IDT theory proposes deception occurs in interpersonal interactions

Communication Theory
Six:
Three
David B. Buller Judee K. Burgoon
August 1996
Pages: 203-242
Interpersonal Deception Theory
Interpersonal deception theory ( I D T ) represents a merger of interpersonal communication and deception principles designed to better account for deception in interactive contexts. A t the same time, it bas the potential to enlighten theories related to ( a )credibility and truthful communication and ( b ) interpersonal communication. Presented here are key definitions, assumptions related to the critical attributes and key features of interpersonal communication and deception, and 18 general propositions from which specific testable hypotheses can be derived. Research findings relevant to the propositions are also summarized.
Communication is founded on a presumption of truth (Goffman, 1959; Grice, 1989; Knapp & Comadena, 1979). In practice, however, communicators frequently decide that honesty is not the best policy. Job applicants overstate their qualifications to make a favorable impression, spouses lie to minimize relational conflict, students claim purchased term papers as their own work, politicians misrepresent their actions to the media, and public officials conceal their true motives to representatives of foreign governments. In short, deception and suspected deception arise in at least one quarter of all conversations (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1994; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975). Extensive multidisciplinary literature on deception stands as testimony to the psychological, social, political, and cultural importance of this common form of communication. Ironically, however, deception has seldom been studied as a truly communicative activity. We know little about how social interaction alters deception and how deception alters social interaction. Normal social interaction usually entails a mutual exchange in which acquainted senders and receivers influence each other in a highly interdependent and dynamic fashion. Yet social science research on deception has typically employed noninteractive designs in which senders deliver messages for subsequent reading, viewing, or hearing by unacquainted receivers rather than interact directly and freely with those receivers (Burgoon, 1989; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985a). As Krauss (1981) observed, Infrequently do our subjects actually see other people and
203
infrequently still do they interact with them. Certainly people make messy stimuli, less tractable than the idealized representations of them we often employ. But . . . in our interaction with others we can and frequently do affect them as stimuli (p . 340). Divorcing senders (deceivers) from receivers (detectors) draws attention to characteristics of individual actors rather than to properties of interpersonal relationships and interactions, to independent rather than to joint patterns of action, and to static rather than evolving deceptive performances. This state of affairs places scholars interested in interpersonal communication in a quandary as to how far previous assumptions, theories, and findings about deception can generalize to social interaction. We believe a new theoretical perspective is warranted to account for deception, and more broadly, credible or noncredible communication, in interpersonal contexts. The model offered herein represents our attempt to develop a theoretical perspective in which individual factors such as goals, motivations, emotions, and cognitive abilities are necessary but not sufficient factors to predict and explain the topography of interpersonal deceptive encounters and their outcomes. In it, we approach the issue relationally, considering deceptive interchanges from a dyadic and dialogic rather than monadic and monologic perspective. We acknowledge the cooperative nature of deceptive episodes, such that interactants communicative acts, not just their psychological processes, are antecedents to behaviors and interpretations. Additionally, special cognitive and behavioral requirements that attend active participation are taken into account. In short, we merge deception principles with interpersonal communication principles. The model we have fashioned, interpersonal deception theory (IDT), is still in its formative stages (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Burgoon, 1989; Burgoon & Buller, 1994). Its name specifies its scope conditions, namely, interpersonal interaction in which communicator believability is salient or in question. It has evolved from our own and others research, conducted over the last 2 ?h decades, into the broad areas of interpersonal communication, nonverbal behavior, message processing, credibility, and deception. Our perspective does not eschew what is already known about deception. Rather, it builds on it to complete our understanding of deception as accomplished in interpersonal situations and to establish the generalizability of current knowledge to interpersonal interaction. At the same time, it invites deeper examination of features that distinguish interpersonal from noninterpersonal and noninteractive communication as well as the broader issue of credibility in interpersonal communication. We begin this essay by defining key terms in our model and articulating fundamental assumptions underlying interpersonal communication and deception. We then develop the propositional framework of the theory, which is predicated on these assumptions, and suggest hypotheses that flow from these propositions. The discussion is augmented by
204
evidence gleaned from extant research and generated by our recent research program testing, in interactive contexts, hypotheses derived from the set of interrelated propositions.
Definitions
Key to understanding our conceptualization of interpersonal deception is what we mean by interpersonal, interactive, deception and suspicion. These definitions further specify the scope of IDT. Interpersonal communication, at its simplest, can be defined as the dynamic exchange of messages between two ( o r more) people. Interpersonal communication may or may not be interactive: To the extent that it entails synchronous rather than delayed turn exchanges and opportunities for immediate feedback and mutual influence, it is interactive. We recognize that scholars disagree on whether interpersonal communication must also be dyadic, face-to-face, unmediated, idiosyncratic or personal in character, so we prefer to start with a more neutral, noncontroversial definition (see Knapp, Miller, & Fudge, 1994, regarding definitional issues). However, we view dyadic, face-to-face exchange as the prototypical exemplar of interpersonal, interactive communication and consider it the benchmark against which to compare other communicative formats. As this implies, when communicative transactions increase beyond two participants or shift from face-to-face to mediated formats, they become increasingly less interpersonal and interactive, a point we take up more specifically in our propositions. Much of the motivation for developing IDT rests in understanding deception in faceto-face interactions, as contrasted with deception under decreasingly interpersonal, interactive conditions. It is thus both an interpersonal and an interactive theory. Deception is defined as a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver (see Ekman, 1985, and Knapp & Comadena, 1979, for further discussions of definitional issues in deception). More specifically, deception occurs when communicators control the information contained in their messages to convey a meaning that departs from the truth as they know it. This rules out mistaken or unintended lies. The receivers counterpart to deception is perceived deceit or suspicion. Suspicion refers to a belief, held without sufficient evidence or proof to warrant certainty, that a persons speech or actions may be duplicitous. As such, suspicion falls somewhere in the intermediate ranges along a truth-falsity judgment continuum; that is, a suspicious receiver is uncertain whether a sender is telling the truth or lying. As receivers approach either extreme of certainty, uncertainty gives way to virtual certainty, and suspicion becomes transformed into a firm conviction about senders truthfulness; that is, receivers know senders are truthful or deceptive. In the latter case, it becomes what is referenced in the deception literature as perceived deceit. By these
205
Communication
Theory
definitions, IDT is a theory of deception and reactions to actual or perceived deception.
Assumptions
Making our assumptions explicit exposes some of the major differences between our perspective and the way deception has been conceptualized previously, especially outside the communication discipline. Some of our assumptions may appear so self-evident as to need no articulation. However, it is important to clearly specify our assumptions about human communication because deception is studied by scholars from different fields who have not always found it important to analyze it in interactive contexts. T o accept our propositional framework, one must accept these assumptions. These assumptions reflect principles that are theoretically primitive and require no empirical test. We begin each subsection by describing critical attributes that further specify the domain of interpersonal communication and deception. Next we describe suppositions derived from well-established principles from kindred lines of research on interpersonal communication and deception.
Assumptions Associated With Interpersonal Communication Criteria1Attributes. An essential attribute of interpersonal communication
is that it entails active participation by both sender and receiver, that is, both are actors rather than passive recipients or observers of one persons actions. This is the basis for mutual influence in dyadic interaction, where communication phenomena cannot be explained without considering the interplay between participants. Elevating receivers to active status implies a duality of sender and receiver roles such that both participants must simultaneously accomplish encoding and decoding tasks. This multiplicity of responsibilities has implications for the multifunctional nature of deception, the cognitive effort it requires, and effective performance during deception, discussed shortly. Another essential feature of interpersonal communication is that it is a dynamic activity. Behavioral patterns fluctuate over time as communicators adjust to one anothers feedback, acclimate to the communication context, and change topics. The implication for interpersonal deceptions is that a uniform deceptive profile is unlikely, as behavioral displays at the outset of deception differ from those exhibited later. Interpersonal communication is also multifunctional, multidimensional, and multimodal. Motivated by instrumental, relational, and identity goals, interactants seek to accomplish multiple purposes (e.g., structuring and management of conversation, impression management, relational communication, emotional expression and management, social influence; Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, in press; see other functional approaches by Patterson, 1983, and Street & Capella, 1985), each of which is multifaceted (e.g., people exchange relational messages
206
of trust, liking, involvement, and composure; Burgoon & Hale, 1987) and expressed through multiple channels (e.g., visual, vocal, spatial, temporal, and tactile). Interpersonal communication comprises both strategic and nonstrategic behaviors. Given its goal-oriented nature, much interpersonal communication is enacted consciously and deliberately to achieve multiple functions and to negotiate attendant encoding and decoding demands. This is accomplished by what we are calling strategic behaviors, strategic in the sense of reflecting large-scale plans and intentions (as opposed to specific behavioral routines or tactics). By this purposive characterization we are not assuming that interpersonal communication need be a highly conscious, planned activity. We regard it as inherently goaldirected but often automatic or habituated (Kellerman, 1992) and as varying in degree of intentionality and conscious awareness, with communicators more aware of some behaviors and less aware of other (Stamp & Knapp, 1990). Along with purposive, strategic actions, interactant exhibit unintentional, often unconscious, behavior (such as nervous movements or nonfluencies). These inadvertent behaviors, which we are calling nonstrategic, usually reflect perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes accompanying message encoding and decoding or the communicative situation- what in the deception literature is often termed leakage (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Interpersonal communication processes are governed by a host of cognitive and behavioral factors. Most germane to IDT are direct, proximal antecedents to actual interaction patterns and their outcomes: communicator goals; knowledge of the partners typical behavior patterns; expectations, interpretations, and evaluations associated with communicative behavior; social skills; and contextual and relationship factors in which interactions are embedded. Like Jussim (1991), we take a weak rather than strong social constructivist view: Behaviors during interaction can, and often do, influence participants subsequent cognitions and behaviors. The influence of preinteraction cognitions is strongest in early parts of interactions and their influence declines as the interaction proceeds and communicators adjust to interaction behavior. A final critical attribute fundamental to all forms of human communication is that communicators and their messages are judged on credibility. For centuries, scholars have recognized the superordinate importance of communicator credibility, or what Aristotle called ethos. Credibility refers to a constellation of judgments that message recipients make about the believability of a communicator. Foremost among these are character (how honest, trustworthy, responsible, and well intentioned a person is), competence (how knowledgeable, intelligent, experienced, and current a communicator is), composure (how poised, relaxed, and calm the individual is), sociability (how friendly, warm, and cheerful a person is), and dynamism (how talkative, energetic, outgoing, and assertive a communicator is) (see McCroskey, 1972; cf. McCroskey & Young, 1981).
