Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus

OveeI Ivvedenlisn in Asia Minov and Cpvus
AulIov|s) FascIaIis M. KilvoniIides

Souvce MiddIe Easlevn Sludies, VoI. 26, No. 1 |Jan., 1990), pp. 3-17
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Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and
Cyprus
Paschalis M. Kitromilides
The
concept
of national
identity
and its
transmogrification
into the histori-
cal
phenomenon
of nationalism have been one of the
problematic
areas of
social
theory. Although
some of the
great
thinkers of the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth centuries
paid
attention to these
issues,1
generally speaking,
the idea of the nation has remained in the
margins
of social
theory.
Furthermore its twentieth
century
association with fascism has done lit-
tle to enhance its attractiveness as an
object
of research.2
Consequently
thinking
about the idea of the nation and nationalism is
plagued by
stereo-
types,
unsubstantiated
assumptions
and a
variety
of
mythologies.
One
such
mythology,
central to all nationalist
ideologies, posits
the diachronic
permanence
of national characteristics as the
necessary
foundation of
national
identity. Failing
to
perceive
that this static
conception
is not
only
unhistorical but also
contingent upon
an
assumption
of the
stagnation
of an ethnic
community,
this view has considered nations as
unchanging
entities which have remained the same
throughout
all the
stages
of their
historical existence.3 With the idea of
dynamic change
exiled
by
definition
from
enquiries
about the
nation,
it is not
surprising
that social
theory
felt
so little
captivated by
the
subject.
Recent research has been more sensitive to the
conceptual problems
de-
riving
from the traditional
understanding
of nationalism and has
attempted
consequently
to connect the
phenomenon
with broad and
epoch-making
mutations in the collective
destiny
of sections of
humanity
and the
politi-
cal choices
contingent upon
them.4 The reorientation towards this more
dynamic perspective
however has not
responded
to the more concrete
problems
as to how the collective sense of
identity
of an ethnic
group
comes to be
forged.
It has been
increasingly
realized that this
eminently
political problem
can be treated
adequately only
in terms of historical
studies that trace the
gradual
evolution of communities over time. This
approach
makes
possible
the reconstruction of
processes
of cultural and
social
change
that lead to the
emergence
of self-conscious and articulate
national communities and it
has,
for
instance,
been
fruitfully applied
to
the
study
of East
European history.5
For convenience one
might
label this
method historical
ethnography
to
distinguish
it from the ahistorical and
largely
folkloristic
understanding
of the nation as an almost transcendental
and
unchanging entity.
In this
essay
I would like to
suggest
that this
approach might
be
profitably
applied
to the
phenomenon
of the
propagation
of Greek nationalism in
the Eastern Mediterranean in the course of the nineteenth
century. My
objective
is to
develop
the
methodological
framework for such a
study
of
Greek nationalism
by focusing
on three cases of the Eastern
periphery
of
the Ottoman
Empire: Cyprus, Cappadocia
and Pontos.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
I
The
emergence
and
growth
Cyprus
was the out-
come of the
interplay
of two factors. One was the Hellenic
ethnological
character of
Cypriot society,
as reflected in its
language,
traditions and
archaic culture. This
provided
the
demographic
and cultural substratum
for the
implantation
and
growth
of a nationalist movement.6 The second
factor was the
nineteenth-century process
of Greek intellectual
expan-
sion
emanating
from the Hellenic
kingdom
to the Eastern
periphery
of
Hellenism - a
policy
aimed at the
ideological preparation
of the
applica-
tion of the
political programme
of the Great Idea.7 It was this
ideological
process
that
politicized
the local
ethnological
traditions and turned them
into
dynamic
elements of
political change
in distant and isolated
regions
without
any
direct or
organic
ties with the
independent
Greek state. A
consideration of the
Cypriot experience
in these terms will reveal
precisely
the
dynamic process
of the formation of national
identity.
To
appraise
the nature of this
process
and its historical
significance,
events in
Cyprus
must be examined
comparatively
in connection with similar
processes
that
unfolded on a much
larger
scale in Asia Minor. A consideration of the
process
in Asia Minor therefore will set the context for the balanced
historical
understanding
of the
growth
of Hellenic national consciousness
in
Cyprus.
The cultivation of Greek national
feeling
in Asia Minor was a
complex
process
whose character was determined
by
the historical
demography
and
the
geographical
dimension of the Greek
presence
in the
peninsula.
The
pattern
of Greek settlement in Asia Minor was the decisive factor in the
differentiation of the social
significance
of the local manifestations of
Greek nationalism. Asia Minor Hellenism in the nineteenth
century
was
composed
of three main
geographically
based
demographic subgroups.8
In
the Western coastal
regions
and their natural extensions into the riverine
valleys
that
penetrated
inland,
were concentrated the
compact
settlements
of
Greek-speaking populations mostly
based in the towns but also
spreading
into
villages
in the
countryside.
Most of this
population
was the
product
of
immigration
from the
Aegean
islands and continental
Greece,9
it
spoke
the common Modern Greek
tongue
and shared in the common Modern
Greek culture. All these factors and the
geographical proximity
to the
Greek
kingdom
turned these areas and their
leading
urban centres like
Smyrna
and
Kydonies (Ayvalik)
into home bases of Greek nationalism. It
was from here as well as from Athens that Greek nationalism was
exported
to the Eastern
periphery, including Cyprus.
The
demographic
and cultural
pattern
was
quite
different further in-
land. To the East of the riverine
valleys
of Western Asia Minor in the
ancient Roman
provinces
of
Phrygia, Galatia, Pissidia,
Pamphylia,
Lucia,
Lycaonia
and
Cappadocia
the Greek
presence
was much less
compact
and
the Greek
language
had been
replaced by
Turkish as the
daily tongue
of
the Orthodox Christians.10 Even in the case of
immigrants moving
inland
from the West or from
Cyprus
to the
port
cities of Southern Asia Minor
4
GREEK IRREDENTISM IN ASIA MINOR
like Attaleia
(Antalya),
Greek tended to
disappear
as a main
language
and
to be
replaced by
Turkish.
