Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.

com/abstract=1907749
1
Quantitative estimation in democratic consolidation. Romanian Case
Silviu-Petru Grecu
ABSTRACT
Institutional transparency, the equilibrium of parliamentary parties, development of civil
society and economic growth are the critical conditions of Romanian democratic transitional
process. Political parties and electoral competition between political actors represent Romanian
minimal condition of democracy. In this context, for speaking about democratic consolidation in
Romanian political system we have to underline, for political decedents and for civic community,
the major role played by all these critical conditions of transition. A mix analytical strategy, which
is based on normative reflection, social and political anthropology, contemporary political history
and a mathematical discreet design, can be a good way of understanding and explaining political
changes. The aim of this article is to create a comprehensive analytical model for democratic
transition, focused on a case study, for understanding the main particularities of eastern democratic
transition. In this meaning, the methodological design of research is focused on quantitative-
multivariate models- the graphs and networks theory- for observing the minimum and critical routes
/ ways of Romanian democratic transition. For creating a general radiography of systems dynamic,
we are interpreting all these statistical correlations and mathematical models in social and political
terms. This research is anchored in systemic paradigm of political sciences and wants to underline
the complexity and the elementary conditions of a social and political process.
Key words: democracy, transition, mathematical model, critical way of democratization,
prediction, factorial design


I. General issues and particular problems of democratic consolidation

Although democratic consolidation theory seems to be an old paradigm of the contemporary
political sciences approach, this paper want to resign the democratic theory and democratic
consolidation starting with a new type of design: factorial design through mathematical models. In
this context, the paper tries to create a new analytical view in democratic transition, using, beyond
the traditional empirical theory, a new mathematical method - discreet mathematics and graph
theory. All traditional perspectives of democratic theory are based on historical design and on a kind
of social-political hermeneutics of mentalities, behaviours and structures of political elite and
institutional building.
In this approach, the main analytical model describes the reform of political class, the continuity
of the communist practices (post-communism) and the institutional political design. All political
variables were associated with economical practices, ideologies and indicators to create a macro-
level paint of democratic transition. Starting with 1950-1960, empirical studies of democracy were
based upon a dynamic perspective in which the main role had been played by liberal economy.
Without creating a co relational model of transition between capitalist economy and democratic
development, D. Rustow had announced the dynamic character of democratic transition. This
process is characterized by two phases: 1. input phase (enter democracy) and 2. output phase (out
democracy). Between two phases, we assist to a complex mechanism of political transformation,
social changes and economic development.
Traditional postulates of democracy are almost normative, and relevant theories of democracy
are met in the work of Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, David Held, Philippe Schmitter, Karl
Deutsch, Samuel Paul Huntington etc. These normative points of view understood democracy in a
procedural manner or better in processual terms. In this line, democracy is a procedural regime
based only the liberalism - civil liberalism (civil and political rights and liberties), social liberties,
economic liberties private propriety and free market. These procedural conditions have to be
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907749
2
completed by a processual approach, which can create, for political and social researcher, a better
way of explanation and comprehension. Therefore, I opt for conceptualizing democracy in
processual terms as a liberal democracy in a relatively independent geographic unit with an existing
state. A political regime can be regarded as liberal democratic when it allows for the free
formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of associations, information
and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular
intervals by non-violent means their claims to rule without excluding any effective political
office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing
their preference.
1

To the normative level of democratic theory, most researchers distinguish between two types
of democracy: idealistic democracy and pragmatic democracy. In this context, the first concept of
democracy is premised on the idea that every adult who is not profoundly retarded has a moral
right to participate on terms of equality in the governance of the society. With that moral right come
the moral duties (1) to take sufficient interest in public affairs to be able to participate in governance
intelligently, (2) to discuss political issues in an open-minded fashion with other citizens, and (3) to
base ones political opinions and actions (such as voting) on ones honest opinion, formed after due
deliberation, of what is best for society as a whole rather than on narrow self-interest
2
.
This first meaning of democracy has a civic - interest perspective. In this case, the democratic
rules are based on the public interest rather than private and selfish interests. This type of democracy
is normative, idealistic and deliberative. The second meaning of democracy refers to a kind of
pragmatic democracy. If the first view of democracy is almost moral and normative, pragmatic
democracy do not begin with moral or political theory but with the actual practice of democracy in
its various instantiations from Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries b.c. to the United States in the
twenty-first century a.d.
3

Pragmatic democracy refers to the practice of democracy, in which the citizens elect the
officials and if they do not perform in public affairs they are fired by the people at the end of a fixed
or almost limited term of office. In this case, pragmatic democracy can be reduced to a kind of
administrative/ bureaucratic practice or, in a best case, to a contractual activity between public
institutions/ public governance and citizens. The management of public affairs is the main purpose
of pragmatic democracy. Pragmatic democracy - thus is unillusioned about democracy, which it
regards as an accident, often but not always a fortunate one, of historical circumstances
4
.
The process of democratic consolidation is based on the second approach of democracy. The
researcher of democratization wants to analyze how it is possible to create an efficient institutional
design, an operative and active political class, an open civil society, and how it is possible to
increase civic participation in public affairs. In this context, democratization can be reduced to an
administrative activity/ management of society, economy and public affairs. First step in democratic
consolidation is based on institutional engineering. Although the study of institutions has been
considered an outdated approach of politics and society, the enlightened neo-institutionalism of
the 1980s brought institutions back into political science.
5
After 1945, western democracies had
started the process of democratic consolidation. In this case, western governments were extremely
interested in creating a viable institutional sphere. All western European states had known various

1
Carsten Q Schneider, Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America Democratization Studies,
Taylor & Francis Routledge, 2009, p. 10
2
Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, And Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
London, 2003, p. 131
3
ibidem, p. 144
4
ibidem, p. 145
5
Klaus von Beyme, Institutional Engineering and Transition to Democracy, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democratic
Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume I, Institutional Engineering, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.3
3
forms of parliamentarism. The parliamentary democracies were focused on building representative
and efficient institutions.
Given this model, after 1989, eastern European states were unable to import foreign
institutions. Thus, political researchers have been starting a long process of building democratic
institutions- translated at normative level in institutional engineering. The concept of constitutional
engineering is neutral on the question of whether constitutional provisions develop via diffusion and
import from other countries, or spring up as functional equivalents because constitutional engineers
in different countries have to solve similar problems
6
. The main directions of institutional
engineering are focusing on: 1) creating constitutions; 2) discovery of semi- presidential system; 3)
search of new electoral law; 4) use of plebiscitarian instruments to overcome the crisis of the
representative system.
7

Beyond institutional engineering, democratic transition is characterized by a free competition
and participation for public officials. Thus, most analysts of transitions consider that is a king of
analogy between political elections and economic market. Although this comparison is not perfect,
we can observe many competitive mechanisms in electoral campaign for public officials.
Democracy can be built in a social world characterized by free and fair play competition.
This concept presents similar difficulties as the concept of competition in the economic
sphere, with which it may be usefully compared. In economic life competition is never completely
lacking, but hardly ever is it perfect. Similarly, in political life there is always some competition,
though perhaps only a potential one, for the allegiance of the people. To simplify matters we have
restricted the kind of competition for leadership that is to define democracy, to free competition for
a free vote. The justification for this is that democracy seems to imply a recognized method by
which to conduct the competitive struggle, and that the electoral method is practically the only one
available for communities of any size
8
. In Joseph Schumpeters view, democratic game is reduced
to an electoral competition between political actors. This manner of comprehending democracy can
create for political researcher a dynamic model of democracy.
Thereby, democratic consolidation must start with the consolidation of political class and
political actors. To understand democracy and the transitions to democracy we must underline the
main role played by actors and institutions. From social and political actors we can create a dynamic
view of democracy through civil society, social and political movements, political parties and
political behaviours. In this sense, Schumpeters opinion about democracy may be functional if we
may reduce society to a rational world, a formalized world in which a mathematical model can
describe a competition between two or more parties through games theory. (democracy, in a rational
manner, may be viewed as a probabilistic play between 2 or n players, where players may be
represented by political actors).
Joseph Schumpeter, during his work, was convinced that perfect competition had never existed
and also it never would exist. If it ever came into existence, it would be harmful to the economy.
Extrapolate this from economic approach we consider that democratic play cannot be viewed as a
perfect competition, because in this sphere of reality the main tendency is- monopolistic practice.
Institutional design and the reform of political class are two important conditions for a sustainable
democracy. Therefore, bureaucracy and institutions are not an obstacle to democracy but an
inevitable complement to it
9
.
Institutional design and democracy may be understood through an economic concept, used,
starting with70s, in political research-public management. In this assumption, democracy is a

