Professional Documents
Culture Documents
07-17369
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Defendants/Appellees.
The Appellants are not associated with any corporate entity that Fed. R.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED.................................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................15
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.........................................................................43
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................44
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................45
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................49
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TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES
Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990)....................20, 21, 31
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990)..............................39
Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1997)......................14, 29
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1987). ........................................15, 16, 23
Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). ..........................39
Hamilton v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1987). ...................24
Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1998). .................................23
In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.
2006). ...............................................................................................................20
Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2002)..................................31
Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987).....................15
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McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954). ......................................................31
Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments, 228 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2000)...................39
Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1994). ........................20
Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F. 2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980)
. ............................................................................................................37, 39, 40
Qwest Comm’ns Inc. v. Kerkeley, 433 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on
other grounds, Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 543
Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 173 (4th Cir.1978). ...............37
Selden Apartments v. United States Dept. of HUD, 785 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1986).37, 38
Thompson v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.
1986). ...............................................................................................................15
United States Dept. of HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1990)..........40, 41
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004). ............36
Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051 (9th
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2003). .......................................16
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FEDERAL STATUTES
FEDERAL RULES
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case below
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. This case primarily dealt with the
interpretation and application of federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because this case is
an appeal from a final judgment. On December 5, 2007, the lower court entered
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ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE I.
Does a District Court err when it, sua sponte, sanctions disabled pro se
plaintiffs by prohibiting them from conducting any discovery in a civil rights case
ISSUE II.
Does a district court err when it declines to find excusable neglect when it
bases its decision on erroneous facts; and when the plaintiffs, who caused no
medical condition; and where the District Court fails to use the proper test to
ISSUE III.
§§ 1981 and 1982 when a landlord refuses to rent to a racial minority but shortly
thereafter rents the same unit to a non-racial minority with lesser financial
qualifications?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying case involves civil rights, tort and contract claims under both
federal and state law. This appeal involves a civil rights question and several
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case below dealt with federal civil rights and housing discrimination
claims as well as various state law contract and tort claims. After dismissing the
federal claims, the District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims and thus never addressed them on their merits.
(Excerpt of Record (“E.R.”) at 21-22.) As only the federal claims are relevant to
this appeal, this brief focuses only on the facts giving rise to them.
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Appellant Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross (“Hiawatha”)1 is a disabled African-
degenerative disk disease with chronic neck and upper back pain. (Id.) Monica
and his in-laws, the Appellees (the “Hoefts”). (E.R. at 72.) The Hoefts
including big dumb nigger, angus, banjo lips, and ape. (Id.) The Hoefts often told
their daughter that Hiawatha “was a no-good nigger and that Monica Hoeft-Ross
The events underlying the civil rights and housing discrimination claims
began on or around September 22, 2001. Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross applied to rent
a housing unit from the Hoefts, intending to rent it jointly. (E.R. at 16, 23-24.)
1
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross have given their permission for the parties and the
Court to refer to them by their first names. This brief does so, not out of
disrespect, but for clarity and ease of reading, as the Appellants’ and Appellees’
names are so similar.
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Despite the fact Hiawatha Hoeft-Ross provided the household’s only income, (id.
at 23), and that he would be living in the housing unit anyway, the Hoefts refused
to enter into a rental agreement with him (id. at 16, 23-24). After rejecting the
agreement solely with the Caucasian Monica Hoeft-Ross. (Id.)2 Hiawatha lived in
the house for the next three years, during which time the Hoefts repeatedly refused
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross filed their complaint against the Hoefts on March
3, 2005. (Id. at 2.) Because of issues with service of process (id. at 2-3), and a
motion to dismiss (id. at 4), the Hoefts did not answer the complaint until June 19,
2006. (Id. at 3.) Under Rule 26-1(d) of the Local Rules of the District Court, the
parties had thirty days, or until July 19, 2006 to conduct a Rule 26(f) conference.3
2
Subsequent to rejecting Hiawatha’s rental application, the Hoefts
committed various torts and breaches of contract that comprise the state law claims
which the District Court did not address on their merits. (See generally Doc. # 5 of
the Record.) Again, this brief does not address the factual underpinnings of the
state law claims because they are not relevant to this appeal.
3
See Appendix B for the text of Local Rule 26-1
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Shortly after the Hoefts filed their answer, the parties engaged in what is
scheduling this conference only through mail, instead of using both mail and
telephone.5
On July 6, 2006, the Hoefts’ counsel, Mr. Kealy, asked Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
Ross to meet on the last day of the time period prescribed by Local Rule 26-1(d).
(E.R.II. at 1.) Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross could not meet on that day, but wrote three
separate letters requesting a new time to meet. (Id. at 2-4.) In the last of these
letters, and in an attempt to comply with Rule 26(f) and Local Rule 26-1, Mr. and
Mrs. Hoeft-Ross sent Mr. Kealy their proposed discovery plan and initial
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s discovery plan proposed dates for the following:
discovery cut-off, amending the pleadings and adding parties, disclosing experts,
submitting a joint interim status report, filing dispositive motions, filing the joint
4
See Appendix A for a more complete summary of the correspondence the
parties sent each other between July 6, 2006 and September 8, 2006.
5
The record shows that in the course of seven letters written by Mr. Kealy,
Mr. Kealy, he only tried to contact Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross via telephone once.
