Appendix A

Team #2
Intelligence Collection and Foreign Liaison - Key Questions

How does the 1C collect information on global terrorism?

2. Who was in charge (responsibility and authority) of counterterrorism intelligence
collection prior to September 11th 2001?
3. How did counterterrorism rank among competing national security threats for
collection resources (requested, budgeted, spent) and emphasis? Who made the
decisions about priorities and resources?
4. What was the counterterrorism collection strategy? Was the strategy approved by the
DCI and the interagency process?
5. How effective was the collection strategy particularly against Al Qaida and UBL
during the 1990s? Who was assessing and changing (as needed) collection?
6. How effective was the counterterrorism collection prioritization process? Was it
dynamic enough to react to changes in the environment?
7. How did the 1C perform collection of strategic and tactical counterterrorism
intelligence for the President and the NSC prior to September 2001? Did the
President or NSC provide feedback to direct/request changes in collection? Which
collection practices/operations and assets have proven effective?
8. How was the IC's collection strategy coordinated (see also #9 and #10) with
traditional foreign reporting conducted by the Department of State, Treasury,
Commerce and Justice? Did coordination change collection strategy, priorities,
resources or operations?
9. How effective was this strategy in countries such as Pakistan, Germany, Malaysia and
Saudi Arabia? Was it at all effective in countries that might not have been
immediately implicated in Al Qaida and UBL collection but do have a connection to
international drug/slave trade, organized crime, and financial crime as in Latin
America, the "Stans", Russia, Eastern Europe, etc.?
10. How did collection and analysis strategies and processes connect or fail to connect?
11. How are collection and warning connected?
12. Did counterterrorism collection policy, strategy, resources, organization or
practices/operations change after the Yemen attacks in 1992; the WTC bombing in
1993; the Khobar Towers attack in 1996; the embassy bombings in 1998; the
millennium celebrations of 2000; and the USS Cole attack in 2000? Did policy
makers (including the DCI)/government leaders request any changes? Did they
review/assess changes?
13. Did Intelligence support to military actions/force protection requirements in the
Balkans, Turkey, Iraq, Africa, and the Middle East and worldwide peacekeeping
missions impact 1C collection against global terrorism positively or negatively? Did
strategy, policy, organization, resources, or operations change as a result?
14. Did law enforcement requirements and prosecution of terrorists in the 1980s and
1990s (and publicity on evidence used - sources and methods) impact collection
capabilities positively or negatively? As in #13 above were changes made as a result?
15. Have any constitutional strictures, legal issues/laws, or policy directives hampered
collection against counterterrorism targets? Were these discussed within the 1C; were
changes proposed to facilitate improvement? Were changes made?
16. Was there effective oversight of 1C collection policy, strategy, organization, resource
allocation and operations/practices? Who provided or failed to provide oversight?