Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Department of Justice
Hohenstein, Joseph C. Orlow, Kaplan & Hohenstein, LLP P.O. Box 40017, 620 Chestnut St., Suite 656 Philadelphia, PA 19106
A029-043-107
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case. Sincerely,
Enclosure
Cite as: Richard Michreka Nyamwange, A029 043 107 (BIA March 17, 2011)
U.S.
;Department of Justice
File: In re:
Date:
MAR 14 201!
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS CERTIFICATION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF DHS: Joseph C. Hohenstein, Esquire
CHARGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(A), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)] Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(F), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)] APPLICATION: Termination
The respondent, a native and citizen of Kenya, appealed from an order ofthe Immigration Judge, dated October 1, 2010, finding him removable as charged. On November 8, 2010, we returned the record to the Immigration Judge for issuance of an oral or written decision. The Immigration Judge issued an oral decision on November 18, 2010, and certified the case to the Board. The record will be remanded to a different Immigration Judge for a new hearing and for the entry of a new decision. We review the findings offact, including determinations ofcredibility, made by the Immigration Judge under a "clearly erroneous,, standard. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1( d)(3)(i). We review all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion, under a
de novo standard.
8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
During the several hearings in this case, the respondent challenged his removability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. At the final hearing on August 11, 2010, the Immigration Judge informed the parties that he would find the respondent removable as charged and would explain his reasoning in a later oral decision; he further stated that he would entertain further challenges to removability during the next hearing (Tr. at 22-23, 26). The proceedings were reset until November 10, 2010, so that the respondent and his attorney could confer about possible relief from removal (Tr. at 29).
Cite as: Richard Michreka Nyamwange, A029 043 107 (BIA March 17, 2011)
On September 30, 2010, the respondent, through a filing by his counsel, notified the Immigration Judge that he would reserve the right to file an appeal on the issue of removability, but would not be applying for relief from removal. The respondent requested that a final decision be issued before the scheduled hearing date. On October I, 2010, the Immigration Judge issued a summary order, which noted that the respondent reserved appeal. The respondent filed an appeal, and the Board remanded the record to the Immigration Judge for the issuance of a written or oral decision as his summary order provided no reasons for his decision. In his November 18, 2010, decision the Immigration Judge focused on the actions of the respondent's attorney, stating that he felt he was "broadsided" by the counsel, and that the appeal referenced his conduct in a completely unrelated case (Id. at 6-8). The Immigration Judge indicated that he found the respondent's request for a final order tantamount to a waiver of appeal. was "frivolous" (l.J. at 6-7). The Immigration Judge further criticized the respondent's counsel and
In his subsequently filed appeal brief, the respondent, through counsel, asserts that his
removability is not adequately addressed by the Immigration Judge. Counsel also takes issue with the Immigration Judge's characterization of his actions. We agree that the Immigration Judge's November 18, 2010, decision fails to provide adequate legal analysis ofremovability, which he acknowledged was "a difficult legal issue" (Tr. at 28). This alone would warrant another remand. We also find that the Immigration Judge's decision contains undue criticism of the respondent's counsel. The respondent repeatedly indicated he was challenging his removability, and he twice stated he was reserving appeal in his September 30, 20 I 0, filing with the Immigration Court. The Immigration Judge also acknowledged that the respondent reserved appeal in the summary order he subsequently issued. It is therefore not apparent why the Immigration Judge found the September 30 filing to be tantamount to a waiver of appeal, or that he would be justified in issuing a decision without addressing the merits of the removal charges. It is also not appropriate for an Immigration Judge to deem an appeal as "frivolous" as it is the Board's task to evaluate appellate filings. Finally, we do not find the Immigration Judge's mention of the facts and identifying information of an unrelated case to be proper. Under the totality of circumstances presented, we deem it appropriate to remand the record to a different Immigration Judge for a new hearing and for the entry of a new decision. Accordingly, the following orders will be entered. ORDER: The Immigration Judge's order dated October I, 2010, and his decision dated
November 18, 2010, are vacated. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to a different Immigration Judge for a new hearing and the entry of a new decision.
