TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 1st Batch 1. People vs.

Bisda 406 SCRA 454, GR 140895, July 17, 2003

Facts: Alma Bisda and Jenny Basilan (cousin of Yaya Wendy, not a stranger) were involved in kidnapping for ransom of victim Angela Michelle Soriano (6yo) in Marikina on Sep 3, 1998, after her class by telling her that her parents were waiting for her in Jollibee. They brought the kid to Jollibee and afterwards to their residence in Paco, Manila They asked for 5M ransom from William and Marymae which they negotiated down to 50k and 25k Alma was apprehended and her alibi was she was also a victim and the perpetrator was Jenny Rose. Jenny Rose voluntary arrived at the PAOCTF where she announced that she was one of Almas cohorts Defenses laid by accused: inconsistent testimony of Angela, voluntariness of Angela, Angela was free to roam around the house thus no illegal detention. Issue: WON accused guilty of kidnapping Held: Affirmative Accused guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection and to pay jointly and severally to the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P 100,000 by way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. The prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, or at least one of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for the release of their daughter. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proved by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Magbanua vs. IAC 137 SCRA 329

for they could not plant palay due to lack of water. The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former believe that as a shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings. Issue: WON the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Held: The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the defendants . Under the law, the landowners have obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same Code which provides, Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liable for the compensation to the latter. 3. MVRS Publications Inc. et al vs. Islamic Dawah Council of the Phil. et al. 396 SCRA 210

FACTS: 1.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC.,alocalfederation of more than sevent y (70) Muslimreligiousorganizations,and someindividual Muslims field in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a classsuit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRSPUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staff arising from an articlepublished in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. 2.Thecomplaint: a)The statement was insulting and damaging to theMus lims; b) that these words alluding to the pig as the God of theMuslims was not only published out of sheer ignorancebut with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult anddisparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in thiscountry, in violation of law, public policy, good morals andhuman relations; c)that on account of these libelous wordsBulgar insultednot only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entireMuslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.

Facts: The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surenamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the defendants, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas

3.MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in their defense,contended that the article did not mention respondents as theobject of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinionand was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,prejudice or injury to Muslims. 4.The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Islamic Dawah et al.failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedlydefamed by the article were not specifically identified.The alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for whichthe readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslimmember to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. 5.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. It opinedthat it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation wasdirected to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This li belousimputation undeniably applied to the plaintiffappellants who areMuslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that the suitfor damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAHCOUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as aMuslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality tosue and protect the interests of all Muslims. ISSUE: Whether or not there was an existence of the elements of libel in the Bulgar article. HELD The article was not libelous. 1.There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedlyinjured by theBulgar article. An individual Muslim has areputation that is personal, separate and distinct in thecommunity. Each has a varying interest and a divergentpolitical and religious view. There is no injury to thereputation of the individual Muslims who constitute thiscommunity that can give rise to an action for group libel.Each reputation is personal in character to every person.Together, the Muslims do not have a single commonreputation that will give them a common or general interestin the subject matter of the controversy. 2.Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written) andslander (in general, oral), means the offense of injuring aperson's character, fame or reputation through false andmalicious statements. It is that which tends to injur ereputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. 3.Defamation is an invasion of arelational interest since itinvolves the opinion which others in the community mayhave, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which aremerely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious,ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do notconstitute a basis for an action

for defamation in theabsence of an allegation for special damages. 4.Declarations made about a large class of people cannot beinterpreted to advert to an identified or identifiablein dividual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or al luding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing theequally demanding right of free speech and expression, aswell as of the press, under theBill of Rights 5.The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC: where thedefamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be sosweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual inthat group or class, or sufficiently specific so that eachindividual in the class or group can prove that thedefamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that hecan bring the action separately. 7."Emotional distress" tort action has no application in thiscase because no particular individual was identified in theBulgar article. "Emotional distress" means any highlyunpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry,nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror,and chagrin. This kind of tort action is personal in nature,i.e., it is a civil action filed by anindividual to assuage theinjuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attackson his character. Under the Second Restatement of theLaw, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotionaldistress the plaintiff must show that: (a)The conduct of the defendant was intentionalor in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b)The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c)There was a causal connection between thedefendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mentaldistress; (d)The plaintiff's mental distress was extremeand severe. 8."Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that isso outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as togo beyond all possible bounds of decency. The actionsmust have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate,embarrass or frighten the plaintiff 9.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must provemore than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment,or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults,indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. Intentional tort causing emotional distress mustnecessarily give way to the fundamental right to fr eespeech. 4. Yasona vs. De Ramos 440 SCRA 154 GR 156339 October 6, 2004

Facts:

- Aurea asked Jovencio for help in paying her bank loans and in return sell to him half of her land. - Jovencio did help and Deed of Sale was executed and the land was divided into 2 as contained in the Title. - 22 years later Aurea sued Jovencio for estafa contending that she was directed to sign blank paper which turned out to be documents transferring ownership of her property. - The case did not prosper and Jovencio filed Malicious Prosecution against her. Issue: WON Aurea is liable for Malicious Prosecution Held: Affirmative "malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein." To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These two elements are present in the present controversy. Petitioners were completely aware that Jovencio was the rightful owner of the lot covered by TCT No. 73251, clearly signifying that they were impelled by malice and avarice in bringing the unfounded action. That there was no probable cause at all for the filing of the estafa. 5. Alonzo vs. CA 241 SCRA 51 Facts: From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13, 1985, accused was directed by Executive Officer of the PMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct inspections of Medicare-accredited clinics and hospitals. (order approved by Chairman of PMCC, Dr. Pacifico Marcos) Among the inspected by accused were the Sto. Nio Medical Clinic in Astorga, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in Guihing,Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, owned and managed by complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco. Inspection report noted physical plant- too small for a 50 bed hospital and other violations and a threat of libel by the couple Dra. Velasco and Judge Dan Velasco. On the basis of said report and other documents, Executive Director Rossi Castro, on October 15, 1985, filed a complaint with the PMCC against the Sto. Nio

Medical Clinic for "Misrepresentation by Extending Confinement of Patients, Misrepresentation by Claiming for Non-Existing Patients, Breach of Warranty of Accreditation" Finding that the last portions of the report to be libelous, Velascos filed complaint for libel. Alonzos defense: privilege communication RTC ruling: Alonzo guilty and found defamatory the statement in the last paragraph which read: "the husband is a judge and it gives them certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make court suits their pasttime." The trial court said that this statement "conveys the meaning that Judge Velasco abuses his powers and authority as a judge thus enabling him and his wife to violate the law with impunity and even 'make court suits their pasttime [sic].'" Regarding the requirement of publication, it held that there was sufficient publication of the petitioner's subject report when she sent it to Dr. Tamesis , a person other than the complainants, who read the report. CA: affirmed "qualified privileged communication" was lost because of proof of actual malice obviously made out of ill-will or revenge. Issue: WON questioned report of the petitioner to Dr. Tamesis is libelous Held: Negative Malice is not presumed and must, therefore, be proved. RPC Art. 333. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 5 Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true; if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. 6 Truth then is not a defense, unless it is shown that the matter charged as libelous was made with good motives and for justifiable ends. It is undisputed that Alonzo, as Field Operations Officer for Region XI of the PMCC, is a public officer and that she submitted the questioned report after she had conducted the inspection of the two clinics of Dr. Velasco pursuant to and by virtue of the directive of the Executive Officer, Atty. Rossi Castro, which was duly approved by the Chairman of the PMCC, Dr. Pacifico Marcos, as Special Order No. 73 12 under which she

was to submit a report. Her authority to conduct the inspection and to submit the corresponding report were not questioned by the private respondents. It is precisely because of such authority that the Court of Appeals conceded that her questioned report was a qualified privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made her report in the exercise of her official duty or function. She rendered it in due course to her superior who had a duty to perform with respect to its subject matter and which the latter faithfully did by filing the appropriate complaint against Dr. Velasco after an evaluation of the report. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the privileged character of the report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that ofbona fides." 15 Tested under these principle, we disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that malice in fact was duly proved in this case since the petitioner "was moved by ill-will" because Dr. Velasco did not grant her "a loan of P1,500.00" and refused "to bear the vacation expenses of her children at the Davao Insular Hotel, the most expensive hostelry in Davao City." This conclusion is purely conjectural for, as a matter of fact, Dr. Velasco herself was uncertain if these incidents indeed incited the petitioner. Finally, the statement on the threat of a libel charge was evidently based on a rumor (from the grapevine) which we, nevertheless, find to be relevant to the report since it serves to forewarn the petitioner's superiors of the risks she and they might meet as a consequence of her report on the violations and to emphasize the need for PMCC's firmness and courage to pursue the appropriate charges as may be warranted in the premises. All told then, the prosecution in this case was unable to prove malice in fact. Finally there was, in law, no publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a communication made by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of officers having a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication does not amount to a publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. 20 6. Canlas vs. CA GR 112160 February 28, 2000 Facts: Canlas and Maosca decided to venture in business. To raise capital, Canlas executed an SPA authorizing Maosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land. Eventually, Canlas agreed to sell these to Maosca for 850k. Canlas delivered the TCTs, and Maosca issued postdated

checks (40k, 460k), but the check for 460k was not sufficiently funded. Maosca was able to mortgage the parcels of land to an Atty. Magno with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as Sps. Canlas [fake couple]. Maosca was granted a 500k loan by Asian Savings Bank [ASB] with the involvement of the fake couple.[TOWARDS THE END OF THE CASE, it was said that Canlas was with Maosca when the latter submitted documents for the loan application. Maosca showed Canlas several TCTs, which were collaterals for the loan, and Canlas was confident that his parcels of land were not involved. However,Maosca used Sps. Canlas parcels of land as collaterals. A 200k check was released, and Canlas received it as payment of the parcels of land he sold to Maosca.] The loan was not paid so the mortgage was foreclosed. Canlas wrote to ASB, saying that the execution of the mortgage was without their authority, so steps should be taken to annul the mortgage. Canlas also wrote the sheriff to cancel the auction sale; however, the sale pushed through. Sps. Canlas instituted a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage [REM], with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC issued an order restraining the sheriff from issuing the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale, and it annulled the REM. CA reversed RTC,holding that the REM was valid, that Sps. Canlas are not entitled to relief because of their negligence. CA said ASB exercised due diligence in granting loan application, and that it did not act with bad faith. Issue: WON Canlas may recover Held: Affirmative 1. ASB DID NOT OBSERVE REQUIRED DILIGENCE IN VERIFYING COUPLES IDENTITY 2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE; ASB MUST SUFFER RESULTING LOSS Assuming Canlas was negligent, what was his fault? He gave Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud by entrusting to the latter TCTs of the parcels of land (even though Maosca did not pay yet!). HOWEVER, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by faithfully complying with the bank requirement of ascertaining the identity of persons transacting with them. Canlas negligence made him undeserving of an award of attorneys fees. PROPERTY LESSON: A CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE MUST BE CONSTITUTED ONLY BY THE PROPERTYS ABSOLUTE OWNER, SO A MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY AN IMPOSTOR IS VOID 7. So Ping Bun vs. CA GR 120554 September 21, 1999 Facts: In 1963, TekHua Trading Co, through its managing partner,SoPekGiok, entered into lease agreements with

lessor Dee C.Chuan& Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) leasecontracts were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-Band 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. TekHua used theareas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-yearterm. They provided that should the lessee continue tooccupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on amonth-to-month basis.When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew thecontracts, but TekHua continued to occupy the premises. In1976, TekHua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the originalmembers of TekHua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong,formedTekHua Enterprising Corp., herein respondentcorporation.SoPekGiok, managing partner of TekHua Trading, died in1986. So PekGioks grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun,occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to TekHua Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase inrent effective September 1, 1989. The rent increase was lateron reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon otherlessees demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessorimplemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letterswere new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned thatfailure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall bedeemed as lack of interest on the lessees part, andagreement to the termination of the lease. Privaterespondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, thelease contracts were not rescinded.On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter topetitioner, to recover possession of the warehouse. Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitionerrequested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after thedeath of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupyingthe premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent.DCCSI acceded to petitioners request. The lease contracts infavor of Trendsetter were executed.In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for thenullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI andpetitioner. They also claimed damages. Issue: WON SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT Held: Affirmative There was tort interference in the case at bar as petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. However, nothing on record imputed malice on petitioner; thus, precluding damages. But although the extent of damages was not quantifiable, it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. Hence, the Court confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a non-

trespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defend ants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSIto lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefitedfrom it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. Sec 1314of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since thetrial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled toactual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of anyliability, including attorneys fees. It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only becausethe extent of damages was not quantifiable. While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest tointrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that theconduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to makesome gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however,precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for enteringinto contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate courtcorrectly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunctionsaved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference. 8. Arafiles vs. Phil. Journalist Inc. GR 150256 March 25, 2004 FACTS: This is a complaint for damages filed by CatalinoArafiles, Director of the National Institute of Atmospheric Science (NIAS) against Peoples Journal Tonight reporter, Romy Morales.

