i e

masHKean
CHAIR
Date:
Et Hamilton
ICE CHAIR.

aid Beit- Veniste

TO: TEAM_Z=:
Oeland

F. Fielding
FROM: Dianna Campagtia

: S. GoreUck

i Gorton The attached correspondence from e 0 yy^G V

is being forwarded to you for information and consideration. A copy has

ttyj, Roetner
also been sent to Team(s) _____ _ for their information. If you
! R Thompson
have any questions, please call me on 33 1 -4082. Thank you.
>D. Zelikow
LJTIVE DIRECTOR

TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9- llcommissiongov
05/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 01/6

Fax Cover Sheet

MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT
550 UTTERBACK STORE ROAD
GREAT FALLS, VIRGINIA 22O66
(703) 430-0372

MACNUT4EVR@YAHOO.COM

Date: May 17, 2004

No. of Pages (including this sheet): 8

To: Mr. Thomas H. Kean, Chair

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States

Fax: (202)296-5545

Subject: Restoring Critical National Imagery

Intelligence Capabilities
d5/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 02/08

GEOFFREY s. BOEHM
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT

May 17,2004

Mr. Thomas H. Kean, Chair

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, D. C. 20407

Subject: Restoring Critical National Imagery Intelligence Capabilities

Dear Mr. Kean:

Since 1996, our national imagery intelligence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent
that national security is in jeopardy. As you investigate the intelligence failures of 9/11,
please consider the following.

Imagery is a major—and often the only—source of intelligence about global issues of the
highest importance. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA, formerly
named National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]) is the sole national organization
responsible for analyzing world-wide imagery to derive intelligence critical to US
leaders. Alarmingly, the analytical depth and breadth of that vital national capability
were seriously eroded by NIMA, and the problem continues under NGA. Intelligence
gaps, errors, and major failures are inevitable from the existing hollow shell of dwindling
imagery analysis abilities—and conceivably may have been partially to blame for the
intelligence failures of the 9/11 catastrophe.

As a management consultant to NPIC (the CIA's former National Photographic

Interpretation Center, a NIMA predecessor) and then NIMA for a combined 31 years, I
witnessed significant deterioration in our national imagery intelligence capabilities
caused when NPIC was subsumed by NIMA under DoD in 1996. Hundreds of expert
CIA imagery analysts were driven away by NIMA's inept management and stifling
bureaucracy that failed to treat imagery analysis as the top mission priority. These
imagery experts—the eyes, brain, heart, and soul of analysis—took pride in the
unsurpassed professional standards and prestige of CIA and refused to work for DoD
where they saw a military mentality and a policy of mediocrity engulfing their highly
specialized tradecraft

This significant loss of expert imagery analysts has had compounded negative effects:
not just a serious shortfall in the number of qualified analysts but—more importantly—a
decimated knowledge base essential to quality imagery analysis and too few seasoned

SSO U T T E R B A C K STORE R O A D • G R E A T F A L L S . V I R G I N I A 2 2 O S 6 • ( 7 O 3 ) 4 3 O - O 3 7 Z - M A C N U T 4 E V R ® Y A H O O .C OM
05/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 03/b

veterans to train and mentor junior analysts properly. (Note: I do not know to what
extent, if any, these problems might have contributed to the national intelligence failures
of 9/11. But such problems certainly couldn't have helped the situation.)

Many years will be needed to rebuild these critical imagery analytical capabilities to the
comprehensive depth and highly respected status of pre-NIMA days. Reversing the
continuing slip toward mediocrity requires hiring, training, and retaining the necessary
cadre of professional imagery analysts. In my judgment, such an endeavor can succeed
only if the national imagery analysis mission is returned to the CIA where—unlike the
NGA—the most-qualified recruits are attracted and where management is focused strictly
on intelligence production of the highest possible quality. And as a bonus, if the CIA
were in charge again, I believe many of the experienced CIA imageiy analysts driven
away by NIMA/NGA may well return to that profession, which they truly love.

