SUSIA CHAN-TAN v. JESSE C. TAN G.R. No. 167139, 25 February 2010, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.

) Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, and Jesse C. Tan, respondent, were married in 1989, such marriage, thereafter, bore two sons. Twelve years into the marriage, Chan-Tan filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the parties also executed a compromise agreement governing the issues of support, custody, visitation rights, and property relations. The court issued a partial judgement approving the compromise agreement. Eventually, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. Meanwhile, Chan-Tan had left the country bringing the children with her. Thus, Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking the main custody of the children, contending that the act of ChanTan in bringing the children out of the country was without his knowledge and consent, in addition, Tan also alleged that Chan-Tan has failed to pay the remaining balance for the Megaworld property, which, if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and that Chan-Tan failed to turn over to him (Tan) documents and titles in the latters name. The trial court, in a resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children, ordered ChanTan to turn over to Tan documents and titles in the latters name, and allowed Tan to stay in the family dwelling. Chan-Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, on the ground of denial of due process, which the trial court denied in its Resolution. Thereafter, Chan-Tan filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts most recent resolution. Thus, the trial court issued another Resolution denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. Chan-Tan again filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court, again, denied. This prompted the trial court to issue a Certificate of Finality. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision and resolutions of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process HELD: In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioners loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioners allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioners end despite her counsels efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on respondents omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.