G.R. No.

107964 February 1, 1999 THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES Represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NIFATAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.: On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, 1 in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 2 were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig (herein Branch 158-Pasig). Said Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior to arraignment. 3 After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the People thru herein petitioner, Panel of Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the three (3) Informations pending before Branch 158-Pasig with the 21 other cases pending before RTC Branch 26-Manila (herein Branch 26-Manila). 4 The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that "the indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the transaction complained" of in criminal cases 91-101732, 91-101734 and 91-101735 pending before Branch 26-Manila 5 and that these two groups of cases (the Pasig and Manila cases) "relate to a series of transactions" devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth. 6 The RTC of Pasig granted the motion for consolidation provided there is no objection from the presiding judge of Branch 26-Manila. 7 Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan wherein the three informations (CriminalCases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92) were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92107943 and 92-107944. Then, without private respondent yet taking any action of filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order dated July 20, 1992 requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent's right against ex post facto law,8 In that order, respondent judge said that a "check with official publications reveals that CB Circular 960 is dated 21 October 1983 (. . .) and that said regulatory issuance was imperfectly published in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official Gazette." 9 Respondent judge concluded that "since the date of violation alleged in the information was prior to the date and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily dismissible, for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior to its date and publication would make it an ex post facto law, which is a violation of the Constitution." 10 On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondent's right to double jeopardy was violated. 11 It is respondent judge's posture that based on the Solicitor-General's allegations in its Motion for Consolidation filed on Branch 58-Pasig that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of

transaction would endow it with the "functional ability of a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction". 12 Thus, accused wiould be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. In the two orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three "seemingly unmeritorious" and "duplicitous" cases would help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious suits. 13 The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent judge. On August 6, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for consolidation (embodied in the prosecution's compliance with the show cause orders) of the three informations with those pending before Branch 26-Manila on the ground that consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of civil procedure has no counterpart in criminal procedure, and blamed the panel of prosecutors as "apparently not conversant with the procedure in the assignment of cases." As additional justification, respondent judge stated that since he is "more studious and discreet, if not more systematic and methodical," than the prosecution "in the handling of cases," it would be unfair to just pull out the case when he had already studied it. 14 The next day, August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing criminal case no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law. 15 In a separate17page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was "part of a sustained political vendetta" by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondent's right against double jeopardy. l6 From his disquisition regarding continuing, continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch 26-Manila had placed private respondent in double jeopardy because of the three cases before his sala. The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent judge denied in a single order dated September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages wherein he made a preliminary observation that: (T)he very civil manner in which the motions were framed, which is consistent with the high ideals and standards of pleadings envisioned in the rules, and for which the panel should be commended. This only shows that the Members of the panel had not yielded to the derisive, panicky and intimidating reaction manifested by their Department Head when, after learning the promulgation of the orders dismissing some of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos cases. Secretary Drilon went to the media and repeatedly aired diatribes and even veiled threats against the trial judges concerned. By the constitutional mandate that 'A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence (Sec 7[3]. Art. VIII, judges are precluded from being dragged into running debates with parties-litigants or their counsel and representatives in media, yet by reason of the same provision judges are mandated to decide cases in accordance with their own independent appreciation of the facts and interpretation of the law. Any judge who yields to extraneous influences, such as denigrating criticisms or threats, and allows his independence to be undermined thereby, leading to violation of his oath of office, has no right to continue in his office any minute longer.
The published reaction of the Hon. Secretary is to be deplored, but it is hoped that he had merely lapsed into impudence instead of having intended to set a pattern of mocking and denigrating the courts. He must have forgotten that as Secretary of Justice, his actuations

reflect the 'rule of law' orientation of the administration of thePresident whom he represents as the latter's alter ego. 17

(emphasis supplied). The dispositive portion of the order denying the motions for reconsideration provides:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds no valid reason to reconsider the dismissals heretofore decreed, and the motions for reconsideration are consequently denied for manifest lack of merit. 18

Obviously dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari, where the primary issue raised is whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. (emphasis supplied). It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information at an information time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion to rule. In the case at at bench, private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 1 17 which provides: Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or informatin, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except, the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied) It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied

upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judges as well. A combination of these two personalities in one person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. That the initial act to quash an information is lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117 which states that: Sec. 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the Court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: a). That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; b). That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; c). That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; d). That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; e). That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; f). That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; g). That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and h). That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Sec. 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads (Emphasis supplied). Sec. 2 requires that the motion must be signed by "accused" or "his counsel"; Section 3 states that "the accused" may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if "the accused" do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned. Section 2 further ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the motion which should be "specify(ied) distinctly" therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belong to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than

that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of the filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the rationale that the right to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the cause. With these, the rule clearly implies the requirement of filing a motion by the accused even if the ground asserted is premised on lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Besides, lack of jurisdiction should be evident from the face of the information or complaint to warrant a dismissal thereof. Happily, no jurisdictional challenge is involved in this case. Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable. On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every laws carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. 19 To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the SolicitorGeneral challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first 20 or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. 21 In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Sec. 7, Rule 117 provides: When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx 22

Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 23

Other than the Solicitor-General's allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-Manila, respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent. had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely, those Branch 26-Manila cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was not convicted, acquitted nor the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or otherwise terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of private respondent under the three informations pending Branch 56-Manila would violate the former's right against double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the two orders dated Januay 20, 1990, as well as the orders dated August 7, 1992 August 10, 1992 and September 7, 1992 all issued by respondent judge are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Assisting Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, and REUBEN ALBAO, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Lorenzo S. Paylado for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.: The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the resolution issued by respondent judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor in Criminal Case No. DU-1805 dated June 26, 1991, containing the following disposition: WHEREFORE, the court resolves to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by accused being meritorious and hereby sets aside the decision dated February 6, 1991 and promulgated on May 3, 1991 for being null and void, and finally, to ACQUIT the accused. Private respondent Reuben Albao, the accused in Criminal Case No. DU-1805, was charged with the crime of arson before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, then presided by Judge Willelmo C. Fortun as assisting judge. Upon arraignment, private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the parties rested their case before Judge Fortun. It appears that on February 4, 1991, Judge Fortun was designated as Assisting Judge for the Regional Trial Court in the National Capital Judicial Region, to hold office in the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court in Manila (Administrative Order No. 10-91, later amended by AO

No. 10-91A dated February 12, 1991, designating Judge Fortun to assist Judge Ricardo Diaz of RTC, Br. 27, NCJR, and to hold office thereat). On March 13, 1991, respondent judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as replacement of Judge Fortun and assisting judge of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, wherein the criminal case against private respondent was pending. On May 3, 1991, Judge Fortun promulgated his decision dated February 6, 1991, convicting private respondent of the crime of arson. At the time of promulgation of Judge Fortun's decision, respondent judge was already presiding as assisting judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City. On May 9, 1991 private respondent moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. On June 26, 1991, respondent judge issued a resolution referred to above granting private respondent's motion for reconsideration and acquitted the latter of the crime charged (Rollo, pp. 3132). In the same resolution, the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was declared null and void for having been promulgated after said judge had vacated his office and after being assigned to the Office of the Court Administrator in Manila. On August 1, 1991, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration of private respondent and acquitting the latter. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and executory and a reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy. Private respondent's reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is misplaced. In order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge. (People vs. Asuncion, 208 SCRA 231 [1992], People vs. Puno, 208 SCRA [1992], Bogo Medellin vs. Son, 209 SCRA 329 [1992]). Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial (People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None exists in the case at bar. Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover him. As pointed out by the Solicitor General: . . . , private respondent's acquittal was upon his motion and with his express consent. In People v.Villon, 192 SCRA 521, this Honorable Court likewise stated: However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon

consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (Rollo, pp. 142143) Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the assailed resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty judgment of acquittal a bare adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the offense charged anchored on the mere supposition that the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed, respondent judge acquitted private respondent without expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. This can be clearly seen from the resolution issued by respondent judge which we quote in its entirety, to wit: RESOLUTION This is with reference to the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused from the decision dated February 6, 1991 and promulgated only on May 3, 1991 on the following grounds: 1. The decision being prepared and signed by the previous Judge Willelmo Fortun but promulgated only after he has ceased or relieved as incumbent judge is null and void and may be set aside or modified; 2. The sentence is imposed, being based on paragraph 4, Art. 322 of the Revised Penal Code, has no binding force and effect because said law has been repealed by P.D. 1613 and was not revived by P.D. 1744; 3. The law applicable is P.D. 1615 and as such, the issue of ownership of the shed that was burned which was raised by the accused must be resolved and considered in the new decision. There was no opposition filed thereto by the prosecution in spite of due notice. Considering the three grounds invoked by the accused in his motion for reconsideration, the Court is more engrossed in the 1st ground. It is undisputed that when the decision was promulgated on May 3, 1991, Judge Willelmo A. Fortun who rendered the decision was no longer sitting in this Court as he has been transferred and was relieved as incumbent judge of this court. It is now firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment, thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186); or when the term of office of the judge has ended (Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675); or when he has left the bench (People vs. C.G. et al., 99 Phil. 786); or after the judge had vacated his post in view of the abolition of his position as Judge-at-large under Rep. Act 1186 (People vs. Bonifacio So, 101 Phil. 1257 unrep.); or after the cessation or termination of his incumbency as judge;