207
Although the character dimension is most closely linked to judgments of a senders truthfulness, all of these dimensions may influence perceptions of creditility.4 Even though not every message is expected to meet conversational ideals of truthfulness, completeness, relevance, and clarity (Grice, 1989), the assumption being advanced here is that credibility is a salient judgment in all communicative transactions and one to which both participants orient -senders, to put forward a truthful demeanor, and receivers, to assess the veridicality and quality of incoming messages. Interaction and Information-ProcessingAssumptions. The critical attributes of interpersonal communication describe a complex process requiring actors to perform numerous perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral tasks concurrently. As senders, communicators must simultaneously produce messages on-line, create desired identities and impressions, adjust ancillary nonverbal and verbal elements to send appropriate relational messages, monitor self and receiver feedback, adapt messages to this feedback, and regulate the pacing, turn taking, and synchrony of conversation itself. Likewise, as receivers they must cope with the ongoing, rapidly changing stream of information, determine the functions of messages, make sense of incongruent or ambiguous ones, and make interpretations rapidly enough to create a response. Thus, conducting interpersonal interaction demands cognitive (as well as physical) effort. The amount of effort can vary based on the conversational context; number, type and consistency of messages; number and type of goals; and clarity of meaning. The cognitive demands lead to a corollary assumption that interactants, of necessity, must be selective information processors, with degree of selectivity influenced by the number of cognitive resources enlisted at a particular point in time, by the individuals emotional state, and by other information-processing biases. Because people vary in their abilities to manage these demands, another assumption is that competent interpersonal communication is a skilled activity. (Competence entails both knowledge and performance of requisite behaviors in response to situational requirements. ) Those with greater social skills are better able to handle interaction demands with aplomb. Assumptions Related to Expectations and Norms. Normative expectations are foundational organizing principles in interpersonal communication. Interactants enter all interpersonal encounters with a host of expectations about how others will behave and why (Burgoon & Walther, 1990; Jones, 1986). These expectations, which are grounded in social norms and any individuating information about the cointeractants behavioral routines, form cognitive schemata for interpersonal communication. Among the most important expectations is veridicality: Philosophers, sociologists, and conversational analysts have asserted that people routinely presume others are truthful, and deception researchers have verified this expectation (Buller & Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; Clark & Clark 1977; Grice, 1989; Kalbfleisch,
208
1992; Kraut & Higgins, 1984; Levine & McCornack, 1989, 1992; OSullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987; Zuckerman, Fischer, Osmun, Winkler, & Wolfson, 1987). Dubbed a truth bias, t h s expectation may be part of a large positivity bias present in interpersonal encounters: People expect others to be decent, pleasant, and worthy of positive regard (Kellerman, 1984). Relatedly, interactants typically expect to trust one another-to keep confidences, to protect the self, and to avoid doing harm. Trust is the foundation on which enduring relationships are built, and trust grows with the belief that another is communicating in an honest, straightforward manner. A similar expectation is that social interactants follow the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Relationships rely on the exchange of help, aid, and rewards to satisfy members needs (Buller, Kikuchi, & Eloy, 1994; Greenberg, 1980; Roloff, 1987). In interpersonal interactions, at least those characterized by good will, communicators expect that partners will return good for good, not harm for good. The inherency of interpersonal expectations implies in turn that expectancies can be violated and that violations are recognized. In this vein, we import from expectancy violations theory ( Burgoon, 1978, 1993 ) three further assumptions: Interactants recognize violations of expectations, violations prompt an attentional shift to the communicator and the violative act, and violations activate an interpretive and evaluative appraisal process.
Assumptions Associated with Deception
Criteria1 Attributes. Information management is a fundamental aspect of
human communication. In extraordinary and mundane circumstances, people manage their communication to present certain information while hiding, obscuring, evadmg, or creating other information. Specifically, deceivers control information by encoding messages that alter veracity, completeness, directnesdrelevance, clarity, and personalization (Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1994). Deceptive messages typically include three components: ( a )the central deceptive message (usually verbal in nature), ( b ) ancillary messages (verbal or nonverbal) bolstering the verisimilitude of the deceptive message or protecting the source in the event deception is detected, and ( c ) inadvertent behaviors (mostly nonverbal) divulging deceptive intent and / o r the true state of affairs (leakage and deception cues as defined by Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Functionally, the central and ancillary messages are intended to foster credibility, while the inadvertent behaviors may detract from it. Like other forms of interpersonal communication, deceptive encounters implicate multiple goals, some beneficial to the communicator and others beneficial to the partner, the relationship, or a third party (Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; Metts & Chronis, 1986). Communication functions that become salient are message processing and produc209
tion, social influence, identity and impression management, relational communication, expression and management of emotion, and conversation management. Deception or suspected deception is especially likely to intensify surveillance and heighten attention to feedback- senders to assess the success or failure of their performance so as to make necessary adjustments and protect themselves in the event that their deception is detected and receivers to evaluate their own detection strategies and to assess sender awareness of suspicion. Cognitive and Emotional Responses. Following E kman and Friesens ( 1969 ) leakage hypothesis and Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthals (1981 ) expanded four-factor theory of deception, we assume that both deception and detection displays are partly a manifestation of underlying arousal, negative affect, cognitive effort, and attempted control. Deceivers may experience varying degrees of physiological arousal and negative affect stemming from detection apprehension (the fear of being caught deceiving) and guilt o r discomfort associated with violating conversational rules and social prescriptions against deceit. Receivers may experience similar cognitive and emotional responses when experiencing suspicion due to their motivation to detect deception, heightened surveillance, cognitive difficultly, and unpleasantness associated with uncovering duplicity. At the same time, deceivers and detectors should be motivated to control their communication to achieve their goals. The result is that some behaviors linked to cognitive and emotional responses will reflect strategic conversational activity while others will reflect nonstrategic activity. Finally, we assume that deception and deception detection are complex tasks that add further cognitive demands beyond those already associated with conducting conversation. Deceivers must strategically manipulate information to craft plausible messages on-line all the while attending to partner reactions for information about success or failure. Detectors in turn must choose whether to mask or reveal their suspicions while searching for clues to deception. These tasks alone are demanding and are made more so by the special demands of creating false impressions (such as honesty or belief in anothers honesty), a task that is more cognitively taxing than creating truthful ones (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). All else being equal, then, interpersonal deception and its detection should require more cognitive resources than truthful interchanges.
Propositions
The foregoing assumptions supply the warrants for the propositions and sample hypotheses that follow. As presuppositions or suppositions, they represent necessary bridging statements between propositions and as noted are not themselves subject to test within the confines of this theory (see Kaplan, 1964). The propositions, however, are subject to empirical verification. All contain empirical content and are capable of generating
210
numerous testable hypotheses. The propositions offer our model of how deception is played out in interpersonal contexts. Many of the early propositions are not unique to IDT. What is unique about them is their prominence in a theory o f deception and their emphasis on communication-related factors as explanatory mechanisms for deception. Later propositions which deal specificallywith interaction patterns are original with IDT. The relevant factors we have identified to date and their proposed interrelationships are depicted in Figure 1. IDT begins by locating interpersonal deception within a given communication context and relationship between the actors. Embedded within the context and relationship are preinteraction and interaction features that influence behavioral dynamics and interaction outcomes. Specifically, preinteraction factors influence initial sender and receiver cognitions and behaviors (depicted as Time 1 [ T l ] in Figure 1). Those in turn affect interim receiver detection accuracy, credibility judgments, and suspicion displays (shown as T2 and T3 ). Next, receiver cognitions and behaviors influence subsequent sender cognitions and behaviors (arbitrarily designated as T4 and TS), which feed into subsequent receiver adjustments (T6), and so forth. This process is presumed to continue iterating over time through these sequences until the interaction terminates. Lastly, the entire process is posited to affect postinteraction cognitions (the far right portion of the figure). Figure 1 is offered as a conceptual road map to the following discussion of the propositions. It should help clarify the complex and nonobvious relationships in IDT.
a w
a E v) c
Q 0 .c
z Lu
( I )
021
k, c
c
[r
1 w
211
The Superordinate Role of Context and Relatlonship
In IDT predictions and explanations of interpersonal deception are contingent upon the kind of situation and relationship in which an interaction is embedded. Communicator goals, expectancies, behavioral repertoires, and behavioral constraints all depend on the definitions of the situation and interpersonal relationship that are in force. Centrally important are the interactivity of the communication context and degree of relational familiarity and interdependence. Thus, our first propositions consider how these context and relationship factors influence deceptive interchanges. Znteractivity of Communication Contexts. We have noted previously that interpersonal communication contexts can be arrayed along a continuum anchored at the most interactive end by face-to-face interaction. Several interrelated properties associated with interactivity should produce systematic differences in how deception transpires in interactive as compared with noninteractive or minimally interactive contexts. First is access to social cues. In face-to-face deception, participants have full access to the range of social information available in environmental, visual, auditory, and verbal channels. By contrast, less interactive contexts restrict channel and information availability, producing a limited cues environment that may alter behaviors and perceptions. Psychoanalytic research has shown that lack of visibility between interactants can inhibit body movement, pausing, and verbal output (Mahl, 1987). The social context cues hypothesis (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) proposes that the absence of environmental, nonverbal, and status cues leads to uninhibited communication and greater self-absorption, and social presence theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) contends that when channel availability is limited, individuals pay less attention to other social participants. Other social information processing perspectives (Walther, 1993, 1996; Walther & Burgoon, 1992) assert that channel-restricted interpersonal exchanges alter temporal dimensions of interactions. Thus, the removal of relevant social information present in face-to-face communication should produce predictable intrapersonal and interpersonal changes (Culnan & Markus, 1987). Related to the number of sensory channels available is the degree of immediacy or presence associated with the context. Face-to-face interaction is spatially and temporally immediate. Immediacy as a concept has both distance and time connotations, that is, it refers to the here and now (Mehrabian, 1981; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968). High immediacy creates a sense of psychological as well as physical closeness, timeliness, and personalization; nonimmediacy conveys distance and disassociation. Spatial immediacy is created through a combination of nonverbal behaviors that engage the Senses (specifically, proximity, gaze, body lean, body orientation, and touch) as well as linguistic constructions and devices that are more concrete and direct (e.g., active rather than passive
212
voice) or reduce distance (e.g., we rather than you and I). The more channels available and the more physically proximal the participants are, the greater the immediacy. Temporal immediacy is created when interchanges occur in real time (i.e., they are synchronous) rather than being delayed (asynchronous) and may be bolstered by linguistic devices that emphasize the present (e.g., present rather than past or future tense). This heightened social presence, which is arousing, can facilitate attention, message receptivity, and performance of overlearned tasks or can produce cognitive overload, distraction, and interference with information processing (Zajonc, 1980). An essential quality that flows from immediacy or presence is participants feeling relationally engaged with one another. The mere act of engaging in face-to-face interaction establishes an implied relationship (Burgoon, 1994) because, compared with third-party observers, interactants orient to each other as people rather than objects (Burgoon, 1974). This sense of relationship may invoke norms of reciprocity and expectations of trust and mutual aid, creating positivity biases in interpersonal conversations. Empirical evidence has confirmed that face-toface participants evaluate each other more leniently than do observers or interactants in mediated contexts (Buller & Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; Burgoon & Newton, 1991; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; Storms, 1973; Street, Mulac, & Wiemann, 1988; Weisband, Schneider, & Connolly, 1993). The impression that participants are part of an interpersonal relationship also elicits increasing conversational involvement from participants as contexts become increasingly interactive. Normal interpersonal interaction is typified by a moderately high level of conversational involvement (Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993; Coker & Burgoon, 1987), and we might therefore expect interpersonal deception to appear the same and consequently to alter the behavioral displays of deceivers relative to noninteractive deception. We assumed that communication contexts differ in the kinds of conversational demands placed on participants. Face-to-face interactive deception introduces numerous demands not present in noninteractive deceptions. Conducting conversation requires negotiating the dual roles of sender and receiver and accomplishing multiple functions simultaneously. Ekman and Friesen (1969) surmised that judging honesty is more difficult when receivers must encode their own messages as well as decode senders messages. IDT expands upon this observation by noting that the multiplicity of sender and receiver roles and tasks may not only introduce excessive cognitive load that distracts from processing anothers message but also may impair ones ability to project a credible image (Buller & Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991). Finally, interactive deception requires greater spontaneity and adaptability because of the feedback and mutual dependency between interact213
ants. Unlike rehearsed monologues or written discourse, interpersonal interaction patterns are dynamic and cannot be anticipated fully; consequently, departures from preinteraction plans are commonplace (Berger & diBattista, 1993). Deception in highly interactive contexts, like all unscripted face-to-face interaction, thus, should entail frequent spur-ofthe-moment behavioral change. These context features lead to the first general proposition:
Proposition 1: Sender and receiver cognitions and behaviors vary systematically as deceptive communication contexts vary in ( a ) access to social cues, ( b ) immediacy, (c) relational engagement, ( d ) conversational demands, and (e)spontaneity.
