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The formation of the state in Greece, 18301914


Kostas P . Kostis

Introduction
Anyone interested in modern Greek history is aware of the plethora of studies on the formation of the Greek state. However, it would be difficult to argue that these studies allow a clear understanding of the mechanisms and the processes of the formation of Greek state. In large part the relevant research suffers from problems inherent to Greek historiography. Two of these are the most important. The first is the extremely abstract nature of the discourse, which makes no effort to get in touch with the data. The second is a procrustean use of theoretical models to fit the Greek and generally the non-Western European realities. The final result is, I think, obvious. Despite the large number of studies in political history, we actually know very little about the formation of the Greek state and the phenomenon of patronage which constitutes the passe partout concept of every theoretical undertaking, despite the criticisms it has been subjected to because of its limited heuristic ability.1 The problems begin with the very foundation of this state. This is not so much because it is difficult for us to understand the nature of the Greek revolution. Rather it is because we are unable to connect the pre-revolutionary reality with the result of the apostasia (defection) of 1821, to use the wording of a chronographer of the revolution, Ambrosios Frantzis.2 Scholars concerned with this issue are well aware of the problem. In a relatively recent study, Christos Lyrintzis poses the question in the following way: Perhaps the most important problem in the study of the Greek political scene as it was shaped after Independence, can be summed up in the analysis and interpretation of the process of transition from one system in which the presence of a strong Ottoman power dominated, to a system in which power was subjected at least to some degree, to the control of different agents and in which representative/participatory processes were put into place that were new to Greek society.3 Indeed, a primary question, the answer to which would solve many difficulties faced by students of nineteenth-century political history, concerns the process of

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transition from the systems of power and political domination prevailing during the Ottoman period to their respective institutions in post-revolutionary Greece. Up to here, there is no point of disagreement. Nevertheless, all those who have studied the political life of modern Greece tend essentially to overlook the Ottoman reality. This attitude can be observed as early as the formative years of the creation of the Greek state. Explicitly or not, it aims to disconnect the Oriental past of the Ottoman domination from what is considered the Western background of the post-revolutionary state. In other words, Ottoman reality is totally overlooked, reduced to the mere relationship between subjects (more particularly between notables and captains on the one hand and the people on the other). This is probably because these relationships may be considered directly comparable to those of the post-revolutionary period, insofar as they concern the same individuals. In this way, however, the entire functioning of the relationships of power, as they were structured within a broader political system, the Ottoman Empire, disappear from the analysis. In other words, the transition from one system of political domination to another is not studied within the framework of the structures of power before, during and after the revolution. Consequently, the phenomenon of transition or continuity cannot be assessed. Instead, it is considered self-evident that the transition takes place through the adoption of a new institutional framework by the revolution, while at a local level the structures of power remain unaltered, riddled with patronage exchanges and the attempt to appropriate the state apparatus. Thus the modern Western-like institutions, which are summed up in the national state, work closely with the notables and the people whose actions are based on the logic of patronage relationships and who represent the traditional structures of Greek society. This is in the sense that the latter constitute the only element, which may offer coherence to the political and social structure of the modern Greek state, insofar as the powers of the market and the civil society are absent. All of this results in an extremely common interpretative schema: that of a traditional society eroding the institutions, which are intrusive and foreign to it, as a final product of the spurious construction called the Greek state.4 Inversely, the opposite schema, prevalent in mainly conservative political circles, expresses the same point of view. The introduction of foreign institutions into Greece led to the disorganization of traditional society and to the distortion of Greekness, which was the only guarantee of a successful historical course for the Greek state. Consequently, both these perspectives share a belief in the impossibility of the coexistence of a traditional society with the modernity of Western institutions. It is here that lies, in my opinion, the second weak point to be found in the problematic concerning the articulation of post-revolutionary political life, and which can be expressed by the lack of conceptual coherence and continuity.

The problem
This conceptual weakness is connected with the identification of the state, which emerged from the Revolution, with the nation-state of Western Europe. The

