Fulgencio Batista: Why History Will Absolve Him

Fidel Castros recent illness has focused attention on the Cuban dictators career. Castros successes in establishing and maintaining a Communist dictatorship 90 miles off the coast of the United States are remarkable achievements. Unfortunately, these successes have been achieved at the Cuban peoples expense. By examining the history of the proceeding Batista regime, a perspective will hopefully emerge which illustrates how Castro deceived the Cuban people and how cruel and unnecessary his totalitarian dictatorship has been. This biography, of Castros predecessor, Fulgencio Batista is based on an earlier version written by David Bennett which appeared in August 1996 in the Melbourne based publication, The Sentinel.
The Historical Significance of Fulgencio Batista

One of the myths perpetuated by the extreme Left since Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959 is that contemporary Cuba is a dynamic and politically vibrant nation. Whatever Castro's past and present successes in promoting international discord, the current domestic Cuban political scene is staid and uneventful, as befits a totalitarian nation where all politics are controlled by Fidel Castro and/or his brother Ral. This situation starkly contrasts with the fluidity, passionate dynamism and complexities of pre-Castro Cuba, which were personified by the major figure of that by-gone era, Fulgencio Batista. Because the Castro regime's political repression is too brazen and apparent to deny, apologists for it have asserted that this has been offset by

the tremendous achievements that have allegedly occurred in the area of higher living standards. To help justify this warped logic, the excesses of Fulgencio Batista's career have been exaggerated, his positive achievements ignored and in the process his important role in Cuban history negated. It is the purpose of this article to redress this historical vilification.
Spanish Colonial Rule and 'Yankee' Intervention: Their Respective Legacies

Until 1958 Cuba had a potent political tradition * Cortes - the Spanish of competing political parties and activism. Parliament This tradition can be traced back to 1876 with the promulgation of a new Spanish constitution. Mid to late nineteenth century Spanish politics were immersed in dynastic struggles and ensuing wars of succession. The only substantive issue that lay outside this paradigm was that of Cuban autonomy. Cuban representatives in the Spanish Cortes* were successful in drawing attention to the cause of Cuban Home Rule. A notable figure who took exception to this constitutionalist approach was the poet Jos Mart, of whom Castro claims to be a disciple. Such a claim, while ridiculous and insulting, is not surprising, because the major ideological issue in Cuba up until 1958, was not that of free market economics versus state intervention, but what Mart stood for and which party and/or leader could claim his mantle. It was his death in combat in 1895 which sparked Cuba's War of Independence. The United States' military intervention, at the point at which Cuba was about to break free from Spain and the ensuing four year occupation (1898-1902), became a tremendous source of national frustration which is still to be fully exorcised from the Cuban psyche. On terminating its occupation, the United States retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs

so as to protect American properties and investments under the notorious Platt Amendment. If the aim of this amendment was to provide stability, then it proved to be counterproductive. The new nation was polarized between the Liberal and the Moderate parties (the latter metamorphosised into the Conservative and eventually the Democratic Party). Consequently, a pattern developed whereby the losing party in an election, instead of accepting the result, would stage a revolt in order to provoke American intervention. Despite the economic boom that Cuba enjoyed following the First World War (which spawned a not inconsiderable middle class), American dominance, both real and imagined, as well as racial unrest amongst the Negro minority, served to retard Cuba's development of a positive national identity.
Frustrated Nationalism Spawns the Dictatorship of Gerado Machado

A milestone in Cuba's struggle for self-assertion was seemingly reached in 1924, when a successful businessman, independence hero and retired general, Gerado Machado of the opposition Liberal Party was elected president. He pledged that his business acumen would raise the standard of living and, most importantly, that he would bring true independence to the island republic. Machado launched a vast and unprecedented public works programme. A less benevolent innovation of his was the establishment of Cuba's first secret police and the subsequent imposition of a dictatorship in 1928 after being re-elected with a new Constitution that favored him. The trappings of democracy were maintained but their hollowness was evident in Machado's purge of the ruling Liberal Party and of the opposition Conservative Party. Machado justified these dictatorial acts on the basis that
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they promoted stability and thereby denied the Americans a pretext for intervention.
Cuba's New Class: 'The Generation of 1933'

Machado (as is the case with Castro) was only interested in holding power for the sake of having it. His regime's brutal suppression of student demonstrations in September 1930 spawned the 'Generation of 1933'. This caste would maintain their profile in Cuban politics for a quarter of a century between Machado's fall in 1933 and Castro's rise to power in late 1958. In the aftermath of the suppression of the student demonstrations, a clandestine and predominately middle class organisation called the ABC was founded. Between 1931 and 1933 both actual and suspected members of the ABC were hunted down by Machado's secret police. Some of the dissidents that were apprehended were tried (if they were relatively fortunate enough) by military tribunals. It was as a court stenographer, that a young Sergeant Batista was first exposed to and gained an invaluable insight into the dark side of Cuban politics. In 1921, at the age of twenty, Batista entered the Cuban army and by 1928 he had risen to the rank of sergeant, which was as far as someone of his humble background could rise. The ill effects of the Great Depression, combined with the corrupt Machado's unpopularity, precipitated massive and violent ABC-instigated riots in July 1933. In the face of this explosion of unrest and the Roosevelt Administration's hostility, Machado resigned and fled first to Bahamas and later to Miami. Due to the strong intervention of the American Ambassador Sumner Wells, Carlos Manuel de Cspedes (whose father had led an abortive bid for independence from Spain from 1868 until his death in 1874 - the bid for independence continued until 1878) was chosen as the new
* One Machadista who escaped to America was Desi Arnaz, later of I Love Lucy fame.