6
ibidem, p. 5
7
ibidem
8
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy, Routledge London & New York, 2003, p. 271
9
ibidem, p. 206
4
political strategy based on management of community/ society. Social or public management is
correlated with an efficient institutional design and with a strong civil society. The political
approach warrants this name because it is based on the idea of the public sector's irreducible
specificity, it is considered eminently political, ruled by the principles of power and legitimacy,
while the private sector is mainly economic, ruled by the market and the principle of profit. In this
context, the value given to citizens' participation in the management of the public thing takes on
high relevance. The client-citizen is a whole citizen, who is both object and subject of public
services as he participates in the formation of public policies and in the evaluation of results
10
.
If we want to analyze democratic consolidation through efficient management of society and
also through rational models like economists we must underline the main role played in this
process by the citizens and civic society. Symbolically reduce the hypothetic state of nature (from
Thomas Hobbes to J.J. Rousseau) modern societies have developed social mechanisms of civic
participations. Civil societies of western democracies are only the attributes of civic implications- a
model symmetrically built with Athenian participative democracy. Since the seventeenth century,
this philosophical concept has evolved, migrated, and re-emerged in diverse guises and perspectives.
The Anglo-Saxon tradition associated it with contract theory and individualism. The Scottish
Enlightenment linked it to the rise of commercial society. In the German tradition, it was
historicized and raised to a higher level of abstraction by Hegel and Marx. In post-communist
Eastern Europe, it became identified with Western liberties and the rejection of totalitarianism
11
.
Civil society is the main expression of democratic rules. Democracy is not functional in states in
which any forms of associations or political participations are rejected by the authorities. Minimum
way of democratization requires equilibrium between state and civil society. Only a democratic state
can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.
The civility that makes democratic politics possible only can be learned in the associational
networks; the roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the networks have to be
fostered by the democratic state
12
.
Democratic structures and procedures which adapt and develop decisional practices are based
on the relationships between the structures, the development of parties and the party system
(organizational strengthening, identity formations, and establishing the conventions of political
competition, relationships between intermediation structures and civil society; and relationships
between intermediation structures and the regime.













10
Luiz Carlos Bresser- Pereira, Democracy and Public Management Reform, Building the Republican State, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, New York, 2004, p.250
11
Laurence Whitehead, Democratization, Theory and Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2002,
p.70
12
Michael Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society, apud Laurence Whitehead, op.cit, p.76
5


II. Research Methods

II.1. Objectives and hypothesis

To the normative level, this paper wants to answer to the problem of democratic consolidation.
In this case, we want to observe the degree of democracy in Romanian political system and also the
critical way or critical conditions for democracy. The paper tries to adequate the normative
implications and perspectives in theory and practice of democracy to the reality of post-communist
countries, especially the last countries which were integrated in E.U. Starting with this theoretically
premises we want to describe and also to explain the democratic process in post-communist
countries using a quantitative methodology of research. This kind of methodology will facilitate the
comprehensive - inference procedure and will create a mathematical approach of political live. The
main purpose of this research is to transcend the limit of descriptivism in understanding democratic
consolidation. This fact is possible through discreet mathematical models. The explanation of
Romanian democratic consolidation will focus on the main variables of democratization and also on
the minimum way (critical route) of democracy. The mathematical model used in this research is
graph theory associated with elements of linear algebra and social statistics.
The research questions of this study are: What are the conditions of Romanian democratic
transitions? How will affect economic disequilibrium democratic consolidation? What are the
critical variables/ ways of Romanian democratic transition? How much predictable is Romanian
political system in its evolution to democracy? These questions are both normative and empirically,
in this case our design of research focuses in two main directions- 1. a theoretical direction, in which
we try to enounce comprehensive inferences about democratic transition in Eastern of Europe; 2. an
empirical case study, in which we want to observe the causal relationships between social, economic
and political factors.
The main hypotheses of this research are: h
1
:

Civil society is the main elementary condition of
Romanian democratic consolidation. h
2
:

The negative economic growth affect negatively direct the
level of democratic consolidation in Romanian political system. h
3
:

Institutional engineering and
development are the main pivots around which is crystallized the democratic regime in Eastern
Europe.
The aim of this paper is to observe, at empirical level, the main variables that sustain
Romanian democratic transition. Starting with this point of view, this analyzes will be applied on
the other European democracies to observe the level of external validity. We use regional case study
for understanding the particularities of the Romanian democracy. The case study is also completed
by direct observation and by secondary data, derived from academic research or scientific institutes
of democratic researches.

II.2 Data of research

Although is very difficult to create an exploratory design of transition because the most part of
data are only qualitative, we try to understand this process and to use general concepts which can
conduct to real values of the variables which are compounding the democratization. In this context,
we agree the main variables which were being used in other empirical studies, and which describe in
a eloquent manner the transition between totalitarianism to democracy. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan
observed, in their researches, that for being functional, democracy needs five elementary conditions.
Thus, they have identified the direction of bureaucracy (political institutions), the direction of
human rights, the direction of civil society, an established political class and also economic growth.
6
For other researchers the democratic law
13
and rechtsstaat are the conditions for democracy.
Through democratic law, the system is autonomous and is also characterised by a diverse range of
decision-making. Democracy can be regarded as a set of explicit and pre-established rules for
political participation, open competition and free election, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in
the society. These political arrangements are the result of compromise, the substantive outcome of
which remains relatively uncertain. The main authors of such compromise are political intermediary
structures, often linked to the various interests in different ways. Political intermediaries are
important as far as they play a leading role in the decision-making process and, more generally, in
the functioning of a democratic regime
14
. Thus, consolidation is the multifaceted process by which
democratic structures, norms, and regimecivil society relationships are firmly established.
15
In
this approach democracy and democratic consolidation is defined as a relationship between
governing and political representative institutions and civil society. In addition, for this researcher
democracy implies a kind of coordination between government, representative institutions, other
structures and civil society. The political process of transitions/ democratization can be in two
directions: i) from political institutions to social structures and civil society; ii) from civil society,
through social structures to political institutions/ government. Except institutional perspectives,
democratic transition is understood through political parties and electoral systems. Democratic
consolidation requires the establishment and confirmation of new political structures. In this
context, it also requires some rooting of the system in society, where political parties are the
obvious and probably crucial agents
16
. In this approach, political parties are an important variable
of democracy, because the number and the behaviour of these organizations in electoral campaign
represent a valid indicator of the level of democratization.
Concluding for all these approaches under democratic consolidation, we can observe a number
of invariant characteristics of democracy, as in the table below:

In this context we select as the main variables of this research: 1. the dynamic of
parliamentary political parties; 2. transparency and reform of political institutions; 3 electoral
processes; 4. judicial framework and the independence of justice; 5. civic society; 6. political rights
and civic liberties; 7. the independence of mass-media; 8. economic freedom; 9. economic growth;
10. democracy score. Through all this variables, we want to create a general view of
democratization in Eastern Europe. All these concepts and variables can be placed in the scheme
below: political institutions (bureaucracy and civil servants), social structures and organizations
(political parties, economic organizations, economic and public policies) and civil society (human
rights, civic freedom, and political liberty).
To the empirical level, we have measured the variable to a parametric level through the values
from Freedom Houses reports. In the meaning Freedom House realise an analytical instrument with
real values between [1; 7], where 1 represents a free country and also a democratic one, and 7
represents a non free country with an authoritarian regime or a post totalitarian one. The middle
values [2.5; 4.5] reflect a partial democracy or a nation in transit to democracy. Thus, except the
variables used in Freedom House s reports, for the dynamic of political parties in governmental