To give you a few more specifics, I have attached a copy of the letter that I sent to the
Senate and House intelligence committees last fall, briefly describing the troubling
situation at NIMA when I retired last August. The complete story, however, is much
larger than can be depicted in a few pages. Please do not hesitate to contact me, should
you want amplification on any or all issues.

To improve our nation's intelligence, I strongly urge you to consider recommending that
national imagery intelligence capabilities be moved out of DoD and back into the CIA
where they could once again thrive.

Respectfully,

Geoffrey S. Boehm

Attachment: Letter to Senate and House Intelligence Committees, September 26,2003

£5/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 04/08

GEOFFREY s. BOEHM
M A N A G E M E N T CONSULTANT

September 26,2003

[to all members of the HPSCI and SSCI]

Subject: Intelligence Problems al NIMA are Jeopardizing National Security

Dear fmember J:

As a patriot and staunch supporter of national imagery intelligence for 31 of my 35

management-consulting years, I can not sit idly by while NIMA's imagery intelligence
capabilities deteriorate. Because the impact on our nation's security is potentially
disastrous, I am writing to assure that you are fully aware of the situation and in hopes
that you will direct corrective actions as appropriate. Please permit me to explain.

The creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1996 was a
terrible mistake. This merger was based on the seriously flawed premise that imagery
intelligence analysts (from NPIC and DIA) and map makers (from DMA) had much in
common. This misconception was the brainchild of Keith Hall and John Deutch, both of
whom had only superficial understanding of either tradecraft In fact, anyone with
moderate knowledge of the two tradecrafts knows they are unique and have very little in
common. Forcing them together has severely harmed national imagery intelligence.
Maps have always been an essential part of imagery analysis, but making imagery
analysts "integrate" with map makers where they aren't needed or wanted has done little
to improve national intelligence measurably—quite to the contrary, this "oil and water"
mix has served mainly to distract and obstruct imagery analysts from doing their primary
job of producing quality imagery-derived intelligence that is vital to national security.

To exacerbate this already untenable situation, NIMA is being directed ineptly with
misguided priorities, harmful policies, and stifling bureaucracy. Rather than facilitating
imagery intelligence analysis, Agency misdirection is impeding it. Among dozens of
examples, here is just a sampling to partially illustrate the present state of affairs:

• Appearance, "kissing up" to the General (NIMA Director James Clapper, retired
three-star), political spin, and personal career advancement take precedence over the
national intelligence mission, which has slipped far below first priority.

• Imagery analysts are being pressured to include detailed maps in all of their graphical
intelligence products—whether appropriate or not. Such contrived "integrated"
products are meant to show the wisdom of the NIMA merger, but, in fact, they are

SSO UTTERBACK STORE ROAD • GREAT PAULS, VIRGINIA 22OS6 • (7O3) 43O-O372
05/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 05/fc

dishonest, misleading to customers, and insulting to imagery analysts who know

better. Typically, to report most imagery-derived intelligence, all but the most simple
orientation maps are superfluous, and usually pictures with annotations best
communicate the intelligence. Thus, Colin Powell showed only annotated pictures
from MIMA—no maps—to make his points to the UN Security Council last February.

Lower managers and staff no longer can freely express views that differ from Agency
managers without risking their careers. Senior imagery managers who used to be
very vocal about doing what was right have been "worn down" and sense their
careers would be threatened should they persist against the Agency spin. To quote a
respected office director, "We have to pick our fights," meaning only the most severe
problems are worth a battle with Agency management. (This draws an alarming
parallel with root problems at NASA, where a similar atmosphere that discouraged
dissenting views was identified by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.)