Sergeant Batista's Emergence

provisional president. His elevation to the presidency was supported by the ABC, the National Union (an anti- Machado organisation which had emerged from a split from the Liberal Party) and other smaller parties. Cspedess assumption of the presidency was accepted by, (but not actively supported) by the Conservative Party. Despite Machados fall there was still a strong public groundswell for a radical break with the past and this was manifested by the lynching of Machadistas*. The students at Havana University were at the forefront in demanding a significant shift. Their capacity to affect change depended on their success in making common cause with the disgruntled elements within the army. During the unrest against Machado, a group of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were killed. As the chief orator at the funeral of Sergeant Miguel Angel Hernndez, Batista was able to project himself as, and gain acceptance as the champion of NCO concerns. From this position Batista helped lead a NCO mutiny demanding higher wages and better living conditions as a pretext to take part in the antiMachado revolution.
The Revolution of 1933

Taking advantage of this discord, a newspaper editor named Sergio Carb made contact with the mutineers and helped persuade them to make common cause with the students and depose the faltering Cspedes government. A five member junta (the Pentarqua) succeeded Cspedes on an interim basis. However due to internal tension the Pentarqua did not function properly and the initiative subsequently passed to the Student Directory (Directorio Estudiantil), the leading student political organisation, which with Batistas support, appointed the former Dean of Physiology, Dr. Grau San Martn as president in September
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1933. In his four-month stint as president, Grau made a profound impact on the public. His myopic, if not effeminate persona attracted widespread popularity because it contrasted with Machado's brutal machismo. The new president's declaration of 'Cuba for the Cubans' and his advocacy of what he termed 'Cubanism', which was essentially Yankee bashing, revived memories of the 1898 Revolution. For many, Grau had assumed Mart's mantle.
Batista Moves Against the Revolution's Flawed Idol

For Colonel Batista,* Grau's first presidency provided a breathing space during which he could consolidate his hold over the army. This was accomplished in November 1933, when Batista crushed an ABC backed revolt by the army's hostile officer corps. By January 1934, with middle class opposition to Grau galvanizing and the continued threat of American intervention, Batista (with the support of some members of the Student Directory) moved swiftly by deposing Grau. This coup helped polarize Cuban society. For many people, Grau became an idol. Carlos Pro Socarrs, who had been a prominent leader of the Student Directory, helped found the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autntico), which derived its popularity from its stated commitment of restoring Grau. Another avowed adherent of Grau's, Antonio Guiteras, (who despite being lionized in contemporary Cuba, was in fact a vehement anti-Communist) organized the Joven Cuba, a militant revolutionary organisation that was committed to bring drastic changes by carrying out terrorist actions to promote political unrest. Needing a shield, Batista installed Carlos Mendieta, the leader of the National Union, as the new president.

*A promotion he received for 'services to the revolution' and which he would hold until promoted to the rank of General.

The New

The Mendieta regime was primarily composed

Strongman

of the more moderate elements of the antiMachado opposition and they regarded Batista as a pliant tool who would help underwrite their rule. As army chief of staff, Batista concerned himself with bettering the living conditions of armed forces personnel (most of whom had received rapid promotion) and their families. Thus barracks were upgraded, pay hikes granted, health services and night school literacy classes provided for armed forces personnel. Consequently when the Joven Cuba led by Antonio Guiteras took advantage of a general strike in 1935 the army was committed and steady enough to crush the revolt. (Guiteras died in a shoot out with the army during this revolt). This abortive revolution highlighted the depth of the chasm between Cuban government and the Cuban people. As a result of this repression, the congressional and presidential elections held in January 1936 were of little meaning to most Cubans. Nonetheless the restoration of constitutional processes was a positive development in that it helped promote a framework for later democratic progress. Meanwhile Batista was confronted with the dilemma of commanding a largely inactive army, which faced a hostile populace. To surmount these interrelated challenges, Batista had over one thousand Escuelas Cvico Rurales (Rural Public Schools) built to educate peasant families and these schools were also built in the most remote parts of the island. Army officers were active in establishing these schools and in teaching in them. Despite the much-heralded advances attributed to the Castro regime in eliminating illiteracy, Cuba already had a literacy rate of 80% in 1958. By exerting pressure on the Congress, Batista ensured that the tax base was broadened so that
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Reform From Above

social and public works programs (including the construction of Tuberculosis sanatoriums in the remote parts of the country) could be increased. Much of the military's reformist stance was influenced by the Roosevelt Administration's New Deal policy. American/Cuban relations were considerably bolstered in 1934 with the repeal of the Platt Amendment. In the area of race relations, Cuba at this time was more advanced than the United States. Batista (who probably had African ancestry) took strong exception to racial discrimination. Batista also supported the Association of Cane Growers, and by doing so was able to mollify middle class reservations about his progressive orientation, whilst also undercutting American influence over Cuba's vital sugar industry. Consequently, in overall terms during the 1930s, Batista was able to reposition the role of the military from being the force that underwrote an unpopular elite, to an intermediary body, which safeguarded the public interest.