Except
for the coastal communities of Makri
and Livisi in
Lycia," only
in a few isolated communities in the interior
of
Cappadocia
a form of idiomatic Medieval Greek had survived but it
was in the
process
of
disappearance
under the
pressures
of socio-economic
change
in the
early
twentieth
century.12
This network of
highly
traditional
and
backward,
mostly Turkish-speaking
communities in
Cappadocia
consti-
tuted the most
important
of the
fragments
of Greek Orthodox
society
in the
interior of Asia Minor.13
The third
region
of Greek
presence
in Asia Minor was that of the Pontos
in the Northern section of the
peninsula, along
the Black Sea coast. Here
too the
pattern
of Greek settlement had its
peculiatiries.
Pontos was the
single region
of Asia Minor where a
compact
Greek
society
had survived
from Hellenistic and
Byzantine
times because of the late
conquest
of the
area
by
the Turks in 1461 and the
consequent
absence of the social
dislocation that was suffered
by
other areas
during
the four centuries
of
Byzantine-Turkish
confrontation
(llth
- 15th
centuries).14
Isolated in
the Pontic mountains and
protected by
the
Empire
of Trebizond from the
nomadic raids that dislocated Greek
society
in the rest of Asia Minor in
the centuries of
conquest,
Pontic Hellenism
preserved
its social
cohesion,
ethnic traditions and its
peculiar language
and culture. In the centuries of
Ottoman rule the Greek
presence
in the Pontos constituted the
single
most
important segment
of native Hellenism that had survived from the Mid-
dle
Ages.15
In the nineteenth
century
favourable economic circumstances
reinforced local Greek
society
and fostered its
extraordinary
cultural and
political development.16
It was these
populations
of the distant interior of Asia Minor that nine-
teenth
century
Greek irredentist nationalism
aspired
to
integrate
into its
system
of values. This was an
epic process
whose broad outlines are
roughly
known but
which,
with the
exception
of a remarkable literature about the
Pontos,
still awaits
systematic
research. These details are
beyond
the
scope
of this
essay.
But in order to have a
comparative
standard for the
appraisal
of the
growth
of nationalism in
Cyprus
two
general
statements about the
historical
significance
of the
expansion
of Greek nationalism in Asia Minor
are in order.
First,
concerning
the
impact
of this
dynamic
factor of cultural and
politi-
cal
change
in the closed and backward Greek Orthodox communities of
Cappadocia,
it has to be noted that it reversed a
process
of social
integra-
tion that was well-advanced at the time of its
emergence.
In
Cappadocia
the Greek Orthodox communities were well-advanced on the
way
to
being
fully integrated
into the dominant Turkish
society.
Not
only
had the lan-
guage
ceased to be a
barrier,
but also
popular religion
with its traditional
syncretism provided
an element of
psychological integration
at the basis of
Christian and Muslim communal life - an element that
bridged
instead of
reinforcing
ethnic
separateness.'7
The introduction of Greek nationalism
in the Orthodox communities of
Cappadocia, through
the creation of a
network of Greek
schools,
staffed
by
teachers who had been socialized
in Greek nationalist
values,
had over a
period
of half a
century
from
5
the 1870s
through
the
early 1920s,
the effect of
reversing
the
process
of
integration
and
cultivating
a sense of Greek national
identity among
the
younger generations
of this isolated and distant
community.18
These
younger generations
tended
gradually,
as a result of their
education,
to shed
their ties of traditional
loyalties
which focused
exclusively
on the Orthodox
Church and to
identify politically
with Greece - a
country they
had never
seen and of which
they
had a
very vague,
if idealized
conception.19
The
process
was initiated under the
aegis
of the Greek Orthodox
Church,
whose
original
motives however were not nationalist but were dictated
by
a
pasto-
ral
strategy aiming
at
eradicating
the elements of
religious syncretism
at the
grassroots.
Secondly,
the
special
circumstances of Pontos fostered the
growth
of a
powerful
local movement of Greek nationalism in that
outlying region.
If
in
Cappadocia
we can talk of a
process
of radical ethnic
differentiation,
in
Pontos the conditions and scale of cohesive ethnic Greek settlement could
and did sustain the
growth
of a movement of national
consciousness-raising
and national assertion that culminated in a
political
vision of national
emancipation through
union with Greece.20
II
My argument
about
placing
the
study
Cyprus
in its
relevant historical context
suggests
that the case of
Cyprus
can be consid-
ered as a third
example
of this
phenomenon
of
political
socialization. The
insular
society
of the Eastern Mediterranean constituted another instance
of an
ethnically
Greek
community
which
preserved
its traditions and an-
cient memories but had remained isolated
politically
and
culturally
from
the new Greek
state,
locked in its backwardness and
tempestuous destiny.
Yet the ethnic cohesion and archaic culture of
Cypriot
Hellenism
provided
a most fertile
ground
for the
implantation
of Greek nationalism. The
historical record
suggests
that this environment was
gradually penetrated
by
Greek nationalism in a
process parallel
to the one that
politicized
Pontic
Greek culture. The two cases are
highly
similar:
distant,
archaic but cohe-
sive
Greek-speaking
communities which
managed
to resist the
pressures
of
ethnic assimilation in Ottoman
society
on account of their
geographical
isolation,
they
discovered in Greek nationalism a relevant cultural
system
that meditated the articulation of their
self-conception
and the conscious
visualization of their collective
destiny.21
During
the last
half-century
of Ottoman rule the
penetration
of Greek
nationalism into
Cyprus represented
a
parallel
reenactment of the
process
of the
politicization
of Pontic Hellenism. The
compactness
and cohesion
of the two communities in their isolated
geographical regions
set the
preconditions
for the
impressive
effectiveness of the
process.
This was
their critical difference from
Cappadocia
where the
interpenetration
with
Turkish
society
and the
fragility
of Greek
presence despite
the
genuineness
of the archaic tradition of the
area,
could never
provide
the basis for a full-
blown nationalist movement.
Cyprus
and Pontos on the
contrary present
a remarkable
similarity
with
only
two critical differences: first there was
6
a difference in
timing
dictated
by
the remarkable economic
development
in Pontos in the
early
nineteenth
century
which fostered the cultural and
political awakening
at an earlier date.
Cyprus
did not catch
up
until after the
1850s,
always lagging
behind however as a more
parochial
and backward
society.
The second critical difference
naturally
was the British
occupation
of
Cyprus
in 1878 which created an
entirely
new basis for the
growth
of
nationalism.