On April 14, 1987, Morales was at the Western Police District Headquarters when NIAS employee, EmelitaDespuig lodged a complaint for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape against Arafiles. After interviewing Emelita and checking the police blotter, Morales wrote a story about it, which was published that same day. Arafiles then filed a complaint against Morales, alleging that on account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director of theNIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA. For its part, Morales et al. countered that the news item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter, which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal interview of the victim, falls within the protective constitutional provision of freedom of the press. The RTC ruled in favor of Arafiles, stating that the article did not use phrases like allegedly or reportedly and that it reported the allegations of the victim as if it were fact and truth. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was reversed. CA found no proof that respondents were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and injury to petitioner. ISSUE: WON publication was as malicious sensationalization of fabricated facts? The argument of the petitioner is that the sole basis of the news item is the police blotter. However, said police blotterplainly shows that there was only one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita. SC found that while the police blotter entry recorded Emelitas complaint about only a case for abduction with rape, her sworn statement given in the presence of Morales, who subsequently interviewed her, reported about the second abduction incident. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. The first seven paragraphs gave the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes, but the succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to the readers that the narration of events was only Emelitas account to the police. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to

a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. 9. Manila Electric Co. vs. CA GR 132539 July 11, 2001 Facts: 1st Case October 19, 1987, Concast(steel manufacturing) filed injunction against Manila Electric for demanding payment of P6,753,192.85 representing the value of electric current, allegedly used but not registered in the meter with a threat of disconnection if unpaid for 3 days. That the plaintiff is engaged in steel manufacturing and its plant is heavily dependent upon the electric supply from the defendant for its daily operation and the threatened disconnection of electric supply to the plaintiff which has already become very imminent will cause it great and irreparable damage and injury as not only will its various machinery for steel making and processing will grind to a halt, but various ingredients in the steel making process stand to be spoiled and the steel making process itself will be ruined; not to mention the fact that the plaintiff will be needlessly exposed to public ridicule on account of a contested billing by the defendant; TRO granted. 2nd Case On 22 January 1982, the Concast entered into a service agreement with MERALCOwhereby MERALCO obligated itself for a fee to supply Metro Concast with electric energy at the latters manufacturing plant in Bgy. LawangBato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The terms and conditions of the agreement were embodied in a prepared standard form denominated AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF ELECTRIC ENERGY. Series of inspection by MERALCO showed tampering by Concast, thus billed of P44,470,441.22 representing an unspecified amount of electric energy allegedly consumed but not registered in the electric meters for [an] unspecified period of time, upon the alleged finding that in the inspection of its metering installation on 02 April 1987. Metro Concast disclaimed any knowledge of the alleged tampering of MERALCOs metering installation and refused to pay the said differential billing, prompting MERALCO to give notice to Metro Concast of eventual disconnection of its electric power supply should it fail to settle and pay the said billing within a given period. On 13 July 1987, in a tactical move to ward off the threat of disconnection, Metro Concast filed Civil Case No. 54752 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, to enjoin MERALCO from disconnecting the supply of electricity to Metro Concasts plant at Bgy. LawangBato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On 28 July 1987, MERALCO filed its answer with counterclaim for the sum

of P45,836,886.78representing the alleged actual electrical consumption from June 1982 to June 1987, and for damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. RTC decision: in favor of Concast In the First Case, the trial court[13] held that Meralco failed to sufficiently establish by preponderance of evidence that Metro Concast had tampered with the secondary lead wires and forcibly pulled out the conduit pipes inside its compound. Without sufficient evidence of electricity pilferage, Meralco had no legal ground for disconnecting and discontinuing its supply of electricity to Metro Concast. Thus, judgment[14] in favor of the latter was rendered by the trial court, making the preliminary injunction permanent and ordering Meralco to pay P50,000 as and for attorneys fees. In the Second Case, the trial court[15] did not give credit to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by Meralco. Rulings of the Court of Appeals In the First Case, the Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the findings of the trial court that Meralco failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that Metro Concast had tampered with the wirings inside its compound. Thus, it upheld the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees, since no justification for the award had been indicated. In the Second Case, the CA reversed the trial court. It concluded that Meralco had presented enough evidence to establish sufficiently that Metro Concast had tampered with the metering facilities installed inside its compound. Issue: WON there was Tampering of Metering Facilities 1st case- Negative Meralco had failed to establish adequately that Metro Concast was guilty of tampering with the metering equipment installed inside the corporations compound during the period June 4, 1987 to August 19, 1987. did find the conduit pipe ajar with the meter cabinet, an indication of willful tampering. Yet, he did not make any official report on the supposed meddling with the facility. Worse, Meralco took no immediate steps to seal it so as to avoid further losses. Without explanation, Talusan had to wait for a fourth occasion before conducting further inspections. On the other hand, if Talusans first statement was true, no tampering or pilferage could have been done prior to August 4, 1987. But why is Meralco now charging alleged losses from June 4, 1987 to August 19, 1987? With such convoluted evidence, Meralco indeed failed to substantiate its allegations of tampering and pilferage against Metro Concast during the period June 4 to August 19, 1987. 2nd case- Affirmative

Indeed, a closer examination of the testimony of Meralcos principal witness reveals that there was actual tampering of the metering facilities inside the Metro Concast compound. The CA further noted that in discovering the tampering of the metering facilities, the Meralco inspection team had to open the secondary terminal cover at the potential transformer to be able to inspect the secondary current leads inside the conduits x x x.[23] The bare portions found on the secondary leads provided the means for stealing electric current and preventing the meter from fully registering the actual consumption of Metro Concast. In turn, this fact translated into losses on the part of Meralco. The Court also finds no reversible error in the CAs ruling that Metro Concast should bear the responsibility for the tampering of the facilities within its compound, which was totally under its supervision and control.[24]Being within its control, any resultant breach in the integrity of the equipment is indeed attributable to it. Besides, the Meralco inspection was done in the presence of the officers of Metro Concast, specifically Willy Salas, to whom the irregularities were pointed out upon discovery. Being in the employ of Metro Concast, he could have been presented by the corporation to rebut Partos testimony. The fact that he was not presented only shows that he had really nothing to say to controvert the evidence presented by Meralco. 10. GMA Network & Rey Vidal vs. Jesus Bustos MD GR 146846 October 17, 2006 FACTS: A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey Vidal. The issue started from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the physicians licensure examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations. As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof the allegations of the unsuccessful examiners that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and for all. Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage showing physicians wearing black armbands. Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said report was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added that, the showing of the unrelated old footage was done purposely so as to make a forceful impact on their audience making it appear that other

doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued that the same was but a privileged communication. ISSUE: 1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication 2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the used of video footage were libelous HELD: 1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within the protected ambit of privileged communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by respondents for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern. Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.The news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter. 2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged communication. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part of the petitioners. Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying charactergenerated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not nevertheless, change the legal situation insofar as the

privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. In view of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 2nd Batch 1. Republic vs. De los Angeles

Facts: Plaintiff sought annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the defendants over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. It was alleged that Hacienda Calatagan subdivision caused the survey and preparation of a composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from 9,652,583 hectares to 12,000 hectares, thru alleged survey error. Plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of such areas in excess (supposedly outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan) and for which fishpond permits were already issued in favor of bona fide applicants (Tolentino and 22 others); for damages in the sum of P500,000.00, and for a restraining order to enjoin defendants from exercising further acts of ownership. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, annulling the subdivision titles of Dizon (purchased the land from Ayala) and some others others being portions of the foreshore, beach or navigable water itself hence not capable of registration.Dizons were also ordered to vacate the area and pay Tolentino, jointly and severally compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360, until he is placed in possession thereof.that the areas in dispute were . . . The SC affirmed the lower courts decision with some modification that "there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land" and that, accordingly, they "cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their" Soon after, the case was returned to CFI-Batangas. Republic and the Intervenors, filed a motion for the corresponding issuance of writ of execution which Judge Delos Angeles denied (solidary liability was extinguished), thus the present action for certiorari and mandamusto recover moral, actual and exemplary damages, the sum of P80,000, for having been deprived of the use and possession of the portions of the territorial waters above referred to, and P100,000, "for having unduly prolonged this litigation" by resorting to technical devices "to prevent the enforcement of the final decision against them." ISSUE: WON the other defendants liability was also extinguished when the solidary liability of the Dizons were extinguished. WON petitioners are entitled to moral, actual and exemplary damages.

HELD: Negative Dizons, as possessors in good faith, were and are entitled by law to retain the property in question, until the indemnity due to them is paid. In other words, they were never under obligation to pay damages to Tolentino either jointly or solidarily, and, hence, there was no solidary obligation on their part that could have been remitted. These claims for damages cannot be upheld: the first, for P80,000, because the damages resulting from said deprivation of use and possession have already been adjudicated in the decision in question; and the second, for P100,000, because the undue delay was mainly due to the action of the lower court. Besides, an action for certiorari and mandamus, before this Court, is not a proceeding suitable for the determination of the latter damages. 2. Grand Union Supermarket vs. Espino

Espino objected, saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for theP3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5 billand said it was a fine. Espino and wife objected andsaid that he was not a common criminal. Fandino said itwas a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers.People started milling around and stared at Espino. Hewas directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for thefile. All the time the people were staring at him. He wastotally embarrassed. - After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. Hethought about going back that night to throw stones atthe supermarket; but decided to file a case. The CFIdismissed. CA awarded him damages. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliationhe experienced at the supermarket HELD YES- The false accusation charged against the privaterespondent after detaining and interrogating him by theuniformed guards and the mode and manner in whichhe was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon hima fine, threatening to call the police and in the presenceand hearing of many people at the Supermarket whichbrought and caused him humiliation andembarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitionersliable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relationto Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitionerswilfullycaused loss or injury to private respondent in a mannerthat was contrary to morals, good customs or publicpolicy. Everyone must respect the dignity,personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighboursand other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And onemust act with justice, give everyone his due andobserve honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code). - While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in orderthat moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated orexemplary damages may be adjudicated, theassessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,is left to the discretion of the court, according to thecircumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). The whole incident that befell respondent had ariseninsuch a manner that was created unwittingly by his ownact of forgetting to pay for the file. It was hisforgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for itthat started the chain of events which led to hisembarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing himmental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed tothe occurrence of his injury or loss and suchcontributory negligence is a factor which may reducethe damages that private respondent may recover (Art.2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many peoplewere present and they saw and heard the ensuinginterrogation and altercation appears to be simply amatter of coincidence in a supermarket which is apublic place and the crowd of onlookers, hearersorbystanders was not deliberately sought or called bymanagement to witness private respondent'spredicament. The Court does not believe that privaterespondent was intentionally paraded in order tohumiliate or embarrass him because petitioner'sbusiness depended for its success and patronage thegood will of the buying public which can

Facts: Engr. Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P.Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor &Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager,incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honourablydischarged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United Statesfor six months; member of the Philippine VeteransLegion; author of articles published in the ManilaSunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of thelate Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy, Washington.One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their 2 daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (ownedby Grand Union) in Makati. While his wife was shoppingfor groceries, he went around the store and found acylindrical rat-tail file that he had wanted to buy forhis hobby. Because it was small, he didnt put it in thegrocery cart because it might fall and get lost. Heinstead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he andhis wife ran into his aunts maid. While they weretalking he stuck the file in his breast pocket, with agood part of the merchandise exposed. He paid for the items in his wifes cart; but he forgotabout the file in his pocket. On their way out, the guardstopped him and told him he hadnt paid for the file. Heapologized and said he had forgotten. He startedtowards the cashier to pay; but the guard stopped himand said they were to go to the back of thesupermarket. There, a report was made, where Espinosaid that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocketwhile talking to the maid and his wife. He was thenbrought to the front of the grocery, near the cashierstoa Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am and the manypeople were at the store. Fandino read the report and remarked: Ano,nakawannamanito. Espino said he was going to pay for it.Fandino replied: That is all they say, the people whomwecause not paying for the goods say . . . They allintended to pay for the things that are found to them.

only bepreserved and promoted by good public relations. Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moraldamages = P5k; attys fees = P2k. no exemplarydamages 3. Patricio vs. Hon. Oscar Liveste

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter. Pursuant to Art.21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the complainant. In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, although such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right. 4. Geluz vs. CA

Facts: Patricio was an ordained Catholic priest and appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. On 16 May 1976, 10PM, while a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, Patricio together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. Criminal complaint for "Slander by Deed was flied by petitioner with the MTC-Pilar, Capiz, but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by petitioner with the court a quo which ruled in his favourholding Bacalocosliable for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. The Court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff the damages as follows: a) Moral damages of P10,000.00 b) Exemplary damages, P1,000.00 and c) Attorney's fees, P2,000.00. Respondent filed MR which the Court granted, particularly noting that there was indeed no showing of compensatory damages being proved. The Court reconsidered its decision to conform that moral and exemplary damages, in order to merit, the plaintiff ought to have proven actual or compensatory damages. Issue: WON Patricio is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Held: Affirmative There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

Facts: Nita Villanueva had abortion for 3 times with the aid of Dr. Geluz. One in 1950, before they were legally married with the plaintiff (who gave his consent), the other 2 abortions were after the marriage. Plaintiff filed a case for damages after the last abortion of their 2months old fetus.

The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC. Issue: WON award for damages was proper. Held: Negative Fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. (1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its prenatal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro natohabetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. (2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the speshominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection. Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation. "The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and consequently is not born in the

contemplation of law." 5. Carandang vs. Santiago Facts: At CFI-Batangas, Valenton was convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against Carandang. Carandangfiled a civil case in CFI-Manila to recover actual and moral damages for the injuries sustained. After the defendants submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case in CA. The Judge Santiago ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. Issue: WON the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not. Held: Article 33 of the new Civil Code:In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary generic sense because there are no specific provisions in the RPC. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical sense. "Physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death. The respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.

TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 3rd Batch 1. AC Enterprise vs. Fabrelle Properties Corp

Facts: Petitioner ownsthe Feliza Building which issituated at the rear of the Frabelle Condominium Iwhich is owned by respondent. Feliza has 36 exhaustof blowers from air-conditioning units on its buildingwhich produce a continuous, intense and unbearablenoise and hot air blasts directed towards the rear of Frabelle Condominium. Respondent wrote requests topetitioner to abate the nuisance but which wasignored by the latter. Frabelle went filed a complaintbefore the Pollution Adjudication Board. Pending thedecision on the complaint, respondent requestedoffice of the Makati Mayor to cancel petitionersbusiness permit. The complaint was directed to theNCR Environmental management Bureau and it ruledthat there the exhaust on the blowers were not thesole factor in the noise pollution. Unsatisfied with theresolution, respondent filed a complaint for theabatement of nuisance with a prayer for the issuanceof preliminary and permanent injunction before thetrial court of Malabon City. It ruled that there is asufficient cause of action for respondent to file acomplaint and it ruled in the latters favor. Court of Appeals ruled that respondent has the right to abatethe nuisance to protect his property and proprietaryrights against business losses. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action and RTC has the jurisdiction over the case. Held: The Court held that a simple suit for abatementof nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of theRTC where it is the one which has the right to declarewhether a thing is a nuisance as under Article 694 of the Civil Code. More so, having suffered from thenuisance, respondent has a cause of action where itmay institute an action to abate it as under Article 705and 706. There is cause of action if there is a right infavor one party and an obligation not to violate thatright for the other and there is a breach of thatobligation. LGUs are not vested with the power todeclare a thing a nuisance. PETITION DENIED 2. Limanch-O Hotel and Leasing Corp vs. City of Olongapo

The City then filed a motion for reconsideration but pending resolution of said motion it also filed criminal complaint against Dado for theft of electric current punished under PD 410 and for disengaging and tampering with his electric meters potential link thereby resulting in zero-zero power consumption in violation of City Ordinance 23, Series of 1989 and PD 401. After preliminary investigation however, the City Prosecutor dismissed the charges. Eventually the Secretary of Justice sustained this finding and also dismissed the charges although it initially directed the filing of an Information for theft of electricity. This ruling of the DOJ dismissing the charges was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) and ultimately by the Supreme Court (SC). Then it was Dado and LHL who now sued the City for having filed malicious and unfounded charges of theft of electricity against them. Dado claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation while LHL suffered loss of business goodwill, financial reverses and injured reputation. The said complaint of Dado and LHL was however dismissed by the RTC upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the City. This was affirmed by the CA. Both courts found that Dado and LHL failed to prove that the City instituted the criminal complaint for theft of electricity against them maliciously and without probable cause. Issues: Were the RTC and the CA correct? Yes. The burden in suits for malicious prosecution is being able to prove the complainants deliberate initiation of a criminal action knowing the charge to be false and groundless. Here the City did not concoct out of thin air the criminal charge of theft of electricity. It filed the case based on the results of an investigation carried out at Dados premises which indicated a tampering of the electric meter. The City did not conjure the charge with the intention of vexing Dado and LHL. It acted within its right to bring up the result of its investigation to the authorities for evaluation and resolution. The fact that the DOJ found no probable cause and that such finding was sustained by the SC does not mean that a case of malicious prosecution already exists against the City. The SC merely determined that the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion. Such finding does not amount to a judicial determination of lack of probable cause. The test should be whether sufficient facts exist which show that, in bringing the criminal action, complainant acted without probable cause which is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probably guilty of the crime or wrongdoing. Here the fact that the filing of the complaint was prompted by the result of an investigation shows that the City had reasonable ground to believe that a crime had probably been committed. Finally no evidence was shown that there was bad blood between the City and Dado and LHL prior to the filing of the case which circumstance if present could

Facts: Sometime in 1993, after obtaining a search warrant, the City of Olongapo assessed Dado and LHL unregistered electricity consumption from November 1988 to February 1993 in the amount of P9,364,276.50 with a threat to cut off the electric supply if he did not settle the amount. The City mayor then also called for the boycott of Dados business after he was branded an electricity thief. The Regional Trial Court however upon petition of Dado rendered a decision in the latters favor enjoining the City from collecting the deficiency amount and from cutting off the power supply.

justify a malicious motive in filing the charge. Resort to judicial process, by itself, is not an evidence of ill will which would automatically make complainant liable for malicious prosecution. Otherwise peaceful recourse to the courts will be greatly discouraged and the exercise of ones right to litigate would become meaningless and empty. The fact that the City branded Dado and LHL as thieves, asked the people not to patronize their business and had been overly zealous in pursuing the criminal complaint, are not the legal malice contemplated in suits for malicious prosecution. The determining factor is evil motive in bringing the action, not the acts exhibited by complainant after the case has been filed 3. Lazatin vs. Twano

(malicious attachment) is identical or is analogous to the ordinary action for malicious prosecution court did not make any finding that the said petition was maliciously sued out therefore not entitled to moral damages In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be covered, except: . . . (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff. (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered." (Art. 2208, Civil Code). without cause, the good and honest motive, which should be presumed, when a litigant goes to court for the determination of his alleged right considering the fact that defendants-appellant lees were drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant and were compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them, and taking into account the work done by said attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings, we deem it just and equitable to award at attorney's fees for defendants-appellees 4. Santos vs. Pizarro

FACTS: Angel C. Twao and Gregorio T. Castro filed a case for the recovery of P35,000 plus interest against F. L. Lazatin, et al. for their purchase from the U.S. government of 225 auto-trucks. CFI: dismissed the complaint as well as intervention CA: reversed - Twao and Castro are co-owners in the business of buying and selling surplus auto-trucks, and ordered the Lazatin to pay P10K so it was levied on his properties and was subsequently sold at the public auction where Twao and Castro were the purchasers Before the expiration of the redemption period, Lazatin deposited the redemption price Lazatin filed to recover from Twao and Castro the balance of P19,676.09 representing the proceeds of auto-trucks sold directly to the purchasers by Twao and Castro and secured a writ of attachment alleging that no security whatsoever for the payment claimed in the complaint and that they are removing or are about to remove or dispose of their property with intent to defraud their creditors and that the sheriff refused to deliver the amount deposited Lower court granted the Urgent Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment and dissolved the writ May 9, 1953: Lazatin died March 10, 1954: Gil Gotiangco was appointed and qualified as administrator of plaintiff's estate RTC: Lazatin and Central Surety and Insurance Co. solidarily liable to pay P3,000 for attorney's fees, P500 for moral damages, 6% interest and costs. CA: affirmed ISSUE: W/N Lazatin is liable for the damages HELD: YES. Affirmed with modification: elimination of moral damages Article 2197 mentions the kind of damages recoverable, among which are (1) actual or compensatory and (2) moral Article 2219 provides that moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases malice is an essential ingredient (3) malicious prosecution There is an abundance of case holding that the action to recover damages from the attachment plaintiff, for the wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment

Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiplehomicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle collision between Viron Transit busdriven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However the municipal circuit trial court was nopronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages to therespondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action citing judgment conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitioners opposedand contends that the motion to dismiss that be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminalaction is the prescription and therefore it is within the period since it was just barely two (2)years had elapse.The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners filed a reconsideration that the complaint is not basedon quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten(10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration of the petitionerswas denied by the trial court based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that thecomplaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities therefore it prescribesalready.On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it wasdismissed the same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It also failed to allege that the petition was brought within the recognizedexceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal. Petitioners insist that it should beenforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since theaction is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued fromthe finality of the judgment of conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out theaverments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years

should be reckoned from the time theaccident took place. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforcedsinceSibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of RevisedPenal Code the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no reservation tofile a separate civil case was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitionersshouldhave appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the privaterespondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of their arguments. Hence this petition.Issues:Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to theenforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer?Held:The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liability of theemployer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with controlling force to obviate thepossibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint onthe ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to beprosecuted on the merits, this does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of aseparate civil waives the other civil actions but this is merely an avoidance of multiple suits. Theaction for damages based on quasi- delict should be considered waived no occasion forpetitioners to file multiple suits against private respondets as available to them is to pursuedamages ex delicto. 5. Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. Bustos

emphasized that indemnity for loss of earning capacity and moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to fixed sum in no. 1. Theses damages may be subject to Art 2204. Art 2206 also apply to death of a passenger caused by breach of contract of common carrier. Same rules on damages are generally to be observed, whether death results from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach of contract of carriage. 6. Sanchez vs. Far East Bankard Trust Co.

The Facts It is undisputed that Kai J. Chin was the director and representative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, the Chemical International Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust [C]ompany (FEBTC), x xx. In representing the interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a director and sr. vice president of FEBTC. [Petitioner] Josephine Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of Chin. CIFL also maintained a checking account (CA# 0009-04212-1) in FEBTCs investment arm, the Far East Bank Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin was one of the authorized signatories in the said current and money market accounts. According to [respondent], [petitioner] made unauthorized withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC through the use of forged or falsified applications for cashiers checks which were deposited to her personal accounts. Once credited to her account, she withdrew the amounts and misappropriated, misapplied and converted them to her personal benefit and advantage, to the damage of FEBTC. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be a credible witness. The RTC added that the allegedly fraudulent transactions had occurred from September 1992 to June 1993, with the use of documents bearing the signatures of other officials and employees of respondent. In other words, all the questioned transactions had been approved and allowed by the bank officials concerned, despite apparent procedural infirmities.[10] Yet, only petitioner was indicted. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Granting respondents appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial courts judgment of acquittal did not preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on a quasi delict.[13] The CA held that the outcome of the criminal case, whether conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential in adjudging civil liability arising from the same act that could also be considered a quasi delict. Moreover, FEBTC did not have to reserve its right to file a separate civil action for damages, because the law had already made that reservation on respondents behalf.[14] ISSUE: was the civil liability of petitioner duly established by the evidence?

Bustos was convicted of homicide for killing Castro, 2 mitigating circumstance passion or obfuscation & voluntary surrender. The law regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or in a separate civil action items are identical in both procedures except with attorneys fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil action is instituted. Art 2204 does not warrant a complete deletion of said item of damages. Heirs are entitled to the following when death occurs as a result of a crime: indemnity for the death of the victim of the evidence 12k without need of evidence and even if mitigating circumstance is present loss of earning capacity item may be considered included in the prayer for actual damages and for other just and equitable reliefs art 2206 & 1764 moral damages mental anguish amount fixed by court. Can be recovered even by illegitimate descendants and ascendants of deceased in case of death, once heirs claim such and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it becomes the duty of the court to make the award. exemplary damages attended by one or more aggravating circumstances. Fixed by court separate from fines attorneys fees and expenses of litigation actual amount (only when separate civil action has been filed or exemplary damages are awarded) interests in proper cases

Answering in the affirmative, the CA explained that a single act or omission may produce two forms of civil liability: one is for ex delicto or that which arises from a crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for a quasi delict or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, civil liability ex delicto was foreclosed by the acquittal. Nonetheless, [a]lthough the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist due to [petitioners] acquittal, [respondents] cause of action makes out a case of quasi delict.[50] Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelieved petitioners assertions that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting that she was authorized to encash the checks, she supposedly had no like authority to deposit the proceeds to her personal bank account. The appellate court concluded that, in breach of Article 33[51] of the Civil Code, she abused the confidence reposed in her by [respondent] in the performance of her duty.[52] Thus, the CA ordered her to pay respondent the amount of P1,187,530.86 as actual damages, representing the total value of five checks paid in her name and to her account.[53] In view of the conflicting findings of the lower courts as regards the credibility of the witnesses, we invoke the time-honored rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve.[54] Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts that might affect the result of the case otherwise, the RTCs assessment of the witnesses and their testimonies in this case binds even this Court.[55] In any event, we scoured the records and, unlike the CA, we found no sufficient reason to reject the trial courts assessment. There was no arbitrariness or oversight of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence to justify a different conclusion. Moreover, the CA based its imposition of civil liability upon petitioner on her supposed abuse of her employers confidence. Granting for the sake of argument that she indeed forged the checks and misappropriated the proceeds to her personal benefit, it must be recalled that it was Kai Chins signatures that she purportedly forged; and CIFLs account that she, in effect, misappropriated. Be it remembered that respondents own documentary evidence unequivocally concurred in the assertion of petitioner that Kai Chin had given her express authority to transact CIFLs account on his behalf. Consequently, it was his, not respondents, confidence that she had exploited. In other words, the factual premises of the CA did not support its conclusion. In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was based on the fact that she had not committed the offense imputed to her. Consequently, she

cannot be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was credible, the trial court cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or negligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands unrebutted. Petition is hereby GRANTED 7. Escueta vs. Fandialan

Facts:On July 5, 1968Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna againstdefendant for damages. The complaint alleged that onJuly 2, 1952, defendant inflictedseveral physical injuries on the person of plaintiff for which he was charged with thecrime of frustrated homicide but was convicted of slight physical injuriesby the CFI of Laguna, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; that on June 20, 1956,plaintiff, having reserved his right to institute a separate civil action, filed with the CFI acomplaint to enforce defendant's civil liability under Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode but the same was dismissed , forlack of interest ; and that despite the lapseof several years and the attempt on plaintiff's part to enforce the said civil liability,defendant failed to settle the same, thus compelling plaintiff to re-file the case on July 5,1968.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. Which the courtgranted because the action has been barred by the Statute of Limitations since the casewas filed after the lapse of 16 years, that the period of prescription applicable being 4years according to Art. 1146(1) of the Civil Code. Issue:WON the Lower Court is correct in dismissing the complaint filed after 16 years on theground that the action is barred by prescription Ruling: Yes. The lower court correctly dismissed the plaintiff-appellant's civil action for damagesarising from physical injuries filed after the lapse of 16 years on the ground that theaction was already barred by the fouryear statutory limitation under Article 1146 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that actions "upon an injury to the rights of plaintiff" mustbe instituted within four years. The points of question refer to the date of accrual of plaintiff's cause of action for damages and to the applicable period of prescription.On the date of accrual of cause of action, the SC finds that the LC correctly sustaineddefendant's contention that plaintiff's cause of action for damages accrued on July 2,1952when the physical injuries were inflicted as against plaintiff's contention that hiscause of action accrued three years later on August 31, 1955 when the judgmentof conviction for physical injuries against defe ndant as accused in the criminal casebecame final.Under Article 33 of the Civil Code,even without such reservation, he could prosecute hiscivil action for damages from thephysical injuries separately and independently of thecriminal action and would require only a prepondera nce of evidence to support hisaction.Plaintiff's civil action for damages does not fall under that category of civil actions basedupon a criminal offense which are suspended to await the outcome of the criminal caseunder Rule 111, section 3 of the Rules of Court.

