Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996 TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents. G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996 PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.: These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client. The facts of the case are undisputed. The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in

PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1 Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nomineesstockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2 On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant. 3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4 Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations: 14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel

Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5 In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that: 4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering. 4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock. 4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6 Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7 Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as partiesdefendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion for

dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings. 9 Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10 It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11 On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held: xxx xxx xxx ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence andidentity of the client. This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG. The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco. Neither can this Court. WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12 ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds: I The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency. II The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nomineestockholder. 2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause. 3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause. III The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. 1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s). 2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters. IV The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law. Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship. Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyerclient confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. 13 In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "( Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No .0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15 Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit. I It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as codefendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit: ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client. This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein . (Emphasis ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in blank. We quote Atty. Ongkiko: ATTY. ONGKIKO: With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16 It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint. II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorariumor for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee. In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24 It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. 25 InStockton v. Ford, 26 the U. S. Supreme Court held: There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27 In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the

course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides: Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29 Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval. This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,

violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once selfevident. Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility. The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31 The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33 Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged. U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained. The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino. In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held: A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information

would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v.Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case. The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. 36 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, 37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation. In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said: That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him. 38 xxx xxx xxx All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they

relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . . It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39 In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held: If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. 41 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged. In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held: The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43 Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client

relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45 Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46 The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship). The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings. From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings. There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47 An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him. These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists. In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." 50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek

to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution. There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege. In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship. The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, 54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client. To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller 55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure

his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon 56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but thepunctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all. The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57 Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise: Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God. We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.

The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines. By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime." III In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59 First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show and absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at bar that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for reinvestigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61 To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed. . . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,

whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. 63 We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights. An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are coprincipals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer. While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover illgotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyerclient confidentiality privilege. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al." SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur. Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the result. Romero and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., took no part. Mendoza, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring: The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it should, an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles have evolved that would help ensure its effective ministration. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is one, and it has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence essential in a justice system that works on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and will make that rule endure. I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish

a case not on what it perceives to be the strength of its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination. Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for the GRANT of the petition.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting The impressive presentation of the case in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes difficult the espousal of a dissenting view. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that view because I strongly feel that this Court must confine itself to the key issue in this special civil action for certiorari, viz., whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been simply buried under the avalanche of authorities upholding the sanctity of lawyer-client relationship which appears to me to be prematurely invoked. From the undisputed facts disclosed by the pleadings and summarized in the ponencia, I cannot find my way clear to a conclusion that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' prayer in their Comment to the PCGG's Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint. The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the issue of "interest" ( 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a misjoinder of parties ( 7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised. In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude from the complaint original co-defendant Raul Roco because he had allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short, there was an agreement or compromise settlement between the PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a Third Amended Complaint without Roco as a defendant. No obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely

answerable therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. There is at all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot further be proceeded upon or that any judgment therein cannot be binding without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly, the admission of the Third Amended Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the Sandiganbayan. Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be excluded but only made the request to that effect as a rider to their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third Amended Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the answer is clearly in the negative. The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason and logic dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they must first voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by Roco and must bind themselves to perform certain obligations as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to the petitioners' comment on the aforementioned Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that it is willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave Roco provided they would do what Roco had done, that is, disclose the identity of their principals/clients and submit documents substantiating their claimed lawyer-client relationship with the said principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds of assignments the petitioners executed in favor of their principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because they believed that compliance thereof would breach the sanctity of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship. It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that 5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of action against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to substantiate Roco's compliance. The ponencia itself so stated, thus:

. . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence by the PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. (Id., 5-6). These are the pieces of evidence upon which the Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the PCGG was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The petitioners have not assailed such finding as arbitrary. The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not refute the petitioners' contention that he did not comply with his obligation to disclose the identity of his principals is entirely irrelevant. In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely aground for disqualification of a witness ( 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communicator or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce, through subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or otherwise reveal"any [confidential] communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment." What they are being asked to do, in line with their claim that they had done the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their professional relation to their clients, is to identify the latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if they so choose in order to be dropped from the complaint, such identification being the condition under which the PCGG has expressed willingness to exclude them from the action. The revelation is

entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners' prayer for their exclusion as party-defendants because they did not want to abide with any of the conditions set by the PCGG. There would have been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because then it would have capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed its will on the PCGG. Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal of the case insofar as they are concerned because either they are invested with immunity under the principle of confidentiality in a lawyer-client relationship, or the claims against them in Civil Case No. 0033 are barred by such principle. Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit that the lawyerclient privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No. 0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the acts complained of for being nominees of certain parties. Their inclusion as defendants in justified under 15, Article XI of the Constitution which provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel and E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of 12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG. Furthermore, 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint or information should be "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved." Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege. This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication . The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the identity of the client under the exceptional situations narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which are preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked in the court where it was already filed and presently pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules abovequoted. Secondly, and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as coconspirators in the offenses charged. The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them. Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, 393 to 395, pages 356-357: 393. Effect of unlawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attorney-client privilege from attaching. The attorney-client privilege does not generally exist where the representation is sought to further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past, present, or future. Thus, a confidence received by an attorney in order to advance a criminal or fraudulent purpose is beyond the scope of the privilege. Observation: The common-law rule that the privilege protecting confidential communications between attorney and client is lost if the relation is abused by a client who seeks legal assistance to perpetrate a crime or fraud has been codified. 394. Attorney participation.

The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime in concert with the attorney, even where the attorney is not aware of his client's purpose . The reason for the rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advised on the commission of crime. Professional responsibility does not countenance the use of the attorney-client privilege as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies, either active or passive, which are calculated to hinder the administration of justice will vitiate the privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this exception to the rule of privilege in confined to such intended acts in violation of the law as are mala in se, as distinguished from those which are merely mala prohibita. 395. Communication in contemplation of crime. Communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. But, the mere charge of illegality, not supported by evidence, will not defeat the privilege; there must be at least prima facie evidence that the illegality has some foundation in fact. Underhill also states: There are many other cases to the same effect, for the rule is prostitution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice . In accordance with this rule, where a forged will or other false instrument has come into possession of an attorney through the instrumentality of the accused, with the hope and expectation that the attorney would take some action in reference thereto, and the attorney does act, in ignorance of the true character of the instrument, there is no privilege, inasmuch as full confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then compelled to produce a forged writing against the client. The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it, attempts to dissuade his client, is immaterial. The attorney's ignorance of his client's intentions deprives the information of a professional character as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C. Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Case Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837; emphasis mine).

125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED, 516-519, summarizes the rationale of the rule excepting communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts, thus: c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent act. Various reasons have been announced as being the foundation for the holdings that communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts are not privileged. The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in such cases there is no professional employment, properly speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221 Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW(2d) 599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App 338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland(1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM Dec 287; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc 714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in (1934) 242 App Div 611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell v. Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng Reprint 558;Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR; Re Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div (Eng) 722. In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR, the court said: "In order that the rule may apply, there must be both professional confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent . The client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts which is the foundation of the supposed confidence does not exist. The solicitor's advice is obtained by a fraud." So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the court said: "The reason of the principle which holds such communications not to be privileged is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice upon such subjects, and that it is no part of the profession of an attorney or counselor at law to be advising persons as to how they

may commit crimes or frauds, or how they may escape the consequences of contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has already been committed and finished, a client may advise with an attorney in regard to it, and communicate with him freely, and the communications cannot be divulged as evidence without the consent of the client, because it is a part of the business and duty of those engaged in the practice of the profession of law, when employed and relied upon for that purpose, to give advice to those who have made infractions of the laws; and, to enable the attorney to properly advise and to properly represent the client in court or when prosecutions are threatened, it is conducive to the administration of justice that the client shall be free to communicate to his attorney all the facts within his knowledge, and that he may be assured that a communication made by him shall not be used to his prejudice." The protection which the law affords to communications between attorney and client has reference to those which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment, and does not extend to communications made in contemplation of a crime, or perpetration of a fraud. Strong v.Abner (1937) 368 Ky 502, 105 SW (2d) 599. The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594, in holding not privileged communications to an attorney having for their object the communication of a crime, said: "They then partake of the nature of a conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec 287, the court was of the opinion that there could be no such relation as that of attorney and client, either in the commission of a crime, or in the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an individual, the privileged relation of attorney and client existing only for lawful and honest purposes. If the client consults the attorney at law with reference to the perpetration of a crime, and they co-operate in effecting it, there is no privilege, inasmuch as it is no part of the lawyer's duty to aid in

crime he ceases to be counsel and becomes a criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054. The court cannot permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud forms part of the professional business of an attorney or solicitor. Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751. If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his object and intention as well as facts, there is not professional confidence, and therefore no privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308. There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the production of documents passing between solicitor and client, when the transaction impeached is charged to be based upon fraud, that is the matter to be investigated, and it is thought better that the alleged privilege should suffer than that honestly and fair dealing should appear to be violated with impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L Rep 334. In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172 CCR), the chief justice said "I believe the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards turns out to be the commission of a crime or a fraud, that party so consulting the attorney has no privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney from stating the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege should be contended for, or existing, it would work most grievous hardship on an attorney, who, after he had been consulted upon what subsequently appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would have his lips closed, and might place him in a very serious position of being suspected to be a party to the fraud, and without his having an opportunity of exculpating himself . . . There is no privilege in the case which I have suggested of a party consulting another, a professional man, as to what may afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the best mode of accomplishing it." In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39, although the question of privilege as to communications between attorney and client was not involved, the question directly involved being the competency of a clerk in a business establishment to testify as to certain information which he acquired while working in the establishment, the court strongly approved of a view as stated arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr

(Eng) 1229, as follows: "I shall claim leave to consider whether an attorney may be examined as to any matter which came to his knowledge as an attorney. If he is employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose it; no private obligations can dispense with that universal one which lies on every member of society to discover every design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of society, to destroy the public welfare. For this reason, I apprehend that if a secret which is contrary to the public good, such as a design to commit treason, murder, or perjury, comes to the knowledge of an attorney, even in a cause where he is concerned, the obligation to the public must dispense with the private obligation to the client ." The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213, said; "It would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was asked and obtained in reference to a contemplated crime that the lips of the attorney would be sealed, when the facts might become important to the ends of justice in the prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot be taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it." And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36, observed that this rule was not in contravention of sound public policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance of a higher standard of professional ethics by preventing the relation of attorney and client from operating as a cloak for fraud. Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged if they were a request for advice as to how to commit a fraud, it being in such a case not only the attorney's privilege, but his duty, to disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907) 3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: "We say this notwithstanding the comments of opposing counsel as to the indelicacy of his position because of his being now on the opposite side of the issue that arose as a consequence of the communication he testifies about, and is interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee, as he confesses." The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications is to protect the client, and not to make the attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the commission of a crime. People vs.Petersen (1901) 60 App Div 118, NYS 941. The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a transaction which is in itself a crime.People v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE 457.

As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, 410 and 411, pages 366-368, states: 410. Name or identity of client. Disclosure of a client's identity is necessary proof of the existence of the attorney-client relationship and is not privileged information . Thus, the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable even though the information was communicated confidentially to the attorney in his professional capacity and, in some cases, in spite of the fact that the attorney may have been sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is directed to an attorney as to the name or identity of his client. This general rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action, the opposing party has a right to know with whom he is contending or who the real party in interest is, if not the nominal adversary . 411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of confidentiality. The revelation of the identification of a client is not usually considered privileged, except where so much has been divulged with regard to to legal services rendered or the advice sought, that to reveal the client's name would be to disclose the whole relationship and confidential communications. However, even where the subject matter of the attorney-client relationship has already been revealed, the client's name has been deemed privileged. Where disclosure of the identity of a client might harm the client by being used against him under circumstances where there are no countervailing factors, then the identity is protected by the attorneyclient privilege. In criminal proceedings, a client's name may be privileged if information already obtained by the tribunal, combined with the client's identity, might expose him to criminal prosecution for acts subsequent to, and because of, which he had sought the advice of his attorney. Although as a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege, where the attorney has surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in his possession by way of the attorney-client relationship, the state must prove the connection between the piece of physical evidence and the defendant without in any way relying on the testimony of the client's attorney who

initially received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may not be called to the stand and asked to disclose the identity of the client. However, an attorney cannot refuse to reveal the identity of a person who asked him to deliver stolen property to the police department, whether a bona fide attorney-client relationship exists between them, inasmuch as the transaction was not a legal service or done in the attorney's professional capacity. Distinction: Where an attorney was informed by a male client that his female acquaintance was possibly involved in [a] his-and-run accident, the identity of the female did not come within scope of attorney-client privilege although the identity of the male client was protected. (emphases supplied) WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is not within the lawyerclient privilege in this manner: 2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit. The identity of the attorney's client or the name of the real party in interest will seldom be a matter communicated in confidence because the procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to secure action without appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents . He cannot be obliged to struggle in the dark against unknown forces . He has by anticipation the right, in later proceedings, if desired, to enforce the legal responsibility of those who may have maliciously sued or prosecuted him or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as much right to ask the attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to ask the witness (966 supra). "Who maintains you during this trial?" upon the analogy of the principle already examined (2298 supra), the privilege cannot be used to evade a client's responsibility for the use of legal process. And if it is necessary for the purpose to make a plain exception to the rule of confidence, then it must be made . (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609; emphases supplied). In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following statement: 1. Name or identity. As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that the rule making communications between attorney and client privileged from disclosure ordinarily does not apply where the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's employment and the name of the person

employing him, since the privilege presupposes the relationship of client and attorney, and therefore does not attach to its creation. At the present stage of the proceedings below, the petitioners have not shown that they are so situated with respect to their principals as to bring them within any of the exceptions established by American jurisprudence. There will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the trial where the broader perspectives of the case shall have been presented and can be better appreciated by the court. The insistence for their exclusion from the case is understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution desired is naturally suspect. We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his great trust is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his profession and the best interest of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud. I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition. Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur. PUNO, J., dissenting: This is an important petition for certiorari to annul the resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying petitioners' motion to be excluded from the Complaint for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity of their client. First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33 before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Sued as co-defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar lawyers Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.

Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected senator of the Republic. All co-defendants were then partners of the law firm, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law Firm. The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz: xxx xxx xxx The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power as more fully described (in the subsequent paragraphs of the complaint), all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of the San Miguel Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of 7 June 1984. In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal services offered and made available by their firm to its clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators or stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to clients the corresponding documents of their equity holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in

blank or blank deeds of trust or assignment). They claimed that their activities were "in furtherance of legitimate lawyering." In the course of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party defendant. Lawyer Roco was excluded on the basis of his promise to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in the case. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to comment on the motion. In their Comment, petitioners demanded that they be extended the same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They prayed for their exclusion from the complaint. PCGG agreed but set the following conditions: (1) disclosure of the identity of their client; (2) submission of documents substantiating their lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their client covering their respective shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed on lawyer Roco. Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions contending that the attorney-client privilege gives them the right not to reveal the identity of their client. They also alleged that lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It held: xxx xxx xxx ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to the debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client. This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. 5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of course against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to

the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG. The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as a party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco. Neither can this Court. WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' motions for reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21, 1988 and September 3, 1992. In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend: I The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who indisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law agency. II The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment. 1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nomineestockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause. 3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco and violation of the equal protection clause. III The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. 1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s). 2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters. IV The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law. The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege. It ought to be noted that petitioners were included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33 as conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having ". . . conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly." To stress, petitioners are charged with having conspired in the commission of crimes. The issue of attorney-

client privilege arose when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on condition they reveal the identity of their client. Petitioners refused to comply and assailed the condition on the ground that to reveal the identity of their client will violate the attorney-client privilege. It is thus necessary to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis that to reveal the identity of their client would violate the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. 1 For the first time in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to disclose the identity of client. The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution requires the delicate balancing of three opposing policy considerations. One overriding policy consideration is the need for courts to discover the truth for truth alone is the true touchstone of justice. 2 Equally compelling is the need to protect the adversary system of justice where truth is best extracted by giving a client broad privilege to confide facts to his counsel. 3 Similarly deserving of sedulous concern is the need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the right to effective counsel in criminal litigations. To bridle at center the centrifugal forces of these policy considerations, courts have followed to prudential principle that the attorney-client privilege must not be expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search for truth. 4 Accordingly, a narrow construction has been given to the privilege and it has been consistently held that "these competing societal interests demand that application of the privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., the privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for which it was created.'" 5 Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define in clear strokes the substantive content of the attorney-client privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the petition at bar. With due respect, I like to start by stressing the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud. Communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." 6 In the well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. 7 I hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer conspired with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the privilege. 8 As early

as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice Cardozo held in Clark v. United States 9 that: "there are early cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any evidence, will set the confidences free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without support . . . To drive the privilege away, there must be 'something to give colour to the charge;' there must be prima facie evidence that it has foundation in fact." In the petition at bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorneyclient privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners from the Complaint provided they reveal the identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that petitioner are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege if they reveal their client's identity. Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the attorneyclient privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 10 viz: The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F. 2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979). The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird the IRS received a letter from an attorney stating that an enclosed check in the amount of $12,706 was being tendered for additional amounts due from

undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS summoned the attorney to ascertain the identity of the delinquent taxpayers the attorney refused identification assertion the attorney-client privilege. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, adjudged that the "exception" to the general rule as pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915) controlled: The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was employed. Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the Baird taxpayer was adjudged within this exception to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit has continued to acknowledge this exception. A significant exception to this principle of nonconfidentiality holds that such information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first case. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This exception, which can perhaps be most succinctly characterized as the "legal advice" exception, has also been recognized by other circuits. See: In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the legal advice exception is firmly grounded in the policy of protecting confidential communications, this Court adopts and applies its principles herein. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra. It should be observed, however that the legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facieshowing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended

continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Decus Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 n. 1; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449, U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct. 869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469, 77, L.Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc). Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication. In Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit observed: If the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attorney and client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in the absence of another factors. Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit promulgated the following exception: To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the rule itself. The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944). See also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh Circuit has added to the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat: The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed

[not necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception, has emphasized that it is the link between the client and the communication, rather than the link between the client and the possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which serves to bring the client's identity within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal advice" exception, this exception is also firmly rooted in principles of confidentiality. Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last link" of evidence: We have long recognized the general rule that matters involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); see cases collected id. at 670 n. 2. There we also recognized, however, a limited and narrow exception to the general rule, one that obtains when the disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney would have supplied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment. I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions discussed above. Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall within the exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. 11 The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege. 12 When these facts can be presented only by revealing the

very information sought to be protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in camera hearing. 13 The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a well-recognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex-parte hearing. 14 Without the proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule. In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions for as aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that petitioners need not further establish the factual basis of their claim that they fall within the exceptions to the general rule, the majority held: The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench therefore clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the word of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime. I respectfully submit that the first and third exceptions relied upon by the majority are not self-executory but need factual basis for their successful invocation. The first exception as cited by the majority is ". . . where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients' name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice." It seems to me evident that "the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice" is a question of fact which must first be established before there can be any ruling that the exception can be invoked. The majority cites Ex Parte Enzor, 15 and U S v. Hodge and Zweig, 16 but these cases leave no doubt that the "very activity" for which the client sought the advice of counsel was properly proved. In both cases, the "very activity" of the clients reveal they sought advice on their criminal activities. Thus, in Enzor, the majority opinion states that the "unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election

laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end." 17 In Hodge, the "very activity" of the clients deals with illegal importation of drugs. In the case at bar, there is no inkling whatsoever about the "very activity" for which the clients of petitioners sought their professional advice as lawyers. There is nothing in the records that petitioners were consulted on the "criminal activities" of their client. The complaint did allege that petitioners and their client conspired to commit crimes but allegations are not evidence. So it is with the third exception which as related by the majority is "where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime." 18 Again, the rhetorical questions that answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without presentation of evidence? and (2) how can we determine that the name of the client is the only link without presentation of evidence as to the other links? The case of Baird vs. Koerner 19does not support the "no need for evidence" ruling of the majority. In Baird, as related by the majority itself, "a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. 20 Once more, it is clear that the Baird court was informed of the activity of the client for which the lawyer was consulted and the activity involved probable violation of the tax laws. Thus, the Court held: The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more tax or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.

