guiding force behind the Un7"ver sities Service Center in Hong.K~ng. Th e same c an be said of the L7"a7"son . Commi ttee on Contemporary C!nna
161

through which the development of Chinese studies in the United States was brought into much nvre intimate contact with that in
Britain~ F~ce~ Ge~any~ Japan~

and several other countries. He was also there at the birth of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on US-China Relations. He served as chairman of the fo~er and as vice president of the latter.... His advice was sought by our government and by a nurrber of foundations. His lates t and ver-y signif{cant contribution was to the Ford Foundation for which he just completed a world wide survey of the state of modern and contemporary Chinese studies. 50
This account was seconded by Barnett: "Johri's special genius, ... was as a leader, organizer, and administrator of research and teaching programs." And Fairbank: "When historians even tually get around to studying the record of these yearS, they will find that John Lindbeck was at the center of the planning, negotiation, and perSist ent effort that produced a whole series of new institutions and activities to serve the profession." All this time, Lindbeck never lost contact with his old milieu in Washington and in the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1959 he served as a formal consultant to RAND, from 1961 to the Institute for Defense Analysis, ana trom 1963 to the State Department. In 1967, when Barnett left his academic position to go to Brookings, his successor as Director of Columbia's East Asian Insti tute was John H. H. Lindbeck. In looking for an explanation of the subordination of contemporary China studies to the planning and policy needs of the government in Washington, the apparent coordination of JCCC research priorities and the priorities actually laid down by government intelligence agencies, one's attention is inexorably drawn towards these two men and the strategic roles they played. Indeed, the preeminent position of
162

Barnett and Lindbeck, who walked out of the State Department anj into the commanding positions of the academic contemporary China field, and who for eight critical years provided the key contacts between funding sources, academic projects and government agen cies, and who played pivotal roles in creating new centralizing academic structures and in setting new national research priorities, would almost suffice in itself to explain the deflection of the field from any scholarly intellectual purpose in this period to one of dedicated government service. But there is a danger in focusing on these individuals and overlooking the structural sources of their power and influence. For the very decision to set up and fund the contemporary China field was a policy decision taken outside the field. And although the files remain closed, it is still per fectly clear on the evidence available that that decision was lodged squarely in the hands of the CFR elite, whose reach extends across state, philan thropic and university boundaries, and whose long-term dominance of US foreign policy is a matter of histor ical recore. NOTES 1. Cf. Richard Hofstadter, Anti Intellectualism in American Life, and The Paranoid Style in American Politics, for the fashion-setting volumes of this mood. 2. Senator Ferguson: "But do you not think that the Government has a right to investigate an institution like the IPR? Mr. Fairbank: "I think the senatorial committee has a right to investigate anything, it seems to me. Sen. Ferguson: "But particularly the IPR, where it was taking information, distributing among the public, distri buting to public officials that infor mation? For instance, we have an exam ple here of Hr. Carter [Executive Secre tary of IPR] advising them to be sure and get to General Marshall and other people a certain book [Israel Epstein's

The Unfinished Revolution] and to see that certain Senators got it and read it. "If that was the province, and I say it was the province, if they wanted to do it, of the IPR doing that, is it not then proper that the Senate of the United States, through this committee, look into the question was to whether or not that book -- let us take that parti cular book -- was written by a person that had pro-Soviet Communist leanings or even was a Communist? Mr. Fairbank: II I think that is perfect ly proper, if the Senate Committee so decides. Sen. Ferguson: "That, I think is what they have decided." Institute of Pacific Relations, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Hearings Held July 25, 1951-June 20, 1952, by the Internal Security Subcommittee (hereinafter referred to as IPR Hear ings): pp. 3724-5. 3. IPR Hearings, p. 3805, in the same vein: Fairbank: .. during the war when I was in China I was under the American Embassy and I had really three jobs. First, I was collecting Japanese documents and sending them back for intelligence purposes. That was paid for by OSS, who sent me out. The second job was that I was the representative in the Far East of the Library of Congress, and for that purpose collecting Chinese pub lications, which eventually were brought back to collections in this country. The third job was that I was under the Embassy, working on some of their cultur al-relations activities." "Now, this cultural-relations activity of the Em bassy was in connection with these other people, the same sort of people that I was dealing with on these publications, I mean intellectuals. That was my spec ial line. I was getting publications from them; I was giving publications to them, I was dealing with cultural relations." 4. University Centers of Foreign Affairs Research, Office of External Research, U.S. Department of State, 1968. See appendix for "Development of Foreign Affairs Research Centers: A Selected Chronology" from this document, together with foundation roles.
164