Democratization Nonetheless, the high rate of voter abstention in and the March 1938 mid-term congressional Reconciliation elections was a warning to Batista of continuing

public discontent against the oligarchic political parties represented in the Congress. Realizing that new alliances had to be made, Batista allowed the legalization of the Cuban Communist Party, which eventually constituted itself in the pre-Castro era as the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). Accordingly, the PPS was given a free hand to organize amongst trade unions and the Communists entered into a strategic alliance with the Batista regime. Of greater significance in terms of political re-alignments was Batista's
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reconciliation with the Autntico Party. This was affected in November 1939 when the Autnticos took part in elections to a Constituent Assembly, which was charged with the task of writing a new constitution. These elections, in contrast to the previous year's congressional elections, were a positive milestone. The parties that took part ranged from staunch Machadistas to Communists. The party which made the greatest gains was the Autnticos. The Constitution of 1940, which the Constituent Assembly subsequently drew up, was highly democratic. It contained provision for a president that was elected for a four-year term, who was banned from succeeding himself for eight years. A quasi-parliamentary system was provided for with the creation of the post of Prime Minister. Provisions were made enshrining the right to strike, collective bargaining and compulsory paid holidays.
(*) The delayed completion of the1940 Constitution forced the postponement of the scheduled elections in February leaving the country in a void without a president. Batista, in a patriotic gesture, picked-up his The most remarkable appointment was that of opponents Dr. Juan Marinello of the PPS as a Minister Without Portfolio in 1943. Marinellos post was Grau and Pro in his car and

Batista retired from the army in December 1939 and subsequently presented himself as a candidate for president under the 1940 Constitution. (Batistas retirement laid the groundwork for an abortive military revolt in February 1941 from army officers who were alienated by their loss of power). The nonAutntico parties formed an alliance called the 'Democratic Socialist Coalition' which consequently rallied around Batista because he was considered to be the only figure that could defeat Grau. After fairly winning the June 1940 presidential election (*), Batista formed a broad-based cabinet, representing the parties which had backed him.

assumed in 1944, by another PPS stalwart,

Carlos Rafael Rodrguez as part of a cabinet reshuffle that occurred that year. The appointment of the then 27 year old Rodrquez was subsequently to become all the more amazing because he would later hold the position of vice-president of Cuba under Castro and for a time he was the third most powerful man in the country after Castro and his brother Ral. The PPSs willingness to take part in the Cabinet of National Unity was due to the Soviet Unions alliance with the United States during the Second World War. (The ABC Party also took the opportunity to join this new cabinet).

all three together with Chibs met President Laredo Bru to express their unanimous agreement for him to remain as President through October when the formal transfer of power ceremony took place.

As president, Batista strictly adhered to the new Constitution. Cuba's relations with the United States were strengthened by her declaration of war on the Axis in 1941. The onset of the Second World War generated a strong economic recovery and there were increased demands for Cuban exports, particularly sugar. Allowing US warships and aircraft to use Cuba as a base to refuel fostered further goodwill in terms of Cuban/American relations.

For many Cubans the real test of Batista's democratic sincerity was whether he would retire once his term expired in 1944. With the notable exception of the new Republican Party (which had split from the DemocraticRepublican Party in 1942 and entered into an alliance with the Autnticos) the same parties that had backed Batista four years earlier, fell in behind his Prime Minister, Carlos Saladrigas, a one-time ABC stalwart. Despite this united backing, Saladrigas lost to Grau. This upset
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victory can be attributed to the mystical, if not saintly mantle that had been attached to Grau's persona since his previous interlude as president. To general disbelief Batista handed power over to Grau and departed for four years of self-imposed exile.
Failed Expectations: Autntico Party Misrule - 1944 to 1952

The nearly eight years of Autntico Party rule were to become the most corrupt that Cuba had yet experienced. Grau's unassuming personality conveyed the impression of humility and moral rectitude, but belied the fact that he was a highly manipulative and cynical character. During his four years in office, Grau and his sister-in-law extorted money and accepted bribes. This type of behaviour extended to the caste of the ruling 'Generation of 1933' and it became not uncommon for Autntico Party politicians to acquire palatial residences. In spite of high taxation rates during the period of Autntico Party rule, the government was often unable to service its commitments because taxation revenue was siphoned off to illegitimate activities. When Grau's term expired in 1948 his Education Minister, Jos Manuel Alemn brazenly absconded with millions of dollars. Having struggled mightily to gain power so as to advance the public good, the 'Generation of 1933' apparently regarded public money as their own. Grau's attempt to alter the Constitution to allow himself a second term caused a split within the ruling Autnticos and led to the foundation of the Cuban People's Party in 1947, which became popularly known as the Ortodoxo Party. Their leader was the charismatic but unstable Senator Eddy Chibs (who had supported Batistas deposition of Grau in 1934). Pressure from within the Autntico Party caused Grau to relent in his attempts to amend

