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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997 JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the

Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel) MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.) (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40 p.m.) On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions. Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts. Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays,but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration. Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8 After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed. First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal." In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution." In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules." In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that

each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure." In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them." Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18. We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view . In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power. Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved. What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved. In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said: Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point

of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25 Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process. Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows. ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996. It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added) This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31 Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32 Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not he

concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34 At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37 Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42 In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the

Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court. Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides: Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part. Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring: When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues is shown to have attended the contested act. All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition. ROMERO, J., separate opinion: In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino. The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main

objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their application. When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus: As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself . Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure. Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926

JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee. The appellant in his own behalf. The appellee in his own behalf. JOHNSON, J.: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its purpose was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The petition was denied by the trial court and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented by the appeal are: (a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good behavior?" And, (b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations? The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows: (a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis Burton Harrison, on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said section is amendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides among other things for the "appointment and term of the justices of the peace." It provides that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for each municipality organized according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."

Said Act No. 2041 was adopted, the Philippine Legislature was composed of the United States Commission and the House of Representatives. (b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and for other purposes. Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. (3107), so far as the same relates to justice of the peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said Act in section 203 provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section ". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here called to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said Act contains provisions for "appointment of justices of the of the peace" nor as to the period during which they may serve after appointment. Attention is also invited to the fact that the same section (203) contains provisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace while section 207 contains provisions defining the"qualifications for justices of the peace." Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in the office of justices of the peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the Act contains said provisions. Attention is here called to the provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof, which provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that the subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be discussed later. (c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letter to the said Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and figures following: MANILA, April 9, 1923 SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the record shows that you are over sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor to hereby advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code. Respectfully, (Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRES Undersecretary of Justice Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of April, 1923. It was handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed or ordered Julio Agcaoili, then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to cease to be a justice of the peace." Against the order contained in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a protest dated April 28, 1923, in the following language: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE P. I. April 28, 1923 The Hon. LUIS TORRES Undersecretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of the Province of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he received, through the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your communication of April 9, 1923, informing the undersigned that, having attained the age of 65 years, he ceased to be justice of the peace of Laoag under the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 3107, amending section 203 of the Administrative Code, which is Act No. 2711 enacted in the year 1919, and which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in part that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they attain the age of 65 years. With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes that the aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace, like the undersigned, before the passage and enactment of said Act No. 3107 and the amended Administrative Code, nor can this be the intention of the legislator, for if it were so, it should have so stated in order that the justices of the peace already appointed, who were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained the age of 65 years when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from their office. The undersigned was appointed of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, and therefore under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, which amended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any subsequent Act and provides: All justices if the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office who have not the qualifications required by this Act shall continue in office until their successors are appointed. Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of Act No. 2041? The undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the context of both laws, nor was it repealed because if this were the case the Governor- General would have renewed the appointments of all the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace under said section 203 of the Administrative Code. The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, under the said Act No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties of the office up to the present time, without the Governor-General having renewed his appointment under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.

Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of the Administrative Code. Has this amendment retroactive effect? In the first place the legislature could not give or have given this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so, it would have so stated; and in the second place, because not only is such express declaration lacking in the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly provides that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed shall hold office until they attain the age of 65 years. Very respectfully, (Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili on the 7th day of July, 1923, and is couched in the following language: I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, do hereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and thereupon showed me the telegram of Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to said provincial fiscal. After reading said telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to furnish me a copy thereof and he furnished me a copy of the telegram. Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the provincial fiscal; to cause me to deliver the office and all the documents and records thereof to the auxiliary justice of the peace, because according to said Undersecretary of Justice I must cease from the office under Act No. 3107, and that I be prosecuted for violation of article 370 of the Penal Codeshould I fail to comply with the telegram sent to me on the 2d instant by the same Undersecretary of Justice. I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the orders of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given telegram and the other by letter. I only desired to study the spirit of the law and this is the reason why I did not leave the office until the present time, because I was from the office of the justice of the peace under the provision of Act No. 2041 under which I was appointed justice of the peace of the capital, and which Act was not repealed by any subsequent one, nor by Act No. 3107, which Act No. 2041 provides that the justices of the peace to be appointed under it, should hold office during good behavior. This Act does not say anything as to limitation of age, and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in, and retain the office. I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not duly respect the constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office of the justice of the peace of Laoag and all its documents and records, as well as the furniture therein contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary justice of the peace, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, in compliance with the telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, received by me through the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte. I make under protest the delivery of the office and its documents and records because I think, as I have stated, that I must not cease from the office of