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reasoning hidden behind this identification is, at first glance, obvious. A national revolution, as the Greek one is considered to be, regardless of its other characteristics, cannot but lead to the creation of a nation-state. This argument is supported by the fact that the modern state acquires, and cannot do otherwise, in order to be legitimized within the Western state-system, European institutions, which are progressively strengthened throughout the entire nineteenth century. However, in this way one identifies the state, which was an outcome of the Greek revolution, with the modern, that is, the nation-state. At the basis of this argument, which in almost all cases is implicit, is the idea that this state is the product of a national revolution or, in accordance with the viewpoint that the institutions which frame it or give it substance, are of the Western variety.5 The latter poses many more substantial problems than it can solve. It also leads to the favourite sport of political scientists and historians, particularly those of Marxist orientation. All the interpretative efforts regarding the formation of the Greek state are reduced to measuring the deviations of state accomplishments from the ideal types that should have emerged and that naturally are represented by the Western European model. In other words, the problem of the formation of the Greek state is not far from being transformed into a moral issue, since some corrupt politicians or a corrupt social mass, depending on the political views of the author, prevented Greece from achieving the position which it deserved or deserves.6 In the more extreme versions of this viewpoint, such as that of Ion Dragoumis, the nation and the state find themselves in a continuous struggle, in which the former has its own glorious destiny, free and independent of the hardships which the Greek state and, in an indirectly clear way, the Greek politicians continually heap on it.7 I previously characterized this problem as conceptual. The haste with which everyone rushes to characterize the Greek state as national creates some questions and contradictions. The international literature sees the modern state as the nation-state, the state that, at least symbolically, is born in the French Revolution and the great Reform Act of 1832 in England. Its being was not determined by the predicate national which is attributed to it, but by certain mechanisms for the management of power which lead to its uniqueness and, therefore, differentiate it from alternative state mechanisms. For M. Mann, for example, infrastructural power, that is the ability of the state to infiltrate civil society and to activate political decisions throughout the entire state, constitutes state power itself, primarily in present-day capitalist democracies.8 A. Giddens defines the nation-state as a bordered power-container and considers the processes of civil transformation and internal peace making as, among other things, the preconditions for its existence.9 The same holds for the views put forward by G. Poggi, according to which the modern state expresses the institutionalization of political power, shifting the problem in this way from the study of institutions to the processes through which political power is institutionalized.10 Thus, attention strays from the institutional level,11 and leads to the scale of the structure of power and how it is exercised. This, in my opinion, constitutes a very realistic approach to the study of the state, which is not simply an institution or

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even a set of institutions, but a way of organizing and exercising power. In reality, this final view is treated from a realistic perspective, as an entity in existence, as an organization that controls or attempts to control territory and populations. This realistic position offers a much greater heuristic freedom from the abstract models usually proposed and it creates the preconditions for a more productive analysis of the institutions. I contest the possibility of speaking of a nation-state, that is a modern state after the revolution. The fact that the latter constitutes a kind of rupture with the Ottoman reality does not allow us to assume a complete break with the power structures of Ottoman Greece. All the characteristics of power exercised, at least in King Ottos Greece, point to the logic of the traditional or pre-modern state. We should not forget that, in this type of state, the government focuses mainly upon the management of conflicts within the framework of the ruling class. This was usually carried out in the most important urban centres and not so much through a systematic management of the whole territory which the state claims as its own, as in the case of modern states.12

A pre-modern state
Therefore, I think that, at least until late in the nineteenth century, it would be incorrect to speak of a nation-state. Power constitutes a personal right and is exercised not by individuals, but by groups, the control of which constitutes a basic priority at the expense of territorial control. The way in which King Otto exercised power gives credence to such a view. This is also so in the case in which power, and more specifically state power, was handled by the local elite in the revolution of 1843. King Otto not only believed that every source of power and legitimacy emanated from himself as the divinely ordained sovereign: he implemented this belief, in managing power through the regulation and the control of the contradictory interests of the political parties and the factions, as J. A. Petropulos has demonstrated so well.13 There is nothing to indicate that the regime of King Otto pursued the development of mechanisms, using infrastructural power means that would extend the sphere in which the state exercised power to ever widening groups of the population, or that it would mobilize a growing volume of economic resources. Is there a clearer demonstration, regarding the way in which power was exercised by King Ottos regime, than that of its utter indifference toward constructing a rudimentary communication network? This alone would have allowed the state direct penetration into the area it wished to control and would have multiplied the resources available for economic utilization.14 If eighteenth-century France created a road network allowing the sovereigns direct control of citizens, in the Greece of 1864 one could see that there are areas which state-power never touched.15 It is thus at this point that we can observe not the non-existence, but the lack of interest in the fulfilment of one of the most fundamental goals of a modern state. The Greek state, like the Ottoman state, took a coherent position on the issue of borders. As I. Koliopoulos notes so penetratingly, the border zone of Greece and