In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly established by the parties. In the case at bar, there is no evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made by petitioners' client. Again, the records do not show that the subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw allegations in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of the client ". . . would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to petitioners who are marquee names in the legal profession and unjust to their undisclosed client. Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners' right to claim the attorneyclient privilege is resolutory of the Complaint against them, and hence should be decided ahead and independently of their claim to equal protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also respectfully submit that there is no immediate necessity to resolve petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this stage of the proceedings. IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions VITUG, J., concurring: The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it should, an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles have evolved that would help ensure its effective ministration. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is one, and it has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence essential in a justice system that works on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and will make that rule endure. I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be the strength of its own evidence but

on what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination. Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for the GRANT of the petition.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting The impressive presentation of the case in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes difficult the espousal of a dissenting view. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that view because I strongly feel that this Court must confine itself to the key issue in this special civil action for certiorari, viz., whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been simply buried under the avalanche of authorities upholding the sanctity of lawyer-client relationship which appears to me to be prematurely invoked. From the undisputed facts disclosed by the pleadings and summarized in the ponencia, I cannot find my way clear to a conclusion that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' prayer in their Comment to the PCGG's Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint. The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the issue of "interest" ( 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a misjoinder of parties ( 7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised. In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude from the complaint original co-defendant Raul Roco because he had allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short, there was an agreement or compromise settlement between the PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a Third Amended Complaint without Roco as a defendant. No obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court in

an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. There is at all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot further be proceeded upon or that any judgment therein cannot be binding without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly, the admission of the Third Amended Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the Sandiganbayan. Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be excluded but only made the request to that effect as a rider to their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third Amended Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the answer is clearly in the negative. The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason and logic dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they must first voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by Roco and must bind themselves to perform certain obligations as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to the petitioners' comment on the aforementioned Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that it is willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave Roco provided they would do what Roco had done, that is, disclose the identity of their principals/clients and submit documents substantiating their claimed lawyer-client relationship with the said principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds of assignments the petitioners executed in favor of their principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because they believed that compliance thereof would breach the sanctity of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship. It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that 5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of action against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to substantiate Roco's compliance. The ponencia itself so stated, thus: . . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent

to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence by the PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. (Id., 5-6). These are the pieces of evidence upon which the Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the PCGG was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The petitioners have not assailed such finding as arbitrary. The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not refute the petitioners' contention that he did not comply with his obligation to disclose the identity of his principals is entirely irrelevant. In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely aground for disqualification of a witness ( 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communicator or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce, through subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or otherwise reveal"any [confidential] communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment." What they are being asked to do, in line with their claim that they had done the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their professional relation to their clients, is to identify the latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if they so choose in order to be dropped from the complaint, such identification being the condition under which the PCGG has expressed willingness to exclude them from the action. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners' prayer for their exclusion as party-defendants because they did not want to abide with any of the conditions set by the PCGG. There would have been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because then it would have capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed its will on the PCGG. Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal of the case insofar as they are concerned because either they are invested with immunity under the principle of confidentiality in a lawyer-client relationship, or the claims against them in Civil Case No. 0033 are barred by such principle. Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit that the lawyerclient privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No. 0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the acts complained of for being nominees of certain parties. Their inclusion as defendants in justified under 15, Article XI of the Constitution which provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel and E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of 12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG. Furthermore, 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint or information should be "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved." Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege. This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication . The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or

his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the identity of the client under the exceptional situations narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which are preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked in the court where it was already filed and presently pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules abovequoted. Secondly, and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as coconspirators in the offenses charged. The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them. Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, 393 to 395, pages 356-357: 393. Effect of unlawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attorney-client privilege from attaching. The attorney-client privilege does not generally exist where the representation is sought to further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past, present, or future. Thus, a confidence received by an attorney in order to advance a criminal or fraudulent purpose is beyond the scope of the privilege. Observation: The common-law rule that the privilege protecting confidential communications between attorney and client is lost if the relation is abused by a client who seeks legal assistance to perpetrate a crime or fraud has been codified. 394. Attorney participation.

The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime in concert with the attorney, even where the attorney is not aware of his client's purpose . The reason for the rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advised on the commission of crime. Professional responsibility does not countenance the use of the attorney-client privilege as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies, either active or passive, which are calculated to hinder the administration of justice will vitiate the privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this exception to the rule of privilege in confined to such intended acts in violation of the law as are mala in se, as distinguished from those which are merely mala prohibita. 395. Communication in contemplation of crime. Communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. But, the mere charge of illegality, not supported by evidence, will not defeat the privilege; there must be at least prima facie evidence that the illegality has some foundation in fact. Underhill also states: There are many other cases to the same effect, for the rule is prostitution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice . In accordance with this rule, where a forged will or other false instrument has come into possession of an attorney through the instrumentality of the accused, with the hope and expectation that the attorney would take some action in reference thereto, and the attorney does act, in ignorance of the true character of the instrument, there is no privilege, inasmuch as full confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then compelled to produce a forged writing against the client. The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it, attempts to dissuade his client, is immaterial. The attorney's ignorance of his client's intentions deprives the information of a professional character as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C. Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Case Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837; emphasis mine).

125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED, 516-519, summarizes the rationale of the rule excepting communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts, thus: c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent act. Various reasons have been announced as being the foundation for the holdings that communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts are not privileged. The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in such cases there is no professional employment, properly speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221 Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW(2d) 599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App 338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland(1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM Dec 287; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc 714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in (1934) 242 App Div 611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell v. Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng Reprint 558;Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR; Re Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div (Eng) 722. In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR, the court said: "In order that the rule may apply, there must be both professional confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent . The client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts which is the foundation of the supposed confidence does not exist. The solicitor's advice is obtained by a fraud." So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the court said: "The reason of the principle which holds such communications not to be privileged is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice upon such subjects, and that it is no part of the profession of an attorney or counselor at law to be advising persons as to how they

may commit crimes or frauds, or how they may escape the consequences of contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has already been committed and finished, a client may advise with an attorney in regard to it, and communicate with him freely, and the communications cannot be divulged as evidence without the consent of the client, because it is a part of the business and duty of those engaged in the practice of the profession of law, when employed and relied upon for that purpose, to give advice to those who have made infractions of the laws; and, to enable the attorney to properly advise and to properly represent the client in court or when prosecutions are threatened, it is conducive to the administration of justice that the client shall be free to communicate to his attorney all the facts within his knowledge, and that he may be assured that a communication made by him shall not be used to his prejudice." The protection which the law affords to communications between attorney and client has reference to those which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment, and does not extend to communications made in contemplation of a crime, or perpetration of a fraud. Strong v.Abner (1937) 368 Ky 502, 105 SW (2d) 599. The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594, in holding not privileged communications to an attorney having for their object the communication of a crime, said: "They then partake of the nature of a conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec 287, the court was of the opinion that there could be no such relation as that of attorney and client, either in the commission of a crime, or in the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an individual, the privileged relation of attorney and client existing only for lawful and honest purposes. If the client consults the attorney at law with reference to the perpetration of a crime, and they co-operate in effecting it, there is no privilege, inasmuch as it is no part of the lawyer's duty to aid in

crime he ceases to be counsel and becomes a criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054. The court cannot permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud forms part of the professional business of an attorney or solicitor. Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751. If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his object and intention as well as facts, there is not professional confidence, and therefore no privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308. There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the production of documents passing between solicitor and client, when the transaction impeached is charged to be based upon fraud, that is the matter to be investigated, and it is thought better that the alleged privilege should suffer than that honestly and fair dealing should appear to be violated with impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L Rep 334. In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172 CCR), the chief justice said "I believe the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards turns out to be the commission of a crime or a fraud, that party so consulting the attorney has no privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney from stating the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege should be contended for, or existing, it would work most grievous hardship on an attorney, who, after he had been consulted upon what subsequently appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would have his lips closed, and might place him in a very serious position of being suspected to be a party to the fraud, and without his having an opportunity of exculpating himself . . . There is no privilege in the case which I have suggested of a party consulting another, a professional man, as to what may afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the best mode of accomplishing it." In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39, although the question of privilege as to communications between attorney and client was not involved, the question directly involved being the competency of a clerk in a business establishment to testify as to certain information which he acquired while working in the establishment, the court strongly approved of a view as stated arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr

(Eng) 1229, as follows: "I shall claim leave to consider whether an attorney may be examined as to any matter which came to his knowledge as an attorney. If he is employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose it; no private obligations can dispense with that universal one which lies on every member of society to discover every design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of society, to destroy the public welfare. For this reason, I apprehend that if a secret which is contrary to the public good, such as a design to commit treason, murder, or perjury, comes to the knowledge of an attorney, even in a cause where he is concerned, the obligation to the public must dispense with the private obligation to the client ." The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213, said; "It would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was asked and obtained in reference to a contemplated crime that the lips of the attorney would be sealed, when the facts might become important to the ends of justice in the prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot be taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it." And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36, observed that this rule was not in contravention of sound public policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance of a higher standard of professional ethics by preventing the relation of attorney and client from operating as a cloak for fraud. Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged if they were a request for advice as to how to commit a fraud, it being in such a case not only the attorney's privilege, but his duty, to disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907) 3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: "We say this notwithstanding the comments of opposing counsel as to the indelicacy of his position because of his being now on the opposite side of the issue that arose as a consequence of the communication he testifies about, and is interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee, as he confesses." The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications is to protect the client, and not to make the attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the commission of a crime. People vs.Petersen (1901) 60 App Div 118, NYS 941. The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a transaction which is in itself a crime.People v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE 457.

As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, 410 and 411, pages 366-368, states: 410. Name or identity of client. Disclosure of a client's identity is necessary proof of the existence of the attorney-client relationship and is not privileged information . Thus, the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable even though the information was communicated confidentially to the attorney in his professional capacity and, in some cases, in spite of the fact that the attorney may have been sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is directed to an attorney as to the name or identity of his client. This general rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action, the opposing party has a right to know with whom he is contending or who the real party in interest is, if not the nominal adversary . 411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of confidentiality. The revelation of the identification of a client is not usually considered privileged, except where so much has been divulged with regard to to legal services rendered or the advice sought, that to reveal the client's name would be to disclose the whole relationship and confidential communications. However, even where the subject matter of the attorney-client relationship has already been revealed, the client's name has been deemed privileged. Where disclosure of the identity of a client might harm the client by being used against him under circumstances where there are no countervailing factors, then the identity is protected by the attorneyclient privilege. In criminal proceedings, a client's name may be privileged if information already obtained by the tribunal, combined with the client's identity, might expose him to criminal prosecution for acts subsequent to, and because of, which he had sought the advice of his attorney. Although as a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege, where the attorney has surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in his possession by way of the attorney-client relationship, the state must prove the connection between the piece of physical evidence and the defendant without in any way relying on the testimony of the client's attorney who

initially received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may not be called to the stand and asked to disclose the identity of the client. However, an attorney cannot refuse to reveal the identity of a person who asked him to deliver stolen property to the police department, whether a bona fide attorney-client relationship exists between them, inasmuch as the transaction was not a legal service or done in the attorney's professional capacity. Distinction: Where an attorney was informed by a male client that his female acquaintance was possibly involved in [a] his-and-run accident, the identity of the female did not come within scope of attorney-client privilege although the identity of the male client was protected. (emphases supplied) WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is not within the lawyerclient privilege in this manner: 2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit. The identity of the attorney's client or the name of the real party in interest will seldom be a matter communicated in confidence because the procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to secure action without appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents . He cannot be obliged to struggle in the dark against unknown forces . He has by anticipation the right, in later proceedings, if desired, to enforce the legal responsibility of those who may have maliciously sued or prosecuted him or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as much right to ask the attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to ask the witness (966 supra). "Who maintains you during this trial?" upon the analogy of the principle already examined (2298 supra), the privilege cannot be used to evade a client's responsibility for the use of legal process. And if it is necessary for the purpose to make a plain exception to the rule of confidence, then it must be made . (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609; emphases supplied). In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following statement: 1. Name or identity. As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that the rule making communications between attorney and client privileged from disclosure ordinarily does not apply where the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's employment and the name of the person

employing him, since the privilege presupposes the relationship of client and attorney, and therefore does not attach to its creation. At the present stage of the proceedings below, the petitioners have not shown that they are so situated with respect to their principals as to bring them within any of the exceptions established by American jurisprudence. There will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the trial where the broader perspectives of the case shall have been presented and can be better appreciated by the court. The insistence for their exclusion from the case is understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution desired is naturally suspect. We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his great trust is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his profession and the best interest of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud. I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition. Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur. PUNO, J., dissenting: This is an important petition for certiorari to annul the resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying petitioners' motion to be excluded from the Complaint for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity of their client. First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33 before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Sued as co-defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar lawyers Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.

Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected senator of the Republic. All co-defendants were then partners of the law firm, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law Firm. The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz: xxx xxx xxx The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power as more fully described (in the subsequent paragraphs of the complaint), all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of the San Miguel Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of 7 June 1984. In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal services offered and made available by their firm to its clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators or stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to clients the corresponding documents of their equity holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in

blank or blank deeds of trust or assignment). They claimed that their activities were "in furtherance of legitimate lawyering." In the course of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party defendant. Lawyer Roco was excluded on the basis of his promise to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in the case. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to comment on the motion. In their Comment, petitioners demanded that they be extended the same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They prayed for their exclusion from the complaint. PCGG agreed but set the following conditions: (1) disclosure of the identity of their client; (2) submission of documents substantiating their lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their client covering their respective shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed on lawyer Roco. Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions contending that the attorney-client privilege gives them the right not to reveal the identity of their client. They also alleged that lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It held: xxx xxx xxx ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to the debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client. This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. 5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of course against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to

the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG. The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as a party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco. Neither can this Court. WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' motions for reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21, 1988 and September 3, 1992. In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend: I The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who indisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law agency. II The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment. 1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nomineestockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause. 3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco and violation of the equal protection clause. III The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. 1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s). 2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters. IV The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law. The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege. It ought to be noted that petitioners were included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33 as conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having ". . . conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly." To stress, petitioners are charged with having conspired in the commission of crimes. The issue of attorney-

client privilege arose when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on condition they reveal the identity of their client. Petitioners refused to comply and assailed the condition on the ground that to reveal the identity of their client will violate the attorney-client privilege. It is thus necessary to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis that to reveal the identity of their client would violate the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. 1 For the first time in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to disclose the identity of client. The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution requires the delicate balancing of three opposing policy considerations. One overriding policy consideration is the need for courts to discover the truth for truth alone is the true touchstone of justice. 2 Equally compelling is the need to protect the adversary system of justice where truth is best extracted by giving a client broad privilege to confide facts to his counsel. 3 Similarly deserving of sedulous concern is the need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the right to effective counsel in criminal litigations. To bridle at center the centrifugal forces of these policy considerations, courts have followed to prudential principle that the attorney-client privilege must not be expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search for truth. 4 Accordingly, a narrow construction has been given to the privilege and it has been consistently held that "these competing societal interests demand that application of the privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., the privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for which it was created.'" 5 Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define in clear strokes the substantive content of the attorney-client privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the petition at bar. With due respect, I like to start by stressing the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud. Communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." 6 In the well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. 7 I hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer conspired with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the privilege. 8 As early

as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice Cardozo held in Clark v. United States 9 that: "there are early cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any evidence, will set the confidences free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without support . . . To drive the privilege away, there must be 'something to give colour to the charge;' there must be prima facie evidence that it has foundation in fact." In the petition at bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorneyclient privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners from the Complaint provided they reveal the identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that petitioner are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege if they reveal their client's identity. Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the attorneyclient privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 10 viz: The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F. 2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979). The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird the IRS received a letter from an attorney stating that an enclosed check in the amount of $12,706 was being tendered for additional amounts due from

undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS summoned the attorney to ascertain the identity of the delinquent taxpayers the attorney refused identification assertion the attorney-client privilege. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, adjudged that the "exception" to the general rule as pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915) controlled: The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was employed. Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the Baird taxpayer was adjudged within this exception to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit has continued to acknowledge this exception. A significant exception to this principle of nonconfidentiality holds that such information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first case. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This exception, which can perhaps be most succinctly characterized as the "legal advice" exception, has also been recognized by other circuits. See: In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the legal advice exception is firmly grounded in the policy of protecting confidential communications, this Court adopts and applies its principles herein. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra. It should be observed, however that the legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facieshowing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended

continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Decus Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 n. 1; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449, U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct. 869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469, 77, L.Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc). Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication. In Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit observed: If the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attorney and client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in the absence of another factors. Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit promulgated the following exception: To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the rule itself. The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944). See also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh Circuit has added to the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat: The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed

[not necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception, has emphasized that it is the link between the client and the communication, rather than the link between the client and the possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which serves to bring the client's identity within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal advice" exception, this exception is also firmly rooted in principles of confidentiality. Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last link" of evidence: We have long recognized the general rule that matters involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); see cases collected id. at 670 n. 2. There we also recognized, however, a limited and narrow exception to the general rule, one that obtains when the disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney would have supplied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment. I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions discussed above. Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall within the exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. 11 The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege. 12 When these facts can be presented only by revealing the

very information sought to be protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in camera hearing. 13 The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a well-recognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex-parte hearing. 14 Without the proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule. In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions for as aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that petitioners need not further establish the factual basis of their claim that they fall within the exceptions to the general rule, the majority held: The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench therefore clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the word of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime. I respectfully submit that the first and third exceptions relied upon by the majority are not self-executory but need factual basis for their successful invocation. The first exception as cited by the majority is ". . . where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients' name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice." It seems to me evident that "the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice" is a question of fact which must first be established before there can be any ruling that the exception can be invoked. The majority cites Ex Parte Enzor, 15 and U S v. Hodge and Zweig, 16 but these cases leave no doubt that the "very activity" for which the client sought the advice of counsel was properly proved. In both cases, the "very activity" of the clients reveal they sought advice on their criminal activities. Thus, in Enzor, the majority opinion states that the "unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election

laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end." 17 In Hodge, the "very activity" of the clients deals with illegal importation of drugs. In the case at bar, there is no inkling whatsoever about the "very activity" for which the clients of petitioners sought their professional advice as lawyers. There is nothing in the records that petitioners were consulted on the "criminal activities" of their client. The complaint did allege that petitioners and their client conspired to commit crimes but allegations are not evidence. So it is with the third exception which as related by the majority is "where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime." 18 Again, the rhetorical questions that answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without presentation of evidence? and (2) how can we determine that the name of the client is the only link without presentation of evidence as to the other links? The case of Baird vs. Koerner 19does not support the "no need for evidence" ruling of the majority. In Baird, as related by the majority itself, "a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. 20 Once more, it is clear that the Baird court was informed of the activity of the client for which the lawyer was consulted and the activity involved probable violation of the tax laws. Thus, the Court held: The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more tax or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.

In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly established by the parties. In the case at bar, there is no evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made by petitioners' client. Again, the records do not show that the subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw allegations in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of the client ". . . would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to petitioners who are marquee names in the legal profession and unjust to their undisclosed client. Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners' right to claim the attorneyclient privilege is resolutory of the Complaint against them, and hence should be decided ahead and independently of their claim to equal protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also respectfully submit that there is no immediate necessity to resolve petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this stage of the proceedings. IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified dissent from the majority opinion. Footnotes 1 Agricultural Consultancy Services, Inc.; Agricultural Investors, Inc.; Anglo Ventures, Inc.; Archipelago Realty Corporation; AP Holdings, Inc.; ARC Investment, Inc. ASC Investment, Inc.; Autonomous Development Corporation; Balete Ranch, Inc.; Black Stallion Ranch, Inc.; Cagayan de Oro Oil Company, Inc.; Christenses Plantation Company; Cocoa Investors, Inc.; Coconut Investment Company (CIC); Cocofed Marketing Corporation (COCOMARK) Coconut Davao Agricultural Aviation, Inc.; Discovery Realty Corporation; Dream Pastures, Inc.; Echo Ranch, Inc.; ECJ and Sons Agricultural Management, Inc.; Far East Ranch, Inc.; Filso v Shipping Co. Inc.; First Meridian Development, Inc.; First United Transport, Inc.; Granexport Manufacturing Corporation; Habagat Realty Development, Inc.; Hyco Agricultural, Inc.; Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc.; Kalawakan Resorts, Inc.; Kaunlaran Agricultural Corporation; Labayog Air Terminals, Inc.; Landair International Marketing Corporation; Legaspi Oil Co., Inc.; LHL Cattle Corporation; Lucena Oil Factory, Inc.; Meadow Lark Plantation, Inc.; Metroplex Commodities, Inc.; Misty Mountains Agricultural Corporation; Northern Carriers Corporation; Northwest Contract Traders, Inc.; Ocean Side Maritime Enterprises, Inc.; Oro Verde Services; Pastoral Farms, Inc.; PCY Oil Manufacturing Corporation; Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.; [(COCOFED) as an entity and in representation of the "so-called more than one million member-coconut

farmers"]; Philippine Radio Corporation, Inc.; Philippine Technologies, Inc.; Primavera Farms, Inc.; Punong-Bayan Housing Development Corp.; Pura Electric Co., Inc.; Radio Audience Developers Integrated Organization, Inc.; Radio Pilipino Corporation; Rancho Grande, Inc.; Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.; Reddee Developers, Inc.; Rocksteel Resources, Inc.; Roxas Shares, Inc.; San Esteban Development Corporation; San Miguel Corporation Officers Incorporation; San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation; Southern Luzon Oil Mills, Inc.; Silver Leaf Plantation, Inc.; Soriano Shares, Inc.; Southern Services Traders, Inc.; Southern Star Cattle Corporation; Spade 1 Resorts Corporation; Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation; Tedeum Resources, Inc.; Thilagro Edible Oil Mills Inc.; Toda Holdings Inc.; United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.; United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation (COCOLIFE); Unexplored Land Developers, Inc.; Valhalla Properties Inc.; Verdant Plantations, Inc.; Vesta Agricultural Corporation; and Wings Resort Corporation. 2 Petition in G.R. No. 105938, Rollo, p. 6. 3 Id., Annex "B," Rollo, p. 45. 4 Id., Annex "C," Rollo, p. 143. 5 Id., Annex "A," Rollo, p. 39. 6 Id., Annex "A," Rollo, p. 39. 7 Petitioner in G.R. No. 108113, Annexes "E," Rollo, p. 161. 8 Id., Annex "D," Rollo, p. 145. 9 Petition in G.R. No. 105938, Annex "E," Rollo, p. 161. 10 Id., Annexes, "G," "H" and "I," Rollo, pp. 191-196. 11 Id., Rollo, p. 8. 12 Id., Annex "K," p. 222. 13 Rollo, p. 303. 14 Id., at 285. 15 Id., at 287. 16 Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 181-182.