justice of the peace, and in order that my right may be defined, I shall institute an action in the proper court of justice to decide the case. (Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI I received the things of the office. (Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN In the presence of: (Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest which he presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having received any reply to his protest, filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 23d day of April, 1925, which petition was amended by the filing of another petition in the same court on the 8th day of September, 1925. A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that they contain arguments in support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded a reply, but no reply was forthcoming. The arguments in support of his protests find a counterpart and are fully supported in the decision of this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47 Phil., 543), wherein the Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced against justices of the peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Had the Secretary of Justice answered said protests, the great injustice which has been done to Julio Agcaoili perhaps might have been avoided. (e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned his office over to the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace and humiliation which might come to him by virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th day of July, 1923, still protesting, delivered the possession of his office, as justice of the peace, to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is a matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had been entrusted with the highest office in his province which the people could confer upon him. The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on the 23d day of July, 1925, and the second on the 8th day of September, 1925, contain, in resume, the foregoing facts. To the petition the respondent Alberto Suguitan answered and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained the defense of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto. From that judgment Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical argument that his remedy has not prescribed. Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12, Public Laws of the Philippine Islands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the Philippine Islands providing a government therefor. Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Under said provision, may the legislature adopt a law which contains in the title of the Act? The effect of violating said provision of the Jones Law has been brought before the courts many times. The effect of violating said provision has already been passed upon by this court. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 889.)

In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of the Jones Law was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which no reference was made in the title. In the decision of this court in the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions of the courts of many of the states of the Union were followed. Many of the constitutions of the States of the Union contain similar provision to that quoted above from the Jones Law. Among such states may be mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his valuable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the reason and the purpose of such a constitutional provision. He says: In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, and for other purposes. The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title. The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similar provision of the constitution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay vs. United States Savings and Loan Association (120 Ala., 156), had the following to say, quoting with approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that question: The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often pass bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covered a legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents. . . . An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to

combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities, defining the objects of this provision: It may, therefore, be assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. (49 Ala., 330, 331.) The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a like limitation prevails. . . . (120 Ala., 172.) In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of California had occasion to discuss the question now before us and said: At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. The practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision. (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has been framed in the constitutions of many of the States of the Union; and the courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation. Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42 Mo., 578); Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board of Public Education for the City of Americus vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232); Spier vs. Baker (120 Cal., 370). Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his work on Statutory Construction, said: The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that the obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the

provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question that such was intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded. In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect of the violation of a constitutional provision like the one before us, said: * * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the Legislature. It matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house, on three different days, and has received the approval of the Governor; still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject. . . . The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker vs. State, supra, said: It is settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that this provision of the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it. . . . Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that our courts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory. Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one above quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixtyfive years," we are forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay. With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel. Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306; People ex rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A., 366.) In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues as a matter of course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel. Washington County vs. Stone, 25

Mo., 555; Commonwealth vs. Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a petition therefor. If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult to understand how in the same action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been forcibly, with threats and intimidation, ousted from a public office by the Government itself as was done in the present case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the representative of the state may file an information on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. (Catlett vs. People ex rel. States's Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet insist that it may plead such statutes to bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public officials whom it itself has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not within the contemplation of sound jurisprudence. So much of the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings. Is there a statute in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the action of a public official of the Government who has been duly appointed and qualified, and who has, by force and intimidation, been ousted from such office, to defeat his action of quo warranto? On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190 which had been considered privately and publicly for several months theretofore. Its provisions were published throughout the Philippine Islands long prior to its adoption. While said Act was adopted on the 7th day of August, 1901, it did not take effect, even though it had been published, until the 1st day of October, 1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190) shows that it provides remedies for the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said Act No. 190 was published in both English and Spanish. Section 216, in English, provided that "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose." The same section (216), as published in Spanish, reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco aos siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del ao siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo." Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as follows: "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless the same be commenced within five years after the commission or omission complained of took place. Neither may an action be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless the same is commenced within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivation thereof, or after the right to hold the office arose." Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands and distributed to the public officers throughout the Philippine Islands. It is a fact of general information that even now, in 1926, the Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the people in remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. It is not strange, therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said section 216 applied to public officers; that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the Spanish translation. Is it just and fair and reasonable for the Government of the Philippine Islands to oust one of its officers