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of the Ottoman Empire had the character of a military frontier, a quasi-undefined and uncontrolled area where military/bandit troupes moved, came into conflict and took shape.16 This was a practice diametrically opposite to that of the modern state for the control of populations, which requires strict control of the border and a zealous monitoring of the movement of populations to and from its territory. At the same time, the institutional framework constituted the only alternative way, related to the Ottoman model, of legitimizing the states existence at the international level and also of transforming the political discourse into a national one. Of course this holds, if we accept the identification of the institutional with the legal framework and do not seek the genuine functioning of every institution as formed through the action of the political agents. This is because, for instance, it is feasible to see the functioning of the Parliament, which was created with the revolution of 1843, as an aberration from the ideal prototype of parliamentarism. It is, however, difficult to understand the real significance of the Parliament in Greek political life, if we do not take into consideration the result of the struggle of the local elite for participation in state power, and that it functioned as an oligarchic structure of their political domination.17 At any rate, the entire system of liberal institutions imported after the Greek War of Independence acquire a completely different content, if we take into account the fact that they play no arbitrating or intermediary role whatsoever as officially they should have,18 and that, to a great degree, they do not differ from the assemblies of the notables of the Ottoman period, except by name. Insofar as individuals, anonymous and equal before the law, are non-existent and the representation of local interests occurs through family and peripheral clientelism, it would be absurd to discuss parliamentarism and liberal institutions. Moreover, the logic of corruption, which coexists with the possession of state power, also constitutes an element of the traditional state and represents the right to office according to Weberian terminology. The words of Makriyannis in the National Assembly of 1844: They (that is the eterochthones19) stayed so long and ate bread and turned our fatherland upside down. Let them go away now and we would eat the bread,20 represent nothing more than a claim to the right to manage the public funds, a right acquired through participation in the administration of power. This, however, is a point of view that can only, to a very small degree, be considered as expressing the modern management of state power. In fact, it is the same redistributive logic that ruled the Ottoman administration. In this regard I believe that the use of the specific term (redistributive) by K. Tsoukalas21 in order to define the nature of the Greek state during the nineteenth century is very successful. This is something which underlines the continuities between the Ottoman and the post-revolutionary period.22 The same phenomenon moreover, is revealed, perhaps in a less impressive manner, but with greater significance for the nature of the state and of public administration, in another field. Despite the prohibition of tax farming and the performing of auctions on the part of civil servants and local authorities over a 50-year period (from 1833), their participation in these activities constituted their ex officio privilege, which was never contested in practice.23 Its acceptance,

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explicit or otherwise, by the majority of the personnel of the Greek state, political and not, implies a political consciousness far removed from the conception of the citizen of Western Europe and a practice which has nothing to do with the modern state. Having clarified these basic principles of the approach, I think that it is feasible to go on to a more specific analysis of the problem of the formation of the Greek state. I believe that a basic axis of this study should not be the model of the modern state. This should be used only to achieve a record of periodization.24 In other words, we should not apply ourselves to investigating the deviations of the achievements of the modern state from the ideal types suggested by the nationstate. This, as I have already mentioned, would lead us to completely misleading interpretations and fruitless analyses. On the contrary, our primary target will be the quest for and the recording of the goals of the Greek state. From this point onwards, we can assess its effectiveness in achieving these goals. In this way, I think that, to some degree, we are being fair to the Greek state. This is because we will not insist that the regimes of King Otto or of Kapodistrias adjust to our demands and desires. Instead, we will search for their goals and judge them according to their ability to achieve those goals. I must add here that obviously this approach to the state may proceed providing only that states are seen as organisms, which exert control over people and territory.25 That is to say, this is only so in a realistic perspective and that the risk of moving on to a hypostasization of the state is always present. Regardless of this danger, however, an investigation of the aims of the state, in addition to its effectiveness, may disengage us from the addiction to Western reality, which is indirectly accepted to exist in the Greek state. I refer to an example, which is typical of this kind of approach. The choice of the regency to make King Otto leader of the Church26 has been considered by some intellectuals as a distorting influence of Protestant origin upon the Orthodox and consequently upon the traditions befitting a Greek, and by others as an achievement of modernist forces. Actually, this problem has two dimensions: on the one hand, the creation of an independent church; on the other, the suffocating control of the state over the church, at least until 1850. With regard to the first point, it would be difficult to imagine a newly born state abandoning one of the most fundamental mechanisms of control of its population, that is the patriarchate, to its opponent, the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, it is not accidental that, even from the time of the revolution, the autocephalous church was seen as a given and that only later would it be used as a point of conflict with King Ottos regime and as a rallying point for the followers of the Russian party. The issue of the relations between the state and the church is not nearly so straightforward. As I have already mentioned, the complete subordination of the church to state power was considered a victory of modernism by some, and by others as a sort of alienation which Westernism brought forth. In both cases, the underlying perception is that of conflict between good and evil, which does not help much in understanding either the problem or the solution, and carries the

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analysis back to a normative framework from which it gains nothing. Furthermore, it oversimplifies a problem to which, even if we limit ourselves to the European experience of the first half of the nineteenth century, a variety of solutions were given, depending upon the national reality which it had to confront. In the Greek case, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the range of choice for state power was extremely limited. This is because the formation of a centralized state with the church, an all-powerful pole for the accumulation of political, economic and ideological power, remaining independent and indeed on friendly terms toward one of the three political parties of the period, was inconceivable. Therefore, attempts to interpret the position of the state toward the church based upon the schemas upheld by the agents of modernism or Westernization on the one hand, and tradition on the other, can offer nothing beyond legitimizing an apologetic political discourse. And this discourse refuses the state its right to act as an organism interested in its strength and its reproduction. The solution, provided for the issue of the relations of the church and the state was one which allowed the Greek state to incorporate the networks of power which passed through the church into its own mechanisms. The policy regarding monasteries and their holdings, as well as the tight control exercised upon the organs of decision-making of the Greek Church, are absolutely interpretable and understandable, if we take into account that all these factors worked to the advantage of some party mechanisms which were antagonistic to Bavarian domination. They also strengthened local powers which were not on friendly terms with its regime, and which developed parallel to the state systems of communication.27 Kapodistriass indifference to the imposition of similar controls on the church substantiates this point of view, exactly because he was in a position to control the church, because of his close ties with the Russian party.28 It is further supported mainly by the increasing indifference of the state in the following years toward imposing analogous regulations on the churches of the regions which it gradually annexed. The most characteristic examples are the churches of Crete and the Dodekanisos which today remain independent of the Greek Church. Finally, the gradual loosening of the control of the state over the church also substantiates this view. A classic example of this is provided by the laws and A of 1852 when the church took the form of a public corporation and administered its affairs to some degree relatively independently of the state.29 The question of national lands and the overall trends in agricultural reforms is a similar issue. Many historians claim that the premature distribution of land supported agricultural reforms of a bourgeois nature. However, they overlook the physiognomy of the agricultural population itself and assume choices on its part, which could be supported within the logic of the market. Yet a point that is more important for our discussion was the intention of the Greek state to surrender, with uncertain consequences, the most important weapon of the peasant populations incorporation into its logic and practices. What is also overlooked is that the villagers and the notables were squatters or had trespassed upon a very large part of the national lands, while the plans for distribution instituted from time to time were resounding failures.30