Sample hypotheses derivable from this proposition are that ( a ) receiver truth-biases decrease as communication contexts move from high interactivity (e.g., face to face) to low interactivity (e.g., electronically mediated communication), and ( b ) sender detection fear and ( c ) deception displays differ between dialogic (e.g., face-to-face) and monologic (e.g., videotaped presentation) contexts. Further amplification on possible cognitive and behavioral effects is offered under subsequent propositions. Relationship Features. As already noted, the act of interacting creates a sense of relationship, with attendant expectations and biases. These relational properties become increasingly salient as relationships become more familiar (i.e., as emotional bonds are established over the course of the relationship). Relational familiarity alone is not the key, however. Relational valence must be taken into account. When relationships are positively valanced, familiar others (such as friends) show a greater truth bias than strangers (Buller, 1987; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994; McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1989). However, when relationships are built on mistrust or are negatively toned, the truth bias should be attenuated or even become a lie bias (McCornack & Levine, 1990). Another important feature of relational familiarity is a shared history with the partner. This produces two types of knowledge: informational familiarity, which is background information about partners, and behavioral familiarity, which includes knowledge of partners typical behavioral routines. Both of these forms of familiarity typically are derived from a history of prior interactions. Informational familiarity may be acquired from third parties, and behavioral familiarity can contain knowledge about prototypical deception cues gained through training or experience. Greater informational and behavioral familiarity should enable receivers to better recognize departures from typical behavior (see e.g., Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980a, 1980b, 1982, for studies on behavioral familiarity). For instance, knowledge of a persons family history may make fabrications about childhood immediately apparent or
214
knowing that a person is usually quick to answer questions may cause slow responses to arouse suspicion. The foregoing arguments lead to another proposition:
Proposition 2: During deceptive interchanges, sender and receiver cognitions and behaviors vary systematically as relationships vary in ( a ) relational familiarity (including informational and behavioral familiarity) and ( b ) relational valence.
The qualities associated with relational familiarity imply that it has competing effects on deception detection: The positivity and truth biases associated with most familiar relationships may undermine detection by causing receivers to overlook, discount, or misinterpret evidence of deceit, while greater shared history may improve detection by providing verifiable background information and a behavioral baseline against which to compare sender messages. The directionality of the effect on detection accuracy should depend on the degree of each feature present and the behavioral patterns exhibited by sender and receiver. For example, we might predict that when a deceiver engages in falsification, the benefits of shared history should be greater among friends than acquaintances ( because it helps identify inconsistencies with what the receiver already knows about the source) and should offset the truth bias, leading to more accuracy among friends than acquaintances. However, we might also expect, based again on shared history, that fear of detection is greater when deceivers lie to friends than when they lie to acquaintances and that this fear is inadvertently manifested in deceivers behaviors. When deceivers instead engage in equivocation, we could hypothesize that the benefit of shared history would evaporate, but so might the fear of detection, because equivocation requires only shading the truth rather than completely fabricating information.
Other Communication-Relevant Preinteraction Factors
Along with the context and relationship, preinteraction features associated with individual communicators influence the actual course of deceptive conversation. IDT focuses on those that should be immediately proximal to actual interaction behavior (see Figure 1). We regard as most salient sender and receiver cognitions related to expectancies, knowledge, and goals or intentions and sender and receiver behavioral repertoires that reflect their communication competence. These preinteraction factors, which vary across actors, constitute the primary individual differences of interest in IDT. Cognitive Preinteraction Factors. In IDT, the expectations, goals, intentions and motivations, and knowledge possessed by senders and receivers determine the interaction patterns that occur in deceptive exchanges. As noted under assumptions, senders and receivers bring to deceptive interchanges expectancies about others interaction patterns and expec215
tancies about their truthfulness. The maxim of quality in interpersonal exchanges creates an implied contract that senders and receivers will be honest with one another (Chisholm & Feehan, 1977; Grice, 1989). These conversational expectations should be held in common by senders and receivers because they are linked to social norms. Another assumption in our perspective is that deception, like all interpersonal communication, is a goal-driven, intentional act. At the most general level, senders deceive to achieve instrumental, relational, and identity objectives. Instrumental motivations include establishing, maximizing, and maintaining power or influence over the receiver, acquiring and protecting resources, avoiding dlssonance, being entertained, avoiding punishment or disapproval, and attempting to harm the target for self-gain. Common moral values usually treat self-serving deception as most reprehensible (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Hample, 1980; Metts & Chronis, 1986). Relational motivations consist of initiating, maintaining, maximizing, or terminating relationships; avoiding interpersonal tension or conflict; maintaining and redirecting social interaction; expressing obligatory acceptance; avoiding self-disclosure; protecting partner from worry, hurt, or punishment; and conforming to relational role expectations. Identity motivations indude avoiding shame or embarrassment, projecting a more favorable image, enhancing or protecting selfesteem, and increasing social desirability (Camden et al., 1984; Metts & Chronis, 1986; Turner et al., 1975). Once senders decide to deceive, they must also be concerned about appearing credible, allaying receiver suspicions, minimizing their responsibility for deceit, and avoiding unpleasant consequences if deception is detected. We introduced knowledge previously as part of relational familiarity. However, knowledge salient during deceptive interactions also arises from sources other than the relationship itself. Senders can rely on this knowledge to craft plausible lies, while receivers can rely upon it to judge the credibility of a message. Behavioral Preinteraction Factors. Behavioral preinteraction factors include the behavioral repertoire and communication competence and skill of senders and receivers. IDT posits that deception performances, in both interpersonal and noninterpersonal contexts, include strategic and nonstrategic behavior (here we expand on our earlier typology of deception behavior offered in Buller & Burgoon, 1994). O n the strategic side, deceivers are likely to engage in information management, image management, and behavior management. Information management is the modification or manipulation of the central message content and its style to maximize message credibility (e.g., to create the impression of being informative and complete). The central deceptive message can be altered along such dimensions as completeness, veridicality , and relevance to produce different deception types (e.g., falsification, equivocation, and concealment) in order to reduce detectability or achieve deniability. This is accomplished through verbal content, linguistic style, and nonverbal
21 6
behaviors that convey uncertainty and vagueness, withhold information (i.e., reticence), express nonimmediacy (verbally distancing the sender from the message or closing off the communication channel), and indicate insincerity (disassociating the sender from the message by indicating that the message is not serious). All of these strategies presumably are intended to maintain credibility by minimizing awareness of actual deceit. Image management refers to all efforts directed toward maximizing communicator credibility. Senders and receivers alike may attempt to convey a poised, pleasant, and controlled demeanor that makes them appear competent, trustworthy, and open. Behavior management refers to additional actions designed to prevent leakage and deception or suspicion detection, often by suppressing and restraining behavior that might expose ulterior motives. Research on noninteractive deception has confirmed that deceivers do indeed reduce specificity, use nonimmediate language, use leveling or inclusive terms and indirect forms of expression, alter lexical diversity, and convey insincerity through humor -all possible indicators of information management (Bauman, 1986; Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990; Cody, Marston, & Foster, 1984; DePaulo et al., 1985a; Dulaney, 1982; Gossen, 1974; Knapp, Hart, & Dennis, 1974; Wagner & Pease, 1977; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1986). IDTs prediction of behavioral management directed toward suppressing leakage cues is consonant with Zuckerman et al.3 (1981) four-factor theory, with Hocking and Leathers ( 1980) argument that deceivers attempt to control those behaviors they stereotypically associate with deception, with DePaulos ( 1992) discussion of deliberate nonverbal behavior in self-presentation. At the same time, the behavioral repertoire also contains actions that inadvertently leak arousal, negative and dampened affect, noninvolvement, and performance decrements. The earliest theories of behavior during deception held that deception is physiologically arousing because of the apprehension of detection. It also provokes guilt and other unpleasant emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, 1974; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Moreover, arousal and negative affect produces unintended changes in behavior. Numerous studies also confirm that arousal cues and negative affect are common in noninteractive deception (see reviews by Buller & Burgoon, 1994; DePaulo et al., 1985a; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Zuckerman et al. (1981) also argued that attempts at controlling ones performance also produced inadvertent behavior leaking deceptive intent. We have expanded on this notion in IDT by specifically arguing that strategic image and behavior management, if carried to extremes, may result in an overcontrolled or rigid presentation, inexpressiveness, and reduced spontaneity, which qualify as nonstrategic behaviors. Similarly, as the complexity of strategic activity increases, performances may
217
suffer (Berger, Karol, & Jordan, 1989). Thus, strategic intentions may produce nonstrategic byproduas in the form of noninvolvement and performance decrements. DePaulo and her colleagues work on the motivation impairment effea implies that nonstrategic leakage can arise from attempts to control demeanors. They found that motivated liars succeeded at the verbal level but overcontrolled their nonverbal behaviors (DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & OBrien, 1988; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985b). This discussion leads to our third proposition, which specifies the general pattern most evident in noninteractive deception and one that is moderated by communication-relevant preinteraction factors discussed shortly:
Proposition 3: Compared with truth tellers, deceivers ( a ) engage in greater strategic activity designed to manage information, behavior, and image and ( b ) display more nonstrategic arousal cues, negative and dampened affect, noninvolvement, and performance decrements.
Our own experiments to date have found evidence of both strategic and nonstrategic activity during interactive deception. Deceivers have been found to manage information in the form of verbal content that is incomplete ,nonveridical, indirect, vague, uncertain, hesitant , brief, and disassociated from the sender; to manage behavior through a submissive and formal demeanor and reduced nonverbal immediacy; and to manage image through increased pleasantness and relaxation over time. They have simultaneously also leaked nervousness, arousal, and negative affect (at least initially) and suffered performance impairments such as nonfluencies and poor impressions (Buller & Aune, 1987; Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1994, this issue; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, & Walther, 1995; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, et al., 1996). A second behavioral preinteraction factor is communicator competence and skill. Successful deceivers should be those who have a knack for emitting behaviors that convey believability while masking behaviors that betray their true feelings or communicate discomfort and dishonesty and for reading receiver feedback for acceptance or disbelief. Successful receivers likewise should be those who are better able to pry behind a facade to discover the truth. Hence, for both senders and receivers, behavioral displays and ultimate detection accuracy should depend on communicator skills. Communication skill is defined as an individual difference variable that reflects ones ability to encode and decode messages and includes ( a ) expressiveness, defined as the ability to encode messages; ( b ) control, defined as the ability to regulate the flow of messages; and ( c )sensitivity,
218
defined as the ability to decode messages (Riggio, 1986,1993; Riggio & Friedman, 1983, 1986). The first two skills are most relevant for senders, while the last is most important to receivers. Each basic skill can be divided into a verbal and nonverbal component. Social expressivity refers to skill in verbal speaking and in engaging others in social interaction. Those high in social expressivity tend to appear outgoing and to speak spontaneously. In contrast, emotional expressivity is senders ability to express, spontaneously and accurately, felt emotional states as well as the ability to nonverbally express attitudes and cues of interpersonal orientation (Riggio, 1986, p. 651). Thus, social expressivity references verbal skill while emotional expressivity references nonverbal skill. Similarly, social control refers to verbal selfpresentation skills, while emotional control refers to nonverbal skills in regulating affect. Those high in social control tend to be tactful, socially adept, self-confident, and able to play various social roles. They are also skillful at adjusting their own behavior to fit with what they consider to be appropriate to any given social situation (Riggio, 1986, p. 651). Those high in emotional control are able to hide felt emotions. On the decoding side, these skills include social sensitivity -the ability to decipher verbal messages accurately - and emotional sensitivity - a general skill in deciphering nonverbal messages (Riggio, 1986, 1993; Riggio & Friedman, 1983, 1986). Encoding skills affect the success of deception and detection strategies, while decoding skills influence senders ability to sense suspicion and receivers ability to detect deceit.