Between the Crimean War and the British
occupation
of
Cyprus
how-
ever the
phenomena
of national
'awakening'
in Pontos and
Cyprus present
remarkable
parallelisms
in the set of mechanisms and forces that drew these
two distant
outspots
of Hellenic culture into the
larger community
of the
Greek nation
by infusing
them with a sense of collective
identity
that broke
their traditional isolation and
insularity
and cultivated their consciousness
of
partaking
in the wider collective
destiny
of that distant and
vaguely
known nation.22
III
On the substantive historical basis that has been outlined above a model
of the
penetration
and
development
of Greek nationalism in Asia Mi-
nor and
Cyprus,
could be formulated. The
comparative approach
to the
growth
of nationalism in the three
regions
of the Greek East
suggests
that the
process might
be understood in terms of the
following
dimen-
sions:
(a)
The construction of a Greek educational network
represented
a
pro-
cess of
political
socialization
involving
a radical break with
past
attitudes
and values. In this
perspective
the
expansion
of the
system
of Greek schools
in the East constitutes the foremost indicator of the
penetration
of Greek
national ideas into distant and inaccessible
regions
with no direct ties with
the Greek state.23
The most
important
effect of the
expansion
of Greek education into
the interior of Asia Minor was the
spread
of the Greek
language among
younger generations.
Thus from the 1860s onward the
major
thrust of
the educational effort was aimed at the substitution of Greek for Turk-
ish as the
language
of the members of the Orthodox communities in the
Turcophone regions
of Asia Minor. The same
objective applied
to the
Greek-speaking parts
of the Greek
East,
like
Pontos,
Cyprus
and the
Greek-speaking
communities of
Cappadocia,
with their
highly
idiomatic
archaic and
Byzantine idioms,
which however were
incomprehensible
to
speakers
of the common Modern Greek
tongue.
These
sharp linguistic
peculiarities,
which were looked
upon
as
symptoms
of cultural and ethnic
degeneration,
were as much a
target
of the
linguistic
rehellenization of
the East as the Turkish
speech
of other Orthodox communities. Thus
the educational effort of the nineteenth
century promoted
the
linguistic
homogenization
of the Christian Orthodox
populations
of the
East,
as
the basis of their
incorporation
into the broader
community
of the Greek
nation. It is
significant
that
language
was
replacing religion
as the
major
unifying
bond of
nationality
under the new conditions. In
ideological
terms
7
this
represented
a transition from the older
community
of the Orthodox
millet in whose context
linguistic
differences were
immaterial,
to the new
community
of the Greek
nation, which,
following
modern nationalist doc-
trine,
used
language
as its foremost hallmark.
(b)
The
development
and content of intellectual life and the
emergence
of local intellectual elites
usually grouped together
in
voluntary
associa-
tions,
was the
leading
element of
ideological change
in the
process
of
national definition.24 Of
particular importance
in this connection was
the formation of an extensive network of local social clubs and cultural
associations
aiming
at the cultivation of the
newly
discovered national
identity.
The movement of local cultural associations went
through
its most
energetic phase
around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries,
when in one Greek
village
after another
throughout
Asia
Minor,
Thrace
and elsewhere in the Ottoman
empire
active
young
teachers were
taking
the
initiative for the creation of such clubs.25
Voluntary
associations with simi-
lar cultural
objectives
were founded in
Cyprus
as well in the same
period,
under conditions of
greatest
freedom because of the British
occupation
of
1878. The movement retained its momentum in
Cyprus
in the interwar
period
and it did recur in the
period
after the Second World War as
part
of
the intellectual
preparation
of the revolt
against
British rule in the 1950s.
(c)
Local
factors,
traditions and initiatives were
rarely
autonomous.
They
were set in motion
through
their
interplay
with external
influences,
emanating especially
from the
great
centres of the Greek
diaspora
in the
Eastern
Mediterranean,
which besides commercial
commodities
exported
cultural commodities as
well,
thus
reinforcing
the dialectic of nationalism.
Athens,
the
capital
of the
independent
Greek
state,
was
by
no means the
only
one or the most
important
centre of emission of cultural influences to
the East. Other
major
focal
points
of Greek urban culture in the Eastern
Mediterranean,
which
played
a
major
role in the
propagation
of Greek
nationalism included
Constantinople, Smyrna,
Alexandria and Trieste.
Books,
newspapers,
teachers and ideas
poured
out of these cities
-
at
times on a
larger
scale
by comparison
with Athens
-
and found their
recipients among
the Orthodox
populations
of the East. As a matter of
fact in the second half of the nineteenth
century,
a
period
in which Greek
claims in Macedonia were
intensified,
a division of labour is observable
between Athens and
Constantinople
in the
promotion
of Greek culture
in the Ottoman
empire.
Whereas the Athens based 'Association for the
Propagation
of Greek Letters' directed the main bulk of its effort toward
Macedonia,
the famous 'Greek
Literary
Association of
Constantinople'
carried the
major
burden of the cultural revival of the Greek commu-
nities in Asia
Minor,
including Cyprus.
It was not until the last decade of
the nineteenth
century (1891)
that an association of Asia Minor
Greeks,
mostly university professors,
intellectuals and
clergymen
was established
in Athens under the name 'Anatolia' with the
express purpose
to aid the
intellectual,
moral and national
regeneration
of their
compatriots
in Asia
Minor.26 'Anatolia'
operated through scholarships
to students from Asia
Minor,
support
of local
schools,
active
encouragement
of local initiatives
8
to form new cultural associations and the establishment of a
seminary
on
the island of Patmos in 1901 to train teachers for Asia Minor Greek schools.
The
seminary
was transferred to the autonomous
principality
of Samos in
1906,
where it
operated
until
1913,
when Samos was united with Greece. In
1909 the Association founded a school for the
training
of
nursery
teachers
at
Zindjidere,
near
Kayseri,
the ancient
Caesarea,
in
Cappadocia,
in order
to
promote
the
teaching
of Greek to the
Turcophone population
of the
interior of Asia
Minor.
From 1896 to 1910 the Association
published
the
journal Xenophanes,
which is a mine of information on the mechanisms
and content of the whole
process
of the
propagation
of Greek nationalism
in Asia Minor.