or a sentence has been set aside where the judge who presided in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had been extended on ad interimappointment to the Court of First Instance of Manila to which position he qualified before the judgment was filed with the Clerk of Court of the former Court (People vs. Soria, 22 SCRA 948). The case of bar falls squarely in the legion of cases quoted above. The judge who rendered the decision ceased to be the judge of that court when the decision was promulgated. On this score alone, the decision in the above-entitled case which was promulgated in (sic) null and void. The rest of the grounds are denied for lack of merit as these were considered in the decision sought to be set aside or reconsidered. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused being meritorious and hereby sets aside the decision dated February 6, 1991 and promulgated on May 3, 1991 for being null and void and finally, to acquit the accused. . . . SO ORDERED. (pp. 31-32, Rollo) It is indubitable that the acquittal of private respondent was not based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case. Furthermore, it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual findings and legal justifications that led to the conclusions of the court (Nicos Industrial Corp., vs. CA, 206 SCRA 127 [1992]). Granting, ex gratia argumenti, that the decision of Judge Fortun was not validly promulgated, such invalidity, per se, does not necessarily operate for the acquittal of the accused. In such instances, the case should have been subjected for new adjudication based on the evidence already submitted by the parties and for further proceedings conformably with law (Solis v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 53 [1971]). If at all, it was the precipitate order of respondent judge acquitting private respondent which should be voided. Coming now to the main issue, petitioner claims that Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court allows the promulgation of a judgment by a judge who has been transferred or assigned to another court of equal jurisdiction. In this regard, it is the submission of petitioner that even though Judge Fortun had been assigned to the Office of the Court Administrator in Manila, he still retained the position of judge of the Regional Trial Court. It is petitioner's contention that this is all that is required for a judge who has been re-assigned and transferred to a court of equal jurisdiction to be able to prepare and sign a decision in a case totally heard by him and which was argued prior to such transfer or reassignment. There is merit in the above submission. Section 9 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 9. Signing judgment out of the province. Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in a province shall leave the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of his temporary assignment, without having decided a case totally heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court where the case was heard or argued

to be filed therein as of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing of the judgment. If the case has been heard only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective district judge, may also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case, if no other judge had heard the case in part, to continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) From the above provision, it is clear that the signing or writing of an order or judgment outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court wherein the case is pending is authorized only when the judge leaves the province "by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction" or by "expiration of his temporary assignment". Thus, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in another office are null and void (Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 [1917]). It is settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon (Jimenez vs. Republic, 22 SCRA 622 [1968], Jandayan vs. Ruiz, 95 SCRA 563 [1980]). In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated after the ponentehas vacated his office (Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. vs. IAC, 189 SCRA 433 [1990]). In the case of Judge Fortun's assignment, however, he was merely transferred from the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue to act as Assisting judge of another Regional Trial Court, specifically RTC Br. 27, NCJR, Manila. Judge Fortun did not vacate his office as judge of a Regional Trial Court which would have otherwise nullified his decision rendered in Criminal Case No. DU-1805. On the contrary, Judge Fortun was merely temporarily assigned to a court of equal jurisdiction, during which time the decision convicting private respondent was promulgated. Under Section 9, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, Judge Fortun still possessed the judicial authority and competence to decide a case fully heard by him and to promulgate a decision thereon while on temporary assignment to a court of equal jurisdiction in Manila. In view of the foregoing, we hold that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the decision rendered by Judge Fortun. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of respondent judge acquitting private respondent Reuben Albao is hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void and the decision of Judge Willelmo Fortun convicting accused Albao is hereby REINSTATED.

[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003] ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order1[1] of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,2[2] dated November 19, 2001, and its Order3[3] dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon. On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads as follows: That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION. CONTRARY TO LAW.4[4]

Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. The Evidence of the Prosecution On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court5[5] alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected deposit. According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared. The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence. On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.6[6] Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion. In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33. The Petition Is Meritorious According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages. Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.7[7] The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.8[8] Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.

