CONGRESSO TOMISTA INTERNAZIONALE LUMANESIMO CRISTIANO NEL III MILLENNIO: PROSPETTIVA DI TOMMASO DAQUINO ROMA, 21-25 settembre 2003

Pontificia Accademia di San Tommaso Societ Internazionale Tommaso dAquino

On a Rejection of Essentionalism
Rev. Dr. Pawel Tarasiewicz Catholic University of Lublin (Poland)

The main purpose of this article is to provide a solution to the following problem: why did St. Thomas Aquinas reject all the ideas of being that were well-known in 13th century? To answer such a question one must either analyse in depth all the ante-Thomas conceptions one by one , or indicate such a common feature of theirs that would be a sufficient motive to reject all of them and undertake the necessary steps to work out a very new idea of being. The second variant seems to be more acceptable not only because of an amount of historical material that exceeds the limited capacity of this article, but rather for an obvious defect of all the ante-Thomas formulations of the being as the principal object of philosophy. Their common defect is what we can qualify as essentionalism, i.e. concentration on the essentional aspect of being, meanwhile overlooking its existentional aspect. As a consequence, the above question can be reformulated into: why did St. Thomas reject essentionalism? The purpose undertaken is approached in three stages. The first part of the answer starts with a presentation of the reasons why ancient metaphysics had to be essentional (or rather pre-essentional), and then indicates an origin of inspiration for the philosophical comprehension of the being with regard to its existence. The second part is to characterize essentionalism through a presentation of its two typical models, which have been called there: Greek model and Semitic model. The third part of the answer presents these defects of essentionalism, which reasonably order the rejection of both of its model types.

It is a basic purpose of all philosophical considerations to understand realitys nature that is given in a sensual experience. 1 To achieve it, a philosopher enters a face-to-face contact with the world of numerous individual beings, and afterwards tries to express his understanding of them within his language. Saying something is, he confirms his affirmation of the existence of some object. Proceeding then and saying a human being is, a man is, John is, he step by step makes this something that exists more clarified, regarding a correlation of the essence and its existence. That is how a process that distinguishes the philosophical object called being, begins. However the philosophical cognition of the being was not always identified with a proportional apprehension of the essence and its existence. Its turning point took place barely in the 13th century with St. Thomas Aquinas, who was an originator of the existentional theory of the being.

M.A. Krapiec, Przedmiot filozoficznych dociekan, Roczniki Filozoficzne 33 (1:1985): 5-54.

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Copyright 2003 INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO VIRTUAL SANTO TOMS Fundacin Balmesiana Universitat Abat Oliba CEU

P. TARASIEWICZ, On a Rejection of Essentionalism

The main purpose of the present article is to provide a solution to the following problem: why was St. Thomas theory of being an alternative one, in other words why did Aquinas reject all the ideas of being that were well-known in 13th century? To answer such a question one must either analyse in depth all the ante-Thomas conceptions one by one, or indicate s uch a common feature of theirs that would be a sufficient motive to reject all of them and undertake the necessary steps to work out a very new idea of being. The second variant seems to be more acceptable not only b ecause of an amount of historical material that exceeds the limited capacity of this article, but rather for an obvious defect of all the ante-Thomas formulations of the being as an object of philosophy. Their common defect is what we can qualify as an essentionalism, i.e. a concentration on the essentional aspect of the being, meanwhile overlooking its existentional aspect.2 As a consequence the above question can be reformulated into: why did St. Thomas reject essentionalism? The following attempt to answer this question refers to the scientific works of M.A. Krapiec as one of the most outstanding present-day Polish philosophers, and an expert and commentator of St. Thomas Aquinas thought. The first part of the answer starts with a presentation of the reasons why ancient metaphysics had to be essentional (or rather pre-essentional), and then indicates an origin of the inspiration for the philosophical comprehension of the being with regard to its existence.3 The second part characterizes essentionalism through a presentation of its two typical models, which have been called here: Greek model and Semitic model. The third part of the answer presents these defects of essentionalism, which reasonably order the rejection of both of its model types. 1. ORIGIN OF ESSENTIONALISM. What is determined as essentionalism by the contemporary philosophy of being has actually been present since the very beginning of metaphysical thought. Prof. Krapiec writes: At a closer look one notices that actually no historically well-known solution passes or disappears for ever, but all of them remain and acquire new forms throughout the changing contexts of history.4 So either the essentional idea of being is something originally new in St. Thomas times and it would thus be a mistake to use time and place for a fruitless exploration of its history, that has been about to start or, on the contrary, the conception that reduces an apprehension of being only to an essentional aspect has its pre-conceptions in the history of philosophy. Therefore the purpose of this part of the article is to
Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, Lublin 2002, esencjalizm.