(d)
The Greek state fostered
programmatically
the
process by
means
of the
expansion
of the consular
system
from the 1840s onward with the
opening
of Greek consulates in the
major geographical points
of Greek
settlement in the Ottoman
Empire.
The
pertinent
law of 12
July
1851
is a
significant
document of this enhanced state-action in the
promotion
of nationalism in the East. The role of the state as the
producer
of the
nation,
recognized long ago by Rudolph
Rocker,
is made
graphically
clear
by
the mission ascribed to Greek consulates in the Ottoman
Empire.27
This
mission is outlined
quite openly by
the Greek Consul General in
Smyrna
in the first decade of the twentieth
century.28
The relevant consular
reports
constitute a most
important
source for the
study
of the
phenom-
enon.29
(e)
The attitude of the Ottoman state to intellectual movements and
cultural initiatives
among
the
subject
non-Muslim
communities,
consti-
tutes a critical
parameter
of the whole
process
of the
implantation
of
nationalism. This attitude was
shaped by
the traditional
policy
of toleration
toward the
'religions
of the Book'
(Judaism
and
Christianity),
reinforced
by
the new climate of reform of the Tanzimat era.
Especially
after the
Crimean War official toleration and non-interference in the educational
and cultural life of the
subject
nationalities allowed
space
for the initia-
tives which led to nationalist ferment
among
Greeks and Slavs in the
Balkans and
among
Greeks and Armenians in Asia Minor
during
the
second half of the nineteenth
century.
The
ideology
of 'Ottomanism'
with its vision of a common Ottoman
identity
based on the
equality
of all ethnic
groups
in the
Empire,
turned out to be a
precondition
of
the
growth
of nationalism
among
the Christian
subjects
of the Sublime
Porte.30 The historical
irony
of this situation is obvious: the
attempt
to
save the
empire by elaborating
an
ideology
of mutual toleration of its
component
ethnic
groups (Ottomanism), only
facilitated the more effec-
tive
growth
of nationalism which
eventually destroyed
both the
empire
and
the
subject
nationalities in Asia Minor. A
comparison
of the attitude of
the Ottoman
supranational Empire
with that of the Balkan states toward
nationalism is instructive: the
neutrality
of the
empire
toward nationalism
in this
period
made room for the
promotion
of
aspirations
of the new
nation-states which coveted its territories in order to achieve their own
national
integration.
In either of its
aspects,
the role of the state in the
promotion
of
nationalism,
appears
to have been the most critical factor.
9
Nationalism was thus
effectively overtaking
the state as the Janus of modern
politics.
IV
The
pivotal place
of the Church in the life of the Orthodox communities
in the Ottoman
empire,
allowed it to exercise the
paramount
influence in
the formation of collective attitudes and values. The
interplay
between
religion
and nationalism has been a critical factor in the creation of
these attitudes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and therefore
requires
a more detailed examination. In
elucidating
this issue it should
be
pointed
out that the identification of the Church with nationalism in
the
early
twentieth
century
fostered the
misconception
that
Orthodoxy
had
always spearheaded
national movements
among
the Christian
subjects
of
the Sultan. This view is in fact an
ideological stereotype
which
projects
in
to the
interpretation
of the
past latter-day political positions.
It is true that
the Orthodox Church has been the
only permanent
institution in the life of
the Orthodox
peoples
of Eastern
Europe
and the Middle East. Medieval
empires
declined and
collapsed,
modern national states have been
very
recent,
rather unstable and
completely
circumstantial creatures of
power
politics,
modes of economic
organization
have been
changing
over the
centuries,
but the Church with her medieval monastic institutions and her
ancient focal role in communal
life,
has
always
remained there.
By
virtue
of its
permanence
and
continuity,
the Church
preserved
and transmitted
the foremost elements of cultural
life,
language, script
and
learning
and
an ancient
memory
as the
depository
of a sense of
history.
It was
precisely
these elements that nationalism inherited or
usurped
and used them for
its own
purposes,
which were
quite
different from those of the Orthodox
Church. The fact however that this cultural inheritance was identified with
and owed its
preservation
to the Church led to the mistaken
assumption
that the Church had also been the
depository
of nationalist values.
The ecclesiastical
history
of the Orthodox East in the
age
of
nationalism,
since the late
eighteenth
and
throughout
the nineteenth
century, points
to the
contrary
conclusion. The official attitude of the Orthodox Church
as
represented by
the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople,
was
from the outset inimical and often
actively
hostile to the secular values
and
aspirations propagated by
nationalism. This
explains
the confronta-
tion between the Church and the
Enlightenment
in the
period
from the
1790s to the 1820s. The
leadership
of the Orthodox Church
repeatedly
and
unequivocally
made clear its
opposition
to the secular
aspirations
of
freedom and national
independence
advocated
by
the
Enlightenment
and
it issued condemnations of
major
initiatives of national liberation like those
of
Rhigas
Velestinlis in 1798 or of the Greek Revolution in 1821.
Ironically
it was Patriarch
Gregory
V who issued the
pertinent pronouncements
on
both of these occasions to the
great
embarrassment of
latter-day supporters
of the nationalist role of the Church.
They
however find their consolation in
the fact that the Sublime
Porte,
in order to
revenge
the revolt in
1821,
hanged
the Patriarch, whom it held
responsible
for the disobedience of his flock.31
10
Although
the
regional
Orthodox Churches that
emerged
in the new
national states of the
Balkans,
being
state institutions became
inevitably
identified with
nationalism,
the Patriarchate of
Constantinople
remained
actively opposed
to nationalism.32 The Church knew that its own survival
was tied
up
to the survival of a
supra-national empire,
which
recognized
its traditional
privileges.
The
scepticism
of the Church toward national-
ism became even more
pronounced
as the nineteenth
century brought
more
challenges
from within the
body
of
Orthodoxy.
These took the
form of unilateral and therefore uncanonical
proclamations
of ecclesiasti-
cal
independence by regional churches, beginning
with Greece in
1833,
Romania in 1866 and
Bulgaria
in
1870,
the latter
culminating
in the reli-
gious
schism that
accompanied
the violent conflict in Macedonia. However
the most
alarming consequence
of the
growth
of nationalism
among
the
Christian Orthodox
peoples
of the Balkans from the
point
of view of the
Ecumenical
Patriarchate,
was the fact that nationalism
among
the former
subjects
acted as a
catalyst
for the
emergence
of nationalism
among
the
ruling
Turks as well. This
essentially
meant that once nationalism had
developed among
the
Turks,
the
supra-national empire
would come to an
end and nationalist exclusivism would
replace
the former
imperial
tolera-
tion that had made
possible
the survival of the Church in the Ottoman
Empire.