Effects of Preinteraction Features on Senders Initial Detection Apprehension and Deception Displays
In interpersonal deception, cognitive and behavioral preinteraction factors, moderated by context interactivity and relational familiarity, combine to determine senders initial detection apprehension and deception displays (shown at T1 in Figure 1 ). Context Interactivity, Relational Familiarity, and Expectations. One route through which context interactivity and relational familiarity exert influence on sender cognitions and behavior is through initial expectations regarding social interaction patterns and expectations for honesty. Whereas the behavioral profile emerging from noninteractive deception research is one of deceivers being nonimmediate and uninvolved, highly aroused and affectively negative, and often impaired in their communication relative to truthtellers, norms for social interaction product a competing profile. People in normal (truthful ) face-to-face interactions are expected to display, and in actuality do typically display, moderately high immediacy and involvement; moderate arousal; positive affect; and relatively fluent, smooth performances that mesh with those of cointeractants (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993; Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 1995; Cappella, 1983; Grice, 1989). These competing profiles raise questions as to whether deceivers in interactive contexts
219
will more closely approximate the standard noninteractive deception profile or the standard interactive truthful profile and whether the behavioral displays will remain unchanging over the course of a n interaction or prove to be dynamic. Also in question is whether receivers will match either of these profiles. The contention by some scholars (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1983; Fiedler & Walka, 1993) that everyday deceptions are not laden with arousal, guilt, and fear leads us to propose, for starters, that interpersonal deception displays will be less pronounced, consistent, and noticeable than those found in noninteractive laboratory experiments. People caught up in the ongoing flow of interaction may be less disturbed about perpetrating deception and/or may be distracted from such concerns by all the other conversational activities in which they are engaged. Additionally, the expectations and functional demands of interaction should override the standard noninteractive deception pattern. Deceivers impression management and relationship management goals, coupled with the numerous other communication tasks that must be accomplished, should result in strategic moves intended to suppress leakage while putting forward a positive face and maintaining relational trust (at least in the case of positively valenced relationships). Thus, relative to noninteractive contexts, deceivers strategic maneuvers in increasingly interactive contexts should attenuate much of the nonimmediacy, nervousness, and unpleasantness associated with deception and should also result in a somewhat stilted , inexpressive, and uninvolved communication style. Although the demands of planning and implementing deception (or, in the case of receivers, its detection) while fulfilling other conversational responsibilities and adapting to the ongoing dynamics of interaction should cause initial performance decrements, these difficulties should typically dissipate over time as participants acquire more feedback, attempt further repairs, and gain greater control over their performance. Thus,
Proposition 4: Context interactivity moderates initial deception displays such that deception in increasingly interactive contexts results in ( a ) greater strategic activity (information, behavior, and image management) and ( b ) reduced nonstrategic activity (arousal, negative or dampened affect, and performance decrements) over time relative to noninteractive contexts.
Numerous hypotheses can be generated from this proposition. For example, deceivers in interactive contexts should display increasing immediacy and involvement, pleasantness, composure, fluency, and smooth turn taking over the course of the interaction. However, because the preinteraction factors of expectancies, knowledge, goals and motivations, and skills impinge differentially on the strategic and nonstrategic processes, there should be no single deception cue profile. Consider circumstances in which senders are highly motivated to deceive but lack the
220
skills to do so successfully. Their behavior management may result in overcontrol. They may appear rigid, inexpressive, nonimmediate, and affectively flat - an overall pattern of depressed nonverbal involvement. Comparatively, skilled senders who are motivated should instead exhibit a relaxed, expressive, immediate, and pleasant demeanor. Moreover , the complexity of influences on strategic and nonstrategic behavior may result in channel discrepancies that have often been associated with deception. For instance, senders experiencing high detection apprehension because they are interacting with a friend may focus on managing their visual cues such as posture and facial expression in order to project a positive image consistent with the intimate relationship. But, at the same time, their belief that lies are transparent to friends may cause them to leak anxiety vocally. The net result is a mix of positive and negative cues. Expectations regarding honesty in conversations should also influence sender and receiver behavior as well as cognitions. As noted in Proposition 1, interaction produces a heightened sense of relationship between senders and receivers. Even this primitive relational bond, providing it is positively valenced, produces a greater expectation of honesty (and concomitantly less suspicion) than that experienced in noninteractive contexts. In turn, expectations influence senders initial apprehension and resultant behavior displays. To the extent that senders depart from the inferred expectations for honesty, receivers should notice and react to such violations, and those reactions or anticipated reactions should provoke fear of detection in senders. Such detection apprehension should be more pronounced in interactive than noninteractive contexts and in positively valenced, familiar relationships. This is because senders cannot anticipate and plan ahead for all the twists and turns of unfettered conversation, and the greater informational and behavioral familiarity associated with existing relationships can aid receivers detection. Further, the consequences of detection may be more detrimental when positively valanced acquaintances uncover deceit. And, as concern about being detected mounts, so should motivation to manage ones performance, resulting in greater strategic activity. This reasoning yields two interrelated propositions: Proposition 5: Sender and receiver initial expectations for honesty are positively related to degree of context interactivity and positivity of relationship between sender and receiver. Proposition 6: Deceivers initial detection apprehension and associated strategic activity are inversely related to expectations for honesty (which are themselves a function of context interactivity and relationship positivity). Support for Proposition 5 comes from our research showing that receivers who participated in deceptive and truthful conversations had a
221
greater truth bias than receivers who only observed the conversation (Buller & Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991). It is also implicitly supported by DePaulo and DePaulos (1989) study showing that receivers judging the honesty of salespeople-people who plausibly fall toward the lower end of the valence yardstick- did not exhibit the usual truth bias. The relationship between expectancies and detection apprehension or strategic activity has yet to be tested but sample hypotheses that could be tested are deceivers informed that receivers are suspicious of them ( a ) report greater concern about being detected and ( b ) report greater motivation to control their performances than d o unalerted deceivers. Goals, Motivations, and Intentions. The behavioral profile also should differ according to whether deception is enacted for instrumental, relational, or identity motivations and whoever is the principal beneficiary of deceit. Senders can select among alternative types of deception, such as falsification, equivocation, and concealment as a means of managing information. For instance, diary recordings of everyday deceit revealed that falsifications are common when deception is motivated by the desire to avoid hurting the partner, avoid relational trauma, or protect the deceivers image (Metts & Chronis, 1986). When deceit is motivated by desires to aid the partner, a third party, or simply to conform to standards of politeness or good taste (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Hample, 1980; Metts & Chronis, 1986), senders may experience less detection apprehension and actually consider deception an acceptable, desirable alternative, thereby displaying little nonstrategic leakage. Strategic behavior, particularly information management, still may be necessary to carry off deception in such circumstances, but behavior and image management may be less extensive, unless the receiver expresses skepticism or disbelief. However, when deceit is motivated by self-interest, it should contain greater strategic behavior to formulate plausible lies, reduce leakage, and project a favorable image because senders want to avoid any negative reactions likely to attend such dishonesty. At the same time, self-serving deceit should be accompanied by nonstrategic behaviors because of senders heightened detection apprehension and discomfort over violating moral standards. Deceiver goals are not the only ones that need to be considered. Receivers, too, enter conversation with goals and intentions of their own. Undoubtedly, these goals affect receivers strategic and nonstrategic behavior, reactions to sender behavior, decisions to employ detection strategies, and judgments about senders truthfulness. For example, receivers motivated by relational objectives may be content to ignore signs warning them about sender deceit to preserve a harmonious relationship. And receivers who are initially suspicious prior to an interaction, perhaps due to a chronic suspicion bias or the inoculation of a third party, should
222
enter interactions with more of a suspicion display than those who do not anticipate dishonesty. Thus, we can posit a general proposition with some nonexhaustive subpropositions:
Proposition 7: Goals and motivations moderate strategic and nonstrategic behavior displays. Subproposition 7a: Senders deceiving for self-gain exhibit more strategic activity and nonstrategic leakage than senders deceiving for other benefits. Subproposition 7b: Receivers initial behavior patterns are a function of ( a ) their priorities among instrumental, relational, and identity objectives and ( b ) their initial intent to uncover deceit.
Unfortunately, few experiments have investigated the impact of these multifaceted motivations on sender behaviors and none has investigated their impact on receiver behavior (although there is reason to believe that female receivers may be more polite, accommodating observers than men and consequently attend more to intentional facial cues while overlooking leakier channels and cues; see DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a, 1979b). Instead of manipulating locus of benefit or comparing the effects of different goals with one another, researchers have focused on deceivers general motivation to succeed by manipulating different goals such as instrumental rewards (e.g., promising a reward to the most successful deceiver) or desire to make a good impression (Bauchner, Brandt, & Miller, 1977; DePaulo et al., 1983; DePaulo et al., 1985b; Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, & Gumpert, 1970; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Although it has been claimed that high motivation impairs performance, our own research, conducted in an interactive context, has found a positive correlation between self-reported motivation and both self and observers judgments of deceiver success (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero & Feldman, 1994). Presumably the greater success was attributable to effective rather than impaired performances inasmuch as overt behavior was the only information available to observers. Thus, it is our hypothesis that motivation under the right circumstances, and with the aid of feedback, can facilitate rather than undermine performance. Knowledge. Researchers interests in the preexisting knowledge possessed by interactants has so far focused mainly on receivers and their ability to detect deception. However, senders may alter their behavior to the extent that they believe receivers are knowledgeable about, or familiar with, them. Senders may believe that familiar receivers are better able to spot their deceit than unfamiliar receivers, so senders experience more detection apprehension and expend greater effort to appear credible when deceiving familiar others.
223
Communication
Theory
Proposition 8: As receivers informational, behavioral, and relational familiarity increase, deceivers not only ( a ) experience more detection apprehension and ( b) exhibit more strategic information, behavior, and image management but also (c) more nonstrategic
leakage behavior. Consistent with Proposition 8, we recently found that complex sender behavioral and image adjustments occur when interacting with acquaintances, and to some extent, with experts (i.e., persons who have greater informational familiarity) (see, e.g., Buller, Burgoon, White, & Ebesu, 1994). Communicator Competence and Skills. Communicator competence is obviously relevant to noninterpersonal deception but should play an increasingly significant role in interpersonal and interactive deception. Communication skill affects deception success by influencing senders ability to encode normal appearing behavior. In particular, we posit that those high in communication skill are better able to engage in strategic activity to manage information, behavior, and image while suppressing leakage. Specifically, socially skilled individuals should be better able t o ( a ) manipulate their communication behavior to include more positive affect and involvement and ( b ) control nervousness, hesitancies, and nonfluencies. In contrast, individuals lacking in social skills may inadvertently depress conversational involvement because they overcontrol their presentation, leak arousal, discomfort, and negative affect, and appear less conversationally competent in the face of the number and complexity of tasks required in interactive contexts.
Proposition 9:
Skilled senders better convey a truthful demeanor by engaging in more strategic behavior and less nonstrategic leakage than unskilled ones.