Cite as: Richard Michreka Nyamwange, A029 043 107 (BIA March 17, 2011)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW IMMIGRATION COURT 3400 CONCORD ROAD, YORK, PA SUITE 2 17402
ORLOW PO
& ORLOW JOSEPH C. 620 CHESTNUT ST, PA 19106 FILE A 029-043-107 DATE: Nov 18, 2010 STE 656
HOHENSTEIN,
BOX 40017;
PHILADELPHIA, IN
NYAMWANGE, HM-4575
UNABLE TO FORWARD - NO ADDRESS PROVIDED ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE. THIS DECISION
IS FINAL UNLESS AN APPEAL IS FILED WITH THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE MAILING OF THIS WRITTEN DECISION. SEE THE ENCLOSED FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPERLY YOUR NOTICE OF APPEAL, ATTACHED DOCUMENTS, OFFICE OF THE CLERK P.O. BOX 8530 VA 22041 FALLS CHURCH, AND FEE OR MUST BE MAILED TO: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PREPARING YOUR APPEAL. FEE WAIVER REQUEST
ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE AS THE RESULT OF YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT YOUR SCHEDULED DEPORTATION OR REMOVAL HEARING. THIS DECISION IS FINAL UNLESS A MOTION TO REOPEN IS WITH SECTION 242B(c) (3) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND SECTION 8 u.s.c. SECTION 1229a(c)(6) IN REMOVAL FILED IN ACCORDANCE 8 U.S.C. 240(c)(6), NATIONALITY ACT,
l252B(c)(3) IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS OR SECTION PROCEEDINGS. COURT: YOUR MOTION MUST BE FILED WITH THIS IMMIGRATION COURT 3400 CONCORD ROAD, YORK, PA 17402 Return/Certification SUITE 2
TO REOPEN,
OTHER:
Order of Administrative
to the Board
BLS
COURT CLERK IMMIGRATION COURT CC: Office of Chief Counsel 3400 Concord Road York, PA 17402 FF
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i
U. S. DE PARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMM IGRATION REVIEW IMMIGRATION COURT York, Pennsylvania
20 10
In the Matter of
CHARGE:
Under Section 237 (a) (2) (A) (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended in that anytime after admission the Respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section lOl (a) (43) (A) of the Act, a law relating to sexual assault. And under Section 237 {a) (2) {A) (iii) of the Immigration and National Act as amended in that anytime after admission the Respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section lOl (a) {43) {F) of the Act, a crime of violence {as defined in Section 16 of Title 18 United States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment ordered is at least one year. Respondent seeks no applications. The Respondent re quested an Order of Removal. The Respondent sought an Order of Removal and specifically requested it on or about September the 30th, of 20 10, and per the Respondent's request in such letter the Court issued the Order of Removal in Respondent's case.
A P PLICATION:
A P PEARANCES: ON BEHAL F O F RES PON DENT: ON BEHALF OF THE DE PARTMENT OF HOMELAN D SECURITY: Alice Hardy, Esquire
Joseph C. Hornstein,
Esquire
(
I
ORAL DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JU DGE FIN DINGS REGAR DING REMOVABILITY The Respondent is a native and citizen of Kenya who was admitted to the United States at Queens, New York, on or about August the 8th, the 30th, 1988, 1975, as an F-1 student. On or about September
1st, 2008, the Respondent was convicted in Pennsylvania in the Court of Common Pleas at Monroe County for the offense of sexual assault, in violation of Title 18 (3125-1) of the Pennsylvania 2008, Respondent
Criminal Statue.