This was
precisely
the
diagnosis
of the
great
Patriarch Joachim
III,
who a
century
after
Gregory
V,
opposed equally
the
pressures
of Greek
nationalism and the rise of
Young
Turk nationalism in the Ottoman
empire.
Joachim died
significantly
in November 1912
just
after the outbreak of the
Balkan wars. What he feared
eventually
did come to
pass:
the conflict of
rival nationalisms
brought
the end of the
empire
and
by
1922 had also
obliterated the Orthodox Church in what had become the modern Turkish
national state.
Meanwhile, however,
and
despite
the
opposition
of an older
generation
of
prelates
the church had been
eventually
converted to nationalism. This
was
partly
the result of the rise of a new
generation
of
prelates
who came to
identify closely
with the interests and
aspirations
of the Greek nation-state
and were
quite prepared
to subordinate the interests of the church to those
of the nation
-
something
that
Gregory
V or Joachim III for instance would
not do. But the new
bishops
had lived
through
the vehemence of nationalist
rivalries in the Balkans and
many
of them like
Chrysostom
of Drama and
then of
Smyrna
or Germanos of Kastoria and then of
Amasya
transferred
their nationalist commitments to their Asia Minor sees. Their eventual
ascendancy
was not won without a
struggle
which was
waged
-
especially
in the case of
Chrysostom
-
mostly against
Patriarch Joachim.33 Thus the
Orthodox
Church, just
on the eve of its fall
along
with the Ottoman
Empire,
was
eventually
converted to
nationalism,
after
painful
conflicts in the ranks
of the
hierarchy.
So the Orthodox communities in the Eastern
periphery
of Asia
Minor,
such as Pontos and
Cappadocia,
found themselves led
by
nationalist
bishops
who had
hoped, along
with the nationalist
teachers,
that
redemption
could come
through
nationalist claims and
struggles.34
This of course involved the collision of Greek national
hopes
with Turkish
nationalism and the eventual defeat and
expulsion
of the
Greeks,
since
11
all forms of traditional accommodation had been abandonned
by
both
sides.
The Church of
Cyprus,
under British rule since
1878,
went
through
its
own crisis of 'nationalization' in the
period
of the so called
'archiepiscopal
question' (1900-1910).35
The conflict between two
candidates,
both
by
the
name of
Cyril,
to the
throne,
involved
essentially
a conflict between differ-
ent attitudes toward nationalism. The more forceful nationalists
eventually
won and from then on the Church of
Cyprus
assumed the uncontested
leadership
of the nationalist movement in the
island,
that
aspired
to
union with Greece. With the accession of
Cyril
II the older tradition of
accommodation with the
ruling power
as
long
as matters of faith remained
intact,
which had been followed
by
the Church of
Cyprus
since the Otto-
man
conquest
in
1571,
was abandoned.
Cyril's predecessor, Archbishop
Sophronios, during
whose
archepiscopate Cyprus passed
from Ottoman to
British hands in
1878,
had carried on this
policy,
true to the ethnarchic
tradition of the Church.
Sophronios
maintained
good
relations with the
new British masters of his island and was
greatly
honoured
during
a visit
to Britain in 1889.36
Cyril
II abandoned this
policy
and
pushed forcefully
for union with Greece. For the rest of the twentieth
century
the Church of
Cyprus
has been
closely
identified with Greek nationalism in the island.
A close
reading
of the historical record however leaves no doubt that this
identification is a twentieth
century development.
V
The enlistment of the Church under the banner of nationalism
brought
the
process
full circle. Her conversion removed the final institutional
and
ideological impediments
to the assertion of Greek nationalism as
the dominant
political
force in the life of the
distant,
isolated and insular
communities of the Orthodox East. It was this achievement of the first two
decades of the twentieth
century
that sealed the eventual
destiny
of these
communities. The
ideological
content of the
movement,
the nature of the
political
and social ideas and values transmitted to the Orthodox Christian
communities of the East
by
Greek
nationalism,
have never formed the ob-
ject
of serious research. On a certain level it
represented
a
phenomenon
of
belated
'Enlightenment',
in the sense that it
replaced
a traditional cultural
system shaped by
the values of
Orthodoxy
with secular ideas and the
politi-
cal values of the modern state. Yet the content of this belated
Enlighten-
ment was
radically
different from the humanism and
cosmopolitanism
of
the
period prior
to the French Revolution and the national revolutions of the
Balkan
peoples.
Those older
systems
of values had
by
the
early
twentieth
century
subsided before the inexorable
logic
of confrontation and violence
immanent in
nationalism,
which was
scarcely
concerned with the needs and
rights
of the individual.
Especially
in connection with
Cyprus
where this
ideology survived,
was reinforced
by
reactions to British colonial
policy
and
had a
determining impact
on twentieth
century politics,
the
understanding
of its inner structure and
implications
is an essential
precondition
of
any
appraisal
of
contemporary politics
as well.
12
This final
component
of the
blueprint
for the
comparative study
of Greek
nationalism in Asia Minor and
Cyprus brings
us to the
specifities
of the
Cyprus experience, geographical, demographic
and
political.
First,
Cyprus
offered a more fertile field for the
growth
of Greek nationalism than
any
other
place
in the Greek East because of its
geographic insularity
that made
it a self-enclosed
community
and had assured its
predominantly
Hellenic
ethnic character. Thus
Cyprus presented
the
specificity
of the
only territory
of the Greek East with an ethnic Hellenic and Greek
speaking majority
in
its
population
in which Greek nationalism was received and
developed
free
from the hostile
pressure
of an alien
majority
in the
society.
The second
specificity
was
political
and was the result of an event of decisive
importance
in the
history
of
Cyprus:
the British
occupation
of 1878. This event created
an
entirely
different environment for the further
development
of Greek
nationalism in the island and in the
longer
run assured its survival after the
extinction of Greek communities in Asia Minor in 1922-24.