The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.9[9] Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof: SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.10[10] The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads: Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt. If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment. In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:11[11]

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.12[12] This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order: (a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. (b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. (d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda. (e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused. In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action. The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.
G.R. No. 182178 August 15, 2011

STEPHEN SY y TIBAGONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated October 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00402, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 17614 convicting petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as well as the Resolution2 dated March 7, 2008, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: Under an Information dated June 12, 2005, petitioner Stephen T. Sy was indicted for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about the 11th day of June 2005, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said [petitioner], not being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and keep one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug. Contrary to Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.3 Upon his arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. To establish its case, on the one hand, the prosecution presented Police Senior Inspector Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas, Police Officer (PO) 3 Liberato Faelogo, PO3 Dario Paquera, Barangay Kagawad Rogelio Talavera, PO2 Glenn M. Corsame, and Reysan Elloren. On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. Evidence for the Prosecution PO3 Faelogo, a member of the PNP and assigned as Intelligence Operative of the Dumaguete City Police Station, testified that at about 2 oclock in the afternoon of June 11, 2005, while he was on duty, their office received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. With him at that time was PO3 Paquera. PO3 Faelogo averred that the two (2) of them immediately responded and went to the place as reported. While walking at the pathway going to the interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, at a distance of about two (2) meters away, they saw a man, later identified as the [petitioner] in this case, examining a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same. They approached the [petitioner], introduced themselves as policemen and announced his arrest for illegal possession of dangerous drug. PO3 Faelogo then apprised the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights but while doing so, the [petitioner] hurriedly boarded on his motorcycle for a possible escape. PO3 Faelogo was not able to finish his recital of the constitutional rights of the [petitioner]. PO3 Faelogo had to wrestle with the [petitioner] who dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground. While PO3 Faelogo and the [petitioner] were wrestling, PO3 Paquera picked up the said sachet of shabu. After a few minutes of struggle, they were able to subdue the [petitioner] and handcuff him. PO3 Faelogo continued to inform the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights in the Cebuano dialect. The [petitioner] was searched and found in his possession was a disposable lighter. PO3 Paquera gave the plastic sachet of shabu to PO3 Faelogo who made markings on it with the initials "SS 06-11-05" with SS to mean the name of the [petitioner] Stephen Sy and the numbers, the date of the incident. They then brought the [petitioner] with the seized items to the police station. They were not able to conduct an inventory in the crime scene, as there was a commotion where some people tried to rescue the [petitioner]. For their safety, they left the area. At the police station, PO3 Paquera took a photograph of the [petitioner] and the seized items. PO3 Faelogo then conducted an inventory of the recovered sachet of shabu including the disposable lighter in the presence of DOJ Representative Pros. Angelita Alcoran, Brgy. Kagawad Rogelio Talavera of Barangay Looc, the elected official representative, Reysan Elloren, the media representative and PO2 Glenn Corsame of the PDEA, who all signed the receipt of property seized.

The [petitioner] was given a copy of the receipt. PO2 Corsame had the incident recorded in the PDEA blotter. PO3 Faelogo also averred that he was the one who submitted the seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline pow[d]er/granules to the PNP Crime Laboratory, together with a letter request dated June 11, 2005 of the Chief of Police of Dumaguete City Police Station. The [petitioner] was not subjected to drug examination, as no drug testing kit was available at that time. It was Police Senior Inspector Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas, forensic chemical officer of the Negros Oriental Provincial Crime Laboratory who received the seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "SS-06-11-05" and conducted a laboratory examination on the contents thereof. She re-marked the sachet as Specimen A which had a weight of 0.02 gram. Her qualitative examination conducted on the specimen gave positive result to the tests for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her conclusion was that Specimen A contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her examination results were embodied in a Chemistry Report No. D-103-05 and a certification, which she signed and submitted. In support of the case filed, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera executed a joint affidavit of arrest, which they identified in Court.4 Evidence for the Defense The [petitioner] claimed that on June 11, 2005 at around 2 oclock in the afternoon, he was in Barangay Looc to book a masseur to massage him in the evening. As he was not able to find the person to massage him, the [petitioner] started to go home. While he was about to board his motorcycle, one of two (2) men, whom he had seen earlier from a distance, immediately handcuffed him in his left wrist. The [petitioner] was not given a warning and he was surprised why he was handcuffed especially since he had not committed any crime. Fearing for his life, the [petitioner] resisted and told the person who handcuffed him, "What am I charged of?" The [petitioner] was told to just keep quiet. The [petitioner] told the person to search him first before he should handcuff him. The [petitioner] continued to resist the person and they wrestled with each other. Noticing that this person had a gun tucked in his waist, the [petitioner] did not resist anymore. The [petitioner] was frisked in his pockets, in his cap and other parts of his body, including his brief wherein the person inserted his hand inside. The pants of the [petitioner] were also removed. The search was conducted in full view of many onlookers, but still nothing was found on the [petitioner]. One of the persons then picked up something, which the [petitioner] could not see and was told that it was shabu and a lighter. The [petitioner] was then brought to the Dumaguete City Police Station. The [petitioner] later learned at the police station the identity of the persons who arrested him, namely, Liberato Faelogo and Dario Paquera. At the police station, a photograph was taken of the [petitioner]. The [petitioner] then requested that he be subjected to drug examination, but was not tested. The [petitioner] kept on requesting for drug examination for a week but still he was not tested. The [petitioner] also claimed that while he was at the police station and being investigated, he was kicked and punched by no less than the Chief of Police, one named Hidalgo. The [petitioner] tried to protest but was not able to do anything, as nobody was around to help him.5 On May 12, 2006, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision6 convicting petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Stephen Sy y Tibagong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, term to fourteen (14) years, as maximum term, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). The seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu is hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance with law. SO ORDERED.7 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the Decision before the CA, which was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00402. On October 24, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the lower court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the Resolution dated March 7, 2008. Hence, the petition raising the following errors: i The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the police officers enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. ii The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that petitioners warrantless arrest was valid. iii The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the right of the petitioner against unlawful searches and seizures was not violated. iv The honorable court of appeals erred in holding the conviction of the petitioner based on the transparent plastic sachet considering that the same was the "fruit of a poisonous tree" and could not be used for any purpose in any proceeding. v