13
Iver B. Neumann, Regionalization and democratic consolidation, in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, Democratic
consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 61
14
Leonardo Morlino, Democracy between consolidation and crises, Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe,
Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 11
15
Ibidem, p. 30
16
Geoffrey Prindham, Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the
role of political parties, in Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, p.7
7
and parliamentary structures we are using as measurement index the number of parliamentary
parties in the period 1990-2007. Through this index, the research will facilitate a general
radiography for the stability and for the competition of Romanian political structure. The economic
development is measured through Heritage Index and the variable, which describes the economic
development, refers to the level of freedom in economic policies. In this context, the World Bank
data and scores for economic policies are used for describing the economic growth and the
macroeconomic equilibrium.
This research is focused upon a temporal series between 1990s-2007. We try to observe de
dynamic of Rumanian political system in 18 years starting with the fall of communism in 1989 and
beginning of democracy in 1990 with the replacement of Communist Party by a new political class,
which have various political colours. The final year of this analyze is 2007, when Romania entered
in EU. We consider that the Romania integration in EU is a point of democratic consolidation. The
Romanian political system is not democratic consolidated, but in economic sphere and in
institutional engineering it respects, with limits, the EU standards.
The case study is applied only to a single unit, for observe in a comprehensive manner the
dynamic of this political system.
Starting with these methodological premises, in the figure 1 we can observe the dynamic of
political class among 1990-2007
17
. In 1990s we assist to a big number of parliamentary parties in
electoral campaign and a kind of pseudo -consensual democracy between 1990-2000. There were
9 political parties with different ideologies which compound the representative institutions. We can
observe that the mean of political parties in electoral functions is 8 parties and the rate of variability
through a differential equation is 0, 2:
y =
dy
dx
and y = 0,2.
In addition, to the nonlinear model we can observe that the time variability of political parties
is:

( )
b
a
f x dx

= F (b) - F (a), in this case ( )

b
a
f x dx

= 8, 66

In this case we observe a very small rate of variability in 18 years of analyses, thus we can
conclude that the rate of political parties dynamic is constant in time, and the politically system is
working only with a number of 7-8 parties. In this context, the single manner of good functionality
for Romanian parties and Romanian Elective Assembly is the consensual model, in the better
case, or a parliamentary collaboration and association between parties. In this sense Romanian
political parties system is divided in two formation of min. 33 and max. 35% between social-
democratic ideologies and liberal or democratic liberal ideologies. The third part of 30% is
distributed between 5-6 small parties with 6% mean rate of voters with a standard mean error of 3%.


17
www.insse.ro and also http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/romania/


8
Dynamic of Parliamentary Parties 1990-2007
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
No.of Years
N
o
.
o
f

P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y

P
a
r
t
i
e
s

Chart no. 1 Romanian Parliamentary Parties (1990-2007)

The second dimension of these democratic variables refers to political institutions. In this
context, institutional design is one of the main important indicators of democratic stability. Thus, the
numerical index used for describing the rate of institutional transparency and for public reform, is
Freedom House index for administrative and institutional level of corruption. The level of political
corruption can express the main tendencies in the administrative system and in political institutions
practices. A high level of administrative corruption is directly correlated with an inefficient public
management and with an institutional framework dominated by the lack of public transparency. If
we consider the number of ministries / governmental departments as an indicator for public reform,
we can observe a very small rate of institutional innovation. The Romanian governance tendency for
administrative structures is to use a mean number of 25 departments. In this case the number of
departments is placed between (20,28). The lower number of departments is met in 2001 and the
highest number of departments is met in 1998 and 1999, a vulnerable period for Romanian political
system
We can observe through a differential equation that the rate of changes in Romanian institution
is a medium rate:
y
2
=
dy
dx
and y = 0, 05
This rate reflects a precarious context for public policies and for institutional innovation or
institutional engineering. The integral model and nonlinear model of variability in administrative
institutions reflects:

( )
b
a
f x dx

= F (b) - F (a), in this case ( )

b
a
f x dx

= 4.77
This value reflects the medium level of which are made Romanians public policies and public
reform. This big number of departments with a variable rate of 2-3 is found consistently in post-
communist countries or in the contemporary authoritarian regimes. This fact can be seen as a
communist legacy for a better social, political and economic control.
Freedom House measures data for electoral process, institutional corruption, electoral process,
judicial framework, civil society, human rights and civil liberties, independent mass- media to
interval level
18
. We opt for this kind of data, because Freedom House analyses are quite pertinently

18
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/nit2009/romania.pdf and the data base for Index of Political Rights and Civil
Liberties to: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7257

9
and objective in describing the level of democracy and the level of freedom in the world. This
temporal series is built for the period: 1999-2007. The average score for Romanian human rights
and civil liberties is 2,28, and this fact reflects a border between free country and partial free
country.

Year Corruption in
public
administration
Electoral
Process
Civil
Society
Political
Rights
Independent
Media
Democracy
Score
1990-
1998
>5.00 >3.00 >3.00 >2.50 >4.00 >4.00
1999 4.25 2.75 3 2.5 3.5 3.54
2000 4.25 2.75 3 2.5 3.5 3.54
2001 4.5 3 3 2.5 3.5 3.54
2002 4.75 3 3 2 3.5 3.67
2003 4.5 2.75 2.75 2 3.75 3.71
2004 4.5 2.75 2.5 2 3.75 3.63
2005 4.25 2.75 2.25 3 4 3.58
2006 4.25 2.75 2.25 2 4 3.39
2007 4 2.75 2.5 2 3.75 3.29
Table 1: Freedom House Index for Nations in Transit

The economic variables of transitions are based on the aggregate index of Economic freedom
realized by Heritage Foundation. In this case, the aggregate index of economic liberty is an average
score for a few economic sectors liberty. In this case the values for economic variables are between
[0%; 100%], where 0 represent a non-economic free country and 100% the most economic free
country. In transition period, Romania has 44, 2%, this fact reflecting a small level of economic
freedom. To the central tendency, we can observe a median value 42%, and a modal value between
42-43%.
The small rate of variability expressed by the differential equation y
3
=
dy
dx
= 1, 12 reflects
the main tendency for partial economic free country. The integral area of variability of this
economic phenomenon is estimated by the formula:
( )
b
a
f x dx

= F (b) - F (a), in this case ( )

b
a
f x dx

= 38.6
This value reflects the main tendency for Romanian economy: a quasi-centralized economy
with a 38.6% freedom. In this case, we can observe that in 2/3 from economic sectors the resources
and the main policies are performed by state. It is a post-socialist economic system with small
orientation to free market.
10
Overall Score of Economic Freedom
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Year ( No.of years)
S
c
o
r
e

o
f

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

F
r
e
e
d
o
m

Chart no. 2 Dynamic and Evolution of Economic Freedom in Romania
19


In a direct association to economic freedom, we can observe the level of democratic
consolidation through economic indicators of macroeconomic growth. Thus, in the first stage of
democratic studies Seymour Martin Lipset, Dunkart Rustow and other American researchers had
announced the importance of economy in democratic building. In this context most researchers,
without underlining a causal model, had observed an empirical high correlation between economy
and democracy with a 0.90-0.95 level of Pearsons coefficient of linearity and a 0.01 level of
significance (p(x)= 0.99). Without demonstrate a causal correlation between economic growth
indicators and score of democracy, this research is focused on the possibility of underline the impact
of liberal economy and economic growth on the dynamic of democracy.

