Correcting Misstatements from the 9/11 Commission Hearings

Factual Inaccuracies from the Commission's Hearings on March 23-24,2004

On the President's Summer 2001 Request for Intelligence on al-Qa'ida Domestic Threat

COMMISSION HEARINGS: The CIA's Presidential Daily Brief of August 6,2001 reviewed al-Qa'ida's
historical desire to attack the U.S. homeland. Dr. Rice stated in her private meeting with the Commission
that, as part of the interactive PDB briefing process, having heard the many reports from the DCI about al-
Qa'ida threats overseas during that summer, the President asked, prior to the preparation of this PDB,
about al-Qa'ida's intentions within the United States. On March 24, Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that
CIA had indicated to the Commission that this PDB was "initiated by individuals within the CIA and not as a
direct request from the National Security Advisor."

FACTS: Following this misstatement at the hearings, CIA has conducted further internal review related to
the preparation of that PDB and is issuing the following clarification to the Commission:

> Throughout the Spring and Summer of 2001, at CIA briefings to the President on the al-Qa'ida
threat, the President raised questions about whether the intelligence pointed toward threats
inside the United States.

> The President's questions were discussed at a PDB planning session at CIA, leading to CIA's
decision to prepare a PDB on Usama bin Ladin's interest in striking inside the United States.
Though CIA did not consider this a "formal tasking," the piece was prompted by the President's
earlier questions.

> When the PDB was presented to the President and Dr. Rice on August 6,2001, the CIA briefer
introduced it by referring to the President's earlier questions.

On the Bush Administration's Pre-9/11 Military Plans to Topple the Taliban if Necessary

COMMISSION HEARINGS: When questioning Mr. Clarke on March 24, Commissioner Gorelick suggested
that Dr. Rice was incorrect in her Washington Post Op-Ed of March 22 when she stated that the al-Qa'ida
strategy developed by the Bush Administration before September 11,2001 "marshalled all elements of
national power to take down the network, not just respond to individual attacks with law enforcement
measures. Our plan called for military options to attack al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, ground forces
and other targets-taking the fight to the enemy where he lived."

FACTS: The Op-Ed is entirely consistent with the language of the National Security Presidential Directive
developed by the Bush NSC staff and approved by Deputies and by Principals before September 11.

> The NSPD directed the Secretary of Defense to plan for actions against "against Taliban
targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control, air and air defense, ground
forces, and logistics."
 > The NSPD also called for plans "against al Qida and associated terrorist facilities in
Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control-communications, training, and logistics
facilities."

On "Eliminating" Al Qa'ida

COMMISSION HEARINGS: When challenged by Commissioner Thompson on March 24 about his

statements to the press in August 2002, Clarke claimed that it was his suggestion, over objections from the
Deputies Committee, to have the new strategy seek to "eliminate" the al-Qa'ida threat, and that his
language only prevailed after 9/11: "I tried to insert the phrase early in the Bush administration in the draft
NSPD that our goal should be to eliminate al-Qa'ida. And I was told by various members of the Deputies
Committee that that was overly ambitious and that we should take the word 'eliminate' out and say
'significantly erode.' And then, following 9/11, we were able to go back to my language of eliminate, rather
than significantly erode. And so, the version of the national security presidential decision directive that
President Bush finally got to see after 9/11, had my original language of 'eliminate,' not the interim
language of 'erode.'"

FACTS: The first and every draft NSPD considered by the Deputies Committee during its policy
development discussions and oversight in Spring and Summer of 2001, and the NSPD as presented to
Principals on September 4,2001, called for the elimination of the al-Qa'ida threat.

> This was a marked departure from the strategy that Clarke presented to Dr. Rice on January 25,
2001, which called for "rolling back" al-Qa'ida.

> Clarke himself stated in August 2002 that the strategic direction to "eliminate" al-Qa'ida came from
President Bush: "The... thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the
elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve
this problem, that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of
elimination." (Dick Clarke briefing to reporters, August 2002)

On Sitting National Security Advisors Testifying on Policy Matters

COMMISSION HEARINGS: Commissioner Ben-Veniste repeatedly cited at the hearings an April 5,2002
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for the proposition that "other National Security Advisors
have come before the Congress and have testified in open session, including Mr. Berger, including
Zbigniew Brzezinski."

FACTS: Each example cited by Commissioner Ben-Veniste is distinct from the Commission's request that
Dr. Rice testify publicly about policy matters.

> The first appearance by Mr. Berger cited in the report (May 3,1994), when he was Deputy
National Security Advisor, was to provide "a policy briefing on Haiti." Contrary to
Commissioner Ben-Veniste's statements, however, the Congressional Record and U.S.
Senate records both indicate that this was a closed briefing, similar to the appearance Dr. Rice
already has made before the Commission.
 > The other appearance by Mr. Berger cited by Commissioner Ben-Veniste (September 11,
1997) was in public, but in decidedly different circumstances. It, along with the instances cited
involving Dr. Brzezinski and another Carter official, involved not policy matters, but potential
improper or illegal conduct.

FACTS: Sitting National Security Advisors in fact regularly decline to testify publicly on policy matters
before legislative bodies, such as the Commission.

> Samuel Berger declined to testify in 1999 concerning the alleged theft of nuclear weapons
secrets by China.

> Anthony Lake declined to testify in 1996 concerning the Administration's Bosnia policy.

> Neither the CRS report, nor any other authority of which we are aware, identifies any instance
in which a sitting National Security Advisor has testified publicly before a legislative body on
policy matters.