Appointed by the General, the Director of NIMA's Analysis and Production

Directorate (this includes all imagery analysts) has virtually no knowledge of the
intelligence or imagery analysis businesses, has bad interpersonal skills, and lacks
fundamental management abilities. He does not recognize the extent of his
ignorance, and he neither seeks nor accepts advice from his many imagery
intelligence experts (again, a problem similar to one at NASA that was cited by the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board). These inadequacies, however, do not deter
him from making major decisions that place NIMA's imagery intelligence mission at
risk. And he is ever eager to please the General, regardless of any negative impacts
on the intelligence mission. Many imagery analysts and their managers express not
just disrespect but contempt for him.

Most NIMA imagery analysts are ill-equipped to accomplish their jobs. All imagery
analysts still do not have softcopy imagery exploitation workstations. Systems for
storing and transferring imagery data electronically are undersized for today's
imagery volumes, let alone the future when the systems will be at risk of saturation
and failure. Imagery analysts who were relocated to Bethesda last fall (for political
reasons) still do not have proper secure telephones to enable important daily contact
with customers and colleagues at NSA, D1A, and the Pentagon. Agency managers
blame these and other such problems on the lack of money, yet they found $9 million
to squander on a 3-D terrain model maker of dubious value. And they spent millions
on an ill-conceived Hollywood-style tactical airborne analysis center that proved to
have essentially zero intelligence value during the Iraq invasion. One senior manager
cynically quipped that the airborne center's main value was to keep visitors out of the
way of imagery analysts doing the real work.

Imagery analysts are being forced to convert from film to softcopy image exploitation
prematurely, regardless of risk to the intelligence mission. Softcopy potentially offers
many benefits and will eventually be the predominant image exploitation medium.
But despite current softcopy system downtime, quality degradation, slow response,
and the lack of tools to enable efficient area search and historical research (a concern
35/17/2004 08:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 06/08

prompting a Congressionally Directed Action questioning NTMA's preparedness for

the future elimination of film production), Agency managers are pressuring imagery
analysts to stop using film before an adequate softcopy replacement is ready.
Imagery analysts moving to Bethesda had to destroy personal film files essential to
historical research. New imagery analysts are no longer being trained to use light
tables and film and, thus, will be ill-prepared to do basic historical research beyond
the five-year softcopy archives and won't know how to search large areas efficiently
using film on light tables. Unfortunately, Agency managers have already made up
their political minds about softcopy. Appearance and pleasing the General are
paramount—never mind reality or risk.

• NIMA's overhead is huge and not very supportive of the intelligence mission.
Instead of forming a lean and mean organization modeled on the imagery intelligence
business, NIMA, by default, inherited the ugliest of non-mission-oriented
bureaucracies from the former DMA. One of many examples is the human resources
staff. Before NIMA, NPIC had less than 10 officers who administered all personnel
matters effectively and efficiently for all NPIC employees. Today, NIMA has a
human-resource staff of several hundred that provides poorer service with a staff-to-
population ratio 10 times higher than NPIC's. Instead of revolving around the NIMA
missions, such support staffs typically operate more for their own convenience and
sustainment. In dealing with these bureaucrats, imagery analysts must compensate
for the lack of support and are distracted from their primary mission.

These and many other similar problems cumulatively create an environment in which
experienced imagery analysts—the heart and soul of national imagery intelligence—are
increasingly no longer willing to work. Despite their intense love for imagery analysis,
imagery analysts are leaving by the hundreds. Mid-level imagery analysts with 10 to 20
years of experience have left in droves. Many senior imagery analysts with 20 to 30 or
more years of experience are retiring prematurely. Dozens of junior imagery
analysts—the foundation for the future—are leaving or simply resigning. In August, an
experienced and highly respected senior intelligence service (SIS) office director left in
total frustration. (This loss of large numbers of experienced imagery analysts is
frighteningly similar to the "brain drain" at NASA that was noted by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board.) NIMA's hemorrhaging of seasoned imagery veterans is
destroying our country's national imagery intelligence capabilities that were once a
national treasure. If such destruction is allowed to continue, major imagery intelligence
failures (aptly called a "train wreck" in a student's thesis at the Joint Military Intelligence
College) are inevitable. And the attrition problem can not be easily or quickly fixed.
Rebuilding a robust national imagery intelligence capability will take many
years—assuming the restoration of an environment conducive to imagery analysts.