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The pre-essentionalism characterizes an option that apprehends the being (its essence) without any regard to its existence, while the essentionalism stands for an option of a primacy of the essence over the existence. Cf. Leksykon filozofii klasycznej, Lublin 1997, esencjalizm.
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M.A. Krapiec, O rozumienie filozofii (Lublin 1991), 47.

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deliver a justification for that second option by indicating ancient sources both of pre-essentional metaphysics and the problem of existence in the philosophy of being as well. a. Exclusiveness of the essence problem. The ancient Greek thinkers, undertaking a rational effort to understand themselves and the world, remained not only in a cognitive relation with an object of their interest, but also in a personal engagement with a wide context of their cultural environment. That is why, together with their scientific fervour, they carried into philosophy many extra-rational opinions, which became a foundation of the whole building of their contemporary knowledge. 5 For e xample, the eternity of the world was one such opinion that came from non-philosophical areas of culture.6 Prof. Krapiec characterizes one of the Hellenic metaphysics founders7 against a background of the mentality of the society of his generation in the following words: Aristotle had the mind of the natural historian (physicist) and he was interested in an u nderstanding of the real world as an object of the everyday spontaneous experience. In Aristotles opinion, this world was also in accordance with the opinions of other thinkers and astronomers a world that existed originlessly. Aristotle did not recognize any mythological tale about the beginning of the world as created by gods or demiurgos. The world had to exist originlessly, which was to be confirmed by a movement of the first heavens, i.e. the sphere of constant stars.8 There are at least three conclusions that come from that quotation. The first one refers to the relation between the science that was cultivated by Aristotle and the mythology that worked in Greek culture. Firstly, metaphysics has to be rational, which places it in disjunctive (i.e. separable) opposition to all the spheres of human imagination and extra-rational opinions. The second conclusion characterizes the founder of the school of Athens himself, showing his aspirations to synthetize the extraphilosophical tradition that was validated by the scientific authorities, with strict philosophical achievements. The third conclusion that is the most important for our considerations reveals that a common opinion about the originlessness of beings as the universum becomes the base for all philosophy. Therefore the most eminent student of Plato had no problem with the existence of the world, because he accepted the mythological faith of his neighbour countrymen there. It seemed to have been quite an exceptional case, for he
E. Gilson, Bg i ateizm (trans. into Polish by M. Kochanowska, P. Murzanski, Krakw 1996), 23-44. 6 Krapiec, O rozumienie filozofii (op. cit.), 187. 7 On the founders of the Hellenic metaphysics cf. G. Reale, Historia filozofii starozytnej (vol. II, trans. into Polish by E. I. Zielinski, Lublin 1997), 29-33. 8 M.A. Krapiec, Filozofia co wyjasnia? Rozumiec rzeczywistosc swiata i czlowieka (Warszawa 1997), 81.
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skipped without any sentiment all the other truths of the Hellenic myth in favour of the scientific theory of the cosmos. That was how Aristotle b ecame a philosopher of science; however, his intention to part from the religious (mythological) doctrine was not accomplished successfully, considering the uncritical starting-point that the world had always existed. But did the Philosopher belittle the matter of existence completely? Prof. Krapiec answers: According to Aristotle, b efore we undertake a study of the nature of things, we should first know whether this thing exists at all. If a thing did not exist, our study of the nature of this non-existing thing would be a vain and useless effort.9 The author of Metaphysics recognized the world that was given in a sensual experience, as a real world, as he expressed his aspiration to explain things that existed. However, according to him, essence itself was a necessary and sufficient factor to an interpretation of the being that really existed. 