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that because petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the lower court, that he also waived his right to object to the admission of the plastic sachet in evidence.9 Simply stated, petitioner contends that since he was not doing anything illegal at the time of his arrest that would arouse the suspicion of the arresting officers, his subsequent arrest and the ensuing search upon his person was illegal and, therefore, any alleged illegal drugs recovered from him cannot be used in trial against him, without the risk of violating his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizure. Petitioner posits that the arresting officers lacked probable cause when they arrested him. He argues that the act of flicking a clear plastic sachet in broad daylight cannot be perceived as an illegal act. Thus, he was not caught in flagrante delicto and the resulting warrantless arrest made by the police officers was invalid. Moreover, the confiscated sachet is not admissible in evidence against him being the fruit of the poisonous tree. The petition is without merit. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.10 In the case at bar, petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Moreover, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.11 As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.12 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Corolarilly, the 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.13 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in "plain view;" 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.14 What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.15 In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.16 In the case at bar, the established facts reveal that on June 11, 2005, PO3 Faelogo, an Intelligence Operative of the Dumaguete City Police Station, received information from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. Together with PO3 Paquera, PO3 Faelogo immediately acted on the information and went to the place. While traversing the pathway going to the interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, they saw petitioner, at a distance of two (2) meters, examining and flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder. The two then approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers, and announced the he is being arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. While being informed of his constitutional rights during the arrest, petitioner tried to escape by boarding his motorcycle. While wrestling with PO3 Faelogo, petitioner dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground, which was picked up by PO3 Paquera. The police officers eventually were able to subdue and handcuff petitioner. Upon searching his person, they also found in his possession a disposable lighter. The seized sachet was marked on location. They then brought petitioner, together with the items seized, to the police station and conducted a proper inventory thereof. The heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165. From the foregoing, sufficient evidence supports that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The police officers

witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Under these circumstances, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers. At the time of his arrest, the police officers were actively performing their duties, since they were following up a tip that there was an illegal drug trade being conducted in the area. This fact, coupled with the overt acts of petitioner, formed sufficient basis on the part of the police officers to believe that a crime was actually being committed. Thus, petitioners case falls within the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged. It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.17 In addition, buttressing the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, the arresting officers substantially complied with the rules on the custody and disposition of evidence recovered from petitioner. Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency] shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination; x x x x. Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),

and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. x x x x.18 In the case at bar, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized from petitioner were preserved and safeguarded. From the time of petitioners arrest, the seized item was properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also made in the presence of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice, the PDEA, and an elected public official, who all signed the receipt of the property seized. The evidence was sent to the Negros Oriental Provincial Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination, which later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride with a weight of 0.02 gram. An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug had been evidently established by the prosecution. For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.19 Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge oranimus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession - theonus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.20 The Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to petitioners guilt of the offense charged against him, particularly where such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. The same respect holds too as regards the lower courts evaluation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses deportment during the trial.21 Furthermore, the well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.22 In the present case, after a careful evaluation of the records, we find that no oversight was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged against him.
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In contrast to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely raised the defense of alibi. The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.23 To stress, in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings

of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners self-serving and uncorroborated denial.24
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As to the propriety of the penalty imposed upon petitioner, We find that the RTC imposed the appropriate penalty. Section 11, Article II, of RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides: Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof: x x x x. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows: x x x x. (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.25 From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.02 gram of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law. Taking the foregoing into consideration, the penalty meted out by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was within the range provided by RA No. 9165. The appropriate penalty was, therefore, imposed by the lower court. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated March 7, 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00402 are AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 189365 October 12, 2011