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The policy followed by the Greek state, one of non-recognition of land ownership unless titles could be verified, remained a very powerful weapon for the control of the legality of each claim and finally of the whole population. On the other hand, it did not prevent squatting or trespassing. Of course, the cost was the underdevelopment of the land market, although this did not appear to concern the state. With its policy in the area of national lands, the Greek state finally succeeded in being formed in such way as to inhibit separatist movements and to integrate peasant populations without much reaction. These examples demonstrate just how rational the policies of the Greek state can be, if we consider them from a different angle.31 The impressive cohesion and rapid formation of the modern Greek state may have had as a cost fiscal weakness and a stunted economy. However, they had the benefit, incomparably more important in the eyes of the state administrators and in the logic of the formation of the state, of the creation of a state apparatus which with very limited means succeeded in absorbing local political elites and peasant populations, eterochthones and aftochthones (foreigners and natives) and in promoting itself as the only factor of legitimacy of political life. That is, they succeeded in the institutionalization of state power, to borrow the phrase of G. Poggi.

The winds of change


Intuitively I would maintain that, until 187080, we have the phase of the strengthening of central power, a period which in many ways can be seen as transitional from the Ottoman reality to the formation of a national state. From then onwards, a series of indicators may convince us, although admittedly based on a quick reading of the empirical material, that we are passing to another phase in the history of the Greek state. I briefly mention the elements that underscore these changes. With the overthrow of King Otto a wave of introspection appears among the Greek politicians. The failures of the Crimean War and later of the Cretan uprising demonstrate the striking weaknesses of the Greek state within a changing environment and lead the new generation of politicians, who made their first appearance in those years, to seek new solutions to the economic problems of the state. The entire decade of the 1870s is replete with parliamentary discussions on the economic and administrative reforms required. From such a perspective one can also see the distribution of national lands of 1871, which on the other hand underlines the weakening of the significance of state ownership of land. The state appears to feel more self-confident, at least domestically, because externally the situation is reversed with regard to the preceding period, as I demonstrate below. Furthermore, during the 1870s, the Greek state begins its agonizing attempts to attain a compromise with its creditors. The achievement of this compromise will allow Greece to appeal once again to foreign capital markets to obtain loans. These will serve in its first attempt to construct a rudimentary road and rail network. Along with its economic dimensions, this undertaking signals the first real declaration of the Greek states intention to penetrate its territory. Until then,

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control mechanisms had been indirect, the interests assimilated or neutralized through negotiation. In direct relation to these changes, the military organization of the Greek state begins to undergo significant changes. Already by 1876, the government of A. Koumoundouros has attempted a new organization of the army, in order to respond to military enterprises of a major scale.32 The changes made by Trikoupis in the army, beginning in the 1880s,33 are directed toward the creation of the framework for long-term change in the military organization of the country aimed at fighting an external enemy and not of confronting domestic opponents. However, it was only the law P, put forward by the Theotokis government (190608) that led to the complete separation of public security from the duties of the army. The latter is clearly forbidden to become involved in services outside its mandate.34 From the same perspective, the suppression of banditry in essence the Dilesis massacre in the 1870s which constitutes the final major incident of banditry underscores a new attitude of the state not to give in to violence. During the same decade, the first constituents of the countrys democratic government are articulated and materialize through the implementation of the parliamentary majority and with the reduction of the influence of the local elites around 1885. In the period 187585, these changes are expressed, on the one hand, according to K. Gardika-Alexandropoulou,35 through the shaping of a selfregulating political system, relatively free of institutionalized inequalities of power. On the other hand, for C. Lyrintzis they are expressed in the reduction, throughout the 1860s, of governmentaladministrative interventions in the electoral process and in the coming to the fore of electoral competition as the field par excellence where the division of political power is judged.36 In direct relation with the limitation of the influence of local elites is the taxation of yoked animals through which the competition between the local elite and the central power reaches its formal end. On the one hand, taxation ceases to constitute a privileged mechanism of surplus distribution to the advantage of the social group of tax farmers. On the other hand, the political significance of the latter is reduced to nothing.37 Last but not least, in 1852 we observe the final and probably the most impressive peasant uprising. With the suppression of Papulakoss movement, the country enters a phase of absolute peace with regard to peasant uprisings.38 Thus, the peasant population appears to have been integrated into the state mechanisms and the slogans which up to that point could incite them for example, that the sovereign was of a different creed apparently cease to stir them.39 We will have to wait until the final years of the nineteenth century and the uprisings connected with the raisin issue in order to find new social movements against the state power. However, they now take a different form and are of a different nature. It may not be at all coincidental that the year of the Papulakos movement is the year during which the law concerning the emancipation of the church is implemented. What could these changes mean? They were cumulative. There is no doubt about it. They are concentrated into a time period of 30 years or perhaps even less. These are years in which the examples could of course have been multiplied.40 The success of a bourgeois class, which attempts to modernize the state, would