was convicted in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas at Monroe County for the offense of aggravated indecent assault without consent, in violation of Title 18 Criminal Statue. (3124.1) of the Pennsylvania
two and a half to five years in prison. The Respondent, through his counsel, acknowledged
receipt of the Notice to Appear and during a proceeding with a prior Immigration Judge, not the one sitting today, admitted
allegations one through four and denied allegations five and six which were the criminal convictions and denied the charges. When
this particular Judge received the Record of Proceedings in this particular case1this Judge reviewed the Respondent's case and the evidence submitted by the Department of Homeland Security contained in Exhibit #2. A 29 043 107 Via these documents and the Notice to 2 November 18, 2010
Appear, this Court concluded that Respondent was in fact convicted of these crimes. The Respondent's counsel did not object to the
submission of Exhibit #2 in this particular case and therefore it was proper for this Court to use and review such submissions from the Department. On or about June the 12th, 2008, the Department arrested See Exhibit #1 and
evidence submitted by the Department of Homeland Security in Exhibit #2, this Court concluded that as a matter of fact the Department of Homeland Security proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent was admitted to subject10f being removed. See Exhibit #1 and Exhibit #2. This Court also
0vr
concluded as a matter of law that the Department of Homeland Security proved by clear and convincing evidence the Respondent is removable from the United States. substantial and probative. Exhibits #1 and Exhibits #2. THE ISSUE REGARDING REMOVABILITY The issue regarding removability is that the Respondent believes he was not convicted and the Respondent also believes that his convictions were not aggravated felonies. As stated The evidence was reasonable, See
above, this Court concluded that the Respondent was convicted of aggravated felonies and that such aggravated felonies were particular serious crimes. A 29 043 107 This Court concluded that Respondent's 3 November 18, 2010
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conviction for sexual assault and for aggravated indecent assault without consent was a aggravated felony under Section lOl (a) (43) (A) of the Act. This Court also concluded that
Respondent's.convictions were also crimes of violence under Section lOl (a) (43) (F) of the Act. This Court also concluded that
Respondent's sentence to two and a half to five years in prison in the aggregate also rendered his aggravated felony convictions particularly serious crimes. And even if the Respondent was not
sentenced to two and a half to five years in prison in the aggregate, this Court would conclude that the Respondent's crimes are particularly serious crimes. Kaplun v. Attorney General, of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 See INA Section 24l (b) (3) . (3rd Cir. 2010) ; Matter
602 F. 3d 260
(BIA 2007) ; Bobb v. US, 458 F.3d 213 defines the crime of
violence as a crime defined in Section 16 of Title 18, United States Code, but not a purely political offense, with the term of
imprisonment is at least one yea r_, is a particularly serious crime. 18 U. S. C. A. Section 16 defines or describes the term crime of violence as (a) an offense that has an element the use, attempted
use or threatened use of physical force against a person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and
that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 162 (3rd Cir. 2001) ; US v. See Francis v. Reno, F. 3d 723 269 F. 3d 1996) . 2010
McQuilkin, 97 4
(3rd Cir.
A 29 043 107
November 18,
Not only did this Court conclude that Respondent was convicted of aggravated felonies but that his aggravated felony convictions were particularly serious crimes. There were no
issues in this Court's mind regarding removability or that the Respondent was not convicted of an aggravated felony or particularly serious crimes. PROCEE DURAL HISTORY This case before this Judge was on various Master Calendars. And on August the 11th, 2010, there was a Master
Calendar where the Respondent's counsel and the government counsel appeared. This Court specifically informed the Respondent's
counsel that the Court had made a decision and that that decision was that the Respondent was convicted of aggravated felonies and that such aggravated felonies were particularly serious crimes. The Respondent's counsel did not say anything at that point regarding this except wanted an in-depth or more explanation regarding the Court's findings. This Court informed the
Respondent and the government's counsel that it believed the Respondent being convicted of particularly serious crimes was eligible only for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and that the Respondent should file an application for deferral. This Court also informed the Respondent's counsel that
the Court will issue an oral decision after the final hearing. That oral decision would have been rendered after the Respondent presented his case on deferral of removal. A 29 043 107 5 This Court reset the November 18, 2010
file his I-589 application for deferral of removal. At no time during this Master Calendar did the Respondent's counsel ever indicate that he was going to appeal this decision before I rendered an oral decision. At no time
during that Master Calendar was this Court aware that the Respondent's counsel was going to file an appeal to the Board before this Court rendered an oral decision. Therefore, this
or about September the 30th, 2010, this Court received a motion from the Respondent through his counsel asking for an Order of Removal. issued. And the Respondent sought an order and an order was Then on or about November the 10th, almost on the same
day that the Master Calendar reset was scheduled this Court received a notification from the Board of Immigration Appeals to issue an oral decision in this matter. This Court is then left guessing as to why the Respondent has filed an appeal without going through the process and waiting for this Court to issue a decision in the deferral of removal case before filing an appeal. ANALYS IS This Court believes that the Respondent's appeal is frivolous. See INA Section 240(b) (6) of the Act. This Court
states that because in an unrelated case in a bond matter under A file A 028 476 276 in the matter of Paul A. Tovatis, the
Respondent had waived appeal in a bond matter and then filed an A 29 043 107 6 November 18, 2010
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals after he had waived the bond matter. This is the same attorney in A 028 476 276 that is
representing this individual in the case now in hearing under A 029 043 107 . This seems to be a type of pattern with this The pattern that this Court sees is that
particular attorney.
