ESTATE OF HEMADY v LUZON SURETY CO., INC. No.

L-8437, 28 November 1956 100 Phil 388 Article 774 provides that by succession, the properties, rights and obligations of a deceased person are transmitted through his death to his heirs either by his will or by operation of law. Hemady holds that the contingent liabilities of the decedent are part of the obligations transmitted by his death to his heirs. Accordingly, contingent claims against the estate of a deceased person arising from the decedent's contractual undertakings under various indemnity agreements executed in favor of various persons and entities are money claims which may be proved against his estate and/or heirs. These contingent claims may be proved during settlement proceedings by an indemnified surety even if in the meantime, no actual liability on the part of an indemnified surety has arisen by reason of actual payment made under the suretyship agreement. Accordingly, Hemady holds that the contingent obligations of a deceased person arising from his personal guaranty are not extinguished by his death. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v ALMEIDA G.R. No. 162784, 22 June 2007 525 SCRA 383 An affidavit made a certain disposition of property which is to take effect upon the death of the affiant. This case holds that such an affidavit is in the nature of a will and that therefore, the transmission of the property and/or rights pertaining thereto is not in the nature of an assignment. The mode of acquisition is succession. However, Chief Justice Puno also insisted that whatever property, rights and obligations which a deceased person may leave behind, the same should go to his or her estate for eventual distribution to the heirs, either by will or by intestacy. This statement is prone to misinterpretation because in Article 777, the rights to succession are transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. Therefore, ownership of the inheritance is automatically and immediately transferred to the heirs. Any proceeding to settle the estate is in the nature of an administrative formality in order to ensure the payment of liabilities, the proper identification of the heirs, and the correct allocation of hereditary shares. Note that in Speed Distributing Corporation v Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 149351, 17 March 2004 (425 SCRA691)], Justice Calleja, speaking for the Court, ruled that The general rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are call upon to succeed by operation of law to the inheritance without the need of further proceedings. Note too, that in this case, Chief Justice Puno recognized explicitly that not only property and rights are transmitted to the heirs under the law; it includes the obligations that are not extinguished by the death of the decedent. Compare this statement to the ponencia of Justice Brion in Reyes v RTC Branch 142 Makati where he said: This interest (referring to the co-ownership of the heirs over the undivided corporate shares), at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after payment of the decedents debts; whether there will be residue remains to be seen.

The final outcome of this case is predictable. The Supreme Court considered the affidavit as a will. As such, it should comply with the formal requisites prescribed in Articles 804, 805, and 806 of the Civil Code. With only 2 attesting witnesses and in the absence of an attestation clause, the affidavit, most certainly, will be denied probate and the estate of Margarita Herrera shall be distributed under the rules of intestacy. NAZARENO v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000 343 SCRA 637 The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. It therefore has a right to recover property belonging to it that were improperly disposed. PACIO v BILLON No. L-15088, 31 January 1961 1 SCRA 384 Properties not validly conveyed by a person during his lifetime will form part of his estate upon his demise. Pacio holds that a parcel of land which was not validly donated (propter nuptias) by the husband to the wife did not leave his patrimony, and therefore formed part of his inheritance upon his demise. USON v DEL ROSARIO, et al. No. L-4693, 29 January 1953 92 Phil 530 Article 777 provides that the right to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Accordingly, Uson holds that the inheritance pertains to the heirs from the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to the heirs a deed for the same before his death. This transmission takes place by operation of law. BONILLA v BARCENA No. L-41715, 18 June 1976 71 SCRA 491 The transmission of the hereditary estate from the decedent to the heirs takes place from the moment of the death of the decedent. A prior judicial declaration of heirship is not necessary to perfect the transmission. Bonilla holds that claims to or rights over property which were initiated by the decedent during his lifetime by appropriate court proceedings are not extinguished by his death. These claims or rights over property are transmitted to his heirs upon his death. BUTTE v MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. No. L-15499, 18 February 1962 4 SCRA 526 The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code is property. Thus, where a decedent dies without having exercised a right of redemption (and provided it has not expired), the said right shall be transmitted to his heirs upon his death. In this event, the right of redemption is part of the inheritance. However, where the right of redemption was acquired after the death of the decedent, the same pertains to the heirs directly in their individual capacities, and not derivatively from the decedent. Butte makes a clear distinction as to when the right of redemption is part of the hereditary estate, and when it is not. Accordingly, Butte clarifies the issue as to who may exercise the