Being a case of physical injuries underArticle 33 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs civil action for damages did not arise from nordepend upon the result of the criminal action but from defendant's act of infliction of physical injuries. Hence, plaintiff's cause of action clearly accrued from July 2, 1952 thedate that the physical injuries were inflicted on him. As of that date, he had the right tofile and maintain his civil action for damages and the period of prescription started torun.On the applicable period of prescription, the SC held that the LC correctly ruled that theapplicable prescriptive period is four years under Article 1146 (1) of the Civil Code asagainst plaintiff's contention that it should be ten years under Article 1144 (3) whichprovides for such ten-year prescriptive for actions based "upon a judgment." Plaintiffs civil suit for damages arising from physical injuries is clearly one based upon aninjury to his rights, for which Article 1146 (1) provides a prescriptive period of four years.Plaintiff's contention that his prescriptive period should be ten years based upon the judgment of defendant's conviction for physical inju ries in the criminal case isuntenable. No civil liability was adjudged in the criminal case since plaintiff expresslyreserved the right of filing a separate civil action. Hence, he had no standing in thecriminal action as an offended party and the verdict of conviction excluded anycivilliability. 8. Dulay vs. CA

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between BenignoTorzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which BenignoTorzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against BenignoTorzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on

crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. Issues: (1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code; (2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and (3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code. Held: (1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Wellentrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. (2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies. (3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. 9. Castillo vs. Castillo

a). The private properties of Ysidro Castillo consisting ill 38 parcels described in the project of partition shall be partitioned in the proportion of 1/9 to each of the children, i.e., 1/9 to plaintiff; b). The four (4) parcel of land share of the children in the conjugal properties as set forth in the project of partition shall be also partitioned in the same proportion; c). The seven (7) parcels of land under usufruct of Enriqueta shall also be partitioned in the same proportion but subject to said usufruct. d). The share in the property described in Exh. Plaintiff 2 shall be partitioned in the proportion of 1/36 to each of the children and 1/4 unto Enriqueta Castillo

the Court grants the partition as to the other in the proportion outlined in par. (h) below; e). The property described in Exh. Plaintiff 3, 7, 8 and 9 shah be partitioned in the proportion of to Enriqueta and 1/18 to each of the 9 children; f). The property in Tagaytay City, exh. Plaintiff 63, shall be partitioned among the 9 children in the proportion of 1/9 each; g). The partition of the properties in the names of defendants (with the exception of Enriqueta) i.e., these in Exhs. 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 25, 26, 62, 56, 57, 58, 22, 59, 60, 61, 52, 53, 54, and 55 is denied; h). h). The properties described in the remaining of Exh. Plaintiff 2 and those in Exhs. 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 40, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78 and 78-A are ordered to be partitioned, giving unto plaintiff a 6/100ths undivided share in the same; i). The parties are given 30 days from notice to arrive at an amicable partition under the proportions set forth above of the properties whose partition is decreed, should they fail to do so, the Court orders commissioners of partition to be appointed to proceed accordingly 1. From and after the date of the filing of the complaint and until partition shall have been terminated, all the income on the properties be partitioned shall he also partitioned in the proportion already stated: 2. The stock of plaintiff in the Tiaong Rural Bank is ordered cancelled and placed in the name of EnriquetaVda. de Castillo; 3. The counterclaims are dismissed. 4. No pronouncement as to costs except the costs of partition which shall be borne by all in proportion to the share of each. We agree with the above ruling of the lower court because, as pointed out by defendants-appellants, Enriqueta was the sole debtor of the loan, the use of the collaterals not being authorized by the court or the children, and as such should also be the sole benefactor thereof In disposing previously defendants-appellants' second assignment of error in relation to the properties under Exhibits 7, 8 and 9, We have ruled that from the total investment of P466,760.00 should be deducted the amount of P20,260.00 representing the investments made in the acquisition of the properties under Exhibits 7, 8 and 9, leaving a balance of P446,500.00. From this balance of P446,500.00 must be deducted the personal investments of Enriqueta in the sum of P153,591.69 as accepted by the lower court, giving a balance of P292,908.31 which should be divided by 9 (there being 9 children) making a quotient of P32,565.35, which is 7/100ths, more or less, of the aggregate total, as the share of each of the 9 children, including plaintiffappellant Zenaida K. Castillo. As a result thereof, We reject plaintiffs-appellants' claim of 9/100ths and affirm the lower Court's disposition of 7/100ths in its order of February 4, 1961. With respect to the third classification of properties which are those acquired by the brothers and sisters of plaintiff-appellant Zenaida Castillo after the death of their father Ysidro Castillo and which plaintiff-appellant claims the court a quo erred in not finding that the income and the fruits of the common properties were used in the acquisition of those properties in the names of defendants-appellants (with the exception of EnriquetaVda. de Castillo) and in consequently denying

the partition of the same, We are in full agreement with the disposition by the trial court and its rationale stated thus: II ANow, however, the Court believes that it should eliminate from the right of plaintiff to demand partition, the properties acquired not by her mother but by her brothers and sisters, Horacio, Crispin, Ysidro, Jr., Lourdes, Nita, Alice and Ernesto, for the reason that there is no proof at all that the moneys with which they had acquired said properties now claimed as common by plaintiff after the death of their father, had been so acquired with fruits of the common properties to all of them adjudicated in the project of partition inasmuch that they had made use of the share of plaintiff in said fruits; it is true that there is in the evidence an indication that the mother, Enriqueta, had made Dr. Horacio Castillo her alter ego in her de facto administration after the death of her husband and even after the approval of the project of partition; but the evidence points to the effect just the same that Dr. Horacio was only such alter ego and no more and that his mother was the one that ultimately gathered the harvest; now since this is the evidence, it cannot be said with reason that plaintiff has proved that her share in the fruits of the common properties had been used by her brothers and sisters in their acquisition of these questioned properties; if as she claims in her counsel's memorandum, said brothers and sisters were in no financial position to buy said properties that alone while suspicious is no proof that they had used her money; the result will be to discard the right to partition the properties described in Exhs. 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 25, 26, 62, 56, 57, 58, 22, 59, 60, 61, 52, 53, 54, and 55." (Decision, pp. 104-105, Record on Appeal). Ruling on the same point raised in plaintiffs- appellants' motion for reconsideration, the lower court was correct in declaring that ... the fact that Dr. Horacio Castillo was an alter ego of the mother Enriqueta is no proof that he had used the money coming from the fruits of his own purposes; the natural presumption should be that the money coming from the fruits went to the principal and not to the agent; this will relieve Horacio; with respect to the brothers and sisters neither is there any proof at all that the money coming from the fruits of the properties are or were being used to enrich said brothers and sisters; mere suspicion cannot take the place of evidence; the Court does not agree that the situation of Dr. Horacio and his brothers and sisters is the same as that of Enriqueta, for the reason that with respect to Enriqueta there is definite proof and it is admitted by her that she had been in administration of the common property even after the closing of the probate case. (Order of February 4, 1961, p. 129, Record on Appeal). For the same reasons that We reject plaintiffsappellants' second assignment of error, We find no merit to her third assignment of error. Her claim that the investments in the Tiaong Rural Bank of defendants excepting her mother Enriqueta, including the investment of P20,000.00 in the name of plaintiffappellant Zenaida having an aggregate value of P318,950.00 were made with the fruits and income of the common properties, is not supported by factual evidence; at most, they are simply suspicions which, however, do not constitute proof. Circumstantial evidence showing gross disparity in their income and

investments as well as their refusal to submit their respective income tax returns do not substantially support plaintiffs-appellants' contentions for it is her duty to establish her allegations with preponderance of evidence based on clear, competent and cogent proofs which she failed to discharge in the case at bar. As regards the P20,000.00 shares of stock subscribed by defendant- appellant Enriqueta K. Vda. de Castillo for plaintiff-appellant 'Zenaida K. Castillo in the Tiaong Rural Bank, without the knowledge of the latter, the lower court disposed of it, saying: "There is no need to debate on the same since plaintiff is willing to have her share subscribed without her knowledge, surrendered unto Enriqueta," (Decision, p. 109, Record on Appeal) and in the dispositive portion of the decision ordered "2.The stock of plaintiff in the Tiaong Rural Bank is ordered cancelled and placed in the name of EnriquetaVda. de Castillo;" (Decision, p. 11 5, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff-appellant in her Brief stated that she was willing to have these stocks cancelled and placed in her mother's name but this manifestation was made under the belief and presumption that all properties and investments, including this P20,000.00 stock, acquired with the fruits of the common properties, would be partitioned equally among the 9 children. This is manifest from her evidence and pleadings and such willingness on her part would not in any reasonable manner be taken as an intention on her part to waive her rights to said stock (Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 25). In other words, she contends that her willingness to surrender the stocks was conditional and not absolute, to which We agree. We note that in plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibit No. 122 listing the stockholders of the Tiaong Rural Bank as of September 30, 1960, there are also subscribed shares in the same amount of P20,000.00 in the name of Alicia K. Castillo, another P20,000.00 in the name of Lourdes K. Castillo, and another P20,000.00 in the name of Beatriz K. Castillo, all sisters of the plaintiff-appellant Zenaida K. Castillo. 'There is strong and cogent reason to conclude that Enriqueta K. Vda. de Castillo, the mother, intended her children Alicia, Lourdes, Beatriz and Zenaida to be the beneficiary of these stocks but with respect to Zenaida, Enriqueta has now adopted a volte face stance because of the complaint filed by Zenaida. Since there is no unequivocal and categorical waiver of her rights to said stocks, We rule that the same be maintained in her name, just as the shares of Alicia, Lourdes and Beatriz are recognized in their respective names. Defendants-appellants under their third assignment of error maintain that the lower court erred when it denied the counterclaims of defendants-appellants. We are in full agreement with the ruling laid down by the lower court that absent any showing that the complaint was malicious and Chat in fact said court found the complaint meritorious to a reasonable extent, damages may not be claimed by defendants-appellants. The lower court ruled correcting when it said: III. Those of the brothers and sisters hardly need any discussion; they refer to moral damages of defendants Beatriz, (answer, p. 32), Crispin (Answer, p. 62), Horacio, Lourdes, Leonor, Alicia, Ysidro, Jr. and

Ernesto, (Answer, p. 35) but there is no showing that the complaint was malicious, in fact the court has found it meritorious to a reasonable extent; as to the counterclaims of the mother, Enriqueta, while it must be admitted that this case is peculiar in that it is one filed by a daughter against her own mother, that alone does not justify any counterclaim, specifically for the exemplary damages and moral damages sought to be collected since the complaint as has been said has been found to have some merit; as to the counterclaim for expenses for Zenaida's education, living maintenance, medical expenses, vacation to Hongkong and Japan for her health the court does not see that they are proper items for counterclaim; it does not appear that they were loaned moneys from which Enriqueta had expected to be repaid; on the contrary to an indications they were spent if truly all of them were, as part of the obligation she believed herself bound to perform for her daughter; at least that is the law that the parent should support the child; as to the counterclaim for the stay of Zenaida in the apartment in Pennsylvania, there is no proof either other than the mother's uncorroborated testimony that Zenaida had agreed to pay for her stay; to all indications, once again, she was allowed to stay because she is her own child, apart from the finding already made by the Court that virtually, Zenaida was a co-owner and could therefore stay without paying; as to the counterclaim for damages allegedly suffered because Zenaida cancelled the authority by her previously given unto her mother to give their properties in security for her mother's overdraft, the Court accepts Zenaida's contention that it was her right and that being the case, the cancellation and its effect was damnumabsqueinjuria as to the counterclaim for the share of Zenaida in the P60,000.00 allegedly paid by the mother unto the creditors of the intestate, and which seeks to impose upon Zenaida the payment of that share in the sum of P6,666.00, the Court once again will have to accept her contention that in the very project of partition presented by her in Special Proceeding No. 4211, Enriqueta manifested that there were no more debts; (Page 1, Project of Partition, Exh. Plff. 1); and her testimony that she had paid them after the closing of the intestate neither is clear and convincing: at any rate, while it may have been true that she did really pay the RFC after the closing of the intestate, as can be seen in Exh. Def. 4, the bank book of the RFC and her total debt therein satisfied after that was P17,452-53 so that 1/9 of it would be P1,939.17 and this should be shouldered by Zenaida, it should be remembered that the Court already had adjudicated unto Enriqueta the worth of all her borrowings in the total sum of P153,591,69, so that she no longer should be allowed once again to recover that from the children; ... Indeed, the right of plaintiff-appellant Zenaida Castillo to demand partition is indisputable, such right being embodied in paragraph 1, Article 494 of the New Civil Code which provides thus: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

