Razon v. Tagitis G.R. No. 182498 03 December 2009 PONENTE: Brion, J.

PARTIES: : l pp n t on l ol ; ol up r nt n nt r m n l nv st t on n t t on roup (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP 2. RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-inFact 1. NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text m ss to t l tt rs M n l -based s r t ry w o v s Kunnon to s mply w t or t s r turn n ov mb r 4 2007 Kunnon n Mu mm b uln z r M tl pro ssor o Musl m stu s n t s llow stu nt ouns lor t t B r port t s s pp r n to t olo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as p t t on rs w t t ourt o pp ls nt s m y t mm t ly ssu t Wr t o mp ro n s t the case for hearing on January 7, 2008. n M r 7 2008 t ssu ts s on on rm n t t t s pp r n o t s w s n n or s pp r n un r t nt t ons l r t on on t rot t on o ll rsons rom n or Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. PERTINENT ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in st t n t t r t n or tu l v ol t on o v t ms r ts s n sp ns bl n n mp ro p t t on 2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.

3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ. ANSWERS: 1. No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause o t on s ow n v ol t on o t v t ms r ts to l l b rty n s ur ty t rou t t or pr v t p rty t on 2. Yes. 3. No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every t l n st t n t t r t n or tu l v ol t on o v t ms r ts s n ny ot r n t tory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the r umst n s w l pr s nt n us o t on s ow n v ol t on o t v t ms rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present. 2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place un r r umst n s s ow n v ol t on o t v t ms onst tut on l r ts to l l b rty or s ur ty n t lur o n the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the v t ms onst tut on l r ts to l l b rty or s ur ty n t lur on t p rt o t nv st t n ut or t s to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a r son bl m n m t pt s qu t to support on lus on st tut prov s t t t rul s o v n pr v l n n ourts o l w n qu ty s ll not b ontroll n obv ous purpos o t s n similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a

desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story. 3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against v ol t ons or t r ts o v ol t on nst t r ts to l l b rty n s ur ty t mbo s s r m y t ourts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate. The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The Amparo Rule xpr ssly prov s t t t wr t s ll ov r xtr l l k ll n s n n or s pp r n s or t r ts t r o W not t t lt ou t wr t sp lly ov rs n or s pp r n s t s on pt s n t r n nor p n l z nt s jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the ountrys onst tut on l s m n pow r stru tur e. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional m n t to promul t rul s on rn n t prot t on n n or m nt o onst tut on l r ts pl n pr t n pro ur n ll ourts s n xtr ju l k ll n s n n or s pp r n s by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Cour ts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial

intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms: 1. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; 2. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; 3. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued; 4. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court; 5. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to s los n orm t on known to m n to s ss ts n r l t on w t t n or ed disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; 6. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action; 7. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision; 8. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision; The abovementioned directives and thos o t ourt o pp ls m pursu nt to t s s on w r v n to n were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the aforementioned directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICOARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.\MORAN,C.J.: (1949)\Nature: En Banc Decision Doctrine: Rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Facts: - A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act establishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. - Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and l to s r s ut s s su omm n p rm tt n t m to omm t brut l tro t s n ot r crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war". - Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA.- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and Port. - Kuro s r um nts w r : 1 o s ll l on t roun t t t v ol t s not only t prov s ons o our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a s n tory to t rst n s n t s on only n 1947 n t r or s r w t r m not b s on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty. Issues/Held: (1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our laws.] (2) WON rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.] (3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case?[Yes, they can.] Ratio: (1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence

established by the United Nation, all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68. (2) Rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. (3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS267 SCRA 408 FACTS: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation raised their case regarding the sale of the Manila Hotel in a Special Civil Action of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner argued that the sale of the hotel should be awarded to them in pursuant to the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. The highest bidder during that time is Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator. The 2 bid for the same number of shares however it was the Malaysian firm who bid 2.42PHP higher than the petitioner at 44PHP. While the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder is still pending, the petitioner matched the bid at 44PHP per share and sent a m n rs k ssu by ltrust B nk or33 M ll on p sos spon nt r us to pt t p t t on rs o r The respondents argued that sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is not self executing and requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Such paragraph states: n t r nt o r ts pr v l s n concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified F l p nos ISSUES: Whether or not sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self executing W t r or not t p t t on r s of the Constitution. RULING: The court ruled that Art II of the Constitution is generally not self executing. However, if a provision is complete in it self and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self executing. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self executing. Sec 10 par 2 Art XII of the Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. or n to t 1986 onst tut on l omm ss on pro n s t t rm qu l F l p no also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. The court further highlighted the exchange of views during the sessions of the Constitutional Commission when framers explicitly provided that a qualified Filipino enterprise shall be given preference over a foreigner even if such foreigner is more qualified in some aspects. The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question. MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES ANDCONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ANDPATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." F l p no ontroll orpor t on s lso ov r by t t rm qu l F l p nos

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference? MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously. MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred? MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes." MR. FOZ. Thank you, Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the socalled "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . . The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former." Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. The Court instructed GSIS to accept the bid offered by Manila Prince Hotel to purchase The Manila Hotel Corporation at 44PHP per share and to execute the necessary clearances and acts as may be necessary for the purpose of the sale.

MINISTERIO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13,1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was mended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation. In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647Bof the Banilad estate described in the Survey planRS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit correct? HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court t t t low r ourts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

TAADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL. Petition for Certiorari & Preliminary Injunction FACTS: On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Taada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Taada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Taada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion. ISSUES: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate HELD: 1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers. 2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Taada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Taada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO PUNO;

FACTS - Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over - May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term. - Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. - Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson - The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation - The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson. - Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada. - Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern - Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation - Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well. - But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.") - November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to the Senate. - Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding. - Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started. - Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000. - Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more bombshells were exploded. > Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. > Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2 envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." > In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II" - January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued - Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines. > Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves Malacaang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. > He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel. - Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA.
nd

- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176 - Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus offictio. - Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate. - Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.

ISSUES 1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2. WON the petitioner resigned as president 3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president 4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity) 5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD 1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at those provisions too.) 2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8) 3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of powers.) 4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.) 5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14 President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
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De Castro v. JBC FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. 4. W/N the petitioners have legal standing? W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING: 1. Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. 2. There is a justiciable issue We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or

to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

3. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

4. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.