SOME PRINCIPLES IN THE ART OF NAMING

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1. The difference between the name and the symbol. Michael A. Augros, Democritus and the Problem of Number, p. 7. That a name signifies what is one per se is what distinguishes it from another kind of artificial sign, the symbol. Symbol is also used as a generic word for the two species name and symbol, but when symbol is used to mean the species of artificial sign distinguished from name, it differs from it as signifying things without any attention to whether or not they are one per se. As Charles De Koninck notes on page 10 of The Hollow Universe, St. Thomas, in speaking of symbols of faith which are collections of propositions of the faith gathered not according to intrinsic order, but according to circumstantial needs of the time, says symbolum importat quamdam collectionem. The word symbol itself comes from the Greek for thrown together. Hence a symbol differs from a name in that a name is an artificial sign given to things as a result of their being grasped as somehow one per se, whereas a symbol is an artificial sign given to things without their being so grasped. Hence it is possible to give a symbol to a heap or list or jumble or random pile of things which have no per se unity at all, whereas it is impossible to give a proper name to such a mess. It is also possible, of course, to give a symbol to something which is one per se, e.g. Let this circle be called A, but A is only a symbol so long as it is used to designate the thing without any attendance to the per se unity it has. Michael A. Augros, ibid., p. 7. ...[S]ince science is of the necessary, and what is one by accident (e.g. what is one by being said of or by belonging to one thing, or by being in one place, or in general what is one not through itself but through happening to be with the unity of some other thing) is not one of necessity, ...so neither can there be a science of it, or a definition, or even a name. For example, although rational animal is composed of two names, the one thing named by these is, as such, a single thing, since something undetermined in animal is further determined by rational. Hence, man, as such, has unity in and of itself. One of the terms in mans definition is perfective of the other and they are found together of necessity; it is impossible to find a complete rational nature which is not also an animal, since to be rational is to be a certain kind of animal, it is a determinate way of being an animal. Therefore man is not a mere symbol, but a name, and the thing so named admits of a real definition (according to genus and differences, or according to causes), and there can be science about that thing. But the case is different with something like opinionated, fashionable, overpaid, nazi. No two of the things just mentioned belong together of necessity, although all four of them may happen to belong to some one person, Hilary. There is no necessary union between opinionated and fashionable; these can be found separately, and being opinionated is not a determinate way of being fashionable any more than fashionable determines a way of being opinionated. They are not found together by reason of anything in themselves, although they might happen to be together in some third thing, such as Hilary. Michael A. Augros, Spring 1993 Scrapbook (Scrapboo. 1), The Art of Naming, n. 6. A name is an artificial sign of a thing which is one of itself, whereas a symbol is an artificial sign of things which are one through something other than themselves. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says things like white, vagrant, thrice-married plumber are one 2

through something other than themselves, in this case the man to whom all these things happen to belong. Any sign for such a collection or heap of things which are one because they are all in one subject, or all in one place, or all on one list in somebodys mind, is a symbol (as distinguished from a name). What, then, of signs we all would call names, such as musician and negro? A musician is a musical man, and a negro is a black man. These have no more unity of their own, it seems, than white man. But musician does not differ logically from musical, which really names music, as in the art (in the genus of habit, and ultimately of quality), though the ending is changed, since music names the quality in the mode of a substance, in the mode of something absolute, so that it must be renamed musical to be predicable of a substance. One cannot say Socrates is music, but Socrates is musical or Socrates is a musician which do not differ logically from Socrates has the art of music. Likewise with negro, which names a racial quality that can be found only in man, and which is an inseparable accident from any in whom it is found. 2. On proportional naming. Michael Augros, Philosophical and Theological Scrapbook #6. Fall 1994 (Scrapboo 6), Logic, nn. 13-14. 13) n 879 In V Metaphysicorum Lectio VIII, St. Thomas distinguishes 2 sorts of proportional naming: Proportione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modis, vel in eo quod aliqua duo habent diversas habitudines ad unum; sicut sanativum de urina dictum habitudinem significat signi sanitatis; de medicina vero, quia significat habitudinem causae respectu eiusdem. Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa, sicut tranquillitatis ad mare et serenitatis ad aerem. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris And at nn 535 (Book IV, Lectio 1), he says: Dicit ergo primo, quod ens sive quod est, dicitur multipliciter. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. --Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. --Quandoquae vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referentur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur. And in Summa Contra Gentiles (I.33), he says: Ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis ... quando unum de pluribus secundum puram aequivocationem praedicatur, ex uno eorum non possumus duci in cognitionem alterius: name cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex nominum ratione. 3

And in Summa Contra Gentiles (I.34), he says: Relinquitur quod ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur, praedicantur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subiectum medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signa. Alio modo, secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidnens ad aliquid tertium referantur. Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo. In huiusmodi autem analogica praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius idem invenitur prius secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam: sicut substantia est prior accidente et natura, inquantum substantia est causa accidentis; et cognitione, inquantum substantia in definitione accidentis ponitur. Et ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum nominis rationem [et secundum naturam]. --Quando vero id quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem. Sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativus, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu; sed quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est sanativum est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur per prius sanum secundum nominis rationem. Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis. Naming things proportionally is one way of naming them equivocally for a reason. There are others, such as the retaining of a common name for all the species other than one which gets a new name because of something significant about it. E.g. animal is divided into man and the animals, so animal can mean two things; according to one of which it is said of man, and according to the other of which it is not. Likewise when finger is divided into thumb and the other four fingers. Again, undergoing has three meanings, each shedding a part found in the previous definition. These are ways of naming things equivocally for a reason, but not so much ways of naming things proportionally. In order for the naming of things equivocally for a reason to be proportional naming, there must be some sort of proportion, or, at least, a ratio which is the basis of the naming. 4