The
specificities
of the
Cyprus
case had two
important consequences
for the
subsequent history
of nationalism in the island. First the eth-
nic
predominance
of the Greek element in
Cyprus
and the
consequent
facility
of the
expansion
of Greek nationalism resulted in an
oversight,
even oblivion of the existence of a Muslim
community
in the island and
a concommitant loss of the sense of
importance
of
neighbouring Turkey
-
which remained the
sovereign power
over
Cyprus
until 1914 - in Greek
Cypriot political
culture.
Secondly
the freedom of
political expression
un-
der the British
regime encouraged
the
growth
of nationalism in
ways
that
were unthinkable under Ottoman rule and therefore infused Greek
Cypriot
national claims with a
rigidity quite
uncharacteristic of the traditional
poli-
tics of
minority
behaviour for survival in the Ottoman state.
Furthermore,
the character of British colonial
policy
contributed to the
preservation
and
politicization
of traditional
corporate
structures and cultures and thus laid
the infrastructure of future ethnic confrontation and conflict.37 The distant
legacy
of the British
handling
of the
political problems
of colonial
Cyprus
has been the
ideological
atavism of
Cypriot political
culture,
which fostered
both the antinomies of the
Cypriot
liberation
struggle
in the 1950s and the
contradictory
attitudes and half-hearted
loyalties
of the
Cypriots
toward
their
independent republic
after 1960.
In
conclusion,
a few
methodological
and substantive remarks are in order.
The
comparative approach
with its focus on historical
change
makes
poss-
ible an
analytical understanding
of
nationalism,
as a
product
of the circum-
stances and
contingencies
of modern
politics.
The
generally
circumstantial
character of the
growth
of nationalism belies the basic illusion entertained
by
nationalists as to the immanence of its values in
particular
cultures.
The historical record instead seems to
suggest
that there is
nothing
foreor-
dained about the
emergence
of nationalist movements and the conversion
of
particular
ethnic and cultural
groups
to a
particular
set of national
values. The
adoption
of a
particular
sense of ethnic
identity
and national
loyalty
are the outcomes of
processes
of historical
change
that transform
certain
ethnological
contexts
by politicizing
them
according
to the
policies
of modern national states.
13
The
politicization
of the traditional
ethnography
of
particular regions
which fall within the
aspirations
of modern states
going through
their
own
process
of national consolidation and
integration,
forestalls a
range
of alternative
paths
of
political development
that
might
be conceivable for
the
regions
in
question.
In the
particular
case studies considered in this
essay
the
export
of irredentist nationalism from the
independent
Greek
kingdom
to the 'Greek East' can be
interpreted
to have had
precisely
such
effects
upon
the collective
destiny
of the Orthodox Christian
populations
which were converted to it. In
Cappadocia
it reversed the
process
of social
integration
of the
Turkish-speaking
Orthodox in Turkish
society
and it thus
sealed their eventual
expulsion
to Greece. In Pontos it
encouraged
such an
uncompromising
identification with the Greek state that it
precluded
the
serious consideration of
any
alternative
political options
when international
circumstances seemed for a
fleeting
moment to favour the creation of an
independent republic
in which
Greeks,
Turks and Armenians
might
coexist
at the end of the First World War.
Finally
in
Cyprus,
Greek nationalism ex-
cluded as
heresy
and treason the visualization of
any
other form of collective
existence short of union with
Greece,
thus
undermining
the
independent
republic
that was created in 1960.
These are the substantive
'lessons',
which unveil a
deeper
historical
antinomy:
the
growth
and total success of nationalism in
converting
the
populations
of the three historic
regions
of the Greek East
eventually
brought
about the obliteration of the traditional Hellenic
ethnography
on
which it had
originally
based its claims: the
Byzantine heritage
of
Cappado-
cia of which a
lingering presence
had survived into the twentieth
century
in the local Orthodox communities and the dense and cohesive
society
of
Pontic Hellenism came to an
abrupt
end as a
consequence
of the
growth
of
Greek nationalism whereas the Hellenic
society
of
Cyprus
which had been
miraculously
saved
by
British rule from the conflicts in Asia
Minor,
across
the channel of the Cilician
sea,
and was delivered to
independent statehood,
suffered violent destruction in the Northern
part
of the island in 1974 as a
consequence
of nationalist
folly
that
provoked
Turkish
military
action and
occupation.
To the observer who looks at the
politics
of nationalism in the
Greek East from this
angle,
it
appears
that as a drama of self-destructive
passion
this
story
is indeed
worthy
of a
Thucydides
in the fullness of his
grimness.
NOTES
1. See Elie
Kedourie, Nationalism, (London 1966), pp.9-61.
2.
Among
older sources see Carlton
J.H.Hayes, Essays
on
Nationalism, (New
York
1933),
pp.196-244,
Frederick
Hertz,
Nationality
in
History
and
Politics, (London
1944),
pp.270-75
and
Rudolp Rocker,
Nationalism and
Culture,
(New
York
1937), pp.240-56.
More recent
perspectives
of
political theory
include Hannah
Arendt,
The
Origins of
Totalitarianism, (New
York
1966), pp.359-361
and John
Dunn,
Western Political
Theory
in the Face
of
the
Future,
(Cambridge 1979), pp.55-79.
3. For an
eloquent critique
of this view see
Rocker,
Nationalism and
Culture,
pp.200-02,
272-73 and
Dunn,
Western Political
Theory,
pp.65-66.
14
4. For the connection between nationalism and historical
change
see John
A.Armstrong,
Nations
before Nationalism,
(Chapel
Hill
1982),
while
Rupert Emerson,
From
Empire
to
Nation, (Boston 1960),
treats the effects of
political change
on the
emergence
of national
communities. For a
survey
of
approaches
to the
problem
see
Anthony D.Smith,
Theories
of Nationalism, (London 1971)
and on the different historical
trajectories
toward the
formation of 'nation - states' see
idem,
'State -
Making
and
Nation-Building',
in States
in
History,
ed.
by J.Hall, (Oxford 1986), pp.228-63.
5. See Geoff
Eley,
'Nationalism and Social
History',
Social
History Vol.6,
No.I
(Jan. 1981),
pp.83-107
for a discussion of some
pertinent
sources.
6. For details see
P.M.Kitromilides,
'From Coexistence to Confrontation: The
Dynamics
of Ethnic Conflict in
Cyprus',
in
Cyprus Reviewed,
ed.
