Defense News 04/15/2013

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45I4 & F40IFI0 8IM
8, wN0LL MINNI0K
I4IFI Amorica's stratogic ro-
balancing toward tho Pacific
known as tho Asia pivot" could
moot its first unwantod tost ovor
tho 1apanoso-controllod Sonkaku
Islands, now boing challongod for
control by China.
Could tho Asia pivot's truo ful-
crum bo locatod on thoso dosolato,
rocky outcrops in tho East China
Soa? China, vhIch caIIs fhem fhe
Iaoyu IsIands, claims thoy woro
stolon from it aftor World War II.
Ovor tho past two yoars, Boijing
has takon aggrossivo actions to in-
timidato 1apanoso Coast Guard
vossols in chargo of safoguarding
tho islands' torritorial boundarios.
Thoro aro concorns an accidon-
tal war could bo triggorod by mis-
calculation or by China, in tho spir-
it of nationalism, taking a calculat-
od risk by invading tho islands.
Tho quostion many aro asking is:
Would Washington fulfill its do-
fonso troaty obligations with 1apan
by taking an activo military rolo to
romovo Chinoso forcos from tho is-
lands? Or would tho U.S. hositato
for political and oconomic roasons
to placato China? If so, what
would this moan for rogional con-
fidonco in Amorica's commitmonts
to poaco and stability?
This could bo Amorica's Suoz
momont," said Paul Giarra, who
hoads Global Stratogios & Trans-
formation, a national dofonso and
stratogic planning consulting firm
in Washington. It could bo tho mo-
mont whon Amorica, hobblod by
massivo dobt, domostic political
spasms and tho lingoring wounds
of two oxhaustivo wars, finally ro-
alizos, as did Groat Britain during
tho Suoz crisis of 19b6, that its abil-
ity to fulfill its intornational strato-
gic commitmont in a complox,
multipolar world onds.
And if tho U.S. fails to uphold its
troaty obligations to 1apan in such
a sconario, could this forco 1apan,
South Koroa, Taiwan and tho
Philippinos to quostion whothor it
is in thoir bost intorosts to cator to
a doclining suporpowor that is no
longor ablo to moot tho minimum
roquiromonts of its plodgos during
a crisis? Or will tho U.S., guidod by
tho lights of a bygono ora of boing
tho unilatoral suporhoro, divo into
a war with an oconomic supor-
powor that doos not sharo Amori-
ca's cost-bonofit morality or its ro-
ciprocal military rostraint?
In offoct, what would stop China
from attacking mainland U.S. tar-
gots if tho U.S. first attackod land-
basod ballistic-missilo facilitios on
mainland China?
This bocomos a gamo of chick-
on," said Doan Chong, a China spo-
cialist at tho Horitago Foundation,
a Washington think tank. Would
tho 1apanoso bo willing to attack
or sink a Chinoso froightor carry-
ing wator? What if tho Chinoso gar-
rison was rosuppliod by civilian
fishing boats, firod up by patriotic
forvor?"
0t|ons for Iaan
Roaction in Tokyo to a Chinoso
military takoovor of tho islands
also might spark vacillation. Tho
1apanoso govornmont would first
go to tho Unitod Nations Socurity
Council, on which China and tho
U.S. sit, boforo taking any moas-
uros against China," said Yoshi
Nakai, a profossor of Chinoso pol-
itics at Gakushuin Univorsity,
Tokyo.
If tho U.S. did not back up
1apan's claims with military assis-
tanco, tho 1apanoso would bo vory
disappointod," and political pros-
suro for tho rovision of [1apan's
pacifist] Constitution would cor-
tainly incroaso," Nakai said.
Masashi Nishihara, prosidont of
1apan's Rosoarch Instituto for
Poaco and Socurity, said, U.S. fail-
uro to assist 1apan on tho
Sonkakus" would bo a sorious
blow to tho allianco."
For tho U.S. to stay out of tho
conflict would roquiro somo logal
gymnastics to oxplain away ro-
poatod assurancos that tho troaty
covors tho Sonkakus," said Toshi
Yoshihara, a profossor at tho U.S.
Naval War Collogo.
Part of tho problom in socuring
U.S. military assistanco is tho vast
rango of Chinoso invasion sconar-
ios. Nishihara said it could simply
bo a floot of Chinoso fishing boats
that havo militia disguisod as fish-
ormon who land on masso" on tho
disputod islands.
Bocauso it will not bo an armod
attack, tho socurity troaty will not
bo invokod, and tho U.S. may not
bo involvod," ho said.
Losing tho islands to China
would causo probloms for socuri-
ty in tho Wostorn Pacific, Nishi-
hara said.
If China took tho islands, it
would probably build radar instal-
lations and holicoptor ports. This
would onablo China to gathor in-
tolligonco on 1apanoso and U.S.
military activitios in Okinawa and
tho Sakishima Islands.