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constitute an easy and rough solution to this problem, in the same way in which the pale industrial movement which appears in the years 187080 has led some to speak about the appearance of capitalism in Greece. I think that nothing of the kind holds, except of course if, beginning from the period of bourgeois transformation and looking backwards, we see things from the perspective of how they turned out. The entire period, which is being examined here, should be seen from its own perspective. A state apparatus asserts itself over populations, an apparatus which attempts to strengthen and reproduce itself broadly. The gradual achievement of some of its goals gives it the possibility of passing on to new targets. Therefore, if at least for the period of King Otto (186090), it is clearly impossible to speak of a modern state; for the period following his fall, a categorical rejection of the attempt which was made for some kind of modernization of the Greek state would be superficial. Perhaps the most important questions that should be answered here are: What kind of modernization? Where does it find its motives? From where does it get its incentive?

External dependence and modernization


Up to this point, the formation of the modern Greek state has been confronted as a process with an exclusively internal dynamic. Restricting ourselves to observing the societies of the Greek peninsula alone would, however, pose severe limits to an understanding of the phenomenon. We must not forget that the Greek state is a product of international conditions, that its sovereignty for a long historical period had been curtailed, and finally that, on the geo-political scale, the protective powers constitute a far from negligible factor, in the sense that they determined positions and choices, internal dynamics and political conflicts. Finally, it should not be overlooked that, throughout the entire period under investigation here, the Greek state is in continuous competition with other states, a relationship which cannot but influence its own make-up. The overlooking of the consequences of the Greek states entrance into the interstate system upon its formation results from the response of historical and political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s to simplistic Marxist theories which attribute every problem of the Greek state to its dependence on foreign powers and their domestic agents. On the other hand, the internally oriented approach to the shaping of the Greek state which led to that response, leaves a series of unanswered questions behind it which in turn lead to the discovery of bourgeois classes about whom it is not worth speaking. The Greek state was created within the framework of the European Concert: its existence, in addition to its position in the geo-political system of the period, cannot be viewed outside of it. It was one of the states which was founded to play a mediating role in the functioning of the nineteenth-century international interstate system. Another example was Switzerland. From this point of view41 these factors also made up one of its new characteristics.42 Its behaviour in some sectors, primarily in foreign policy and on the issue of military organization, which in my opinion are fundamental factors in an understanding of the course of state

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formation, can be interpreted much more easily, if one takes into account this dimension of its existence. Between the Paris conference of 1815 and the Crimean War, the system worked to some degree effectively, based upon a stable balance of power, which the great powers could and did develop in the context of the European Concert.43 The small states like Greece made up a field of confrontation of the contradictions of the great powers, and this phenomenon is expressed both in the internal life of the kingdom with the existence of three foreign political parties and in the foreign policy of the kingdom. The latter is continually oriented neither toward direct intervention in the diplomatic field, nor toward direct military confrontation with the opponent. It simply expects to obtain benefits only on the diplomatic front through inciting/warning of a problem,44 in the same way in which the creation of the kingdom was the result of the policy of the balance of power between the great European nations. The fact that the foreign policy of the Ottonian period displays so many fluctuations in its preferences for foreign powers cannot be attributed to any independent policy which King Otto attempted to follow. Rather it can be found in the articulation of international relations which compel the Greek sovereign to search for rifts in the relations between the great powers in order to reap benefits. This appears even more clearly from the position that the state took in the area of military organization. War in the period of King Otto is nothing more than a mission of bandit groups in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The goal is not to gain territory, something which was impossible given the military strength of the Ottoman empire, but to exert pressure and to declare its presence at the conferences of the great powers. Perhaps it is characteristic of this fact that, during the Ottonian period, there was not a single attempt to organize an army which would be in a position to fight Turkey, nor any complaint that no such attempt was taking place. This was at a time when the Ottomans were totally reorganizing their military system. However, the diplomatic representation of the Greek state is slack, in fact often non-existent, since the presence of Greek diplomats in foreign courts would have little to offer in a period of the smooth functioning of the European Concert. The presence of foreign embassies in the Greek court was sufficient. With the Crimean War a significant change took place in the international balance of power. In contrast to the widespread belief which was common until that time that the future of the small nations was in the hands of the great powers, a feeling developed that they now held their fate in their own hands. Thus, the techniques involved in the change of the balance of power after 1854 result from an extremely well developed and refined system of alliances.45 These changes will also start to be reflected from a certain point onward in the foreign policy of the Greek state and in its very formation. The failures which Greek foreign policy registered during the Crimean War in 1850 and the Cretan revolution of the 1860s demonstrate its limits, but also those of the military organization of the state itself. From then on, a slow but gradual turn toward creating ties with the British sphere of influence begins and can also be seen in the search for Balkan allies, while at the same time the state itself gradually becomes conscious of its need for a new organizational goal.46