(E.R.II. at 19-22.)
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pretrial order, and filing motions to extend. (Id. at 5-7.) Each of these dates was
based off a discovery cut-off deadline of December 19, 2006, which was 180 days
from the date the Hoefts filed their answer. (Id. at 6.) The discovery deadlines and
corresponding dates that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross proposed conformed with the
requirements of Local Rule 26-1(d) and (e). Along with the discovery plan, Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross sent initial disclosures that included a list of witnesses and
On August 8, 2005, almost two weeks after Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross sent
their proposed discovery plan, Mr. Kealy sent them the Hoefts’ version. (Id. at
17.) Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross viewed this discovery plan as a response to and
revision of their own, and referred to the Hoefts’ discovery plan as the “revised
Between July 6 and August 31, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross sent Mr.
Kealy ten different letters, attempting to schedule a Rule 26(f) conference. (Id. at
2, 3, 4, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28.) During this time, Mr. Kealy likewise sent six
different letters trying to schedule the conference. (Id. at 1, 15, 17, 18, 21, 25.)
Due to the time delay of letters, the parties were unable to coordinate a conference.
(See Id. at 15, 16, 18-19 (attempting to schedule an August 11, 2006 conference);
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Id. at 18-19, 22 (attempting to schedule an August 25, 2006 conference); Id. at 20,
21, 23.)
from his various medical conditions were severe but manageable. (E.R. at 41.)
deteriorate, rendering him mentally and physically unstable. (Id. at 57-58; E.R.II.
at 23, 26, 28.) Hiawatha began experiencing unmanageable pain, forcing him to
until his condition had stabilized. (E.R. at 38; E.R.II. at 33, 35.)
the Rule 26(f) conference for August 31, 2006. (E.R.II. at 23.) Monica informed
Mr. Kealy of what had happened to Hiawatha, asking for patience and
understanding. (Id. at 28.) Mr. Kealy rejected that date and asked to postpone the
discovery plan to the District Court, which signed it the next day. (E.R. at 67-70,
63-66) The District Court then issued a notice of a Rule 16 Case Management
Conference. (Id. at 62.) In response, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross filed a motion,
petitioning the District Court to stay the beginning of discovery until January 19,
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2007, to give Hiawatha a chance to recover. (E.R. 56-58.) After reviewing
statements by Hiawatha’s doctor, the court granted the motion and set a case
management conference for January 18, 2007. (E.R. at 44, 45, 50-52, 55.)
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross did not attend the January 18, 2007 conference.
During this conference, the District Court discussed with Mr. Kealy about whether
to sanction Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross. Mr. Kealy recommended that the District
Court not give Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross much leeway. To support his position,
and in a lack of candor, Mr. Kealy made the following statement to the District
Court:
rules at all. Now, we’ve made our productions, and we’ve filed our
this Court for a sanction to, you know, preclude them from
leeway to pro se litigants. And I take that into account as well. But if
they don’t show up at 2:00 and they haven’t complied with any of
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the discovery rules and they’ve brought this massive lawsuit…they
These statements to the District Court were inaccurate, because Mr. Kealy
had previously received Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s initial disclosures and
proposed discovery plan. As noted previously, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross sent Mr.
Kealy their proposed discovery plan and initial disclosures on July 27, 2006.
(E.R.II. at 4-14.) Other portions of the record show that Mr. Kealy himself
acknowledged that he received the discovery plan and initial disclosures. (E.R. at
Based largely on the representations of Mr. Kealy, the District Court made
Well, here’s the Court’s view…if [Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross] are
obligated to follow not only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
the local rules of practice, and they have consistently failed to do so.
And the Court has given them leeway, has given them extensions, has
issues that one or more of the plaintiffs may suffer from. But
notwithstanding that, this case is now -- was filed back in 2005. It’s
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now 2007. And so the Court’s patience and willingness to grant some
the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the local rules of practice, with
plan and scheduling order, and for their failure to appear here in court
(E.R. at 51-52.)
The Court made its ruling without providing Mr. or Mrs. Hoeft-Ross any
announcing its sanction, the District Court entered into a discussion with Mr.
Kealy about how long he needed to file a dispositive motion, indicating that the
On February 12, 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross filed their Rule 60(b)(1)
motion, pleading excusable neglect, and again asking the District Court to stay the
case until Hiawatha’s condition stabilized. (E.R. 38-41.) Hiawatha explained that
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he had missed the January 18, 2007 conference because his doctor told him not to
participate in litigation and because he mixed up the hearing date, due to brain
damage. (E.R. at 41.) Hiawatha also produced a contemporary statement from his
physician, stating his unfitness to litigate. (E.R.II. at 35, 38.) The District Court
believed Hiawatha was capable of litigating the case and declared that Mr. and
Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had not shown excusable neglect in missing the January 18, 2007
conference. (E.R. at 13.) The District Court also noted it was desirable to resolve
the case because it had been pending for almost three years. (Id.)