from an office to which he had been legally appointed, by force and intimidation and without just cause, and then to defeat his action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions of a public statute, different from the one which the Government itself had furnished its public officers? The appellant is familiar with the Spanish but not with the English language. He naturally relied upon the Spanish version of the law for his information as to what the law really was. Not only had the appellant the right to rely upon the provisions of section 216 as they appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands, but the reading of the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216 will show that they refer specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was justified in believing that said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the Government should give him credit with having in good faith. But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears in English, is the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to said section above quoted in English, it will be seen that after the word "committed" there is a semicolon. Does that which follows the semicolon have reference to the same subject matter which precedes it? A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation. But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the latter part of said section applies to public officers who have been ousted from their position, and not only to officers of corporations, then we have the question presented: Had the one year mentioned in said section expired on the 23d day of April, 1925, when the first complaint, was filed in the present action? When did the year begin to run if said section is applicable to the appellant? It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted from his office as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he surrender his office on that date under protest, but also on the 28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary of Justice that he cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality, he then protested and gave a long and lucid argument in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did he not have a right, without any legal action to protect his right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th day of April, 1923? He had a right to believe that the grounds upon which his protest was based would be convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he would not be removed. Until this very hour the record contains no reply from the Secretary of Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the appellant upon his right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be ousted. In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription had not begun and run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been made. He had right to await the answer to his protest, in the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action would unnecessary.

It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against the contention of the appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38 Phil., 624). In that case no question was raised nor was it even suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public officer. That question was not discussed nor referred to by any of the parties interested in that case. It has been frequently decided that the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its validity, where the question is squarely and properly raised and presented, Where a question passes the court sub silentio, the case in which the question was so passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U. S. vs. Noriega and Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil., 401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159, 172; U. S. vs. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in the case of McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding force in the interpretation of the question presented here. The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office. The history of this case reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like a procedure under a well-organized Government. It seems impossible to believe, and we could not believe it, were the facts not actually supported by the record. Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 is not explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his protest, couched in most humble and respectful language, fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the respectful protest and the able argument given in support thereof. The only answer to his protest was a threat of a criminal prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was met with austereness. His humble petition was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his protest was ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for refusing to comply with an order by one who was not willing to follow the well-defined and well-beaten road of "due process of law" by preferring charges and giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard and to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole procedure, from beginning to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he had been legally appointed and against whom no complaint has been made, is anomalous in the jurisprudence under the American flag. Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the fundamentals of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never yield, to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There is also some plausible reason for the latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power some evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the Government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that the courts and legislatures are gradually undermining and finally overthrowing constitutions. It is by yielding to such influences that constitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. It has been, and is my purpose, so far as it is possible for me, to follow the fundamental law does not work well the people or the legislature may amend it. If, however, the legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects in the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a would upon the constitution of the state which nothing can cure. One step

taken by the legislature or the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the Government, opens the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of the Government are just what those in authority are pleased to call them. (Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock [N. Y.], 547, 568.) I cannot give my consent to a rule or doctrine which will permit a Government to throw an honest and efficient official out of office without reason and without authority of law, refuse to consider a protest, and then permit the application of a law to prevent a recovery of that which he has lost illegally and without reason. The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering the restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should follow the effect of the doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered. Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Johns, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting: (1) I concur in so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as relates to the legal issue presented in the lower court and here, pertaining to the question of whether or not the present action was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and in entire accord with the reversal of the judgment and the reinstatement of Julio Agcaoili, the appellant, in his office as justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. My reasons are these: (A) Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years, should not be given retroactive effect. That was expressly decided in the analogous case of Segovia vs. Noel ([1925], 47 Phil., 543). (B) Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section particularly confines itself to an action "against a corporation." Thereafter following a semicolon, comes the clause "nor shall an action be brought against an officer," which plainly relates back to "corporation." Otherwise, the new idea would neither have been expressed in a separate section or in a separate sentence. That this is true is further borne out by the Spanish transaction, making use of the phrase "la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion," which we are privileged to consult to explain an ambiguity in the English text. (C) Even under the supposition the section 216 of the code of Civil Procedure applies, still it is not clear that one year has elapse "after the cause of such ouster, . . . arose." In reality, no cause for ouster has arisen since it was an erroneous interpretation of the law which met with the disposal of the Supreme Court, which resulted in the attempt to force Mr. Agcaoili out of the office and to place the auxiliary justice of the peace on office. The most that could be said of the attempted ouster is that the auxiliary justice of the peace became a justice of the peace de facto.