GNP 1990-2007 (bilion $)
0
50
100
150
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Period (No.of years)
G
N
P

V
a
l
u
e

Chart no.3. Evolution of Romanian GNP
20


In the economic evolution, we can observe a critical period for Romanian macro equilibrium
among 1991-2004. In this context is obviously the transition valley for this period the small rate of
economic evolution. The small rate of variability expressed by the differential equation
4
y =
dy
dx
=
7.29 reflects the main tendency for economic growth in 18 years. The integral area of variability of
this economic phenomenon is estimated by the formula:

( )
b
a
f x dx

= F (b) - F (a), in this case ( )

b
a
f x dx

= 28.33

19
www.heritagefoundation.org

20
www.worldbank.org.ro
11
Appling this mathematical nonlinear models in this primary data analyses we can observe a
fragile framework for economic investments, for entrepreneurial activities and a lack of practical
coordination of macro economic policies. Thus, the year 2004 is quite similar, at GNP value, with
1990, the debut of liberalism in Romanian market.
Concluding, to a descriptive level we can observe the main tendency for Romanian democratic
dynamic: around the value 2.5-3.0. In this meaning, we have a post-communist country, which is
placed, statistically speaking, to the border of democracy and free country and partial democratic or
partial free country. Although the empirical data and empirical measurement can be quasi-
objective, we understand Romanian dynamic to democracy through historical strategies and through
normative interpretation of social facts. Combining political history with social hermeneutics and
mathematical methodology is an analytical mechanism (comprehensive mechanism) and a heuristic
way of political analyses. Democracy and democratic consolidation are not physical phenomena
which can be seen as causal mechanisms, all these being social phenomena modulated by social or
political actors in a historical context, with a mentalities background and also with anthropological
implications. A comprehensive strategy for understanding political systems and their dynamic can
be a mixtum compositum of methodology of research, political history, political geography and
international context, and political theory based on an anthropological and sociological design.

III. Results of Research. To a mathematical model for Romanian Democratic Transition

For demonstrate the work-hypothesis this research is concerned in the observing all these
connections between social, political and economic variables. In a general meaning, transition to
democracy from authoritarian systems can be seen as a physical dynamic with a various routes and
with a various correlations between separated phenomena.
If we agree an anthropological view of democratic transition, in Darwins terms, we can see
the politics is a part of the general struggle for survival. In this context according to Vanhanens
theory, democratization process depends on the distribution of relevant power resources.
Democratization takes place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely
distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its
hegemony.
21
In this case, we assist to a complex process of power resources distribution between
political institutions/ political actors and the social structure. All the conditions for democratizations
can be placed in two categories: symbolical conditions ( social mentalities, social and political
imaginary) and material conditions ( efficient public policies, competition between politically
parties, constitutions for human rights, an active civil society, civil servants in public administration,
and the most important condition a high level of economic development). The social basis of
power concentration in East European societies is not secure, because it is supported only by one
structural factor, the concentration of economic power resources, and contradicted by several others,
particularly by the fact that intellectual power resources are widely distributed and that the
occupational diversification of the population has created inevitable interest cleavages that provide a
natural basis for competing political parties
22
.
Starting with these premises for democratization, this research wants to create an empirical
model of democratic consolidation for Romanian political system, and to realize an analytical
approach for understanding and evaluating other democratic transitions.

21
Tatu Vanhanen and Richard Kimber, Predicting and explaining democratization in Eastern Europe, in Geoffrey
Prindham, Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe, Domestic and International Perspective, Routledge,
London, 1994, p.63
22
ibidem, p. 68
12
Methodological design of this research is factorial analyses, for observing all the correlations
between research variables and for observing the importance of each factor in the general variance.
The research is interested in the statistical correlation and in the multivariate and nonlinear model of
the variables implications. In this situation, the article is using procedures for controlling the false
discovery rate due to multiple testing
23
. Thus, all positive significant correlation will be evaluated
in model-graph building and the geometric representation in 3d space will be underlined into
dynamic transition model. This article uses as mathematical model directed graph for underline the
sense of transition and for creating a dynamic view in a very complex mechanism, which includes
political structures, social mentalities and actions and also economic equilibrium and evolution of
economic freedom.
The values of statistical correlations are represented in the matrix below. In this sense, this
research is interested only in positive values with a great level of significance. Thus we understand
through relevant positive values the values 0,50. The research relevant interval for association is
[0,50;1,00]. We opt for high level of correlation because any valid association between variables can
describe, in general terms, the democratization processes. All these correlations are valid to 0,05
level of significance with a probability function P(X)= 0,95. This type of probability is almost
statistically significant
24
.
All research variables, to the formal level, are market with X
1,n
and the elements of analytical
process are: X
0
- the fall of communist regime and X
10
- democratic consolidation. In this meaning,
the formal values for research variables are:




Table no.3

Correlation Matrix of Research Variables
















23
David A. Freedman, Statistical Models, Theory and practice, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 80
24
ibidem, p.70
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
Dynamic of
Parliamentary
Political Parties
Transparency
of Political
Institutions
Electoral
Process
Judicial
Framework
Civil Society
X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
Political Rights
and Civil
Liberties
Independent
Mass- media
Economic
Freedom
Economic
Growth
Democratic
Consolidation

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
X1
1 0.53 0.42 0.46 0.2 0.3 0.62 0.78 0.54 0.57
X2
0.53 1 0.89 0.92 0.7 0.28 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.96
X3
0.42 0.89 1 0.77 0.72 0.3 0.37 0.46 0.62 0.8
X4
0.46 0.92 0.77 1 0.84 0.37 0.39 0.67 0.76 0.93
X5
0.2 0.7 0.72 0.84 1 0.3 -0.07 0.43 0.73 0.69
X6
0.3 0.28 0.3 0.37 0.3 1 0.32 0.5 0.37 0.41
X7
0.62 0.57 0.37 0.39 -0.07 0.32 1 0.57 -0.25 0.62
X8
0.78 0.63 0.46 0.67 0.43 0.48 0.57 1 0.73 0.72
X9
0.54 0.67 0.62 0.76 0.73 0.37 0.25 0.73 1 0.7
X10
0.57 0.96 0.8 0.93 0.69 0.41 0.62 0.72 0.7 1
13
To the factorial level, we can observe a high correlation between variables. In this case the
factorial matrix determinant is 0,84, value which reflects a strong association in a plan geometry
between the research variables/ vectors. Starting with this premise, this research, in a factorial
manner, is quite representative for 80% for the reality. This describes around 81% ( if we consider
the sphericity test Bartlett) for the reality with a probabilistic value of 0,95.
To the geometric level, we can observe the distribution of the research variables in a rotated
space. This geometric arrangement is quite interesting for observing the similarities between
variables and the order of their determination.

Chart no. 4 Geometric Representation of Factorial Correlation

At the regression equations, we can observe that political parties (58, 78%) explain the most
part of the phenomenon variance and the rest part of the process is explained with 12-15% by
political institutions and civil society. In this case we agree to place the first graph variable the
political parties.
The mathematical models for this transitional process is a directed and plan graph, a discreet
model, which reflects the dynamic of the process. In a general definition, a graph is a mathematical
model which combines geometric descriptors with algebra operations.
In this meaning, a graph G is an ordered pair of disjoint sets (V, E) such that E is a subset of
the set V
(2)
of unordered pairs of V. Unless it is explicitly stated otherwise we consider only finite
graphs that is, V and E are always finite" The set V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. If
G is a graph, then V = V (G) is the vertex set of G. and E = E (G) is the edge set. An edge {x, y} is
said to join the vertices x and y and is denoted by xy. Thus xy and yx mean exactly the same edge;
the vertices x and yare the end vertices of this edge
25
.
Let be a nonempty sequence in L(V ). We denote the first element of by ().Let , ,
and be, possibly empty, sequences in L(V ). Note that is a subsequence consisting of consecutive
elements of . If is non empty, we write < . Note that the < symbol is only used for
sequences having the same first element. Of course, if we allow to be empty, then we write _ .
A route system on the set V is a family of nonempty sequencers L(V ) satisfying the following
axioms:

25
Bela Bollobas, Modern graph theory, Springer-Verlag, New York-Heidelberg-Berlin, 1998, p.1-2
14
1) (r0) u R for any u V,
2) (r1) uv Ru, v R.
Let R be a route system. The sequences in R are called routes. The length of a route is
|| 1.
26

As a complex and dynamic model, graphs theory have a lot of empirical applications in
physical sciences, economic sciences and also it may be used in political or social sciences for
describing the interactions at the social networks. Thus, in this mathematical model, through
specific algorithms it can be estimated the minimum or critical route, the cycles, the flow and the
optimal time for a process. This research is focused on the possibility of route estimation, in this
case being interested in minimal variables of the process and in critical ways and variables of
democratic transition.
For realising the graph associated with democratic transition in Romanian political system,
this research uses the Bellman-Kalaba algorithm for building and analysing the elements of the
graph. In this meaning, all the research variables are represented by the X0; X11 vertices (nodes in
the graph) and the edges are represented by statistical factorial correlation between all these
variables.