5. For John D. Rockefeller's views, see Random Reminiscences of Men and Events; for Carnegie, see The Gospel of Wealth, and Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie; for present-day philanthropic strategies, see the Cox Comndttee Hearings. 6. Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie, Oxford University Press, 1970. 7. David Horowitz, "Billion Dollar Brains," Ramparts, Hay 1969; Howard J. Savage, Fruit of an Impulse, Harcourt Brace, 1953; and E.V. Hollis, Philan thropic Foundations and Higher Education, Columbia University Press, 1938. 8. John D. Ro_ckefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events, Doubleday, 1909, pp. 62-64. 9. On Rockefeller and his philan thropies see Nevins, Rockefeller: A Study in Power, John T. Flynn, God's Gold, Raymond B. Fosdick, Adventure in GIVing [The General Education Board], and Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rocke feller Jr.: A Portrait. Also Annual Reports and publications of the various foundations. 10. Among them was Charles Evans Hughes (unkindly termed by his critics the "Secretary for Oil") who with Robert Lansing, subsequently a Carnegie trustee, was a policy maker for the Far East during the decade following World War I. Lansing's nephew John Foster Dulles was yet another exemplar of these plur alist politics. A corporate attorney for the Standard Oil Company, and chief Republican advisor on foreign affairs during the early cold war years of bi partisan policy, Dulles was Chairman of the Board of both the Carnegie Endow ment and the r~ckefeller Foundation before leaving to become Secretary of State from 1952 to 1959. At that time his protege, Dean Rusk, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, from 1950 to 1951, became President of the Foundation, which he then left for an eight-year stint as Secretary of State in the Kennedy Johnson year, beginning in 1961. Nor were these the only pluralists to occupy such key positions. For example, Allen Dulles ~d JohnJ. HcCloy, two of the most significant figures in the

creation of US cold war policy and in the shaping of US intelligence agencies, were important philanthropic trustees (of the Carnegie and Rockefeller founda tions respectively). McCloy -- a former Assistant Secretary for War, High Com missioner for Germany, and Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller-Chase }{...an hattan Bank, was also the first Otairman of the Board of the Ford Foun dation when it was reconstituted as a mammoth trust in 1950, and set up along the lines of its Rockefeller-Carnegie predecessors. 11. Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, 1962. 12. T.H. White, The Making of the President 1964, 1965, pp. 67~68. 13. Joseph Kraft (CFR), "s chool for Statesmen," Harper's, July 1958. 14. Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, 1962, 1963, etc. 15. The United States and China in World Affairs, edited by A. Doak Barnett, McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 266. 16. Others include A.M. Halpern, Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents, A.T. Steele, The American People and China, Alexander Eckstein, ConDillmis t China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for US Policy, Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, and Samuel B. Griffith II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army. 17. Eustace Seligman (of the banker Seligmans). The Dulles brothers and Arthur H. Dean were also members of this firm, which represents Standard Oil and other key international giants. 18. Thomson, a former State Depart ment official, is currently heading a Council on Foreign Relations study group on "u. S. Policy in Eas t Asia: the 1930' s and 1960' s." (Chairman 0 f the group until his death was John Lindbeck.) 19. For a case study of a more recent integrated foundation project, see David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre" in B. Garrett and K. Barkeley, Two, Three Many Vietnams, San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1970. 20. "Toward a Dynamic Far Eastern Policy," Far Eastern Survey, Septem ber 7, 1949.

21. Nelson Rockefeller, The Future of Federalism, the Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1963. 22. Cox Hearings. 23. William Langer, An End to Iso lation, Council on Foreign Relations, 1952. 24. The results were written up in a volume by Grayson Kirk, The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities, for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1947. 25. "An 'area' is not an important unit of study except possibly in geogra phy," it was argued. "The area divisions of the language and area programs do not reflect systematic classifica tions derived from prolonged scholarly and scientific investigations in any discipline. They represent very rough and ready delimitations serving chiefly the practical needs of military and political operations." Milton Singer, "The Social Sciences in Non-Western Stu dies," The Annals of the American Aca demy of Political and Social Science, 1964. 26. David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire," Ramparts, October 1969. -R.B. Hall, "Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences," SSRC pamphlet (n. d.)
-Annual Reports, SSRC: 1943-; Rockefeller
and Carnegie Foundations: 1943-.
-George M. Beckmann, "The Role of Foun
dations in non-Western Studies," and
Philip E. Moseley, "International Affairs,"
in Warren Weaver, U.S. Philanthropic Foun
dations, Their History, Structure, Manage
ment and Record, Harper and Row, 1967.
-also, Cox Committee Hearings.
27. John K. Fairbank, Comment. 28. Warren Weaver, Ope cit. 29. Ibid. 30. John J. HcCloy's High Commission was also a prime developer of postw::lr intelligence operations and agents. 31. Bernard Bererson article on "Behavioralism" in the International En cyclopaedia of the Social Science~. " Cf. Horowitz, "Billion Dollar Bralns, Ramparts, May 1969: "The term 'beha~ioral sciences' came into currency, one mlght even say into being, in the United States in the early 1950' s . Wh at happened to 165