(Proportion even in English first means a ratio of one quantity to another, and later a likeness of such ratios. But, following Euclid, it is best to use proportion to mean a likeness of ratios, and ratio for a simple ratio of one thing to another.) IF WE COMPARE TWO THINGS TO EACH OTHER 1)- And we name them the same because of ratio they have to each other, then they are named Proportionally. E.g. Substance and accident are called being equivocally for a reason, namely the ratio that accident has to substance. 2)- And we name them the same, but not because of a ratio they have to each other, then they are named equivocally by chance. E.g. piece of baseball equipment and nocturnal winged animal are called bat equivocally by chance, since they are not so named because of any relation between the two. IF WE COMPARE TWO THINGS TO OTHER THINGS 3)- And they have the same ratio to different things, then they are named Proportionally. E.g. a certain kind of statement is to the subject it helps us conclude about as the innermost boundary is to the thing contained in it, and hence the statement is called a Place after the innermost boundary of the containing body. 4)- And they have different ratios to the same thing, then they are named Proportionally. E.g. a scalpel has one relation to the art of medicine, namely it is an instrument of it, and a doctor has another relation to the art of medicine, namely he is the subject of it. Hence both the scalpel and the doctor are called medical. 5)- And they have the same ratio to the same thing, then they are named univocally. E.g. if a scalpel and a bandage both have the same relation to the art of medicine, namely that they are instruments of it, and if that is why each is called medical, then they are called medical univocally. 6)- And they have different ratios to different things, then they are named equivocally by chance. E.g. if the wooden baseball equipment has one relation to the sport of baseball, and the nocturnal winged animal has another relation to its cave, this cannot be a reason for naming both the equipment and the animal bat. 1) 2 things have ratio to each other = PROPORTIONAL NAMING 2) 2 things have no ratio = PURELY EQUIVOCAL NAMING 3) 2 things have same ratio to different things = PROPORTIONAL NAMING 4) 2 things have different ratios to same thing = PROPORTIONAL NAMING 5) 2 things have same ratio to same thing = UNIVOCAL NAMING 6) 2 things have different ratios to different things = PURELY EQUIVOCAL NAMING

14) Equivocally = named unequally, univocally = named equally (ex aequo), analogously = named proportionally. Cf. Michael Augros, Notes from the Berquist Seminars (Duane.4), n. 644: 664) ANALOGY OF NAMES. A name may be equivocal either by chance or for a reason. But name used equivocally for a reason is broader than name used proportionally. Sometimes St. Thomas limits divisio to the separation of parts of some whole, either composed or universal, and other times he is willing to use it to mean any kind of separation, e.g. of a word into its meanings or in a negative statement. Likewise, St. Thomas will sometimes call being a genus. In a similar way, we might say that any name used equivocally for a reason is used proportionally in some very loose way of speaking, but more strictly we should say that we have a proportional name only if there is actually a proportion in Euclids sense, or at least a ratio. When Dr. Berquist tried to pin down Dionne about the sorts of name used equivocally for a reason, Dionne seemed unwilling to call all of them analogous or proportional names. E.g. when isosceles is divided into isosceles and equilateral, or animal into animal and man, or finger into finger and thumb, and disposition into disposition and habit, or episteme into episteme and sophia, or man into man and boy, or cat into cat and kitten, Dionne said these are not examples of proportional naming. When we say Socrates is an animal, and then we deny that he is an animal (in the sense of animal that is opposed to man), there are two meanings of the word animal here, and it is not by chance. At first, it seems that one is distinguishing between the genus and the species, as if distinguishing dog from animal, which is odd. But really there are two meanings attached to the common name. Consider the example with animal. One meaning is sensitive living thing, which is said of Socrates, the other is irrational sensitive living thing which is not said of Socrates. It is unhelpful to describe this kind of name used equivocally for a reason as a proportional name. There is no proportion. Rather, it seems better to say that one species keeps the common name, and the other gets a new name because of something significant about it. Or, as in the last two examples, what has the common notion fully keeps that name, as a grown cat keeps the common name cat, whereas the kitten, as distinguished from the adult cat, gets a new name because it is imperfect. Again, undergoing seems to have three meanings. First, it means receiving and going from contrary to contrary and receiving the worse of the two, then it means receiving and going from contrary to contrary, and finally it means receiving. We lose a part of the previous definition each time. This does not seem to be a proportional name, but a name having three different meanings, each one of which sheds a part of the previous one. Again, seeing is said of the eye, the imagination, and reason not so much by a proportion or by shedding parts of a definition as you go along, but by the likeness between their acts. As for proportional names ... we can either compare two things to each other, or the two things to other things. We then have these possibilities: 6