17 Coquia, Jorge, Principles of Roman Law (Manila: Central Law Book Supply, Inc., 1979), p. 116. 18 Id., at 122. 19 Kelly v. Judge of Recorders' Court [Kelly v. Boyne], 239 Mich. 204, 214 NW 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 179 A. 139, 100 ALR 226. 20 Curtis v. Richards, 95 Am St. Rep. 134; also cited in Martin, Ruperto, Legal and Judicial Ethics (Manila, Premium Printing Press, 1988) at p. 90. 21 Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 100 ALR 226; Cooper v. Bell, 153 SW 844; Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., 98 SW 173; Armstrong v. 163 NW 179; Re Mosness, 20 Am. Rep. 55. 22 Re Paschal (Texas v. White) 19 L. Ed. 992; Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. (US) 232; 13 L. Ed. 676; Berman v. Cookley, 137 N <E> 667; 26v ALR 92; Re Dunn 98 NE 914. 23 Agpalo, Ruben, Legal Ethics (Manila: Rex Book Store, 1992), p. 136. 24 Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569; Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775. 25 C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 146 (1986). 26 52 U. S. ( 11 How.) 232, 247, 13 L. Ed. 676 (1850). 27 Ibid. 28 Act No. 190, sec. 383. 29 Rules of Court, Rule 130, sec. 24 (b). 30 People v. Warden of Country Jail, 270 NYS 362 [1934]. 31 58 AmJur 2d Witnesses sec. 507, 285. 32 Id. 33 5 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 23 13, pp. 607-608. See also, U. S. v. Flores, 628 F2d 521; People v. Doe, 371 N.E. 2d. 334. 34 270 ALA 254 (1960). 35 548 F 2d 1347 (9th Cir. 197).

36 Id. (citations omitted). 37 249 NYS 631 (1931). 38 Id., at 632. 39 Id., at 634. 40 87 NYS 1059 (1904). 41 Id. 42 279 F. 2d 623 (1960). 43 Id., at 633. 44 Supra, note 20, at 257. 45 R. ARONSON, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 203 (1991). 46 Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 770, 603 P. 2d 19, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1979); Ex parte McDonough, 180 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F. 2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F. 2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Michaelson, 511 F. 2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978, 95 S. Ct. 1979, 44 L Ed. 2d 469 (1975); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1960) (applying California law); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F. 2d 1101, 114 15 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S. Ct. 2207, 53 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F. 2d 666, 670 71 (5th Cir. 1975); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F. 2d, 663, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F. 2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F. 2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S Ct. 505, 9 L. Ed.2d 499 (1963). 47 Baird v. Koerner, supra. The general exceptions to the rule of privilege are: "a) Communications for illegal purposes, generally. b) Communications as to crime; and c) Communications as to fraud." 58 Am Jur 515-517. In order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. This includes contemplated criminal acts or in aid or furtherance thereof. But, "Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by the party who committed it to an attorney, consulted as such are, of course privileged communications, whether a fee has or has not been paid. " Id. In such instances even the name of the client thereby becomes privileged.

48 58 Am Jur 515-517. 49 Supra, note 40. 50 Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 NY 394, 399. 51 517 F. 2d 66 6, 671 (5th Cir., 1965). 52 350 F. 2d 663 (7th Cir., 1965). 53 See, In re Shawmut Mining Co., 87 N.Y.S. 1059 (1904). 54 US Case No. 491, 93-7418 (1994). 55 US Case No. 92-2439 (1993). 56 249 NY 458 (1920). 57 Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Daria, 197 SCRA 428. 58 Lerner, Max, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (New York; Halycon House, Garden City, 1943), p. 28. 59 Rollo, p. 164 60 Id., at 155. 61 As manifested by the PCGG, the following documents constituted the basis for the PCGG's decision to drop private respondent: 1. A letter to the PCGG dated 24 May 1989 signed by Mr. Augusto Sanchez, as counsel for Mr. Roco reiterating an earlier request for reinvestigation of the case; 2. An affidavit dated 8 March 1989 signed and executed by Mr. Roco which was an enclosure to the letter of 24 May 1989; 3. A letter to the PCGG dated 21 September 1988 by the Roco, Bunag and Kapunan Law offices, which was the original request for reinvestigation and/or reexamination of the evidence in the possession of the PCGG. Rollo, p. 238. 62 Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971). 63 Id.

64 Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. PUNO, J., dissenting: 1 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, S. 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 2 In re Selser 15 N.J. 393, 405-406, 105 A. 2d 395, 401-402 (1954). 3 See Note, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can Attorney Serve Two Masters? 54 Va. L. Rev. 145 (1968). 4 United States v. Nixon, 418 US 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974). 5 In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 83-1290, 723 F2d. 447 (1983) citing In re Walsh, 623 F2d 489, cert. denied 449 US 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 US 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1975). 6 125 American Law Reports Annotated 516-519 citing People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594. 7 Millare v. Montero, 246 SCRA 1. 8 81 AM JUR 2d. Witnesses, Section 395, pp. 356-357. 9 289 US 1 (1933). 10 Op cit. 11 Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L.ed. 118 (1951). 12 US, et al. v. Tratner, 511 F., 2d, 248-255 (1975); US v. Landoff, 591 F 2d 36 (1978); US v. Bartlett, 449 F 2d 700 (1971); cert. denied, 504 US 932, 92 S-Ct. 990, 30 L.ed. 2d 808 (1972). 13 US v. Tratner, op cit., p. 252 citing US v. Johnson, 465 F2d 793 (1972). 14 In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F2d 446 (1983). 15 270 ALA 254 (1960).

16 548 F2d 1347 (9th Cir. 197). 17 See page 25 of majority decision. 18 See page 31 of majority decision. 19 279 F2d 623 (1960). 20 See pp. 31-32 of majority decision.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915

UY CHICO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL., defendantsappellees. Beaumont and Tenney for appellant. Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellees. TRENT, J.: An appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint upon the merits, with costs. The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he

is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate. The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon, and cite in support thereof Ross vs. Great Northern Ry. Co., (101 Minn., 122; 111 N. W., 951). The case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. vs. Cripe and Co. (142 Ky., 810), also appears to sustain their contention. But a preliminary question suggest itself, Was the testimony in question privileged? Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters." (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.) A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent. We quote from but one case among the many which may be found upon the point: The proposition advanced by the respondent and adopted by the trial court, that one, after fully authorizing his attorney, as his agent, to enter into contract with a third party, and after such authority has been executed

and relied on, may effectively nullify his own and his duly authorized agent's act by closing the attorney's mouth as to the giving of such authority, is most startling. A perilous facility of fraud and wrong, both upon the attorney and the third party, would result. The attorney who, on his client's authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation and integrity that he binds his client. The third party may well rely on the assurance of a reputable lawyer that he has authority in fact, though such assurance be given only by implication from the doing of the act itself. It is with gratification, therefore, that we find overwhelming weight of authority, against the position assumed by the court below, both in states where the privilege protecting communications with attorneys is still regulated by the common law and in those where it is controlled by statute, as in Wisconsin. (Koeber vs. Sommers, 108 Wis., 497; 52 L. R. A., 512.) Other cases wherein the objection to such evidence on the ground of privilege has been overruled are: Henderson vs. Terry (62 Tex., 281); Shove vs. Martin (85 Minn., 29); In re Elliott (73 Kan., 151); Collins vs. Hoffman (62 Wash., 278); Gerhardt vs. Tucker (187 Mo., 46). These cases cover a variety of communications made by an authority in behalf of his client to third persons. And cases wherein evidence of the attorney as to compromises entered into by him on behalf of his client were allowed to be proved by the attorney's testimony are not wanting. (Williams vs. Blumenthal, 27 Wash., 24; Koeber vs. Sommers, supra.) It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-21237 March 22, 1924

JAMES D. BARTON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO., LTD., defendant-appellant. Block, Johnston & Greenbaum and Ross, Lawrence & Selph for appellant. Frank B. Ingersoll for appellee. STREET, J.: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by James D. Barton, to recover of the Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd., as damages for breach of contract, the sum of $318,563.30, United States currency, and further to secure a judicial pronouncement to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract Exhibit A. The defendant answered with a general denial, and the cause was heard upon the proof, both documentary and oral, after which the trial judge entered a judgment absolving the defendant corporation from four of the six causes of action set forth in the complaint and giving judgment for the plaintiff to recover of said defendant, upon the first and fourth causes of action, the sum of $202,500, United States currency, equivalent to $405,000, Philippine currency, with legal interest from June 2, 1921, and with costs. From this judgment the defendant company appealed. The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila, while the defendant is a corporation organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its principal office in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippine Islands. Said company appears to be the owner by a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located on the Island of Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. On April 21, 1920, one William Anderson, as president and general manager of the defendant company, addressed a letter Exhibit B, to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter. In the third cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered services to the defendant company in the way of advertising and demonstrating the products of the defendant and expended large sums of money in visiting various parts of the

world for the purpose of carrying on said advertising and demonstrations, in shipping to various parts of the world samples of the products of the defendant, and in otherwise carrying on advertising work. For these services and expenditures the plaintiff sought, in said third cause of action, to recover the sum of $16,563.80, United States currency. The court, however, absolved the defendant from all liability on this cause of action and the plaintiff did not appeal, with the result that we are not now concerned with this phase of the case. Besides, the authority contained in said Exhibit B was admittedly superseded by the authority expressed in a later letter, Exhibit A, dated October 1, 1920. This document bears the approval of the board of directors of the defendant company and was formally accepted by the plaintiff. As it supplies the principal basis of the action, it will be quoted in its entirety. (Exhibit A) CEBU, CEBU, P. I. October 1, 1920. JAMES D. BARTON, Esq., Cebu Hotel City. DEAR SIR: You are hereby given the sole and exclusive sales agency for our bituminous limestone and other asphalt products of the Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Company, Ltd., May first, 1922, in the following territory: Australia New Zealand Tasmania Saigon India Sumatra Java China Hongkong

Siam and the Straits Settlements, also in the United States of America until May 1, 1921. As regard bituminous limestone mined from the Lucio property. No orders for less than one thousand (1,000) tons will be accepted except under special agreement with us. All orders for said products are to be billed to you as follows: Per ton In 1,000 ton lots ........................................... P15 In 2,000 ton lots ........................................... 14 In 5,000 ton lots ........................................... 12 In 10,000 ton lots .......................................... 10 with the understanding, however that, should the sales in the above territory equal or exceed ten thousand (10,000) tons in the year ending October 1, 1921, then in that event the price of all shipments made during the above period shall

be ten pesos (P10) per ton, and any sum charged to any of your customers or buyers in the aforesaid territory in excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton, shall be rebated to you. Said rebate to be due and payable when the gross sales have equalled or exceeded ten thousand (10,000) tons in the twelve months period as hereinbefore described. Rebates on lesser sales to apply as per above price list. You are to have full authority to sell said product of the Lucio mine for any sum see fit in excess of the prices quoted above and such excess in price shall be your extra and additional profit and commission. Should we make any collection in excess of the prices quoted, we agree to remit same to your within ten (10) days of the date of such collections or payments. All contracts taken with municipal governments will be subject to inspector before shipping, by any authorized representative of such governments at whatever price may be contracted for by you and we agree to accept such contracts subject to draft attached to bill of lading in full payment of such shipment. It is understood that the purchasers of the products of the Lucio mine are to pay freight from the mine carriers to destination and are to be responsible for all freight, insurance and other charges, providing said shipment has been accepted by their inspectors. All contracts taken with responsible firms are to be under the same conditions as with municipal governments. All contracts will be subject to delays caused by the acts of God, over which the parties hereto have no control. It is understood and agreed that we agree to load all ships, steamers, boats or other carriers prompty and without delay and load not less than 1,000 tons each twenty-four hours after March 1, 1921, unless we so notify you specifically prior to that date we are prepared to load at that rate, and it is also stipulated that we shall not be required to ship orders of 5,000 tons except on 30 days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice. If your sales in the United States reach five thousand tons on or before May 1, 1921, you are to have sole rights for this territory also for one year additional and should your sales in the second year reach or exceed ten thousand tons you are to have the option to renew the agreement for this territory on the same terms for an additional two years. Should your sales equal exceed ten thousand (10,000) tons in the year ending October 1, 1921, or twenty thousand (20,000) tons by May 1, 1922, then this contract is to be continued automatically for an additional three years ending April 30, 1925, under the same terms and conditions as above stipulated.

The products of the other mines can be sold by you in the aforesaid territories under the same terms and conditions as the products of the Lucio mine; scale of prices to be mutually agreed upon between us. LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO., LTD. By (Sgd.) WM. ANDERSON President (Sgd.) W. C. A. PALMER Secretary Approved by Board of Directors, October 1, 1920. (Sgd.) WM. ANDERSON President Accepted. (Sgd.) JAMES D. BARTON Witness D. G. MCVEAN Upon careful perusal of the fourth paragraph from the end of this letter it is apparent that some negative word has been inadvertently omitted before "prepared," so that the full expression should be "unless we should notify you specifically prior to that date that we are unprepared to load at that rate," or "not prepared to load at that rate." Very soon after the aforesaid contract became effective, the plaintiff requested the defendant company to give him a similar selling agency for Japan. To this request the defendant company, through its president, Wm. Anderson, replied, under date of November 27, 1920, as follows: In re your request for Japanese agency, will say, that we are willing to give you, the same commission on all sales made by you in Japan, on the same basis as your Australian sales, but we do not feel like giving you a regular agency for Japan until you can make some large sized sales there, because some other people have given us assurances that they can handle our Japanese sales, therefore we have decided to leave this agency open for a time. Meanwhile the plaintiff had embarked for San Francisco and upon arriving at that port he entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of that city, whereby said firm was constituted a subagent and given the sole selling rights for the bituminous limestone products of the defendant company for the period of one year from November 11, 1920, on terms stated in the letter Exhibit K. The territory assigned to Ludvigsen & McCurdy included San Francisco and all territory in California north of said city. Upon an earlier voyage during the same

year to Australia, the plaintiff had already made an agreement with Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, whereby the latter was to act as the plaintiff's sales agent for bituminous limestone mined at the defendant's quarry in Leyte, until February 12, 1921. Later the same agreement was extended for the period of one year from January 1, 1921. (Exhibit Q.) On February 5, 1921, Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of San Francisco, addressed a letter to the plaintiff, then in San Francisco, advising hi that he might enter an order for six thousand tons of bituminous limestone to be loaded at Leyte not later than May 5, 1921, upon terms stated in the letter Exhibit G. Upon this letter the plaintiff immediately indorsed his acceptance. The plaintiff then returned to Manila; and on March 2, 1921, Anderson wrote to him from Cebu, to the effect that the company was behind with construction and was not then able to handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12, Anderson was in Manila and the two had an interview in the Manila Hotel, in the course of which the plaintiff informed Anderson of the San Francisco order. Anderson thereupon said that, owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and suggested that the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter of taking orders. The plaintiff expressed surprise at this and told Anderson that he had not only the San Francisco order (which he says he exhibited to Anderson) but other orders for large quantities of bituminous limestone to be shipped to Australia and Shanghai. In another interview on the same Anderson definitely informed the plaintiff that the contracts which be claimed to have procured would not be filled. Three days later the plaintiff addressed a letter (Exhibit Y) to the defendant company in Cebu, in which he notified the company to be prepared to ship five thousand tons of bituminous limestone to John Chapman Co., San Francisco, loading to commence on May 1, and to proceed at the rate of one thousand tons per day of each twenty-four hours, weather permitting. On March 5, 1921, Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, had cabled the plaintiff an order for five thousand tons of bituminous limestone; and in his letter of March 15 to the defendant, the plaintiff advised the defendant company to be prepared to ship another five thousand tons of bituminous limestone, on or about May 6, 1921, in addition to the intended consignment for San Francisco. The name Henry E. White was indicated as the name of the person through whom this contract had been made, and it was stated that the consignee would be named later, no destination for the shipment being given. The plaintiff explains that the name White, as used in this letter, was based on an inference which he had erroneously drawn from the cable sent by Frank B. Smith, and his intention was to have the second shipment consigned to Australia in response to Smith's order. It will be noted in connection with this letter of the plaintiff, of March 15, 1921, that no mention was made of the names of the person, or firm, for whom the

shipments were really intended. The obvious explanation that occurs in connection with this is that the plaintiff did not then care to reveal the fact that the two orders had originated from his own subagents in San Francisco and Sydney. To the plaintiff's letter of March 15, the assistant manager of the defendant company replied on March, 25, 1921, acknowledging the receipt of an order for five thousand tons of bituminous limestone to be consigned to John Chapman Co., of San Francisco, and the further amount of five thousand tons of the same material to be consigned to Henry E. White, and it was stated that "no orders can be entertained unless cash has been actually deposited with either the International Banking Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, Cebu." (Exhibit Z.) To this letter the plaintiff in turn replied from Manila, under date of March, 1921, questioning the right of the defendant to insist upon a cash deposit in Cebu prior to the filling of the orders. In conclusion the plaintiff gave orders for shipment to Australia of five thousand tons, or more, about May 22, 1921, and ten thousand tons, or more, about June 1, 1921. In conclusion the plaintiff said "I have arranged for deposits to be made on these additional shipments if you will signify your ability to fulfill these orders on the dates mentioned." No name was mentioned as the purchaser, or purchases, of these intended Australian consignments. Soon after writing the letter last above-mentioned, the plaintiff embarked for China and Japan. With his activities in China we are not here concerned, but we note that in Tokio, Japan, he came in contact with one H. Hiwatari, who appears to have been a suitable person for handling bituminous limestone for construction work in Japan. In the letter Exhibit X, Hiwatari speaks of himself as if he had been appointed exclusive sales agent for the plaintiff in Japan, but no document expressly appointing him such is in evidence. While the plaintiff was in Tokio he procured the letter Exhibit W, addressed to himself, to be signed by Hiwatari. This letter, endited by the plaintiff himself, contains an order for one thousand tons of bituminous limestone from the quarries of the defendant company, to be delivered as soon after July 1, 1921, as possible. In this letter Hiwatari states, "on receipt of the cable from you, notifying me of date you will be ready to ship, and also tonnage rate, I will agree to transfer through the Bank of Taiwan, of Tokio, to the Asia Banking Corporation, of Manila, P. I., the entire payment of $16,000 gold, to be subject to our order on delivery of documents covering bill of lading of shipments, the customs report of weight, and prepaid export tax receipt. I will arrange in advance a confirmed or irrevocable letter of credit for the above amounts so that payment can be ordered by cable, in reply to your cable advising shipping date." In a letter, Exhibit X, of May 16, 1921, Hiwatari informs the plaintiff that he had shown the contract, signed by himself, to the submanager of the Taiwan Bank

who had given it as his opinion that he would be able to issue, upon request of Hiwatari, a credit note for the contracted amount, but he added that the submanager was not personally able to place his approval on the contract as that was a matter beyond his authority. Accordingly Hiwatari advised that he was intending to make further arrangements when the manager of the bank should return from Formosa. In the letter of May 5, 1921, containing Hiwatari's order for one thousand tons of bituminous limestone, it was stated that if the material should prove satisfactory after being thoroughly tested by the Paving Department of the City of Tokio, he would contract with the plaintiff for a minimum quantity of ten thousand additional tons, to be used within a year from September 1, 1921, and that in this event the contract was to be automatically extended for an additional four years. The contents of the letter of May 5 seems to have been conveyed, though imperfectly, by the plaintiff to his attorney, Mr. Frank B. Ingersoll, of Manila; and on May 17, 1921, Ingersoll addressed a note to the defendant company in Cebu in which he stated that he had been requested by the plaintiff to notify the defendant that the plaintiff had accepted an order from Hiwatari, of Tokio, approved by the Bank of Taiwan, for a minimum order of ten thousand tons of the stone annually for a period of five years, the first shipment of one thousand tons to be made as early after July 1 as possible. It will be noted that this communication did not truly reflect the contents of Hiwatari's letter, which called unconditionally for only one thousand tons, the taking of the remainder being contingent upon future eventualities. It will be noted that the only written communications between the plaintiff and the defendant company in which the former gave notice of having any orders for the sale of bituminous limestone are the four letters Exhibit Y, AA, BB, and II. In the first of these letters, dated March 15, 1921, the plaintiff advises the defendant company to be prepared to ship five thousand tons of bituminous limestone, to be consigned to John Chapman, Co., of San Francisco, to be loaded by March 5, and a further consignment of five thousand tons, through a contract with Henry E. White, consignees to be named later. In the letter Exhibit BB dated May 17, 1921, the plaintiff's attorney gives notice of the acceptance by plaintiff of an order from Hiwatari, of Tokio, approved by the Bank of Taiwan, for a minimum of ten thousand annually for a period of five years, first shipment of a thousand tons to be as early after July 1 as possible. In the letter Exhibit H the plaintiff gives notice of an "additional" (?) order from H. E. White, Sydney, for two lots of bituminous limestone of five thousand tons each, one for shipment not later than June 30, 1921, and the other by July 20, 1921. In the same letter thousand tons from F. B. Smith, to be shipped to Brisbane, Australia, by June 30, and a similar amount within thirty days later. After the suit was brought, the plaintiff filed an amendment to his complaint in which he set out, in tabulated form, the orders which he claims to have received and upon which his letters of notification to the defendant company were based.