HON. JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 112 and CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, Chief Administrative Officer, DSWD, Petitioners,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its duly authorized representative, the Legal Service of the DSWD, Quezon City and the Office of the Solicitor General, Respondents. DECISION SERENO, J.: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, private petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated 19 March 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105199. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Orders2 dated 19 December 2007 and 2 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 112), granting her demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 02-0371 and 02-0372. Private petitioner also assails the CA Resolution dated 28 August 2009, denying her Motion for Reconsideration. As the records and the CA found, private petitioner Carmelita F. Zafra (petitioner Zafra) was Supply Officer V3 of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). On 14 November 1998, she arranged for the withdrawal for replacement, of two hundred (200) cartons of Bear Brand Powdered Milk that were nearing their expiry date. She made the arrangement for their withdrawal through DSWD personnel Marcelina Beltran, Administrative Officer III; and Manuelito Roga, Laborer 1.4 Petitioner Zafra instructed Marcelina Beltran to have someone from the DSWD Property Division withdraw the 200 cartons of milk from the DSWD-Villamor Airbase Relief Operation Center (DSWDVABROC) on 14 November 1998. Beltran relayed this instruction to Roga. On the appointed date, however, no one from the Property Division arrived to pick up the milk cases. Instead, three unidentified persons on board a four-wheeler truck came and hauled the 200 cases of milk. One of the three persons who came to pick up the milk cases at the DSWD-VABROC premises introduced herself as Ofelia Saclayan to Roga, the only DSWD employee present at that time.5Saclayan turns out to be the sister of Zafra. The 200 cases of milk withdrawn by Saclayan and her unidentified companions were valued at three hundred six thousand seven hundred thirty-six pesos (P306,736).6 An internal investigation was conducted by the DSWD on the persons involved in the loss of the milk cases. On 06 August 1999, the investigating committee of the DSWD issued a Memorandum7 entitled "Report and Recommendation on the Loss of the Two Hundred (200) Cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk from DSWD-VABROC." In brief, the committee report dismissed petitioner Zafra and her co-employees Beltran and Roga, whom they implicated in the loss of the milk cases. The committee found substantial evidence to hold petitioner Zafra guilty of dishonesty and "negligence of duty."8 The report of the DSWD investigating committee finding petitioner Zafra and her co-employee Beltran guilty of dishonesty and negligence of duty was appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission). On 03 December 1999, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 992652,9 which slightly modified the findings of the committee. The Resolution, while absolving petitioner Zafra of the charge of dishonesty, found her guilty of simple neglect as follows: The Commission has noted, however, that Zafra is not that entirely innocent. For the records disclose that it was she who made representation with the MEGA Commercial, the supplier of said milk, to withdraw and replace those cases of milk that are nearing their expiry dates. Surprisingly, however, after November 14, 1998, when the 200 milk cases of milk were actually withdrawn from VABROC she never made any contact with MEGA Commercial as to what further steps to take on the case, such as to retrieve the loss thereof and have these replaced by the company. Neither did

she make any further inquiry as to the condition of milk from VABROC. This unnatural inaction or callousness displayed by Zafra and her utter apathy in the performance of her official functions calls for the imposition of sanctions on her. xxx xxx xxx

