40

APPRESENT

generally, the term apprehension is another term for intention , the experiential grasp of an object in a determinate manner. APPRESENT. See APPERCEPTION; APPRESENTATION APPRESENTATION. 1. Appresentation is the presentation that accompanies a presentation . Within the momentary phase of an experience, only the moment of primal impressional directly presents its object or, more precisely, a particular aspect of the object. However, one is also aware in the same experience of other aspects of the directly presented object and of other, related objects as the horizon of what is directly presented. This horizonal, appresentational awareness is m ade possible by two other moments of the momentary phase, namely, retention and protention . Appresentation, then, is the experiencing, the re-presenting , or making present of the not directly presented. 2. Appresentation can also refer to what is appresented. Whereas the directly experienced aspect is presented, the not directly presented aspects are appresented. See also APPERCEPTION; INTUITION; PERCEPTION (Perzeption); PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung) . ARO N, RAYM O ND (19051983). R aymond A ron was trained as a philosopher of history. H is Introduction to the P hilosophy of H istory ( Introduction la philosophie de lhistoire , 1933) was undertaken from a phenomenological perspective. Aron introduced Jean-Paul Sartre , his fellow student at the cole Normale Suprieure, to Husserls phenomenology. After serving in the French air force and the Free French forces during World War II, Aron devoted his energies largely to social and political commentary, writing first for Le Figaro and then LExpress . ASSERTION. See APOPHANSIS . ASSOCIATION. Association is the synthetic and structured unification of the intentional content of a multiplicity of experiences or experiential phases by virtue of which an identical objectivity is given. As such, association is a matter of intentionality and is the principle by which passive synthesis proceeds. Husserl characterizes his account of association as an extension of the theory of inner time-consciousness . He distinguishes the nearassociation that occurs within the living present , especially in retention, from the far-association that recalls past experiences into the living present in a manner that reactivates their affective force on the subject. In experiencing an object, the subject is affected by prominences in the sensory field, but this affecting prominence is not yet the appearance of an