On March 26, 2007, the Hoefts filed a motion for summary judgment against
Hiawatha’s federal claims. (Id. at 30.) The District Court ultimately granted the
summary judgment motion, holding, in part, that the Hoefts were not liable under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, because Hiawatha could not prove that he was
qualified to rent the housing unit and because the housing unit did not remain
available after the Hoefts rejected Hiawatha. (Id. at 15-17.) Once all of the federal
claims had been dismissed, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and dismissed the case. (Id. at 20-
21.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court made three errors of law that should be reversed. First,
the District Court erred by sanctioning Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross without warning
Second, the District Court erred in ruling that Hiawatha’s failure to attend the
January 18, 2007 conference was not due to excusable neglect. Third, the District
Court erred when granting summary judgment based on finding that Hiawatha
could not prove he was qualified to rent the housing unit and that the housing unit
plaintiff. Before a court may apply a dispositive sanction, it must first apply a five
part balancing test. In a case involving pro se plaintiffs or sua sponte sanctions, a
court is required to either warn the plaintiff of pending sanctions or first consider
whether lesser sanctions would suffice before issuing a case dispositive sanction.
In the instant case, the District Court erred by issuing a sanction prohibiting the
plaintiffs from engaging in any discovery without warning Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
The District Court erred when it ruled that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s failure
to attend the January 18, 2007 conference was not due to excusable neglect.
Regarding a claim of excusable neglect, a court abuses its discretion when its
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ruling is clearly erroneous or it does not apply the four factors of the test outlined
in Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). In the
instant case, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to apply the Briones
test. The District Court also abused its discretion because an application of the
Briones test clearly shows excusable neglect in this case because the Hoefts did not
suffer prejudice, the length and impact of the delay was negligible, and the Hoefts
had reasonable and good faith reasons for not attending the conference.
1981 and 1982 claims. The District Court ruled that these two sections did not
apply because Hiawatha had not shown that he was qualified to rent the housing
unit and because the unit did not remain available after he was rejected. However,
a reasonable jury could have found that Hiawatha was qualified to rent the housing
unit because his wife was qualified and she was dependent upon his income.
Moreover, the Hoefts’ rental of the housing unit to Mrs. Hoeft-Ross after they had
rejected Hiawatha is prima facie evidence that the unit did remain available after
the rejection.
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ARGUMENT
I.
IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES BROUGHT BY PRO SE LITIGANTS, A
COURT MUST EITHER WARN PLAINTIFFS OF POTENTIAL
SANCTIONS OR CONSIDER LESS SEVERE ONES BEFORE ISSUING
CASE DISPOSITIVE SANCTIONS
This Court should reverse the District Court’s sanction prohibiting Mr. and
Mrs. Hoeft-Ross from engaging in any discovery. An appellant court reviews the
application of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d
1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987); Thompson v. Housing Authority of the City of Los
extreme circumstances.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.
1986). Here, the district court failed to weigh the following five factors (the
(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and
(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Malone v. United States Postal
Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987); Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831. Because
the District Court applied dispositive sanctions without making an explicit finding
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regarding this five-factor test, this Court examines the record and applies the test
itself to check for an abuse of discretion. See Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424.
Sanction Test in the context of an order of dismissal, see e.g. Eldridge, 832 F.2d
1132 (applying the Dispositive Sanction Test to a sanction dismissing the case),
this test applies to any sanction that has a dispositive effect, see Valley Engineers
Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057-1058 (9th Cir. 1998)
(applying the Dispositive Sanction Test to a dismissal, but recognizing that this test
applies more broadly to dispositive sanctions). In the instant case, this five-factor
test demonstrates that the District Court abused its discretion in applying a
Shakman, 204 Ariz. 231, 237, 62 P.3d 976, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App.2003) (holding that
a motion in limine was a dispositive sanction when it excluded all evidence from
trial); Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3rd Cir. 2003) (stating that
the exclusion of vital evidence under Rule 37(b)(2) is tantamount to the dismissal
of a claim, and thus is dispositive); Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1276 (6th
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dismissal of the case, and a court must review the sanction as one resulting in
dismissal). 6
In the instant case, the District Court’s prohibition of all discovery was
dispositive. In its summary judgment on Sections 1981 and 1982, the District
Court relied on the Hoefts’ affidavits which claimed that the housing unit was not
open to the general public and that the Hoefts did not own enough units or conduct
enough transactions to make them subject to the fair housing act. (E.R. at 18-19.)
Hiawatha and his wife, however, were never able to dispute these factual
allegations because the Court prohibited all discovery. If the District Court had
and real estate information from the Hoefts and, more importantly, the trust in
which the property was held. For example, such information may have shown:
- that the Hoefts or their trust owned more real estate and thus were
- that the Hoefts had attempted to rent the housing unit to the general
6
The sanction to preclude discovery in this case was dispositive. As
explained previously, in the same hearing that the District Court barred Mr. and
Mrs. Hoeft-Ross from conducting discovery, the court also asked Mr. Kealy how
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- what requirements the Hoefts looked for in determining who was
credit score.
Ultimately, without these answers, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross were never
able to adequately refute a summary judgment. This information would have been
crucial to a deposition that the Court never allowed them to have. Moreover, by
foreclosing Mr. and Mrs. Heoft-Ross’ ability to conduct a deposition, they were
never able to challenge the veracity of the allegations the Hoefts made in their
bare-boned affidavits which was the foundation of the Courts order granting
summary judgment. Thus, the District Court’s sanction precluding all discovery
was dispositive because it prevented Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross from investigating
and disputing the factual allegations upon which the District Court based its
summary judgment.