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the Constitution and seek re-election. Grau then backed Pro's presidential candidacy as the Autntico Party standard bearer. Pro's presidential election in June 1948 was primarily because of his adroit distribution of patronage, rather than the electorate's endorsement of Grau's performance as president. A revealing aspect of the election result was that the runner up was not the flamboyant Eddy Chibs, but the Liberal Party's Dr. Ricardo Nuez Portuondo, a respected surgeon. It was also noteworthy that the PPS's candidate Juan Marinello came a distant fourth and last. Nuezs strong showing was attributable to the exiled Batista, who was elected to the Senate. The corruption of Pro's regime exceeded that of his predecessor and the scourge of gangsterism continued to erode public life. It should be pointed out at this juncture that Batista has unfairly been portrayed as a front man for American and Cuban gangsters, (particularly with regard to his alleged links to Meyer Lansky). The caricature of pretotalitarian Cuban politics as essentially a shell game for gangster bosses is inaccurate and insulting to the Cuban people. The problem of gangsterism was derived from the deep involvement that crime gangs had in three revolutionary political groups: Accin Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG), that descended from Joven Cuba plus two ostensible student political groups at Havana University, the Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR) and the Insurrectional Revolutionary Union (UIR)(*). Graus action of bringing both the MSRs and the UIRs chiefs into the National Police in order to placate these gangs and subsequently align them to the Autntico Party
12 Fidel Castro in the University of Havana was a member of UIR.

was probably his worst abuse of power because it promoted an environment of general lawlessness and extortion.

Batista on his return to power in the 1950s terminated this private political gangsterism which subsequently resulted in some members of the UIR and MSR actually partaking in political activity by supporting anti-government insurrectionary groups (which were more often than not financed by the exiled Pro). In order to limit the scope of opposition to his regime, Batista was somewhat more permissive to the gambling and smuggling by former members of MSR and UIR in return for their foregoing extortion activities and not opposing his regime.

Batista ReEnters the Fray

However, Batistas return to power still lay in the future and in the interim Pro would prove to be a wily opponent. As president, Pro attacked Chibs and in the process began to win over the Liberal and Democratic parties from Batista.

On returning to Cuba in 1948 Senator Batista decided to run for president in 1952. To solidify his political base, Batista founded the Unitary Action Party (PAU) in 1949 as a vehicle with which to run for president. Rafael Daz Balart, then Fidel Castro's brother-in-law led the PAU's youth wing. The PAU in contrast to the Liberal and Democratic parties identified with the Revolution of 1933, asserting that the corruption of the 'Generation of 1933' contrasted with Batista's positive record.

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Batista's chances of winning the 1952 presidential election were seemingly bolstered when the temperamental Chibs committed suicide in August 1951 and Grau split with the Autnticos and founded the Cubanidad Party. As Cuba approached what would have been the historic elections of June 1952, the man who seemed to hold the balance of power was the Mayor of Havana, Nicols Castellanos, the leader of the Cuban National Party (PNC). Batista reached an understanding with Castellanos that whichever party, out of the PAU and the PNC, had had the most members in 1951 would support the other partys candidate for president in the 1952 elections. As the capital's mayor, Castellanos held the second most powerful and lucrative position in Cuba (after the presidency). Having declined Grau's offer to be the Cubinandad Party's presidential candidate, Castellanos fell in behind the Autnticos. The pay back from Pro was that he would back candidates of Castellanos' Havana based PNC in some electoral contests outside the capital. Once this deal was struck, Grau reunited his party in February with the Autnticos. The flow-on effect continued in the same month with both the Liberal and Democratic parties pledging their support to the Autntico Party presidential candidate, Carlos Hevia. His glaring point of attraction was that he was about the only apparently honest senior Autntico Party figure. Consequently Hevia's candidacy began to swing the undecided voter away from the Ortodoxo presidential candidate, Roberto Agramonte. These political re-alignments, particularly Castellanos's new alliance with the Autnticos, seemed to thwart Batista's chances of victory. Between February and early March 1952 the PAU was racked by defections to the now
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Autntico-aligned PNC. This state of affairs was intolerable to Batista. From Batista's perspective it was bad enough that the Autnticos had been elected in 1944, but even more infuriating to him was that they would probably continue to hold office, even after proving themselves so unfit to rule.
10 th March, A group of young, professionally trained junior 1952: Batista's officers approached Batista in January 1952 and Surprise Return asked him to lead a coup against Pro. These to Power

officers were sick of the corruption of the Autntico Party and the favoritism shown to officers linked to the ruling party. They realized that Batista's support was crucial because he could persuade their superiors, who were NCOs in the 1930s, to withhold their support for Pro. Batista initially scorned their approaches (although his indignation was not such that he would report them). But as the rate of defections from his party ripped into Batista's base, his determination to re-assert himself increased. When informed on the 8th of March of a further swag of defections from the PAU, the senator (who realized that a coup would be attempted regardless of his participation) decided to act. Two days later, without consulting his family or campaign staff, he detoured from a scheduled election rally and met up with the army plotters, who escorted him to the Columbia Barracks. Batista asked the assembled officers (most of whom were old comrades) to support his coup. Pro on hearing that the Columbia Army Barracks had raised the vertical five colour standard of the blue, white, red, yellow and green flag of the 1933 Revolution, fled to Matanzas Province, but on discovering that no military units outside Havana would support him, entered the Mexican Embassy and then fled the country. The coup was accomplished in seventy-seven
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The Recycled

Regime's Shaky Underpinnings

minutes with only three (accidental) fatalities and this swiftness was due to the decadence of Autntico Party rule. Other than Pro's banishment (and a nominal ban on the PPS, so as to gain US diplomatic recognition) there were no bloody purges or mass arrests on Batista assuming the post of Chief of State, although Castellanos was dismissed as Mayor of Havana. The new government forged a close relationship with the Central Organisation of Cuban Unions (CTC) who, like their leader Eusebio Mujal, had been aligned to the Autntico Party. The CTC, beside the army became the other pillar underpinning the regime. Meanwhile, Batista's second wife Marta established and headed a quasi-official charity. Despite the ease of the coup (or perhaps because of it), the seeds of the second Batista regime's demise were implanted, particularly with regard to the army. The officers who initiated the coup resented Batista's preference for officers who had been NCOs in the 1930s. To insulate himself from any backlash, Batista cultivated links with contemporary NCOs - a policy that would later rebound because it undermined the lines of authority within the army.