1) The 2 things have a ratio to each other 2) The 2 things do not have a ratio 3) The 2 things have the same ratio to different things 4) The 2 things have different ratios to the same thing 5) The 2 things have the same ratio to the same thing 6) The 2 things have different ratios to different things Now, in 6), if we say health has a certain relation to the body, and father has a different relation to son, there is no reason in any of this to name any of the things by the same name. Hence, if any 2 things (such as health and a father) are named the same, having only different ratios to different things, they are named equivocally by chance. Now in 5), if we say a scalpel has a relation to the art of medicine, namely that of an instrument, and a bandage has this same relation to the art of medicine, and if they are both named medical in virtue of this same relation the have to the same thing, then they are so called purely univocally. Now in 4), if we say a scalpel has a relation to the art of medicine, namely that of an instrument, and a doctor has a different relation to the art of medicine, namely as its subject, then if they are both named medical in virtue of these different relations to the same thing, then they are so called PROPORTIONALLY (for it is not univocal, being named the same for different reasons, but it is not purely equivocal, each having that name for not entirely unrelated reasons). Now in 3), if we say a certain kind of statement has a relation to the subject it helps us conclude about, and the innermost boundary of the containing body has the same relation to the contained body, then if they are both named place in virtue of these same relations they have to different things, then they are so called PROPORTIONALLY. Now in 2), if we are simply comparing two things having the same name, and they have no relation to one another in virtue of which they are named the same, e.g. the baseball bat and the vampire bat, or the bark of a tree and the bark of a dog, then they are named purely equivocally. And in 1), if we are simply comparing two things having the same name, and they do have a relation to one another in virtue of which they are named the same, e.g. substance and accident are both called being because of a relation of accident to substance (which is called being first, or before accident), then they are named PROPORTIONALLY. Hence, we say being of substance and quantity because one is called being first, and the other is called being because it is something of a being in the first sense. Here we have the same name given to different things because of a ratio of one to the other. But if we said being only of quantity and quality, then it would be because they 7

have different ratios to the same thing, namely substance. But since being is in fact said of all three, we have both kinds of proportional naming involved. In summary, analogous or proportional names are names said of two things for a reason, namely by reason of 1) A ratio of one to the other, as being is said of substance and quantity 2) The same ratio they have to other things (a strict proportion) 3) The different ratios they have to the same thing, as being is said of quantity and quality. All three of these can be found in St. Thomas, namely in the commentary on the chapter on one in the Metaphysics, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles (the chapter on how God is named analogously with creatures). One must put these two texts together to get all three. It is not helpful to call the example of undergoing an example of proportional naming, but it is equivocal for a reason. 2 is said of 2 and 3, and because 2 is just 2 it keeps the old name, but because 3 is 2 + 1, it gets a new name it is not just a 2. You dont call it 2 because that is an insult to 3. This kind of naming should not be called proportional naming, either. It is keeping the common name for the species which does not have anything significant added.

3. The primary division of names. Michael Augros, Spring 1993 Scrapbook (Scrapboo.1), The Art of Naming, n. 3, revised: Original version and my alternate division.1
(Original Version) 3) It is in this part of logic, the art of naming, that we distinguish the name from the symbol, and then the proper name from the figurative or improper name. (Alternate division by B.A.M.) In this part of logic, the art of naming, we distinguish the name from the symbol, and then the universal or common name from the individual or private name. Among the universal names, we distinguish the proper from the improper or figurative name. Among the proper names, we distinguish the universal from the individual name. Among the universal names, we distinguish the equivocal use of a word from the univocal use of a word, and we define the denominative use of a word. Among universal names (to the extent that they are used univocally), we distinguish the five kinds of name: the genus, the species, the difference, the property, and the accident. Among the proper names, we distinguish the equivocal or unequal use of a word from the univocal or equal use of a word, and we define the denominative use of a word. Among universal names (to the extent that they are used univocally), we distinguish the five kinds of name: the genus or general name, the species or specific name, the difference or distinguishing name, the property, and the accident. Among universal names (to the extent that they are used equivocally), we distinguish the merely accidentally equivocal use of names from the intended equivocal use of names. And we distinguish the intended equivocal use of names from the metaphor. And among the equivocal uses of names we distinguish the proportional or analogous uses of names from those that are not so used.

Among universal names (to the extent that they are used equivocally), we distinguish the merely accidentally equivocal use of names from the intended equivocal use of names. And we distinguish the intended equivocal use of names, or the analogous use of names, from the metaphor. And among the analogous uses of names, we distinguish several different ways of so using names, e.g. based on a proportion, or a relation to one, or a likeness, or by descent from one (see Boethius commentary on the Categories).

As the reader will observe, my presentation supposes that names are immediately divided into the common or universal (= the appellative) (e.g. man, ox) and the private or individual (e.g. Socrates, Plato), then, that the common is subdivided into the proper and the improper or figurative (e.g. lion said of the beast and of Winston Churchill). I also present an expanded division of the equivocal use of names in the light of the preceding section.

And among the proportional uses of names, we distinguish several different ways of so using names, e.g. when two things compared to each other have a ratio to each other; or have the same ratio to different things; or have different ratios to the same thing. Among the uses of names that are equivocal but not proportional, we distinguish those uses where one species keeps the common name, but the other or others do not; where one species keeps the common definition, but the others shed part of it; where one thing is like another thing; and where many things descend from one. Again, in this part of logic, we not only distinguish the meanings of words, but we also distinguish the meaning of a word from its etymology (Bertrand Russell and Hobbes fail to do this all over the place): see Charles De Koninck, Abstraction from Matter, 150-152. Again, in this part of logic, we not only distinguish the meanings of words, but we also distinguish the meaning of a word from its etymology (Bertrand Russell and Hobbes fail to do this all over the place): see Charles De Koninck, Abstraction from Matter, 150-152.