The Fifth factor of the Dispositive Sanctions Test provides the clearest
evidence that the District Court abused its discretion by foreclosing Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross’s ability to conduct discovery. The District Court was required to warn
long it would take him to file a dispositive motion, indicating that the District
Court was aware and intended that the sanction effectively end the case.
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Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross of potential sanctions and to consider and/or apply lesser
sanctions before applying dispositive ones. See Valley Engineers Inc., 158 F.3d at
1057. The District Court may only avoid these requirements of the fifth factor if
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had established a “pattern of deception and discovery
abuse” that made it impossible for the district court to conduct a trial “with any
reasonable assurance that the truth would be available.” Id. (quoting Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir. 1995)).
In the instant case, the fifth factor of the Dispositive Sanctions Test shows a
clear abuse of discretion. The District Court did not warn Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
Ross that potential sanctions were pending. The first time the District Court even
mentioned the possibility of sanctions was during the January 18, 2007 conference,
the conference they missed. Moreover, the District Court never applied lesser
sanctions. (See generally, E.R. 44-54.) Instead, the District Court stated that Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross would not be allowed to engage in discovery and then asked
Mr. Kealy how much time he needed to draft a dispositive motion. (Id. at 43, 50-
52.)
sanction would have been insufficient. Further, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross did not
commit a pattern of discovery abuses, and certainly not ones that would make it
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impossible for the District Court to rule on the merits of the case. This Court
should therefore reverse the District Court’s ruling because that court never warned
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross, never explicitly considered lesser sanctions and never
evidence that the District Court abused its discretion when sanctioning Mr. and
Mrs. Hoeft-Ross. Under this factor, the risk of prejudice to the non-sanctioned
party only becomes relevant if such a risk actually exists and is substantial. Here,
the Hoefts failed to meet their burden of showing that they suffered actual
prejudice that is substantial when compared to the reason for delay. See In re
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir.
1994)).
To prevail on the third factor, the District Court needed to find that the
Hoefts suffered prejudice because Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s actions impaired the
the case.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990).
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discovery abuse made it impossible’ for the district court to conduct a trial ‘with
any reasonable assurance that the truth would be available.’” Valley Engineers
Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir. 1995)). Since a dispositive sanction
inflicts the ultimate prejudice, the third factor only truly favors sanctions if bad
faith discovery violations “threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s actions prejudiced the Hoefts. Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross did
not substantially cause any unauthorized delay in this case. The District Court
granted Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Start
Discovery, staying the beginning of discovery until January 19, 2007. (E.R. at 55.)
Based on that order, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross cannot be sanctioned for not
participating in discovery before January 19, 2007. Thus, the only delay in this
case was Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s failure to appear at the January 18, 2007 case
does not establish the type of delay that “impair[s] the defendant’s ability to go to
trial or threaten[s] to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Thus, Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s failure to appear not did cause the prejudice required under
this factor.
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Even if the failure to attend the January 18, 2007 conference did cause
enough delay to be prejudicial, which it did not, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had a
non-frivolous excuse for not attending. In his January 25, 2007 declaration,
Hiawatha’s doctor stated: “[Hiawatha Ross] has had severe and chronic problems
stemming from motor vehicle accidents which have aggravated past injuries. He
has been disabled and has not been able to function well enough to attend court.”
(E.R.II. at 38.) Moreover, Hiawatha’s mental illness caused him to confuse the
dates of the hearing. (E.R. at 41.) Even though the District Court ultimately
disagreed with his doctor’s prognosis, Hiawatha’s reasons for missing the Rule 16
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s action did not rise to the level of “impair[ing] the
decision of the case.” Importantly, neither the Hoefts nor the District Court has
evidence of such prejudice in this case, this Court should thus reverse the District
7
In Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Discovery
Motion for Sanctions and Request for Judicial Notice, the Hoefts state that an
indefinite continuance of litigation would prejudice the elderly Hoefts. The Hoefts
never alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s failure to attend the January 18, 2007
hearing caused the Hoefts the prejudice contemplated by this factor.
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C. The District Court Erred In Applying Dispositive Sanctions Because
The Interest In Resolving A Case On Its Merits Is Heightened In Civil
Rights Cases
The fourth factor of the Dispositive Sanction Test also provides clear
reasons that the District Court’s sanction was an abuse of discretion. The fourth
factor -- the strong policy of resolving a claim on its merits -- “is particularly
important in civil rights cases.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 396
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). In
Hernandez, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ civil rights case merely
because it perceived that the plaintiffs had engaged in judge shopping. See id. at
397. This Court ultimately reversed the sanction, in part, stating that the public
The instant case centers on whether the Hoefts violated Hiawatha’s civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982. Where, as here, allegations of civil rights
violations are involved, the District Court should promote resolving the case on the
merits. By foreclosing discovery, this sanction prevented the District Court from
doing so in regards to Hiawatha’s civil rights claims. The District Court abused its
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D. The First Two Factors Of The Dispositive Sanctions Test Do Not
Outweigh The Last Three Factors In This Case
The first two factors of the Dispositive Sanction Test -- the public’s and the
court’s desire to expedite litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket -- do
not render the District Court’s decision proper. Although speedy litigation is
desirable, courts give these two factors little weight in a dispositive sanction
analysis unless the plaintiff is first warned about the sanctions. See Hamilton v.
Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1987). In Hamilton, a
plaintiff did not actively litigate a case for three years due to, among other things,
mistakes plaintiff’s counsel made. See id. at 499. After the case had been pending
for over three years, plaintiff’s counsel appeared at trial and informed the court that
the plaintiff was not ready for trial. See id. at 499-500. Although the district court
litigation and the District Court’s ability to manage its docket. See id. at 500.
However, this Court held that “[w]hile these are legitimate concerns, they do not
relieve the district judge of his obligation to warn the plaintiff that dismissal is
imminent.” Id. (citing Tolbert v. Leighton, 623 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir.1980)).
Thus, the timeframe of the litigation is substantially less important than a judge’s
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In the instant case, the first two factors of the Dispositive Sanction Test do
not overcome the last three factors. As in Hamilton, the District Court never
warned Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross of potential sanctions. Thus, the first two factors
-- the public’s desire for speedy litigation and the court’s ability to manage its
docket -- are accorded little to no weight in this case. Ultimately, this Court should
reverse the District Court’s sanction as an abuse of discretion because this was a
civil rights case in which, even though the defendants had not suffered any
prejudice, the court issued sua sponte sanctions against handicapped pro se
II.
HIAWATHA SHOWED EXCUSABLE NEGLECT FOR FAILING TO
APPEAR AT THE JANUARY 18, 2007 CASE MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE
The District Court also erred when it denied Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s Rule
60(b)(1) motion and ruled that they had not shown excusable neglect for missing
the January 18, 2007 case management conference. This Court reviews a denial of
a 60(b)(1) motion for abuse of discretion. See Bateman v. United States Postal
Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion
regarding excusable neglect if it bases its opinion on erroneous facts, does not
apply the correct test, or if its decision is based on an erroneous application of the
-25-
correct test. See id. (citing United States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
This Court should reverse the District Court’s rejection of Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion for at least three reasons. First, the District
Court’s sanction was based on erroneous facts. Second, the District Court did not
use the Briones Test to determine whether the alleged neglect was excusable.
Third, the Briones Test shows that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s actions were
excusable.
conference; however, the District Court made several erroneous findings that
First, contrary to the District Court’s findings, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross did
produce initial disclosures and a proposed discovery plan. During the January 18,
2007 hearing, the District Court based its sanctions in part on the representations of
all. Now, we’ve made our productions, and we’ve filed our report. I
haven’t received anything. So I was half inclined to ask this Court for
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they don’t comply with the fundamental rule of the initial disclosures.
And I take that into account as well. But if they don’t show up at 2:00
and they haven’t complied with any of the discovery rules and they’ve
leeway.
provided a proposed discovery plan and initial disclosures on July 22, 2006. (E.R.
believe that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had made no effort to comply with the Rule
26(f) requirements. When Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross later pointed out this error,
(E.R. at 38), the District Court ignored them, citing the multiple efforts of Mr.
Kealy to hold a Rule 26(f) conference. (Id. at 27.) As just outlined, it was clearly
erroneous for the District Court to find that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had not
provided initial disclosures and that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had failed to
Second, the District Court also erroneously found that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
-27-
September, 2006. (Id. at 27-28.) As explained previously, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
Ross made a good faith effort to hold a Rule 26(f) conference. Mr. Kealy initiated
sent a letter stating that he could only hold the conference on July 19, 2006, the last
day of the Local Rule 26-1 deadline. (E.R.II. at 1.) Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross
could not attend that day because of a previous court engagement. (Id. at 2.) From
around mid-July 2006 through August 23, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross made
seven different attempts to set up a Rule 26(f) conference. (Id. at 2, 3, 4, 16, 20,
22, 23.) During that time, Mr. Kealy also attempted to schedule a Rule 26(f)
It was not until the end of August 2006 that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross
became clear that Hiawatha was impaired and would be for at least the next few
months, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross moved the District Court to extend their deadline
requirements until January 19, 2007. (E.R. at 56.) The District Court granted Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s motion and set a case management conference for January
Although it is unfortunate that the parties were unable to schedule a date for
the Rule 26(f) conference, the delay was due to mutual legitimate scheduling
conflicts, letters getting crossed in the mail, and both parties’ seeming refusal to
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use the telephone to assist them in scheduling the meeting. The 17 letters sent by
the parties between July 6, 2006 and September 8, 2006 clearly establish that Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross made a good-faith effort to hold a Rule 26(f) conference.
Thus, the District Court’s finding that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross refused to
participate in the Rule 26(f) conference from July through September, 2006 is
clearly erroneous.
excusable neglect. Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a court may relieve a party from a
final order upon the showing of excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
Briones Test: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of
the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay;
and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Briones v. Riviera Hotel &
A district court abuses its discretion by failing to use all four factors of the
Briones Test. In Bateman v. United States Postal Service, a district court refused
to find excusable neglect when a party’s attorney missed a deadline because he was
out of the country for 19 days. See 231 F.3d at 1223. The district court reasoned
that the attorney (1) knew about deadline, (2) did not warn the court he would miss
-29-
the deadline, and (3) never explained why he spent so much time in rectifying the
problem. See id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, finding that
it had abused its discretion by examining only the reason for the delay, instead of
each of the four factors of the Briones Test. See id. at 1223-24.