10 He did not take into his consideration existence as an ontological element that could explain the world. By the way, it must be underlined that world in the ancient parlance meant the totum ens universale, i.e. a sum of all the beings that really existed. The individual beings, that composed the world, were all accidental, they appeared and disappeared, they had their own beginning and their end. However considering the material that all the individual beings were made of, the world was unchangeable, without any beginning or any end. This subtle axiom about the originlessness of universe, lying at the base of ancient philosophy, explicitly determined the consistent development of metaphysics towards the essentional interpretation of the being.11 b. Discovery of the existence problem. As ancient metaphysics was subjected to a wider cultural context that actively co-produced philosophical interpretations of the world, it could be expected that, together with a modification of the subject itself, its attributes would be transformed as well. Indeed, a change of relation to the world in an aspect of its origin o ccurred to be a sufficient motive to modify the Greek culture, a particular signal to verify all its branches, philosophy included. It was all inspired by a meeting of two cultures: the Greek and the Semitic.12 Prof. Krapiec says: There was however ... a non-philosophical but religious thought, a Jewish one, that created a revolution in philosophical thinking within the time.13 What was that revolution like? Firstly, the point was that every single philosopher who
M.A. Krapiec, Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu (Lublin 1995), 331. 10 Cf. M.A. Krapiec, Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu (Lublin 1995), 343. 11 Cf. S. Swiezawski and M. Jaworski, Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej (Lublin 1961), 167-172. 12 Cf. Gilson, Bg i ateizm (op.cit.), 45-48. 13 Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 336.
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reflected on the first cause and principle of the world, and accepted a Jewish God as the real God, necessarily had to identify Him with his highest philosophical cause, with the philosophical Absolute. That necessity resulted from an original biblical idea of God Himself, which had its intercultural carrier in a Greek expression taken from Septuaginta. According to that translation of the Bible, God appeared to Moses as the one who is, so as the Personal BeingExistence. Speaking more precisely, God revealed himself to the man as pure personal existence.14 It leads to the conclusion that everything beyond God, what was created by Him, is a being that has existence, however is not existence. Therefore a second reason that created a reconstruction of metaphysics, and as important as Gods revelation itself, was a new conception of the relation between God the Creator and the world. It produced a new status of the world. It would not infringe any of the standards of the old-Greek thought, if there was not a new look at the world that suddenly ceased to be an originlessly existing one, but existed thanks to its Reason, thanks to its own Creator, who was giving it existence. So in the light of the Hebrew Bible the world appeared as very different from the one that was accepted by Aristotle and many others: the world was real, because God the Person produced it to existence ex nihilo.15 Such an opinion was unfamiliar both to Greek mythology, which represented an absolute existential autonomism of the gods and the world, and also to metaphysics, which accepted a fact of the real world, but for nonphilosophical reasons it skipped existence as a rule that could explain the universe. On account of the domination of essentional options among philosophers, assimilation of this religious advantage into metaphysics was not done automatically. Nevertheless, as Prof. Krapiec writes, a problem of existence gradually percolated into the mental constructions that explained the world.16 As a consequence there was a more and more vivid need to differentiate the essentional understanding of the being from the existentional one.17 2. MODELS OF ESSENTIONALISM. Following the evolving human thought from its very beginning to the times of St. Thomas, some characteristic approaches to the question of the worlds realism should be indicated. The present article contains two of them and they have both been formulated as

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Cf. Krapiec, O rozumienie filozofii (op. cit.), 187. Cf. A. Maryniarczyk, Zeszyty z metafizyki (vol. III, Lublin 1999), 33-76. Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 338. Cf. Swiezawski and Jaworski, Byt (op. cit.), 172-176.