In this amended answer the name of Ludvigsen & McCurdy appears for the first time; and the name of Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, is used for the first time as the source of the intended consignments of the letters, Exhibits G, L, M, and W, containing the orders from Ludvigen & McCurdy, Frank B. Smith and H. Hiwatari were at no time submitted for inspection to any officer of the defendant company, except possibly the Exhibit G, which the plaintiff claims to have shown to Anderson in Manila on March, 12, 1921. The different items conspiring the award which the trial judge gave in favor of the plaintiff are all based upon the orders given by Ludvigsen & McCurdy (Exhibit G), by Frank B. Smith (Exhibit L and M), and by Hiwatari in Exhibit W; and the appealed does not involve an order which came from Shanghai, China. We therefore now address ourselves to the question whether or not the orders contained in Exhibit G, L, M, and W, in connection with the subsequent notification thereof given by the plaintiff to the defendant, are sufficient to support the judgment rendered by the trial court. The transaction indicated in the orders from Ludvigsen, & McCurdy and from Frank B. Smith must, in our opinion, be at once excluded from consideration as emanating from persons who had been constituted mere agents of the plaintiff. The San Francisco order and the Australian orders are the same in legal effect as if they were orders signed by the plaintiff and drawn upon himself; and it cannot be pretended that those orders represent sales to bona fide purchasers found by the plaintiff. The original contract by which the plaintiff was appointed sales agent for a limited period of time in Australia and the United States contemplated that he should find reliable and solvent buyers who should be prepared to obligate themselves to take the quantity of bituminous limestone contracted for upon terms consistent with the contract. These conditions were not met by the taking of these orders from the plaintiff's own subagents, which was as if the plaintiff had bought for himself the commodity which he was authorized to sell to others. Article 267 of the Code of Commerce declares that no agent shall purchase for himself or for another that which he has been ordered to sell. The law has placed its ban upon a broker's purchasing from his principal unless the latter with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances acquiesces in such course; and even then the broker's action must be characterized by the utmost good faith. A sale made by a broker to himself without the consent of the principal is ineffectual whether the broker has been guilty of fraudulent conduct or not. (4 R. C. L., 276-277.) We think, therefore, that the position of the defendant company is indubitably sound in so far as it rest upon the contention that the plaintiff has not in fact found any bona fide purchasers ready and able to take the commodity contracted for upon terms compatible with the contract which is the basis of the action. It will be observed that the contract set out at the beginning of this opinion contains provisions under which the period of the contract might be extended. That privilege was probably considered a highly important incident of the contract

and it will be seen that the sale of five thousand tons which the plaintiff reported for shipment to San Francisco was precisely adjusted to the purpose of the extension of the contract for the United States for the period of an additional year; and the sales reported for shipment to Australia were likewise adjusted to the requirements for the extention of the contract in that territory. Given the circumstances surrounding these contracts as they were reported to the defendant company and the concealment by the plaintiff of the names of the authors of the orders, -- who after all were merely the plaintiff's subagents, the officers of the defendant company might justly have entertained the suspicion that the real and only person behind those contracts was the plaintiff himself. Such at least turns out to have been the case. Much energy has been expended in the briefs upon his appeal over the contention whether the defendant was justified in laying down the condition mentioned in the letter of March 26, 1921, to the effect that no order would be entertained unless cash should be deposited with either the International Banking Corporation of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, in Cebu. In this connection the plaintiff points to the stipulation of the contract which provides that contracts with responsible parties are to be accepted "subject to draft attached to bill of lading in full payment of such shipment." What passed between the parties upon this point appears to have the character of mere diplomatic parrying, as the plaintiff had no contract from any responsible purchaser other than his own subagents and the defendant company could no probably have filled the contracts even if they had been backed by the Bank of England. Upon inspection of the plaintiff's letters (Exhibit Y and AA), there will be found ample assurance that deposits for the amount of each shipment would be made with a bank in Manila provided the defendant would indicated its ability to fill the orders; but these assurance rested upon no other basis than the financial responsibility of the plaintiff himself, and this circumstance doubtless did not escape the discernment of the defendant's officers. With respect to the order from H. Hiwatari, we observe that while he intimates that he had been promised the exclusive agency under the plaintiff for Japan, nevertheless it does not affirmatively appear that he had been in fact appointed to be such at the time he signed to order Exhibit W at the request of the plaintiff. It may be assumed, therefore, that he was at that time a stranger to the contract of agency. It clearly appears, however, that he did not expect to purchase the thousand tons of bituminous limestone referred to in his order without banking assistance; and although the submanager of the Bank of Taiwan had said something encouraging in respect to the matter, nevertheless that official had refrained from giving his approval to the order Exhibit W. It is therefore not shown affirmatively that this order proceeds from a responsible source. The first assignment of error in the appellant's brief is directed to the action of the trial judge in refusing to admit Exhibit 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10, offered by the defendant,

and in admitting Exhibit E, offered by the plaintiff. The Exhibit 2 is a letter dated June 25, 1921, or more than three weeks after the action was instituted, in which the defendant's assistant general manager undertakes to reply to the plaintiff's letter of March 29 proceeding. It was evidently intended as an argumentative presentation of the plaintiff's point of view in the litigation then pending, and its probative value is so slight, even if admissible at all, that there was no error on the part of the trial court in excluding it. Exhibit 7, 8, 9 and 10 comprise correspondence which passed between the parties by mail or telegraph during the first part of the year 1921. The subjectmatter of this correspondence relates to efforts that were being made by Anderson to dispose of the controlling in the defendant corporation, and Exhibit 9 in particular contains an offer from the plaintiff, representing certain associates, to but out Anderson's interest for a fixed sum. While these exhibits perhaps shed some light upon the relations of the parties during the time this controversy was brewing, the bearing of the matter upon the litigation before us is too remote to exert any definitive influence on the case. The trial court was not in error in our opinion in excluding these documents. Exhibit E is a letter from Anderson to the plaintiff, dated April 21, 1920, in which information is given concerning the property of the defendant company. It is stated in this letter that the output of the Lucio (quarry) during the coming year would probably be at the rate of about five tons for twenty-four hours, with the equipment then on hand, but that with the installation of a model cableway which was under contemplation, the company would be able to handle two thousand tons in twenty-four hours. We see no legitimate reason for rejecting this document, although of slight probative value; and her error imputed to the court in admitting the same was not committed. Exhibit 14, which was offered in evidence by the defendant, consists of a carbon copy of a letter dated June 13, 1921, written by the plaintiff to his attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which plaintiff states, among other things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of eigthy-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity of this city document is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. Upon this the attorney for the plaintiff made this announcement: "We hereby give notice at this time that unless such an explanation is made, explaining fully how this carbon copy came into the possession of the defendant company, or any one representing it, we propose to object to its admission on the ground that it is a confidential communication between client and lawyer." No further information was then given by the attorney for the defendant as to the

manner in which the letter had come to his hands and the trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground that it was a privileged communication between client and attorney. We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. In this connection Mr. Wigmore says: The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption from its processes of disclosure against himself or the attorney or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is necessary for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy. (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2326.) Although the precedents are somewhat confusing, the better doctrine is to the effect that when papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that question. (10 R. C. L., 931; 1 Greenl. Evid., sec. 254a; Statevs. Mathers, 15 L. R. A., 268; Gross vs. State, 33 L. R. A., [N. S.], 477, note.) Our conclusion upon the entire record is that the judgment appealed from must be reversed; and the defendant will be absolved from the complaint. It is so ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

An intensive scrutiny of every phase of this case leads me to the conclusion that the trial judge was correct in his findings of fact and in his decision. Without encumbering the case with a long and tedious dissent, I shall endeavor to explain my point of view as briefly and clearly as possible. A decision must be reached on the record as it is and not on a record as we would like to have it. The plaintiff and the defendant deliberately entered into a contract, the basis of this action. The plaintiff, proceeding pursuant to this contract, spent considerable effort and used considerable money to advance the interests of the defendant and to secure orders for its products. These orders were submitted to the president of the defendant company personally and later formally by writing. Prior to the institution of the suit, the only objection of the defendant was that the money should be deposited with either the International Banking Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China at Cebu, a stipulation not found in the contract. A reasonable deduction, therefore, is that the plaintiff presented orders under circumstances which were a substantial compliance with the terms of the contract with the defendant, and which insured to the defendant payment for its deliveries according to the price agreed upon, and that as the defendant has breached its contract, it must respond in damages. The current running through the majority opinion is that the order emanated from subagents of the plaintiff, and that no bona fide purchasers were ready and able to take the commodity contracted for upon terms compatible with the contract. The answer is, in the first place, that the contract nowhere prohibits the plaintiff to secure subagents. The answer is, in the second place, that the orders were so phrased as to make the persons making them personally responsible. The Ludvigsen & McCurdy order from San Francisco begins: "You can enter our order for 6,000 tons of bituminous limestone as per sample submitted, at $10 gold per ton, f. o. b., island of Leyte, subject to the following terms and conditions: * * * "(Exhibit G). The Smith order from Australia contains the following: "It is therefore with great pleasure I confirm the booking of the following orders, to be shipped at least within a week of respective dates: . . ." (Exhibit L). The Japan order starts with the following sentence: "You can enter my order for 1,000 tons of 1,000 kilos each of bituminous limestone from the quarries of the Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co. . . ." (Exhibit W.) But the main point of the plaintiff which the majority decision misses entirely centers on the proposition that the orders were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and that the only objection the defendant had related to the manner of payment. To emphasize this thought again, let me quote the reply of the defendant to the plaintiff when the defendant acknowledge receipts of the orders placed by the plaintiff. The letter reads: "In reply to same we have to

advice you that no orders can be entertained unless cash has been actually deposited with either the International Banking Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, Cebu." (Exhibit Y.) Prior to the filing of suit, the defendant company never at any time raised any questioned as to whether the customers secured by plaintiff were "responsible firms" within the meaning of the contract, and never secured any information whatsoever as to their financial standing. Consequently, defendant is now estopped by its conduct from raising new objections for rejection of the orders. (Mechem on Agency, section 2441.) The majority decision incidentally takes up for consideration assignments of error 1 and 2 having to do with either the admission or the rejection by the trial court of certain exhibits. Having in mind that the Court reverses the court a quo on the facts, what is said relative to these two assignments is absolutely unnecessary for a judgment, and even as obiter dicta, contains unfortunate expressions. Exhibit 14, for example, is a letter addressed by the plaintiff to his lawyer and probably merely shown to the counsel of the defendant during negotiations to seek a compromise. Whether that exhibit be considered improperly rejected or not would not change the result one iota. The rule now announced by the Court that it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession of the document, and that a court will take no notice of how it was obtained, is destructive of the attorney's privilege and constitutes and obstacle to attempts at friendly compromise. In the case of Uy Chico vs. Union Life Assurance Society ([1915], 29 Phil., 163), it was held that communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are not privileged if they have been so communicated. But here, there is no intimation that Exhibit 14 was sent by the client to the lawyer for the purpose of being communicated to others. The Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Southern Railway Co. vs. White ([1899], 108 Ga., 201), held that statements in a letter to a party's attorney handed by the latter to the opponent's attorney, are confidential communications and must be excluded. Briefly, the decision of the majority appears to me to be defective in the following particulars: (1) It sets aside without good reason the fair findings of fact as made by the trial court and substitutes therefor other findings not warranted by the proof; (2) it fails to stress plaintiff's main argument, and (3) it lay downs uncalled for rules which undermine the inviolability of a client's communications to his attorney. Accordingly, I dissent and vote for an affirmance of the judgment.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC G.R. No. 34098 September 17, 1930

ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. E. P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and TEAL MOTOR CO., INC., respondents. Gibbs and McDonough for petitioner. Guevara, Francisco and Recto for respondents. STREET, J.: This is an original petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus filed in this court by the Orient Insurance Company against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Teal Motor Co., Inc. The object of the petition is to obtain an order requiring the respondent judge to permit the attorney for the petitioner to examine a letter (Exhibits 49 and 49-Act) part of which has been read into the record in the course of the examination of one of the witnesses testifying for the plaintiff in the case of Teal Motor Co., Inc. vs. Orient Insurance Company, now pending in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, civil case No. 35825, with which, for purposes of trial, have been consolidated several other cases of similar character. The cause is now before us for resolution upon the complaint and answer interposed by the two respondents. The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 35825) for the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company, aggregating P60,000, upon a stock of merchandise alleged to be of the value of P414,513.56, which, with the exception of salvage valued at about P50,000, was destroyed by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be commenced within three months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in the civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months after the rejection of the claim. In a replication to the answer of the defendant, containing the foregoing and other defenses, the plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the plaintiff that the Orient Insurance Company would not pay the claim, basing refusal upon alleged incendiarism and fraud on

the part of the plaintiff; and by way of avoidance, it was alleged in the replication that, after notification of denial of liability by the insurance company, one E. E. Elser, as representative of the company, expressly requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action until after the following July 31, stating that three were great possibilities that an extrajudicial compromise might be arranged in the matter; and it was further asserted, in the replication, that the plaintiff had deferred action, relying upon this request. It will thus be seen that the reason for the admitted delay in the institution of the action is an important issue in the case, or case, now in course of trial. It further appears that while case No. 35825 was in course of trial, as it still is, before the respondent judge, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the circumstances surrounding the institution of the action, said that he had reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: "I waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, I received a letter from our attorneys, Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases." The attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, saying: "I ask that the witness be required to produce the letter referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else his answer be stricken out. (To the witness) Have you got the letter there?" The witness replied that he had the letter with him and that he had no objection to show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to proceed with the cases. Upon being asked about the other part of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained private matter, "between the attorney and ourselves," meaning between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys. Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, said he would like to see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that it bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the court inquiring whether the witness had any objection to the reading of the letter by the attorney for the defendant, the witness replied that he wished to consult with his attorney. Upon this the attorney for the adversary party, the Orient Insurance Company, suggested that he would like to have the letter marked without his reading it, and it was accordingly marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view of the production of the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the witness as to its contents," and he added: "I now ask the permission of the court to read the letter for my information." The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and the attorney observed that he would have no objection to the disclosing of that part of the letter which referred exactly to the point of the urging of the filing of the complaints, and he added: "Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a communication between a client and attorney, I don't think, if your Honor please, it can be disclosed without the consent of both."

In the course of the colloquy which thereupon unsued between the attorney for the plaintiff and the attorney for the defendant, it was stated by the attorney for the plaintiff that only a part of the letter had anything to do with the urging of the presentation of the complaints in the cases to which the witness had testified, and that the other part of the letter referred to the contract of fees, or retaining of the services of plaintiff's attorneys in connection with said cases, a matter, so the attorney suggested, entirely distinct from the urging of the presentation of the cases. The attorney for the defendant thereupon insisted before the court that, inasmuch as all the letter refers to the case then in court, the entire document should be exhibited, in conformity with the rule that when part of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be presented. Upon this the respondent judge ruled as follows: "Objection of the counsel for the plaintiff and the witness, Mr. Barchrach, to the showing or reading of the whole letter in the record is sustained, and it is ordered that only that part of the letter which has been referred to by Mr. Bachrach in his testimony be read and transcribed into the record." To this ruling the attorney for the defendant excepted and the respondent judge then said: "Let that part of the letter pointed out by Mr. Bachrach be transcribed in the record;" whereupon the following part of the letter was read out in court and incorporated in the transcript. July 13, 1929 DEAR SIR: As you know, your attorney Mr. Basilio Francisco has turned over to us, prior to his departure, all the papers in connection with the insurance claim of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., on destroyed or burned merchandise, and everything is now ready for filing of the corresponding complaints in the Court of First Instance. When the matter above quoted had been thus read into the record, the attorney for the defendant made the following observation: "In view of the fact that counsel for the plaintiff has just now read into the record and presented as evidence a part of the letter of July 13, I now request that the entire letter be produced." This request was overruled by the court, and the attorney for the defendant excepted. After further discussion, upon the suggestion of the attorney for the defendant and by agreement of the counsel for both parties, the second page of the letter was marked 49-A by the clerk court. The incident was renewed when it came at turn of the attorney for the defendant to cross-examine the same witness E. M. Bachrach, when the attorney for the defendant, having ascertained from the witness that he still had the letter in his possession, and that he had not answered it in writing, formally offered the letter in evidence. The attorney for the plaintiff again objected, on the ground that the letter was of a privileged nature and that it was the personal property of the witness. Thereupon the court, receiving the letter in hand from the witness, observed that he had already ruled upon it, and after further discussion, the court

sustained the objection of the attorney for the plaintiff and refused to admit in evidence so much of the letter as had not already been read into the record. The attorney for the defendant again excepted. At a later stage of the trial the attorney interposed a formal motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the court in refusing to admit the letter in evidence, or the part of it not already incorporated in the record. The court, however, adhered to its original ruling, and the attorney for the defendant excepted. Another incident that might be noted, though not alleged as a ground of relief in the petition before us, but set forth in the answer of the respondents, is that the attorney for the defendant procured a subpoena duces tecum to be issued by the clerk of court requiring the attorneys for the plaintiff to produce in court certain papers including the letter which gave rise to the present controversy. The court, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said subpoena. The essential character of this incident, which we have perhaps narrated with unnecessary prolixity, is readily discernible. A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter which had been received by the plaintiff from its attorney, and when the fact was revealed that the communication had been made by letter, the attorney for the defendant requested that the witness be required to produce the letter in court, and if not, that his answer should be stricken out . This in legal effect was a demand for the production of "the best evidence," it being a well-known rule of law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper writing which can be produced in court. In response to this request that portion of the letter to which the witness had supposedly referred was read into the record. The respondent judge appears to have considered that the excerpt from the letter thus incorporated in the record was either proof of the defendant, its production having been demanded by defendant's counsel, or that at least the legal responsibility for the incorporation of said excerpt into the record was attributable to the defendant. We are unable to accept this view. The incorporation of this excerpt from the letter was a necessary support of the oral statement which the witness had made, and if this basis for such statement had not been laid by the incorporation of the excerpt into the record, the oral statement of the witness concerning the tenor of the letter should properly have been stricken out. But instead of withdrawing the oral statement of the witness concerning the nature of the written communication, the witness produced the letter and the part of it already quoted was read into the record. The excerpt in question must therefore be considered as proof submitted by the plaintiff; and there can be no question that, part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the whole of the letter could properly be examined by the other party, in accordance with the express provision of section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other portions of the letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged, because they related to the terms of employment between attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes communications from attorney to client relative to privileged matters. But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any exception. Practically every feature of the question now under consideration was involved in the case of Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), which in 1885 came before Wallace, J., a distinguished jurist presiding in the Federal Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York. The substance of the case is well stated in the note to Kelly vs. Cummens (20 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 1283, 1287), from which we quote as follows: In Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), it appeared that upon a motion in the cause, which was in equity for a preliminary injunction, one of the questions involved was whether a reissued patent upon which the suit was founded was obtained for the legitimate purpose of correcting mistake or inadvertence in the specification and claims of the original, or whether it was obtained merely for the purpose of expanding the claims of the original in order to subordinate to the reissue certain improvements or inventions made by others after the grant of the original patent and before the application for the reissue. To fortify its theory of the true reasons for obtaining the reissue, the complainant upon that motion embodied in affidavits extracts from communications made by a patent expert and attorney in the office of the solicitor general of the complainant, to the president and the vicepresident of the complainant, when the subject of applying for a reissue was under consideration by the officers of the complainant, and while the proceedings for a reissue were pending. After the cause had proceeded to the taking of proofs for final hearing the defendant sought to introduce in evidence the original communications, extracts from which were used by the complainant upon the motion for an injunction, on the ground that the parts of the communication which were not disclosed had an important

bearing upon the history of the application for a reissue, and indicated that it was not made for any legitimate purpose. The complainant resisted the efforts of the defendant to have the original communications admitted, on the ground that they were privileged as made to its officers by its attorney, but it was held that the defendant was entitled to introduce them in evidence, the court saying: "The question, then, is whether the complainant can shelter itself behind its privilege to insist upon the privacy of the communications between its attorney and its other officers as confidential communications, when it has itself produced fragmentary part of them, and sought to use them as a weapon against the defendant to obtain the stringent remedy of a preliminary injunction. Assuming that the communications addressed to the president and vice-president of the complainant by Mr. Buckingham were communications made to the complainant by its attorney, and as such privileged at the option of the complainant, it was competent for the complainant to waive its privilege. It would hardly be contended that the complainant could introduce extracts from these communications as evidence in its own behalf for the purpose of a final hearing, and yet withhold the other parts if their production were required by the defendant. A party cannot waive such a privilege partially. He cannot remove the seal of secrecy from so much of the privileged communications as makes for his advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much as makes to the advantage of his adversary, or may neutralize the effect of such as has been introduced. Upon the principle it would seem that it cannot be material at what stage of the proceedings in a suit a party waives his right to maintain the secrecy of privileged communication. All the proceedings in the cause are constituent parts of the controversy, and it is not obvious how any distinction can obtain as to the effect of waiver when made by a party for the purpose of obtaining temporary relief and when made by him to obtain final relief." From the foregoing decision and other cases contained in the note referred to, we are led to the conclusion that the attorney for the defendant in the court below was entitled to examine the whole of the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A), with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit the inspection of the letter by said attorney. It is suggested in the argument for the respondents that the question of the admissibility in evidence of the parts of the letter not already read into the record was prematurely raised, and that the attorney for the defendant should have waited until it became his turn to present evidence in chief, when, as is supposed, the question could have been properly raised. We are of the opinion, however, that if the attorney for the defendant had a right to examine the letter, it should have been produced when he asked for it on the cross-examination of the witness who had the letter in his possession. Besides, in the lengthy discussions between court and attorneys, occuring at different times, there was not the

slightest suggestion from the court that the parts of the letter which were held inadmissible would be admitted at any time. Furthermore, the action of the court in quashing the subpoena duces tecum for the production of the letter shows that the court meant to rule that the letter could not be inspected at all by the attorney for the defendant. Objection is also here made by the attorney for the respondents to the use of the writ of mandamus for the purpose of correcting the error which is supposed to have been committed. The situation presented is, however, one where the herein petitioner has no other remedy. The letter which the petitioner seeks to examine has been ruled inadmissible, as to the parts not introduced in evidence by the defendant in the court below, and the respondent judge had not permitted the document to become a part of the record in such a way that the petitioner could take advantage of the error upon appeal to this court. It is idle to discuss whether other remedy would be speedy or adequate when there is no remedy at all. This court is loath, of course, to interfere in course of the trial of a case in a Court of First Instance, as such interference might frequently prolong unduly the litigation in that court. But this case has been pending before the respondent judge for a considerable period of time, and undoubtedly the probatory period will be necessarily extended much longer. Under these circumstances, the action of this court in entertaining the present application will either be conductive to the speedy determination of case, or at least will not appreciably extend the proceedings. It goes without saying that the subject matter of the contention is of a nature which makes the use of the writ ofmandamus appropriate, since the right from the exercise of which the petitioner is excluded is one to which it is entitled under the law and the duty to be performed is one pertaining to the respondent judge in his official capacity. From what has been said it follows that the writ of mandamus prayed for will be granted, and the respondent judge is directed to permit the attorney for the defendant (petitioner here) to inspect the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A) with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to the issues made by the pleadings in civil case No. 35825 and other cases which have been consolidated with it for trial. So ordered, with costs against the respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:

I concur solely on the ground that the portion of the letter alleged to be privileged is not so.

