The issue is whether the Sessions Court judge has correctly represent the law on corroboration for accomplice

and an agent provocateur. There are two sections in Evidence Act 1950 that deal with the evidence of an accomplice. The first provision is Section 133 which provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Another provision is illustration b of Section 114 where it provides that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The rule with regards to accomplice evidence is provided in the case of R v Baskerville (1916) 2 KB 658. The rules are the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible and a conviction founded on such evidence is not illegal but the judge must warn the jury of the danger of convicting on such uncorroborated evidence. The judge also has the duty to tell the jury that the accused can legally be convicted on such uncorroborated evidence. If it appears that the judge has not given the required warning, the Court of Appeal will quash the conviction. Another rule is that one accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice and the corroboration must be one implicates the accused. However, evidence that tending to show that crime has been committed is insufficient. In the case of Jegathesan v Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 LNS 74, it was held that the judge must adequately warn himself of the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. If the judge ignores or disregards the principle, then the conviction will be quashed by the appellate court. However, if it appears that the judge has clearly present his mind the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice but nevertheless believes the evidence and convicts, then the appellate court will not interfere with the conviction merely on the ground of want of corroboration. In dealing with uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it is important for the court to state in its judgement that it was aware of the danger on convicting the accused based on the uncorroborated evidence and the warning to that effect must be clearly stated in the judgement. This was affirmed in the case of Aziz bin Muhammad Din v Public Prosecutor (1996) 5 MLJ 473 where it was held that the rule of practice regulate the manner which uncorroborated evidence is to be treated that is to say, the judge must warn himself of the danger of convicting on such offence.

The question of corroboration would be relevant if after hearing the accomplice and the judge found that the accomplice is a credible witness. Thus, it becomes necessary for the court to seek corroborative evidence in support of the evidence of the accomplice. The evidence of an accomplice must be both credible and be corroborated as it has been decided in the case of Sabarudin bin Non v Public Prosecutor (2005) 1 CLJ 466. In this case, the appellate court judge state that the trial judge has correctly directed himself on the law with regards to corroboration because the trial judge proceeds to the issue of corroboration after found that the accomplice is a credible witness. In determining the admissibility of the corroborative evidence, it is important to determine that the evidence must itself be credible. In the case of Yap Ee Kong & Anor v Public Prosecutor (1981) 1 MLJ 144 the court held that the essence of corroborative evidence is that one creditworthy witness confirms what another creditworthy witness has said. Corroboration support that which evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible and corroborative evidence will only fill its role if it is completely credible evidence. Applying to this case, it is provided that the evidence of an accomplice is admissible even if it is not corroborated provided that the court must adequately warn itself of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence as it was decided in the case of Jegathesan v Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 LNS 74. The conviction will be quashed if the judge failed to warn himself of the danger convicting on uncorroborated evidence. The court has to state in its judgement that it was aware of the danger on convicting the accused based on the uncorroborated evidence and the warning to that effect must be clearly stated in the judgement. However, the Sessions Court judge stated that he is obliged to accept and act on the evidence of Muthu who is the accomplice in this case as the law allows for the reception of uncorroborated evidence. His judgement doesnt state that he has warned himself of the danger to accept and convict uncorroborated evidence from Muthu. As a consequence, his conviction will be quashed as he failed to warn himself and convicted the accused based on the evidence of Muthu without clearly present his mind the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. Therefore, the Sessions Court judge has misdirected himself on the law on corroboration of evidence for an accomplice.

On the other hand, a distinction for an accomplice and agent provocateur should be made because they apply a different rule on corroboration. An agent provocateur is a person who openly and actively instigates and entices another to commit a criminal offence.1 In the case of Rex v Mullins 3 Cox CC 526, the court held that agent provocateur or a spy may be an honest man and does not deserve to be blamed if he instigates offences no further than by pretending to concur with the perpetrators. An agent provocateur is distinguished in fact and in principle from accomplice and although their evidence is entirely for jury to judge of, the court is bound to say that the evidence does not require corroboration. This principle also is affirmed in the case of Teja Singh v Public Prosecutor (1950) MLJ 71, where the court held that the evidence of police spy or agent provocateur is not that of an accomplice and does not require corroboration. Applying to this case, Ah Chong is an agent provocateur as he is a police informer. As the law provided that the evidence of an agent provocateur does not require corroboration, thus, the evidence given by Ah Chong doesnt have to be corroborated as it has been decided in the case of Teja Singh v Public Prosecutor (1950) MLJ 71. However, based on the judgement from the Sessions Court judge, the judge stated that the evidence of Ah Chong must be treated with special caution and requires to be corroborated by some independent evidence. This judgement clearly does not correctly represent the law on corroboration for an agent provocateur. Therefore the Sessions Court judge doesnt correctly directed himself to the law on corroboration.

Augustine Paul, (2010), Evidence: Practice and Procedure, Petaling Jaya: Lexis Nexis,