Support for this proposition originates with work by Riggio, Tucker, and Throckmorton (1987), who initially found that social control was associated with believability of both truthful and deceptive messages, while emotional control and social expressivity affected believability of truthful, but not deceptive, messages. A second study showed that .more socially skilled individuals enacted a more fluent conversation than their socially unskilled counterparts, presumably because they possessed the ability to role-play more effectively (social control) while feeling comfortable during interactions with others ( social expressivity; Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman, 1987). DePaulo, LeMay, and Epstein (1991 ) subsequently found that deceivers were most successful when they had both high motivation to succeed and high expectations for success (the latter creating a belief that they were skilled communicators). Our own research conducted in an interactive context has confirmed that skilled senders are seen as more believable (Burgoon, Buller, &
224
Guerrero, 1995; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, et al., 1994). Those senders who scored higher on nonverbal expressivity and verbal control skills but lower on verbal expressivity skills were the most believable to receivers (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995). Observers, likewise, considered senders with more verbal control skills to be more successful (Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, et al., 1994). Furthermore, as we proposed, social skills affected perceptions of believability by helping senders to encode a truthful-appearing demeanor. Skilled senders were more fluent and less hesitant. Senders were most believable, and receiver truth biases were higher, if senders displayed greater involvement, positive affect, fluency, and composure, but curiously, also more hesitancy (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995).
Effects of PreinteractionFeatures and Initial Interaction on Receiver Cognitions
Next we contemplate how the preinteraction features discussed so far, coupled with initial behavioral displays, affect receivers initial suspicion (see T1 in Figure 1 ) and their ongoing detection accuracy in interactive contexts (see T2, T6, and subsequent time periods). Detection accuracy as used here refers to correct recognition of both truthful and deceptive messages. Receivers are regarded as successful if they can detect both accurately. Deceivers are regarded as successful if receivers fail to detect their deceit and/or receivers view them as credible (often measured as attributions of honesty or believability). Cognitive Biases. At the outset, we noted that interactants are selective information processors due to the demands of conversations. T o the extent that interactants are unable to decode and interpret all incoming social information, the potential exists for biased processing during interaction. The biases that receivers bring to interpersonal interactions may affect receivers abilities to recognize deceit when it is actually present and/or their perception (correct or otherwise) that a sender is dishonest. Also, if receivers are completely oblivious to deception cues or do not attribute deceit, they will not manifest suspicion behaviorally, which will alleviate deceivers need to make behavioral adjustments. The dynamic changes in deceptive performances we have posited are therefore largely predicated on receivers suspecting or recognizing deceit (o r senders fearing the same). One reason deceivers may be successful (and receivers inaccurate) is that in interactive contexts, receivers fail to recognize the available deception clues and leakage. We assumed that receivers enter most conversations with positivity and truth biases. These biases may function like an information-processing heuristic, causing receivers to attend to information only selectively and in a manner that confirms initial impressions. Impressions formed prior to or at the outset of interaction may be resistant to subsequent information available in the deceivers demeanor. This seize and freeze tendency (Kruglanski, 1989, 1993), also referred to as premature cognitive commitments (Langer, 1989), leads to mind22s
less information processing. This may be especially likely to occur as the cognitive demands associated with interpersonal communication increase. Gilberts (1989; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1988) recent work on cognitive busyness suggests that when people are cognitively occupied, the two-stage attribution process, consisting of an initial characterization stage and a subsequent correction stage, is disrupted. As cognitive busyness increases, people are less likely to correct initial characterizations based on succeeding information. Applied to interpersonal interactions, most receivers should initially characterize senders as honest. This impression may not be corrected subsequently because conversational demands place receivers in a cognitively busy state. Busy receivers may seize upon initial impressions or expectations of a sender as honest and freeze upon that judgment despite receiving subsequent information that should cause them to think otherwise. Hence, as receivers entering truth biases increase and/or communication context interactivity increases, receiver awareness and / or suspicion of deceit should decrease. In the case of those who enter an interaction with a high level of suspicion-due either to a chronic tendency or to externally induced doubts -the opposite should be true: They should overattribute deceit and not adjust attributions to conversational events. More fundamentally, cognitive biases may affect the attention paid to sender behavior. Early research on priming, that is, making interviewers suspicious, found that it affected channel reliance. Observers relied more on vocal cues and channel discrepancies than facial behavior in making truthfulness judgments when suspicious ( DePaulo, Rosenthal, Eisenstat, Rogers, & Finkelstein, 1978; DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Hocking, Bauchner, Kaminski, & Miller, 1979; Toris & DePaulo, 1984; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Zuckerman, Spiegel, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1982). Recent research revealed that when people were led to expect deceit, they focused on larger units of behavior, and they attributed more deception to senders when encouraged to look at large segments of behavior, but actually, they were more accurate when focusing on small units of behavior (Zuckerman, Driver, & Guadagno, 1985). Thus, receivers may employ counterproductive information-processing strategies. This problem is exacerbated when receivers shift from being observers to being participants. Our research found that compared with observers, participants attended more to facial cues, which may be least informative, than to vocal cues (Buller & Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991). All else being equal, then, cognitive biases should reduce receivers overall detection accuracy over the course of an interaction because receivers misjudge deceivers as truthful or misjudge truthful communicators as liars. Of course, a truth bias should at least improve detection accuracy with honest senders and a lie bias, or suspicion, should improve detection accuracy with dishonest senders (OSullivan et al., 1988).
226
Moreover, induced skepticism might lead those who typically overestimate truth to evaluate incoming information more critically. Zuckerman et al. (1985) found, for example, that forewarning people they would be making truthfulness judgments about a sender diminished their truth bias, presumably because being alerted to the possibility of deception reduced their inclination to judge message content as reflecting the senders true attitudes. But this need not be the case. Biases introduced by suspicion might instead encourage receivers to seek information confirming their initially positive judgments and/or to engage in informationseeking strategies that reduce rather than enhance the chances of ascertaining the truth. An additional concern is that in many instances receivers need to determine both what is true and what is not in a senders message. Analyses of deception in everyday life show that the majority of deceptions are achieved by messages that combine truthful and deceptive information (e.g., equivocation, exaggeration) or that merely omit relevant details from truthful communication. Thus, biases should have a deleterious effect on overall ability to discern truth from deception. Knowledge. Knowledge should also alter awareness and /or perceptions of deceit and ultimate detection accuracy. Those who have greater informational and behavioral familiarity with the receiver (gained through past interactions, third-party knowledge, or exposure to baseline truthful behavior) and those who have greater knowledge of deception in general (another form of behavioral familiarity gained through experience and/or training), should be better able to recognize behavioral patterns that deviate from expectancies. As we noted, though, improved accuracy should be mitigated by the trust and positivity bias associated with relational familiarity. Communicator Skills. Receiver skills should affect receivers initial and ongoing recognition or perception of deceit and judgments about sender credibility. Successful receivers should be more effective at controlling information, managing impressions, enacting detection strategies, and judging source and message credibility. On the encoding side, these skills entail the same ones that are posited to contribute to sender success: expressivity and control. On the decoding side, sensitivity skills affect receivers ability to decipher messages accurately (Riggio, 1986, 1993; Riggio & Friedman, 1983, 1986). In light of the postulated sender manipulation of both verbal information and nonverbal demeanor, both social and emotional sensitivity skills appear essential for accurate recognition of deceit. Communication Normalcy. Recall that among the expectations that interactants typically bring to deceptive encounters are for cointeractants to engage in normal interaction patterns, to display moderate conversational involvement, and to reciprocate verbal and nonverbal immediacy. To the extent that these expectations are violated, they should trigger suspicion because, as we also observed earlier, participants are already attuned to credibility concerns and because expectancy violations are
227
attention getting, prompting cognitive search processes that often alter cognitive and emotional states. Hence, it may be less important for receivers judgments and perceptions that a certain behavior is displayed during conversation than that it conforms to, or departs from, normative expectations. This calls for a reorientation in searching for deception and suspicion cues to consideration of behavior vis-a-vis expectations. As sender behavior departs from normalcy, moderate involvement, and reciprocity, the greater should be the receivers awareness and/or suspicion of deceit. Such deviations may be intentional or unintentional, given that communication frequently deviates from the ideal (Turner et al. , 1975). Thus, some preinteraction factors determine whether receivers attribute honesty or dishonesty (i.e. , credibility) to senders regardless of actual sender veracity. These and some additional features can make receivers more or less accurate when discerning the actual truth or falsity of the message.
Proposition 10: Initial and ongoing receiver judgments of sender credibility are positively related to ( a ) receiver truth biases, ( b ) context interactivity, ( c ) and sender encoding skills; they are inversely related to ( d ) deviations of sender communication from expected patterns. Proposition 11: Initial and ongoing receiver detection accuracy are inversely related to ( a ) receiver truth biases, ( b ) context interactivity, ( c )and sender encoding skills; they are positively related to ( d ) informational and behavioral familiarity, ( e )receiver decoding skills, and ( f ) deviations of sender communication from expected patterns.
So far, several of our studies have documented that receivers do perceive deception when it is present (Buller & Aune, 1987; Buller, Comstock, Aune, & Strzyzewski , 1989; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991). But, consistent with Propositions 1Oc and l l c , as deceiver social skills increased, receiver accuracy decreased and believability increased (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995). Skilled senders were particularly able to enact more fluent, less hesitant communication. (However, receiver skills failed to show much impact on detection accuracy or credibility. ) Additionally, some empirical evidence appears to support the notion that deviant behavior provokes suspicion. Bond et al. (1992) found that greater deceit was attributed to people who engaged in unusual, fishylooking behavior. Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, et al. (1995) examined the specific behavioral patterns engendering such suspicion and found that receivers reported being more suspicious when senders were more distant, less pleasant vocally, less relaxed vocally, more nervous, and more uncertain and vague. Receivers also interpreted such sender behavior as
228
less immediate, pleasant, relaxed, and receptive and trustworthy, and it led them to evaluate overall sender performance as poor.
Iterative interactional Patterns
Up to this point, we have identified sender and receiver preinteractional factors that should govern initial cognitions and behavioral displays and receivers subsequent detection accuracy and credibility judgments (see T1 and T 2 in Figure 1). We are now ready to consider how these factors relate to receiver suspicion displays (see T 3 ) and sender reactions to those displays (see T 4 and T.5). Although we only describe the linkages among factors through one sequence, the pattern should repeat itself, iterating until the interaction comes to a close. We also do not mean to imply that the cognitive reactions and behavioral displays will occur in discrete, concatenous sequences. Instead, they may occur simultaneously or nearly so. The model in Figure 1 is simplified for heuristic purposes. Receiver Suspicion Displays. The effects of deception on receiver behavior and the reciprocal effects of receiver behavior on senders have rarely been studied. Theoretically, receiver behavior should be influenced by how suspicious receivers are and whether they make their suspicions known. Here is where our emphasis on feedback becomes especially critical. Some receivers, alerted to the possibility of duplicity, may scan senders verbal and nonverbal communication surreptitiously to test senders truthfulness without resorting to blatant confrontation. If their observations are primarily covert, their behavior may show little change and so have little effect on the sender. By controlling the conversation, they also may limit senders opportunity to adjust their behavior to repair credibility (Toris & DePaulo, 1984). But if receivers heightened surveillance, motivation to detect deception, and discomfort in having to make truth judgments result in alterations of their behavior, receivers may telegraph their doubts and suspicions to senders. Such feedback, if recognized, may allow suspects to engage in more elaborate, controlled, and consequently successful deceit. Some receivers, instead, may opt for a more confrontative, openly skeptical interaction style to intimidate and fluster their quarry. These alternative scenarios lead to the expectation that receivers, like deceivers, may behave strategically when attempting to unmask deception. But like deceivers, the cognitive demands of deception detection, coupled with normal conversational demands and the discomfort associated with suspicion, should give rise to nonstrategic behavior as well.
Proposition 12: Receiver suspicion is manifested through a combination of strategic and nonstrategic behavior.