4. The division of names in sum. Name Symbol Name Name Individual (Private) Universal (Common) (= the appellative) Improper (Figurative) Proper Denominative Univocal (Equal) Equivocal (Unequal) By chance For a reason Proportional Two things compared to each other have a ratio to each other Two things compared to other things

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Have the same ratio to different things Have different ratios to the same thing Not proportional One species keeps the common name, the other or others do not One species keeps the common definition, the others shed part of it One thing is like another thing Several things descend from one thing

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5. On the difference between that from which and that with respect to which a name has been imposed in order to signify. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Ver. q. 14, art. 1, obj. 8, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.). obj. 8. Further, each name chiefly signifies that from which [id a quo] it is imposed. But the name verbum is imposed either from verberatione aeris, or from boatu, which word is nothing other than verum boans. This, then, is chiefly signified by the name of verbum. But this belongs to God in no way except metaphorically. Verbum, or word, then, is not properly said in the divine. ad 8 To the eighth it must be said that a name is said to be imposed from something [ab aliquod] in two ways: either on the part of the one who imposes the name, or on the part of the thing upon which it is imposed. Now on the part of the thing a name is said to be imposed from that [ ab illo] by which the account of the thing which the name signifies is completedand this is the specific difference of that thing. And this is what is principally signified by the name. But because essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidents or effects in their place, as is said in the eighth book of the Metaphysics; and we name the thing according to this. And so that which is taken in place of essential differences is that from which [id a quo] the name is imposed on the part of the one who imposes [the name], just as lapis, stone, is imposed from an effect, which is laedere pedem, to hurt the foot. And this should not be principally signified by the name, but that in place of which this is put. N.B.That is, what should be principally signified by the vocal sound verbum is the ratio of the thing, and not that which is put in place of such a ratio, which is the vocal sound taken from verberatio, etc. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 8 (tr. B.A.M.). To the eighth one proceeds as follows. obj. 1. It seems that the name God is not the name of a nature. For Damascene says in the first book [sc. De Fide] that God is said from theein, which is to run, and to cherish all things; or from aethein, that is, to burn (for our God is a fire consuming all malice); or from theasthai, which is to consider all things. But all these things pertain to operation. Therefore, the name God signifies an operation, and not a nature. obj. 2. Further, to the extent that something is named by us, to that extent it is known. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore, the name God does not signify the divine nature. s.c. But to the contrary is what Ambrose says in the first book De Fide, that God is the name of a nature. corp. I reply that it must be said that that from which [id a quo] a name is imposed in order to signify is not always the same as that with respect to which [id ad quod] the name is imposed in order to signify. For just as we know a thing from its properties or

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operations, so at times we name the substance of a thing from some operation or property or it, just as we name the substance of a stone from some action of it because laedit pedem, it hurts the foot. Still the name has not been imposed in order to signify this action, but the substance of the stone. But if there are things which are known to us according to themselves [secundum se], like heat, cold, whiteness, and the like, they are not named from other things. And so in such things what the name signifies and that from which it is imposed in order to signify are the same thing. Therefore, since God is not known to us in His own nature, but he is made known to us from His operations or effects, we are able to name Him from these things, as was said above. And so the name Deus, God, is the name of an operation, with respect to that from which it is imposed in order to signify. For the name is imposed from the universal providence of things; for all men speaking about God intend this to name God, because he has a universal providence over all things. And so Dionysius says in chapter 12 of About the Divine Names that the Deity is that which watches over all things with perfect providence and goodness . But the name Deus, God, taken from this operation has been imposed in order to signify the divine nature. ad 1. To the first, then, it must be said that all the things set down by Damascene pertain to providence, from which the name God is imposed in order to signify. ad 2. To the second its must be said that according as we can know the nature of any thing from its properties and effects, so we can signify it by a name. And so because we can know the substance of a stone from its property according to itself [ secundum se], by knowing what a stone is, the name stone signifies the very nature of a stone as it is in itself, for it signifies the definition of a stone, by virtue of which we know what a stone is. For the ratio which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. But from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature as it is in itself such that we know about it what it is, but by way of eminence and causality and negation, as was said above. And thus the name Deus, God, signifies the divine nature. For the name has been imposed in order to signify something existing above all things, which is the principle of all things, and is removed from all things. For those naming God intend to signify this. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 2. c. (tr. B.A.M.). I reply that it must be said that, as is clear from the things stated (q. 17, art. 3), our intellect, which is properly equipped to know the whatness of a thing as its proper object, takes [knowledge] from sense, the proper objects of which are external accidents. And this is why we arrive at knowing the essence of a thing from the things which appear about it outwardly [ex his quae exterius apparent de re]. And because we name a thing as we know it, as is clear from the things said above (q. 13, art. 1), it is for this reason that names for the most part are imposed from exterior properties in order to signify the essences of things. And so names of this sort sometimes are taken properly for the very essences of the things upon which they are principally imposed for the purpose of signifying. But sometimes they are taken for the properties from which they are imposed, and this is done less properly. For example, it is clear that the name body has been imposed in order to signify a certain genus of substances by reason of the fact that three dimensions are found in them, and as a result sometimes the name body is put down in order to signify three dimensions, according as body is put down for a species of quantity.