Let be {X0X10} variables with card |X1;X10|= 18,
0
;
2 2 2 2
n n n
i i i i
o o
x y
n n n n
i i i i
o o o o
n X Y X Y
r
n X X n Y Y

=
l l
1 1
l l


l l

( ) ( )
l l
l l


,



and M1- a matrix M
11*11
of l factorial correlation between X0; X10, in the matrix M1 are
marked with: 0 absence of relevant correlation/ implication between X
i-1
; X
i
and with 1- the
correlation between X
i-1
; X
i
:



X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
X0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
X2
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
X3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
X4
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
X5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
X6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
X7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
X8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
X9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
X10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table no. 4 Matrix of Graph Incidence


26
Manoj Changat, Henry Martyn Mulder, Route Systems on Graphs , in Mathematica Bohemica, Vol.126, No.3, 2001,
p.608
15
Let be {X0X10} variables with card |X1;X10|= 18,
0
; ;
2 2 2 2
' [0.50;1.00]
n n n
i i i i
o o
x y x y
n n n n
i i i i
o o o o
n X Y X Y
r r
n X X n Y Y

=
l l
1 1
l l


l l

( ) ( )
l l
l l


,


and M2- a matrix M
11*11
of factorial correlation between X0; X10, in the matrix M2 are marked
with : 0 absence of relevant correlation/ implication between X
i-1
; X
i
and with r
x,y
values - the
correlation between X
i-1
; X
i
:

Values of r
x,y
, where r
x,y
[0.50;1.00]

X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
X0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X1 0 0
0.53
0 0 0 0
0.62 0.78 0.54 0.57
X2 0 0 0
0.89
0
0.7
0
0.57 0.63 0.67 0.96
X3 0 0 0

0
0.72
0 0
0.62 0.8
X4 0 0
0.92 0.77
0
0.84
0 0
0.67 0.76 0.93
X5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.73 0.69
X6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
X7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.62
X8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.57 0 0.73 0.72
X9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7
X10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
Table no.5 Adjacency Graph Matrix

Although to mathematical level all part of the research variables are not scalar, except
economic variables, the research is focused on perception values which were transformed to scalar
level through statistical algorithms. In this case, we can observe similar correlation values between
Kendall Coefficient of correlation for nonparametric variables and linear coefficient of correlation
(Pearson). Starting with these statistical values research methodology is based on linear and
nonlinear models between variables for extrapolate all the possible intersection or covariance
mechanisms. Factorial design associated with scalar and parametric correlation can create a general
overview of the process and can induce to the social researcher any possible association or variation
between cases or values. Through both methods of correlation we had observed that any variability
of correlation coefficients is very small, having scalar values between [0.05; 0.10]. For having an
optimal level of confidence and for reducing statistical error for Type I or II our factorial design is
based on dyadic data analyses.
27

Deriving from these premises we can realize the dynamic graph model for Romanian political
transition, in which are represented all the statistical correlation between research variables:


27
David A. Kenny, Deborah A. Kashy, William L. Cook, Dyadic Data Analysis, The Guildford Press, London & New
York, 2006, p. 47
16

Figure no. 1. Dynamic Graph Model for Romanian Transition

In the graph G (V, E) may be estimated, through mathematical algorithms, the minimum way
from X
0
to X
n
, maximum way of the process, the cycle between vertices, and the flow of the process
modelled through the graph.
This research of democratic transition is focused on the identifying the minimum or critical
ways for the transitional processes for understanding which of the democratic variables are most
important democratic consolidation. In addition, starting with the minimum/critical way of the graph
we can induce the elementary way and the maximum way of the process.
Appling Belam-Kallaba algorithm for directed graph we can observe the elementary ways of
democratic consolidation. In the connection matrix of the graph we have the values:
i) 0- the intersection of X
i
with X
i

ii) Values of Pearson Coefficient (r
x,y
) the correlation between X
i
and X
j,

iii) +- the intersection between X
i
and X
j
, but is not any correlation between
each variable.

17
The minimum way of the process estimated through the graph below is based on political
parties. In this meaning, we can corroborate the models result with o political theory of democracy:
Theory of Elites. Romanian political system has to underline the role of social and political elites for
realising an optimal transitional process.
If political parties and political elites are the main and also sine qua non condition for
building democracy this article is focused on the critical conditions without any democratic
transition can not be realised. Thus, through the same algorithm is estimated the maximum and
critical route of the democratic transitional process.
The estimation of maximum (critical) route of the transitional process through this
mathematical algorithm is quasi- similar of minimum route determination with these annotations:
i) 0- the intersection of X
i
with X
i

ii) Value of Pearson Coefficient (r
x,y
) the correlation between X
i
and X
j,
where
exists any correlation
iii) - the intersection between X
i
and X
j
, but is not any correlation between each
variables.
iv) Near the last column of vectors values (X10) will be added a similarly column with

0,n
values of vectors.
v) From the scalar operation between
0
and each column will be estimated maximum
values between
0n,
and the column X
nn
- max (
0n,
+ X
nn)

vi) If
n-1
=
n
results a route between X
0
; X
n

vii) If
n-1
=
n
and
1
max( ; )
n n
X X

than the maximum rout can be estimated from

n
-
n-1
= d( X
n
-X
n-1
)




The critical/ maximum way of Romanian transitional process has as elementary variables
(vertices): Political- Parties- Transparency of Political Institutions- Electoral Process- Civil
Society and Economic Growth. For realising an optimal flow and optimal route under the process
is quite necessary to underline the major role played by these political and economical variables in
building democracy. We can observe o sense of democracy consolidation, which started from
political actors to economic policies. In this case, we assist to a quasi-linear model of power flow
from political structures to economic mechanisms. Transitional process is based on political
variables and economic factors. Why we cannot speak about real democracy in Romania? One of
the answers can derive from the interpretation, in political context, of critical route of democracy.