The finding of the trial court that the firing of the complaint in the case at bar was not malicious is a finding of fact which is binding and conclusive upon Us, thereby negating any award of damages against plaintiffs-appellants, following the ruling that it is not a sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate (Koster Inc. vs. Zulueta, 99 Phil. 945; Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez, L-22183, Aug. 30, 1968), and that in order that a person may be made liable to the payment of moral damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously." (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771). WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but with the modification that the stocks of plaintiff-appellant Zenaida K. Castillo in the amount of P20,000.00 in the Tiaong Rural Bank remain in her name. No pronouncement as to costs. 10. Nuguid vs. Nicdao FACTS: Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that respondent and her husband approached petitioner and asked her if they could borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of respondent to petitioner, the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00. As security for the P1,150,000.00, respondent gave petitioner open dated checks with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year, petitioner can deposit the checks. Subsequently, petitioner demanded payment of the sums above-mentioned, but respondent refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thereafter, petitioner deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank totaling P1,150,000.00. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds. A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the respondent. The trial court convicted the defendant. The CA reversed the decision, thus acquitting Nicdao. Petitioner now contends that the civil liability of the defendant was not extinguished by the acquittal. ISSUE: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner despite her acquittal. HELD: No. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no

civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability. TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 4th Batch 1. Bordas vs. Cana Dalla

Facts: Canadalla was charged before the City Court of Cebu, Branch III, with the offense of Serious Physical injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, for having allegedly sideswiped Bordas along M. C. Briones St., Cebu City, on May 2, l968 at about 8:40 a.m. Canadalla is driving a jeepney owned and registered in the name of Primo Tabar who is Canadalla's employer. While Criminal Case was pending, Bordas filed a separate civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana against Canadalla and the latter's employer, Primo Tabar. Canadalla filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the complaint for damages was filed without the proper reservation in the criminal action Issue: WON case for damages maybe filed without the proper reservation in the criminal action. Held: Affirmative There is no need for a reservation of right to file a separate civil action inasmuch as the civil action contemplated is not derived from the criminal liability of the accused but one based on culpa aquiliana. The confusion lies in the failure to distinguish between the civil liability arising out of criminal negligence governed by the Penal Code) on one hand, and the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict on the other, the latter being separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. It is thus clear that the plaintiff-appellant's action, being one for culpa aquiliana (Article 2176) may not be classified as a civil action arising from the criminal offense of Senceno Canadalla to be suspended "until judgment in the criminal case has been rendered. Petition is GRANTED. 2. Jarantilla vs. CA

the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. In the case under consideration, Sing participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against Jarantilla . U nder the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Sing, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt ha s not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. 3. Cabucungan vs. Curalles

FACTS Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in Iloilo City. Said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen car, was then driven by Jarantilla and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. Jarantilla wa s accordingly charged for serious physical injuries thru reckless. Sing, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt". Sing filed civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case Jarantilla alleged as defenses that the Sing had no cause of action and, , that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect. ISSUE: WON Sing can institute a separate action for civil damages based on the same act without reserving such right to institute such action in the criminal case Held: Affirmative. Sing can file a separate civil action for damages despite failure to reserve such right in the previous criminal case Settled rule is that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex qua si delicto . Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of

The complaint sets up three causes of action, but for allegedly not pleading facts sufficient to support any of them, the court ordered it dismissed on defendants' motion before answer. 1. appellants, are sisters and, together with three other sisters, "co-heirs and co-owners" of a piece of land; that having been notified on September 6, 1952, that two of their sisters, co-heirs and co-owners - Sofia Hidalgo Soria and Carmen Soria Abad - had sold their undivided shares in said land to defendant Quintin Corrales, an outsider, and wishing to be subrogated to the rights of the buyer in accordance with article 1088 of the New Civil Code, plaintiffs, on the 10th of the same month, approached the said Quintin Corrales and his wife and co-defendant Catalina V. Corrales and rendered them P600 for that purpose, but the tender was refused. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that defendants be ordered to allow them to exercise their right of legal redemption. Considering the case to be one of redemption among co-owners under article 1620 in connection with article 1623 of the New Civil Code and not that of redemption among co-heirs under article 1088 thereof, the lower court held the complaint insufficient for not containing "any allegation respecting the existence of any notice in writing by the vendor or vendee of the date of such notice if any" and "any allegation to show if the deeds of sale in favor of the defendants were registered in the Registry of Property and if there were any affidavit of the vendor or vendors to the effect that such vendor or vendors have given written notice of the sale or purchase to all possible redemptioners or in this case to the plaintiffs." We note, however, that the complaint does allege that plaintiffs were, on September 6, 1952, notified of the sale and that on the 10th of that month they made their offer to redeem. If information was desired whether the notice was in writing or that the sale was recorded in the registry of property and there was an affidavit of the vendors that written notice of the sale had been given to plaintiffs, the complaint could have been ordered amended to include those particulars. Defendants have, indeed, annexed to their motion to dismiss an affidavit to the effect that written notice of the sale was given to the other co-owners on February 25, 1952, which, if true, might, in the absence of other circumstances, make plaintiff's offer to redeem on February 6 out of time. But whether the notice of the

sale was given on February 25, as stated in the affidavit, or on September 6, as stated in the complaint, was a question of fact which could best be determined after trial on the merits or in a motion for summary judgment and not in a mere motion to dismiss, as this hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint. Moreover, the affidavit mentioned refers only to the share of Sofia Hidalgo Soria and says nothing of the share of her sister Carmen Soria Abad as to which there is nothing said therein to contradict plaintiffs' allegation that notice of sale was given on September 6. It is, therefore, our view that the complaint should not have been dismissed as to the first cause of action. 2. The second cause of action is for moral damages alleged to have been suffered by plaintiffs on account of their arrest and incarceration by reason of a false and malicious complaint filed against them in the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan by Catalina V. Corrales, one of the herein defendants, charging them with the crime of malicious mischief. But there is no allegation that plaintiffs have been acquitted. Indeed, it would appear from a certified copy of docket entries referring to the case that the same is still pending trial. Obviously, plaintiffs' second cause of action has not yet accrued. The complaint hat cause was, therefore, property dismissed as premature. 3. For a third cause of action, the complaint alleges that in January, 1950, defendants, being owners of a lot contiguous to the land here in question, constructed a building on said lot with balcony and windows less than three meters distant from said land and with roof that drains rain water into it in violation of Article 670 and 674, respectively, of the New Civil Code. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the said balcony and windows be ordered closed and the roofs constructed in such a way that rain water would not fall on plaintiffs' land. Taking the view that, with the acquisition by defendants of a share in the land in question, the easement of light, view and drainage was extinguished "by merger in the same person of the ownership of dominant and servant estates" pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code, the lower court ruled out this cause of action. This view if patently erroneous. As defendants have not become sole owners of the servient estate, for they have acquired only a part interest therein, it cannot be said that in this case ownership of the dominant and servient estates has been merged in the same person for the purposes of the article cited. Thus, commenting on the corresponding article of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 546), Manresa observes that under that article the easement is not extinguished by the acquisition of a share in property held in common. And as to the matter of drainage, Article 674 of the New Civil Code specifically provides "that the owner of a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such a manner that the rain water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his neighbor, even though the adjacent

FACTS Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of th e C i v i l Commission of the Philippines and Secretaryof theI n t e r i o r o f t h e I n s u l a r G o v e r n m e n t c o m m e n c e d a n action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos,Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco,B a r r e t t o a n d C a n s i p i t ( o w n e r s , d i r e c tors, writers,editors and administrators of a c e r t a i n n e w s p a p e r known as El Renacimiento or Muling Pagsilang) forthe purpose of recovering damages resulting from analleged libelous publication.- T h e e d i t o r i a l B i r d s o f P r e y w a s a l l e g e d t o h a v e incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of theposition which he held. The said editorial alluded to himas an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture thatgorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl thataffects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire thats u c k s t h e b l o o d o f t h e v i c t i m u n t i l h e l e a v e s i t bloodless.- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the j u d g e o f t h e C F I r e n d e r e d j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes,Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but ina subordinate position and found to have merely actedunder the direction of their superiors) liable jointly ands e v e r a l l y f o r s u s t a i n e d d a m a g e s o n a c c o u n t o f petitioners wounded feelings, men tal suffering andinjuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to theSC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors inrendering said judgment among which was that thelower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. ISSUE WON the defendants, regardless of their participation inthe commission of the actual tort, may be held jointlyand severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD: YES. Joint tortfeasors are all the persons w h o command, instigate, promote, encourage , a d v i s e , countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commissionof a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done fortheir benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for thet o r t w h i c h t h e y c o m m i t . T h e y a r e e a c h l i a b l e a s principals, to the same extent and in the same manneras if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, becausetort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basisof the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize theuniversal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not onlyindividually liable for the tort in which he participates,b u t i s a l s o j o i n t l y l i a b l e w i t h h i s t o r t f e a s o r s . T h e defendants might have been

land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the owner of the proof." (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is affirmed as to the second cause of action, but revoked with respect to the first and third causes of action, as to which the case is ordered remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Costs against the appellees 4. Worcester vs. Ocampo

sued separately for thecommission of the tort. They might have sued jointlyand severally, as they were. It is not necessary that thecooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. (In a case of assault and battery committed byv a r i o u s p e r s o n s , u n d e r t h e c o m m o n l a w , a l l a r e principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, orassists in any way the commission of a wrong. Underthe common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled,in any way the commission of a crime, was as much aprincipal as he who inflicted or committed the actualtort.- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for thetort which they commit. The person injured may sue allof them, or any number less than all. Each is liable forthe whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointlyliable for the whole damage. It is no defense for onesued alone, that the others who participated in thewrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; noris it any excuse for him that his participation in the tortwas insignificant as compared with that of the others.- The courts during the trial may find that some of thealleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort.And this is true even though they are charged jointlyand severally. However, in this case, the lower court,committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized bySection 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeablewith the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were theauthor of the same. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified.O c a m p o , K a l a w , P a l m a , A r e l l a n o , J o s e , L i c h a u c o , Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally liablefor the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santosabsolved from any liability. 5. Howpia vs. CA

Jose Escasa, a Chinese subject - and the final certificate of sale was issued to her on June 10, 1938. The amount of P490.00 paid by Altea to the Provincial Sheriff was, in turn, deposited by the later with the Clerk of Court but was later on withdraw by Hawpia. Within one year from the issuance of the final decree of registration in favor of Petra Hawpia, Altea filed in the same proceedings two petitions: one, for the reopening and review, of the decree, and another, for the issuance of an order requiring Hawpia to execute a deed of reconveyance of the lot in question in her favor. After due hearing, the Cadastral Court ordered the reopening of the decree of registration aforementioned and afterwards ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 43125 issued in the name of Hawpia, and the issuance in lieu thereof of TCT No. 20400 in the name of Altea. From this decision Hawpia appealed, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this Court (G.R. Nos. 48209 & G.R. No. L-952). Both appellate courts affirmed the decision of the lower court (Exhs. 9-A and 9-B). Sometime in 1947 Jose Escasa and Aurelia Altea, who had been living together as husband and wife for 16 years and had begotten seven children, lived separately for a period of four months due to jealousy. During this period Escasa filed an action against Altea in the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Civil Case No. 476) to compel her to reconvey the 8 parcels of land acquired by them between 19371946, including Lot No. 8610, all in the name of Altea, in favor of their six living children Norberto, Gloria, Jose, Jr., Corazon, Fely and Zenaida, who were joined as party defendants. The complaint alleged the following among other things: Shortly after Altea had filed her answer, the parties were reconciled and lived together again. Two years after the filing of the complaint, however, a certain Atty. De Guzman prepared for Altea's signature a petition in Tagalog entitled: "Salaysay sa Juzgado" which the latter signed in the belief - as she was assured - that it was necessary to avoid further litigation. Filed in court on April 26, 1949, the document read as follows: Humaharap ngayong ang demandada sa asuntong ito at sa Kagalanggalang ng Juzgado ay magsaysay: 1. Na tutoo at tinatanggap niya ang lahat at bawat isa sa anim na pangkat na bumubuo ng demanda laban sa akin ni Jose Escasa, na may fecha 8 de Mayo, 1947. 2. Na pumapayag ng kusang loob na nombrahang Tutor si Jose Escasa ng mga bienes na walong (8) parcela na binabanggit sa nasabing demanda, na pagaari ng aming mga anak na ang ngalan ay nababanggit na sa pangkat No. 2 ng naulit na demanda. 3. Na pumapayag nasentenciahan o pasiyahan ng Kagalanggalang na Juzgado ang asuntong ito susog sa kahilingan sa demanda at sa hinaharap na kasagutan, na walang costas. (Sgd) AURELIA ALTEA Demandada As a consequence, judgment was rendered by the Court on May 11, 1949 declaring, that the 8 lots, including Lot No. 8610, were the property in common and pro-indiviso of the seven minor children abovenamed, and should be registered in their names, and ordering Escasa to institute within 30 days the necessary guardianship proceedings. Upon being informed by her counsel - who happened to come