On the surface, this deteriorating situation is not apparent to the average customer. The
NIMA "spin meisters" have painted a glowing picture of NIMA, touting the recent
superb support provided to combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today's marvelous
support is rightly credited to the sweat and blood of a dwindling cadre of experienced and
dedicated imagery analysts who understand the importance of their task and who are able
05/17/2004 03:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 07/1

to perform when their country needs them—in spite of Agency mismanagement and
impediments. Unfortunately, such successes are hollow because they belie the true state
of national imagery intelligence capabilities today: an imagery analyst staff that is half
inexperienced journeymen, a seriously eroding knowledge base, an incomplete and out-
of-date intelligence database, and denied areas that have not been looked at for years—to
give a few examples. Do not be fooled into thinking that NIMA is thriving because of a
few flashy successes. In truth, NIMA's overall national imagery intelligence capability is
steadily losing the analytical breadth and depth critical to national security.

Just as NASA managers did not heed the foreshadowings of the Columbia catastrophe,
NIMA managers pay only lip service to the attrition problem and do nothing to keep
essential imagery analysts from leaving. Agency managers do not see the error in their
ways and continue to create an atmosphere that is driving imagery analysts away. Agency
managers are so bereft of a basic understanding of imagery analysis that they think the
solution to this attrition is merely hiring and training more replacements—an extremely
simplistic and flawed approach, given the three to five years required for a new trainee to
become fully productive and the 10 to 30 years to rebuild the lost knowledge. Agency
managers also naively think that technology is a panacea, but, in reality, it is only a pipe
dream—the immaturity of automated exploitation tools makes the imagery analyst's eyes
and brains irreplaceable for the foreseeable future. NIMA managers continue to spin the
Agency line and focus on cute slogans and fancy toys while ignoring the unmistakable
erosion of its core imagery analysis capabilities—fiddling while Rome burns, so to speak.
Like NASA, failure of NIMA is inevitable under the current management. (If I were in
charge, I'd replace the General and the Director of Analysis and Production immediately
with qualified managers who understand the imagery analysis business and who would cut
attrition and focus all necessary resources toward imagery intelligence as a top priority.)

I could go on and on with many additional problems because the actual situation is worse
than what I describe here. The facts are easily verifiable. Almost any senior imagery
analyst and Iheir managers could corroborate what I say and add some details of their
own. Unfortunately, given the current atmosphere that discourages dissenting views,
most NIMA employees will not risk their careers by voicing anything that would upset
Agency managers—unless protection from retribution is guaranteed. In addition, a
number of other people are not subject to such retribution and would be good sources:
imagery analysts about to retire and recently retired, experienced imagery analysts who
have left recently, and selected contractors.

I hope this letter sparks your interest and that you will try to fix the problems at
NIMA—before it's too late and we see a "NIMA Accident Investigation Board." Please
feel free to contact me should you want further information or clarification.

Respectfully,

Geoffrey S. Boehm
(35/17/2004 88:45 7034300372 GEOFF BOEHM PAGE 08/08

My Background. / was bom in Council Bluffs, Iowa,

and raised on a nearby small farm where I learned the
virtues of hard work and honesty—which have proven
unwavering throughout my life of 60 years. I attended
grade school in a one-room country schoolhouse,
graduated from high school at age 16, and was the
first in my family to graduate from college (B. S. in
Math and M. S. in Statistics from Iowa State). I was
commissioned a lieutenant in the Army and proudly
served a tour in Vietnam. I was a management
consultant my entire 35-year career, serving national
imagery analysts and their managers continuously
since 1972—over 24 years at the former NPIC and
nearly seven at NIMA—before retiring this August. I
understand the intricacies of the national imagery
analysis business, and managers have come to trust
my objective, straightforward, honest, friendly, and
non-political advice.