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models that include two elements each.18 The first element always corresponds to a central metaphysical problem of antiquity, i.e. to the problem of the relation between the Absolute and a multitude of beings. 19 The second element appears as a background of the first one, and concentrates directly on a mistake of essentionalism, i.e. on the relation between essence and existence in an accidental being. a. Greek essentionalism.20 In a sense this model unites the Platonian thought with the Aristotelian one. As a feature of the f ormer there is a specific Plato-like conception of the relation between the world of gods and the world of all the accidental beings. And as an Aristotelian token there is a terminology that is used to resolve all the detailed questions. As a justification of the relation between the Absolute and a plurality of beings that could be found in the metaphysical considerations of that time, it is to be said openly that the Greek doctrine is very hardly legible. The first element of that relation is a n uncomposite and simple one, a pure form, and so it is the Absolute, whereas the second element is a composition of matter and form, and so it is mobile and numerous. However, though the determination of the relations ends themselves is quite reasonable, but the correlation of these ends seems to exceed the intellectual possibility of the human being, their ontological autonomy appears to be unquestionable, though considering the possibility of their correlation an undefined dependence and assignment of the accidental beings to the Absolute being is always being mentioned. 21 This doctrine is aware of and recognizes the real world, but it is not yet in a position to discover existence as a philosophical principle that can explain the world and the relation of the Absolute to the other beings. All its explanation consists in an engagement of the formal order and a composition of the formal elements. The second question, i.e. a determination of the relation between existence and essence in a really existing being, is undertaken in a similar way. Prof. Krapiec, presenting one of the theoreticians of that correlation, writes: Boethius connects, like Aristotle does, the reality of the thing with its form; therefore to have a form means for him nothing else but to exist .22 These words contain a definition of the real being. So, every being both numerous, mobile
On a criterion of the distinction of those two elements cf. Krapiec, Metafizyka (op. cit.), 101. 19 Cf. M. Gogacz, Punkt wyjscia analizy filozoficznej w glwnych odmianach metafizyki XIII wieku (Wroclaw 1974), 144. 20 E.g. Boethius and Averroes. 21 Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 345. 22 Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 343.
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and composite one, and individual, immobile and simple one is a real one not because of anything else, but because of its form. This is how existence that actually decides about a reality of the world has become one (if not the only one) of the constitutive elements of being. However it is not existence that conditions a form, but it is the form that conditions existence. The form is a necessary and sufficient factor that makes existing all legitimate elements of the real beings collection. Therefore it can be said that the Greek model of essentionalism reduces the existence of the being to its essence.23 b. Semitic essentionalism.24 In this case the problem of relation between the Absolute and the multitude of beings has its religious inspirations. The Muslim Allach , who was identified with the Jewish God, was also an equivalent of the philosophical Absolute. Here the latter has the status of necessary b eing, i.e. such a being that does not possess any reason of its own existence outside himself, that has existence from his own nature. So the necessary being is perfectly one, the only one. If there are any other beings, they can be nothing more than possible ones only. A key feature of the Absolute is his causal character towards all the other beings that are outside of him. On the other hand, as a fundamental characteristic of the latter there is their derivativeness. None of the possible beings can fail to be a result of other beings activity. A ll they are able to be is to be not necessary, but possible ones. So all possible beings, if they are in reality, owe their existence to some external cause. And considering a relation between the possible beings and the necessary b eing, it is 25 to be said that the latter causes (creates) the possible ones. They seem to become really existing beings just because of creation. However having analysed a notion of the possible being, there is the conclusion that it would not exist without any possibility of existence in se. In other words, every possible being whatever it would be has to be possible to get existence before it becomes really existing. So it could be ascertained that it is not a derivativeness, but the possibility of existence that constitutes the main feature of real beings. This feature is assigned to the Absolute, which having at his disposal the possibility of the things existence can (or rather has to) give such existence to them. What is the value of the existence given to a possible being? Prof. Krapiec replies that it is an accidence for the possible being as its subject.26 There, existence does not belong to the constitutive
Cf. E. Gilson, Byt i istota (trans. into Polish by P. Lubicz and J. Nowak, Warszawa 1963), 55-68. 24 E.g. Alfarabi and Avicenna from the Arab tradition, and Moses Majmonides from the Jewish one. 25 Cf. Krapiec, Metafizyka (op. cit.), 384-387. 26 Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 349.
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elements of the being. Neither is it reduced to essence, because both essence and existence are separate from each other in all the really existing concretes. However their determinative power remains completely incompatible. While essence is the only factor that constitutes the being, existence is satisfied by the status of accidence. 27 3. MISTAKE OF ESSENTIONALISM. Both models of essentionalism that have just been introduced consistently have found their various developments and interpretations. When a problem of the relation between the Absolute and the accidental beings, as well as a problem of the essence existence correlation in actual things, gets a more radical presentation, then it becomes far more possible to indicate the most evident incorrectness of the essentionalistical consequences. 28 a. Mistake of the Greek essentionalism. Let us take it for granted that firstly all this model depends on a notion of the Absolute as a n uncomposite being, whose nature consists of a pure form that simultaneously determines the existence, and secondly on a notion of the accidental being as composed of matter and form, where the form is also as in the Absolute case a warrant of its existence. Thus, existence was reduced to essence, which led to an identification of the beings existence with its essence: to exist meant to have a form, or more generally to h ave an essence. Prof. Krapiec says: And existence, that here is an essence of the being, is an independent existence, an existence that comes from the inside of each particular being, an existence of the definition, of the necessity, a non-caused existence, the unique existence, namely: the Absolute.29 The consequence of these words can easily surprise: the being, that has been supposed to be an accidental one so far, appears as an Absolute now. Not only does the hitherto idea of the philosophical Absolute decline here, but the religious notion of the only God follows it as well. In the Greek essentionalism doctrine especially all the immaterial beings have to be divine ones.30 Certainly it is always possible to reply that God does not need to be comprehended as a being where existence has necessarily to be identical with the essence, but as for instance an infinite being. Unfortunately such an