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The Balkan issue will play a catalytic role in state organization. A simple study of the budgets of the Greek state suffices to demonstrate the importance of war expenditures in the decade of the 1870s and after, and consequently that of the expansion of the state apparatus, and to underline the contrast with the Ottonian period.47 If O. Hintze, possibly influenced by his origins, considered military organization as the basic variable in state formation, C. Trikoupis vindicated him to some degree when, in 1890, he announced in Parliament that the sound parts of the budget depend to a large degree upon the army and the navy expenditures.48 The fact that until 1860 the budgets are put forward as measured and balanced, while after this period they employ the logic of large deficits and of rapid expansion is probably not a chance occurrence.49 Furthermore, the good housekeeping attributed to the Ottonian period was not simply an idiosyncrasy of the king, but a product of a different perception of the state concerning geo-political relations and state administration. The size of the budgets of the Greek state displays such intense variations from period to period that there is no significant scope for doubt on this point. Thus the Greek state orients itself more and more toward the formation of those mechanisms (military and diplomatic) which would allow it to participate on an equal basis in the Balkan competition. During the 1870s the decisiveness with which a solution is found for the debts of the War of Independence which had remained unsettled for five decades, underlines the immediate need for the readjustment of the state apparatus to the changing elements in the environment of the state. It was only through external borrowing that the Balkan states hoped that they could find themselves in the position to demand their share of the empires legacy. If, however, the direct changes brought about by the new international conditions were nothing but increased foreign and domestic borrowing, indirectly the consequences were more serious. Initially the need for participation in the interstate system meant reorganizing the army and the diplomatic corps. With regard to the former, one could stop at the consequences which something of this sort could have for the society itself. For example, the introduction of conscription was an initiative that would not leave the Greek countryside indifferent, since it would deprive it of labour. However, the more general reorganization of the army, which would allow it to participate in military confrontation, also meant reorganization of the state apparatus in order to respond to the needs of conscription, organization and support of a significant number of men and the handling of the new war technologies. However, as C. Trikoupis often stressed, the introduction of conscription surpassed the capabilities of the Greek state, and that was the reason why its implementation was curtailed and ineffective.50 The adaptability of the state apparatus to new demands appeared limited and this observation holds for all the Balkan states. The absolute incapacity of the state to raise capital in a way that would serve its interests, but even more to utilize it rationally, was a product of this weak organizational adaptability. Modernization, of course, constitutes a framework, but also a reality which does not suit the Balkan case. In fact, we can observe the transmission of incentives from the international environment to which the states attempted to adapt. Thus,

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with the exception of Romania, all the rest of the Balkan countries sooner or later proved themselves incapable of reorganizing in accordance with the demands of the international economy and politics. In the end they had to submit to international economic control. Only through such control could the institutional framework for raising and yielding return on borrowed capital be organized and a rudimentary framework for the rational management of public funds be put together. To put it briefly, the dynamic of change in the state apparatus does not seem to constitute an element inherent in the states nature. It emerges from external incentives and adapts to them. Thus the dynamics of the transformation observed after 1870 are a product of changes in the interstate system after the Crimean War that push the political elites toward the reorganization of the military and diplomatic apparatus of the state, in order not to lose contact with the dynamics of Balkan antagonism. The formation of the nation-state in Greece is a phenomenon which cannot be understood only through the process of internal accumulation, but is primarily the outcome of the countrys participation in the interstate system, as it is shaped after the Crimean War.