IV. Discussions. An analytical perspective under Romanian transition. Actors, policies
and democratic reform

Romanian democratic consolidation seems to be a continuous process, characterized by the
temporary changes and a fluid public system reform. Political parties and political actors are playing
the fundamental role in democratic consolidation. An anthropological explanation for this kind of
dynamic derives from historical approach.
After fifty years of political monopole (1947-1989), in which the Communist Party was the
single political major entity of Romanian society, it is very obviously for citizens to create and to
empathize with a diversity of ideologies and parties. In this manner, we can understand the high
number of parties registered to the Juridical Authorities in 1990, and the high number of
parliamentary parties among 1990-1996. For Romanian transition to democracy, the central
18
mechanism is played by political elections. If in the Western Europe we can observe social
mechanism and civic reactions to governmental public policies, in Romanian incipient democracy
political parties substitute the civil society and the civic reactions. If in Western societies it is very
obviously meet a form of democratic liberalism which generates the theory of managerial
capitalism
28
based on civic values, economic resources and private propriety in Romania,
democracy can be reduced to a political game between post communism and a very incipient set
of liberal values.
To create a general and sustainable framework for democratic consolidation, political parties,
and political class have to underline the role of the elites in building a new society. In this case study
we can observe that all post-communist parties are built under the old political actors and the
system can be characterized by a lack of political and economical elites. Public affairs and political
reforms are only the attributes for experts or elites
29
. In western political practices, we can meet a
functional democracy model through political institutions and political parties, based on the transfer
of the private models and concepts in public affairs. In this sphere, political actors and political
parties (as social organizations) have to realize a kind of cultural pattern for citizens and to catalyze
democratic transitions. Thus, in western transitions to democracy we can underline the dynamic
processes of central and local political administrations through cultural approaches
30
.
In Max Weber, assumption political parties are the promoters of democracy. Their major role
in democracy is to create the best mechanisms for electoral competition and to create the best
opportunities for promoting political culture. There are two major axes: i) a post communist one,
which is continued, in general terms, by social- democracy and also by the SDP (Social- Democratic
Party with a few number of ideological and political changes); ii) a liberal view, based on the
historically parties (National Liberal Party). Besides these major orientations, we can observe some
particularities of Romanian party system: a radical tendency with nationalists values, which is
constantly elected among 1992-2004 (with a general mean of voters- 12-14%) and minorities parties
as a mechanism of democratic representation of ethnic groups. It is very difficult to underline the
parties role in civic building and in democratic transition. Any form of civic culture does not
structure both ideological axes.
First orientation can be seen as a moderate post-communist class, with a general tendency of
promoting in public office actors of the past regime. In this case, the governances among 1990-1996
and 2000-2004 are social- democratic practices, with a moderate socialist view of political
intervention, social changes and economic freedom. In a behaviour paradigm, to the psycho-
sociological level, it is very obviously that all political behaviours of the social-democrats leaders
are symmetrically, in any political areas, with the communists behaviours.
Second political orientation, the liberal- democracy, is a soft paradigm of political
government. The period among 1996-2000 governed by a democratic alliance can be seen as a
vulnerable period of government, except last year (1999-2000), when economic policies have led to
economic growth. Isarescus economic policies, statistically speaking, have generated a medium
level of economic freedom. In this case, comparative with 1998 or 1996, the economic freedom is
almost 55%, in accord with Heritage Foundations Index. The second period of government, into a
politically alliance between National Liberal Party and Democrat Party ( 2004-2008), is
characterized by economic reforms for free market and also by the manner of preserving the power,
in the case in which we had assisted to a tacit conflict between president and prime-minister. This,

28
Bruno Tinel, propos de la crise du nolibralisme, in Partis mouvements, Second semestre, 2009, Presses
Universitaires de France, p.180
29
Isabelle Berrebi- Hoffmann and Pierre Grmion, lites intellectuelles et rforme de ltat, in Cahiers Internationaux
de Sociologie, quoi servent les experts ? Volume CXXVI, Janvier- Juin 2009, Presses Universitaires de France, p. 40.
30
Patrick Fridenson, Nouvelles perspectives sur les organisations, in Le Mouvement Social, Organisations publiques,
organisations marchandes: cultures, volutions, contestations, Juillet- Septembre 2009, p.6
19
historically speaking, is a period of political stability and is the moment of Romanian integration in
E.U.
Overall, both ideological and political practices cannot be seen as a democratic model for the
promotion and dissemination of political culture and the formation of democratic citizens.
Post communist countries and other late democracies faced challenges of multiple transitions.
In this context economic forces, international influences and, the most important, the public
participation in political process dominate democratization. Under these new conditions, mass
political mobilization was no longer seen as a threat to emerging democracies. To the contrary, the
passivity and apathy of citizens and voters and the weakness of political parties and civic
organizations were considered major impediments to successful democratization and the most
difficult challenge to overcome
31
. Thus, the strengthening of political participation became a major
priority for democratic transition.
Romanian estimated way of transition is focused on politically parties and civil rights. These
are the elementary conditions for Romanian transition to democracy. Although in political theory
the civic society and citizens participation in NGO s structures are elementary conditions for
democracy, Eastern European transitional processes are based on institutional engineering or
political class consolidation. In this case, the political class is succeeded by the respect for
democratic law and for civic rights. Since 2002, Freedom House labels Romanian system as a
democratic one and a free country, and the rank for civic rights is 2.00. Thus, this value, which
reflects a minimum condition for democracy, has been announcing the incipient phase of civic
participation.
In a direct correlation with mathematical model of transition, Romanian system is
characterised by two tendencies: i) a political tendency based on the consolidation of political
parties and political elites, and on the institutional reform; ii) an economic tendency based on the
development of economic policies for macroeconomic growth and free market. In this meaning, we
assist to a model characterised by a strong equation: political framework- economic development. If
we try to compare this kind of dynamic to western democracies, we have to underline the social
variables and conditions for democracy. In Romanian political system the sense of the vectors is
from politics to economy and a mechanism of political intervention in free market, in western
democracy we have an endogen model where the vectors sense is from civil society to political
institutions and actors and to economic dynamic. Western strategy for democracy, which is an
endogen process, can be viewed as an optimal model for political changes.
To underline this fact its very obviously to analyse the dynamic through a historical paradigm. In
this meaning, if we use as referential models for regime changes the American War for
Independence, France Revolution (1789) or other significant movements for XIX- th century (like:
Italian movements for political union- Risorgimento, Germany union under Otto von Bismarck,
regional independence is Southern Europe) and the democratic building in Western Europe after
Second World War, we observe a central vector of social and political dynamic: civil society. Civic
movements and civic participation have built all contemporary democracies. From this reason, we
can speak about endogen democracy based on social forces. If we try to realise a similarity with a
physical process we assist to centrifugal model were the main force and vector of dynamic is civic
society. Civil society and civic reactions are the forces, which polarises the political structure and
the economic equilibrium.
Characterised by liberal values, civic society is a kid of social engine that animates all
political approaches. But is there a causal connection between the density of civil society and the

31
Przeworski, Adam. 1992. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press in Jorge I. Dominguez
and Anthony Jones (ed.), The construction of democracy, Lessons from practice& research, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 2007, p. 23
20
actual progression of the process of democratization, as implied in the neo-Tocquevillean
hypothesis? In other words, does the density of civil society has any real effect on the creation,
development and maintenance of democratic institutions? To explore this question, it is imperative
to look at the composition of civil society in recently democratic countries and contrast it to specific
advances in the realm of democratic consolidation. Of course, we cannot presume that the
composition of civil society alone will determine the project of democratic consolidation.
Nonetheless, if civil society does in fact have the kinds of causal effects on democratization
attributed to civil society, we should find a strong correspondence between the density of civil
society and the quality of the emerging democracy. This causality, however, is not borne out by the
empirical evidence.
32
This author started his approach about democracy and social capital through
a causal question between civic society and democracy, and tries to adequate an empirical study for
demonstrate this correlation. Although we can express an empirical coefficient between these
variables with a strong values (almost >0.90), all historical examples and all contemporary
democracy can be understood through civil mechanism or civil liberties. Democracy can be viewed
as legitimate regimes that sustain the social trust.
For other political scientists, civic culture and a strong institutional building complete civil
society. The available evidence cannot determine the causal direction but it does indicate that
culture and political institutions have a strong tendency to go together.
33
In this context,
institutional reform seems to another significant element of democratic transition. We cannot speak
about democracy without underling the major role played by institutional design and institutional
engineering in democratic transformation. Democratic transition produced initially a series of
institutions that were specially designed for that process, or even for the pre-transition.
34
For
exemplifying in Romanian transition to democracy all these institutional transformations, it is very
obviously to realize a historical approach of institutional changes. Thus, the period 1990-1992 can
be viewed as a pre-transitional context in which old communist elements are combined with new
democratic perspectives. In institutional building, we can observe an inertial mechanism of
communist bureaucracy reflected in the number of ministries and in the dense structure of
bureaucracy. In these two years, all public institutions worked through post communist practices.
Public policies were inefficient in creating a coherent framework for democratic institutions. Thus,
inertial mechanisms and a high level of institutional corruption characterize this first stage of
democracy in Romanian political system. A probabilistic estimation of Freedom House Index of
Corruption reflects small institutional changes, lack of public transparency and a high level of
corruption (>5). All these empirical data can be correlated with International Transparency Index of
Corruption for creating a general radiography of a static society and of an incoherent public process.
The period among 1992-2000 is a pre-transition period of institutional building. In 1999 and
the first semester of 2000 had been made some relevant changes in institutional design, in
administrative structure and in economic policies. Statistical indicators reflect a soft positive
tendency for institutional reform and transparency, electoral process, democracy score and
economic growth. In this case, to the institutional level the tendency is to positive appreciation with
a reform rate of 10%. Although this value is not quite relevant for institutional transparency, this
reform seems to place Romania under the route of democratic transition. Institutional reform is
associated with economic growth and with electoral process with a strong statistical power, and all
the public policies reflect a minimum effort for sustaining free market and macroeconomic

