FRANCISCO VS. CA Facts: Mrs.

Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding since November 24, 1965 she consulted a Dr. Custodio about her ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days her bleeding recurred that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her that if her bleeding continued she should go to a hospital bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy" x-ray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965 Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complaint Dr. Patrocinio her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed that the operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested December 26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her operation in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on and that if he were the one he would not conduct an operation but only curretage accused Atty. Harry Bernardino that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless imprudence accused Dr. Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private patients who needed the facility of the hospital for proper management accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of triplets accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of grave oral defamation Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was instituted Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned. alleged defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, and the information charging the accused of the greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed with the court more than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966. complaint was filed by the offended party before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine (39) days after the incident in question which is still within the prescriptive period ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed RULING:

respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times. Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

CRESPO v MOGUL 151 SCRA 462 GANCAYCO; June 30, 1987 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City (petitioner prays that respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trail of petitioner, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.) FACTS - Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge (leodegario Mogul) denied the motion through his order. - The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction. In an order (Aug 17 1977), the CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court - On May 15 1978, a decision was made by the CA granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Dept of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. - On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino Macaraig Jr, resolving the petition for review, reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment - The accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. On January 23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However,

the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription accused Emiliano Francisco is hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio.

SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU Facts: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition to challenge the order of the

in a decision of October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a resolution. ISSUE WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits HELD YES Ratio Once an information is filed in court, the courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. DISPOSITION Petition dismissed PEREZ v HAGONOY 327 SCRA 588 DE LEON; March 9, 2000 NATURE: Review on Certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers. - For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings account went below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.This prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed. - Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan. - The prosecutor granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, - On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with finality by the latter.Pursuant to the said resolution, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused which motion was granted by the RTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the petitioner. ISSUES

1. WON Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter 2. WON the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor HELD 1. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reasoning - As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.. 2. YES Ratio While it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Reasoning - In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we held that: "In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant." - Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.

PEOPLE v ASUNCION 161 SCRA 490 PADILLA; May 24, 1988 NATURE Certiorari FACTS: -Rolando Abadilla, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged before the QC RTC with the offense of Violation of PD No. 1866 [ILLegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) --The Information read that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession and under his custody and control rifles, pistons, ammunitions and magazines (see orig case for the list) without first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. -Upon motion of the accused, Asuncion dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by EO No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation in said

information that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime. - In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658. -The prosecution filed a MR of said Resolution, but the motion was denied -Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution. Petitioners Claims -nothing is contained in said EOs which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; -that said EOs merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; -that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866 which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222. ISSUES 1. WON J. Asuncion erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222 2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence HELD 1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. SC did NOT give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. 2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO. 3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. J. Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion. Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law." -Abadilla is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of the Marcos regime. But the Court cannot be swayed by appellations for it has a duty, as a temple of justice, to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws. Reasoning 1. It may be true that there is nothing in EO Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes similar to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a period within which a holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender the same to the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a criminal liability was temporarily LIFTED for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within the period provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surrendering the same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition. -People vs. Lopez~ It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA NO 4) excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to August 31, 1946, possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used for any purpose other than selfdefense or carried for any purpose other than of surrendering them to the proper authorities. The Government does not dispute this interpretation. Although the law does not categorically state that criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is the only construction compatible with the spirit and purposes of the enactment as revealed by its context. -People vs. Feliciano~ SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law, and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surrender them. The Court said:

-Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares: RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on within one year from said date, and punished only (1) the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof on the person except for purpose of surrender. Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or about November 6, 1950. 2. People vs. Lopez~ the Court already ruled that, under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. -People vs. Austria~ the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, under RA No. 482, may be deemed suffident, it must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the time he was apprehended by the authorities with said firearm. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.

MATILDE v JABSON 68 SCRA 456 ANTONIO; December 29, 1975. NATURE Certiorari to nullify the judgment of respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVI, in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554, imposing upon the accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, for the crime of simple theft, the penalty prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133 (which imposes a heavier penalty) instead of that imposed by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS - An Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed three informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554 against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, Patricio Guiruela y Luna, Ricardo Abener y San Pascual, Edgardo Cape y Atienza, Servando Calpo y Caballero, and Ireneo Belver y Bale. In three criminal cases, respondent court imposed upon petitioner, for the crime of simple theft, the penalty prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133, instead of that imposed by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that petitioner and his co-accused, being then laborers, conspired and confederated with, and mutually aided one another, with intent of gain and without knowledge and consent of their employer, in stealing the articles mentioned therein belonging to their employer. Although the preamble of said informations stated that petitioner was charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," nowhere was it alleged in the body of said information that the articles stolen were materials or products which petitioner was "working on, or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 133. Except for the dates of commission and the amounts involved, the aforesaid three (3) informations uniformly stated that said accused were charged with the crime of qualified theft, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133, committed as follows: "That on or about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then laborers working at the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises, conspiring and confederating together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still at large, all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the said firm, its President and General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to wit: . . ." - When the informations were amended from Qualified Theft to Simple theft and deleting from the body of Information the phrase Grave abuse of confidence, Matilde pleaded GUILTY but the Court imposed the penalty under PD 133 and not those by Article 309 (3) of the RPC. From this decision, Matilde sought from the Court a quo a reconsideration contending that in the absence of any allegation in the body of information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD. 133, he cannot be conviceted and penalized under the aforesaid decree. ISSUE WON the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft in relation to PD 133 suffices HELD NO