On August 2, 1932 Petra Hawpia purchased Lot No. 8610 of the Cadastral Survey of Atimonan, Tayabas (now Quezon) from Valeriano Neala for the sum of P490.00. The contract provided that Neala could repurchase the property within the period of ten years for the same amount. Subsequently, Hawpia filed an application with the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the registration of said lot in her name (Cadastral Proceedings No. 63, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1019). In a decision rendered on December 8, 1937, the Court adjudicated the property to her, and after the decree of registration had become final, Original Certificate of Title No. 43125 in her name was issued by the Register of Deeds of Tayabas. Subsequently, in Civil Case No. 1125 of the then Justice of the Peace Court of Atimonan, Quezon, Neala was sentenced to pay the sum of P98.36 to Jose Escasa, alias Sia Chin Ting. Having failed to satisfy the judgment, a writ of execution was issued, and pursuant thereto Neala's right to repurchase Lot No. 8610 was levied upon and sold at public auction by the Provincial Sheriff of Quezon for the sum of P490.00 on May 29, 1937 to Aurelia Altea - the Filipina common-law wife of

across the record of Civil Case No. 4763 - that Altea was merely a dummy of Escasa in the purchase of lot 8610, Petra Hawpia and her husband, Sergio Tan See, a naturalized Filipino citizen, filed on October 20, 1951 the present action (Civil Case No. 5271) in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province against Altea and Escasa, praying for the (1) cancellation of TCT No. 20400 and (2) for the reconveyance to them of Lot No. 8610. As ground for the action they alleged that the purchase at the auction sale of said lot by Escasa, through his common-law wife, was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation and was therefore null and void, it being furthermore violative of the provisions of C.A. No. 108, as amended by C.A. No. 421 and R.A. 134 in relation to Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution. In their answer the defendants set up the affirmative defenses of prescription and the indefeasibility of their Torrens title, and pleaded a counterclaim for damages, legitimate expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of P17,000.00. After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment on February 24, 1953 dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs, as well as defendants counterclaim, for lack of merit. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 18, 1962 the Court of Appeals rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of which is as follows: With all these circumstances, it can easily be gleaned that, indeed, plaintiffs-appellants' purpose in filing the present action was merely to harass herein defendantsappellants. As a consequence, defendants incurred not only actual but also moral damages, aside from attorney's fees. We, therefore, sentence plaintiffsappellants to pay defendants-appellants the sum of P13,000.00, as actual and moral damages and the further sum of P4,000.00 as attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs appellants. In support of her appeal, petitioner raises the following questions: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that Lot No. 8610 of the Cadastral Survey of Atimonan province of Quezon, was bought by Jose Escasa and that the latter being then a Chinese citizen, the transaction was null and void; (2) that, as a consequence, it also erred in not ordering Jose Escasa, Aurelia Altea and their children to reconvey said lot to petitioner; and lastly, that the Court of Appeals erred in sentencing petitioner to pay damages to Aurelia Altea. Upon the facts stated heretofore, We find the present appeal to be without merit. Petitioner's theory is that while Aurelia Altea appeared to be the highest bidder at the auction sale of lot 8610, the real purchaser was her common-law husband Jose Escasa, and that whatever donation is claimed to have been intended in favor of their children was a mere subterfuge to go around the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural lands by aliens. The Court of Appeals, however, held - and with this we agree - that petitioner utterly failed to prove this contention by substantial evidence. Moreover, as stated above, as a result of the petitions, filed by Aurelia Altea in Cadastral Case No. 63, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1019, the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province reopened the registration proceedings and, after hearing the parties, ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 43125 issued in the

name of petitioner Petra Hawpia and ordered the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a transfer certificate of title over the same property in favor of Aurelia Altea, to whom in fact Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20400 was thereafter issued. From said decision petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals where the decision was affirmed. Not yet satisfied, petitioner appealed to Us, but we likewise affirmed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. It is, therefore, inevitable that we must accept the fact that the lot already referred to was purchased by and belonged to Aurelia Altea, although it was subsequently transferred to her children. In connection with the portion of the judgment under review sentencing herein petitioner to pay damages, it appears that aside from the case at bar, petitioner, with blind persistence, had filed case after case and complaint after complaint against Aurelia Altea and her common-law husband. Among others, she filed the following cases against them: Criminal Case No. 11153 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon; Criminal Case No. 5836 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon; Criminal Case No. 5898 of the same Court; Criminal Case No. 121 of the Municipal Court of Atimonan, Quezon Province; Criminal Case No. 1125 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon; Criminal Case No. 11025 of the same Court, later on elevated to the Court of Appeals as G.R. No. 12844-R. Not a single case, among those enumerated, prospered. That petitioner harassed and embarrassed Aurelia Altea in particular and thereby made her suffer actual damages and moral suffering and anxiety is, therefore, beyond doubt. Wherefore, the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same is affirmed, with costs.

TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 5th Batch 1. People vs. Bondoc

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases. (1) (2) (3) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; Adultery or concubinage; Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; Illegal search; Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; Malicious prosecution; Acts mentioned in article 309; Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages. The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

But in those cases were awarded damages, because it was due indedublamente Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes the award of moral damages in the crimes of rape, kidnapping, rape, adultery or concubinage, and other lewd acts, not including this enumeration is the crime of bigamy. There is therefore legal basis for allocating here P5 damage, 000.00 above.
... The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo. The Court rules against the petitioner. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66] Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named. Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)[68] Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69] Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71] 2. Bernardo vs. NLRC

hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her Petitioner admitted making the insertion in the Capital Appropriations Request but explained that she had done so in good faith, without any intention of defrauding the company, because she intended the chair for the manager of her department, Dr. Salvador Cajilog. She claimed that what she did was made with the knowledge of Dr. Cajilog. Apparently, petitioners explanation was considered not satisfactory, because on March 18, 1989, she was given notice of the termination of her employment. Petitioner alleged that she was dismissed because she had exposed the involvement of two company officers, Conrado Baylon and Dr. Benedicto Santiago, in the rival company, Biomass Corp. of the Philippines. On appeal the NLRC, while finding petitioner liable to disciplinary action, thought that the penalty imposed by the company was too severe. Accordingly, it set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the petitioner reinstated and paid backwages for one year of P84,164.72 (P7,014.56 x 12) and attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the award or P8,416.47. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification, while private respondent Univet Agricultural filed a motion for reconsideration. On March 13, 1992, the NLRC modified its decision and deleted the award of backwages and, instead of reinstatement, simply ordered petitioner to be paid separation pay equivalent to 1/2 months pay for every year of service based on her salary at the time of dismissal, unless the company opted to reinstate her. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES. Ruling: It is sufficient for our purpose, that the action taken against her is based on the first ground (making an unauthorized intercalation in the approved requisition form), as to which there is no question that petitioner was duly heard. We agree with the finding that the insertion of an additional item in the request for purchase, after this had been approved, was a violation of company rules but it was not of such gravity as to warrant petitioners outright dismissal. On other hand, considering the offense committed, an award of backwages and order of reinstatement cannot be justified. Considering, however, that the insertion of the additional order did not cause damage to the company in the sense that the cost of the chair, even if purchased, would not make the total amount to be expended exceed the amount of budget, and that in all probability petitioner was simply motivated by a desire to curry favor with the head of her department rather than gain materially, we agree with the NLRC that outright dismissal would be out of proportion to the gravity of her offense. The question is what penalty is reasonable under the circumstances. Petitioner, while not deserving of outright dismissal as a penalty is not entitled to reinstatement either. Considering that petitioner has been in the service for twelve years and that her performance was rated excellent and superior, she is, in our opinion, entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-half months pay for every year of service, based on her

Facts: Marilyn Bernardo was employed at the Univet Agricultural Products, Inc., a division of United Laboratories, on February 14, 1977. Starting as general clerk, she rose in 1980 to the position of administrative clerk, which she held until March 18, 1989 when she was dismissed for dishonesty. It appears that in January 1989, the Manufacturing Department of the Univet Agricultural asked for two filing cabinets. Accordingly, petitioner prepared the Capital Appropriations Request (CAR) for the purchase of two filing cabinets. The request was signed by Dr. Salvador P. Cajilog, department head, and later approved by five other officers of Univet Agricultural. Before the CAR was transmitted to the purchasing department for the procurement of the office equipment, it was discovered that petitioner had included in the order the acquisition of one executive swivel chair. On February 18, 1989, the following memorandum was issued to petitioner, requiring her to explain within 48

salary at the time of dismissal from February 14, 1977 to March 18, 1989. Petitioners claim for moral damages is without merit. Not only was she guilty of misconduct, there is no showing that the company acted in bad faith or fraud or in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,[13] in dismissing petitioner. Univet Agricultural was acting in the legitimate protection of its interest in seeing to it that its employees were performing their jobs with honesty, integrity and fidelity. For the same reason there is no basis for an award of attorneys fees. Under Art. 2208(2) of the Civil Code, the award of such fees is to be justified if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the party against whom it is sought.[14] WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is MODIFIED and private respondents are ORDERED to PAY petitioner separation pay at the rate of one-half month pay for every year of service based on her salary at the time of her dismissal, for the period February 14, 1977 to March 18, 1989. 3. Quisaba vs. Sta Ine-Melale

members of a society for the protection of private interests. Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations," Quisabas complaint is grounded on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal, not on his dismissal per se, as he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages. The "right" of SIMVP to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, then SIMVP violated the following: NCC 1701 prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other NCC 21 makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy Moral damages may be recovered in acts and actions referred to in NCC 21. [NCC 2219 (10)] ORDER SET ASIDE; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 4. Globe Macklay Cable vs. CA

FACTS Quisaba was an internal auditor of SIMVP for 18 years. On January 1973, SIMVP VP Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant, but Quisaba, he refused to do so, saying that such task is inconsistent with his position. The next day, Hyde informed Quisaba of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out the instructions given. Hyde warned him that failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal. Quisaba filed a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees against SIMVP and its VP Robert Hyde. Quisaba was NOT asking for backwages nor reinstatement. Quisaba alleged that due to SIMVPs acts, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. SIMVP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI, asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC. Quisaba opposed this, and he informed the court that an NLRC representative said that NLRC has no jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of employee-employer relationship. Nonetheless, CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint involves an employee-employer relation. ISSUE & HOLDING Who has jurisdiction over the case? CFI has jurisdiction. This is a CIVIL dispute, not a labor dispute. RATIO This case is concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute, as it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and it does not involve an existing employee-employer relation within the meaning of PD 21, Sec. 2(1). Civil law consists of that mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations that exist between

10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs;

hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED 5. Tenchaves vs. Escano

Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is not valid, making the second marriage void since marriage ties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing. Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separation because Escao committed sexual infidelity because of the fact that she had children with the American.S exual infidelity of a spouse is one of the grounds for legal separation. Civil Law/Torts & Damages/ Damages for Malicious Prosecution: Malicious prosecution hasbeen expanded to include baseless civil suits which are meant to harass or humiliate adefendant, but both malice and lack of probable cause must be clearly shown to justify an awardof damages. 6. Chua vs. CA, 242 SCRA 341 the settled rule is that the law always presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. 11 In the case at bench, we find the evidence presented by the private respondent insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith. On the contrary, a careful scrutiny of the evidence leads us to take the opposite view. We are convinced that the petitioners had in fact acted in accord with the norms of good faith. 7. Safeguard Security Agency Inc. vs. Tangco, 511 SCRA 67, 78 Facts: On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. HELD: Yes. His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her nonappearance in court); that he failed to prove that

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Issues: (a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code? (b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code? (c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes? Held: The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have 8.

exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case. The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with. In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Tuates vs. Bersamin, 390 SCRA 458

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the following: (1) Decision dated April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated June 9, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845;1[1] (2) Decision

dated September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9770428 and Q-97-70429;2[2] and (3) Decision dated December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) in Criminal Cases Nos. 380130 and 38-0131.3[3] The facts are as follows: Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their conviction was affirmed in toto by the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts was enacted. In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners criminal convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners illegally constructed house and improvements, shall remain executory against them.4[4] On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC and denied due course to the petition per its Decision, dated April 30, 1999.5[5] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June 9, 1999.6[6] Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following issues: 1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;

2. That public respondent erred in holding that the civil aspect of the judgment rendered x x x shall be executory against the accused; and 3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, grossly erred in ignoring applicable laws and jurisprudence.7[7] Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime. Private respondent, however, insists that public respondents were correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was absolved and the civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that the petition should now be denied as its title to the land subject of this case has already been adjudged in its favor. 8[8] In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed and set aside. We find the petition to be meritorious. Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law Repeal Act of 1997, provides: SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997. SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts is hereby repealed. SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act. SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify, eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions relative to sanctions against professional squatters and squatting syndicates. SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. Approved, October 27, 1997.9[9]

The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical, definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated. 10[10] In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.11[11] Specially so, as in the present case where it is unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368 that: (A)ll pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.12[12] Obviously, it was the clear intent of the law to decriminalize or do away with the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question. 13[13] In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr.14[14] we implicitly recognized the unconditional repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the dismissal of the petition filed in said case, without any qualification whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.: But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.15[15]