Some prior empirical evidence implicitly supports this proposition. Toris and DePaulo (1984) found that targets of suspicion believed suspecters were more controlling than nonsuspecters, a findmg suggestive of active behavioral manipulation by senders, but targets of suspicion also thought
229
suspecters performed poorly, a finding suggestive of nonstrategic performance impairment. Our own research program also provided supporting evidence. In a first experiment, suspeaers appeared to conceal their suspicions by using follow-up questions that actually conveyed less suspicion than the probes employed by nonsuspicious receivers (Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991). In a later experiment, suspecters appeared to take the alternative approach of revealing their doubts by adopting a more dominant interview style (Burgoon, Buller, & Dillman, et al., 1995). Those who were moderately suspicious showed a nonimmediate, unpleasant, and kinesically aroused but vocally fluent, smooth interview style; their performances were rated as uncomposed, undesirable, and unexpected. By contrast, highly suspicious receivers showed a largely immediate, dominant, pleasant, and kinesically relaxed but hesitant, nonfluent interview style, a style that may have been intended to disguise their suspicions. Moreover, those who initially showed some negative affect, tension, or nonfluency improved over time, in line with a behavior management interpretation. In a third experiment (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, & Rockwell, this issue), experts and chronically suspicious receivers tended to exhibit a dominant, involved, aggressive, and unpleasant style, one perhaps designed to intimidate their suspect, while lay receivers who were induced to be suspicious spoke faster and less clearly, had longer response latencies, and were more disfluent - all indications of impaired performance. Overall, these investigations yielded a mixed picture of suspicion often leading to greater dominance and decrements in communication performed and also to variable patterns in terms of pleasantness and composure. In short, there is unlikely to be a uniform receiver style just as there is not a uniform deceiver style. Rather, receiver behavior appears to vary as a function of receivers preinteraction beliefs and goals (e.g., to show or hide ones suspicions). Nevertheless, it appears that the alternate styles share in common a strategic component. At the same time, suspicious receivers may engage in nonstrategic behavior and inadvertently signal their doubts to the suspect. Senders Perceived Deception Success. In turn, senders belief that they have been successful will depend on the behaviors manifested by the receiver, that is, feedback. Although the behavioral profile triggering senders perceptions that receivers are suspicious (or conversely, that they have succeeded with their duplicity) remains an empirical question, our theory at minimum requires that senders be able to recognize suspicion when it is overt. Otherwise, there is little expectation for senders to adjust behavior, and the dynamic changes attributed to noninteractive deception relative to noninteractke deception evaporate. As subpropositions, however, we can begin to propose that some of the same features triggering receiver suspicion should also trigger sender perceptions of suspicion, namely, when the communicators behavior deviates from expected com230
munication patterns. Additionally, use of information-seeking strategies that express outright skepticism should trigger perceived suspicion. Proposition 13: Senders perceive suspicion when it is present. Subproposition 13a: Deviations from expected receiver behavior increase perceptions of suspicion.
Subproposition 13b: Receiver behavior signaling disbelief, uncertainty, or the need for additional information increase sender perceptions of suspicion. Sender Behavioral Changes. If suspicion is manifested behaviorally and perceived by senders, the previous assumptions about the strategic nature of interpersonal communication and interpersonal deception argues for senders engaging in strategic repairs. At the same time, deceivers and truth tellers alike should manifest dynamic changes in nonstrategic behaviors reflective of their. discomfort at being suspected. Deceivers, though, may evidence greater anxiety associated with detection apprehension, whereas truth tellers may evidence frustration at failing to be believed.
Proposition 14: Suspicion (perceived or actual) increases senders ( a ) strategic and ( b ) nonstrategic behavior.
Our findings to date offer some mixed support for this proposition. Buller, Comstock, and Strzyzewski (1991) found that senders under suspicion reduced their activity level and expressivity, were more reticent, displayed more uncertainty and negative affect, and evidenced some impairment of their performances. Another investigation corroborated these findings when sender perceptions of suspicion were correlated with trained coders ratings and participant self-reports: Senders perceiving greater suspicion displayed more random movement and arousal / nervousness, less pleasantness (especially vocally), and made a poorer impression than those perceiving less suspicion (Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, et al., 1995). However, those senders who were actually subjected to experimentally induced high suspicion were more pleasant, immediate, relaxed, and fluent than those under moderate or no suspicion. Recently, diBattista ( 1995) reported that when receivers told senders that they did not believe their deceptive message, senders telling lies with high as opposed to low consequences increased their eye gaze, response latencies, and unfilled pauses. Gazing may have been a strategic attempt to look more involved when receivers indicated disbelief, while the response latencies and unfilled pauses may have been nonstrategic leakage of cognitive effort aimed at repairing the unsuccessful deception. The pattern we found associated with high suspicion is contrary to the perceived suspicion pattern and might appear to contradict the anticipated increase in nonstrategic behavior. It also may indicate, instead, that when sufficiently motivated, strategic moves can cover nonstrategic
231
Communication
Theory
leakage. Another explanation for the effects of high suspicion brings us back full circle to an interpersonal perspective and to the two intrinsic features of interactive contexts and of ongoing personal relationships that we started with in our model: Interaction patterns are dynamic and participants adapt to one anothers communication style. The sequencing of actions and reactions between sender and receiver sets up an interaction dynamic in which behavior patterns displayed early differ from those displayed late as each person adjusts to the others verbal and nonverbal behavior. Thus, initial discomfort associated with deception may dissipate as senders become more relaxed or perceive that their partner is not suspicious or when initial suspicions have been allayed. Regardless of which explanation ultimately is supported by future research, a general proposition can be offered about the dynamic nature of deception and suspicion displays: Proposition 15: Deception and suspicion displays change over time. Proposition 15 should be particularly true if senders or receivers perceive a threat to the success of their performance because such threats should activate ( a ) greater self-monitoring and partner-surveillance for feedback about ones own effectiveness and ( b ) subsequent moves designed to authenticate the performance, protect self, and/or preserve the interpersonal relationship. Thus, we hypothesize that deceivers faced with receiver skepticism (negative feedback) manifest greater variability in behavior than do those faced with apparent acceptance (positive feedback). This adaptation of interactants to one another highlights an important distinction between interactive and noninteractive deception. Sender and receiver displays are not solely a function of the deception or detection activities that deception research foregrounds but also a function of normal dyadic interaction patterns. That is, they should also manifest some of the interpersonal adaptation that characterizes normal discourse, one feature of which is the aforementioned predominance of synchronization, matching, and reciprocity of communication styles. To the extent that senders and receivers become enmeshed in normal interaction rhythms and patterns, we should expect to see a high degree of reciprocation of one anothers verbal and nonverbal behaviors. In this way, senders may come to match the interaction style of the receiver. If the receiver is pleasant and relaxed, the sender may become likewise. Only under special circumstances- such as high, negatively valenced arousal should we expect to see a compensatory pattern in which participants behaviors are dissimilar or opposite one another (Burgoon, Dillman, & Stern, 1993; Burgoon, Dillman, Stern, & Kelley, 1992; Burgoon, Stern, et al., 1995). Hence, we can advance a proposition specifically relevant to interpersonal deception:
232
Proposition 16: Reciprocity is the predominant interaction adaptation pattern between senders and receivers during interpersonal deception. Proposition 16 is not intended to imply that compensation is nonexistent, only that it is rarer than reciprocity. The conditions under which compensation might occur need to be fleshed out more, but we can tentatively hypothesize that negative feedback is more likely to generate compensatory moves than positive feedback because it violates expectations and motivates efforts to restore receiver confidence and approval. How well do our interactive research findings to date support these propositions? They appear to be largely supportive. We noted earlier numerous instances of deceiver and suspecter behavior changing over the course of the interaction, often in the direction of greater strategic activity. Our research also has produced some evidence that senders adapt to receiver interaction styles. Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, et al. (1995)found a prevailing pattern of reciprocity. Particularly relevant, when interviewers ( ERs) were highly immediate, interviewees (EEs) reciprocated with high immediacy instead of reducing immediacy as the noninteractive deception literature would predict. When ERs were nonimmediate and inexpressive, which occurred under moderate suspicion, EEs also reciprocated with low levels of immediacy and expressiveness. Reciprocity of immediacy was attenuated, however, when both deception and suspicion were present as compared with the condition in which both were absent. By contrast, EEs in Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, and Rockwell (this issue) compensated dominance and expressiveness by suspicious ERs, and those interviewed by suspicious experts compensated involvement. However, that study also found that reciprocity was the predominant pattern.
PostinteractionOutcomes
The recursive spiral of sender and receiver cognitions influencing behaviors and subsequent cognitions during an interaction culminates in a set of postinteraction judgments related to sender credibility and receiver suspicion (see Figure 1 ). The most commonly studied postinteraction outcomes are ones that can also be viewed as interactional phenomena but have usually been measured only at the conclusion of an interaction. They include receiver accuracy or bias in detecting deception and receiver attributions about sender credibility. Less studied but also relevant are sender judgments about receivers suspicion and their own deception success. An interpersonal perspective argues for those final judgments being contingent upon the relative success of senders and receivers strategic communication. Factors affecting receiver suspicion and recognition of deceit in early stages of interactions (T2 in Figure 1) should remain relevant to their postinteraction judgments. Among them, cognitive biases and decoding skills should be especially relevant. Although persistent truth biases and
233
Communication
Theory
attributions of sender honesty may undermine the accuracy of final judgments, so may persistent suspicion. Offsetting these misjudgments should be receiver decoding abilities. Those who have greater emotional and social sensitivity in particular should be most successful at making accurate, unbiased judgments and most likely to assign higher credibility to truthful than deceptive senders. Deceivers success (and receivers lack thereof) is likely to depend on how well deceivers utilize receiver feedback to manage information, behavior, and image. The degree to which receivers display skepticism and suspicion should affect senders perceptions of their own success, as should all the factors influencing earlier perceptions of suspicion. But most influential should be their own terminal perceptions and receivers terminal behavioral displays (i.e., those in force during the final phase of interaction ). Socially skilled communicators are most likely to take advantage of this feedback to craft believable messages (DePaulo, Blank, Swaim, & Hairfield, 1992) and cause receivers to misjudge deceptive performances as truthful. Less skilled senders efforts to suppress leakage cues and to create a credible performance may backfire because self-conscious attempts to improve performance can increase arousal and cognitive load. This may cause less skilled senders to deviate from their natural communication style. Ironically, even less skilled truth tellers may look dishonest when they sense receiver suspicion, leading receivers to misjudge their truthful performances as deceptive. Thus sender social skill, and attendant normality of senders performance, should make a difference.
Proposition 17: Receiver detection accuracy, bias, and judgments of sender credibility following an interaction are a function of ( a ) terminal receiver cognitions (suspicion, truth biases), ( b ) receiver decoding skill, and ( c )terminal sender behavioral displays. Proposition 18: Sender perceived deception success is a function of ( a ) terminal sender cognitions (perceived suspicion) and ( b ) terminal receiver behavioral displays.