HICKMAN V. TAYLOR, 329 U. S. 495 (1947) Case Preview Full Text of Case U.S. Supreme Court Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) Hickman v. Taylor No. 47 Argued November 13, 1946 Decided January 13, 1947 329 U.S. 495 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff in a suit in a federal district court against certain tug owners to recover for the death of a seaman in the sinking of the tug filed numerous interrogatories directed to the defendants, including one inquiring whether any statements of members of the crew were taken in connection with the accident and requesting that exact copies of all such written statements be attached and that the defendant "set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports." There was no showing of necessity or other justification for these requests. A public hearing had been held before the United States Steamboat Inspectors at which the survivors of the accident had been examined and their testimony recorded and made available to all interested parties. Defendants answered all other interrogatories, stating objective facts and giving the names and addresses of witnesses, but declined to summarize or set forth the statements taken from witnesses, on the ground that they were "privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation." After a hearing on objections to the interrogatories, the District Court held that the requested matters were not privileged and decreed that they be produced and that memoranda of defendants' counsel containing statements of fact by witnesses either be produced or submitted to the court for determination of those portions which should be revealed to plaintiff.

Defendants and their counsel refused, and were adjudged guilty of contempt. Held: 1. In these circumstances, Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the production as of right of oral and written statements of witnesses secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen. Pp. 329 U. S. 509-514. 2. Since plaintiff addressed simple interrogatories to adverse parties, did not direct them to such parties or their counsel by way of deposition under Rule 26, and it does not appear that he filed a Page 329 U. S. 496 motion under Rule 34 for a court order directing the production of the documents in question, he was proceeding primarily under Rule 33, relating to interrogatories to parties. P. 329 U. S. 504. 3. Rules 33 and 34 are limited to parties, thereby excluding their counsel or agents. P.329 U. S. 504. 4. Rule 33 did not permit the plaintiff to obtain, as adjuncts to interrogatories addressed to defendants, memoranda and statements prepared by their counsel after a claim had arisen. P. 329 U. S. 504. 5. The District Court erred in holding defendants in contempt for failure to produce that which was in the possession of their counsel, and in holding their counsel in contempt for failure to produce that which he could not be compelled to produce under either Rule 33 or Rule 34. P. 329 U. S. 505. 6. Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions prepared or obtained from interviews with witnesses by counsel in preparing for litigation after a claim has arisen are not within the attorney-client privilege, and are not protected from discovery on that basis. P. 329 U. S. 508. 7. The general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order. P. 329 U. S. 512. 8. Rule 30(b) gives the trial judge the requisite discretion to make a judgment as to whether discovery should be allowed as to written statements secured from witnesses; but, in this case, there was no ground for the exercise of that discretion in favor of plaintiff. P. 329 U. S. 512.

9. Under the circumstances of this case, no showing of necessity could be made which would justify requiring the production of oral statements made by witnesses to defendants' counsel, whether presently in the form of his mental impressions or in the form of memoranda. P. 329 U. S. 512. 153 F.2d 212 affirmed. A District Court adjudged respondents guilty of contempt for failure to produce, in response to interrogatories, copies of certain written statements and memoranda prepared by counsel in connection with pending litigation. 4 F.R.D. 479. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 153 F.2d 212. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 876.Affirmed, p. 329 U. S. 514. Page 329 U. S. 497 MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an important problem under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to the extent to which a party may inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses, or other information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen. Examination into a person's files and records, including those resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged with care. It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work. At the same time, public policy supports reasonable and necessary inquiries. Properly to balance these competing interests is a delicate and difficult task. Page 329 U. S. 498 On February 7, 1943, the tug "J. M. Taylor" sank while engaged in helping to tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later, the tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug. A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United States Steamboat Inspectors at which the four survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye toward the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed these statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh also interviewed other persons believed to have some

information relating to the accident, and in some cases he made memoranda of what they told him. At the time when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors, representatives of two of the deceased crew members had been in communication with him. Ultimately claims were presented by representatives of all five of the deceased; four of the claims, however, were settled without litigation. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit in a federal court under the Jones Act on November 26, 1943, naming as defendants the two tug owners, individually and as partners, and the railroad. One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The 38th interrogatory read: "State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.' Page 329 U. S. 499 Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports." Supplemental interrogatories asked whether any oral or written statements, records, reports, or other memoranda had been made concerning any matter relative to the towing operation, the sinking of the tug, the salvaging and repair of the tug, and the death of the deceased. If the answer was in the affirmative, the tug owners were then requested to set forth the nature of all such records, reports, statements, or other memoranda. The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories except No. 38 and the supplemental ones just described. While admitting that statements of the survivors had been taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the contents. They did so on the ground that such requests called "for privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation," and constituted "an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files." It was claimed that answering these requests "would involve practically turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts, of counsel." In connection with the hearing on these objections, Fortenbaugh made a written statement and gave an informal oral deposition explaining the circumstances under which he had taken the statements. But he was not expressly asked in the deposition to produce the statements. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that the requested matters were not privileged. 4 F.R.D.

479. The court then decreed that the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for the tug owners forthwith "answer Plaintiff's 38th interrogatory and supplemental interrogatories; produce all written statements of witnesses obtained by Mr. Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for Defendants; Page 329 U. S. 500 state in substance any fact concerning this case which Defendants learned through oral statements made by witnesses to Mr. Fortenbaugh, whether or not included in his private memoranda, and produce Mr. Fortenbaugh's memoranda containing statements of fact by witnesses or to submit these memoranda to the Court for determination of those portions which should be revealed to Plaintiff." Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they complied. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the District Court. 153 F.2d 212. It held that the information here sought was part of the "work product of the lawyer," and hence privileged from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The importance of the problem, which has engendered a great divergence of views among district courts, [Footnote 1] led us to grant certiorari. 328 U.S. 876. The pretrial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, the pretrial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation, and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings. [Footnote 2] Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was Page 329 U. S. 501 narrowly confined, and was often cumbersome in method. [Footnote 3] The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving, and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pretrial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus, civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. [Footnote 4]

There is an initial question as to which of the deposition-discovery rules is involved in this case. Petitioner, in filing his interrogatories, thought that he was proceeding under Rule 33. That rule provides that a party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served. [Footnote 5] The District Court proceeded Page 329 U. S. 502 on the same assumption in its opinion, although its order to produce and its contempt order stated that both Rules 33 and 34 were involved. Rule 34 establishes a procedure whereby, upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, etc., not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or control. [Footnote 6] The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, felt that Rule 26 was the crucial one. Petitioner, it said, was proceeding by interrogatories, and, in connection with those interrogatories, wanted copies of memoranda and statements secured from witnesses. While the court believed that Rule 33 was involved at least as to the defending tug owners, it stated that this rule could not be used as the basis for condemning Fortenbaugh's failure to disclose or produce Page 329 U. S. 503 the memoranda and statements, since the rule applies only to interrogatories addressed to adverse parties, not to their agents or counsel. And Rule 34 was said to be inapplicable since petitioner was not trying to see an original document and to copy or photograph it, within the scope of that rule. The court then concluded that Rule 26 must be the one really involved. That provides that the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken by any party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence, and that the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents or other tangible things. [Footnote 7] Page 329 U. S. 504 The matter is not without difficulty in light of the events that transpired below. We believe, however, that petitioner was proceeding

primarily under Rule 33. He addressed simple interrogatories solely to the individual tug owners, the adverse parties, as contemplated by that rule. He did not, and could not under Rule 33, address such interrogatories to their counsel, Fortenbaugh. Nor did he direct these interrogatories either to the tug owners or to Fortenbaugh by way of deposition; Rule 26 thus could not come into operation. And it does not appear from the record that petitioner filed a motion under Rule 34 for a court order directing the production of the documents in question. Indeed, such an order could not have been entered as to Fortenbaugh, since Rule 34, like Rule 33, is limited to parties to the proceeding, thereby excluding their counsel or agents. Thus, to the extent that petitioner was seeking the production of the memoranda and statements gathered by Fortenbaugh in the course of his activities as counsel, petitioner misconceived his remedy. Rule 33 did not permit him to obtain such memoranda and statements as adjuncts to the interrogatories addressed to the individual tug owners. A party clearly cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground that the information sought is solely within the knowledge of his attorney. But that is not this case. Here, production was sought of documents prepared by a party's attorney after the claim has arisen. Rule 33 does not make provision for such production, even when sought in connection with permissible interrogatories. Moreover, since petitioner was also foreclosed from securing them through an order under Rule 34, his only recourse was to take Fortenbaugh's deposition under Rule 26 and to attempt to force Fortenbaugh to produce the materials by use of a subpoena duces tecum in accordance with Rule 45. Holtzoff, "Instruments of Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 41 Page 329 U. S. 505 Mich.L.Rev. 205, 220. But, despite petitioner's faulty choice of action, the District Court entered an order, apparently under Rule 34, commanding the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as their agent and counsel, to produce the materials in question. Their refusal led to the anomalous result of holding the tug owners in contempt for failure to produce that which was in the possession of their counsel, and of holding Fortenbaugh in contempt for failure to produce that which he could not be compelled to produce under either Rule 33 or Rule 34. But, under the circumstances, we deem it unnecessary and unwise to rest our decision upon this procedural irregularity, an irregularity which is not strongly urged upon us and which was disregarded in the two courts below. It matters little at this later stage whether Fortenbaugh fails to answer interrogatories filed under Rule 26 or under Rule 33 or whether he refuses to produce the memoranda and

statements pursuant to a subpoena under Rule 45 or a court order under Rule 34. The deposition-discovery rules create integrated procedural devices. And the basic question at stake is whether any of those devices may be used to inquire into materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation. The fact that the petitioner may have used the wrong method does not destroy the main thrust of his attempt. Nor does it relieve us of the responsibility of dealing with the problem raised by that attempt. It would be inconsistent with the liberal atmosphere surrounding these rules to insist that petitioner now go through the empty formality of pursuing the right procedural device only to reestablish precisely the same basic problem now confronting us. We do not mean to say, however, that there may not be situations in which the failure to proceed in accordance with a specific rule would be important or decisive. But, in the present circumstances, for the purposes of this decision, the procedural Page 329 U. S. 506 irregularity is not material. Having noted the proper procedure, we may accordingly turn our attention to the substance of the underlying problem. In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes that the depositiondiscovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover the true facts, and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be found. It is said that inquiry may be made under these rules, epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not privileged, and, since the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be restricted to its narrowest bounds. On the premise that the attorney-client privilege is the one involved in this case, petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential communications made by a client to his attorney. And, since the materials here in issue were secured by Fortenbaugh from third persons, rather than from his clients, the tug owners, the conclusion is reached that these materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26. As additional support for this result, petitioner claims that to prohibit discovery under these circumstances would give a corporate defendant a tremendous advantage in a suit by an individual plaintiff. Thus, in a suit by an injured employee against a railroad or in a suit by an insured person against an insurance company, the corporate defendant could pull a dark veil of secrecy over all the pertinent facts it can collect after the claim arises merely on the assertion that such

facts were gathered by its large staff of attorneys and claim agents. At the same time, the individual plaintiff, who often has direct knowledge of the matter in issue and has no counsel until some time after his claim arises, could be compelled to disclose all the intimate details of his case. By endowing with Page 329 U. S. 507 immunity from disclosure all that a lawyer discovers in the course of his duties, it is said, the rights of individual litigants in such cases are drained of vitality, and the lawsuit becomes more of a battle of deception than a search for truth. But framing the problem in terms of assisting individual plaintiffs in their suits against corporate defendants is unsatisfactory. Discovery concededly may work to the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of individual plaintiffs. Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant. The problem thus far transcends the situation confronting this petitioner. And we must view that problem in light of the limitless situations where the particular kind of discovery sought by petitioner might be used. We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the timehonored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. [Footnote 8] Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. But discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules 30(b) and (d) and 31(d), limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown Page 329 U. S. 508 that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And, as Rule 26(b) provides, further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. We also agree that the memoranda, statements, and mental impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorneyclient privilege, and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that

privilege as recognized in the federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case, and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide an answer to the problem before us. Petitioner has made more than an ordinary request for relevant, nonprivileged facts in the possession of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as of right of oral and written statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner appears unimpaired. He has sought production of these matters after making the most searching inquiries of his opponents as to the circumstances surrounding the fatal accident, which inquiries were sworn to have been answered to the best of their information and belief. Interrogatories were directed toward all the events prior to, during, and subsequent to the sinking of the tug. Full and honest answers to such broad inquiries would necessarily have included all Page 329 U. S. 509 pertinent information gleaned by Fortenbaugh through his interviews with the witnesses. Petitioner makes no suggestion, and we cannot assume, that the tug owners or Fortenbaugh were incomplete or dishonest in the framing of their answers. In addition, petitioner was free to examine the public testimony of the witnesses taken before the United States Steamboat Inspectors. We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of written statements and mental impressions contained in the files and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice. For aught that appears, the essence of what petitioner seeks either has been revealed to him already through the interrogatories or is readily available to him direct from the witnesses for the asking. The District Court, after hearing objections to petitioner's request, commanded Fortenbaugh to produce all written statements of witnesses and to state in substance any facts learned through oral statements of witnesses to him. Fortenbaugh was to submit any memoranda he had made of the oral statements, so that the court might determine what portions should be revealed to petitioner. All of this was ordered without any showing by petitioner, or any

requirement that he make a proper showing, of the necessity for the production of any of this material or any demonstration that denial of production would cause hardship or injustice. The court simply ordered production on the theory that the facts sought were material and were not privileged as constituting attorney-client communications. In our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery contemplates production under such circumstances. That is not because the subject matter is privileged or irrelevant, as those concepts are used in these Page 329 U. S. 510 rules. [Footnote 9] Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court, and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Page 329 U. S. 511 Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories, and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways -- aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.

We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file, and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence, or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. Were production of written statements and documents to be precluded under Page 329 U. S. 512 such circumstances, the liberal ideals of the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be stripped of much of their meaning. But the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order. That burden, we believe, is necessarily implicit in the rules as now constituted. [Footnote 10] Rule 30(b), as presently written, gives the trial judge the requisite discretion to make a judgment as to whether discovery should be allowed as to written statements secured from witnesses. But, in the instant case, there was no room for that discretion to operate in favor of the petitioner. No attempt was made to establish any reason why Fortenbaugh should be forced to produce the written statements. There was only a naked, general demand for these materials as of right, and a finding by the District Court that no recognizable privilege was involved. That was insufficient to justify discovery under these circumstances, and the court should have sustained the refusal of the tug owners and Fortenbaugh to produce. But, as to oral statements made by witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether presently in the form of his mental impressions or memoranda, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production. Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account Page 329 U. S. 513 to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such production.

The practice forces the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding witnesses' remarks. Such testimony could not qualify as evidence, and to use it for impeachment or corroborative purposes would make the attorney much less an officer of the court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby suffer. Denial of production of this nature does not mean that any material, nonprivileged facts can be hidden from the petitioner in this case. He need not be unduly hindered in the preparation of his case, in the discovery of facts, or in his anticipation of his opponents' position. Searching interrogatories directed to Fortenbaugh and the tug owners, production of written documents and statements upon a proper showing, and direct interviews with the witnesses themselves all serve to reveal the facts in Fortenbaugh's possession to the fullest possible extent consistent with public policy. Petitioner's counsel frankly admits that he wants the oral statements only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing. That is insufficient under the circumstances to permit him an exception to the policy underlying the privacy of Fortenbaugh's professional activities. If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these matters, petitioner's case is not of that type. We fully appreciate the widespread controversy among the members of the legal profession over the problem raised by this case. [Footnote 11] It is a problem that rests on what Page 329 U. S. 514 has been one of the most hazy frontiers of the discovery process. But, until some rule or statute definitely prescribes otherwise, we are not justified in permitting discovery in a situation of this nature as a matter of unqualified right. When Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries. And we refuse to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and unwarranted a result. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Affirmed. [Footnote 1] See cases collected by Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure in its Report of Proposed Amendments (June, 1946), pp. 40-47; 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-460. See also 2 Moore's Federal Practice (1945 Cum.Supp.), 26.12, pp. 155-159; Holtzoff, "Instruments of Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 41 Mich.L.Rev. 205,

210-212; Pike and Willis, "Federal Discovery in Operation," 7 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev. 297, 301-307. [Footnote 2] "The great weakness of pleading as a means for developing and presenting issues of fact for trial lay in its total lack of any means for testing the factual basis for the pleader's allegations and denials." Sunderland, "The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure," 36 Mich.L.Rev. 215, 216.See also Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932), ch. I. [Footnote 3] 2 Moore's Federal Practice (1938), 26.02, pp. 2445, 2455. [Footnote 4] Pike and Willis, "The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure," 38 Col.L.Rev. 1179, 1436; Pike, "The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules of Evidence," 34 Ill.L.Rev. 1. [Footnote 5] Rule 33 reads: "Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed by the person making them, and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the delivery of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion, and answers shall be deferred until the objections are determined, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable. No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same party." [Footnote 6] Rule 34 provides: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,

objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just." [Footnote 7] The relevant portions of Rule 26 provide as follows: "(a) WHEN DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes." "(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." [Footnote 8] "One of the chief arguments against the 'fishing expedition' objection is the idea that discovery is mutual -- that, while a party may have to disclose his case, he can at the same time tie his opponent down to a definite position." Pike and Willis, "Federal Discovery in Operation," 7 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev. 297, 303. [Footnote 9] The English courts have developed the concept of privilege to include all documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation.

"All documents which are called into existence for the purpose -- but not necessarily the sole purpose -- of assisting the deponent or his legal advisers in any actual or anticipated litigation are privileged from production. . . . Thus, all proofs, briefs, draft pleadings, etc., are privileged; but not counsel's indorsement on the outside of his brief . . . nor any deposition or notes of evidence given publicly in open Court. . . . So are all papers prepared by any agent of the party bona fide for the use of his solicitor for the purposes of the action, whether in fact so used or not. . . . Reports by a company's servant, if made in the ordinary course of routine, are not privileged, even though it is desirable that the solicitor should have them and they are subsequently sent to him; but if the solicitor has requested that such documents shall always be prepared for his use and this was one of the reasons why they were prepared, they need not by disclosed." Odgers on Pleading and Practice (12th ed., 1939), p. 264. See Order 31, rule 1, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, set forth in The Annual Practice, 1945, p. 519, and the discussion following that rule. For a compilation of the English cases on the matter, see 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed., 1940), 2319, pp. 618622, notes. [Footnote 10] Rule 34 is explicit in its requirements that a party show good cause before obtaining a court order directing another party to produce documents. See Report of Proposed Amendments by Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (June, 1946); 5 F.R.D. 433. [Footnote 11] See Report of Proposed Amendments by Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (June, 1946), pp. 44-47; 5 F.R.D. 433, 459, 460; Discovery Procedure Symposium before the 1946 Conference of the Third United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 F.R.D. 403; Armstrong, "Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments," 5 F.R.D. 339, 353-357. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. The narrow question in this case concerns only one of thirty-nine interrogatories which defendants and their counsel refused to answer. As there was persistence in refusal after the court ordered them to answer it, counsel and clients were committed to jail by the district court until they should purge themselves of contempt. The interrogatory asked whether statements were taken from the crews of the tugs involved in the accident, or of any other vessel, and demanded,

"Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports." The question is simply whether such a demand is authorized by the rules relating to various aspects of "discovery." The primary effect of the practice advocated here would be on the legal profession itself. But it too often is overlooked Page 329 U. S. 515 that the lawyer and the law office are indispensable parts of our administration of justice. Law-abiding people can go nowhere else to learn the ever changing and constantly multiplying rules by which they must behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime consequence to society, which would feel the consequences of such a practice as petitioner urges secondarily, but certainly. "Discovery" is one of the working tools of the legal profession. It traces back to the equity bill of discovery in English Chancery practice, and seems to have had a forerunner in Continental practice. See Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932) 13-16. Since 1848, when the draftsmen of New York's Code of Procedure recognized the importance of a better system of discovery, the impetus to extend and expand discovery, as well as the opposition to it, has come from within the Bar itself. It happens in this case that it is the plaintiff's attorney who demands such unprecedented latitude of discovery and, strangely enough, amicus briefs in his support have been filed by several labor unions representing plaintiffs as a class. It is the history of the movement for broader discovery, however, that, in actual experience, the chief opposition to its extension has come from lawyers who specialize in representing plaintiffs, because defendants have made liberal use of it to force plaintiffs to disclose their cases in advance. See Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State (1934) 330, 331; Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932) 35, 36. Discovery is a two-edged sword, and we cannot decide this problem on any doctrine of extending help to one class of litigants. It seems clear, and long has been recognized, that discovery should provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case. Cf. Report of Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State (1934) 41, 42. Page 329 U. S. 516 It seems equally clear that discovery should not nullify the privilege of confidential communication between attorney and client. But those

principles give us no real assistance here, because what is being sought is neither evidence nor is it a privileged communication between attorney and client. To consider first the most extreme aspect of the requirement in litigation here, we find it calls upon counsel, if he has had any conversations with any of the crews of the vessels in question or of any other, to "set forth in detail the exact provision of any such oral statements or reports." Thus, the demand is not for the production of a transcript in existence, but calls for the creation of a written statement not in being. But the statement by counsel of what a witness told him is not evidence when written plaintiff could not introduce it to prove his case. What, then, is the purpose sought to be served by demanding this of adverse counsel? Counsel for the petitioner candidly said on argument that he wanted this information to help prepare himself to examine witnesses, to make sure he overlooked nothing. He bases his claim to it in his brief on the view that the Rules were to do away with the old situation where a law suit developed into "a battle of wits between counsel." But a common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary. The real purpose and the probable effect of the practice ordered by the district court would be to put trials on a level even lower than a "battle of wits." I can conceive of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary an account of what witnesses have told him. Even if his recollection were perfect, the statement would be his language Page 329 U. S. 517 permeated with his inferences. Everyone who has tried it knows that it is almost impossible so fairly to record the expressions and emphasis of a witness that, when he testifies in the environment of the court and under the influence of the leading question, there will not be departures in some respects. Whenever the testimony of the witness would differ from the "exact" statement the lawyer had delivered, the lawyer's statement would be whipped out to impeach the witness. Counsel producing his adversary's "inexact" statement could lose nothing by saying, "Here is a contradiction, gentlemen of the jury. I do not know whether it is my adversary or his witness who is not telling the truth, but one is not." Of course, if this practice were adopted, that scene would be repeated over and over again. The lawyer who delivers such statements often would find himself branded a deceiver afraid to take the stand to support his own version of the witness' conversation

with him, or else he will have to go on the stand to defend his own credibility -- perhaps against that of his chief witness, or possibly even his client. Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand, and will do so only for grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his role; he is almost invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession discourages it. But the practice advocated here is one which would force him to be a witness not as to what he has seen or done, but as to other witnesses' stories, and not because he wants to do so, but in self-defense. And what is the lawyer to do who has interviewed one whom he believes to be a biased, lying, or hostile witness to get his unfavorable statements and know what to meet? He must record and deliver such statements even though he would not vouch for the credibility of the witness by calling him. Perhaps the other side would not want to Page 329 U. S. 518 call him either, but the attorney is open to the charge of suppressing evidence at the trial if he fails to call such a hostile witness even though he never regarded him as reliable or truthful. Having been supplied the names of the witnesses, petitioner's lawyer gives no reason why he cannot interview them himself. If an employee-witness refuses to tell his story, he, too, may be examined under the Rules. He may be compelled on discovery as fully as on the trial to disclose his version of the facts. But that is his own disclosure -- it can be used to impeach him if he contradicts it, and such a deposition is not useful to promote an unseemly disagreement between the witness and the counsel in the case. It is true that the literal language of the Rules would admit of an interpretation that would sustain the district court's order. So the literal language of the Act of Congress which makes "any writing or record . . . made as a memorandum or record of any . . . occurrence, or event" admissible as evidence would have allowed the railroad company to put its engineer's accident statements in evidence. Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 318 U. S. 111. But all such procedural measures have a background of custom and practice which was assumed by those who wrote and should be by those who apply them. We reviewed the background of the Act and the consequences on the trial of negligence cases of allowing railroads and others to put in their statements and thus to shield the crew from crossexamination. We said, "Such a major change which opens wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination should not be left to implication." 318 U.S. at 318 U. S. 114. We pointed out that there, as

here, the "several hundred years of history behind the Act . . . indicate the nature of the reforms which it was designed to effect." Page 329 U. S. 519 318 U.S. at 318 U. S. 115. We refused to apply it beyond that point. We should follow the same course of reasoning here. Certainly nothing in the tradition or practice of discovery up to the time of these Rules would have suggested that they would authorize such a practice as here proposed. The question remains as to signed statements or those written by witnesses. Such statements are not evidence for the defendant. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109. Nor should I think they ordinarily could be evidence for the plaintiff. But such a statement might be useful for impeachment of the witness who signed it, if he is called, and if he departs from the statement. There might be circumstances, too, where impossibility or difficulty of access to the witness or his refusal to respond to requests for information or other facts would show that the interests of justice require that such statements be made available. Production of such statements are governed by Rule 34 and on "Showing good cause therefor" the court may order their inspection, copying or photographing. No such application has here been made; the demand is made on the basis of right, not on showing of cause. I agree to the affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the district court. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins in this opinion.

U.S. Supreme Court UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 449 U.S. 383 UPJOHN CO. ET AL. v. UNITED STATES ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 79-886. Argued November 5, 1980 Decided January 13, 1981 When the General Counsel for petitioner pharmaceutical manufacturing corporation (hereafter petitioner) was informed that one of its foreign

subsidiaries had made questionable payments to foreign government officials in order to secure government business, an internal investigation of such payments was initiated. As part of this investigation, petitioner's attorneys sent a questionnaire to all foreign managers seeking detailed information concerning such payments, and the responses were returned to the General Counsel. The General Counsel and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and other company officers and employees. Subsequently, based on a report voluntarily submitted by petitioner disclosing the questionable payments, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of such payments and issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7602 demanding production of, inter alia, the questionnaires and the memoranda and notes of the interviews. Petitioner refused to produce the documents on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation. The United States then filed a petition in Federal District Court seeking enforcement of the summons. That court adopted the Magistrate's recommendation that the summons should be enforced, the Magistrate having concluded, inter alia, that the attorney-client privilege had been waived and that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protection of the work-product doctrine. The Court of Appeals rejected the Magistrate's finding of a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege, but held that under the so-called "control group test" the privilege did not apply "[t]o the extent that the communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing [petitioner's] actions in response to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the `client's.'" The court also held that the work-product doctrine did not apply to IRS summonses. Held: 1. The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege insofar as the responses to the [449 U.S. 383, 384] questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. Pp. 389-397. (a) The control group test overlooks the fact that such privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. While in the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one and the same, in the corporate context it will frequently be employees beyond the control group (as defined by the Court of Appeals) who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level - and indeed lower-level - employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties. Pp. 390-392. (b) The control group test thus frustrates the very purpose of the attorney-client privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by

employees of the client corporation to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client. The attorney's advice will also frequently be more significant to noncontrol employees than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation's policy. P. 392. (c) The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the Court of Appeals not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. Pp. 392-393. (d) Here, the communications at issue were made by petitioner's employees to counsel for petitioner acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. Information not available from upperechelon management was needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas. The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. Pp. 394395. 2. The work-product doctrine applies to IRS summonses. Pp. 397-402. (a) The obligation imposed by a tax summons remains subject to the traditional privileges and limitations, and nothing in the language [449 U.S. 383, 385] or legislative history of the IRS summons provisions suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the work-product doctrine. P. 398. (b) The Magistrate applied the wrong standard when he concluded that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protections of the work-product doctrine. The notes and memoranda sought by the Government constitute work product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications they reveal attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which accords special protection from disclosure to work product revealing an attorney's mental processes, and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need or inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. P. 401. 600 F.2d 1223, reversed and remanded. REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which BURGER, C. J., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, P. 402. Daniel M. Gribbon argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Stuart A. Smith, and Robert E. Lindsay. *

[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Leonard S. Janofsky, Leon Jaworski, and Keith A. Jones for the American Bar Association; by Thomas G. Lilly, Alfred F. Belcuore, Paul F. Rothstein, and Ronald L. Carlson for the Federal Bar Association; by Erwin N. Griswold for the American College of Trial Lawyers et al.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc and J. Bruce Brown for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Lewis A. Kaplan, James N. Benedict, Brian D. Forrow, John G. Koeltl, Standish Forde Medina, Jr., Renee J. Roberts, and Marvin Wexler for the Committee on Federal Courts et al. William W. Becker filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. [449 U.S. 383, 386] JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to address important questions concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and the applicability of the work-product doctrine in proceedings to enforce tax summonses. 445 U.S. 925 . With respect to the privilege question the parties and various amici have described our task as one of choosing between two "tests" which have gained adherents in the courts of appeals. We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases and not abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so. We can and do, however, conclude that the attorney-client privilege protects the communications involved in this case from compelled disclosure and that the work-product doctrine does apply in tax summons enforcement proceedings. I Petitioner Upjohn Co. manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals here and abroad. In January 1976 independent accountants conducting an audit of one of Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries discovered that the subsidiary made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure government business. The accountants so informed petitioner Mr. Gerard Thomas, Upjohn's Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel. Thomas is a member of the Michigan and New York Bars, and has been Upjohn's General Counsel for 20 years. He consulted with outside counsel and R. T. Parfet, Jr., Upjohn's Chairman of the Board. It was decided that the company would conduct an internal investigation of what were termed "questionable payments." As part of this investigation the attorneys prepared a letter containing a questionnaire which was sent to "All Foreign General and Area Managers" over the Chairman's signature. The letter [449 U.S. 383, 387] began by noting recent disclosures that several American companies made "possibly illegal" payments to foreign government officials and emphasized that the management needed full information concerning any such payments made by Upjohn. The letter indicated that the Chairman had asked Thomas, identified as "the company's General Counsel," "to conduct an investigation for the purpose of determining the nature and magnitude of any payments made by the Upjohn Company or any of its subsidiaries to any employee or official of a foreign government." The questionnaire sought detailed information concerning such payments. Managers

were instructed to treat the investigation as "highly confidential" and not to discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing the requested information. Responses were to be sent directly to Thomas. Thomas and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and some 33 other Upjohn officers or employees as part of the investigation. On March 26, 1976, the company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K disclosing certain questionable payments. 1 A copy of the report was simultaneously submitted to the Internal Revenue Service, which immediately began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the payments. Special agents conducting the investigation were given lists by Upjohn of all those interviewed and all who had responded to the questionnaire. On November 23, 1976, the Service issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7602 demanding production of: "All files relative to the investigation conducted under the supervision of Gerard Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign governments and any political [449 U.S. 383, 388] contributions made by the Upjohn Company or any of its affiliates since January 1, 1971 and to determine whether any funds of the Upjohn Company had been improperly accounted for on the corporate books during the same period. "The records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries." App. 17a-18a. The company declined to produce the documents specified in the second paragraph on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation. On August 31, 1977, the United States filed a petition seeking enforcement of the summons under 26 U.S.C. 7402 (b) and 7604 (a) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. That court adopted the recommendation of a Magistrate who concluded that the summons should be enforced. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which rejected the Magistrate's finding of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227, n. 12, but agreed that the privilege did not apply "[t]o the extent that the communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the `client's.'" Id., at 1225. The court reasoned that accepting petitioners' claim for a broader application of the privilege would encourage upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and create too broad a "zone of silence." Noting that Upjohn's counsel had interviewed officials such as the Chairman and President, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court so that a determination of who was [449 U.S. 383, 389] within the "control group" could be made. In a concluding footnote the court stated that the work-product doctrine "is not applicable to administrative summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. 7602." Id., at 1228, n. 13. II

Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client. As we stated last Term in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." And in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), we recognized the purpose of the privilege to be "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." This rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the Court, see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure"). Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of the [449 U.S. 383, 390] law, and not an individual; but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation, United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915), and the Government does not contest the general proposition. The Court of Appeals, however, considered the application of the privilege in the corporate context to present a "different problem," since the client was an inanimate entity and "only the senior management, guiding and integrating the several operations, . . . can be said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole." 600 F.2d, at 1226. The first case to articulate the socalled "control group test" adopted by the court below, Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (ED Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (CA3 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), reflected a similar conceptual approach: "Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which is seeking the lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?, the most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, . . . then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply." (Emphasis supplied.) Such a view, we think, overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the

giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. See Trammel, supra, at 51; Fisher, supra, at 403. The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts [449 U.S. 383, 391] with an eye to the legally relevant. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1: "A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance." See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined by the court below - "officers and agents . . . responsible for directing [the company's] actions in response to legal advice" - who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level - and indeed lower-level employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties. This fact was noted in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (CA8 1978) (en banc): "In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-management personnel as well as from top executives. The attorney dealing with a complex legal problem `is thus faced with a "Hobson's choice". If he interviews employees not having "the very highest authority", [449 U.S. 383, 392] their communications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only those employees with "the very highest authority", he may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what happened." Id., at 608-609 (quoting Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 873, 876 (1971)). The control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. The attorney's advice will also frequently be more significant to noncontrol group members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation's policy. See, e. g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (SC 1974) ("After the lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corporate personnel who will apply it").

The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, "constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law," Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. Law. 901, 913 (1969), particularly since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter, see, e. g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440 -441 (1978) ("the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is [449 U.S. 383, 393] often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct"). 2 The test adopted by the court below is difficult to apply in practice, though no abstractly formulated and unvarying "test" will necessarily enable courts to decide questions such as this with mathematical precision. But if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all. The very terms of the test adopted by the court below suggest the unpredictability of its application. The test restricts the availability of the privilege to those officers who play a "substantial role" in deciding and directing a corporation's legal response. Disparate decisions in cases applying this test illustrate its unpredictability. Compare, e. g., Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F. R. D. 308, 315-316 (ND Okla. 1967), aff'd in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (CA10 1968) (control group includes managers and assistant managers of patent division and research and development department), with Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F. R. D. 82, 83-85 (ED Pa. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (CA3 1973) (control group includes only division and corporate vice presidents, and not two directors of research and vice president for production and research). [449 U.S. 383, 394] The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees 3 to counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. As the Magistrate found, "Mr. Thomas consulted with the Chairman of the Board and outside counsel and thereafter conducted a factual investigation to determine the nature and extent of the questionable payments and to be in a position to give legal advice to the company with respect to the payments." (Emphasis supplied.) 78-1 USTC 9277, pp. 83,598, 83,599. Information, not available from upper-echelon management, was needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas. 4 The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. The questionnaire identified Thomas as "the company's General Counsel" and referred in its opening sentence to the possible illegality of payments such as the ones on which information was sought. App. 40a. A

statement of policy accompanying the questionnaire clearly indicated the legal implications of the investigation. The policy statement was issued "in order that there be no uncertainty in the future as to the policy with respect to the practices which are the subject of this investigation." [449 U.S. 383, 395] It began "Upjohn will comply with all laws and regulations," and stated that commissions or payments "will not be used as a subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments" and that all payments must be "proper and legal." Any future agreements with foreign distributors or agents were to be approved "by a company attorney" and any questions concerning the policy were to be referred "to the company's General Counsel." Id., at 165a-166a. This statement was issued to Upjohn employees worldwide, so that even those interviewees not receiving a questionnaire were aware of the legal implications of the interviews. Pursuant to explicit instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the communications were considered "highly confidential" when made, id., at 39a, 43a, and have been kept confidential by the company. 5 Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure. The Court of Appeals declined to extend the attorney-client privilege beyond the limits of the control group test for fear that doing so would entail severe burdens on discovery and create a broad "zone of silence" over corporate affairs. Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never taken place. The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney: "[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different [449 U.S. 383, 396] thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, `What did you say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communications to his attorney." Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (ED Pa. 1962). See also Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d, at 611; State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580, 150 N. W. 2d 387, 399 (1967) ("the courts have noted that a party cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer"). Here the Government was free to question the employees who communicated with Thomas and outside counsel. Upjohn has provided the IRS with a list of such employees, and the IRS has already interviewed some 25 of them. While it would probably be more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner's internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege. As Justice Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S., at 516 : "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions . . . on wits borrowed from the adversary." Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any

such approach would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974) ("the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis"); Trammel, 445 U.S., at 47 ; United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980). While such a "case-by-case" basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client [449 U.S. 383, 397] privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules. At the same time we conclude that the narrow "control group test" sanctioned by the Court of Appeals in this case cannot, consistent with "the principles of the common law as . . . interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience," Fed. Rule Evid. 501, govern the development of the law in this area. III Our decision that the communications by Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege disposes of the case so far as the responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. The summons reaches further, however, and Thomas has testified that his notes and memoranda of interviews go beyond recording responses to his questions. App. 27a-28a, 91a-93a. To the extent that the material subject to the summons is not protected by the attorney-client privilege as disclosing communications between an employee and counsel, we must reach the ruling by the Court of Appeals that the work-product doctrine does not apply to summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. 7602. 6 The Government concedes, wisely, that the Court of Appeals erred and that the work-product doctrine does apply to IRS summonses. Brief for Respondents 16, 48. This doctrine was announced by the Court over 30 years ago in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In that case the Court rejected "an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties." Id., at 510. The Court noted that "it is essential that a lawyer work with [449 U.S. 383, 398] a certain degree of privacy" and reasoned that if discovery of the material sought were permitted "much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served." Id., at 511. The "strong public policy" underlying the work-product doctrine was reaffirmed recently in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 -240 (1975), and has been substantially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b) (3). 7 As we stated last Term, the obligation imposed by a tax summons remains "subject to the traditional privileges and limitations." United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980). Nothing in the language of the IRS summons provisions or their legislative history suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the work-product doctrine. Rule 26 (b) (3) codifies the workproduct doctrine, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are made

applicable [449 U.S. 383, 399] to summons enforcement proceedings by Rule 81 (a) (3). See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1971). While conceding the applicability of the work-product doctrine, the Government asserts that it has made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome its protections. The Magistrate apparently so found, 78-1 USTC 9277, p. 83,605. The Government relies on the following language in Hickman: "We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. . . . And production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty." 329 U.S., at 511 . The Government stresses that interviewees are scattered across the globe and that Upjohn has forbidden its employees to answer questions it considers irrelevant. The above-quoted language from Hickman, however, did not apply to "oral statements made by witnesses . . . whether presently in the form of [the attorney's] mental impressions or memoranda." Id., at 512. As to such material the Court did "not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production. . . . If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these matters, petitioner's case is not of that type." Id., at 512-513. See also Nobles, supra, at 252-253 (WHITE, J., concurring). Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney's mental processes, 329 U.S., at 513("what he saw fit to write down regarding witnesses' remarks"); id., at 516-517 ("the statement would be his [the [449 U.S. 383, 400] attorney's] language, permeated with his inferences") (Jackson, J., concurring). 8 Rule 26 accords special protection to work product revealing the attorney's mental processes. The Rule permits disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting attorney work product upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. This was the standard applied by the Magistrate, 78-1 USTC 9277, p. 83,604. Rule 26 goes on, however, to state that "[i]n ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Although this language does not specifically refer to memoranda based on oral statements of witnesses, the Hickman court stressed the danger that compelled disclosure of such memoranda would reveal the attorney's mental processes. It is clear that this is the sort of material the draftsmen of the Rule had in mind as deserving special protection. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 442 ("The subdivision . . . goes on to protect against disclosure the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories . . . of an attorney or other representative of a party. The Hickman opinion drew special attention to the need for protecting an attorney against discovery of memoranda prepared from recollection of oral interviews. The courts have steadfastly safeguarded

against disclosure of lawyers' mental impressions and legal theories . . ."). [449 U.S. 383, 401] Based on the foregoing, some courts have concluded that no showing of necessity can overcome protection of work product which is based on oral statements from witnesses. See, e. g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (CA8 1973) (personal recollections, notes, and memoranda pertaining to conversation with witnesses); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (ED Pa. 1976) (notes of conversation with witness "are so much a product of the lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witness's actual words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure"). Those courts declining to adopt an absolute rule have nonetheless recognized that such material is entitled to special protection. See, e. g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (CA3 1979) ("special considerations . . . must shape any ruling on the discoverability of interview memoranda . . .; such documents will be discoverable only in a `rare situation'"); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 511-512 (CA2 1979). We do not decide the issue at this time. It is clear that the Magistrate applied the wrong standard when he concluded that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protections of the work-product doctrine. The Magistrate applied the "substantial need" and "without undue hardship" standard articulated in the first part of Rule 26 (b) (3). The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are work product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are, in this case, protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications, they reveal the attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. While we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work-product rule, we [449 U.S. 383, 402] think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means than was made by the Government or applied by the Magistrate in this case would be necessary to compel disclosure. Since the Court of Appeals thought that the work-product protection was never applicable in an enforcement proceeding such as this, and since the Magistrate whose recommendations the District Court adopted applied too lenient a standard of protection, we think the best procedure with respect to this aspect of the case would be to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and remand the case to it for such further proceedings in connection with the work-product claim as are consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Footnotes [ Footnote 1 ] On July 28, 1976, the Company filed and amendment to this report disclosing further payments.

[ Footnote 2 ] The Government argues that the risk of civil or criminal liability suffices to ensure that corporations will seek legal advice in the absence of the protection of the privilege. This response ignores the fact that the depth and quality of any investigations to ensure compliance with the law would suffer, even were they undertaken. The response also proves too much, since it applies to all communications covered by the privilege; an individual trying to comply with the law or faced with a legal problem also has strong incentive to disclose information to his lawyer, yet the common law has recognized the value of the privilege in further facilitating communications. [ Footnote 3 ] Seven of the eighty-six employees interviewed by counsel had terminated their employment with Upjohn at the time of the interview. App. 33a38a. Petitioners argue that the privilege should nonetheless apply to communications by these former employees concerning activities during their period of employment. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals had occasion to address this issue, and we decline to decide it without the benefit of treatment below. [ Footnote 4 ] See id., at 26a-27a, 103a, 123a-124a. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (CA3 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 511 (CA2 1979). [ Footnote 5 ] See Magistrate's opinion, 78-1 USTC 9277, p. 83,599: "The responses to the questionnaires and the notes of the interviews have been treated as confidential material and have not been disclosed to anyone except Mr. Thomas and outside counsel." [ Footnote 6 ] The following discussion will also be relevant to counsel's notes and memoranda of interviews with the seven former employees should it be determined that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to them. See n. 3, supra. [ Footnote 7 ] This provides, in pertinent part: "[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." [ Footnote 8 ] Thomas described his notes of the interviews as containing "what I considered to be the important questions, the substance of the responses to them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they related to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other questions. In some instances

they might even suggest other questions that I would have to ask or things that I needed to find elsewhere." 78-1 USTC 9277, p. 83,599. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join in Parts I and III of the opinion of the Court and in the judgment. As to Part II, I agree fully with the Court's rejection of the so-called "control group" test, its reasons for doing so, and its ultimate holding that the communications at issue are privileged. As the Court states, however, "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected." Ante, at 393. For this very reason, I believe that we should articulate a standard that will govern similar cases and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and federal courts. The Court properly relies on a variety of factors in concluding that the communications now before us are privileged. See ante, at 394-395. Because of the great importance of the issue, in my view the Court should make clear now that, as a [449 U.S. 383, 403] general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct. See, e. g., Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (CA8 1978) (en banc); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-492 (CA7 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163-1165 (SC 1974). Other communications between employees and corporate counsel may indeed be privileged - as the petitioners and several amici have suggested in their proposed formulations * - but the need for certainty does not compel us now to prescribe all the details of the privilege in this case. Nevertheless, to say we should not reach all facets of the privilege does not mean that we should neglect our duty to provide guidance in a case that squarely presents the question in a traditional adversary context. Indeed, because Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the law of privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience," this Court has a special duty to clarify aspects of the law of privileges properly [449 U.S. 383, 404] before us. Simply asserting that this failure "may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty," ante, at 396, neither minimizes the consequences of continuing uncertainty and confusion nor harmonizes the inherent dissonance of acknowledging that uncertainty while declining to clarify it within the frame of issues presented.