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The same must be said of life [ vita]. For the name life is taken from something appearing outside a thing [ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem], which is to move itself, yet it has not been imposed in order to signify this, but in order to signify the substance to which it belongs to move itself according to its own nature, or to apply itself in any way to an activity. And according to this, living [vivere] is nothing other than existing in such a nature, and life signifies this very thing, but abstractly, just as the name (a) run [cursus] signifies running [or to run, currere] itself abstractly. And so [a] living [thing] [vivum] is not an accidental predicate, but a substantial one. But sometimes life is taken less properly for the activities of life, from which the name life is taken, as the Philosopher say in the ninth book of the Ethics, that living is principally sensing or understanding. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.). To the second it must be said that in the signification of names, sometimes that from which [id a quo] a name is imposed in order to signify is one thing, and that with respect to which [id ad quod] the name is imposed in order to signify is something else, just as the name lapis, or stone, is imposed from the fact that laedit pedem, it hurts the foot; yet it is not imposed in order to signify what hurts the foot, but in order to signify a certain species of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.). To the first it must be said that in the signification of a name there are two things to be considered, namely, that from which [id a quo] the name is imposed in order to signify, and that with respect to which [id ad quod] it is imposed in order to signify. But it sometimes happens that the substance of some thing is named by some accident which does not follow upon the whole nature of which that name is said, just as lapis, or stone, is said by reason of the fact that laedit pedem, it hurts the foot, still, neither is everything hurting the foot a stone, nor conversely. And so the judgement about a name ought not to be made according to that from which it is imposed, but according to that with respect to which it is established [instituitur] in order to signify. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 9, art. 3, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.). To the first therefore it must be said that in any name there are two things to consider, namely, that with respect to which (id ad quod) the name is imposed in order to signify, and that from which [id a quo] it is imposed in order to signify. For often some name is imposed in order to signify some thing from some accident, whether an act or an effect of that thing; yet these things are not principally signified by that name [principaliter significata per illud nomen], but rather the very substance or nature of the thing, just as the name lapis, stone, is taken from laesione pedis, the hurting of the foot, yet it does not signify this, but rather a certain body in which such an accident is often found. And so the hurting of the foot pertains to the etymology of the name rather than to its signification. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 92, art. 1, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.).

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To the second it must be said that the etymology of a name [ etymologia nominis] is one thing, and the signification of a name [ significatio nominis] is something else. Etymology is looked to according to that from which [id a quo] the name is imposed in order to signify, but the signification of the name according to that with respect to which [id ad quod] the name is imposed in order to signify. Sometimes these things are different; for the name lapis, stone, is imposed from laesione pedis, the hurting of the foot, yet it does not signify this, otherwise iron, since it also hurts the foot, would be a stone. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.). The reason is that one name is imposed in order to signify a simple concept; but that from which [id a quo] the name is imposed in order to signify is other than that which [eo quod] the name signifies, as the name lapis, stone, from laesione pedis, the hurting of the foot, which is not what the name signifies: which nevertheless is imposed in order to signify the concept of a certain thing. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.). But if we were to consider the thing signified in a name [ rem significatam in nomine], which is that with respect to which [id ad quod] a name is imposed in order to signify.

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6. On to speak: St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Job, cap. I (tr. B.A.M.). Now one must know that to speak is taken in two ways. For sometimes it refers to the concept of the heart, whereas other times it refers to the signification by which such a concept is expressed to another.1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1 ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.) For to speak is nothing other than to bring forth a word.2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.). For when we understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood [ex re intellecta] is called a word [verbum].3 7. In sum: Now one must know that to speak is taken in two ways. For sometimes it refers to the concept of the heart, whereas other times it refers to the signification by which such a concept is expressed to another. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Job, cap. I, tr. B.A.M.) For to speak is nothing other than to bring forth a word. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1 ad 3, tr. B.A.M.)

For when we understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives from the thing
understood [ex re intellecta] is called a word [verbum].4 (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1, tr. B.A.M.) For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 4.)
ST1 SUMMAE THEOLOGIAE PRIMA PARS QU-2 AR-4RA-1

ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his in quibus differt intellectus et intellectum, volens et volitum, potest esse realis relatio et scientiae ad rem scitam, et volentis ad rem volitam. sed in deo est idem omnino intellectus et intellectum, quia intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia, et eadem ratione voluntas et volitum. unde in deo huiusmodi relationes non sunt reales, sicut neque relatio eiusdem ad idem. sed tamen relatio ad verbum est realis, quia verbum intelligitur ut procedens per actionem intelligibilem, non autem ut res intellecta. cum enim intelligimus lapidem, id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus, vocatur verbum.

...sciendum autem est quod dicere dupliciter accipitur, nam quandoque refertur ad conceptum cordis, quandoque autem ad significationem qua huiusmodi conceptus alteri exprimitur. 2 nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum. 3 cum enim intelligimus lapidem, id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus, vocatur verbum . 4 cum enim intelligimus lapidem, id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus, vocatur verbum .

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8. On the difference between that from which and that upon which a name has been imposed in order to signify. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.). I reply that it must be said that in any name there are two things to consider, namely, that from which [id a quo] a name is imposed, which is called the quality of the name, and that upon which [id cui] it is imposed, which is called the substance 11 of the name. And a name, properly speaking, is said to signify [significare] the form or quality from which the name is imposed; but it is said to suppose on behalf of that upon which it is imposed [supponere pro eo cui imponitur]. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 13, art. 11, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.). To the first therefore it must be said that the name Qui est, He who is is a more proper name of God than the name Deus, God, with respect to that from which [id a quo] it is imposed, namely, from esse, being or existing, and with respect to both the mode of signifying and of consignifying, as has been said. But with respect to that with respect to which [id ad quod] the name is imposed in order to signify, the name God is more proper because it is imposed in order to signify the divine nature. And a name more proper still is Tetragrammaton, which has been imposed in order to signify the very substance of God, incommunicable, and, if one may be allowed to speak so, singular. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 9, c. (tr. B.A.M.). But if there were some name imposed in order to signify God not on the part of the nature, but on the part of the supposit, insofar as it is considered as a this something [ hoc aliquid], that name would be incommunicable in every way, as perhaps is the name Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews. 9. That the ratio which a name signifies is what the name signifies. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.). For the ratio which the name signifies is the conception of the intellect of the thing signified by the name [de re significata per nomen]. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.). For when we understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood [ex re intellecta] is called a word [verbum]. St. Thomas Aquinas, Resp. ad lect. vercell. de art. 108 (tr. B.A.M.).