Fidel Castro Gains Prominence

The man who would later draw out and capitalize on these internal contradictions was Fidel Castro. On the 26th of July 1953 Castro launched his famous attack on the Moncada Barracks. The attack was more comical than heroic, but still very tragic due to the number of people who died as a result of it. Castro, as Hitler had done following his failed 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, turned the situation to his advantage when he was placed on trial. In contrast to contemporary Cuba, where there are some political prisoners serving terms of up

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to thirty years for the mildest forms of dissent, Castro and his cohorts received a fair trial. From the dock Castro utilized his extraordinary oratorical talents when he delivered a speech in his defence, later entitled "History Will Absolve Me". Castros cause subsequently received nationwide publicity. Sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, Castro was sent to the Model Prison on the Isle of Pines. There he was treated in a decent fashion befitting the prison's name and even allowed to maintain a correspondence with his political contacts on the outside. Castro launched his attack in 1953 for the calculated reason that it was the centenary of Mart's birth. The Batista Government organized a year of national celebration. This policy of glorifying Mart is the only one of Batista's that the Castro regime has continued. On another level, after he had returned to power Batista launched an extensive public works programme, thus reversing the breakdown in services that had occurred under the Autntico Party. Having ruled Cuba for two years as Chief of State, Batista scheduled elections for November 1954. Co-opting collaborationist elements within the Autntico Party, Batista re-launched the PAU as the Progressive Action Party (PAP) and used the Crane bird as his mascot. Batista launched an energetic presidential campaign. The opportunistic Grau offered himself as the opposition candidate to Batista as a means of reclaiming the mantle of Autntico Party leader from the exiled Pro. Realizing that he had no chance of winning, Grau withdrew his candidature the day before polling. Although the government's claim that there was a 70% turnout was exaggerated, the balloting was generally fair. Shortly after his inauguration for a four-year term as president in February 1955,
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Batista took the unfortunate and tragic step of releasing Castro, who shortly thereafter departed for Mexico. Batista's decision to release Castro and other political prisoners was part of a general amnesty which was solicited by the opposition parties and the public. This release of political prisoners was made on the premise that the restoration of constitutional processes constituted a return to normality and the governments political opponents would consequently take the opportunity to oppose him within the constitutional parameters.
Batista's Second As a constitutional president once again, Batista Presidency: exercised his prerogatives within institutional Positive constraints. The government launched a Achievements

National Program for Economic Development which encouraged foreign investment (most of it American, but also including French and West German investment) and the promotion of light industry (so as to boost permanent employment) and these policies led to a consumer boom. Using the leverage of increased investment opportunities the government lobbied the United States to increase its quota of purchases of Cuba's sugar crop. In the realm of industrial relations, the government took a strong pro-labour stand, supporting wage increases for unionized workers.

The Descent

It was at the point at which Batista seemed to be at the pinnacle of his career that the painful descent commenced. The question therefore emerges of why such a promising government was to later so ignominiously and dramatically fall. An important piece in this jigsaw puzzle was Batistas mishandling of talks with the opposition between December 1955 and March 1956 which became known as the Civic Dialogue. Batistas intermediaries negotiated with representatives from opposition parties,
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who had assembled under the banner of the Society of Friends of the Republic (SAR) which was led by the elderly and highly respected independence war hero, Cosme de la Torriente. This dialogue was actually a dialogue of the deaf due to the irreconcilable differences and expectations between the respective negotiating parties. Batista conceptualized the talks as an entry point for the mainstream opposition parties by which they would acknowledge the legitimacy of his regime and consequently take the next step of opposing it within a constitutional framework. From the SARs perspective the talks were a means by which Batista would negotiate the mechanics of forgoing power in return for immunity for him and his supporters. The inevitable collapse of the talks resulted in the opposition announcing that they would boycott mid-term 1957 congressional elections. In response to this boycott announcement, Batista committed one of the worst mistakes of his second presidency, that of canceling the 1957 congressional elections. Although Batista committed himself to holding the 1958 presidential election (in which he was constitutionally barred from standing) the failure of the Civic Dialogue and cancellation of the congressional elections served as a rousing confirmation to the broad mass of the Cuban people that the Batista regime was self-serving and could only be removed by force. With the considerable benefit of hindsight Batista should have proceeded with the 1957 congressional elections and instigated a break with the three junior parties in the ruling Progressive Coalition, the Liberal, Democratic and Radical parties so that there was a safety valve of electoral activity.

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A violent revolutionary cycle ensued shortly after the collapse of the Civic Dialogue. Between 1956 and late 1958 a myriad of revolts were instigated by a range of diverse revolutionary groups. These revolts and the groups who undertook them do not warrant detailing, except to make the general point that they created the necessary environment for Castros phantom guerilla force to triumph in January 1959.

