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u01d1 Consciousness

Read the Attributes and Evaluation of Discussion Contributions Scoring Guide to learn how the instructor will evaluate your discussion participation throughout this course. For this discussion:

Describe one phenomenon from those presented in your textbook readings for this unit (for example, blindsight, commissurotomy, neglect) that furthers our understanding of human consciousness, and explain why it does so. Locate and read an article from the Capella Library related to one or more phenomena through which biopsychologists explore self-awareness (for example, blindsight, unilateral neglect, or the behavioral effects of split-brain surgery), then address the following: o Summarize the research article that you found. o Did the research described in this article advance your understanding of human consciousness? Why or why not? Cite your source using standard APA guidelines.

1. Describe one phenomenon from those presented in your textbook readings for this unit (for example, blindsight, commissurotomy, neglect) that furthers our understanding of human consciousness, and explain why it does so. Since the 17th century, Descartes mind-body dichotomy, otherwise known as Cartesian dualism, formed the philosophical basis of empirical research and methodology in both the hard and soft sciences (Schultz & Schultz, 2008). This epistemological worldview was based upon the philosophical distinction between the nature of the mind as a non-extended entity in contrast to the nature of the body as an extended entity. Moreover, it posited that the mind and body are operationally independent of each other with distinctly different attributes. This distinction essentially embodied the essence of the philosophical dilemma commonly known as the mindbody problem. As a result, for many years the subjective nature of consciousness typically elicited caution among researchers, psychologists and neuroscientists. However in recent decades, research interest has emerged involving causal interaction of the contrasting natures of the mind and body as well as what interactive parameters exist between them. Furthermore, philosophical abandonment of the mind-body dichotomy for a more inclusive monistic approach to understanding the phenomena of the mind has led to an intriguing collective interest in comprehending and conceptualizing the neuropsychological and physiological underpinnings of consciousness (Carlson, 2013). New advances in neuropsychology and brain imaging, as well as substantive research over the last few years in cognitive domains such as attention, intelligence, perception and working memory has

stimulated further empirical research endeavors into the introspective and subjective phenomena of consciousness (Danielian, 2010). It is important to note that the unique distinctive in the study of consciousness that differs from conceptually identifying the physiological domains of cerebral architecture is the need to correlate introspective phenomenological reports of information processing with specific neural substrates of the brain. Hence, cognitive neuroscience and the pursuit of comprehending the nature and range of consciousness based upon ontologically subjective reports require valid empirical explanations among the greater scientific community today. The requirement that science be objective does not prevent us from getting an epistemologically objective science of a domain that is ontologically subjective (Searle, 1998, p. 1937). Consequently, research on brain hemispheric specialization has demonstrated the essential interactive and correlating effects of the mind and brain (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). Numerous studies have indicated the left hemisphere processes information sequentially as a conscious serial processing system, and the right hemisphere involving the affective mind recognizes non-linear realities in an unconscious parallel processing system (Danielian, 2010). When these two hemispheres process information synergistically, the result is a creative and expanded range of psychological integration and consciousness within the mind, based upon the brains neuroplasticity of wiring and rewiring neural firing patterns within respective cortical regions. Split brain patients present a unique opportunity to test the reactions of each hemisphere in callosotomy patients to determine the role each plays in cognition and consciousness. Carlson (2013) suggests that studies on individuals who underwent callosotomy (commissurotomy) or a split-brain surgical procedure, often performed on patients for alleviation of intractable epilepsy, indicate that unless cognitive information processing of an object is operationalized in the left hemisphere, understood as central to language acquisition and verbal recognition, the individual is no longer conscious of the object. Carlsons (2013) conclusions are supported by other studies using self-face recognition among callosotomy patients as an indicator of self awareness and consciousness. Subsequent research indicated that the left hemisphere has an enhanced ability to recognize self-face photographs, while the right hemisphere indicated a bias towards recognizing morphed faces of a familiar other (Turk et al., 2002). These findings further support the conclusion that self awareness, as indicated by self recognition of an object, indicates a comprehensive sense of self and consciousness maintained through neural substrate activations independent of interhemispheric communication. 2. Locate and read an article from the Capella Library related to one or more phenomena through which biopsychologists explore self-awareness (for example, blindsight, unilateral neglect, or the behavioral effects of split-brain surgery), then address the following: Summarize the research