Being both government employees, Zafra and Beltran are required to perform their duties and functions with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. And since both of them failed on this score, they must suffer the consequences of their negligence. WHEREFORE, the respective appeals of Carmelita F. Zafra and Marcelina M. Beltran are hereby dismissed for want of merit. They are however, found guilty only of simple Neglect of Duty for which they are each imposed the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. The appealed decision is thus modified accordingly. Quezon City, December 03, 1999.10 On 15 February 2002, the Ombudsman filed two Informations with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay (RTC-Pasay) against petitioner Zafra, Beltran and Roga, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-0371 and 02-0372. Under Criminal Case No. 02-0371, petitioner Zafra and her co-accused Beltran and Roga were charged with violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The Information filed in this case reads: The undersigned Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses Marcelina M. Beltran, Carmelita Zafra, Manuelito T. Roga and Ofelia Saclayan for Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows: That on or about 13 November 1998, or for sometime, prior, or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Marcelina M. Beltran, Carmelita F. Zafra, Carmelito T. Roga (sic), Administrative Officer III, Supply Officer V, and Laborer I, respectively of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, while in the performance of their official duties, and in connivance with Ofelia Saclayan, a private respondent, with evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause damage or undue injury to the government, particularly the Department of Social Welfare and Development in the amount of Php 306,736.00, by making it appear that the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk stocked at the DSWD Villamor Airbase Relief Operation Center (DSWD-VABROC) are about to expire and need to be changed, and thereafter, without complying with the standard operating procedure in withdrawing goods from the bodega, did then and there arrange for the immediate withdrawal of the subject goods on the next day which was a Saturday, a non-working day, and appropriate the said goods for themselves. CONTRARY TO LAW.11 Petitioner Zafra, Beltran and Roga were charged with malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 02-0372. The Information reads: The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses Carmelita Zafra, Marcelina M. Beltran Manuelito T. Roga and Ofelia Saclayan for Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about 13 November 1998, or for sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Marcelina M. Beltran, Administrative Officer III of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Villamor Airbase Relief Operation Center (DSWD-VABROC), an accountable public officer by virtue of her being the custodian of the goods inside the DSWD-VABROC bodega, in connivance with Carmelita F. Zafra, and Manuelito T. Roga, Supply Officer IV and Laborer I, respectively of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and with the indispensable cooperation of Ofelia T. Saclayan, a private respondent, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, cause the unauthorized withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk, a public property owned by the DSWD stock[ed] at VABROC, and thereafter, did then and there appropriate the said goods for themselves to the prejudice of the DSWD in the amount of Php 306,736.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.12 The cases against petitioner Zafra and her co-accused were raffled to Branch 112 of RTC-Pasay. Upon arraignment, they pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. On 06 August 2003, the pretrial of the case was conducted, attended by only petitioner Zafra and Beltran.13Thereafter, a joint trial for Criminal Case Nos. 02-0371 and 02-0372 ensued. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four witnesses to build up its case. The prosecution presented Consolacion Obrique dela Cruz, a utility worker at the DSWD Property and Supply; Atty. Nelson Todas, former DSWD Legal Officer V; Ruby Maligo Cresencio, the operations officer of Mega Commercial Trading, which supplied the stolen milk cases to DSWD; and Isidro Tuastumban, a security guard posted at the DSWD lobby at the time the incident happened. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence.14 She alleged therein that the prosecution failed to present proof that she and her co-accused had wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously caused the withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk and appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of DSWD. Thus, she concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime of malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. She likewise contended that the prosecution was not able to present proof that she and her co-accused had done so in violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. 3019. The lower court required the prosecution to comment on petitioner Zafras demurrer to evidence. In its Comment,15 the prosecution contradicted the allegations therein and claimed to have established and proved the elements of the crimes as charged against petitioner and her co-accused. It also alleged that it was able to establish conspiracy among the accused and had evidence to show that petitioner Zafra caused the withdrawal of the goods, subject matter of this case, through her sister -co-accused Ofelia Saclayan, who was an unauthorized person. On 19 December 2007, public respondent Judge Mupas issued an Order16 granting the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra. Public respondent ruled that, after evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he found them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner Zafra under the charges filed against her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her demurrer to evidence, petitioner was acquitted. 17 The decretal portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is GRANTED. Consequently, accused CARMELITA ZAFRA y FUENTES is hereby ACQUITTED. SO ORDERED.

On 28 January 2008, the prosecution, through its private prosecutor, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 19 December 2007 issued by public respondent. On 2 June 2008, the motion was denied for lack of merit.18 On 09 September 2008, the People filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the lower courts grant of petitioner Zafras demurrer to evidence, resulting in her acquittal.19 The petition, filed through the DSWD, which was represented by its legal officers, raised the following issues: Whether or not the Honorable Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its Order granting private respondents demurrer to evidence; Whether or not the Honorable Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution providing beyond reasonable doubt private respondents negligence which resulted to (sic) the unauthorized withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk at the VABROC belonging to the government.20 The Peoples Petition for Certiorari was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 105199 and was raffled to the appellate courts Special Sixth Division. On 22 September 2008, a Resolution21 was promulgated, directing petitioner Zafra to file a Comment on the certiorari petition and thereafter instructing the Office of the Solicitor General to file a Reply thereto. On 06 October 2008, petitioner Zafra, as private respondent in the appeal, filed her Comment and sought to dismiss the Petition for Certiorari instituted by the prosecution.22 In her Comment, she assailed the appeal of the DSWD for being improper, having been filed directly with the appellate court instead of seeking the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to act on DSWDs behalf. She also pointed out the lack of authority of the signatory who had executed the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the petition. On 06 November 2008, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion23 adopting the Petition for Certiorari filed by the DSWD. It prayed for the relaxation of the Rules on Procedure pertaining to the authority of the person signing the Verification and Certification against forum-shopping attached to the petition filed by the DSWD. On 19 November 2008, petitioner Zafra filed a Comment/Opposition24 to the OSGs Manifestation and Motion and moved that it be expunged from the records, as it was filed out of time. On 23 January 2009, the CA, through its Fourth Division, issued a Resolution25 granting the OSGs Manifestation and Motion. On 19 March 2009, the appellate court, through its Third Division, promulgated a Decision26 granting the Peoples petition and revoking and setting aside the lower courts Order granting private respondents demurrer to evidence. In its Decision reversing the trial courts Order, the CA found that public respondent Judge Mupas committed grave abuse of discretion through his grant of private respondents demurrer, which consequently resulted in her acquittal. Holding that the prosecution was able to present sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crimes in the Information filed against private respondent, the appellate court ruled as follows: A careful reading of the 19 December 2007 Order, supra, showed that the court a quo in granting the Respondents demurrer to evidence relied heavily on the ground that the Petitioner miserably failed to show that the Respondent had any direct participation in the actual withdrawal of the goods. This may be gleaned from the pertinent portion of the 19 December 2007 Order, supra, to wit:

xxx There is no denying that the prosecution, after presenting all its witnesses and documentary evidence has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused Carmelita Zafra beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has never proven any direct participation of the herein accused to the actual withdrawal of the goods. The prosecution witnesses presented testified during cross-examination that they have no personal knowledge nor did they see that the accused Carmelita Zafra actually withdraw (sic) or cause[d] the withdrawal of the goods from VABROC. The prosecution proved the relationship between Carmelita Zafra and a Ofelia Saclayan, the fact that Carmelita Zafra coordinated with the prosecution witness Ruby Crescencio for the return of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk which were alleged to be near expiry but it did not proved (sic) that on the day when the goods were withdrawn from VABROC[,] accused Carmelita Zafra had a direct participation for its withdrawal. xxx xxx xxx

It bears to emphasize that the crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. Thus, the Petitioners alleged failure to prove the Respondents direct participation in the withdrawal of the 200 cases of milk did not altogether rule out malversation as the dolo or culpa in malversation is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Besides, even if the Information in Criminal Case No. 02-0372, supra, alleges willful malversation, this does not preclude conviction of malversation through negligence if the evidence sustains malversation through negligence. On this score, let US refer to the explicit pronouncement of the Supreme Court in People v. Uy, Jr., thus: xxx Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. Likewise, We find that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the Respondent for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 ... xxx xxx xxx

As earlier discussed, the court a quo acquitted the Respondent of the offense charged mainly because of the alleged lack of any proof of her direct participation in the withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand powdered milk. However, in view of the Peoples evidence showing Respondents inexcusable negligence in the withdrawal of the goods in question, Respondent cannot likewise be acquitted of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 since inexcusable negligence is one of the elements of the said offense. In sum, We hold that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Respondents demurrer to evidence, which resulted to her untimely acquittal. WHEREFORE, instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The court a quos challenged Orders are REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.27

Petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 dated 31 March 2009 praying that the 19 March 2009 Decision of the CA reversing the lower courts grant of her demurrer to evidence be set aside. She further prayed that the criminal cases filed against her be dismissed with prejudice. On 09 June 2009, the OSG filed its Comment29 on the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Zafra. It moved for the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105199 be affirmed. The CA, through its former Third Division, issued a Resolution30 on 28 August 2009 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The appellate court found that the issues she raised had been sufficiently considered and discussed in its 19 March 2009 Decision. On 19 October 2009, petitioner Zafra filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari31 under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. She assailed the 19 March 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 105199, as well as the 28 August 2009 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. We AFFIRM the entire ruling of the Court of Appeals. After a thorough review of the records of this case, particularly the issues proffered by petitioner, we adopt the findings of the appellate court. We find no reversible error in the ruling which is eloquently supported by existing jurisprudence.32 We agree with the CAs disquisition that the lower courts grant of the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The prosecutions evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against her for her inexcusable negligence, subject to the defense that she may present in the course of a full-blown trial. The lower court improperly examined the prosecutions evidence in the light of only one mode of committing the crimes charged; that is, through positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that the crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.33 As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:34 By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.35 In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void.
1avv phi1

Further, we do not find any pronouncement by the trial court on whether the act or omission of petitioner under the circumstances would entail civil liability. Therefore, the CA properly ordered the

remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether petitioner is civilly liable for the loss of the milk cartons. WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition and affirm in toto the 19 March 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 28 August 2009 Resolution. Let the name of Judge Jesus B. Mupas be stricken off as petitioner, as such appellation unilaterally made by petitioner Carmelita F. Zafra, is improper. G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. The petitioners were charged under the following information: The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows: That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings. The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states: WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendantsappellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that: xxx xxx xxx ... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct. Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES. The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ... xxx xxx xxx The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion? From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information. We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court). xxx xxx xxx Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221). The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However,

the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203) There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense: xxx xxx xxx (9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known. The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that: On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were: Cost of stall construction P1,300.00 Value of furniture and equipment judgment destroyed 300.00 Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00 P9,600.00 It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated. The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state: On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ... The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense. As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco: ... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions. ... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the

civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate. In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289). We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks. We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or

correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46). A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.