One of the most important revolts was the one that was undertaken by a new university revolutionary group, the Revolutionary Directorate (DR). The DR launched an audacious attack on the presidential palace on March the 13th 1957 which almost killed Batista and his family. This attack (which was funded and instigated by Pro) failed because Batista kept his nerve. Although a subsequent loyalist rally drew an estimated quarter of a million people before the presidential palace to show their support for Batista, the attack actually marked the beginning of end for the regime. This was because the 13th of March attack on the presidential palace demonstrated the regimes underlying vulnerability and because it contributed to a cycle of repression which would subsequently benefit Castro.

Castro himself landed in Oriente Province in December 1956 and then proceeded to the remote mountainous Sierra Maestra. The yacht that Castro and his party returned on, the Granma, was purchased by Pro's ill-gotten funds. (During his exile, the ever scheming Pro wanted to establish a base of operations in Haiti and he subsequently helped finance the election
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campaign of a Dr. Francois Duvalier. Pro also made a pact with the Dominican Republics dictator Rafael Trujillo, but this later fell through). Castro's guerilla campaign has been mythologized as a military epic. The truth is somewhat different, as there were no more than three hundred combat deaths during the two-year insurgency. Being the skilled propagandist that he is, Castro used his opportunities during his interviews with the New York Times journalist Herbert Mathews in the Sierra Maestra to convey the impression that his insurgency was more potent than it actually was. Castro's real achievement was primarily political in that he was able to make his 26 th of July Movement into a heterogeneous organisation due to the bonanza of the Mathews-generated publicity. The 26th of July Movement was similar to the old ABC as it was organized on a cell basis and was highly effective in conducting a campaign of disruption in urban centres through selective assassinations, industrial sabotage, infiltration of government agencies, violent demonstrations and the kidnapping of foreigners. Che Guevara, an influential 26th of July Movement strategist observed that the more the regime resorted to repression, the more people would turn against it. The nature of the struggle was a class one, because most of the ranks of the 26th of July Movement were drawn from the middle class, while the personnel of the secret police, the SIM (the Military Intelligence Service) were drawn from humbler backgrounds and they were consequently motivated by class resentments. The excesses that army officers committed in the 1950s were derived from the anger which they felt at seeing fellow officers being
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indiscriminately killed by terrorist actions committed by 26th of July Movement partisans. Castro was very successful in construing government action taken to protect the population from terrorist actions which killed innocent civilians. This lack of respect for human life set the scene for the Castro regimes brutal repression.

Internal Contradictions

As the democratic space narrowed, the Batista regime became more corrupt as it needed to maintain the support of the security forces. The nature of the societal divisions, which underpinned Castro's rebellion, also existed within the army. Throughout 1957 Batista refrained from launching an offensive against the rebels in the Sierra Maestra because the Batistiano officers and the NCOs on whom Batista relied were not trained in guerrilla warfare and not prepared to undertake successful sustained offensive action. The professionally trained officers (who had instigated Batista's return to power) may have been competent, but Batista distrusted them too much to allow them a free hand. There were also deep divisions on the Castro side and had Batista exploited them, (the way that Castro was exploiting the government's) his regime might have survived. Even as Castro's reputation as a Robin Hood fighting Batista's Sheriff of Nottingham grew, it was apparent to some Cubans that a Castro triumph might not usher in a democracy. From the Sierra Maestra there were reports of executions of 26th of July Movement partisans for minor breaches of discipline and that Castro (later titled the 'Maximum Leader') demanded absolute loyalty from those he led. Castro's authoritarianism
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created strains between him and his liberal, predominately middle class operatives who were the backbone of the rebellion. While this tension might have proved fatal, even then, Castro displayed a remarkable knack for turning adversity to his advantage.
Castro's Duplicity

The unsuccessful general strike of April 1958 is officially regarded in contemporary Cuba as the greatest setback in the struggle against Batista. The truth however is that the strike's failure enabled Castro to consolidate his power over the 26th of July Movement and subsequently hasten Batista's demise. The organizers of the strike were the liberal elements within the 26th of July Movement. Although Castro pledged his support to them, he delivered none. The Batista Government's determined and brutal response, combined with the crucial support that it received from the CTC ensured the strike's failure. The resulting leadership vacuum in the 26th of July Movement was filled by ardent Fidelistas, while the strident measures that were taken to crush the strike solidified middle class opposition to Batista. Fortified by the crushing of the strike, Batista ordered the professional officer corps to engage and wipe out the rebels in their Sierra Maestra base. That the June 1958 offensive failed was testament to Castro's success in exploiting the army's weaknesses. Throughout his guerrilla campaign, Castro emphasized in his radio broadcasts his commitment to constitutional democracy and his distaste at fighting the honorable elements within the army, whom he hoped would unburden him by overthrowing the Batista 'tyranny'. This form of psychological warfare was highly successful; the officers in combat were often negligent in pressing their advantage. During the June offensive Castro maintained cordial contacts with officers such
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as Major Quevedo and this helped sabotage the offensive. This cultivation of the army concealed Castro's real intentions, for on coming to power he would destroy that institution, even executing those officers that had maintained their distance from Batista and in the process helped to deliver Castro victory. The failure of the June offensive seemed to herald Batista's demise. The impression that the historical tide was against Batista had seemingly been confirmed when the Eisenhower Administration placed an arms embargo against his regime in March 1958, which did much to undermine army morale. Nonetheless, Batista fought on, prophetically convinced that a Castro victory would mean a permanent dictatorship for Cuba. Meanwhile Castro held back, developing his psychological advantage and waiting for the time to strike when the army began to disintegrate from within. The timing of when matters would reach their climax, hinged on the success of Castros election boycott campaign.