Cf. Krapiec, Filozofia co wyjasnia ? (op. cit.), 112. E. Gilson, Tomizm. Wprowadzenie do filozofii (trans. into Polish by J. Rybalt, Warszawa 1998), 51-53. Gilson, Byt i istota (op. cit.), 106-112. 28 M.A. Krapiec, O realizm metafizyki, Zeszyty Naukowe KUL 48 (4:1969): 18. M.A. Krapiec, Dwie wizje swiata realnego: monizm pluralizm in Zadania filozofii we wsplczesnej kulturze, ed. Z. J. Zdybicka (Lublin 1992), 30-44. 29 Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 377. 30 Cf. S. Swiezawski, Dzieje europejskiej filozofii klasycznej (Warszawa-Wroclaw 2000), 672.
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answer cannot satisfy at all. Actually God as an infinite being would differ from all the other beings only on the level of his perfection. Then the accidental beings would be finite in their perfection, while a perfection of God would be infinite. Thus a new notion of God would be produced: God as similar to the other beings essentionally, with a difference in his perfection. Generally the nature of God and of all the other beings would be the same. Every being would simply be a god. Consequently there is an inevitable absurdity about becoming, that consists in a real existence of the numerous absolute beings (then the whole world would be full of absolutes), or a seeming existence of the plurality of beings (the existence of two absolutes would have to be a seeming existence of both, or of one of them at least). This model of being implies another philosophically important consequence. Prof. Krapiec continues: If... existence was identical with essence in a being, such a being would be infinite.31 In this way the conception of the accidental being as a finite one would collapse. According to such a theory, the fact of two or more infinite beings would be acceptable, which would be an evident contradiction. In short, it is to be said that the acceptance of essentionalism in its Greek model version finally leads to extreme ontological individualism, which appears as a lack of any relation between absolutes, or to questioning the accidental beings finiteness.32 b. Mistake of Semitic essentionalism. First of all, a problem of Semitic essentionalism consists in a controversial conception of the being as such. Its doctrine does not reduce itself to the things that really exist, nor to the notions of these things, but to the notions as such, i.e. to the general notions. Very numerous misunderstandings start there, and generate some incorrect consequences. The actual being (thing that really exists) as an object of the considerations of the philosopher ( the realist one at least) comes into being in a final part of the essentional speculation of this type. So, it is not a starting-point, but an ending-point, and that is why it is usually subordinated to some extraphilosophical pre-conceptions. At the basis of the discourse there is a religious problem, the problem of God-Allach. This is his mysterious reality that becomes a necessary means to any understanding of all reality, which the human being participates in. Allach is to be a necessary being, who is the only one from his nature. He who is a necessity of existence can only be the origin of all existence and nothing else, and so he is to be recognized as a genetic cause of all the other
Krapiec, Struktura bytu (op. cit.), 379. Cf. Swiezawski and Jaworski, Byt (op. cit.), 181-183. M. Gogacz, Czym jest rzeczywistosc?, Zycie i Mysl 271 (1:1977): 69.
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beings. Whom or what does God-Allach give existence to? Prof. Krapiec says: Existence NECESSE ESSE (ALLACH) flows out of himself, so he gives himself to the possible beings (natura tertia) that fill his intellect.33 It implies that actually Allach does not create anything at all, but is determined and forced by the possible beings to give them an existence moreover to share his own existence with them. Every fact of the coming into actual being d epends on a perfection of the possible beings that live in the Absolutes intellect. When such an intellectual being gets a possibility of existence, then Allach cannot skip it, and has to give a portion of existence to it. In this moment the idea of the Semitic essentionalism achieves its finial in a kind of the panentheism. Firstly, Allach not only holds the beings up in their existence, but he is a part of theirs, their existence, their accidence as well. Secondly, the Absolute, giving existence to some concrete thought, acquires it for himself. In other words, he fills himself up with another new element of his essence, or actually becomes this concrete being, which would be an evidence that the Absolute is imperfect and needs to improve himself. In spite of all the alleged power of this explanatory hypothesis, it is to be underlined that it works on the basis of non-philosophical suppositions. So the acceptance of this doctrine would mean saving its a priori foundations, and producing new hypotheses.34 Instead of a summary. At the end there is another q uestion, whether St. Thomas was conscious of this, whether he was conscious of fatal consequences for philosophy that c ame from the incorrectness of essentionalism. Prof. Krapiec answers: A little mistake at the beginning is a great one at the end... young Thomas Aquinas repeats after Aristotle..., realizing the importance and consequence of a starting-point in the philosophical cognition of the world. The history of philosophys experiences were, already in Middle Ages, so rich that they led to notice a value of the first steps in the field of philosophy.35 It is an evidence that Aquinas did not avoid a historical reflection on philosophical thought, that he undertook his attempts of reaching the truth through the mediation of the earlier thinkers, that he did not usurp any exclusive right to the ultimate solutions. So, he had a consciousness of essentionalisms mistakes as well as the originality of his own existentionalistic conception of being.36 It can easily be