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give rise to the term? The key event was the development of a Ford Foundation program in this field . It was the Foundation's administrative action, . that led directly to the term and to the concept of this particular field of study .... It is perhaps obvious that the Ford Foundation's commitment of several million dollars to this program had something to do with the term's acceptance and spread. In fact, one observer, upon learning that John Dewey and Arthur Bentley had in 1949 come close to using the term, remarked that 'the term may have been coined by John Dewey but it was minted by the Ford Foundation. '" 32. L. Gray Cowan, 'The School of International Affairs, Columbia Univer sity Press, 1954. 33. He was also -- appropriately - Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia. 34. Cowan, op. cit., Annual Reports, SSRC. 35. L. Gray Cowan, Ope cit., Rusk testimony, Cox Hearings, p. 513. 36. Who Rules Columbia?, North Amer ican Congress on Latin America (pam phlet), New York, 1968. 37. U.S. Department of State, Tran cript of Round Table Discussion on American Policy Toward China, Held in the Department of State, October 6, 7, and 8, 1949--confidential. (subse quently declassified) 38. The extent of the duplicity in which a professor who tries to perform dual service to intellect and to the State can become quickly involved, can be seen by comparing Fairbank's remarks about playing the anti-Russian card in China with an article which he wrote a year earlier: " ... One of the sanctions for the communist regime now lies in its championing of China's inde pendence of foreign influence. To Amer icans who see communism anywhere as a form of Russian influence, this may seem hardly credible. But it must be remem bered that China's communist movement has been for two decades in the hands of Chinese. Of all communist parties, the Chinese has had the most experience, outside of the Russian, in running a government of its own and solving its local problems .. In Chinese communist eyes, Harxism in China has been made
166

Chinese; it is not a Russian device under Russian control. This view is supported by the visual evidence that Russians have not been managing the revolution in North China, which has been in Olinese hands. Russian communism figures in the revolution as a benevolent elder brother to Chinese communism, not as a father with final parental authority in domestic affairs within China." "Can We Compete in China?", Ope cit., p. 115. 39. "Can we Compete ... ", p. 115. 40. Acheson, Present at the Crea tion, pp. 216-220; the status element in McCarthy's attack on the Eastern Estab lishment was quintessentially expressed in the revolt against OSS types. (see also: E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment) 41. Lockwood and Langer were among the first members of the Council back in the twenties. 42. George E. Taylor, 'The Joint Com mittee on Contemporary China, 1959-1969, p. 17. 43. Ibid., p. 28. 44. Jacques Barzun, The American University, Harper and Row, 1968, p. 149. 45. Taylor, Ope cit., p. 28. 46. Ibid., p. 18. 47. Ibid., p. 29. 48. The genesis of this project,a precursor of the 1962 Whiting Studies Group project for State Department Intel ligence -- in which both Boorman and Lindbeck participated -- provides added insight into the use of academic structures and the origins of the Ford program. Boorman was a military officer stationed in the Far East during World War II. "In that role," as he tells it, "and subsequently as a graduate student at Yale University and as a Chinese language officer of the Foreign Service stationed at Peiping (1947-1950) and Hong Kong (1950-1954), I encountered some of the practical and research difficul ties in contemporary Chinese biography and became aware of the urgency of attemp ting to preserve detailed biographical data " In 1954-55, he took a leave from the Foreign Service, made possible by a Rockefeller Public Service Award, and made a proposal for the preparation of a biographical dictionary on 20th century China. This was approved by the

Ford Foundation, "essential counsel"

being provided to Boorman by Paul F.
Langer, "then a temporary consultant
on research and training problems,"
who had set up the pre-Gould House
China projects at Harvard. In 1955,
the Ford project and Boorman were
taken under the auspices of the
School of International Affairs -
~d its presiding figures, from whom
Boorman received additional counsel,
Schuyler Wallace, Andrew W. Cordier
of Congo intervention notoriety,
and Philip E. Moseley. (Acknowledg
ments, Biographical Dictionary of
Republican China.)
49. The Harvard Graduate Society
for Advanced Study and Research,
Newsletter, March 31, 1966: "East
Asian Research Center," by John K.
Fairbank.
50. Alexander Eckstein in John M.H.
Lindbeck, In Hemoriam, 1971 (privately
printed). Eckstein was a member of the
JCCC from 1959 to 1967 and was also on
the Subcommittee on Materials and on
the Committee on the Economy of
China.
APPENDIX