Compare Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.: In another way the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of substance is called substance. (alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae).

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First one must consider that the ratio of anything is what its name signifies, just as the ratio of a stone is what its name signifies. But names are signs of intellectual concepttions: and so the ratio of each thing signified by the name is the conception of the intellect which the name signifies. But this conception of the intellect is indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in the thing understood as in a thing represented: for the conceptions of the intellect are certain likeness of things that have been understood. But if the conception of the intellect were not made into a likeness of the thing, the conception of that thing would be false, as if one were to understand a stone to be what is not a stone. Therefore the ratio of a stone is indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in the stone as in that which causes truth in the conception of the intellect of the one understanding the stone to be such. Therefore when the intellect comprehends a thing, it represents that thing perfectly by one conception. And thus there happen to be diverse conceptions of diverse things. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 8 (tr. B.A.M.). And so because we can know the substance of a stone from its property according to itself [secundum se], by knowing what a stone is, the name stone signifies the very nature of a stone as it is in itself, for it signifies the definition of a stone by virtue of which we know what a stone is. For the ratio which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, c., tr. B.A.M.). One must bear in mind that ratio, as it is taken here, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and thisin those things which have a definitionis the definition itself of the thing, according to what the Philosopher says: the ratio which the name signifies is the definition. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are not defined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most general genera, are not defined. And nevertheless the ratio of quality is what is signified by the name of quality; and this is that from which quality has what quality is. For this reason, he does not refer to whether those things which are said to have a ratio either have or do not have a definition. Michael Augros, Philosophical and Theological Scrapbook. Summer 1994 (scrapboo 5), Logic, n. 1. Accidentia. MEANINGS OF ACCIDENTIA. Posterior Analytics, Commentary, L.II, l.XIII, n 533. Sed quia formae essentiales non sunt nobis per se notae, oportet quod manifestentur per aliqua accidentia, quae sunt signa illius formae, ut patet in VIII Metaphysic. Accidentia here is taken according to the common meaning of anything belonging to something which is not itself part of the what. Hence properties in the strict sense would be accidentia in this sense. Going from sense to understanding, effect to cause, accident to substance, are all connected.

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10. Charles De Koninck on matters concerning the impositions of names. Charles De Koninck, The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science, footnote 14. By natural language Prof. Heisenberg does not mean a language that is natural to us as our organs of speech are natural, as if nature provided us with a language the way that she produces feet and brain. Unless we call the grunts and groans of man or beast language, this term refers to artifacts that signify by convention. Using ordinary language we should always be able to refer its words back to common knowledge of things first known, a knowledge which may lead us to further knowledge of things, requiring either new impositions upon words already in use, or even, simply, a new word. An example of a new imposition would be the word soul, which first meant breeze or breath; an instance of a new word is Godno matter what its etymological originfor God can be known only at the term of a discourse, and once known we impose the name as entirely proper to Him. I do not mean that in doing so we spell out a new word. The point is that in virtue of the imposition the name now has a single meaning incommunicable to anything else, except by metaphor. Charles De Koninck, The Hollow Universe, Chapter III, The Lifeless World of Biology. Of all our normal language it is true that, whether its words be used as metaphors, given new meanings, or meanings long worn out and now revived, they still imply reference to something already known, something that may be quite certain, no matter how fuzzy at the edges. Charles De Koninck, Abstraction from Matter, Part I, IV. What is meant by Matter in Abstraction from Matter?. 2. Original meaning and etymology Now concerning the word matter, the original meaning we have in mind should be distinguished from the words origin or etymology,1 which is quite contingent.
The etymology of a word is one thing, its meaning another. For its etymology shows that from which the word was taken for the purpose of signification [ id a quo imponitur ad significandum ]: whereas the meaning of the word concerns that upon which the word is imposed for the purpose of signification [id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur ]. These things are not always the same: for the name lapis is taken from laesio pedis,2 but this is not what it means; else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone.3 From the Greek etymologia: the real, true (etymon) or primitive meaning of a word. This etymology, reported by St. Isidore of Seville (cir. 570-636), is in fact incorrect. 3 IIa IIae, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; Q. D. de Potentia, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1.
2

Yet whatever the etymology of the word lapisor of our own word stone, for that matter the meaning we are concerned with here would be that of lapis as the name of this kind of object to which we can point a finger, and not with the name as drawn from the