In the instant case, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to apply
the full Briones Test. When denying Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s Rule 60(b)(1)
motion, the District Court stated that it disagreed with Hiawatha’s doctor about
Hiawatha’s ability to participate in discovery. (E.R. at 13.) The District Court also
stated that “to reach a resolution to this case [is] desirable” because “[t]his case has
been pending for almost three years.” (Id.) At best, the District Court only applied
one and a half of the four Briones factors: the reason for the delay and the length
of the delay. The District Court never considered what the impact of the delay had
on the proceedings, whether Hiawatha was acting in good faith and whether the
delay had prejudiced the Hoefts. The District Court’s failure to apply the proper
C. The Briones Test Shows That Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s Actions were
Excusable
The District Court’s ruling that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had failed to show
“although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
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McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954). Hiawatha’s failure to comply
with the District Court’s requirements is excusable under the Briones Test.
opposing party existed -- supports a finding of excusable neglect. Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross’s actions did not cause the Hoefts any prejudice. “A defendant suffers
threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v.
Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Laurino v. Syringa Gen.
Hospital, 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (using this definition of prejudice in
the Briones test). As explained previously, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s actions did
not rise to the level of impairing the Hoefts’ ability to go to trial or threaten a
rightful decision of the case. Ultimately, this factor of the Briones Test shows that
b. The delay was not excessive and its potential impact was
negligible
The second factor of the Briones Test -- whether the delay was excessive
excusable neglect. The delay in this case and its impact were negligible. The only
unexcused delay in this case was Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s failure to attend the
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January 18, 2007 conference and their failure to provide the District Court with a
discovery plan during that conference. On September 20, 2006, Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross informed the District Court that Hiawatha was ill. (E.R. at 60-61.)
Five days later, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross moved the District Court to delay
the beginning of discovery, implicitly along with all of its deadlines, until January
19, 2007. (E.R. at 56-58.) The District Court granted the extension. Thus, the
only relevant violation occurred when Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross did not attend the
January 18, 2007 conference. The minute order sanctioning Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
Ross was entered the same day of the conference. (E.R. at 42-43.) Thus, the
relevant delay in this instance was less than one day. A delay of less than one day,
excusable neglect. Here, the delay was legitimate and reasonable. There were two
periods of delay in this case -- the delay before the January 18, 2007 conference
and the delay after. Although the first delay was excused by the District Court,
Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross had a legitimate reason for not holding a Rule
26(f) and for not submitting their discovery plan and proposed scheduling order to
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the District Court before the January 18, 2007 conference. As discussed
conference with Mr. Kealy. Unfortunately, the parties consistently got their
23), Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross moved the District Court for an extension. (See Id.;
E.R. 56-58, 60-61.) After the District Court granted the extension, Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross reasonably believed that they were temporarily relieved of the duties
Although the record does not explicitly state why Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross
did not send the District Court an individual discovery plan and scheduling order,
as Mr. Kealy did, an examination of the record shows why a pro se litigant might
have made such a delay. First, Rule 26(f) and Local Rule 26-1 indicate that the
discovery plan should be submitted after the Rule 26(f) conference. The Rule
26(f) conference never took place, thus it would be reasonable for a pro se litigant
In a letter Mr. Kealy sent Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross on September 8, 2006,
Mr. Kealy stated that his scheduling order was very similar to Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-
8
Mr. Kealy also did not individually submit his discovery plan until
September 8, 2006. (E.R. at 67-70.)
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Ross’s scheduling order and he would be submitting it to the District Court. He
also stated: “[I]t is my intent to inform the Court that additional time will be
Accordingly, it would not be necessary for your [sic] to seek special scheduling, as
my proposed plan will request that in any event. It seems that we have a consistent
view on this issue; therefore, there is no reason for a problem.” (E.R.II. at 30.) A
pro se litigant could easily interpret this as relieving their obligation of submitting
Ultimately, it was reasonable for Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross to believe that the
District Court’s granting of their request for an extension, and Mr. Kealy’s
duties under Rule 26(f) and Local Rule 26-1 at least until January 18, 2007.
Hiawatha did not attend the January 18, 2007 conference because he was
physically and mentally unwell and because he mixed up the dates of the
deteriorate, resulting in the discovery period being postponed until January 2007.
(E.R.II. at 23; E.R. at 55.) On October 12, 2006, the day before the District Court
aggravated his condition. (E.R.II at 33, 34, 38.) In their Rule 60(b)(1) motion, Mr.
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and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross stated that they missed the January 18, 2007 conference
because Hiawatha was physically and mentally unable to participate and because
his mental condition caused him to mix up the date of the Conference. (E.R. at
40.)
granting the Rule 60(1)(b) motion would have been appropriate. However, even if
Hiawatha could have attended and merely forgot about the Conference, such
negligence is the type of neglect anticipated by Rule 60(1)(b) and the Briones Test.
finding of excusable neglect. There is nothing in the record that indicates bad faith
on the part of Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross. Nor have the Hoefts or the District Court
suggested that Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross have acted in bad faith. Moreover, Mr.
and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross have corroborated their claims of mental and physical
(E.R.II. at 32, 33, 35, 36-37, 38.) Although the District Court disagreed with the
discovery, the District Court never alleged a belief that Hiawatha was not acting in
good faith. (E.R. at 13-14.) Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross fulfill the good
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Ultimately, the District Court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion was an
abuse of discretion because the District Court used the wrong test and applied
violations that did not exist. Moreover, an application of the Briones Test shows
that, even if Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s actions were within their control, which
they were not, Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross’s neglect was excusable. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the District Court’s ruling regarding Rule 60(b)(1).