M.Attalides, (Nicosia 1977),
pp.35-70
and idem, The Dialectic of Intolerance:
Ideological
Dimensions of Ethnic
Conflict,
Journal
of
the Hellenic
Diaspora,
Vol.VI No.4
(Winter 1979), pp.5-30.
7. For a fuller
analysis
see
P.M.Kitromilides,
'The Dialectic of
Intolerance,' pp.5-18
and
idem,
'To elliniko kratos os ethniko
kentro',
in Ellinismos
-
Ellinikotita,
ed.
D.G.Tsaoussis, (Athens 1983), pp.143-64.
8. See
Speros Vryonis,
Jr. The Decline
of
Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the
Process
of
Islamization
from
the Eleventh
through
the
Fifteenth Centuries, (Berkeley
1971), pp.448-52
and for details see P.M.Kitromilides - A.
Alexandris,
'Ethnic
Survival,
Nationalism and Forced
Migration.
The Historical
Demography
of the Greek Commu-
nity
in Asia Minor at the close of the Ottoman
Era',
Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon
Spoudon,
Vol.V
(1984-1985), pp.9-44.
9. See
e.g. V.Sphyroeras,
'Metanastefsis kai
epikismi Kykladiton
is Smirnin kata tin
Tourkokratian',
Mikrasiatika
Chronika,
vol.X
(1963), pp.164-99
and
Kyriaki Mamoni,
'Peloponisii
sti Mikra
Asia',
Praktika B'Diethnous
Synedriou Peloponnisiakon Spoudon,
Vol.3
(1981-1982), pp.209-24.
10. The ethnic
origin
of this
population
of Orthodox Turkish
speakers
is a
disputed
issue
in the
history
of Asia Minor. The conventional view is that
they
constituted
Byzantine
Greeks who were
linguistically
Turkified under the
pressure
of the Turkish
conquest.
An alternative view
points
to the
phenomenon
of Christianized Turkish nomads in
Byzantine
Asia Minor as the
possible origin
of the
Turcophone
Orthodox communities
of the Anatolian hinterland. The
geographical
extent and the social
diversity
of the
phenomenon
however make
acceptance
of both views as
partial explanations
of the
historical
provenance
of the
Turcophone
Christians of
Anatolia,
perfectly legitimate.
Cf.
Vryonis,
The Decline
of
Medieval
Hellenism,
pp.452-62.
11. See
R.M.Dawkins,
Modern Greek in Asia
Minor,
(Cambridge 1916), pp.37-38.
12. On the
factors, mostly geographical,
of this
linguistic
survival cf.
George L.Huxley,
'Topics
in
Byzantine
Historical
Geography', Proceedings of
the
Royal
Irish
Academy,
Vol.82,
C.No.4
(Dublin 1982), pp.89-110, esp. pp.108-110.
For a
general survey
see
R.M.Dawkins,
Modern Greek in Asia
Minor, p.10-37.
Cf. his
telling
remark on
p.198
concerning
the
impact
of Turkish on these Greek dialects: 'the
body
has remained Greek
but the soul has become Turkish'.
13. For a
survey
see
Melpo Logotheti- Merlier,
'Ellinikes Kinotites sti
sygchroni Kappadokia',
Spoudon,
vol.1
(1977), pp.29-74.
14. Cf.
Vryonis,
The Decline
of
Medieval
Hellenism,
pp.160-162,
451-52.
15. For a
survey
of
pertinent historiographical
issues see
A.A.Bryer,
'The Tourkokratia
in the Pontos: Some Problems and
Preliminary
Conclusions' in idem, The
Empire of
Trebizond and the
Pontos, (London:
Variorum
Reprints, 1980),
XI.
16. See
Bryer,
'The Pontic Revival and the New
Greece',
The
Empire of
Trebizond and the
Pontos,
XII.
17.
Among
the
many
sources of evidence see the monumental work
by
F.W.Hasluck,
Christianity
and Islam under the
Sultans, (Oxford 1929),
John
Kingsley Birge,
The
Bektashi Order
of
Dervishes,
(London 1937), pp.215-18
and
R.M.Dawkins,
'The
Crypto-
Christians of
Turkey', Byzantion
Vol.8
(1933), pp.247-75.
See also
Vryonis,
The Decline
of
Medieval
Hellenism,
pp.481-96.
The Centre for Asia Minor studies has collected
considerable material on the
subject.
See
D.Petropoulos
-
E.Andreades,
I
thriskeftiki
zoi stin
peripheria
Akserai-
Gelveri, (Athens 1971), D.Loukoupoulos
-
D.Petropoulos,
I laiki latria ton
Pharason, (Athens 1949)
and
K.Boura,
'I Bektasi Dervisides: Merikes
15
ptyhes synyparxis metaxy
Ellinon kai Tourkon sti Mikra Asia
1826-1922',
Deltio Kentrou
Mikrasiatikon
Spoudon,
Vol.3
(1982), pp.185-94.
18. For a
contemporary
account see
S.B.Zervoudakis,
'Dianoitiki
anagennisis
en Kesaria tis
Kappadokias', Xenophanis,
Vol.1
(1896), pp.74-85.
19. Two
manuscript
sources in the collection of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies document
vividly
this
process
of
ideological change
and transvaluation of values in
Cappadocia.
In
the 1880s Ioannis
Kouyioumtzoglou,
who set off from his native Cesarea in
Cappadocia
and visited Athens on his
way
to
Manchester,
was struck
by
the
many
differences from the
customs of his native
regions
and the
peculiar ways
of
doing things
in the Greek
kingdom.
See
I.Kouyioumtzoglou, Odiporiko apo
tin Kesaria stin
Athina, 1882-1883,
Ms.
No.24,
(Athens:
Centre for Asia Minor
Studies).
In contrast to
Kouyioumtzoglou's puzzlement,
Emmanouel
Tsalikoglou
in his multi-volume
Aftoviographia
kai istorike
anamnisis,
Ms.
No.184, (Athens:
C.A.M.S.
1957),
which records his
youthful experiences
and recollec-
tions from
early twentieth-century Cappadocia, appears militantly
socialized in Greek
nationalist values.
20. See Alexis
Alexandris,
'I
anaptyxi
tou ethnikou
pnevmatos
ton Ellinon tou Pontou
1918-1922',
in Studies on Venizelos and his
Time,
ed.