Development of Foreign Affairs Research

Centers: A Selected Chrvnology

1908 - Proposal for National Political Research Center 1910 - Carnegie Endowment for Inter nat ional Peace 1911 - Carnegie Corporation of New York 1913 Rockefeller Foundation 1918 - Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial 1918 - Foreign Policy Association [Rocke feller-funded] 1919 American Council of Learned Soc ieties [Rockefeller] 1919 - Institute of International Edu cation [created by John D. Rockefeller Jr.] 1921 - Council on Foreign Relations [Rockefeller, Carnegie] 1923 - Social Science Research Council [Rockefeller] 1926 - Causes of War Project, Univer sity of Chicago Brookings Institution [Rockefeller, 1928 Cargegie]

1930 - Walter Hines Page School of In ternational Relations, Johns Hopkins 1931 - Committee on International Re lations, University of Chicago 1933 - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University 1935 - Institute of International Studies, Yale University [Ro cke feller] 1943 - Army language and area training program 1943 - School of Advanced International Studies (became part of Johns Hopkins University in 1950) 1945 - Project RAND budgeted by Air Force (in 1948 became RAND Corporation) [Ford] 1945 - Rockefeller grant to Columbia University for Russian Institute 1946 - Fulbright Act (first grants-1948) 1948 - Area Research Training Fellowships, Social Science Research Council [Rockefeller-Carnegie] 1948 - Office of External Research, Department of State 1950 - Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System (Air Force contract) 1950 - Ford Foundation (founded 1936) reorganized as a national philanthropy 1951 - ECA (now AID) university contract program initiated 1951 - Center of International Studies, Princeton University (a reincarna tion of the Yale Institute of International Studies) 1951 - Center for International Studies, Hassachusetts Institute of Technol ogy [Ford-CIA] 1952 - Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowship Program 1954 - Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto [Ford] 1954 - Committee on Comparative Politics set up by Social Science Research Council 1956 - National 'Science Foundation pro gram extended to social sciences 1958 - National Defense Education Act 1960 - Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs [FordJ 1961 - East-West Center, Honolulu 1961 - Fulbright-Hays Act 167

1962 - Education and World Affairs, Inc. [Ford] 1964'- Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR) 1965 - National Ednowment for the Human ities 1966 - International Education Act [sponsored by John W. Gardner, former Secretary of HEW and former head of the Carnegie Corpora tion]

1966 - Proposal for National Social Science Foundation 1967 - FAR Guidelines for Foreign Area Research [from University Centers of Foreign Affairs Research: A Directory, Office of External Research, U.S. Department of State, 1968, pp. 138-139 ]

168

CODlBlDDicatioDS

EQBAL AHMAD Dear Brothers and Sis ters , Before I b ring you up to date on the Harrisburg indictments there has been a second round of indictments since I last wrote I want to thank CCAS chapters for their immediate response to the January 12, 1971 indictment of fellow CCAS member, Eqbal Ahmad. We had so many speaking reques ts that we were unable to work all of them into Eqbal's extremely full schedule. We did make a lot of bread and each place that he spoke, for the most part, had well coordinated interplay of speaking, TV-radio appearances and cocktail par ties. Scheduling has slacked off during the summer and, much to Eqbal's relief, he is not finding time to finish a book which he has been working on. We are beginning to gear up again for autumn quarter and with your help it will be a busy one. Eqbal' s view that Nixon Kissinger foreign policy is primarily European-Middle Eastern oriented (in contrast to previous administrations' preoccupation with Asia) takes on added significance with the lifting of some trade restrictions and Kissinger's recent trip to Peking. Please contact Alan Smart, Harrisburg Defense Commit tee, 5500 Woodlawn, Chicago 60637 (312-493-6416) for speaking requests. Now, as to the indictments and the defendants' responses. As you remember the Federal Grand Jury in Harrisburg, Pa., was convened on December 1, 1970. It began hearings two w~eks later, calling nine people to testify. After hearing testimony from six of the nine, the jurors handed down Indictment #14886 on January 12, 1971. As in many con spiracy cases, there was a government informant who testified: Boyd Doug las, a former convict, recently released from the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pa., where he met Father Philip Berrigan. (see NYT, February 21, 1971 for John Kifner's lengthy article on Boyd Douglas) The three other wit nesses refused to testify; subsequently two of them were cited for civil con tempt of court by a judge. This first indictment had seven counts. The crux of the case was Count I, which charged that all the defendants and "co-conspirators" had conspired to blow up heating ducts serving govern ment buildings in Washington, D.C., and kidnap presidential advisor, Henry Kissinger. Conviction on the kidnap ping charge could have brought a life sentence for the defendants. The "Overt Acts" listed in Count I consisted in part of telephone conver sations among those cited and indicted. The defendants claimed that illegal electronic surveillance was used by the government to monitor calls, and they have filed motions on their right to listen to the recordings of the phone calls. The court denied the motion, and that decision is being appealed. The other six counts contained charges that the defendants Sister Elizabeth McAlister and Father Philip Berrigan had exchanged communications in violation of federal priSon rules.