III.
CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS, HIAWATHA
HOEFT-ROSS HAS VIABLE CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 AND 1982
BECAUSE HE WAS QUALIFIED TO RENT THE HOUSING UNIT AND
THE HOUSING UNIT REMAINED AVAILABLE AFTER THE HOEFTS
REJECTED HIS RENTAL APPLICATION
This Court should reverse the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment and holding that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 allow a landlord to reject
the rental application of a racial minority but then accept a rental application for
the same unit from a non-racial minority with identical or worse financial
Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004); Qwest Comm’ns Inc. v. Berkeley,
433 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by, Sprint
Telephony PCS L.P. v. County of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008).
-36-
The Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, were established to help
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Likewise, Section 1982 states, “[a]ll citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
claims. See e.g. Selden Apartments v. United States Dept. of HUD, 785 F.2d 152
(6th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff has a valid claim for housing discrimination under
Sections 1981 and 1982 when the plaintiff can show: “(1) that he or she is a
member of a racial minority; (2) that he or she applied for and was qualified to rent
or purchase certain property or housing; (3) that he or she was rejected; and (4) that
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Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F. 2d 548 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying elements in
§ 1982 action); Selden Apartments, 785 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1986); Sandford v. R.L.
Coleman Realty Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 173, 175 (4th Cir.1978) (elements same under
The District Court held that Hiawatha made a prima facie case for some, but
not all of the elements of the housing discrimination test. The District Court
correctly held that, for purposes of summary judgment, Hiawatha satisfied the first
element of the test because Hiawatha is of a racial minority, (E.R. at 16); that
Hiawatha satisfied the first half of the second element because an issue of material
fact exists as to whether Hiawatha applied for the rental unit, (Id. at 16-17); and
that Hiawatha satisfied the third element because an issue of material fact exists as
However, the District Court incorrectly held that Hiawatha did not satisfy
the remaining elements of Sections 1981 and 1982, based on the limited facts
before it. Specifically, the District Court erred in ruling that the record gave no
indication that Hiawatha was qualified to rent the housing unit (id. at 16-17) and
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that the unit did not remain available after the Hoefts rejected Hiawatha’s rental
nothing in the record to reasonably indicate that the plaintiff was “qualified” to rent
the housing unit.10 See, e.g., Phiffer, 648 F.2d at 551 (stating that a plaintiff in a
housing discrimination case must have been qualified to rent the housing unit). If
there is anything in the record from which a jury might reasonably infer that the
plaintiff was qualified to rent the housing unit, then summary judgment on that
issue is inappropriate. See Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892,
896 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court must examine “evidence in the light most
material fact);Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990)
9
As explained previously, the District Court sanctions precluded Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross from developing the evidence crucial in opposing a motion for
summary judgment
10
Being “qualified to rent” means being “ready and able to accept
defendants’ offer to rent or buy.” Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments, 228
F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2000).
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(stating that courts must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally,
In the instant case, a reasonable jury could have found that Hiawatha was
qualified to rent the housing unit. The record shows that Mrs. Hoeft-Ross was
qualified to rent the housing unit, as is evidenced by the fact that she actually did
rent the housing unit. (E.R. at 11) Mrs. Hoeft-Ross lived with Hiawatha and was
financially dependent upon Hiawatha. (E.R. at 23.) Thus, construing the record in
the light most favorable to Hiawatha, a reasonable jury could find that he was
someone who actually rented the unit. Therefore, this Court should vacate the
District Court’s judgment which is based on its finding that the record gives no
Hiawatha’s rental application. A valid claim for housing discrimination must show
that the “rental opportunity remained available [after the defendants rejected the
plaintiff].” Phiffer, 648 F.2d at 551; United States Dept. of HUD v. Blackwell, 908
F.2d 864, 870-71 (11th Cir. 1990). In Blackwell, the Eleventh Circuit found that a
plaintiff had shown a prima facie case regarding the “availability” portion of the
housing discrimination test when the landlord continued to try to rent the housing
-40-
unit after he had rejected the plaintiff. See Blackwell, at 908 F.2d at 870-71. Thus
it is prima facie evidence that a “rental opportunity remained available” when the
landlord attempts to, or actually does, rent to another party after a racial minority’s
The District Court incorrectly held that the rental unit did not remain
available in this case because the Hoefts rented the unit to Monica shortly after
they rejected Hiawatha. (E.R. 17-18.) This ruling defeats the entire purpose
behind Sections 1981 and 1982. Sections 1981 and 1982 were established to help
landlord could not be held liable for racial discrimination so long as the landlord
rents the unit to a non-racial minority shortly after he rejects a racial minority.
Such an interpretation defies logic and renders Sections 1981 and 1982 utterly
meaningless.