article that you found. Did the research described in this article advance your understanding of human consciousness? Why or why not? In a recent research study with a 26 year old collosotomy patient, it was suggested that self face recognition is an indicator of self awareness and consciousness (Keenan et al., 2003). The patient was tested using a morphed self-face stimuli and it was assumed that a contralateral association exists between the left hand and right hemisphere processing and hence responses with the right hand reflect left hemisphere processing. Two morphed series of the patients face were superimposed into a photo of a famous person and a second morphed series was created using a person familiar to the patient. The patient was instructed to identify through hand pointing, the morphs that contained his own face and the familiar face. Using an ANOVA statistical procedure with reasonable statistical power (medium effect size, 2 = .03, = .05, p < .05), the results indicated that the patient made more truepositive and fewer Type I errors (false-positive) when responding with the left hand to the question: Does this image contain portions of your face? (Keenan et al., 2003). These findings contradict research indicated above that the left hemisphere is imperative to self awareness and consciousness of an object. It suggests that the right hemisphere is more sensitive to self recognition, a presumed indicator of self awareness. To complement the conclusions of these opposing research studies, Uddin, L. (2011) documents another study to revisit the methodologies of the above studies. Using signal detection of selffaces, the study showed that both hemispheres were statistically significant and concluded that self-face recognition is not restricted to a particular hemisphere. In conclusion, the above studies indicate that each hemisphere exhibits varying degrees of selfface recognition and therefore self awareness and consciousness. Thus, these studies further accentuate cognitive conceptualizations that neural networks within specific brain hemispheres are involved in creating and maintaining conscious perception and self awareness. Information is encoded in the firing patterns of active neural populations and immediately accessible to influence other neural-cognitive systems. Moreover, the ability to maintain these representations in an active state for an extended period of time even in the absence of stimulation involves consciousness. Anthony Rhodes General Psychology PhD. References Carlson, N. R. (2013). Physiology of behavior (11th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN: 9780205239399.

Danielian, J. (2010). Andrew tershakovec: The mind: The power that changed the planet. American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70(1), 100-104. doi:10.1057/ajp.2009.31. Retrieved October 10, 2012 from http://search.proquest.com.library.capella.edu/psychology/docview/807478254/136296807A04C 45AA33/4?accountid=27965 Keenan, Julian Paul; Wheeler, Mark; Platek, Steven M.; Lardi, Gina; Lassonde, Maryse. (2003). Self-face processing in collostomy patient. European Journal of Neuroscience. 18(8), p. 2391. doi: 10.1046/j.1460-9568.2003.02958.x. Retrieved October 10, 2012 from http://web.ebscohost.com.library.capella.edu/ehost/results?sid=e5d7d447-2009-43e7-b5e48de40274db4d%40sessionmgr113&vid=4&hid=122&bquery=JN+%22European+Journal+of+N euroscience%22+AND+DT+20031015&bdata=JmRiPWFwaCZ0eXBlPTEmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1s aXZlJnNjb3BlPXNpdGU%3d Searle, J. R. (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 353:1935-1942. Schultz, D. P. & Schultz, S. E. (2008). A history of modern psychology (9th ed.). Belmont: CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. ISBN: 9780495097990. Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2012). Cognitive psychology (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. ISBN 9781133313915. Turk, D. J., Heatherton, T. F., Kelley, W. M., Funnell, M. G., Gazzaniga, M. S., & Macrae, C. N. (2002). Mike or me? self-recognition in a split-brain patient. Nature Neuroscience, 5(9), 841-2. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn907. Retrieved October, 10, 2012 from http://search.proquest.com.library.capella.edu/docview/274768915/139B33F12BC746CA32D/13 ?accountid=27965 Uddin, L. (2011). Brain connectivity and the self: The case of cerebral disconnection. Consciousness and Cognition. 20(1), 94-98. Retrieved October 10, 2012 from http://www.sciencedirect.com.library.capella.edu/science/article/pii/S1053810010001753

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