Notes
1 Lyrintzis, C., d a e Ef 19 b [The Political and Patronage System in Nineteenth-century Greece], Ed Kc [Hellenike Koinonia], 1 (1987), 15782. 2 Frantzis, A., Ed kc c Ef [Synopsis of the History of Renaissance Greece], 3 vols (Athens: 1839), vol. 1, p. : Frantzis adopts the distinction between revolution and defection which is also used in Thucydides. Thus, defection of those who suffer violence is juxtaposed with the revolution of those who do not suffer violence. Trikoupis, S., Ikc Ed Ef [The History of the Greek Revolution], 2nd edn, 3 vols (London: 1860), vol. 1, p. 311, also adopting in his turn the Thucycidian distinction, maintains that the Greek war had the characteristics of revolution in the overturning of the regime and the characteristics of defection since Greece defected from the Ottoman empire which controlled it, and, for this reason, he uses both these terms without differentiation. 3 Lyrintzis, C., T C b. Kc d Ah 19 b [The Last of the Great Families: Society and Politics in Achaia in the Nineteenth Century] (Athens: Themelio, 1991), p. 13. 4 Diamandouros, N., H ck e Ef kc f 19 b [The Establishment of Parliamentarism in Greece and its Functioning during the Nineteenth Century], in D. Tsaousis (ed.), O Ed c 19 b [Aspects of Nineteenth-century Greek Society] (Athens: Estia, 1984), p. 57ff. 5 A term which is usually replaced by what is thought to be cosily identical to that of bourgeois. 6 For a typical articulation of this view, see Mouzelis, N., The Concept of Modernisation: Its Relevance for Greece, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14, 2, October (1996), where the fact that the state is controlled by patronage and populist parties, in addition to its grotesque size, are the elements which made it resemble a monster. This is considered the main reason for its impotent reactions to the rapid changes in the international environment. As a result, the state is reduced to political parties and the political personnel.

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7 Dragoumis, I., Ea a [Greek Civilization] (Athens: Philomythos, 1914, last edn 1931); Veremis, T., Aa a kf C c kf. T ck kf Ka [From the Nation-state to the Nation without a State: The Experiment of the Konstantinopolis Organisation], in T. Veremis (ed.), Ed a a Ef [National Identity and Nationalism in Modern Greece] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1997), pp. 2752. 8 Mann, M., The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results, in M. Mann, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 9 Giddens, A., The Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 121. 10 Poggi, G., The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 18ff. 11 However, even if we remain at the institutional level, before we discuss modern or civil institutions in the modern Greek state, we should demonstrate that these institutions under discussion have a specific civil or modern physiognomy, something which I do not think is self-evident. Institutional regulations of the Antivassilia, for example, do not consist of anything more than elementary regulations for the functioning of a centralized state. In fact, it is perhaps not coincidental that, among all the areas with which the Ottoman regime was involved, only that of civil law did not attract its interest. It is always worthwhile to read Maourer, G. L., O Ea a [The Greek People] (Athens: first German edn 1835, 1976), p. 397ff, in order to see the reasoning which hides the measures of the Bavarian regency and which I do not think justify the characterization of modern or bourgeois type for those institutions which were imported into Greece by the Bavarians. 12 Giddens, The Nation State, p. 57. 13 Petropulos, J. A., Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 18331843 (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1968). 14 Synarellis, M., ka f Ef 18301880 [Roads and Ports in Greece, 18301880] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of the Greek Bank for Industrial Development, 1989). 15 Halikiopoulos, P. I., C kc Ef [Thoughts on Greece], 2 vols (Patras: 1864), vol. II, p. 44. 16 Koliopoulos, J. S., c ka Ef 19 b [Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 18211912], in T. Veremis (ed.), Ed a a Nak Ef [National Identity and Nationalism in Modern Greece] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1997). 17 Petmezas, S., a ka d c Ef [Political Liberation Struggles and National Integration in Greece], Ik [Histor], 2, September (1990). 18 Ibid., 99. 19 People who arrived in Greece after the War of Independence and took control of the army and civil offices. 20 Dimakis, I., H d d 1843 d a ka [The 1843 Change of Regime and the Issue of Natives and Foreigners] (Athens: Themelio, 1991), p. 33. 21 Tsoukalas, K., Kd f kf. H ka a bk Ef [Social Development and the State: The Formation of Public Space in Greece] (Athens: Themelio, 1981), p. 80. 22 This continuity appears even more clearly with regard to the issue of taxation. Despite the constitutional principles regarding taxation, which were determined by the revolution and are considered the foundation of the taxation policy of the Greek state, it is difficult to consider the very taxation logic which was adhered to as different from that of the Ottomans. The goal of collecting revenue which would support state power and