Castro Deceives the Cuban People at the Crucial Juncture

Castro realized that a clean election would short-circuit his revolutionary route to power and despite his declared and explicit commitment to constitutional democracy he pronounced all-inclusive death sentences against running candidates in the November 1958 general elections. The leading opposition presidential candidate, Carlos Marquez Sterling of the electionist wing of the Ortodoxo Party, the Free Peoples Party, (Grau's candidacy and his wing of the Autntico Party were too discredited to be taken seriously), courageously defied the strong election boycott movement because of his fears for the long term prospects for Cuban democracy should Castro prevail.
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The election victory of the PAP's Andrs Rivero Agero (who had initially built a political base in the Cuban Liberal Party but had followed Batista into the PAU in 1949) was due to the success of Castros boycott movement. Rivero Agero had previously served as prime minister and his humble background, apparent financial probity and administrative competence (Cuba maintained a high economic growth rate despite the political turbulence during this period) made him the most credible candidate that the regime could offer. For all of Rivero Ageros possible virtues as president, it was tragic that the overwhelming majority of the Cuban people forewent the opportunity to vote for an impeccable democrat in the person of Carlos Marquez Sterling because he could have saved them from the totalitarian future that remained in store. Marquez Sterling had had an ambivalent political relationship with Batista, which reflected the latters ambiguity as a democrat. (Marquez Sterling had been the president of the Constituent Assembly which had produced the 1940 Constitution). Although Marquez Sterling had commenced his political career as an antiMachado Liberal he finished it as an avowed Ortodoxo due to that partys democratic bona fides. (Marquez Sterlings presidential candidacy was also supported by minority factions within the ruling Progressive Coalition). Castros success in seducing the overwhelming majority of the Cuban electorate to boycott the November 1958 presidential election was testament to his charisma (which still entrances many people around the world today). For all Castros personal magnetism, it

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is highly improbable that the Cuban people would have courageously rallied to his cause had they actually known that he was a totalitarian dictator in waiting. The overwhelming support that Castro enjoyed at this point was also due to his masterstroke in publicly designating Manuel Urrutia as the future provisional president of Cuba. Urrutia was a respected former judge who was a staunch democrat, avowed anti-communist and someone who was known to be committed to free and democratic elections. (Unfortunately, from the very beginning of his tenure as president, Urrutia ignored violations of the Cuban Constitution and thereby provided Castro with sufficient scope to consolidate his de facto dictatorial power). The cabinet that Urrutia assembled, which held nominal power between January and July 1959, was the most honest and talented in Cuban history. However the Urrutia presidency would be nothing more than a useful front for Castro which enabled him to establish a police state. A crucial prerequisite to Castros establishment of a permanent dictatorship was the bloody purge he undertook in eliminating hundreds of Batistianos so that his Rebel Army displaced Cubas regular army. For this reason the execution of Batistiano war criminals was an immediate priority for Castro on him taking de facto power. The final and fatal missed opportunity which enabled Castro to assume dictatorial power was American ambivalence about offering Batista and his family asylum in the United States. In December 1958, William Pawley acting as an unofficial emissary of the United States government asked Batista if he would leave the government to a military junta and depart to Daytona where he had lived in self-imposed
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exile from 1946 to 1948. Batista, point blank, asked Pawley if he was authorized by the State Department to make the offer. Pawley remained silent. Later that month the American Ambassador, Earl Smith visited President Batista but did not offer him and his family asylum in the United States. The American failure to offer the outgoing Cuban president Batista an expeditious exit was a mistake because it could have forestalled the immediate catalyst for Castros revolutionary seizure of power. Furthermore, from Daytona Batista might have exercised a degree of political influence because his outgoing Machadista vice-president Dr. Gus Incln could have secured a Batistiano political base in a post-Batista democratic Cuba. This was because Gus Incln was due to assume the post of Mayor of Havana which he had been elected to in November 1958. By holding the second most important position in Cuba many Batistianos would have taken refuge in Gus Inclns Liberal Party. Although the ostensible junior coalition party, the Liberal Party, due Batistas role in protecting it following the 1933 Revolution, had always provided him (with the notable exception of 1952) with a legitimate block vote approximating between fifteen and twenty percent. (This voting base in conjunction with Castros successful boycott campaign had secured Rivero Ageros victory over Marquez Sterling). This scenario would have been possible only if the whole political structure had not collapsed.
The Regime Unravels

The stunning success that the Rebel Army enjoyed when it launched its December 1958 offensive was not due to its military prowess,

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but rather the breakdown in their opponent's morale due to overwhelming hostility toward the person of President Batista. The maxim that success in guerrilla war is not achieved by destroying your enemy militarily, but by destroying their morale was proven to be correct. Despite their overwhelming superior numerical strength, government units when confronted mostly surrendered, fled or defected. On learning that the Army Chief of Staff, General Francisco Tabernilla Dolz had ordered General Eulogio Cantillo, who commanded operations in Oriente Province to meet with Castro behind his back, Batista decided to abandon power as quickly as he had once seized it. At the 1959 New Year's party held at his home at Camp Columbia army barracks, Batista told his assembled guests of his immediate resignation. Batista took some of the guests with him and his wife (and those of his children that were still in Cuba), departing from Camp Columbias military airport. The impetuous nature of their escape belied the radical and tragic transformation that it heralded for Cuba.
Batista's Final Exile