Krapiec, Filozofia co wyjasnia ? (op. cit.), 104. Cf. M.A. Krapiec, Byt i istota. Sw. Tomasza De ente et essentia przeklad i komentarz (Lublin 1994), 167-238. 35 Krapiec, Byt i istota (op. cit.), 51. 36 Cf. S. Swiezawski, Istnienie i tajemnica (Lublin 1993), 66.
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testified by the fact that he undertook numerous discussions with the essentionalism of Averroists, or Augustinists.37 The undertaken attempt of an answer to the question why did Aquinas reject all the ideas of the being that were well-known in 13th century, and consequently why did he not accept essentionalism arrives at two main conclusions. Directly it can justify a cognitive insufficiency of all the theories of being until the 13th century that reduced the object of philosophy to an essentional aspect only.38 Indirectly it can indicate a necessity of the existentional aspect in the philosophers work. Only the apprehension of essence and existence in their real proportions can be a warranty of the proper cognition of being. Deprived of it philosophys object is excellent material to become nothing but a mental construct, and philosophy itself a kind of mythology, ideology, or utopia.

Cf. J.A. Weisheipl, Tomasz z Akwinu. Zycie, mysl i dzielo (trans. into Polish by Cz. Wesolowski, Poznan 1985), 342-365. 38 Cf. S. Swiezawski, Swiety Tomasz na nowo odczytany (Poznan 1995), 78-79.
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