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policy is expressed through improvements in the collection of taxes and not in an increase in the taxation capacity of the population through an increase in incomes. Related to this see Mitrophanis, G., H kc ke kd Ef (18281862) [The Taxation of Primary Production in Greece (18281862)], unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Athens, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Athens (1992). The point of view which Halikiopoulos puts forward ( C kc Ef, p. 77) that Taxation is Turkish does not constitute a simple figure of speech but represents reality. Sideris, A. K., H kd C kd kc [The Historical Evolution of our Agricultural Taxation], Akc Ob Kb Eb [Archives of Economic and Social Sciences], 11 (1931), p. 370. As I hope will become clear as we go on, there is a clear break in the behaviour of the state during the nineteenth century and, contrary to the viewpoint of Tsoukalas, Kd f kf, p. 43, the articulation of a rudimentary periodization is possible. Skocpol, T., Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in P. Evans, K. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 9. Pantazopoulos, N. I., Georg Ludwig von Maurer. H k khf ka kd kd d c [Georg Ludwig von Maurer: The Full Turn of Modern Greek Legislation toward the European Model], offprint, Ed Ekc d Nb Ob Eb Akc c c [Scientific Annual of the School of Law and Economic Sciences], vol. I (Thessaloniki: Aristotelian University, 1968), p. 217; Konidaris, I. M., H C e c Ec Ef [The Genesis of the Autocephalos Regime of the Greek Church], in E. Chrysos (ed.), E C a C. H a e e kd d 19 b [A New World is Born: The Image of Greek Civilisation in Nineteenth-century German Science] (Athens: Goethe Institute, 1996), pp. 20722; Metallinos, G., kf kc. TC d kc bk e f d kc [Tradition and Alienation: Breaks in the Spiritual Progress of Modern Hellenism during the Post-Byzantine Period] (Athens: Domos, 1st edn 1986, 1994), pp. 22748; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft. Frazee, C. A., Oka Ec Ed Akc 18211852 [The Orthodox Church and Greek Independence, 18211852] (Athens: Domos, 1987), p. 162; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 194 ff. During the Kapodistrian period, an ecclesiastical committee functioned which made suggestions to the governor, the latter holding decision-making power. As Petrou, I. S., Ec d Ef 17501909 [Church and Politics in Greece, 17501909] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1992), pp. 1467 mentions, the policy of Kapodistrias was the model for the fundamental reshaping of the church in later years. Konidaris, G. I., Ed kc Ef [The Ecclesiastical History of Greece], 2 vols, 2nd edn (Athens, 1970), p. 223ff. Dertilis, G. B., Terre, paysans et pouvoir politique. Grce, XVIIIXXe sicle, Annales E.S.C., JanvierFevrier, 1 (1996), 878. Consequently, I disagree radically with the viewpoint of Tsoukalas, Kd f kf, p. 45, regarding the irrational functioning of the state. In the final analysis, rationality is determined by the aims pursued, and of course the aims of the Greek state were not to live up to the Weberian prototype of bureaucracy. Aspreas, G. K., d kc Ck Ef 18211921 [A Political History of Modern Greece, 18211921], 3 vols (Athens 192230), vol. II, p. 77.

23

24

25 26

27 28

29 30 31

32

The formation of the state in Greece, 18301914

33

33 Veremis, T., O a ka Ef 19 b [The Regular Army of Nineteenth-century Greece], in D. Tsaousis (ed.), O d c 19 b [Aspects of Greek Society in the Nineteenth Century] (Athens: Estia, 1984), p. 170. 34 Aspreas, d kc, vol. III, p. 84. 35 Gardika-Alexandropoulou, K., Parties and Politics in Greece, 18751885: Toward a Two Party System, doctoral dissertation, Kings College, University of London (1988), pp. 308, 382. 36 Lyrintzis, T C b, p. 139. 37 Petmezas, a ka d c Ef, 37. 38 Aroni-Tsichli, K., AkC Ck f Ef, 18331881 [Agricultural Uprisings in Old Greece, 18331881] (Athens: Papazissis, 1989). 39 All of the peasant uprisings of the King Otto era and that of Papulakos, particularly, relegate us ideologically to a traditional system of political relationships in which an uprising constituted an attempt to restore order. Kotaridis, G., kd f C [Traditional Revolution and 1821] (Athens: Plethron, 1993), in particular pp. 137 and 162. 40. It will suffice to stress the changes which are seen in the area of municipal administration and of public administration with the introduction of the law regarding the qualifications of public employees, an indication perhaps of the attempt to set up a Weberian-type bureaucracy and judiciary. 41 Schroeder, P. W., The Nineteenth-century International System: Changes in the Structure, World Politics, 1 (1986), 126. 42 The three new elements of international politics as they are shaped after 1815 are: the European Concert; the cutting off of the European interstate system from the nonEuropean world; and finally the creation of a system of intermediary states, one of which was Greece. 43 Clark, I., The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 145. 44 It is in this way that we can explain the continuous shifts of King Ottos foreign policy from one power to another, depending on the conjuncture which defines the European balance of power. 45 Clark, The Hierarchy of States, pp. 1617, 134. 46 The fragmented perception of how the Greek issue could be solved also constitutes a source of friction between the supporters and the opponents of Trikoupis, even at the close of the century. At least for some members of Parliament of the Deliyiannis bloc Greece must capitalize on the chance conditions occurring in one area or other and solve the upcoming issues one at time, while for Trikoupis the issue has to be confronted in some unified way following the systematic military preparation which will allow Greece to confront Turkey: see Trikoupis, C., Aak Bd (Athens, 1891), pp. 3233. 47 Kostis, K., Politiques financires, finances publiques et contrle financier international en Grce (18811898), in G. Chastagneret (sous la direction) Crise espagnol et nouveau sicle en Mditerrane. Politiques publiques et mutations structurelles des conomies dans lEurope mditerranenne ( fin XIXedebut XXe sicle) (Casa de Velasquez: Publications de lUniversite de Provence, 2000). 48 Trikoupis, Aak Bd, p. 9. 49 We must not forget that the internationalization of the European economies starts to obtain its own dynamics only from the 1860s and onward: see Berendt, I. T. and Ranki G., The European Periphery and Industrialisation, 17891914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 101. 50 Trikoupis, Aak Bd, p. 57.

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