This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No. 836816[16] was unanimously approved by the members of the Senate of the Philippines present on its third reading.17[17] The legislature considered it a major piece of legislation on the countrys anti-poverty program18[18] as it sought to confront the perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise inutile and oppressive law, and pave the way for a genuine urban housing and land reform program. Senate records reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of R.A. 8368 to decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or protect acts of squatting on somebody elses land.19[19] The law is not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners.20[20] Recourse may be had in cases of violation of their property rights, such as those provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act, penalizing professional squatters and squatting syndicates as defined therein, who commit nefarious and illegal activities21[21]; the Revised Penal Code providing for criminal prosecution in cases of Trespass to Property,22[22] Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,23[23] and similar

violations, and, cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer under the Rules of Court,24[24] as well as civil liability for Damages under the Civil Code. Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-9770429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 380130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed. WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the Decision dated April 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision dated December 16, 1996 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal of the aforementioned criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects thereof, without prejudice to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions under the prevailing laws. No costs. RA 7279 clearly defines and criminalizes the socall ed pr of ess iona l squa tter s and provides the cor re sp ond ing pena lties for such violations 9. Delos Reyes vs. CA, 285 SCRA 81

Can an action for reconveyance of real property covered by the Torrens system filed after more than thirty (30) years prosper against the holder for value? On 28 July 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, dismissed Civil Case No. 717-V-78 for recovery of possession of real property with damages filed by Arsenio delos Reyes, Felicidad, Benjamin, Salvador, Soledad (with spouse Pedro Parinao), Trinidad (with spouse Pedro General), Carlos Jr., Roberto, Rodolfo, Ricardo, Zenaida, Veronica and Mercedes, all surnamed Delos Reyes, and Felipe, Gregoria, Lucena, Virgilio and Mercedes, all surnamed Cantillon, against the spouses Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia.i[1] On 23 January l995 the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court.ii[2] Pursuing their recourse with us, petitioners seek the nullification of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners herein by imputing to the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1) in reckoning the 30-year prescriptive period of real actions as provided under Art. 1141 of the Civil Code from the date of issuance of the questioned TCT or annotation of the transaction in 1943 and not from 17 September 1962 when petitioners' mother, original owner of subject property, died or 17 July 1963 when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and

Zenaida Caia and consequently holding petitioners guilty of laches; and, (2) in not applying Arts. 1409, 1410, and 1422 of the Civil Code.iii[3] Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13,405 square meters originally owned by the spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes. On 7 July 1942 Evarista delos Reyes sold to spouses Catalina Mercado and Eulalio Pena 10,000 square meters of the property described as Lot No. 1210 of the subdivision plan of the Malinta Friar Lands Estate situated at Torres Bugallon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On 4 June 1943 the vendees were able to secure Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26184 covering not only the 10,000 square meters of land bought by them but also the remaining 3,405 square meters left unsold. In turn, the Pena spouses sold the whole property to Isaias de Guzman and Emiliana de Onon who later conveyed the same whole area to Elpidio Concepcion, Liwayway Serrano, Norberto Concepcion and Marta de Guzman. Eventually, the land was acquired by private respondents herein, Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia, on 9 July 1963 through a "Deed of Exchange." Eight (8) days later, or on l7 July l963, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42753 was issued in the name of the Caia spouses who since then exercised full ownership and possession over the property. On 3 October l978 petitioners, all heirs of Evarista delos Reyes, filed an action against respondents for reconveyance of 3,405 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. 42753 claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of their 10,000 square meters they had bought from Evarista delos Reyes. However, the case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of laches. As already adverted to, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We likewise dismiss the petition. Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists because it accrued either on 17 September 1962 when Evarista delos Reyes died, or on 17 July l963 when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and his sister Zenaida Caia. This is incorrect. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case, petitioners' cause of action accrued on 4 June l943 when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name of the entire l3,405 square meters instead of only 10,000 square meters they actually bought from Evarista delos Reyes. For it was on this date that the right of ownership of Evarista over the remaining 3,405 square meters was transgressed and from that very moment sprung the right of the owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them. But, such right is not imprescriptible. Generally, the law draws a time corridor within which to propel a suit for recovery of property. Section 44, par. (b), of RA No. 296 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides that reinvindicatory actions may be brought by the owner within thirty (30) years after he has been deprived of his property. Under Art. 1141 of the Civil Code, real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty (30) years. Thus, even if we apply the 30-year prescriptive period in accordance with the above legal provisions, petitioners' right to recover has already been effectively foreclosed by the lapse of time having been initiated only after thirty-six (36) years from the accrual of their cause of action.

Be that as it may, we hold that even these laws may not apply to the case before us in the light of PD No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree amending and codifying the laws relative to registration of property and updating Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act. When respondents Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia as fourth transferees in ownership dealt with the land in question, they were not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of their transferor. For all intents and purposes, they were innocent purchasers for value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean title, i.e., there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis pendens at the back thereof. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the title to the property. Therefore it would be the height of injustice, if not inequity, if a valid transaction transferring the subject property to them be set aside just to accommodate parties who heedlessly slept on their rights for more than a third of a century. This is not conducive but anathema to good order. Finally, petitioners' reliance on Arts. 1409, 1410 and 1422 of the Civil Code on the imprescriptibility of void and inexistent contracts is misplaced. While the action to declare a contract null and void does not prescribe, this principle is alien and malapropos to the matter before us. Moreover, the action for reconveyance has now become stale, being barred as it were, by laches. It cannot be disputed that for thirty-six (36) years petitioners and their predecessors in interest, Evarista delos Reyes most especially, never raised a restraining arm to the inclusion of the remaining 3,405 square meters of the land in the titling of the 10,000 square meters bought by the Pena spouses. The property passed through four (4) owners successively in a span of more than twenty (20) years before it went into the hands of private respondents. Surely, the rights of innocent purchasers of real property such as the Caias cannot be swamped and drowned by the remonstrations of the inert and petulant who took no care in seasonably asserting their rights of ownership over the land allegedly wrested from them through fraudulent means. In Avecilla v. Yatcoiv[4] we ruled that the only remedy of an owner who was fraudulently deprived of his land, which was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value, is to file an action for damages against the person who perpetrated the fraud within four (4) years after the discovery of the deception. Unfortunately in this case we may never know why Evarista delos Reyes chose not to go after the Pena spouses to recover what could be rightfully hers, the reason having apparently been long interred with her. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, which ordered the dismissal of the complaint of herein petitioners, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. 10. Bayani vs. Panay Electric Co. Inc. 330 SCRA 759 In March 1996, private respondent, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO), discontinued supplying electrical services to two pension houses, the Bayani Drive Inn at Calumpang, Molo, Iloilo City and the William Bayani Hotel in Mandurriao, Iloilo City, both owned by petitioner. Alleging that it had discovered theft of electricity in petitioner's business establishments, PECO filed two

complaints for violation of R.A. No. 78322 against petitioner with the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaints on August 8, 1996 and August 19, 1996, respectively. PECO appealed the dismissal to the Secretary of Justice. On October 10, 1996, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 23276 with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, for injunction and damages arising from malicious prosecution. PECO moved to dismiss the petition. Pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, petitioner, on January 20, 1997, amended his complaint to add a prayer for writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to make PECO desist from making "false imputations that plaintiff allegedly continued to commit violations" of R.A. No. 7832.3 PECO filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, but said motion was denied by the trial court in its order dated March 20, 1997. The court also denied its motion for reconsideration on August 27, 1997. On September 2, 1997, the trial court granted petitioner's request for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as follows: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issue after the plaintiff puts up a bond in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). Upon the filing of the Injunctive Bond by the plaintiff and approval of the same by the Court, the Defendant is ordered to immediately restore the electric services to the Bayani Drive Inn, Calumpang, Molo, Iloilo City and the William Bayani Hotel at Mandurriao, Iloilo City. SO ORDERED.4 Petitioner initially submitted a surety bond but later substituted a cashier's check for the surety. The trial court approved the substitution on September 10, 1997. On September 15, 1997, PECO filed its answer with counterclaim for damages for alleged injuries done to its good name and business standing. On November 17, 1997, PECO filed a petition, CAG.R. SP No. 46012, for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, praying that the appellate court declare the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1997, August 27, 1997, September 2, 1997 and September 10, 1997 null and void. PECO likewise sought the dismissal of herein petitioner's complaint in the lower court. The Secretary of Justice upheld the dismissal of the complaints for violations of R.A. No. 7832, on March 4, 1998. On October 26, 1998, respondent appellate court disposed of the petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 46012, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed orders of the public respondent dated 20 March 1997, 27 August 1997, 2 September 1997 and 10 September 1997, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint for injunction and damages filed by private respondent against petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.5 On November 12, 1998, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its resolution dated July 15, 1999.

Hence, the instant petition for review before us, with petitioner raising the following issues: I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 23276 filed by petitioner against respondent in ruling that said case is based on malicious prosecution, the element of final termination of the action resulting in acquittal is absent and therefore premature? II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders appealed from, as well as the subsequent orders dated 2 September 1997 and 10 September 1997 granting the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and admitting the cashier's check in the amount of P300,000.00 as substitute for the surety bond earlier submitted as injunctive bond? III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the period to assail the order denying the motion to dismiss filed by respondent has long expired so the latter has already lost the right to question the same and had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court when it filed its Answer with Counterclaim to join the issues raised, when it proceeded to cross-examine the witnesses of the petitioner and presented its evidence to prove his defenses and causes of action? Notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of the issues, the pertinent issues in this case now are: (1) Is Civil Case No. 23276 a case based on malicious prosecution? (2) Was Civil Case No. 23276 prematurely filed with the Regional Trial Court? Petitioner faults respondent court for finding that his complaint in Civil Case No. 23276 was one for malicious prosecution. Petitioner insists that its complaint was based on other causes of action, independent from malicious prosecution. He alleged in particular, that by summarily disconnecting electrical service to petitioner's business establishments, PECO violated Articles 196 and 217 of the Civil Code. A review of petitioner's Amended Complaint,8 however, clearly shows that petitioner's allegations deal mainly with the criminal complaints instituted by PECO against petitioner for violating R.A. No. 7832. In addition to damages, petitioner had sought a prohibitory injunction to prohibit private respondent from making "false imputations that plaintiff allegedly continued to commit violations" of R.A. No. 7832."9 What determines the nature of an action are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 10 Conformably, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in finding that petitioner's action was one based on malicious prosecution. There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime and the maliciously accused is compelled to defend himself in court. 11 While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, "the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or

probable cause." 12 The basis for a civil action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is found in Articles 19, 21, 29, 13 35, 14 of the Civil Code. The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. 15 Considering the facts in this case, we agree with the respondent appellate court that one of the elements for an action based on malicious prosecution, the element of final termination of the action resulting in an acquittal, was absent at the time petitioner filed Civil Case No. 23276. The records show that petitioner's action for injunction and damages was filed on October 10, 1996, whereas the Secretary of Justice dismissed with finality PECO's criminal complaints against herein petitioner only on March 4, 1998. Hence, Civil Case No. 23276 was prematurely filed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 46012 is AFFIRMED. This resolution, however, shall in no way prejudice re-filing of the civil case within the reglementary period.

Lines, Inc. On December 12, 1991, Feliciana Legaspi insured the goods at UCPB at insurance package amounting to P50,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, against all risks. When the vessel left port on December 12, 1991, it had thirty-four (34) passengers and assorted cargo on board. After the vessel had passed by the MandaueMactan Bridge, fire ensued in the engine room, and, despite earnest efforts of the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and destroyed the entire vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the cargoes therein. Shortly thereafter, Feliciana Legaspi filed a claimed from UCPB and received value of P60,338.00 and P110,056.00. UCPB subrogated Legaspi and filed a complaint anchored on torts against, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for 1. Actual damages in the amount of P148,500.00, which it paid to Feliciana Legaspi for the loss of the cargo, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the time of filing of this complaint until fully paid; 2. Attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and 3. Cost of suit. Issue: (1) Is petitioner liable for the loss of the goods? (2) If it is liable, what is the extent of its liability? Ruling: Having originated from an unchecked crack in the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not have been caused by force majeure. Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy.[14] Hence, fire is not considered a natural disaster or calamity. Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their ship frequently so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to force majeure, but to the negligence of those officials.[16] The law provides that a common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. The liability of a common carrier for the loss of goods may, by stipulation in the bill of lading, be limited to the value declared by the shipper. On the other hand, the liability of the insurer is determined by the actual value covered by the insurance policy and the insurance premiums paid therefor, and not necessarily by the value declared in the bill of lading. TORTS AND DAMAGES Midterm 6th Batch 1. Edgar Cokaliong Shippine Lines Inc. vs. UCPB Incurance Co. Inc. 404 SCRA 706 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is MODIFIED in the sense that petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent the sums of P14,000 andP6,500, which represent the value of the goods stated in Bills of Lading Nos. 59 and 58, respectively. No costs. 2. Tan vs. OMC Carriers Inc. 639 SCRA 471

Facts: December 11, 1991, Nestor Angelia and Zosimo Mercado shipped cargoes, amounting to P6,500.00 and P14,000.00, respectively thru Edgar Cokaliong Shipping