Chinoso control of tho islands
also would woakon 1apan's front
lino of dofonso, Nishihara said. Tho
Taiwan Strait is vital for tho U.S. in
its dofonso of Taiwan, and tho
southwostorn island chain is criti-
cal to both China and tho U.S.-
1apanoso allianco.
China has boon using crooping
oxpansionism" to intimidato 1apan
in tho aroa, ho said. Chinoso ships
havo rocontly ontorod tho contigu-
ous zono botwoon 1apan's Sakishi-
ma Islands. Harassmont of 1apan-
oso Coast Guard vossols by na-
tionalistic Chinoso and ovon Tai-
wanoso fishormon continuos in tho
aroa.
Nishihara said ho boliovos that
China is prossuring 1apan to ca-
pitulato and drivo a wodgo into its
socurity partnorship with tho
Unitod Statos.
L|ght and hear, 0ama|gns
Sconarios abound, Yoshihara
said. Thoso includo light to hoavy
campaigns to tako tho islands. A
light campaign would involvo rap-
id soizuro of tho islands by spocial
oporations forcos and civilian as-
sots with tho goal of catching tho
1apanoso Coast Guard and Navy
off guard.
Civilian vossols could bo usod to
ovorwholm tho dofonsos at soa
whilo complicating 1apanoso rulos
of ongagomont," ho said. Militia and
military forcos could disombark
from nonmilitary vossols, allowing
tho Chinoso to land forcos and os-
tablish somo sort of boachhoad."
Howovor, onco ashoro, tho Chi-
noso forcos would faco mounting
probloms, including tho lack of
hoavy oquipmont and supplios to
dig in and ontronch thoir dofonsivo
positions. Thoy may bo too light to
dofond and hold thoir positions
against sustainod shoro bombard-
mont by 1apanoso warships and
aircraft.
Moroovor, thoy risk boing cut
off from rosupply if 1apan and tho
Unitod Statos aro ablo to ostablish
a maritimo quarantino around tho
contostod islands. An isolatod gar-
rison would not bo ablo to food it-
solf or roarm. It would thon bo a
mattor of timo," Yoshihara said.
A hoavior military campaign
would compol tho Chinoso to for-
go tho olomont of surpriso and
spood. Tho proparations for a ma-
jor amphibious assault on tho is-
lands would not oscapo tho atton-
tion of 1apanoso and U.S. intolli-
gonco, ho said.
Romombor also that Chinoso
forcos would still havo to cross tho
East China Soa to roach tho is-
lands," and tho distanco botwoon
Wonzhou in Zhojiang provinco and
tho Sonkakus is ovor zOO milos,"
Yoshihara said.
With sufficiont oarly warning, tho
1apanoso and U.S. navios could bo
in placo to ropol such an assault.
If tho Chinoso could not bo
pushod off tho islands diplomati-
cally or via air or soa bombard-
mont, 1apan would not bo ablo to
pull off a countor-amphibious as-
sault of its own to dislodgo Chi-
noso forcos thoro. Only tho U.S.
Marino Corps is oquippod and
trainod to conduct forciblo ontry,
Yoshihara said.
A countor-amphibious assault
sooms unlikoly, as Chinoso forcos
on tho islands would havo had lit-
tlo timo to proparo fortifications,
Chong said. Many assumo that is-
land battlos will bo roplays of
Tarawa and Iwo 1ima during
World War II, but tho 1apanoso
had about a yoar to proparo
Tarawa and ovon longor for Iwo
1ima. This moans aorial and soa-
basod bombardmont of tho islands
would tako thoir toll.
Tho quostion romains: Aro tho
1apanoso roady to commit to a
military ongagomont with Chinoso
forcos ovor a couplo of rocks?
Chong said ho wondors if 1apan
has honod tho command-and-con-
trol skills noodod. Who would bo
in chargo of such an oporation
tho 1apanoso Navy or Army
for ono of tho most complox op-
orations" sinco World War II?
1apanoso vacillation and disor-
ganization could givo tho Chinoso
Air Forco tho uppor hand if thoy
can gonorato moro shoro-basod
sortios from airfiolds on tho main-
land," Yoshihara said.
Tho Chinoso military also could
widon tho war by omploying its
missilo forcos against 1apanoso
basos to punish Tokyo whilo
avoiding thoso that host U.S.
forcos as a stratagom to isolato
1apan, ho said.
China also could turn on its larg-
or anti-accoss forco," liko tho Dong
Fong z1D anti-ship ballistic missilo,
to tako out 1apanoso or ovon U.S.
ships ongaging Chinoso forcos on
tho islands, Yoshihara said.
To mo, it's a classic problom in
war," ho said. It's oasy to start a
fight, but it's hard to finish it."
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