These propositions apply to circumstances where accuracy, bias, credibility, and success are assessed following an interaction. If, instead, judgments are measured during the interaction itself, the earlier cognitions and behaviors specified in Propositions 10 and 11 should influence sender and receiver success. Three of our interactive research projects have considered successrelated outcomes. In the first experiment (Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, & Feldman, 1994), deceivers judged themselves to be most successful when they were less anxious, felt the deception task was not difficult, and thought they had engaged in expected conversation behavior. Observers (rather than participants) also judged them to be more successful if their communication was more normal and expected. Additionally, socially
234
skilled senders were judged as more successful. In the second experiment (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, et al., 1994; Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995), which focused on receiver accuracy and judgments, receivers were less accurate judging deception than truth due to an overall truth bias, but suspicion also impaired accuracy and was particularly problematic for experts, who tended to have more chronic suspicion. Two earlier studies also showed less detection accuracy, due to ( a ) a truth bias in acquainted dyads that caused overattribution of truth and ( b ) suspicion in both stranger and acquaintance dyads that produced lower honesty ratings (Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991 ;Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991 ). Receivers were also less accurate, more biased, and/or thought senders were more believable, when senders were more socially skilled and when senders demeanor included greater nonverbal involvement, fluency, positive affect, composure, hesitancy, and verbal concealment (Burgoon, Buller, & Guerrero, 1995). Accuracy also suffered when the partner was familiar, again probably owing to truth bias, and varied according to sender deception type and receiver questioning strategy (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, et al., 1994).
Summary
This essay represents a first elaboration of an interpersonal theory of deception. We believe that a complete understanding of deception requires approaching it as a dynamic, iterative process of mutual influence between senders who manipulate information to depart from the truth and receivers who attempt to establish the validity of those messages. Both parties are responsible for shaping the face of deceptive communication. Interpersonal deception is grounded within a conversational context and an interpersonal relationship, which , along with preinteraction expectations, goals, knowledge, behavioral repertoires, and skills, influence the process and its outcomes. While there is a great distance yet to be traveled in pursuit of full causal explanations for all the relationships we posit, we hope that IDT will serve as a lightning rod for researchers, one that will focus research more sharply on principles of human communication and stimulate further conceptual development. We are optimistic that from further research into the principles of IDT will emerge a more complete understanding of both deception and interpersonal communication.
David Buller is professor of communication and Judee K. Burgoon is professor of communication at the University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721. The authors thank Walid Afi), Aileen Buslig, Amy Ebesu, Laura Guerrero, Patricia Rockwell, James Roiger, Krystyna Strzyzewski, and Cindy White. who helped conduct the research reviewed in this manuscript. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Fifth International Conference on Language and Social Psychology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. July 1994. The preparation of this manuscript was funded in part by the US.A m y Research Institute
235
Author
(Contract MDA903-90-K-0113).The views, opinions, and findings in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision.
In actuality, measures of perceptions of deceit are highly variable. It is likely that some reflect a skeptical but uncertain state, which would make them synonymous with suspicion, while others capture a confident belief that the sender is lying. Although we are using the term sender to refer to the actor who engages, or is perceived to engage, in deception and the term receiver for the actor who is the recipient or perceiver of such deception, these terms are not intended to imply one-way, noninteractive communication. We considered alternative terms such as communicator and target, deceiver and deceivee, and speaker and listener, but they, too, imply unidirectional communication. Moreover, the second pair leaves out truthful communication and the thud pair ignores nonverbal behavior. The other alternative of using a single term like interactant for both participants leaves indistinguishable who is enacting deception and who is its target. We believe this usage of the word strategic is consistent with the way it is used by others in the interpersonal communication arena (e.g., Seibold, Cantrill, & Meyers, 1994) and by those in the deception arena (e.g., DePaulo, 1992; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). It is perhaps important to note here that believability is not synonymous with truthfulness or honesty. Communicators may be regarded as believable, or credible, because they are knowledgeable (a competence judgment), poised ( a composure judgment), and so forth.
Notes
References
Bauchner, J. E., Brandt, D. R., & Miller, G. R. (1977). The truth-deception attribution: Effects of varying levels of information availability. In B. R. Ruben (Ed.), Communication yearbook 1 (pp. 229-243). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Bauman, R. (1986).Story, performance, and event: Contextual studies of oral narrative. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Bavelas, J. B., Black, A., Chovil, N., & Mullett, J. (1990). Equivocal communication. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Berger, C. R., & diBattista, P. (1993). Communication failure and plan adaptation: If at first you dont succeed, say it louder and slower. Communication Monographs, 60, 220-238. Berger, C. R., Karol, S. H., & Jordan, J. M. (1989). When a lot of knowledge is a dangerous thing: The debilitating effects of plan complexity on verbal fluency. Human Communication Research, 16, 91-1 19. Bond, C. R., Omar, A., Pitre, U., Lashley, B. R., Skaggs, L. M., & Kirk, C. T. ( 1992). Fishy-looking liars: Deception judgment from expectancy violation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 969-977. Brandt, D. R., Miller, G. R., & Hocking, J. E. (1980a). Effects of self-monitoring and familiarity on deception detection. Communication Quarterly, 28, 3-10. Brandt, D. R., Miller, G. R., & Hocking, J. E. (1980b).The truth-deception attribution: Effects of familiarity on the ability of observers to detect deception. Human Communication Research, 6, 99-110. Brandt, D. R., Miller, G. R., & Hocking, J. E. (1982). Familiarity and lie detection: A replication and extension. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 46, 276-290. Brown, S. C., & Levinson, P. (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language usage. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Buller, D. B. ( 1987, November). Detecting deception by strangers, friends, and intimates: Attributional biases due to relationship development. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Boston. Buller, D. B., & Aune, R. K. (1987). Nonverbal cues to deception among intimates, friends, and strangers. ]ournu1 of Nonverbal Behavior, 1 1 , 269-290. Buller, D. B., & Burgoon, J. K. ( 1994). Deception: Strategic and nonstrategic communication. In J. A. Daly & J. M. Wiemann (Eds.), Strategic interpersonal communication (pp. 191-223). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Buller, D. B., Burgoon, J. K., Buslig, A., & Roiger, J. (1994). Interpersonal deception:
236
VIII. Further analysis of nonverbal and verbal correlates of equivocation from the Bavelas et al. (1990) research. ]ournu1 of Language and Social Psychology, 13, 396417. Buller, D. B., Burgoon, J. K., White, C., & Ebesu, A. S. (1994). Interpersonal deception: VII. Behavioral profiles of falsification, equivocation, and concealment. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 13,366-396. Buller, D. B., Comstock, J., Aune, R. K., & Strzyzewski, K. D. (1989). The effect of probing on deceivers and truthtellers. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 13, 155-169. Buller, D. B., & Hunsaker, F. (1995). Interpersonal deception: XIII. Suspicion and the truth-bias of conversational participants. In J. Aitken (Ed. ), Intrapersonal communication processes reader (pp. 239-251 ). Westland, MI: Hayden-McNeil. Buller, D. B., Kikuchi, T . , & Eloy, S. V. (1994, July). Debt and compliance in interpersonal relationships: Testing the transferability of interpersonal obligations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. Buller, D. B., Strzyzewski, K. D., & Comstock, J. (1991). Interpersonal deception: I. Deceivers reactions to receivers suspicions and probing. Communication Monographs, 58, 1-24. Buller, D. B., Strzyzewski, K . D., & Hunsaker, F. G. (1991). Interpersonal deception: 11. The inferiority of conversational participants as deception detectors. Communication Monographs, 58, 25-40. Burgoon, J. K. (1974). Effects of anomia and personal space invasion on anxiety, nonperson orientation and source credibility. Central States Speech ]ournal, 25, 19-27. Burgoon, J. K. (1978). A communication model of personal space violations: Explication and an initial test. Human Communication Research, 4, 129-142. Burgoon, J. K. (1989, May). Toward a processual view of interpersonal deception. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Francisco. Burgoon, J. K. ( 1993 ). Interpersonal expectations, expectancy violations, and emotional communication. lournal of Language and Social Psychology, 12, 13-21. Burgoon, J. K. (1994). Nonverbal signals. In M. L. Knapp (Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication (2nd ed., pp. 229-285). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Burgoon, J. K., & Buller, D. B. (1994). Interpersonal deception: 111. Effects of deceit on perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics. ]ournu1 of Nonverbal Behavior, 18, 155-184. Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Dillman, L., & Walther, J. B. (1995). Interpersonal deception: IV. Effects of suspicion on perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics. Human Communication Research, 22, 163-196. Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Ebesu, A,, & Rockwell, P. (1994). Interpersonal deception: V. Accuracy in deception detection. Communication Monographs, 61, 303-325. Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., & Guerrero, L. K. (1995). Interpersonal deception: IX. Effects of social skill and nonverbal communication on deception success and detection accuracy. ]ournu1 of Language and Social Psychology, 14, 289-31 1 . Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Guerrero, L. K. Afifi, W., & Feldman, C. (1996). Interpersonal deception: XII. Information management dimensions underlying types of deceptive messages. Communication Monographs, 63, 50-69. Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., Guerrero, L. K., & Feldman, C. M. (1994). Interpersonal deception: VI. Effects of preinteractional and interactional factors on deceiver and observer perceptions of deception success. Communication Studies, 45,263-280. Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., & Woodall, W. G. (1996). Nonverbalcommunication: The unspoken dialogue (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Burgoon, J. K., Dillman, L., & Stern, L. A. (1993). Adaptation in dyadic interaction: Defining and operationalizing patterns of reciprocity and compensation. Communication Theory, 3, 196-215. Burgoon, J. K., Dillman, L., Stern, L. A., & Kelley, D. L. (1992, May). Reciprocity and compensation patterns in dyadic interaction: Statistical analysis. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Miami. Burgoon, J. K., & Hale, J. L. (1987). Validation and measurement of the fundamental themes of relational communication. Communication Monographs, 54, 19-41. Burgoon, J. K., & Le Poire, B. A. (1993). Effects of communication expectancies, actual
237
communication, and expectancy disconfirmation on evaluations of communicators and their communication behavior. Human Communication Research, 20,75-107. Burgoon, J. K., & Newton, D. A. (1991).Applying a social meaning model to relational interpretations of conversational involvement: Comparison of observer and participant perspectives. Southern Communication lournal, 56, 96-1 13. Burgoon, J. K., Stern, L. A., & Dillman, L. (1995). Interpersonal adaptation: Dyadic interaction patterns. New York: Cambridge University Press. Burgoon, J. K., & Walther, J. B. (1990). Nonverbal expectancies and the evaluative consequences of violations. Human Communication Research, 17, 232-265. Camden, C., Motley, M. T., & Wilson, A. (1984). White lies in interpersonal communication: A taxonomy and preliminary investigation of social motivations. Western ]ournal of Speech Communication, 48, 309-325. Cappella, J. N. ( 1983). Conversational involvement: Approaching and avoiding others. In J. M. Wiemann & R. P. Harrison (Eds.), Nonverbal interaction (pp. 113-148). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Chisholm, R. M., & Feehan, T. D. (1977).The intent to deceive. journal of Philosophy, 74, 143-159. Clark, H., & Clark, E. (1977). Psychology and language. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Cody, M. J., Marston, P. J., & Foster, M. (1984). Deception: Paralinguistic and verbal leakage. In R. N. Bostrom (Ed.), Communication yearbook 8 (pp. 464-490). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Coker, D. A., & Burgoon, J. K. (1987). The nature of conversational involvement and nonverbal encoding patterns. Human Communication Research, 13, 463-494. Culnan, M. J., & Markus, M. L. (1987).Information technologies: Electronic media and intraorganizational communication. In F. M. Jablin, L. L. Pumam, K. H. Roberts, & L. W. Porter (Eds. ), Handbook of organizational communication: A n interdisciplinary perspective (pp. 420-444). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. DePaulo, B. M. ( 1992). Nonverbal behavior and self-presentation. Psychological Bulletin, 1 11,203-243. DePaulo, B. M., Blank, A. L., Swaim, G. W., & Hairfield, J. G. (1992).Expressiveness and expressive control. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 276-285. DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (in press). Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. DePaulo, B. M., & Kirkendol, S . E. (1989). The motivational impairment effect in the communication of deception. In J. Yuille (Ed.), Credibility assessment (pp. 51-70). Deurne, Belgium: Kluwer. DePaulo, B. M., Kirkendol, S. E., Tang, J., & O'Brien, T. P. (1988). The motivation impairment effect in the communication of deception: Replications and extensions. ]ournal of Nonverbal Behavior, 12, 177-202. DePaulo, B. M., Lanier, K., & Davis, T. (1983). Detecting the deceit of the motivated liar. lournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 1096-1 103. DePaulo, B. M., LeMay, C. S., & Epstein, J. A. (1991). Effects of importance of success and expectations for success on effectiveness at deceiving. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 14-24. DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1979). Ambivalence, discrepancy, and deception in nonverbal communication. In R. Rosenthal (Ed. ), Skill in nonverbal communication: Individual differences (pp. 204-248). Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, G u m , & Hain. DePaulo, B. M., Rosenthal, R., Eisenstat, R. A., Rogers, P. L., & Finkelstein, S. (1978). Decoding discrepant nonverbal cues. Iournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 313-323. DePaulo, B. M., Stone, J. I., & Lassiter, G. D. (198Sa). Deceiving and detecting deceit. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life (pp. 323-370). New York: McGraw Hill. DePaulo, B. M., Stone, J. I., & Lassiter, G . D. (198Sb). Telling ingratiating lies: Effects of target sex and target attractiveness on verbal and nonverbal deceptive success. lournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48. 1191-1203. DePaulo, B. M., Zuckerman, M., & Rosenthal, R. (1980).Detecting deception: Modality effects. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (pp. 125162). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