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right of redemption. While there is no dispute that the decision arrived at is correct, the matter of tender of the redemption price and the fact of its judicial consignation invite further scrutiny. Was the tender of PNB cashier's check to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. a valid and proper tender of payment? Was Angela Butte required under the law to make a judicial consignation of the redemption price when Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. refused to accept the same? It would seem that the estate of Jose V. Ramirez was insolvent. If indeed it could be proved that the claims of the creditors far exceed the value of the assets, then none of the heirs would receive any part of the inheritance, as the same shall be liquidated to pay the creditors. In this eventuality, can any of the Ramirez heirs claim the right of redemption? The motives of Angela Butte might also be looked into. Why was she eager to redeem the share sold by Garnier to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.? What is the immediate effect of her having redeemed the share sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.? DE BORJA v VDA. DE BORJA No. L-28040, 18 August 1972 46 SCRA 577 The right to the inheritance is transferred to the heirs precisely at the moment of the death of the decedent. From such time, the heirs are deemed to be the owners of the same. De Borja confirms that from the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs begin to enjoy all the attributes of ownership, including the right to dispose (jus disponendi). De Borja holds that the pendency of the probate proceeding is no bar to the exercise of such proprietary rights, since ownership over the hereditary estate has vested in the heirs from the time of the death of the testator. De Borja must be distinguished from the prohibition against disposicion captatoria in Article 875 of the Civil Code. Likewise, it must be reconciled with the provision of Article 784 which states that the making of a will is a strictly personal act of the testator. GO ONG v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-75884, 24 September 1987 154 SCRA 270 Go Ong adds another dimension to the transmission of the hereditary estate from the decedent to the heirs. An heir may encumber his share in the estate during settlement proceedings, even without prior approval of the court. Go Ong holds that the substantive rights of the heir cannot be impaired by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Also, Go Ong holds that pending settlement proceeding, the half share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal estate is freely alienable by said surviving spouse. LEE v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BR. 85 G. R. No. 146006, 23 February 2004 423 SCRA 497 Lee gives another dimension to the right of an heir to dispose properties forming part of the inheritance, pending judicial settlement proceedings. In this case, the dispositions made by the two heirs relate to

specific properties which have not been finally adjudicated by the intestate court. There were also claims made by 5 illegitimate children which have not been acted upon. But more importantly, in this case the legitimate family executed a deed of extra judicial partition, to the exclusion of the illegitimate children, pursuant to which they divided the estate of the decedent amongst themselves. And this deed of extra judicial partition was executed while the intestate proceedings remain pending in court. The decision in Lee is consistent with the law. However, Court omitted to state a very important reason why no heir can sell any specific property of the estate prior to the final settlement of the estate without court approval. The reason is that prior to the partition of the estate among the heirs, all of the heirs are co-owners of the inheritance, each having an ideal or pro indiviso share therein. This co-ownership prevents any heir from alienating a specific property without court approval, because all other co-heirs have an interest in each of the specific property of the estate. It is only upon the partition of the estate that each of the heirs may probably acquire absolute title to specific properties. One wonders if the Court could have allowed the sale in Lee, but subject to the outcome of partition. After all, the hereditary estate is transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the transmission of the estate to the heirs prior to partition is a transmission of aliquot shares, not a transmission of specific property. Thus, where an heir disposes a specific property for his own benefit, such disposition unjustly deprives the other co-heirs of their undivided interest in the thing alienated. Note too the tactical move of Jose Ortaez in seeking the removal of the Special Administratrix Enderes, his illegitimate halfsister. By disposing the shares over which Enderes as administration, he claimed that the appointment has become moot and academic. But the precise reason why such administration became irrelevant was his own unauthorized and surreptitious act of disposing the property subject of administration without court approval. Such machination constitutes a contemptuous act as it sought to indirectly frustrate the courts directive to put Special Administratrix Enderes in charge of the Philinterlife shares. HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS AND ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. v LINA G.R. No. 141634, 5 February 2001 351 SCRA 183 In this case, Justice Panganiban correctly classified the transaction between Buyer and Seller as a conditional sale, thereby correcting the CAs findings that the transaction was a contract to sell. Justice Panganiban correctly distinguished between a contract to sell (wherein the transaction is subject to the positive suspensive condition that the buyer will deliver the purchase price) from a conditional sale (wherein the obligation of the seller to execute the deed of sale is conditioned upon the procurement of the approval of the intestate court). Thus, when the intestate court approved the sale of the property, the condition of the sale was fulfilled and the Seller and the Buyer are obligated to perform their respective obligations under the contract. As to the scope of the property that must be sold, Justice Panganiban correctly ruled that the sale can only cover the undivided
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interest of Eliodoro to the extent of his conjugal share, and his 1/10 share as an intestate heir of Remedios. Therefore, the obligation of the Administrator is to sell to Alex A. Lina + 1/10 of the property or 3/5 thereof undivided share. The Court reiterates the basic rule that an heir may sell his ideal share of the inheritance. Court approval is not necessary before the heir could sell. Judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive right of the heir to dispose his own pro indiviso share in the co-heirship or co-ownership. As to the sale of the entire property to the buyer, Justice Panganiban correctly ruled that the pro-indiviso shares of the non-selling heirs should be excluded from the sale. Hence the transaction between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and Alex Lina cannot extend beyond Eliodoros undivided interest in the property. REGANON v IMPERIAL No. L-24434, 17 January 1968 22 SCRA 80 The undivided share of an heir in the inheritance may be levied upon and/or garnished by an unpaid creditor in order to