32
Omar G. Encarnacion, The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital in Spain and Brazil, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,
2003, p. 179
33
Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Post-modernization: Culture, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies,
apud Omar G. Encarnacion, op.cit,p. 184
34
Attila gh, The Politics of Central Europe, Sage Publications Ltd, London, 1998, p.81
21
equilibrium. We can appreciate this period as a protected transition in a general transitional
process. A democratic transition, in fact, consists of many shorter or longer transitions.
35
This is
the case of Romanian system, where political parties and institutional changes are the elementary
conditions for democracy. The most visible part of this 'transition of transitions' is the start, duration
and end of negotiations, usually finished by signing a pact, followed by a short period between the
pact and the first free elections
36
.
From statistical indicators of institutional reform and transparency for 2000-2004 we must
underline the statically perspective or, in the worst case, an inertial social democratic reform.
Nastases government is statically government, with a medium impact under intuitional and
electoral reform. Comparative with 1999-2000, we can observe a small negative growth of political
indicators. If in 1999 the institutional index of public reform is 4.25 in 2002 it has the value 4.75.
This medium depreciation reflects a bureaucratic model of institutional changes. Positive
appreciation of institutional engineering and transparency can be observed in the period 2005-2007.
Practically, the democratic reform of political institutions dates since 2005. After 15 years of inertial
or statically perspectives in institutional changes we can underline the efforts for reform and
transparency.
In according to institutional reform, another central process of democratization is represented
by electoral process. Romania had a much more difficult start for democratization. The beginnings
were very violent, similar to the nineteenth century revolutions, with a large participation of urban
masses and students []
37
This kind of regime changes generates the first electoral mechanisms
in 1990. Thus, the same communist political actors, with a social- democrat party- NSF, dominate
first parliamentary elections in 1990. Parts of the communist were elected in National Parliament or
in executive positions in Petre Roman and Nicolae Vacaroius govern. The clearest and deepest
turning point was in Romania. People were tired of economic mismanagement and political
corruption, the continued rule of former apparatchiks and the nationalistic hysteria. Whereas the
masses felt simply that 'enough was enough', the large circles of political and economic elite
realized quite precisely that the Iliescu regime provoked Western alienation and made Romania a
pariah of the international system. The 'age of normalcy' came, indeed, with the November 1996
parliamentary and presidential elections. For the first time, the DCR as an umbrella organization
appeared unified and had an alternative political programme.
38
. Since 1996, the electoral system has
been quite open to the new political parties and to the new social elite. In this context, the election
of Emil Constantinescu, as academic personality, at the Romanian presidency and the alliance
between liberal parties is the first step for a democratic and free electoral system. In 2000, in many
political scientists opinion, the electoral system is quite stabile, and the proportional mechanism of
voters generates a system based on 4-5 political parties. In 2000-2007, electoral process is market
with 2.75, fact that represent a border between free electoral system and partial-free electoral
system.
Electoral process and political parties are for Romanian democratic transition the main
elements of systemic changes. In this meaning, the pre-transition stage and the democratic
consolidation are based on the competition of political parties. Although in other political systems
the central element of democracy is civil society, in Romanian democracy it is very evident a partial
consolidation through political parties. This process could be completed by a qualitative element:
political culture and democratic practices. Beyond this element, all Eastern European transitions are
characterized by some general patterns like: a) electoral and party fragmentation; b) high electoral

35
ibidem, p.82
36
ibidem
37
ibidem, p. 183
38
ibidem, p.187
22
volatility and protest voting. c)The return of the 'post-communist' vote and parties; d) Growing
abstentionism at elections; e) Declining confidence in parliaments and parties
39
. All this features
can be correlated with traditional models of policy and with communist conservationism. From
these patterns, we can explain the model of democratic culture. Romanian transition is characterized
by the absence of any social-political-cultural element. It is a centripetal model of democracy with
inertial forces. In this case all the inertial forces derives from authoritarian mentalities,
conservationism and traditional- clienteles patterns of social behavior. If we analyze and interpret
the mathematical model of Romanian transition, we can observe a non-planar vertex (X6- civic
rights and political liberties) which is not associated with political variables and social variables.
This is a particularity of Romanian transition, where civic culture and civic values are not
introduced in democratic flow.
Political changes have almost correlated with economic models and patterns. In this context,
a critical variable for Romanian transition is economic growth. The general picture of economic
activities is very weak. While GDP growth has been considerable in most post-communist countries
since around 1990, firms in post-communist countries invest, on average, only about half of their
GDP into R&D as do typical OECD countries. In terms of innovative outcomes, the difference
between post-communist countries and the more advanced Western countries is even more dramatic
a fact that signals the inefficiency of R&D for innovation
40
. In according to these premises we can
observe a high rate of intervention in economic policies and in economic freedom. After 1990, all
governmental economic policies are characterized by interventionism for a medium or long period.
Historically, the markets in different countries have also resulted from a long process of
organic development. There has been an interaction between the specific features of these societies
and of their markets. The societies have also created the legal framework and the various
organizations required for the market to function properly.
41
Political interventionism is the main
feature of Romanian economic changes. If in traditional model of economic building, the market is
the interaction between society and economys product, in Romanian transition the market is
modulated by the political actors. Romania does not have a competitive and freedom market
because all the reforms were coordinated by the state and by National Bank. Thus National
Romanian Bank intervened in coordinating the monetary flow, the rate of monetary change, and the
impact of macro economic phenomena. Romania has not a liberally policies and a liberally ideology
in economic development. Inertial points characterize all the economic reforms, and the main result
of this kind of intervention is small rate of economic growth and small rate of economic freedom. In
a general view under economic growth Romania is characterized by 7,29 rate of economic
development for a period of 18 years. Starting with 2002-2003 Romania has a positive economic
growth. In 2006-2007 GNP is 169, 28 billions $ and this reflects a positive tendency of
macroeconomic equilibrium and macro social stability. This value can be correlated with economic
freedom, and the empirical coefficient of association is 0.90. From these facts we can observe that a
high level of economic freedom can generate (without a causal model) economic growth. However,
additionally to this economic indicators we must underline the E.U. financial sustain. All the
integration Economic Founds and the requirements of European aquis played a major role for
economic development and equilibrium in 2006 and 2007. From these meanings, we can observe an
external model for Romanian democratization. International context and European regional

39
ibidem, p.101-102
40
Per Hgselius, The Dynamic of Innovation in Post- Communist Countries: Opportunities and Challenges, in Bruno
S. Sergi, William T. Bagatelas, Jana Kubicov, Industries and Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, Ashgate
Publishing, 2007, p.85
41
Mihly Simai, The democratic process and the market: Key aspects of the transition in comparative perspective, in
Mihly Simai (Ed.),The democratic process and the market: Challenges of the transition, United Nations University
Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris, 1999, p.42
23
economic standards are the main pivots around which are crystallized market and economic
development.
For generate a competitive market and sustainable political framework Romanian actors have
to follow some general and systemic criteria. Thus, a competitive economic development is based
on:
i) the system should provide work opportunities and sufficient income to the maximum
number of people;
ii) the same system should create and liberate enough resources for public institutions to fulfill
their collective responsibilities and promote the common good;
iii) workers, employers, citizens, and groups in civil society should be able to participate in the
functioning of the economy, whether at corporate, national, or international level;
iv) the economy should leave to individuals enough space and time for pursuits other than
earning their livelihood, in the intellectual, artistic, or spiritual domains, or simply for social
intercourse and celebration of the pleasures of being human and part of a community
42
.
Concluding, all the economic and political reforms are none coordinated and the general
manner of transition is based on political mechanisms. Romanian transitional model is very similar
with post soviet countries, having as central vertex the political parties. Romanian reforms seem to
be post communist reforms, with an amalgam of political interventionism, inertial social forces and
traditional social and political paradigms.