O.Dimitrakopoulos
and
T.Veremis,
(Athens 1980), pp.427-74.
21. Cf. Clifford
Geertz,
'Ideology
as a Cultural
System',
in
Ideology
and
Discontent,
ed.
David
Apter, (Glencoe, Ill.,
1964), pp.47-76.
22. For historical details on this
process
see
P.M.Kitromilides,
'The Dialectic of
Intolerance',
pp.18-24.
23. A rich source of information on the
growth
of Greek education in Asia Minor is
G.Chassiotis,
L'instruction
publique
chez les Grecs
depuis
la
prise
de
Constantinople
par
les Turcs
jusqu'a
nos
jours, (Paris 1881) pp.355-472.
For
Cyprus
see
L.Philippou,
Ta ellinika
grammata
en
Kypro
kata tin
periodon
tis Tourkokratias
(1571-1878), (Nicosia
1930), Vol.1,
pp.119
ff. The whole
process
could be described
theoretically
in terms of
the
analysis proposed by
Karl
Deutch,
Nationalism and Social
Communication, (Cam-
bridge,
Mass.
1953).
In this connection cf.
R.Rocker,
Nationalism and
Culture,
p.202:
'the so-called national consciousness is not born in
man,
but trained into him'.
24. On this
aspect
of the
growth
of nationalism cf.
Kedourie, Nationalism, pp.41-50,
96-105
and
Gellner,
Thought
and
Change, pp.168-71.
25. The
burgeoning
literature on the
subject
includes
K.Mamoni,
'Les Associations
pour
la
propagation
de l'instruction
grecque
a
Constantinople (1861-1922)',
Balkan
Studies,
Vol.16,
No.1
(1975) pp.103-12, idem,
'Somatiaki
organosi
tou ellinismou sti Mikra
Asia',
Deltion tis Istorikis kai
Ethnologikis
Eterias tis
Ellados,
vol.26
(1983), pp.63-114
and idem
'Syllogi
Thrakis kai Anatolikis Romilias
(1878-1885)',
in La derniere
phase
de la crise orientale et l'Hellenisme
(1878-1881). Actes, (Athens 1983), pp.349-61.
See
also
M.Kouroupou, 'Vivliographia entipon
ton mikrasiatikon idrimaton kai
syllogon
1846-1922',
Spoudon,
Vol.3
(1982), pp.149-83.
26. See
K.Mamoni,
'To archio tou Mikrasiatikou
Syllogou Anatoli', Mnimosini,
Vol.7
(1978-1979), pp.
123-50.
27. In this connection
Rudolph
Rocker's remarks are
particularly apt:
'The nation is not the
cause,
but the result of the state. It is the state which creates the
nation,
not the nation
the state' and 'The nation is a
purely political concept arising solely
from the adherence
of men to a definite state.' See Nationalism and
Culture, pp.200,
272.
28. See
S.Antonopoulos,
Mikra
Asia, (Athens 1907), esp. pp.243-45.
On the
growth
of the
Greek consular
system
and the
political
stakes involved in the
process
see
D.Dontas,
'Greece. The Greek
Foreign Ministry',
in The Times
Survey of Foreign
Ministries
of
the
World,
ed. Zara
Steiner, (London 1982), pp.260-71, esp.
262-65.
29.
Specifically concerning Cyprus,
cf. Eleni
Bellia,
'Ellinika
proxenia
is tin Tourkokratou-
menin
Kypron 1834-1878',
and
Evangelos Kofos,
'I
ekhorisis tis
Kyprou
is tin
Agglian
vasi ellinikon
proxenikon
kai
diplomatikon eggraphon',
both in
Proceedings of
the First
International
Congress of Cypriot Studies, (Nicosia 1973), Vol.III,
Part
1,
pp.245-56
and
181-195
respectively
on the character of the evidence.
30. On the
ideology
of
'Ottomanism',
see Sherif
Mardin,
The Genesis
of Young
Ottoman
Thought, (Princeton 1962).
On the confrontation between Ottomanism and
nationalism,
see Roderic
Davison,
'Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman
Response',
16
GREEK IRREDENTISM IN ASIA MINOR 17
in Nationalism in a non-National State. The Dissolution
of
the Ottoman
Empire,
eds.
W.H.Haddad and
W.Ochsenwold, (Columbus, Ohio,
1977), pp.25-56.
31. For the
pertinent
historical
background
see Steven
Runciman,
The Great Church in
Captivity, (Cambridge 1968), pp.391-406.
32. On the official attitude of the Orthodox Church toward nationalism cf. the remarkable
work
by
the
Metropolitan
of Sardis
Maximos,
The Oecumenical Patriarchate in the
Orthodox Church. A
Study
in the
History
and Canons
of
the
Church, (Thessaloniki:
Patriarchal Institute for Patristic
Studies, 1976), esp. pp.300-11.
The author bases his
argument primarily
on the edict
against
nationalism,
issued
by
a
synod
of the Orthodox
patriarchs
of the East at
Constantinople
in 1872.
33. See
P.M.Kitromilides,
'To telos tis ethnarchikis
paradosis',
Amitos sti mnimi Photi
Apostolopoulou, (Athens 1984), pp.486-507.
34. On the involvement of the Church in the cause of Greek nationalism in the
early
twentieth
century
see the
survey
in E.Kostarides I
sygchronos
elliniki
ekklisia,
(Athens 1921), esp.
pp.89-118,
221-65 on the role of the Church in the
promotion
of nationalism in
Cyprus
and Asia Minor
respectively.
35. For details see
George
Hill,
A
History of Cyprus, Vol.IV,
(Cambridge University
Press
1952), pp.577-603.
See also
Spyros
Araouzos,
A
Report
on the
Archiepiscopal Question,
(Nicosia 1908).
36. See Andreas
Tyllirides, 'Archbishop Sophronios
III
(1865-1900)
and the
British',
Kypriakai Spoudai,
Vol.42
(1978), pp.129-52.
37. See Adamantia
Pollis,
'Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism. Determinants of Ethnic
conflict in
Cyprus'
in Small States in the Modern
World,
eds. Peter
Worseley
and
P.M.Kitromilides,
Revised
Edition, (Nicosia 1979), pp.45-79.

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