169

The defense filed a motion asking the judge to void these charges, as a viola tion of a prisoner's freedom of speech. The judge denied the motion, and that decision is also being appealed. The Grand Jury remained in session after handing down Indictment li14886. In what proved to be an effort to sub stantiate the indictment's charges, more than 22 additional witnesses were called to testify. The witnesses were summoned with "U.S. vs. John Doe" subpoenas, leaving open the subject of questioning. Nineteen of the 22 refused to testify; so far six of them have been cited by a judge for civil contempt of court, and four more have been indicted by the Grand Jury for criminal contempt ... criminal con tempt carrying a potentially heavier penalty and patently an attempt to coerce the witnesses into testifying. A new indictment, #14950, was handed down on April 30, 1971, and takes prior consideration over the January 12th indictment. The number of defendants is increased by two in the second in dictment, with the addition of Mary Cain Scoblick and John Glick. Three who were formerly cited as "co-conspir ators" were dropped from the new indictment, including Tom Davidson, Father Paul Mayer, and Father Daniel Berrigan. (Daniel Berrigan, along with his brother Philip, were the two people whom J. Edgar Hoover originally accused publically of leading the alleged plot, in his senate subcommittee testimony on November 27, 1970. Thus in five months, Father Daniel was dropped from alleged leadership in a plot to a position of no involvement at all, according to the second indictment.) The new indictment contains ten counts. Unlike its predecessor, the April 30th document begins with a list of charges alleging the existence of a conspiracy to "commit offenses against the United States". Within this charge are listed several past and projected protest actions ag~inst S~lective Ser vice files, for which some of the defendants and "co-conspirators" have already publicly acknowledged respon 170

sibility. The Zist of charges ends UJith aonspiraay to kidnap and borrh, UJhiah need not be proven to bring a aonvic

tion on the other aharges listed in the first indiatment of January l2th. In addition, the kidnapping and bomb ing charge is raised under a different statute than the charge in the original indictment, and carries with it a max imum five-year penalty, if proven.
Counts II through X of the second indictment relate to communications among defendants, focusing specifically on two letters said to be written by Sl~ter Elizabeth McAlister and Father Philip Berrigan to each other. The letters, made public with the indictment, are being challenged before Federal Judge Dixon Herman, as being prejudicial to selection of an unbiased trial jury, as having been illegally obtained and there fore as being inadmissable as evidence in the trial. A motion has also been filed calling for contempt citations against members of the prosecution for allowing the release of the letters. Well, if the above is somewhat contradictory and confusing, rest assured that you are not alone. Even the law yers -- Ramsey Clark, Leonard Boudin and Paul O'Dyer -- seem to find it an entanglement. All of the defendants in the second indictment refused to plead and each issued a statement in lieu of plea. Sister Elizabeth's statement cen tered on the process by which the second indictment was returned: issue of wire tap had not been disposed of; the indict ment was a ploy to "gain publicity and to cover for the painful blunders of Mr. Hoover;" and the release of private correspondence (without waiting to see if such "evidence" was admissable in court of law) was "nothing but a gross effort to prejudice us in a way no court of jus tice can sanction." Sister Eliza beth concluded that she could not enter a plea to this second indictment "until and unless the issues brought before this court by our attorneys are answered in favor both of law and of justice." She further warned that "If these efforts at misusing the judicial machinery by the executive aren't stopped here by you, it will become harder and harder for

the JOOst willing and faithful citizens to believe that our government even intends to do justice for its own people or for the people of the world." Philip Berrigan's statement speaks for itself: "I will not respond to this indictment as the government would have me. It is a potpourri of false charges, ~surd allegations, and acts labelled crimes by the law, obligations by think ing men.
"As a legal document, this indict ment is about as sane or insane as our government's Indochinese War. In fact, one is stepchild of the other, legal overkill following military overkill. Both are devious, ruthless, mad. The Indochinese desire their independence; we desire an end to the murder. That makes us criminals together, and Wash ington punishes us as criminals they by American firepower, we by this indict ment.