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possibility of a stone affecting us in this way or that. A person may know the primary imposition of a word without knowing exactly how it came to get it in the etymological sense. For instance, the name Metaphysics came to mean what it does in a very casual way. Because of the place assigned to themafter the Physicsby an early compiler of Aristotles works, certain treatises were called Metaphysics: meta/ ta/ fusika/. This provides us with the etymology of the name, i.e., that whence the name was taken; whereas the primary imposition of metaphysica as a single word refers to treatises which, in the proper order of learning, are to be studied after those on nature. Eventually, by a new imposition, going beyond yet embracing the previous one, metaphysica, as Boethius (cir. 480-524) employed this term, referred to the science which Aristotle himself had called First Philosophy and TheologyFirst by reason of its principles, Theology because of its principal term, viz., knowledge of what is divine.1 Of course, that from which the signification of the word is drawn or that whence the name is imposed, and that which the word signifies are sometimes the same, viz., in the case of words conveying what is immediately known to our senses, such as hot, cold, hard, white,words which are verified directly by reference to sense experience, and which are in no other way verifiable. The reason for this resides in the fact that even of the things which are present to our senses, and at any rate first and more known to us, we do not know directly what they are in themselves; this we can approach only through something extrinsic to their nature, viz., some sensible effect or quality.2 What we first discern of a horse, for example, is what appears to the senses and allows us to tell it from a cow, or pig, etc. These colours, textures, sounds, we can name at once, and, in such instances, that from which the signification is drawn does not differ from what the name is intended to mean, although that to which these qualities belong is still not truly known as to what it is in itself absolutely.3 But it is perhaps well to point out that these qualities or operations which lead to a first attempt at naming a thing like a horse are not to be confused with the distinctive properties which truly set a horse apart from other things. Further knowledge may oblige us to change our minds about what constitute real differences. We may become acquainted with an animal like a zebra, let us say, possessing all the traits we had assigned as peculiar to the horse, and yet endowed with a few more of its own. What was thought to characterize a horse would now appear to be only something it has in common with certain other animals. In other words, if we assumed that we knew a given substance, e.g., a woodpecker, as to what sets it apart from all other things absolutely, just because we knew the word woodpecker in its derivation from some other words previously formed to signify a substance and operations or effects of what we call a woodpecker, we would be like a man who, understanding that bluefish is derived from blue plus fish, insisted that every blue fish ought to be a bluefish, and all bluefish blue. Such examples may seem somewhat outlandish, yet the confusion they illustrate is widespread among philosophers and even among their critics.4
Outside the Aristotelian tradition, for centuries now the name metaphysics (as the adjective metaphysical) has had almost as many different meanings as there have been authors to use it, its etymology being the only common aspect of the word to survive. 2 Ia Pars, q. 13, a. 6, c. [N.B. The reference should be to the corpus of article 8.B.A.M.] 3 Obvious examples of substance-names taken from a perceptible quality or action already named would be quicksilver or rattlesnake; they do not signify the fluidity of mercury or the rattle of a

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certain type of snake. The word snake is another example, being kin to sneak, as well as to the Old German snachan, to creep.
4

The criticisms leveled against philosophical jargon by the logical positivists are only too often well taken and should be turned to advantage.

To cling to the first impositions as the only valid ones may be just as foolish as to lose oneself in vague, extended meanings without comprehending the basic imposition to which these may owe their force. 3. Names that are not taken from other things It should be noted, however, that names signifying substances, such as man, horse, tree, stone, etc., can never have the immediate meanings of words like noise, smell, sweet, pain, large, smooth, inside, feel, move, etc. Terms like these are the most basic in any language. Whatever their philological origin, they are not named from other things: that which they mean is the same as that from which their signification is drawn. Now the fact that this identity holds only in the case of objects immediately known by our senses 1 should make us aware of how important it is to take into account what happens in the knower between his apprehension of a thing and his naming of it. Different words are intended to signify different things. But the differences indicated by variations in names are seldom the proper differences which set the things themselves apart from one another. If the knower, who imposes a meaning upon a word, does not actually attain the essential differences between the things named, he may in his naming of them, refer to some trait which, though admittedly not the essential difference, is used instead of itas in the name rattlesnake. If we assumed that the warning sound referred to in this name, which is that whence it was imposed, was actually what the name meant, we would imply, gratuitously, that this sound was the essential difference of that which we name.2 To sum up, if the essential differences between things were grasped at once, the differences of names would be taken from them: that whence they signify would be that which they signifythe specific differences of the things themselves. The whole relevance of the distinction between the specific difference of the thing itself and the trait from which the things name is taken derives from the fact that we do not know outright the essential differences of things, and that we can name things only as we know them.3
As we shall see in Part II, chap. 3, there is a notable difference between interpreting a word like horse by pointing to such an animal, and interpreting the word white by designating a white horse. What we call white is something sensible per se, whereas a white horse, as a substance, is sensible only per accidensas we shall explain further on. 2 The word rattlesnake may, as a composite name, be used to confirm the distinction between etymology and signification. For, that which the name signifies, is not the two things called rattle and snake, these being only that from which the name has been imposed. The components of this name can signify separately, but they cease to do so when taken together as one name. The reason is that a single name is imposed to signify a simple concept; for, that whence the name is imposed to signify is not the same as that which the name signifies, as lapis from laesio pedis, which is not what the name signifies: for it was imposed to mean the concept of a thing. Hence it is that a part of the composite name imposed to signify a simple concept, does not signify part of the composite conception from which the name was imposed to signify. An expression [e.g., pale man] signifies the composite conception itself: hence a part of the expression signifies the composite conception (St. Thomas, In I Perih., lect. 4, n. 9).

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That a name is said to be imposed from something can be taken [a] either on the part of the one who imposes it, or [b] on the part of the thing upon which it is imposed. In the latter case, a name is said to be imposed from that which completes the notion of the thing it signifies, viz., the specific difference of the thing [i.e. that which sets it apart from other things]. However, since the essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidents or effects in their steadand name the things accordingly. And thus it is that, whatever is used to take the place of the essential differences is also that whence the name is imposed, considered on the part of the one who imposes the meaning: as when lapis is imposed from an effect, laedere pedem. And this need not be that which the word is intended to mean before all; the word means that instead of which we use the effect [viz., laedere pedem] (St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8).