238
DePaulo, P. J., & DePaulo, B. M. (1989). Can deception by salespersons and customers be detected through nonverbal behavioral cues? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19,1552-1577. diBattista, P. (1995, May). Probing, preparation, familiarity, and control: What affects how deceivers respond? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Albuquerque, NM. Dulaney, E. F., Jr. (1982). Changes in language behavior as a function of veracity. Human Communication Research, 9, 75-82. Ekman, P. (1985). Telling lies. New York: Norton. Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception. Psychiatry, 32, 88-105. Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1974). Detecting deception from body or face. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 288-298. Exline, R., Thibaut, J., Hickey, C., & Gumpert, P. (1970). Visual interaction in relation to Machiavellianism and an unethical act. In R. Christie & R. Geis (Eds.), Studies in Machiavellianism (pp. 53-75 ). New York: Academic Press. Fiedler, K . , & Walka, I. (1993). Training lie detectors to use nonverbal cues instead of global heuristics. Human Communication Research, 20, 199-223. Gilbert, D. T. (1989). Thinking lightly about others: Automatic components of the social inference process. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 189211). New York: Guilford. Gilbert, D. T., & Osborne, R. E. (1989). Thinking backward: Some curable and incurable consequences of cognitive busyness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 940-949. Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,733-740. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation ofselfin everyday life. Garden City, NY: Anchor/ Doubleday. Gossen, G. H. ( 1 974). Chamulas in the world of the sun: Time and space in a Maya oral tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178. Greenberg, M. S. (1980). A theory of indebtedness. In K. Gergen, M. Greenberg, & R. Willis (Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (pp. 3-26). New York: Plenum. Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the ways of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hample, D. (1980). Purpose and effects of lying. The Southern Speech Journal, 46, 3347. Hocking, J. E., Bauchner, J., Kaminski, E. P.,& Miller, G. R. (1979). Detecting deceptive communication from verbal, visual, and paralinguistic cues. Human Communication Research, 6, 33-46. Hocking, J. E., & Leathers, D. G. (1980). Nonverbal indicators of deception: A new theoretical perspective. Communication Monographs, 47, 120-13 1 . Jones, E. E. ( 1986). Interpreting interpersonal behavior: The effects of expectancies. Science, 2 34, 4 1-46. Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 7894) Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Jussim, L. ( 1991 ). Social perception and social reality: A reflection-construction model. Psychological Review, 98, 54-73. Kalbfleisch, P. J. (1992). Deceit, distrust and the social milieu: Application of deception research in a troubled world. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 20, 308334. Kaplan, A. (1964). The conduct of inquiry: Methodology for behavioral science. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing. Kellermann, K . (1984). The negativity effect and its implications for initial interaction. Communication Monographs, 51, 37-55.
239
Kellermann, K. ( 1992). Communication: Inherently strategic and primarily automatic. Communication Monographs, 59, 288-300. Knapp, M. L., & Cornadena, M. E. (1979). Telling it like it isnt: A review of theory and research on deceptive communication, Human Communication Research, 5, 270-285. Knapp, M. L., Hart, R. P., & Dennis, H. S. (1974). An exploration of deception as a communication construct. Human Communication Research, 1, 15-29. Knapp, M. L., Miller, G. R., & Fudge, K. (1994). Background and trends in the study of interpersonal communication. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication (2nd ed., pp. 3-20). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Krauss, R. M. ( 1981 ). Impression formation, impression management, and nonverbal behaviors. In E. T . Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 1, pp. 323-341). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kraut, R. E., & Higgins, E. T. (1984). Communication and social cognition. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook ofsocral cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 88-127). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaurn. Kruglanski, A. (1989). Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases. New York: Plenum. Kruglanski, A. ( 1993, April). Motiuated social cognition. Colloquium presented to the Department of Communication, University of Arizona, Tucson. Langer E. ( 1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Levine, T . R., & McCornack, S. A. (1989, November). Distinguishing between types of suspicion and measuring a predisposition toward suspicion: T w o studies validating a measure of trait suspicion. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, San Francisco. Levine, T. R., & McCornack, S. R. (1992). Linking love and lies: A formal test of the McCornack and Parks model of deception detection. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 9, 143-154. Mahl, G. F. (1987).Explorations in nonverbal and vocal behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. McCornack, S. A,, & Levine, T. R. (1990). When lovers become leery: The relationship between suspicion and accuracy in detecting deception. Communication Monographs, 57, 219-230. McCornack, S. A , , & Parks, M. R. (1986). Deception detection and relationship development: The other side of trust. In M. L. McLaughlin (Ed.), Communication yearbook 9 (pp. 377-389). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. McCroskey, J. C. ( 1972). An introduction to rhetorical communication. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. McCroskey, J. C., & Young, T. J. (1981). Ethos and credibility: The construct and its measurement after three decades. Central States Speech Journal, 32, 24-34. Mehrabian, A. (1981 ). Silent messages: Implicit communication of emotions and attitudes (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Metts, S., & Chronis, H. (1986). An exploratory investigation of relational deception. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Chicago. Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Marecek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 154-1 64. OSullivan, M., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1988). The effect of comparisons on detecting deceit. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 12, 203-215. Patterson, M. L. (1983). Nonverbal behavior: A functional perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag. Riggio, R. E. (1986). Assessment of basic social skills. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 649-660. Riggio, R. E. (1993). Social interaction skills and nonverbal behavior. In R. S. Feldman (Ed.), Applications of nonverbal behauioral theories and research (pp. 3-30). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Riggio, R. E., & Friedman, H. S. (1983). Individual differences and cues to deception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 899-915. Riggio, R. E., & Friedman, H. S. (1986). Impression formation: The role of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 421-427.
240
Riggio, R. E., Tucker, J., & Throckmorton, D. (1987).Social skills and deception ability. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 568-577. Riggio, R. E., Tucker, J., & Widaman, K. F. (1987). Verbal and nonverbal cues as mediators of deception ability. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 11, 126-145. Roloff, M. E. ( 1987). Communication and reciprocity within intimate relationships. In M . E. Roloff & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Interpersonal processes: New directions in communication research (pp. 11-38). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Rosenthal, R., & DePaulo, B. M. (1979a).Sex differences in accommodation in nonverbal communication. In R. Rosenthal (Ed. ), Skill in nonverbal communication: Individual differences (pp. 68-103). Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, & Hain. Rosenthal, R., & DePaulo, B. M . (1979b).Sex differences in eavesdropping on nonverbal cues. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 273-285. Seibold, D. R., Cantrill, J. G., & Meyers, R. A. (1994).Communication and interpersonal influence. In M . L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication (pp. 542-588). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Short, J., Williams, E., & Christie, B. (1976). The social psychology of telecommunication. London: Wiley. Sproull, L. S., & Kiesler, S. (1986). Reducing social context cues: Electronic mail in organizational communication. Management Science, 32, 1492-1512. Stamp, G. H., & Knapp, M . L. (1990).The construct of intent in interpersonal communication. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 76, 282-299. Stiff, J . B., Kim, H. J., & Ramesh, C. N. (1989, May). Truth-biases and aroused suspicion in relational deception. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Francisco. Storms, M. D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors and observers points of view. ]ournu1 of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 165-175. Street, R. L . , & Cappella, J. N. (Eds.). (1985). Sequence and pattern in communicatzve behavior. London: Edward Arnold. Street, R. L., Mulac, A., & Wiemann, J. M. (1988). Speech evaluation differences as a function of perspective (participant versus observer) and presentational medium. Human Communication Research, 14, 333-363. Toris, D., & DePaulo, B. M. (1984). Effects of actual deception and suspiciousness of deception on interpersonal perceptions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1063-1073. Turner, R. E., Edgley, C., & Olmstead, G. (1975).Information control in conversations: Honesty is not always the best policy. Kansas Journal of Speech, I I , 69-89. Wagner, H., & Pease, K. (1977). The verbal communication of inconsistency between attitudes held and attitudes expressed. lournal of Personality, 44, 1-1 5. Walther, J. B. ( 1996). Computer-mediated communication: Impersonal, interpersonal, and hyperpersonal interaction. Human Communication Research, 23,3-43. Walther, J. B. ( 1993, November). Anticipated ongoing interaction versus channel effects on relational communication in computer-mediated interaction. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Miami, FL. Walther, J. B., & Burgoon, J. K. (1992).Relational communication in computer-mediated interaction. Human Communication Research, 19, 50-88. Weisband, S. P., Schneider, S. K., & Connolly, T. (1993). Participation equality and influence: Cues and status effects in computer-mediated groups. Unpublished manuscript, University of Arizona. Wiener, M . , & Mehrabian, A. (1968). Language within language. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Zajonc, R. B. (1980).Compresence. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.), Psychology ofgroup influence (pp. 35-60). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M . , & Rosenthal, R. (1981).Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 14, pp. 1-59). New York: Academic Press. Zuckerman, M . , DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1986). Humans as deceivers and lie detectors. In P. D. Blanck, R. Buck, & R. Rosenthal (Eds.), Nonverbalcornrnunication in the clinical context (pp. 13-35). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
241
Zuckerman, M., & Driver, R. E. (1985). Telling lies: Verbal and nonverbal correlates of deception. In A. W. Siegman & S. Feldstein (Eds.), Multichannel integrations ofnonverbal behavior (pp. 129-148). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Zuckerman, M., Driver, R. E., & Guadagno, N. S. (1985). Effects of segmentation patterns on the perception of deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 9, 160-168. Zuckerman, M., Fischer, S. A., Osmun, R. W., Winkler, B. A., & Wolfson, L. R. (1987). Anchoring in lie detection revisited. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 11, 4-12. Zuckerman, M., Spiegel, N. H., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1982). Nonverbal strategies for decoding deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 6, 171-1 87.
242

IDT theory proposes deception occurs in interpersonal interactions

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

IDT theory proposes deception occurs in interpersonal interactions

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Communication Theory

David B. Buller Judee K. Burgoon

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

definitions, IDT is a theory of deception and reactions to actual or perceived deception.

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Criteria1 Attributes. Information management is a fundamental aspect of

Interpersonal Deception Theory

The Superordinate Role of Context and Relatlonship

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal Deception Theory

You might also like