already eroded margins of civil liber ties at home. "Second, at the time of my previous arraignment, I had expected that the court shall put an end to the extra judiciality and incriminatory publicity mongering which had characterized the government's behavior even prior to our indictment. I had hoped that by enforcing a measure of executive respon sibility, the court shall help us estab lish a degree of civility so rare among the rulers of this country. "Today, three months and seventeen days later, I have been recalled to this court to be arraigned for a second time under a new indictment whose terms I do not understand. Furthermore, I am deeply disappointed that the court has so far failed to stop the government's irregular and extra-judicial behavior which predicated the production of this new indictment. Count I now appears to contain five separate conspiracies. To wit: conspiracy to (a) oppose the war; (b) raid draft boards, i.e., acts simi lar to those for which some of us are serving prison terms and several have taken public responsibility; (c) incite others to resist the war; (d) blow up the heating ducts of Washington, D.C.; and (e) kidnap Dr. Henry Kissinger. "Your Honor, I s till wish to plead not guilty to the original charges of plotting to kidnap and bomb only if the government would show some consistency in its repression of dissenters against its criminal policies. But I must also emphasize my continuing opposition to the American government's genocidal assault on the peoples and cultures of South east Asia, and consequently, my commit ment to reSisting and encouraging resist ance against this war. "Your Honor, much more agonizing is the disappointment of my expectation that this court shall restrain the govern ment from its lawless behavior which not only violates our rights as defend ant~, but also the rules of this court. This expectation resulted from the fact that I grew up in colonized British India believing that while the executive
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"I will regard it therefore, as a piece of legal pathology supporting our military pathology in Southeast Asia. And I will resist it as I re sist the war." Eqbal Ahmad's statement in lieu of plea contrasted his posiiton on the first indictment and his refusal to plead on the second. Because of its wrap-up nature and its eloquence, I shall quote it in full. "Your honor, on February 8, 1971, I pleaded not guilty before this court on charges of conspiring, with 12 other persons, to blow up Washington, D.C.'s heating system and, on the following day, kidnap Dr. Henry Kissinger. I was able then to respectfully enter my plea for two reasons: "First, I had no difficulty under standing the terms of Count I in the first indictment. The charge being con spiracy to engage in bombing and kid napping. I believed that we needed only a modicum of judicial fairness to prov~ our innocence, and the additional guilt of the government which is committing crimes of war abroad and narrowing the

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i t

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autho~ities were oppressive and worthy of opposition, the judiciary only among colonial institutions deserved the res pect of individuals for its independent administration of justice. MY present disappointment is painful despite my realization that the judicial system in this country is extremely uneven, so that for its correct functioning it depends on individual judges of whom, I am told, at least a few are endowed with the strength and independence re quired to adjudicate disputes between government and its opponents.

From here it looks as if the t rial will not take place until December. Sandy ~turdevant Chicago CCAS

YOKOTA ORGANIZING PROJECT Yokota Airbase is described as "the hub of U.S. Air Force activities in Central Japan" with the mission of pro viding a "strike capability in the Far East." To render this base less deadly, the Pacific Counselling Service has just established an office to work with GI's at Yokota. We can provide Airmen with legal counsel and help in filing for C.O. 's and other discharges. More impor tant, our office is available as a meet ing place where they can rap with move ment activists, put out their own news paper (the first edition of which has just come out), and read movement oriented literature. CCAS members can help us in many ways .. If you're in the States, we need books and periodicals--particularly those

"Your Honor, I had originally hoped that in this game of chance, we had hit upon a judge who would contribute to terminating this government's viola tions of laws in the United States no less than in Indochina. Insofar as this court has not yet satisfied that expec tation, I am unable to offer my coopera tion to it. For these reasons I refuse to enter my plea before this court on the new indictment." Upon refusal of defendants to enter a plea, the judge was obliged to enter in their name a plea of "not guilty."

The following item from the New York Times of some years ago is perhaps of interest to those who read Tom Engelhardt's arti cle in the latest Bulletin discussing the relationship between American attitudes towards Indians and other third world people as manifested in films:

VIETCONG CAPTIVES CHEER FOR INDIANS IN MOVIES Nuidat, South Vietnam, Jan. 22 (Reuters)--Captured Vietcong guerrillas cheer for the Indians during Western movies shown to them at an Australian hospital at Vungtau, an Australian intel ligence officer said here today. One guerrilla, who said he had changed his political views since his capture three months ago, gave himself away by crying at the end when the Indians lost, the officer said. He said the guerrilla would be handed over to South Vietnam ese authorities tomorrow to be interned in a prisoner of war camp. [New York Times, January 23, 1967] . Steve Shalom, Cambridge, Ma

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on contemporary Asia,. and on the problems of racism, imperialism and women's libera tion. We hope to develop a library for GI's to make use of. Needless to say, we also need money. If you're in Tokyo, get in touch with us here. We always need people to leaflet and to rap about their thing to GI' s and to us. After a week in the library, it's really a gas. Pacific Counselling Service
P-12, 2099
3-5, l-chome
Musashi-no-dai, Fussa
Tokyo, Japan

BOOKS FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

fought for survival but built for the future, and managed to triple the number of students at the University of Hanoi (1400 in 1965 to nearly 5000 in 1967). Under the bombs, scientists worked in improvised laboratories in bamboo huts dispersed in the country side, spending part of their time doing farm work with the local peasants so as not to be a burden on the local community. Even during the bombing, archaeologists worked on newly discovered sites, adding to Vietnam's knowledge of its national identity and origins. Higher education and scientific and technological development is greatly stressed in the DRV, but the leadership has a realistic view of the country's present capacities. As Prime Minister Pham Van Dong noted recently,