this attorney will waive appeal or will ask for an order and then the case would be taken out the normal process and once that happens
ihis
Court believes that the appeal in the instant case is actually frivolous. Another reason why this Court believes this appeal is frivolous is because 8 C. F. R. Section 1240. 12 decision of the Immigration Judge under Section B where it talks about a summary decision it says, not withstanding the provisions of paragraph A of this section, in any case where inadmissibility or
deportability is determined under pleadings pursuant to Section 1240. lO (b) and the Respondent does not make an application under
Section 1240. 11 the alien is statutorily ineligible for relief or the Respondent applies for voluntary departure only and the Immigration Judge grants the application, may enter a summary decision, the Immigration Judge
or if voluntary departure is
granted, a summary decision with an alternate Order of Removal. Well, this attorney asked for an order and did not file the I-589 application as the Court instructed him to do on or before November the 10th, of 2010. A 29 043 107 Therefore, it was proper for this 7 November 18, 2010
should know that it was proper for this Court to issue a summary decision since he has been practicing in this local area for quite some time. Therefore, this Court seems to believe that this
attorney is using and abusing the appeal process for his own means. And I suspect in the case in hearing that this attorney is
using the appeal process to gain some time for his client and is engaging in .
Jll(J..tory
tactics.
Court believes that this attorney is filing this appeal frivolously and is trying to gain time for his client in the habeas corpus matter. Also, this Court believes that the fact
that the Respondent sought1with no coercion or input from this Court an Order of Removal1is tantamount to waiving his right of 1 appeal. See 8 C. F. R. Section 1240.14
(fi
nality of
rde .
The
order of the Inunigration Judge shall become final in accordance with Section 1003.39 of this chapter. And 1003.39 of 8 C. F. R.
states that, l cept when certified to the Board the decision of the Inunigration Judge becomes final upon waiver of appeal or upon expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is taken, occurs first. whichever
Respondent specifically asked for an Order of Removal is tantamount to waiving his right to appeal. The Respondent also abandoned his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. A 29 043 107 8 On August the 11th, 20 10, 2010
November 18,
the Respondent was specifically told to file an application, the Respondent failed to so. an application. this Court.
yet
The Respondent did not file an application with when the Respondent
requested a removal orde 7 he did ot submit an I-589 application for asylum, withholding or relief under the Convention Against Torture. Therefore, this Court concludes that the Respondent There are therefore The burden of
abandoned any form of relief he may have had. no applications in which this Court can review.
proof is on the applicant to establish withholding of removal under either Section 241 (b) (3) of the Act or the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C. F. R. Section 1208. lG (a) , (b) and (c) .
There being no applications to review this Court will once again issue a summary order removing the Respondent to his native country of Kenya. ORDER IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent be removed to his native country of Kenya.
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CERTIFICATE PAGE
I hereby certify that the attached proceeding before JESUS CLEMENTE, in the matter of: RICHARD MICHREKA NYAMWANGE A 29 043 107 York, was held as herein appears, Pennsylvania
transcript thereof for the file of te Executive Office for Immigration Review.
YORK STENOGRA PHIC SERVI CES, INC. 34 North George Street York, Pennsylvania 17401-1266 (717) 854-0077
U.S.
Department of Justice
NYAMWANGE, RICHARD MICHREKA A# 029-043-107 (INMATE# HM-4575) 1120 PIKE STREET, P.O. BOX 999 HUNTINGDON, PA 16652
A029-043-107
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision in the above-referenced case. This copy is being provided to you as a courtesy. Your attorney or representative has been served with this decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1292.5(a). If the attached decision orders that you be removed from the United States or affirms an Immigration Judge's decision ordering that you be removed, any petition for review of the attached decision must be filed with and received by the appropriate court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the decision.
Sincerely,
Enclosure