However, though, the relationship between meaning and etymology should not be confused with the dependence of a new and extended imposition upon a prior meaning, it must not be thought that knowledge of a words origin is of importance only to the philologist. Etymology, providing as it does a kind of reason why a given word was formed and used to signify this or that, has the advantage of referring us to something known even before the first imposition of that word. For instance, the verb to manifestmeaning to show plainly, to make appear distinctly, to put beyond question or doubtcomes from the Latin manifestare which was originally taken from manus, hand, and fendere, to sieze; fur manifestus meant a thief caught in the act. This word, then, referred originally to the most basic of our external senses: to touch, and to the palpable. Michael A. Augros, Scrapboo.5. n. 34. 34) WE DO NOT KNOW THE SUBSTANTIAL FORMS OF THINGS. From De Spiritualibus Creaturis (Q1 A11 Ad3), in answer to the objection that the powers of the soul must be substance, since we use the powers as substantial differences, St. Thomas says: Ad tertium dicendum quod formae substantiales per seipsas sunt ignotae; sed innotescunt nobis per accidentia propria. Frequenter enim differentiae substantiales ab accidentibus sumuntur, loco formarum substantialium, quae per huiusmodi accidentia innotescunt; sicut bipes et gressibile et huiusmodi; et sic etiam sensibile et rationale ponuntur differentiae substantiales. Vel potest dici, quod sensibile et rationale, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a ratione et a sensu secundum quod nominant potentias, sed ab anima rationali, et ab anima sensitiva. 11. On the proper and common sensibles. Cf. Michael Augros, Notes from the Berquist Seminars (Duane.2), nn. 232; 237238: 232) MISTAKES IN THE SENSES AND IN REASON n 385. The senses do not make mistakes about the first things they know, their own private sensibles, but only about the common sensibles they know through their private sensibles. This is like reason, which doesnt make mistakes about the first things it knows (e.g. the axioms), but only about the things it knows through the first things it knows. 237) DIVISION OF SENSIBLES DO NOT CORRESPOND TO CATEGORIES. Are the five common sensibles and the various proper sensibles divided in a way that fits with the

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division of the categories? The proper sensibles are all in the third species of quality. Of the common sensibles, figure is in the fourth species of quality. Number and size are in the category of quantity. Motion and rest are all over the place. Hence, the division of sensibles into private and common sensibles does not correspond to the division of the categories. The categories are distinguished by the ways (or figures, as Aristotle says) of predication, whereas the common and private sensibles are distinguished in a different way. 238) COMMON SENSIBLES IMPORTANT TO WHOLE LIFE OF MIND. Common sensibles are more the basis of knowing other things than are the private sensibles. Hence we carry over names such as form from the common sensibles to many other things, some of which are not even sensible at all. But what role does green play in the life of the mind? When St. Thomas is commenting on Boethiuss De Trinitate, he answers an objection that we cannot know God because the human mind understands nothing without the continuous and time by saying we can know him by negating these. Hence we can know that God is not a body, and not in time; we are still understanding God with the continuous and time, since one must understand what one is negating. But notice that the continuous and time are common sensibles, or based on common sensibles, such as size and motion. No one could object that we cannot understand anything without proper sensibles, e.g. green and sweet. Michael Augros, Summer 1993 Scrapbook. Philosophy And Theology (Scrapboo.2), n. 3: [3] Mind alone can be the cause of order, i.e. intellectual knowledge, and not sense knowledge. For the senses cannot know order: I cannot sense the order of one thing to another, but only the separate things in the order. Therefore the cause of order must be mind. But why is it proper to a mind to grasp relation or the proportion of one thing to another? Why cant the senses grasp relation? If any relation is sensible, most assuredly the relations between magnitudes are, e.g. larger than. If larger than is a sensible, then it should be a common sensible, since the terms in the relation (two sizes) are themselves common sensibles. Now why are common sensibles, such as size and shape, regarded as per se sensibles at all? After all, we see the size only through the color. Because a different size really affects the sight differently. It physically acts on the sense organ. Likewise motion is a per se sensible, although common, because it really affects the senses differently (motion sooner catches the eye than what not stirs). Do different relations do this? If I see three objects at once, A, B, C, and B is larger than A but smaller than C, then B is at once larger and smaller (with respect to different things), so there are two relations here, but my sight is not affected differently by them: B does not look differently because of the two relations. Therefore relation is not a per se sensible, but only sensible per accidens. It does not affect the senses at all, and so it is not an object of the senses. Hence mind alone can know relation, and so mind alone can know order, and so mind alone can know in particular the order of means to ends, and so mind alone can guide and direct natures to their ends

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12. Some examples of the principles of names taken from St. Thomas. The name Trinitas, Trinity. that from which: ipso numero qui in nomine importatur, the very number implied in the name, which is trium unitas, a unity of three things that with respect to which: tres personae unius essentiae, three Persons of one essence, or numerum personarum unius essentiae, a number of Persons of one essence, or numerum personarum ad invicem relatarum, a number of Persons related to each other The name Qui Est, He who is. that from which: esse, being or existing The name Deus, God. that from which: universalis rerum providentia, the universal providence of things that with respect to which: natura divina, the divine nature The name Tetragrammaton. that with respect to which (and also that upon which, although not in the same respect): ipsam dei substantiam incommunicabilem et singularem, the incommunicable and singular substance of God Himself The name ens, (a) being. that from which: actus essendi, the act of being The name unum, one. that from which ordo, order, or indivisio, being undivided; for one is ens indivisum, undivided being The name lapis, stone. that from which: quod laedit pedem, what hurts the foot, inasmuch as hurting is an operatio or effectus of a stone that with respect to which: the definition of a stone, which is the ratio signified by the name, which is a certain species of body (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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