The Future of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) By John Walter -----------------------------------------------------------------------February 1st was the

one-year anniversary of the Columbia space shuttle accident. The 113th mission of the Space Shuttle Program was the 28th flight of Columbia, launched January 16, 2003. The flight s mission was comprised of scientific research in the fields of life, physical and space sciences and education. More than 70 scientists were involved in the research projects. The seven-member Columbia crew carried out numerous science experiments and research throughout the 16-day flight. All onboard experiments were concluded and stowed away on Saturday February 1st to return to earth and the Kennedy Center. Unfortunately, the return flight resulted in a tragic end in the skies above Texas. How will NASA proceed after this latest shuttle disaster? What direction will NASA pursue next for space exploration? What are the immediate priorities for NASA in light of the safety questions that the accident poses? What lessons were learned, and what will NASA s commitments be for future shuttle flights? These primary questions will be explored in a series of articles about NASA over the next few months. (Check back here every few weeks for the latest news and views about the future of NASA and space exploration.). Once it became clear that the Columbia had been lost, NASA declared a Shuttle Contingency and executed a Contingency Action Plan that was established after the Challenger accident in 1986. NASA Administrator Sean O Keefe then activated an Accident Investigation Board. NASA officials immediately impounded all data, software, hardware, and facilities at both NASA and contractor sites. NASA s immediate response was quick and effective, in accordance with the established NASA plans. For example, at the Johnson Space Center, the door to Mission Control was locked while personnel at the flight control consoles archived all original mission data. At the Kennedy Space Center, mission facilities and related hardware, including the Launch Complex, were put under guard or secured in warehouses. Similar actions were taken at other key shuttle facilities, including the Marshall Space Flight Center and the Michoud Assembly Facility. The NASA Mishap Investigation Team was also activated to coordinate the debris recovery efforts with local, state, and federal agencies. The team operated first out of Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Later they added Carswell Field in Fort Worth, Texas. While the debris search and recovery efforts were quickly established and carried out, the focus soon migrated to the cause of the accident. The The the the Columbia Accident Investigation Board lasted nearly seven months. Board was established within two hours of the loss of signal from shuttle in accordance with procedures established by NASA following Challenger accident 17 years earlier.

The Board was comprised of 13 members, supported by a staff of more than 120 people and some 400 NASA engineers. There were more than 30,000 documents reviewed, 200 formal interviews, and over 25,000 searchers

deployed to retrieve aircraft debris. The Board s report issued in August 2003 includes both recommendations for future flights and conclusions about the cause of the accident. The conclusions of the board were direct and frank. They included criticism of the organizational culture of NASA, the detrimental impact of certain practices on safety, and an overall indictment of the shuttle program, and the engineering practices of the agency. The recommendations of the board are directly related to the physical cause of the accident. They were primarily related to the problem of foam loss and subsequent damage to the left wing of the shuttle during takeoff. The board recommendations were categorized into 2 levels; those labeled as before return to flight and then continuing to fly recommendations regarding changes needed for the longer-term safety of spacecraft flight in general. The next article will take a closer look at the recommendations of the Board and some analysis of the cause and effects of the problems identified in the Board report.