Batista took initial refuge in the neighboring Dominican Republic. Realizing that the unpopularity of Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican Republics dictator, in Cuba, doomed Trujillos support for an invasion of that country in August 1959 to be carried out by Cuban exiles, (this project is not to be confused with the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961) Batista broke with Trujillo and departed for Portugal and eventually settled in Spain. During his fourteen-year exile Batista remained in contact with former cabinet ministers, but not with Cuba's growing Diaspora. This ostracism did not particularly disturb Batista, because he blamed the Cuban middle class for his fall, and they now constituted the bulk of Cuba's exile
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community. Indeed, Castro's elimination of the middle class gave Batista a sense of bittersweet satisfaction. Otherwise, the frustration of exile was lessened somewhat by financial security, the time that Batista spent with his family, him becoming a practicing Roman Catholic and the solace he found in writing. The two best known books that Batista published during his second exile were Cuba Betrayed and The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic. The latter book was aimed at highlighting the role, and arguing the case that the 1933 Revolution was in keeping with Mart's legacy and asserting that Castro's seizure of power was the antithesis of that tradition. Indeed for all his faults, an objective analysis of Batistas career indicates that he brought Cuba closer in line with Marts vision of an independent, democratic and prosperous republic than Castro ever did. It was under Batistas stewardship that the promises of the 1933 Revolution were being fulfilled: in 1934 the Platt amendment was abrogated, a democratic constitution was promulgated in 1940 and from 1955, Cuba due to the application of the Governments National Economic Development Program utilized, its geographical proximity to the United States as a strategic asset towards Cuba becoming a developed nation with a diversified agricultural and industrial base. By contrast, Cuba as a totalitarian state under Castro became overly dependant on the Soviet bloc with regard to its trading and financial arrangements. Consequently Cuba was dangerously exposed following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. Utilizing the skills of brilliant technocrats such as Carlos Lage, Castro
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was able to stave off economic collapse. Nonetheless it is disturbing that Castro did not allow economic reform to be further advanced due to his concern that a civil society could emerge which could threaten his power. Therefore Cuba in a post-Soviet world is now even more dependant upon sugar as its major export and on tourism than it ever was under Batista. Indeed contemporary Cuban society is divided between those who through Communist Party connections have access to American dollars by having access to government run hotels that are patronized by foreign tourists and most Cubans who are denied such access. While Batista, from his exile devoted his energy toward vindicating his legacy by writing books that extolled the virtues of his regime and attacked its communist successor, Castro himself had not forgotten his former nemesis. In August 1973 Castro dispatched a special agent, Tony de la Guardia, on a secret mission to kidnap Batista and bring him back to Cuba for a show trial and subsequent execution. On the night that de la Guardia arrived in Madrid, Batista died from a sudden and unexpected heart attack in Marebella, Spain. (Interestingly, and brutally, Castro had Tony de la Guardia executed in July 1989, along with General Arnaldo Ochoa, by scapegoating them for drug smuggling, because the Cuban dictator feared that they possessed the capacity to stage a successful military coup).
Fulgencio Batista's Tragic Epitaph

That Fulgencio Batista Zaldvar continues to be reviled by history is testament to the scale of Castro's triumph over him. Batista might receive a more balanced and just re-appraisal should Cubans regain their freedom to objectively study and analyze their history. It was Batista's misfortune that his arch-nemesis Fidel Castro was such a formidable adversary.
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For Batista was not so much an evil man, as a tragic one, who ultimately destroyed everything that he tried to build. More than anything, Batista craved acceptance and legitimacy. For that reason he initially gave way to a democracy, only to overturn it when faced with the prospect of rejection and Batista's failed struggle against Castro thwarted his attempts to liberalize his regime and Castro's victory over him has ushered in over two generations of totalitarian tyranny, which is yet to end. While Castro may have been more able than Batista, his striving for absolute power illustrated that Castro's motivations are more basic. Hence Batista is a more complex historical character and a more detailed study of him might eventuate in history offering some absolution for his actions in relative terms and a critical appreciation that he too, similar to the Cuban people whom he attempted to serve, ultimately fell victim to Castros chicanery.
David Bennett as Convener of Historical and Current Affairs Analysis (HCAA) would like to thank Roberto A. Torricella for his comments, corrections and suggestions to a previous edition of this article. Information and insight into pre-totalitarian Cuba can be gained by visiting two websites assembled by Mr. Torricella http://www.cubarepublicana.org and www.cubarepublicana.org. BIBLIOGRAPHY Agote-Freyre, F, Fulgencio Batista From Revolutionary to Strongman, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, 2006. Brenner, Leo Grande, Rich and Siegal (editors), The Cuban Reader-The Making of a Revolution , Grove Press, New York, 1989. Edmund A Chester, A Sergeant Named Batista, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1954. Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1993.

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Louis A Perez, Cuba Between Reform and Revolution , Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. Robert E Quirk, Fidel Castro , W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1993. Rhonda P Rabkin, Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1993. SBS World Guide, the-, 5th Edition, Special Broadcasting Service, Reed Reference, Port Melbourne, 1995. Jean Stubbs, Cuba: The Test of Time, Latin American Bureau (Research and Action), London, 1989. James Suchlicki, Historical Dictionary of Cuba, Latin American Historical Dictionaries; No 22, USA, 1988. Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986. Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, Eyre & Spohiswoode, London, 1970.

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