(2) I dissent from so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, as discusses the question of whether or not the provisions of act No. 3107 are costitutional, as unnecessary to a decision, as not submitted for decision, and so as entirely uncancelled for. The complaint for quo warranto presented in the court of first Instance contained the usual allegations without, however, making any reference at all to the constitutionality of Act No. No. 3107. the answer set up presentation. The trial judge announcing the theories of the parties said: "The defense of the defendant is that the action brought by the plaintiff has prescribed because since July 7, 1923, when he left his office, no complaint was filed until April 23, 1925, and, therefore, more than one year had elapsed. The plaintiff in turn alleges that there is no such prescription," and then proceeded to deny the petition. On appeal this court, the errors assigned by Mr. Agcaoili as appellant are these: (1) The lower court erred in holding that the action of the petitioner had prescribed on account of the same not having been brought within one year from July 7, 1923, when by an illegal order of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner forcibly ceased to discharge the duties of the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and respondent assumed said office and began to act as such justice of the peace. (2) The lower court erred in applying tot he instant case the provisions of section 216 of act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). (3) The lower court erred in finding that the period of prescription must be counted from July 7, 1923, instead of March 4, 1925. (4) The lower court finally erred in not granting the relief invoked by the petitioner; in not ousting the respondent from the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in not reinstating the petitioner in said office and in not sentencing the respondent to pay the costs and damages caused to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000." There is not one word either in appellant's brief or in appellee's brief on the subject of the constitutionality of Act No. 3107. Had not the constitutional question been discussed and decided without it being suggested anywhere in the bill of executions, in the assignments of error, on in the briefs, it would hardly be necessary to cite well known principles as these: It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, cconscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can consciously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. . . . . . . The task . . . is a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. . . . Neither will a court, as a general rule pass a constitutional question, and decided a statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause. "While courts cannot shun the discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the very lis mota . . ." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 227, 228, 231.)

STREET, J., dissenting: This is an action of quo warranto instituted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by Julio Agcaoili for the purpose of restoring his restoration to the office of justice of peace of Laoag and to secure the removal of the defendant, Alfredo Saguitan, from the present employment of the same office. Upon hearing the cause of the trial judge, while recognizing the theoritical right of the plaintiff's right of section had been barred by the limitation prescribed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He therefore denied the writ, with half costs, and the plaintiff appealed. It appears that on March 25, 1916, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor-general to the office of Justice of the peace of Laoag, in the Province of Ilocos Norte, effective from April 10, 1916, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. This appointment was approved by the Philippine Senate, and the plaintiff entered upon the discharged of his duties in due course. At that time there was no age limit upon the tenure of office of justices of the peace, but on March 17, 1923, act No. 3107 of the Philippine Legislature went into effect. By this Act, appointment of justices of the peace, was amended by the addition of a proviso to the first auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." In the year 1923 the plaintiff herein had attained the age of 65; and the Secretary of Justice, supposing that was applicable to the case, brought Administrative Code was applicable tot he case, brought administrative pressure to bear upon the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff ceased to exercise the functions of justice of the peace for Laoag and the Governor-General to the same office. This appointment having been approved by the Senate, the said Suguitan entered upon the discharge of the duties thereof. On March 4, 1925, this court promulgated the decision in the case of segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543), wherein we decided that the amendment contained in Act No. 3107 to section 203 of the Administrative Code should be given prospective application only, with the result that said provisions is not applicable to a justice of the peace appointed prior to enactment of the amendatory law. When this decision was promulgated it came to the attention of the plaintiff, and the present action was stipulated by him shortly thereafter for the purpose of obtaining his restoration to the office. Practically the only defense insisted upon in the court below was to the effect that the action had prescribed under the one-year limitation; and the only question made in this appeal arises upon the application of said section. It appears from he record that the plaintiff was ousted from office on July 7, 1923, and that the defendant, as auxiliary justice of the peace, then entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office, by direction of Governor-General Wood, in the character of a temporary appointee to the vacancy. Later, as already stated, Suguitan entered upon the discharged of the duties of the office under commission from the Governor-General, approved by the Philippine Senate, effective from December 13, 1923. It is therefore apparent that more than a full year had elapse between the removal of the plaintiff from office and the date of the institution of the present action; and more than a year had also elapsed later the defendant began the discharge of the duties of the office as a regularly commissioned justice of the peace. The section of the Code of civil Procedure, the application of which is here in question, reads, in English, as follows: SEC. 216. Limitations. Nothing herein continued shall authorized an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an

officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office arose. The same section as it stands in a current version of the Spanish translation differ somewhat, in the second member from the English version, a s will be seen by comparing the Spanish version, which reads as follows: ART. 216. De las limitaciones. Ninguna de estates disposiciones facultara la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos que el jioco se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco anos sigientes a la comision u omision del hecho objecto de la accion. Tampoco se podra inciar un juicio contra la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a fecto dentro del ao siguinte la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo. Upon comparison of these version it will be seen that the word office (cargo) in the second sentenced of the Spanish version is qualified by the expression "en una corporacion." The plaintiff, relying upon the Spanish version, insist that the provision is not applicable to a public office, like that of justice of the peace; and it is further insisted that the whole section deals exclusively with the subject of the writ of quo warranto as used against a corporation or against a person in possession of a corporate office. I am unable to accede to this view of the law. Upon examination of section 197 to 216, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be found that two subjects are there threated, namely, usurpation of franchise by corporation and usurpation of office; and the evident purpose of this part of the Code is to define the conditions under which the writ of quo warranto may be final section (sec. 216) dealing with the subject, a limitation is prescribe for both. The first member of the section, down as far as the semicolon in the English version, prescribes a limitation of five years upon any action instituted against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter. In the matter following the semicolon is found the limitation appropriate to the case where instituted to oust the incumbent and to secure the office for the person unlawfully kept from the occupancy thereof. The prescription established for this case is one year. A careful perusal of the section, in connection with related provisions of the Code, leaves no room for doubt that have actions over public of the section was instituted to apply to actions over public officer as well as corporate offices; and in this sense said provision has been applied by this court. (Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624.) The author, or authors, of the Code of Civil Procedure could hardly have intended for this provision to be applied only to corporate officers, since there is a public interest in public offices which requires there should be a prescriptive provision applicable to actions over these offices no less than to actions over the offices of corporations. The insertion "en una corporacion" after the word "cargo" was evidently a mere mistake, resulting from a superficial attention to the context; and it will be found that in the Spanish edition to the Code of civil Procedure edited by C. M. Recto this phrase has been dropped. It goes without saying that the English version of the Code of civil Procedure is controlling, and in case of conflict the courts must be governed by this version. The suggestion contained in the opinion of the court of the Spanish language is novel and if followed by us in the future will be the source of much uncertainty in the interpretation and application of our statutes. The opinion of the court contains a lengthy dissertion intended to demonstrate that the amendment of section 203 of the Administrative Code contained in act No. 3107 is unconstitutional, for defect in the title of the Act. With this provision I am also unable to agree. The title to act No. 3107 begins with theses words: "An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code in my opinion broad enough to include the amendment of section 203 relating the analysis of Title IV of the

Administrative Code it will be found that justices of the peace are; and although the provisions of act No. 3107 are variously, they have this in common, that they deal with different parts of the judiciary establishment and are intended that a pronouncement as to the constitutionality of the amendment in question was by no means called for in this case, not only because the point was not raised in the discussion of the case but for the further reason that we the plaintiff. RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION February 26, 1926 The clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of Alberto Suguitan for a reconsideration of the decision of the court promulgated on February 13, 1926, and (b) the motion of the Secretary of Justice, praying for leave to appear in the said decision in relation with said motions, it is hereby ordered and decreed that said decision heretofore announcement, be modified, to the end that the decision of all the questions involved ins aid decision be limited tot he following alone: (a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and, (b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause. Modifying the decision heretofore announced, as herein indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied. Avancea, C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ., adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur nevertheless in this resolution. Avancea, C.J. and Ostrand, J., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974 HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents. Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner. Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila. Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service. Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila." The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's

incapacity to act as Mayor. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress." Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065. Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court." The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly

enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties. Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent. The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution. The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect." Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads: The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof. Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President. In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point. The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed

Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions: Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal." Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal." Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic. As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement." Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,

granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part. Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes 1 Amending Section 10 of R. A. No. 409 defining the powers and duties of the Vice-Mayor. 2 See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rules II (d) and IV(j) and Rules of the Senate; Sections 3(e) and 6(h). 3 Brown vs. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160, 164. 4 Taylor vs. Wilson, 22 NW 119, 120. 5 See Annotations in 95 ALR 273. 6 Brown vs. Morris supra, at pp. 164-165. 7 Hammond vs. Lynch, 151 NW 81, 88.

8 Lynch vs. Hutchinson 76 NE 370. 9 143 U. S. 294, 303; 36 L. ed. 294. 10 Gray vs. Taylor, 113 P 588, 591, affirmed in 227 U. S. 51, 57, 57 L. ed. 413, 416; Pelt vs. Payne, 30 SW 426, 427. 11 Field vs. Clark, supra at p. 303; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 13; Morales vs. Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131, 134. 12 Article VI, Section 20(1). The 1973 Constitution similarly provides in Article VIII, Section 20(1) that "(E)very bill passed by the National Assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Prime Minister ... " 13 See, for example, the decisions of this Court in Casco Phil. Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 347 and Morales vs. Subido, supra.
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