VIETNAM
When Noam Chomsky visited the Demo cratic Republic of Vietnam in early 1970, he was surprised by a request to lecture at the Polytechnic Institute on current work in linguistics in the u.S. He lectured for seven hours to a group of 70-80 linguists and mathematicians. "Their work, in this rather remote area of science and scholarship, was at an international level. I lectured approx imately as I would at Tokyo, Oxford, or the Sorbonne." [Noam Chomsky, At War With Asia, Vintage, 1970, p. 283] This testi mony seems barely believable. One would have thought that people of all walks of life in the DRV would be too concerned with bare survival after years of the onslaught by the world's most powerful military machine to concern themselves with such esoteric matters. But North Vietnam has consistently defied all ideas on the limits of human capacities. As a French mathematician, Professor L. Schwartz, noted after his visit to the DRV in 1969, "Whereas most peoples of the world have a technical and scientific consciousness which is inferior to their material possibil ities for development, it is the other way around in Vietnam." Even during the three years, 1965 to 1967, when North Vietnam was subjected to some of the most intensive bombing in human history, the country not only

We are carrying out our technical while most of the world has alrear.iJJ passed through the industrial revolution and is in the process of carrying out a scien tific and technical revolution. We must dPC1JJJ the conclusions from this situation: we must rapidly apply the results obtained through research done throughout the world and apply them to our conditions.
revolution~

Western friends of Vietnam can offer significant aid in making scientific, technical, medical and scholarly develop ments in the West available to Vietnam ese researchers. In France in March 1967 about fifty professors and researchers, including some of the most respected names in French university circles, signed an appeal for "Books for Vietnam". The pro ject caught on: to date, more than $100,000 has been collected and 15,000 books have been sent. The project is sponsored and coordinated by a federation of unions connected with higher education called the coZZectif intersyndical Univer sitaire. Thanks to their effort, the Universi ty of Hanoi now has a modern scientific library, but an enormous amount of work remains to be done. Al 173

though the library now has a large number of the best and most rec~nt books in mathematics, physics and medicine as well as a substantial collection in tropical agriculture, the library is weak in chemistry and technology and lacks periodicals, including back issues and current subscriptions. Besides the Central Scientific Library in Hanoi there is the library of social sciences and humanities, which has been comparatively neglected until now. Around 2,000 books have been sent, some of them gifts of editors or authors. The concentration has been in pedagogy and child psychology. In the past, a large percentage of the books sent from France were American, but to date there has been practically no participation in the project by Americans. A member of the Collective, Mlle- Annick L~vy, has agreed to serve as liaison for American individuals and groups who want to send books to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Your assistance can take many forms: books, periodicals, subscriptions to periodicals, or even annotated biblio graphic lists of the best and most recent works in your field. Or send a check. 'The Collective has been fortunate enough to find a sympathetic book dealer who offers a 25% discount and packs the books for shipment to the University of Hanoi. Orders are placed regularly on the basis of the priorities indicated by the Univer sity of Hanoi and lists drawn up by French specialists. EVEN IF YOU OR YOUR GROUP HAS NO IDNEY, there are many ways you can help. 1. Many libraries throw out back copies of periodicals or duplicate copies. Try to set up regular channels for getting these. 2. Government publications. Many govern ment publications, in particular House and Senate Hearings, are available free on request to American citizens. Write your home town Congressman or Senator; they have allowances of a certain number of these publications to send to their constituents. Examples: Hearings on Vietnam, arms or foreign aid appropria tions.
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3. Appeal to anti-war professors, writers, magazines, or publishers for donations. 4. Appeal to professors and teaching assistants to donate review copies and free teaching copies of books they use in their classes. 5. Spread news of this project to other groups or individuals who may be interested. SOCIAL SCIENCES: Books in the following fields would be most useful, according to Vietnamese consulted by representatives of the French group. 1. History, geography, archaeology of the countries of Indochina. 2. Economics: the American economy, the economy of underdeveloped countries, factory management. 3. American politics, including the Vietnam War, US policies in Indochina. 4. Linguistics applied to the teaching of languages. 5. Child psychology, educational sciences. Books in ALL FIELDS of SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY are needed. }mDICINE is a vital field for Vietnam, and the Vietnamese are particularly eager to get subscriptions to American medical journals. Individuals or groups particularly interested in the medical question should contact the Association ~dicale Franco-Vietnamienne, 13 rue Payenne, Paris IIle, France. The Vietnamese are interested in works dealing with the problem of keeping things dry in very humid conditions. Given the climate in North Vietnam, preserva tion of film, cameras, electrical equip ment, etc. poses a problem. They need materials that can resist heat and humid ity. Send good quality works, naturally. Don't worry about the possibility of someone else sending the same books. There are institutes in the provinces which could use the duplicates of the University of Hanoi. To end this appeal in the most elo

quent way possible, I'd like to quote

Professor Chomsky's reflections on his
contact with Vietnamese professors in
Hanoi.