- The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment, and directed that another one be rendered. It held that since the objective of Presidential Decree No. 133 is to place a strong deterrent on workers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, it is essential, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the heavier penalty prescribed by said Decree, that the information should aver that the articles stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on or using or producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," does not suffice for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional guarantee that the accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court said that the appropriate penalty is that under Article 309 (3) of the RPCprision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if value of property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea of guilty, penalty is in its minimum period.

BALITAAN v CFI BATANGAS (DE LOS REYES) 115 SCRA 729. GUERRERO; July 30, 1982 FACTS - Luz Balitaan owns a baby dresses mending shop. Rita de los Reyes is the manager of her business. - Luz, thru Special Counsel Aguila, filed with the MTC of Bauan, Batangas an Information charging Rita of the crime of estafa. The information contains that Rita misappropriated P127.58, through grave abuse of confidence, despite of repeated demands of Luz. (See original for exact wording of Information.) - During trial at the MTC, Luz testified that Rita delivered the baby dresses to Uniware, and for this she (Rita) obtained 3 checks totaling P1,632.97. A cash voucher evidencing the receipt of said amount was entered into evidence. The lawyer for the defense moved: (1) to strike the testimonies with regard to the voucher evidence on the ground that said testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information, that there is no allegation in the information whatsoever regarding these checks and this cash voucher; and (2) in the nature of an objection to any other question or questions regarding these checks that were allegedly received by the herein accused from the Uniware Incorporated because there is no allegation in the information. The court overruled such objections as the lawyer of the complainant told the judge that the evidence was presented to prove that the P127.58 was misappropriated from the P1,632.97. The testimony thus continued. [It turns out that Rita told Luz that P127.58 was due a Cesar Dalangin for some of the dresses he made. Luz then instructed Rita to encash the checks and pay Cesar. Rita gave Luz the encashed amount minus the P127.58. Three weeks later, when she noticed that many baby dresses were lost, she verified the receipts of the payments. Cesar said he did not make the baby dresses Rita said he did, and he didnt receive the amount (he didnt even know Rita). Luz then demanded from Rita the said amount; but Rita kept the money.] - The defense then filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Batangas against the MTC judge for denying the motions to strike out the testimonies relating to the evidence. CFI granted the petition and ordered the testimonies stricken out of the record. ISSUE WON the testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information. HELD NO - It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. - Inasmuch as the crime of estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse of confidence is charged, the information must contain these elements: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it;

(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. - The position of the defense is that the testimonies tend to prove another kind of estafa --- using false pretenses or fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)-- and not thru abuse of confidence (Art 315 par 1b RPC). The elements of these two are different. Under par 2a, demand is not necessary and deceit or false representation must be shown. But this doesnt mean that proof of deceit is not allowed for par 1b. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence will characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or, is absorbed by abuse of confidence. - As long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission. - The presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Dispositive CFI decision to strike out testimonies is reversed and set aside.

PEOPLE v ALAGAO 16 SCRA 879 ZALDIVAR; April 30, 1966 NATURE This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining the motion to quash the information FACTS -City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging them of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, as follows: "That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place on commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied -appeal by fiscal before SC ISSUE WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash HELD YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money

taken from the offended party. Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months. Dispositive The order appealed from is reversed and set aside

PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX 103 SCRA 21 GUERRERO; February 24, 1981 NATURE Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court imposing upon Casey and Felix the capital c\punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. FACTS - On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death. - In June, 1968, upon arraignment, Casey pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint. - September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an accused, stating: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly - The court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing or taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation, one of which qualified the killing to murder. ISSUES 1. WON the Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information without arraignment 2. WON the Court a quo erred in holding that appellants acted with evident premeditation and abuse o of superior strength, and in qualifying the crime committed as aggravated murder 3. WON whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused in the commission of the crime 4. WON the Court erred in discounting Caseys defense that he acted in legitimate self-defense HELD 1. NO Reasoning - The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as accused-appellant Casey is

concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights. - The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. YES Reasoning - Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accused-appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However, there is no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn statement show that there was no preconceived design to kill the victim. - There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and accept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It has also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. - From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached by accusedappellant Ricardo Felix. - There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength." 3. YES Reasoning - Although there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. - Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased. From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it was Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he did so out of his perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Ricardo Felix. 4. YES Reasoning - claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of the eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo. - The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while the accused complained merely of abrasions on his back indicates the falsity of the claim. Dispositive the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.