In the instant case, Hiawatha has shown a prima facie case regarding the
fourth element of the housing discrimination test. The record is clear that after
Hiawatha’s rental application was rejected, the Hoefts rented the housing unit to
Monica. Thus, the rental opportunity remained available. The Hoefts rejected
Hiawatha. Therefore, this Court should vacate the District Court’s summary
judgment because Hiawatha has shown a prima facie case for housing
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CONCLUSION
The District Court’s orders granting judgment in favor of the Hoefts should
be vacated and its orders, denying the Hoeft-Ross’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion and
sanctioning the Hoeft-Ross’s should be reversed, and the case should be remanded
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
2. This brief complies with the type face requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because
type style.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Appendix A
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Summary of Mail Correspondence between Mr. Kealy and Mr. and Mrs.
Hoeft-Ross
-46-
20 not received a confirmation of the August
10th or 11th conference. They suggest holding
the conference after Mr. Kealy’s trial. They
suggest either August 29th or 30th.
8/17/06 Defendant E.R.II. at Mr. Kealy accepts the August 30th as the
21 26(f) conference date.
8/18/06 Plaintiff E.R.II. at Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross state that they can
22 meet on either August 24th, 25th, or their
proposed dates of August 29th or 30th. They
note that they have received Mr. Kealy’s
initial disclosures and discovery plan sent on
August 8, 2006. They refer to Mr. Kealy’s
discovery plan as a “revised discovery
plan.”
8/23/06 Plaintiff E.R.II. at Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross inform Mr.
23 Kealy that Hiawatha has become very ill.
They ask for an August 31, 2006 Rule 26(f)
conference.
8/24/06 Plaintiff E.R.II. at Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft-Ross note that they have
24 not received an agenda about what will be
discussed at the Rule 26(f) conference.
8/28/06 Defendant E.R.II. at Mr. Kealy states that he cannot meet on
25 August 31, 2006. He asks for new
conference dates after September 5, 2006.
He states that he will submit his discovery
plan to the court himself.
8/30/06 Plaintiff E.R.II. at Monica states that she and her husband will
26-27 not be attending that day’s Rule 26(f)
conference because Hiawatha had been in the
emergency room that day. She states that she
will contact Mr. Kealy as soon as Hiawatha’s
condition is under control. She provides Mr.
Kealy with proof of the emergency room
visit.
8/31/06 Plaintiff E.R.II. at Mrs. Hoeft-Ross states that Hiawatha is
28-29 extremely ill and that they will not be able to
give new dates for a meeting until after a
September 8 doctor’s appointment. She asks
for patience.
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9/08/06 Defendant E.R.II. at Mr. Kealy responds to Monica’s August 31st
30-31 letter. He asks for new Rule 26(f) conference
dates. He states that he has not received a
response to his proposed discovery plan. He
states that his discovery plan is substantially
similar to their discovery plan. He states that
they will not need to seek special scheduling,
since he will request that of the court
himself.
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Appendix B
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LR 26-1. DISCOVERY PLANS AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURES.
(d) Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) Meeting; Filing and Contents of Discoverv Plan and
Scheduling Order. Counsel for the plaintiff shall initiate the scheduling of the Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(f) meeting within thirty (30) days after the first defendant answers or
otherwise appears. Fourteen (14) days after the mandatory Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
conference, the parties shall submit a stipulated discovery plan and scheduling
order. The plan shall be in such form so as to permit the plan, on court approval
thereof, to become the scheduling order required by Fed. R. Civ. P. l6(b). If the
plan sets deadlines within those specified in LR 26-1(e), the plan shall state on its
deadlines are sought, the plan shall state on its face “SPECIAL SCHEDULING
26-1(e), a statement of the reasons why longer or different time periods should
apply to the case or, in cases in which the parties disagree as to the form or
contents of the discovery plan, a statement of each party’s position on each point in
dispute.
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(e) Form of Stipulated Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order, Applicable
Deadlines. The discovery plan shall include, in addition to the information required
(1) Discovery Cut-Off Date. The plan shall state the date the first
discovery measured from the date the first defendant answers or otherwise appears,
and shall give the calendar date on which discovery will close. Unless otherwise
ordered, discovery periods longer than one hundred eighty (180) days from the
date the first defendant answers or appears will require special scheduling review;
(2) Amending the Pleadings and Adding Parties. Unless the discovery
plan otherwise provides and the court so orders, the date for filing motions to
amend the pleadings or to add parties shall be not later than ninety (90) days prior
to the close of discovery. The plan should state the calendar dates on which these
discovery plan otherwise provides and the court so orders, the time deadlines
modified to require that the disclosures be made sixty (60) days before the
discovery cut-off date and that disclosures respecting rebuttal experts be made
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thirty (30) days after the initial disclosure of experts. The plan should state the
and the court so orders, the date for filing dispositive motions shall be not later
than thirty (30) days after the discovery cut-off date. The plan should state the
(5) Pretrial Order. Unless the discovery plan otherwise provides and
the court so orders, the joint pretrial order shall be filed not later than thirty (30)
days after the date set for filing dispositive motions. In the event dispositive
motions are filed, the date for filing the joint pretrial order shall be suspended until
thirty (30) days after decision of the dispositive motions or further order of the
court;
otherwise provides and the court so orders, the disclosures required by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(3) and any objections thereto shall be included in the pretrial order; and
(7) Form of Order. All discovery plans shall include on the last page
thereof the words “IT IS SO ORDERED” with a date and signature block for the
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(f) Unless otherwise ordered, Local Rule 26-1(d) and (e) do not apply to
interpleader actions. The procedures in Local Rules 22-1 and 22-2 will govern all
interpleader actions.
9605189.7
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