Such perceptions are most wide spread in discussions in the West when the subject is that of the most misunderstood of the great powers. But these perceptions are false. It is possible to speak of China as seriously and intelligently as any othe r co un try. This is what is proposed in publishing the revue, La Nouvelle Chine, the first issue of- which has just appeared in Paris. The editorial board is composed of French and Chinese who all work on contempo rary China. The purpose of La Nouvelle Chine is to give verified information on China, to explain her problems, to point out her efforts, in short, to substitute a concrete image of China for the customary simplified one. Unlike China Quarterly, La Nouvelle Chine is not aimed at scholars or specialists. But in following current events, it seeks to render China more meaningful for a wide variety of readers: people interested in China in a general way, students, politicians, activists in socialist organizations, etc. No revue of this kind is yet published in Europe. Each issue will include an article on internal politics, foreign policy, literature and society, plus provide a platform for exchanges, and studies on geography of large regions. The first issue includes: a revue of the political year 1970, analysis of diplomatic recognition by various countries last autumn, articles on reform of the university system, on the question of Stalin and the CCP, on family planning.

They are not familiar with the most recent work~ because of the unavailability of recent materials~ but they are~ I believe~ in a position to close the gap quickly if this problem is overaome--and to help them overcome it~ in all fields ~ is one tiny effort that Americans might make in the hopeless task of compensating for the destruction of much of what the Vietnamese have created lJith remarkable enterprise~ diligence~ and courage. [At War With Asia~ pp. 283-4]
Address books and correspondence to: Hlle Annick L~vy Centre de Documentation sur l'Asie du Sud-Est 43, rue Cuvier Paris 5, France [This article is based on newsletters and other materials of the Collective and on discussionS with Annick Levy and with one of the Collective's coordinators, Mlle Nicole Simon. Report written by Christine White. ]

LA NOUVELLE CHINE [NEW CHINA] A French Revue of Current Chinese Affairs For some, China is a count ry 0 f permanent anarchy and of hopeless struggle against famine, flood and drought. For others, its government seems dependent on the most dangerous form of militarism and it mocks the possibility of nuclear holocaust.

Price for ten issues:

60F [$12] by sea mail 95F [$19] by air mail LA NOUVELLE CHINE Boite postale 150.09 Paris 9, France 175

It remains only for the world to discover \.,rhat I have long suspected: Henry Kissinger is actually Peter Sellers. There have been many hints. The accent for one thing. But the real give-away was the announcement, in beautiful downtown Burbank, that "Kissinger" had just returned from a secret flight to Peking and that, in the near future, the President himself would debate Hao Tse-tung on his own k'ang. In a private interview with Sellers~ I learned that the press con ference was in fact a trailer for the . coming movie, tentatively titled;'Son of Nettern~ch." (Studio scuttlebutt has it that Sellers himself preferred to call the epic, "!~arco :~et ternich" but was overruled.) Controversy surrounds the film and many people doubt it will meet the somewhat rigid budget and production schedule ,.,rhich has been set. The expense

is, of course, immense. Renting China for location scenes has proven difficUl and even if the movie is completed, it t will face grave distribution difficulti in Taiwan, Saigon, Seoul and POSSibly even Tokyo. Yet Sellers is determined to continue and dismisses the fai~t hearted with a ferocious, "hock mir in China." The politics of the film unfortunately remains obscure and grumblings have been heard from e;;<:tremist both left and right. Sellers himself seems undaunted by criticism, either practical or ideological, pointing to the favorable advance publicity he has received as a clear omen of ulti mate success. Those of us who have long admired his amazing cinema career can only hope for the best. Clearly this is the best gimmick Sellers has had since the old goon show days. -from a reader-

C OMMITTEE

o
E

R N

A SIAN

SCHOLARS

CCAS is an international scholarly/political organization concerned with Asia. Member ship in CCAS is $5 yearly, $10 for those with greater resources. With membership comes the "CCAS Newsletter," a monthly newssheet with organizational and topical news. Membership in CCAS is contingent upon acceptance of the "Statement of Purpose," available from the national office (which shifts location with the national coordina tors; see effective dates below). See back cover of Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars for listings of local CCAS chapters and/or CCAS contact people in your area. AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1971 Concerned Asian Scholars at Stanford Building 600T Stanford University
Stanford, CA. 94305
DECEMBER 1971-~1ARCH 1972 Boston CCAS 146 Sixth Street Cambridge, HA. 02139

Overseas readers may be interes ted in CCAS' sister organizations: AREAS in Britain [Association for Radical East Asian Studies, London] and CASAN in Australia [Concerned Asian Scholars of Australia and New Zealand, Canberra].
176

___.. 1-------
June 15,1971

'\

~HE GLAD
(

t&!!'r

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