V. Conclusions. How robust is Romanian democratic consolidation?

Why political parties are the elementary condition for Romanian democratic transition? Why
political parties are the minimum route in transitional graph model? These questions are the central
points of this analyze, and the answers can derive from some general directions. In this context, the
research is interested in anthropological explanation, in psycho- sociological point of view, and in
historical approach. Through anthropological explanation, we can understand in evolutionary terms
the political class building. In this case, political process and political actors can be assimilated with
Darwin conception under natural world. Political process can be reduced to a simple term: power.
Political competition between actors seems to be a fight for ascending in power positions. After
fifty years of political monopole from Communist Party (a symbol of totalitarians power), it is very
obviously to understand electoral competition as a mechanism for preservation personal interests
and for monopole public affairs. In anthropological terms political competitions is reduced to a
traditional patterns, where political status is quite synonym with personal power. All this meanings
of political competitions are the avatars of post communism. The regimentation in governmental
party is quite synonym with personal advantages and public affairs control. All these aspects are the
residuals aspects of the old society and their understanding is possible through anthropological
design. Thus, the post communist actors, in a traditional logic, try to preserve and to perpetuate their
political status.
The second manner of understanding democratic transition through political parties is based on
psycho- sociological design. In this sense, this article wants to underline the Theory of political
elites in political building. With reverberations in Pareto, Mosca and other 70s political scientists,
this theory underline the major role played by elites in political culture, public policies and also in
democratic building. For ascending to viable model of democracy Romanian system, have to

42
Jacques Baudot, Criteria and values for assessing the quality of economic systems, in Mihly Simai (Ed.), op.cit, p.29

24
encourage and develop political and economical elites. Its very obviously the major role played by
elites in western democracies in XIXth century movements and in XX th century public and
democratic policies. Romanian parties system is partially characterized by the absence of political
elites. Many parts of political actors are actors from the old political structure, with post communist
ideologies and practice. It is very important, for developing and securing democracy, to create a
legal framework for encourage the elite ascension and development. Public reform, institutional
innovation and economic freedom can be realized by technocrats or by a rational and democratic
political class.
In historical approach, we can understand the absence of political elites and all the
anthropological implications. In historical meaning, we can speak about political parties at the end
of XIX th century. Parliamentary tradition for Romanian system is characterized by a short period of
time (1880-1947) under a constitutional monarchy. The end of 1950 announced a communist
system, where Romanian Communist Party played the major role. All the political parties, civic
associations or social movements were repressed by totalitarianism. Contemporary parliamentary
tradition dates since 1990.
Beyond elementary condition of Romanian transition, through mathematical model we have
observed that this process is based on some critical variables like transparency of public institutions,
electoral process, civil society and economic growth. All these variables can be viewed as critical
condition for the process dynamic. Directly correlated with political parties, transparency of public
institutions and electoral process are the main political variables which play the role of vectors for
democratic dynamic. Thus, the high level of institutional corruption can be reduced through
institutional reform and through political elite development.
Electoral process, partial free in Freedom Houses analyses, is another critical variable for
democratic transition. Proportional effects characterize Romanian electoral system. In these terms,
proportionality can determine many mechanic effects under parties system, facilitating a big
number of parties in electoral structures. Comparative with western democracies we can underline
the importance of majority vote in democratic building. Proportional effects generate an affluence of
parties in parliamentary structures and multi color government with a high degree of fragmentation.
For these reasons, we are assisting to a very low rate of government stability and balance. Maurice
Duverger had announced a sociological law based on correlation between electoral system and
democracy. In this sense, he had observed a strong empirical correlation between majority vote and
democratic practices. Only a mixed electoral system, based on majority vote and proportional
effects, could reduce the high level of electoral fragmentation. The elementary conditions for
democracy political parties and political elites- are strongly correlated with all electoral
procedures and techniques.
Civil society and economic growth are both critical conditions foe democracy. A democratic
system is based on civic society or civic corpus, which functions as a mechanical arrangement
based on bivalent relation: public policies- reactions for civic society. In a systemic approach, the
civic society represents the main input for the system. All the civic wishes/ necessities are
materialised in systemic inputs for governmental decedents. All the reactions or movements for
public policies are materialised, in a feedback mechanism, in civic society. In tocquevillean
meaning, civic society is the main vector for democratic progress. Romanian civic society is
characterised by a strong influence for political parties. We cannot speak about a real civic society
because all civic movements were, in many times, a simulacrum of democratic practices. Among
1990-1997, all international reports characterise Romanian civic society as a model subdued under
political power. Since 2004-2005, we can observe a positive dynamic in civic society structure.
Therefore, we have a partially democratic model of civic reaction and intervention in public
affairs. Directly coordinated with civic values and political structures, economic growth is a
significant element of democratic transition. Without creating a pseudo- causal model between
25
economy and democracy, we can underline the main role played by free market and economic
freedom in democratic building. A nation based on economic liberalism has a good rate of
institutional changes and of democratic consolidation. This aspect, in a historically approach,
derives from western democracies. USA model of democracy or Western European democracies are
the relevant examples of confluence between political process and macro economic development.
How robust is Romanian democratic consolidation? This is a key-question for any social,
political or economic scientist. Is a key-question because all the answers, or predicted models are
not materialised by governmental decedents in public policies/ democratic reforms for optimize the
democratic flow. We assist to an inertial model of democracy with many cyclical trends and with
centripetal forces between relevant democratic variables. We can speak, in this moment, as
analytical model, about a partial democratic system, or a nation on the correct route for transit to
democracy. As a prediction model, we can underline the positive trend of Romanian transition
after 2005-2006 with some critical conditions. Therefore Romanian political system will be
considered a viable democracy when the political competition will be based on political elites;
when institutional reforms and constitutional engineering will be realised by technocrats; when
the main inputs for political actions/ policies will derive from civic society or from civic practices,
and also when the economic freedom will be placed in directly correlation with economic growth
and systemic equilibrium.
For political practices, this article wants to underline the importance of all the critical
variables in building, developing and securing democratic values and democratic process.


VI. Forwards


All critical models and routes for democratic transition will generate to the normative level a
new manner of understanding and modeling the democratic transition. In this manner, this article
wants to create an epistemic approach under the possibility of applying mathematical models in
political sciences, and particularly in theory of democratic transition. The optimum design for
understanding the complexity of democratic dynamic is the comparative design, based on a mixed
strategy: political theory, mathematical models and political anthropology and history. For
realizing, a comprehensive theory under political regime changes in Eastern Europe this article
will be completed by another comparative study with Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. Therefore, we
intend to observe through cluster and correspondence analyses any similarities between democratic
routes in dynamic graph models. In consequences, all practical results and all empirical lessons will
facilitate and improve interpretation to the normative level the theory of democratic consolidation.


VII. Bibliography:
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26
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Reviews and articles:

1. Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, quoi servent les experts ? Volume CXXVI, Janvier-
Juin 2009, Presses Universitaires de France
2. Le Mouvement Social, Organisations publiques, organisations marchandes : cultures,
volutions, contestations, Juillet- Septembre 2009
3. Mathematica Bohemica, Vol.126, No.3, 2001

Sites:

1. www.freedomhouse.org
2. www.heritagefoundation.org
3. www.insse.ro
4. www.nsd.uib.no
5. www.worldbank.org.ro