Petitioners: House owner

Respondents: Truck owner + driver At around 6:15am, Respondent Arambala was driving a truck with a trailer, owned by OMC. Driver noticed that the truck lost its brakes and told his companion to jump out. Both of them did. The truck rammed into the house/tailoring shop of Petitioner Leticia Tan and husband Celedonio Tan. The husband, standing at the doorway, was instantly killed. Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the owner of the truck + trailer, OMC, and Arambala, the driver. Petitioner argument: Collision was due to OMCs gross negligence in not properly maintaining the truck; And to the drivers recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck Petitioners want: OMC + driver held solidarily liable for the actual damages (i.e., damage to property, funeral expenses of the husband, and his loss of earning capacity) Moral, exemplary, and atty fees Respondent defense: Fortuitous event - slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil Issue: Are the respondents liable for damages? Held: Yes. OMC + driver solidarily liable to damages based on vicarious liability. Relied on res ipsa loquitur unusual for a truck to suddenly lose brakes - Truck rammed into house raises presumption of negligence which both failed to refute Fortuitous defense not well taken driver did not slow down or take any precautionary measure to prevent the skidding; defective brake could have been discovered if there was a more rigid inspection Disposition: for the damage house, tailoring shop, equipment: P200k

Tugade and another passenger by the name of Consuelo Estolonio.[2] Separate cases for damages, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. A-1368 and A-1384 were filed by the heirs of the two deceased before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan against Panelco and Dagupan Bus Co. and their respective drivers, Honorato Areola and Renato Quiambao. It is Civil Case No. A-1368 filed by the heirs of Henry Tugade, which is now the subject of the present petition. The Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 55) held Panelco and its driver liable, thus: As a consequence and in view of the evidence on record, the Court holds and so finds that the accident occurred due to the fault or negligence of Panelco and its driver Honorato Areola. The negligence of Panelco consists in having allowed its rover jeep which is mechanically defective, unsafe and not roadworthy to be operated on a highway. On the other hand, the defendant-driver Honorato Areola was likewise, negligent in driving a vehicle which was not roadworthy, unsafe and with a mechanical defect. Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PANELCO) and Honorato Areola are ordered to pay jointly and severally the following amounts to the heirs of Henry Tugade: 1. Death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); 2. Temperate damages in the amount of TwentyFive Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00); 3. Attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); 4. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); 5. Loss of earning capacity in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Forty Eight Pesos (P173,448.00); and 6. the costs of suit. 4. Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval 344 SCRA 76

FACTS: On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 oclock midnight, Eduardo Edm was driving a Luring Taxi along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab wasparked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger.Thereafter, the driver exectued a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. Atthis point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collidedwith the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit in the middle portion and waspushed sideward, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into thenearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, EduardoEdem, sustained injuries as a result of the incident. Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed adamage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, andits driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding p etitioner liable to respondent foractual, compensatory

3.

Tugade vs. CA 85 SCRA On June 12, 1980 at around 12:00 noon, Engr. Henry Tugade of the Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Panelco) rode in a company rover jeep together with four other employees bound from the Panelco compound in Bani to Bolinao, Pangasinan. Somewhere in Tiep, Pangasinan, a Dagupan bus that was also headed for Bolinao, began to follow the rover jeep. While the bus was trying to overtake the jeep, the latter turned turtle and caused four of its five occupants to fall out of the jeep causing the death of

and .exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and cost of suit. RULING: Yes. The Court finds that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and thedriver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. The fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is his own making and this should not relieve him of liability. From petitioner Castros testimonial admissions, it is established that he was driving at a speed faster than 50km/hr because itwas a downhill slope coming from the Rosario Bridge. But as he allegedly stepped on the brake, it lockedcausing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently hit the taxicab. It is said thatmalfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. Even assuming arguendo that loss of brakes is anact of God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering the Nissandriver liable for the ensuing damages As mentioned earlier, the driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U turns are not generallyadvisable particularly on major streets. Obviously, there was a lack of foresight on his part, making himcontributorily liable. Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondents taxi, the award of 47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards fordamages are deleted for lack of merit. 5. Pagdanganan vs. Galleta 30 SCRA 426

To the question May the heirs of a deceased tenant be dispossessed by the landholder, who is a civil law lessee of the owner, upon the ground that said landholder-lessee wants to personally cultivate the land himself? the answer of the Court of Agrarian Relations is in the negative. Hence, the appeal of the landholder-lessee direct to this Court. The facts stipulated by the parties are these: . Felix Galleta, father of herein respondents, was the tenant of herein petitioner Canuto Pagdanganan on a landholding situated in Barrio San Miguel, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Pagdanganan, in turn, was the lessee of this landholding which was owned by Hacienda Favis. On November 20, 1962, Felix Galleta died. On March 25, 1963, Galleta's widow received from Pagdanganan a letter warning her and her children, respondents herein, against entering the landholding, and notifying him that he (Pagdanganan) and his sons would work the same beginning the agricultural year 1963-1964. Three days thereafter, on March 28, 1963, herein respondents Eladio and Domingo Galleta went to the Court of Agrarian Relations on petition for judgment declaring either of them as petitioner's lawful tenant by way of succession to their deceased father Felix Galleta.1 This petition notwithstanding, in April 1963, petitioner planted palay on the land by the broadcasting method. Because of drought, however, there was no harvest for the agricultural year 19631964. Petitioner's answer below set up the special defense of termination of tenancy relationship upon the death of

his tenant. Felix Galleta, and his (petitioner's) right to personally till the land. Upon the facts thus stipulated, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered partial judgment as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent CANUTO PAGDANGANAN is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to exercise his right under Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended, to choose between petitioners ELADIO and DOMINGO, both surnamed GALLETA, who should succeed their deceased father, Felix Galleta, as tenant on the landholding in question situated at barrio San Miguel, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed by law, and thereafter, respondent is ordered to reinstate the petitioner so chosen in the aforesaid holding. Upon failure of respondent to exercise his choice within the aforesaid period, this Court hereby declares ELADIO GALLETA to be the successor of the late Felix Galleta as tenant respondent on the aforesaid landholding (Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code), and the latter is ordered to reinstate him therein. Commissioner Clemente S. Felix is directed to set this case immediately for hearing for reception of evidence as to respondentlandholder's participation in the harvest for the agricultural year 1962-63. Com. Felix shall submit his report, together with the record of this case, within six (6) days from submission of the transcript of stenographic notes. Petitioner's claim for counsel fees is denied. Following a hearing, the agrarian Court came out with a supplemental decision, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent: (1) To reinstate Eladio Galleta as his share tenant on the landholding in question with all the rights and obligations prescribed by law; (2) To pay him the sum of P431.25 (value of 37-1/2 cavans of palay at the rate of P11.50 per cavan, the official buying price of the Rice and Corn Administration), as damages, for the agricultural year 1963-1964; and, (3) To continue paying him the same amount as damages, every agricultural year thereafter until his actual reinstatement. Petitioner's move to reconsider both the original and the supplemental decisions failed. Hence, the present petition for review. 1. To be reckoned with in the resolution of the crucial issue we have stated at the beginning is Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act, enacted on August 30, 1954. Worth remembering at this point is that this Section 9 was thereafter amended on June 19, 1959 by Republic Act 2263. The statute as thus amended controls this case. Perhaps a clear picture of the law in its original state upon enactment on August 30, 1954 and as amended on June 19, 1959 may aid in the proper approach to the question before us. The two provisions, the old and the new, are as follows: Section 9 of Republic Act 1199: The same Section 9 as amended by Republic Act 2263:

SEC. 9. Severance of Relationships. The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the surrender or abandonment of the death or incapacity of, the tenant, land by, or the death or incapacity but his heirs or the members of of, the tenant:Provided, That in case his immediate farm household of the tenant's death or incapacity, may continue to work the land the tenancy relationship shall until the close of the agricultural continue between the landholder year. The expiration of the period and one member of the tenant's of the contract as fixed by the immediate farm household who is parties, and the sale or alienation related to the tenant within the of the land do not of themselves second degree by consanguinity extinguish the relationship. In the and who shall cultivate the land latter case, the purchaser or himself personally unless the transferee shall assume the rights landholder shall cultivate the land and obligations of the former himself personally or through the landholder, in relation to the employment of mechanical farm tenant. In case of death o the implements, in accordance with landholder, his heir or heirs shall section fifty hereof. Should the likewise assume his rights and deceased or incapacitated tenant obligations. have two or more members of his immediate farm household qualified to succeed him, the landholder shall have the right to choose from among them who should succeed. . . . The limited right of the heirs of a tenant under the original statute is quite plain. Upon the death of the tenant, the heirs could only "continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year." After amendment, in case of the tenant's death, "the tenancy relationship shall continue between the landholder and one member of the tenant's immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree by consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally." With one exception. And that exception is couched in the following language: "unless the landholder shall cultivate the land himself personally, or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, in accordance with section fifty hereof." Section 50 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended by the same Republic Act 2263, it bears emphasizing, gives the right to dispossess a tenant solely and exclusively to "the landholder-owner or his relative within the first degree by consanguinity." The pertinent provision of Section 50, as amended, reads: SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of Tenant. Any of the following, and no other, shall be sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings. (a) The bona fide intention of the landholderowner or his relative within the first degree by consanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of farm machinery and implements: . . . . In its original form, Section 50(a) reads: (a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or

through the employment of farm machinery and implements: . . . . It is true that the amended Section 9 heretofore quoted merely uses the word "landholder" in reference to the person who may exercise the right to personally cultivate the landholding of the deceased tenant. However, congressional intention to limit the import of the term landholder to landholder-owner is clear from a reading of Section 50 (a), as amended. And then, during the debates in Congress Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, who sponsored the bill (Senate Bill 119) that became Republic Act 2263, remarked: "The hereditary right involved is the right to the land. Now, the right to work the land is not absolute because the land still belongs to the landowner. To be just to the landowner, he should have the preference to choose among the two or three qualified members."2 Thus it is, that according to the amended Section 9, such right to cultivate the landholding is to be exercised "in accordance with section fifty" of the law. The Section 50 referred to is Section 50 of the Agrarian Tenancy Act, as amended by Republic Act 2263. For, Republic Act 2263 simultaneously amended Section 9 and Section 50. And, Section 50, as amended, specifically gives such right solely and exclusively to a landholder-owner. It should not escape notice that the amendment inserted in Section 50 by Republic Act 2263 was from "landholder" to "landholder-owner or his relative within the first degree by consanguinity." The intent of Congress is too plain for argument. No one who is not a landholder-owner may dispossess the authorized successor of the deceased tenant upon the ground that he or his relatives mentioned in the law intend to cultivate the land personally. Statutes must be given conjoint, not discordant, effect.3 Our primary duty then is to harmonize Section 9 with Section 50, both as amended. Thus harmonizing, we take the word "landholder" in Section 9 to mean "landholder-owner." Really, it would be unreasonable to think that a mere lessee could rise to the level of a landowner. The protection afforded the landowner to enable him to improve his own economic situation by working the land himself does not apply to a lessee, such as is petitioner. A lessee is much like a middleman. He technically holds the land; but he does not own it. Furthermore, it is evident from a reading of Section 9, as amended, that Congress would want to fortify the security of tenure of the tenant. This is reflected in the record of the congressional debates, thus Another important aspect of the Agricultural Tenancy Act is to strengthen the security of tenure of the tenants. Before the passage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, there were many cases of ejectment for unjustified reasons. Under Republic Act No. 1199, we have provided that a tenant may be ejected only upon just cause. With respect to the death of the tenants the present law provides that the heirs may cultivate the land for one more agricultural year, in which case the land is returned to the landholder after one year. In the present amendatory bill, it is proposed that the right to till the land should be made hereditary. The idea is not new, Mr. President. As a matter of fact, the idea goes back to the time of President Quezon, who, in 1939, first broached the idea of giving

security to the tenure of the tenants and to make the right to work the land hereditary.4 To allow a landholder-lessee to get back the possession from the tenant is to open the door to fraudulent schemes to defeat the tenant's security of tenure. We may cite an instance: A landowner has a tenant. Thereafter, in order to displace the tenant's successor, he (the landowner) enters into a fictitious civil law lease of the land with that other person who becomes the lessee. The lessee ejects the tenant's successor to become the tenant of the owner.5 The result would be achieving by indirection what the law proscribes. Section 50, as amended, plugs this loophole. Finally, the Agricultural Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation in implementation of the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.6 Such being the case, a sensible view of the provisions of Section 9 here being construed should lean towards the security of tenure of tenants. We, accordingly, rule that petitioner, being a mere landholder-lessee and not the landholder-owner, cannot exercise the right granted under Section 9 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act to personally cultivate the landholding upon the death of the tenant. And in consequence, we uphold respondent Eladio Galleta's right to till the land in question as set forth in the judgment below. 2. Since respondents were unlawfully dispossessed of the landholding, upon the provisions of Section 27(l) of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, petitioner was adjudged liable for damages "to the extent of the landholder's participation in the harvest." No question on appeal would have arisen on this score were it not for certain facts in this case obtaining. The parties had stipulated that because of drought petitioner did not harvest in the 1963-1964 agricultural year. Not that petitioner was alone. During the hearing before the Court of Agrarian Relations, an additional stipulation was made that the landholding adjoining petitioner also "had no harvest due to drought."7 Because the measure of damages fixed by law is the landholder's share, and given the fact that for the agricultural year 1963-1964 there was no production and no share either for the landholder or for the tenant to speak of due to a fortuitous event, it would collide with our sense of justice to award respondents damages for that agricultural year.8 We, accordingly, rule that no damages should be awarded for the agricultural year 1963-1964. However, damages of P431.25 per year for every succeeding agricultural year thereafter until actual reinstatement stand; for, good faith had ceased. Modified as just stated, the original and supplemental decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations are hereby affirmed in all other respects. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.