[ Footnote * ] See Brief for Petitioners 21-23, and n. 25; Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 5-6, and n. 2; Brief for American College of Trial Lawyers and 33 Law Firms as Amici Curiae 9-10, and n. 5. [449 U.S. 383, 405] UNITED STATES V. NOBLES, 422 U. S. 225 (1975) Case Preview Full Text of Case U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) United States v. Nobles No. 74-634 Argued April 23, 1975 Decided June 23, 1975 422 U.S. 225 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus During respondent's federal criminal trial, which resulted in a conviction, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained from the witnesses by the investigator. When the investigator was called as a witness, the District Court stated that a copy of the investigator's report, inspected and edited by the court in camera so as to excise references to matters not relevant to such statements, would have to be submitted to the prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigator's testimony. When defense counsel said he did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify about his interviews with the witnesses. The Court of Appeals, considering such ruling to be reversible error, held that both the Fifth Amendment and Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 prohibited the disclosure condition imposed. Held: 1. In a proper case, the prosecution, as well as the defense, can invoke the federal judiciary's inherent power to require production of previously recorded witness statements that facilitate full disclosure of all the relevant facts. Here, the investigator's report might provide critical insight into the issues of credibility that the investigator's testimony would raise, and hence was highly relevant to such issues. Pp. 422 U. S. 230-232.

2. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. In this instance, the fact that the statements of third parties were elicited by a defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not convert them into respondent's personal communications, and requiring their production would in no sense compel respondent to be a witness against himself or extort communications from him. Pp. 422 U. S. 233234. 3. Rule 16, whose language and history both indicate that it addresses only pretrial discovery, imposes no constraint on the Page 422 U. S. 226 District Court's power to condition the impeachment testimony of respondent's witness on the production of the relevant portions of his report. The fact that the Rule incorporates the Jencks Act limitation shows no contrary intent, and does not convert the Rule into a general limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to evidentiary questions at trial. Pp. 422 U. S. 234-236. 4. The qualified privilege derived from the attorney work product doctrine is not available to prevent disclosure of the investigative report, since respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony. Pp. 422 U. S. 236-240. 5. It was within the District Court's discretion to assure that the jury would hear the investigator's full testimony, rather than a truncated portion favorable to respondent, and the court's ruling, contrary to respondent's contention, did not deprive him of the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and cross-examination. That Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system, and cannot be invoked as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. Pp. 422 U. S. 240-241. 501 F.2d 146, reversed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in parts II, III, and V of which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 422 U. S. 242. DOUGLAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 422 U. S. 227 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a criminal trial, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained from the witnesses by the investigator. The question presented here is whether, in these circumstances, a federal trial court may compel the defense to reveal the relevant portions of the investigator's report for the prosecution's use in cross-examining him. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that it cannot. 501 F.2d 146. We granted certiorari, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975), and now reverse. I Respondent was tried and convicted on charges arising from an armed robbery of a federally insured bank. The only significant evidence linking him to the crime was the identification testimony of two witnesses, a bank teller and a salesman who was in the bank during the robbery. [Footnote 1] Respondent offered an alibi but, as the Court of Appeals recognized, 501 F.2d at 150, his strongest defense centered around attempts to discredit these eyewitnesses. Defense efforts to impeach them gave rise to the events that led to this decision. In the course of preparing respondent's defense, an investigator for the defense interviewed both witnesses and preserved the essence of those conversations in a written report. When the witnesses testified for the prosecution, respondent's counsel relied on the report in conducting their cross-examination. Counsel asked the bank Page 422 U. S. 228 teller whether he recalled having told the investigator that he had seen only the back of the man he identified as respondent. The witness replied that he did not remember making such a statement. He was allowed, despite defense counsel's initial objection, to refresh his recollection by referring to a portion of the investigator's report. The prosecutor also was allowed to see briefly the relevant portion of the report. [Footnote 2] The witness thereafter testified that, although the report indicated that he told the investigator he had seen only respondent's back, he, in fact, had seen more than that, and continued to insist that respondent was the bank robber. The other witness acknowledged on cross-examination that he too had spoken to the defense investigator. Respondent's counsel twice inquired whether he told the investigator that "all blacks looked alike" to him, and in each instance the witness denied having made such a statement. The prosecution again sought inspection of the relevant portion of the investigator's report, and respondent's counsel again objected. The court declined to order disclosure at that time, but ruled that it would be required if the investigator testified as to the

witnesses' alleged statements from the witness stand. [Footnote 3] The Page 422 U. S. 229 court further advised that it would examine the investigator's report in camera, and would excise all reference to matters not relevant to the precise statements at issue. After the prosecution completed its case, respondent called the investigator as a defense witness. The court reiterated that a copy of the report, inspected and edited in camera, would have to be submitted to Government counsel at the completion of the investigator's impeachment testimony. When respondent's counsel stated that he did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator would not be allowed to testify about his interviews with the witnesses. [Footnote 4] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that the trial court's ruling constituted a "very limited and seemingly judicious restriction," 501 F.2d at 151, nevertheless considered it reversible Page 422 U. S. 230 error. Citing United States v. Wright, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 68, 489 F.2d 1181, 1192 (1973), the court found that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the disclosure condition imposed in this case. The court further held that Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16, while framed exclusively in terms of pretrial discovery, precluded prosecutorial discovery at trial as well. 501 F.2d at 157; accord, United States v. Wright, supra at 6667, 489 F.2d at 1190-1191. In each respect, we think the court erred. II The dual aim of our criminal justice system is "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer," Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 295 U. S. 88 (1935). To this end, we have placed our confidence in the adversary system, entrusting to it the primary responsibility for developing relevant facts on which a determination of guilt or innocence can be made. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 709(1974); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 399 U. S. 82 (1970); Elkins v. United States,364 U. S. 206, 364 U. S. 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). While the adversary system depends primarily on the parties for the presentation and exploration of relevant facts, the judiciary is not limited to the role of a referee or supervisor. Its compulsory processes stand available to require the presentation of evidence in court or before a grand jury. United States v. Nixon, supra; Kastigar v. United

States, 406 U. S. 441, 406 U. S. 443-444 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 378 U. S. 93-9,4 (1964) (WHITE, J., concurring). As we recently observed in United States v. Nixon, supra at 418 U. S. 709: "We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both Page 422 U. S. 231 fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense." Decisions of this Court repeatedly have recognized the federal judiciary's inherent power to require the prosecution to produce the previously recorded statements of its witnesses so that the defense may get the full benefit of cross-examination and the truthfinding process may be enhanced. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957); [Footnote 5] Gordon v. United States, 34 U. S. 414 (1953); Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 360 U. S. 361 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). At issue here is whether, in a proper case, the prosecution can call upon that same power for production of witness statements that facilitate "full disclosure of all the [relevant] facts." United States v. Nixon, supra, at 418 U. S. 709. In this case, the defense proposed to call its investigator to impeach the identification testimony of the prosecution's eyewitnesses. It was evident from cross-examination that the investigator would testify that each witness' recollection of the appearance of the individual identified as respondent was considerably less clear at Page 422 U. S. 232 an earlier time than it was at trial. It also appeared that the investigator and one witness differed even as to what the witness told him during the interview. The investigator's contemporaneous report might provide critical insight into the issues of credibility that the investigator's testimony would raise. It could assist the jury in determining the extent to which the investigator's testimony actually discredited the prosecution's witnesses. If, for example, the report failed to mention the purported statement of one witness that "all

blacks looked alike," the jury might disregard the investigator's version altogether. On the other hand, if this statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report, it would tend strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview, and to diminish substantially the reliability of that witness' identification. [Footnote 6] It was therefore apparent to the trial judge that the investigator's report was highly relevant to the critical issue of credibility. In this context, production of the report might substantially enhance "the search for truth," Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 82. We must determine whether compelling its production was precluded by some privilege available to the defense in the circumstances of this case. Page 422 U. S. 233 III A The Court of Appeals concluded that the Fifth Amendment renders criminal discovery "basically a one-way street." 501 F.2d at 154. Like many generalizations in constitutional law, this one is too broad. The relationship between the accused's Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecution's ability to discover materials at trial must be identified in a more discriminating manner. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is an "intimate and personal one," which protects "a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Couch v. United States,409 U. S. 322, 409 U. S. 327 (1973); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85,417 U. S. 90-91 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 322 U. S. 698 (1944). As we noted in Couch, supra, at 409 U. S. 328, the "privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him." [Footnote 7] In this instance, disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report would not impinge on the fundamental values protected by the Fifth Amendment. The court's order was limited to statements Page 422 U. S. 234 allegedly made by third parties who were available as witnesses to both the prosecution and the defense. Respondent did not prepare the report, and there is no suggestion that the portions subject to the disclosure order reflected any information that he conveyed to the investigator. The fact that these statements of third parties were elicited by a defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not

convert them into respondent's personal communications. Requiring their production from the investigator therefore would not in any sense compel respondent to be a witness against himself or extort communications from him. We thus conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. The Court of Appeals' reliance on this constitutional guarantee as a bar to the disclosure here ordered was misplaced. B The Court of Appeals also held that Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 deprived the trial court of the power to order disclosure of the relevant portions of the investigator's report. [Footnote 8] Acknowledging that the Rule appears to control pretrial discovery only, the court nonetheless determined Page 422 U. S. 235 that its reference to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, signaled an intention that Rule 16 should control trial practice as well. We do not agree. Both the language and history of Rule 16 indicate that it addresses only pretrial discovery. Rule 16(f) requires that a motion for discovery be filed "within 10 days after arraignment or . . . such reasonable later time as the court may permit," and further commands that it include all relief sought by the movant. When this provision is viewed in light of the Advisory Committee's admonition that it is designed to encourage promptness in filing and to enable the district court to avoid unnecessary delay or multiplication of motions, see Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 16, 18 U.S.C.App. p. 4494, the pretrial focus of the Rule becomes apparent. The Government's right of discovery arises only after the defendant has successfully sought discovery under subsections (a)(2) or (b), and is confined to matters "which the defendant intends to produce at the trial." Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(c). This hardly suggests any intention that the Rule would limit the court's power to order production once trial has begun. [Footnote 9] Finally, the Advisory Committee's Notes emphasize its pretrial character. Those notes repeatedly characterize the Rule as a provision governing pretrial disclosure, never once suggesting that it was intended to constrict a district court's Page 422 U. S. 236 control over evidentiary questions arising at trial. 18 U.S.C.App. pp. 4493-4495.

The incorporation of the Jencks Act limitation on the pretrial right of discovery provided by Rule 16 does not express a contrary intent. It only restricts the defendant's right of pretrial discovery in a manner that reconciles that provision with the Jencks Act limitation on the trial court's discretion over evidentiary matters. It certainly does not convert Rule 16 into a general limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to evidentiary questions at trial. Cf. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U. S. 66, 386 U. S. 101 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in judgment). [Footnote 10] We conclude, therefore, that Rule 16 imposes no constraint on the District Court's power to condition the impeachment testimony of respondent's witness on the production of the relevant portions of his investigative report. In extending the Rule into the trial context, the Court of Appeals erred. IV Respondent contends further that the work product doctrine exempts the investigator's report from disclosure at trial. While we agree that this doctrine applies to criminal litigation as well as civil, we find its protection unavailable in this case. The work product doctrine, recognized by this Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947), reflects the strong "public policy underlying the orderly prosecution Page 422 U. S. 237 and defense of legal claims." Id. at 329 U. S. 510; see also id. at 329 U. S. 514-515 (Jackson, J., concurring). As the Court there observed: "Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court, and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories, and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways -- aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the 'work product of the lawyer.' Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would

not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served." Id. at 329 U. S. 510-511. The Court therefore recognized a qualified privilege for Page 422 U. S. 238 certain materials prepared by an attorney "acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." Id. at 329 U. S. 508. [Footnote 11] See generally 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 26.63 (2d ed.1974); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 204-209 (2d ed.1972); Note, Developments in the Law -- Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 1027-1046 (1961). Although the work product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital. The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case. [Footnote 12] At its core, the work product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case. But the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as Page 422 U. S. 239 well as those prepared by the attorney himself. [Footnote 13] Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work product doctrine do not disappear once trial has begun. Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly development and presentation of his case. We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at trial, for, in this instance, it is clear that the defense waived such right as may have existed to invoke its protections. The privilege derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived. Here, respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested statements with that of the prosecution's

witnesses. Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony. [Footnote 14] Respondent Page 422 U. S. 240 can no more advance the work product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination. See, e.g., McGautha v. California,402 U. S. 183, 402 U. S. 215 (1971). [Footnote 15] V Finally, our examination of the record persuades us that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in this instance. The court authorized no general "fishing expedition" into the defense files, or indeed even into the defense investigator's report. Cf. United States v. Wright, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 489 F.2d 1181 (1973). Rather, its considered ruling was quite limited in scope, opening to prosecution scrutiny only the portion of the report that related to the testimony the investigator would offer to discredit the witnesses' identification testimony. The court further afforded respondent the maximum Page 422 U. S. 241 opportunity to assist in avoiding unwarranted disclosure or to exercise an informed choice to call for the investigator's testimony, and thereby open his report to examination. The court's preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method of assuring compliance with its order. Respondent's argument that this ruling deprived him of the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and cross-examination misconceives the issue. The District Court did not bar the investigator's testimony. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 388 U. S. 19 (1967). It merely prevented respondent from presenting to the jury a partial view of the credibility issue by adducing the investigator's testimony and thereafter refusing to disclose the contemporaneous report that might offer further critical insights. The Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. Deciding, as we do, that it was within the court's discretion to assure that the jury would hear the full testimony of the investigator, rather than a truncated portion favorable to respondent, we think it would be artificial indeed to deprive the court of the power to effectuate that judgment. Nor do we find constitutional significance in the fact that the court in this instance

was able to exclude the testimony in advance, rather than receive it in evidence and thereafter charge the jury to disregard it when respondent's counsel refused, as he said he would, to produce the report. [Footnote 16] Page 422 U. S. 242 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [Footnote 1] The only other evidence introduced against respondent was a statement made at the time of arrest in which he denied that he was Robert Nobles and subsequently stated that he knew that the FBI had been looking for him. [Footnote 2] Counsel for the Government complained that the portion of the report produced at this time was illegible. The witness testimony indicates, however, that he had no difficulty reading it. [Footnote 3] The essence of the District courts order was as follows: "[If the investigator] is allowed to testify, it would be necessary that those portions of [the] investigative report which contain the statements of the impeached witness will have to be turned over to the prosecution; nothing else in that report." "* * * *" "If he testifies in any way about impeaching statements made by either of the two witnesses, then it is the Court's view that the government is entitled to look at his report and only those portions of that report which contain the alleged impeaching statements . . . of the witnesses." App. 31. [Footnote 4] Although the portion of the report containing the bank teller's alleged statement previously was revealed and marked for identification, it was not introduced into evidence. When the discussion of the investigator's testimony subsequently arose, counsel for the Government noted that he had only a limited opportunity to glance at the statement, and he then requested disclosure of that portion of the report as well as the statement purportedly made by the salesman.

As indicated above, the bank teller did not deny having made the statement recorded in the investigator's report. It is thus possible that the investigator's testimony on that point would not have constituted an impeachment of the statements of that witness within the contemplation of the court's order, and would not have given rise to a duty of disclosure. Counsel did not pursue this point, however, and did not seek further clarification of the issue. Respondent does not, and, in view of the failure to develop the issue at trial, could not, urge this as a ground for reversal. Nor does respondent maintain that the initial disclosure of the bank teller's statement sufficed to satisfy the court's order. We therefore consider each of the two alleged statements in the report to be impeaching statements that would have been subject to disclosure if the investigator had testified about them. [Footnote 5] The discretion recognized by the Court in Jencks subsequently was circumscribed by Congress in the so-called Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500. See generally Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343 (1959) [Footnote 6] Rule 612 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence entitles an adverse party to inspect a writing relied on to refresh the recollection of a witness while testifying. The Rule also authorizes disclosure of writings relied on to refresh recollection before testifying if the court deems it necessary in the interests of justice. The party obtaining the writing thereafter can use it in cross-examining the witness, and can introduce into evidence those portions that relate to the witness' testimony. As the Federal Rules of Evidence were not in effect at the time of respondent's trial, we have no occasion to consider them or their applicability to the situation here presented. [Footnote 7] "The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled self-incrimination, not to protect private information. Testimony demanded of a witness may be very private indeed, but unless it is incriminating and protected by the Amendment, or unless protected by one of the evidentiary privileges, it must be disclosed." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 419 U. S. 473-474 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). Moreover, the constitutional guarantee protects only against forced individual disclosure of a "testimonial or communicative nature," Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 761 (1966); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 388 U. S. 222 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). [Footnote 8]

Rule 16(c), which establishes the Government's reciprocal right of pretrial discovery, excepts "reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attorneys." That Rule therefore would not authorize pretrial discovery of the investigator's report. The proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure leave this subsection substantially unchanged. See Proposed Rule 16 of Criminal Procedure, 62 F.R.D. 271, 305-306 (1974). [Footnote 9] Rule 16(g) imposes a duty to notify opposing counsel or the court of the additional materials previously requested or inspected that are subject to discovery or inspection under the Rule, and it contemplates that this obligation will continue during trial. The obligation under Rule 16(g) depends, however, on a previous request for or order of discovery. The fact that this provision may have some effect on the parties' conduct during trial does not convert the Rule into a general limitation on the court's inherent power to control evidentiary matters. [Footnote 10] We note also that the commentators who have considered Rule 16 have not suggested that it is directed to the court's control of evidentiary questions arising at trial. See, e.g., Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution -- the Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L.Rev. 437, 494-514 (1972); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 Geo.L.J. 1276, 1279, 1282 n.19 (1966); Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 994 (1972). [Footnote 11] As the Court recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 508, the work product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege. [Footnote 12] A number of state and federal decisions have recognized the role of the work product doctrine in the criminal law, and have applied its protections to the files of the prosecution and the accused alike. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); State ex rel. Polley v. Superior Ct. of Santa Cruz

County, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956); Peel v. State, 154 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1963); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy v. United States), 473 F.2d 840 (CA8 1973); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F.Supp. 683 (SDNY 1966). [Footnote 13] The sole issue in Hickman related to materials prepared by an attorney, and courts thereafter disagreed over whether the doctrine applied as well to materials prepared on his behalf. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 26.63 [8] (2d ed.1974). Necessarily, it must. This view is reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 26(b)(3), and in Rule 16 of the Criminal Rules, as well, see Rules 16(b) and (c); cf. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 208 (2d ed.1972). [Footnote 14] What constitutes a waiver with respect to work product materials depends, of course, upon the circumstances. Counsel necessarily makes use throughout trial of the notes, documents, and other internal materials prepared to present adequately his client's case, and often relies on them in examining witnesses. When so used, there normally is no waiver. But where, as here, counsel attempts to make a testimonial use of these materials, the normal rules of evidence come into play with respect to cross-examination and production of documents. [Footnote 15] We cannot accept respondent's contention that the disclosure order violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. This claim is predicated on the assumption that disclosure of a defense investigator's notes in this and similar cases will compromise counsel's ability to investigate and prepare the defense case thoroughly. Respondent maintains that even the limited disclosure required in this case will impair the relationship of trust and confidence between client and attorney and will inhibit other members of the "defense team" from gathering information essential to the effective preparation of the case. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function 3.1(a) (App.Draft 1971). The short answer is that the disclosure order resulted from respondent's voluntary election to make testimonial use of his investigator's report. Moreover, apart from this waiver, we think that the concern voiced by respondent fails to recognize the limited and conditional nature of the court's order. [Footnote 16]

Respondent additionally argues that certain statements by the prosecution and the District Court's exclusion of purported expert testimony justify reversal of the verdict, and that the Court of Appeals' decision should be affirmed on those grounds. The Court of Appeals rejected respondent's challenge to the exclusion of the testimony of the proffered expert, 501 F.2d at 150 151. Respondent did not present this issue or the question involving the challenged prosecutorial statements to this Court in a cross-petition for certiorari. Without questioning our jurisdiction to consider these alternative grounds for affirmance of the decision below, cf. Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 282 U. S. 538 (1931); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 397 U. S. 475 476, n. 6 (1970); see generally Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or Cross-Petition -- Certainty or Confusion?, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 763 (1974), we do not consider these contentions worthy of consideration. Each involves an issue that is committed to the trial court's discretion. In the absence of a strong suggestion of an abuse of that discretion or an indication that the issues are of sufficient general importance to justify the grant of certiorari, we decline to entertain them. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring. I concur in the judgment and in Parts II, III, and V of the opinion of the Court. I write only because of misgivings about the meaning of 422 U. S. The Court appears to have held in Part IV of its opinion only that whatever protection the defense investigator's notes of his interviews with witnesses might otherwise have had, that protection would have been lost when the investigator testified about those interviews. With this I agree also. It seems to me more sensible, however, to decide what protection these notes had in the first place before reaching the "waiver" issue. Accordingly, and because I do not believe that the work product Page 422 U. S. 243 doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947), can be extended wholesale from its historic role as a limitation on the nonevidentiary material which may be the subject of pretrial discovery to an unprecedented role as a limitation on the trial judge's power to compel production of evidentiary matter at trial, I add the following. I Up until now, the work product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has been viewed almost exclusively as a limitation on the ability of a party to obtain pretrial discovery. It has not been viewed as a "limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to evidentiary questions at trial." Ante at 422 U. S. 236. The problem discussed

inHickman v. Taylor arose precisely because, in addition to accelerating the time when a party could obtain evidentiary matter from his adversary, [Footnote 2/1] the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure greatly expanded the nature of the material subject to pretrial disclosure. [Footnote 2/2] Page 422 U. S. 244 Under the Rules, a party was, for the first time, entitled to know in advance his opponent's evidence, and was entitled to obtain from his opponent nonprivileged "information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts" relevant to a case even though the "information" was not itself evidentiary. Hickman v. Taylor, supra, at 329 U. S. 501. Utilizing these Rules, the plaintiff in Hickman v. Taylor sought discovery of statements obtained by defense counsel from witnesses to the events relevant to the lawsuit, not for evidentiary use, but only "to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he ha[d] overlooked nothing." 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 513(emphasis added). In concluding that these statements should not be produced, the Court treated the matter entirely as one involving the plaintiff's entitlement to pretrial discovery under the new Federal Rules, [Footnote 2/3] and carefully limited its opinion accordingly. The relevant Rule in the Court's view, Rule 26, on its face required production of the witness statements unless they were privileged. Nonetheless, the Court expressly stated that the request for witness statements was to be denied "not because the subject matter is privileged" (although noting that a work product "privilege" applies in England, 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 510 n. 9) as that concept was used in the Rules, but because the request "falls outside the arena of discovery." Id. at 329 U. S. 510 (emphasis added). The Court stated that it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, and concluded that the effect of giving one lawyer's work (particularly his strategy, legal theories, and mental impressions) to another would have a "demoralizing" effect on the legal profession. The Court then noted that witness Page 422 U. S. 245 statements might be admissible in evidence under some circumstances, and might be usable to impeach or corroborate a witness. However, it concluded that, in the case before it, the plaintiff wanted the statements for preparation only, and had shown no reason why he could not obtain everything he sought by doing his own work, rather than utilizing that of his adversary. The conclusion that the work product of a lawyer is not "privileged" made it much more difficult for the Court to support its result. Nothing

expressed in the Rule supported its result, and the Court was forced to explain its decision by stating: "When Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries." Id. at 329 U. S. 514. (Emphasis added.) I am left with the firm conviction that the Court avoided the easier route to its decision for a reason. To have held an attorney's work product to be "privileged" would have been to limit its use at trial as evidence in those cases in which the work product qualified as evidence, see Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 460 (1946), and, as Mr. Justice Jackson stated in his concurring opinion, a party is entitled to anything which is "evidence in his case." 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 515. [Footnote 2/4] Page 422 U. S. 246 Since Hickman v. Taylor, supra, Congress, the cases, and the commentators have uniformly continued to view the "work product" doctrine solely as a limitation on pretrial discovery, and not as a qualified evidentiary privilege. In 1970, Congress became involved with the problem for the first time in the civil area. It did so solely by accepting a proposed amendment to Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 26, which incorporated much of what the Court held in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, with respect to pretrial discovery. See Advisory Committee's explanatory statement, 28 U.S.C.App. p. 7778. In the criminal area, Congress has enacted 18 U.S.C. 3500 and accepted Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 (c). The former prevents pretrial discovery of witness statements from the Government; the latter prevents pretrial discovery of witness statements from the defense. Neither limits the power of the trial court to order production as evidence of prior statements of witnesses who have testified at trial. [Footnote 2/5] With the exception of materials of the type discussed in 422 U. S. infra, research has uncovered no application of the work product rule in the lower courts since Hickman to prevent production of evidence -- impeaching or Page 422 U. S. 247 otherwise -- at trial, [Footnote 2/6] and there are several examples of cases rejecting such an approach. [Footnote 2/7] Similarly, the commentators have all treated the attorney work product rule solely as a limitation on pretrial discovery, e.g., 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 26.626.64 (2d ed.1974); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2026 (1970); 2A W. Barron &

A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 652 (Wright ed.1961), and some have expressly stated that it does not apply to evidentiary matter. F. James, Civil Procedure 211 n. 13 (1965); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 16.23[8.-4] (1963). The reasons for largely confining the work product rule to its role as a limitation on pretrial discovery are compelling. First of all, the injury to the factfinding Page 422 U. S. 248 process is far greater where a rule keeps evidence from the factfinder than when it simply keeps advance disclosure of evidence from a party or keeps from him leads to evidence developed by his adversary and which he is just as well able to find by himself. In the main, where a party seeks to discover a statement made to an opposing party in order to prepare for trial, he can obtain the "substantial equivalent . . . by other means," Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 26(b)(3), i.e., by interviewing the witness himself. A prior inconsistent statement in the possession of his adversary, however, when sought for evidentiary purposes -- i.e., to impeach the witness after he testifies -- is for that purpose unique. By the same token, the danger perceived in Hickman that each party to a case will decline to prepare in the hopes of eventually using his adversary's preparation is absent when disclosure will take place only at trial. Indeed, it is very difficult to articulate a reason why statements on the same subject matter as a witness' testimony should not be turned over to an adversary after the witness has testified. The statement will either be consistent with the witness' testimony, in which case it will be useless and disclosure will be harmless, or it will be inconsistent, and of unquestioned value to the jury. Any claim that disclosure of such a statement would lead the trial into collateral and confusing issues was rejected by this Court in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), and by Congress in the legislation which followed. The strong negative implication in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, that the work product rule does not apply to evidentiary requests at trial became a holding in Jencks v. United States, supra. There, a defendant in a criminal case sought production by the Government at trial of prior statements made by its witnesses on the same subject matter as their testimony. The Government Page 422 U. S. 249 argued, inter alia, that production would violate the " legitimate interest that each party -- including the Government -- has in safeguarding the privacy of its files.'" 353 U.S. at353 U. S. 670. The Court held against the Government. The Court said that to deny

disclosure of prior statements which might be used to impeach the witnesses was to "deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense," id. at 353 U. S. 667(emphasis added). Also rejected as unrealistic was any rule which would require the defendant to demonstrate the impeachment value of the prior statements beforedisclosure, [Footnote 2/8] and the Court held that entitlement to disclosure for use in cross-examination is "established when the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness." Id. at 353 U. S. 669. Thus, not only did the Court reject the notion that there was a "work product" limitation on the trial judge's discretion to order production of evidentiary matter at trial, but it was affirmatively held that, prior statements of a witness on the subject of his testimony are the kind of evidentiary matter to which an adversary is entitled. Indeed, even in the pretrial discovery area in which the work product rule does apply, work product notions have been thought insufficient to prevent discovery of evidentiary and impeachment material. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 511, the Court stated: "We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged Page 422 U. S. 250 facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those fact is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration." (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Jackson, in concurring, was even more explicit on this point. See supra at 422 U. S. 245. Pursuant to this language, the lower courts have ordered evidence to be turned over pretrial even when it came into being as a result of the adversary's efforts in preparation for trial. [Footnote 2/9] A member of a defense team who witnesses an out-of-court statement of someone who later testifies at trial in a contradictory fashion becomes, at that moment, a witness to a relevant and admissible event, and the cases cited above would dictate disclosure of any reports he Page 422 U. S. 251 may have written about the event. [Footnote 2/10] Since prior statements are inadmissible hearsay until the witness testifies, there is no occasion for ordering reports of such statements produced as evidence pretrial. However, some courts have ordered witness

statements produced pretrial in the likelihood that they will becomeimpeachment evidence. [Footnote 2/11] Moreover, where access to witnesses or to their information is unequal, discovery of their statements is often granted solely to help a party prepare for trial regardless of any eventual evidentiary value of the out-of-court statements. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. at 501. Accordingly, it would appear that, with one exception to be discussed below, the work product notions of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, impose no restrictions on the trial judge's ordering production of evidentiary matter at trial; that these notions apply in only a very limited way, if at all, to a party's efforts to obtain evidence pretrial pursuant to available discovery devices; and that these notions supply only a qualified discovery immunity with respect to witness statements in any event. [Footnote 2/12] Page 422 U. S. 252 II In one of its aspects, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has application to evidentiary requests at trial. Both the majority and the concurring opinions in Hickman v. Taylor were at pains to distinguish between production of statements written by the witness and in the possession of the lawyer and those statements which were made orally by the witness and written down by the lawyer. Production and use of oral statements written down by the lawyer would create a substantial risk that the lawyer would have to testify. [Footnote 2/13] The majority said that this would "make the attorney much less an officer Page 422 U. S. 253 of the court and much more an ordinary witness." 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 513. Mr. Justice Jackson, in concurring, stated: "Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand, and will do so only for grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his role; he is almost invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession discourages it. But the practice advocated here is one which would force him to be a witness not as to what he has seen or done, but as to other witnesses' stories, and not because he wants to do so, but in self-defense." Id. at 329 U. S. 517. The lower courts, too, have frowned on any practice under which an attorney who tries a case also testifies as a witness, and trial attorneys have been permitted to testify only in certain circumstances. [Footnote 2/14]

The remarks of the Court in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, while made in the context of a request for pretrial discovery, have application to the evidentiary use of lawyers' memoranda of witness interviews at trial. It is unnecessary, however, to decide in this case whether the policies against putting in issue the credibility of the lawyer who will sum up to the jury outweigh the jury's interest in obtaining all relevant information, and whether Jencks v. United States, supra, and 18 U.S.C. Page 422 U. S. 254 3500 are to be viewed as expressing a preference for disclosure of all facts. [Footnote 2/15] In this case, the creator of the memorandum was not the trial lawyer but an investigator, [Footnote 2/16] and he was, in any event, to be called as a witness by the defense. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment below because, quite apart from waiver, the work product rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has no application to the request at trial for evidentiary and impeachment material made in this case. [Footnote 2/1] Under criminal discovery rules, the time factor is not as great as might otherwise appear. Federal Rule Crim.Proc. 16 permits discovery through the time of trial; and, under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c), evidentiary matter may be obtained pursuant to subpoena in advance of trial in the discretion of the trial judge. [Footnote 2/2] Prior to the Federal Rules, requests for witness statements were granted or denied on the basis of whether they were evidence and nonprivileged. In the main, production was denied, either because witness statements were not evidence (they are inadmissible hearsay until and unless the witness testifies); because a party is not entitled to advance knowledge of his adversary's case; or because the Statements were made by the client or his agent to his attorney, and thus covered by the attorney-client privilege. 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 26.63 [3] (2d ed.1974), and cases cited therein. The cases did not hold that witness statements were generally privileged if they were evidentiary, and had no cause to decide whether a work product notion should protect them from discovery, since they were nondiscoverable anyway under applicable discovery rules. But see Walker v. Struthers, 273 Ill. 387, 112 N.E. 961 (1916). [Footnote 2/3] Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence is even more express on this point. It states: "[T]he question is simply whether such a demand is

authorized by the rules relating to various aspects of discovery.'" 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 514. [Footnote 2/4] Mr. Justice Jackson also emphasized that the witness statements involved in Hickman v. Taylor were neither evidence nor privileged. Id. at 329 U. S. 516. Indeed, most of the material described by the Court as falling under the work product umbrella does not qualify as evidence. A lawyer's mental impressions are almost never evidence, and out-of-court statements of witnesses are generally inadmissible hearsay. Such statements become evidence only when the witness testifies at trial, and are then usually impeachment evidence only. This case, of course, involves a situation in which the relevant witness was to testify and thus presents the question -- not involved in Hickman v. Taylor -- whether prior statements should be disclosed under the trial judge's power over evidentiary matters at trial. [Footnote 2/5] In 422 U. S. 13 of its opinion, the Court cites Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(c), as containing the work product rule. In n 10, the Court correctly notes that Rule 16(c) is not "directed to the court's control of evidentiary questions arising at trial." It seems to me that this supplies a better ground for the Court's decision than "waiver." [Footnote 2/6] The majority does cite one case, In re Terkeltoub, 256 F.Supp. 683 (SDNY 1966), in which the court referred to the work product doctrine in preventing the Government from inquiring of a lawyer before the grand jury whether he had participated in suborning perjury of a prospective witness while preparing a criminal case for trial. In any event, a grand jury investigation is, in some respects, similar to pretrial discovery.Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy v. United States), 473 F.2d 840 (CA8 1973), with Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (CA8), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). The proper scope of inquiry is as broad, and it can be used as a way of preparing for the later criminal trial. There is, for example, a split of authority on whether the work product rule applies to IRS tax investigations. Compare United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (CA5 1967), with United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (CA7 1973). [Footnote 2/7] Shaw v. Wuttke, 28 Wis.2d 448, 454-456, 137 N.W.2d 649, 652-653 (1965); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 620-621, 417 P.2d 431, 432-433 (1966); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416

(Del.1959); United States v. Matles, 154 F.Supp. 574 (EDNY 1957); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 16 F.R.D. 533 (ED Pa.1954); United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (Colo.1964). [Footnote 2/8] The Court in Jencks quoted the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 191 (Va. 1807): "'Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?'" 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 668 n. 12. [Footnote 2/9] Cummings v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 47 F.R.D. 373 (ED Pa.1968); Marks v. Gas Service Co., 168 F.Supp. 487 (WD MO.1958); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 207 F.Supp. 739 (ED La.1962); Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 386 (Colo.1955); Parrett v. Ford Motor Co., 47 F.R.D. 22 (WD Mo.1968); Scuderi v. Boston Ins. Co., 34 F.R.D. 463, 468 (Del.1964) (each involving a situation in which a member of a litigation team witnessed an event or scene in the course of preparing a case for trial and the court ordered disclosure of his report of the event); Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29 (Conn.1969);McCullough Tool Co. v. Pan Geo Atlas Corp., 40 F.R.D. 490 (SD Tex.1966); O'Boyle v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 299 F.Supp. 704 (WD MO.1969). Cf. LaRocca v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (WD Pa.1969), and Kennedy v. Senyo, 52 F.R.D. 34 (WD Pa.1971) (in each of which the preparation for trial was the subject of the suit); see also Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (CA10 1968); F. James, Civil Procedure 211 (1965). [Footnote 2/10] The holding in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), would put to rest any claim that such prior statement would be disclosable only if the adversary established its evidentiary value ahead of time by specific proof that it was inconsistent. [Footnote 2/11] Vetter v. Lovett, 44 F.R.D. 465 (WD Tex.1968); McDonald v. Prowdley, 38 F.R.D. 1 (WD Mich.1965); Tannenbaum v. Walker, 16 F.R.D. 570 (ED Pa.1954); Fulton v. Swift,43 F.R.D. 166 (Mont.1967); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557-558 (CA2 1967) (in camera inspection). Cf. Goosman v. A. Duie

Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (CA4 1963). For cases contra, see 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 26.64[3] n. 14 (2d ed.1974). [Footnote 2/12] The majority states: "Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work product doctrine do not disappear once trial has begun. Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly development and presentation of his case. We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at trial, for, in this instance, it is clear that the defense waived such right as may have existed to invoke its protections." Ante at 422 U. S. 239. As noted above, the important question is not when the document in issue is created, or even when it is to be produced. The important question is whether the document is sought for evidentiary or impeachment purposes, or whether it is sought for preparation purposes only. Of course, a party should not be able to discover his opponent's legal memoranda or statements of witnesses not called, whether his request is at trial or before trial. Insofar as such a request is made under the applicable discovery rules, it is within the rule of Hickman v. Taylor even though made at trial. Insofar as the request seeks to invoke the trial judge's discretion over evidentiary matters at trial, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor is unnecessary, since no one could ever suggest that legal memoranda or hearsay statements are evidence. If this is all the majority means by the above-quoted language, I agree. [Footnote 2/13] If the witness does not acknowledge making an inconsistent statement to the lawyer -- even though the lawyer recorded it -- the crossexaminer may not offer the document in evidence without at least calling the lawyer as a witness to authenticate the document and otherwise testify to the prior statement. [Footnote 2/14] United States v. Porter, 139 U.S.App.D.C.19, 429 F.2d 203 (1970); United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180 (CA2 1967); Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261 (CA8 1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 968 (1964); United States v. Newman, 476 F.2d 733 (CA3 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v Dykes, 395 F.2d 747 (CA5 1968); United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (CA2 1957); United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, modified on rehearing,187 F.2d 12 (CA2 1950), vacated as to one petitioner, 341 U.S. 946, cert. denied as to other petitioner sub

nom. Stancin v. United States, 341 U.S. 956 (1951); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (CA7 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U. S. 312 (1961). [Footnote 2/15] The cases have held records of witness statements made by prosecutors to be disclosable under 18 U.S.C. 3500, United States v. Hilbrich, 341 F.2d 555 (CA7),cert. den., 381 U.S. 941, reh. den., 382 U.S. 874 (1965), and 384 U.S. 1028 (196); United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186 (CA2 1963); Saunders v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 316 F.2d 346 (1963); United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (CA10 1973), cert. den., 415 U.S. 915 (1974). Cf. Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (CA8 1966). In State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1969), the court reached a contrary result under state law. [Footnote 2/16] A conflict arose among lower federal courts over the question whether the work product of members of a litigation team other than the lawyer was protected from discovery by the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra. Ghent, Development, Since Hickman v. Taylor, of Attorney's "Work Product" Doctrine, 35 A.L.R.3d 438-440 ( 7 [a] and [b]) and 453-455 ( 15[a] and [b]) (1971); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501-502 (1970). With respect to discovery in civil cases under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 26, the conflict was resolved in the 1970 amendments by affording protection to documents by a party's "representative," whether a lawyer or not. Where the purpose of the rule protecting the work product is to remove the incentive a party might otherwise have to rely solely on his opponent's preparation, it is sensible to treat preparation by an attorney and an investigator alike. However, the policy against lawyers testifying applies only to the lawyer who tries the case.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

REGALADO, J.: Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. 1 The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse. The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in thepoblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. 4 Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury 5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. 6 On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter aliaof prescription, hence the proceedings were

terminated. 7 In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel. Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes' counsel of record therein. On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion: . . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.) A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent court's resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription. On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy. In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan

del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. 14 Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, 15respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein. For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement. Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position: . . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial. The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the

requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes. Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination: From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged. 19 Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan. The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis. As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's consent." 21 The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or qualification. 22 In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. 23 Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence. 2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated. The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future . In other

words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client'scontemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.) 3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. 4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice." 27 It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his

conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law. II On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification. 1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28 2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification. This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit: Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants. As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single action. 29 Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means "common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or "shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode. 2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness. To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter: It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime. On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them. Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso: Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others. We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his coaccused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed . While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in

the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. xxx xxx xxx Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Emphasis ours.) The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all. Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy. III The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for

the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications. His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario. On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness. This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its Second Division 37 and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof 39 declared: 4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores; 5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter,

We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave. Footnotes 1 Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-92, Second Division; both penned by Atienza, J. with Escareal and Amores, JJ ., concurring; Rollo, 3741, 42-43. 2 Civil Case No. 512, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 3 Per Judge Carlo H. Lozada; Rollo, 167-185. 4 Rollo, 128. 5 Criminal Case No. 1393; Rollo, 195-198. 6 First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-RosarioBunawan, Agusan del Sur, presided by Judge Ciriaco Ario. 7 Rollo, 204-207. 8 Ibid., 210-219. 9 Ibid., 221. 10 Criminal Case No. 13800.

11 Penned by Garchitorena, P.J., with Hermosisima, Jr. and Del Rosario, JJ., concurring; Rollo, 227-237. 12 Rollo, 247-352; Case No. OMB-MIN-90-0053. 13 Ibid., 72-74. 14 Ibid., 241-248. 15 Ibid., 57-85. 16 Ibid., 255-258. 17 Ibid., 259-260. 18 Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793. 19 Rollo, 40. 20 Ibid., 42-43. 21 Ibid., 46. 22 Section 24 (b), Rule 130, Rules of Court. 23 In re Carter's Will, 204 N.Y.S. 393, 122 Misc. 493; State vs. Dawson, 1 S.W. 827, 90 Mo. 149. 24 As noted, ante, this was later filed as Criminal Case No. 13800 but ultimately dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. 25 58 Am Jur, Witnesses, Sec. 516, 288-289. 26 Ibid., id., Sec. 515, 288; 81 Am Jur, Witnesses, Secs. 393-394, 356-357; see also 125 American Law Reports Annotated, 516-519. 27 Underhill, H.C., A Treatise of the Law of Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2. Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, at 836-837. 28 Quisumbing et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60364, June 23, 1983, 122 SCRA 703; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-37783, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 357; Tejones vs. Gironella, etc., et al., G.R. 305506, March 21, 1988, 159, SCRA 100; Quillian vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 55457, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 279.

29 Citing 8A Words and Phrases 358, on the authority of Kenedy vs. Empire State Underwriters of Watertown, N.Y., 24 S.E. 2d 78, 79, 202 S.C. 38. 30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., 1219. 31 Sec. 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court. 32 People vs. Faltado, et al., 84 Phil. 89 (1994); People vs. Bayona, etc., et al., 108 Phil. 104 (1960); People vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 55533, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 107. 33 G.R. Nos. 65345-47, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 1989. 34 G.R. Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 169. 35 G.R. No. L-42637, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 388. 36 G.R. No. 94555, August 17, 1992, 212 SCRA 646. 37 Justices Narciso T. Atienza and Augusto M. Amores. 38 Rollo, 320-322. 39 Justice Romeo M. Escareal, Chairman, and Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Roberto M. Lagman, members.