satisfy a judgment debt of the said heir. The fact that the hereditary estate has not been divided among the heirs is of no consequence, particularly if heirship is not disputed and the estate is not burdened by any debt. This is a necessary consequence of the automatic transmission of ownership under Article 777. It was argued that the property comprising the hereditary estate was in custodia legis and therefore could not be levied upon, garnished, or be subject to execution. It must be noted that since the guardianship proceeding terminated ipso facto upon the demise of the ward, and that the ownership of the same transferred to the heirs from the moment of such death, the argument was devoid of merit. It must be borne in mind, however, that prior to the final distribution of the hereditary estate among the heirs, an unpaid creditor may not attach or garnish a specific property forming part of the estate. The attachment or garnishment must refer to the hereditary share of the debtor-heir. And in any event, the attachment or garnishment will be effective as regards the properties which may eventually be allocated to the debtor-heir pursuant to partition. SALVADOR v STA. MARIA No. L-25952, 30 June 1967 20 SCRA 603 While the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent, Salvador holds that the right of an heir to his distributive share thereto is not determinable until all the estate liabilities have been paid. Until then, the right of an heir to his share is not demandable, and is subject to the existence of a residue after the payment of debts. Salvador further holds that the proceeds of the sale of a property forming part of the estate, likewise forms part of the estate. It must be noted that the reconveyance court had jurisdiction over the determination of ownership of the parcels of land subject matter

of the case. Issues of ownership are beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. However, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the disposition of any property pertaining to the estate, as well as the distribution of the shares of the instituted heirs. In this case, three things are interesting as they are puzzling. First, of the twenty-three (23) instituted heirs in the will, nine (9) were not among the so-called heirs of Salvador who were substituted in the reconveyance case. Of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted for Salvador, seven (7) were not instituted in the will. Therefore, there were fourteen (14) instituted heirs who were also named as substitutes in the reconveyance case. It would therefore seem that everyone knew what was going on. Second, the reconveyance case as well as the probate proceedings were then being heard in two different branches of the same court. The reconveyance court must have known that probate proceedings involving the same properties were pending before another branch of the same court. Third, what led the Court of Appeals to order the reconveyance of the properties to the substituted heirs? The Court of Appeals virtually pre-empted the probate court in the task of determining who the heirs of Celestino Salvador were. In addition, the judgment of the Court of Appeals could result in a situation were the properties of the deceased would be transferred to the heirs even before the debts of the estate are paid, or before tax obligations are fully settled. RAMIREZ v BALTAZAR No. L-25049, 30 August 1968 24 SCRA 918 While it is true that heirs inherit from the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs are, pending judicial confirmation of heirship, precluded from commencing an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. The rule is necessary for an orderly administration of the estate of the deceased person. Therefore, as a rule the power to commence suit in behalf of the estate is generally given only to the administrator. However, where the administrator fails or refuses to act, or cannot be expected to act in a particular circumstance, then by way of an exception to the rule, the heirs may commence the necessary action even if in the meantime, their heirship has not been judicially confirmed. In general, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The right to commence suit is not, however, one of those rights granted to the heirs, pending judicial confirmation of heirship. What is the justification for denying an heir the right to commence legal action before judicial confirmation of heirship? The very patent conflict of interest demonstrated in this case must be noted. PUNO v PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC. G.R. No. 177066, 11 September 2009 599 SCRA 585 Notwithstanding Article 777, an alleged heir of a deceased stockholder does not, upon the demise of the stockholder, automatically become a stockholder of the corporation. REYES v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI BR. 142 G.R. No. 165744, 11 August 2008 561 SCRA 593 Further to Puno v Puno Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court in this case clarified the relationship between the corporation, on the one
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hand, and the heirs of a deceased stockholder, on the other. While the ruling in relation to Section 63 of the Corporation Code seems to be correct, the dictum of the court in relation to the opening of succession under Article 777 of the Civil Code, and the consequences thereof, appear to be debatable. In addition, the ruling of the Supreme Court in relation to the acquisition or vesting of title to the estate of the deceased person in favor of the latters heirs is clearly in conflict with the statutory definition of the term inheritance in Article 776 of the Civil Code. Finally, the statement of the Court to the effect that the undivided interest of the co-heirs, in relation to the shares forming part of the estate of the deceased person, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings is rather disturbing as it clearly runs against the explicit dictum of Article 777. See the ruling in Santos v Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408, supra. SANTOS v LUMBAO G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007 519 SCRA 408 Santos explains in very specific terms the rights of the coheirs, as co-owners of the estate of a deceased person. The decision specifically refers to a parcel of land which, upon the death of the decedent, passed in co-ownership to her children. The dictum in this case should be compared to the ponencia of Justice Brion in Reyes v Regional Trial Court of Makati, infra, where he stated: In the present case, each of Anastacias heirs holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. You will note that Rita, in this case, validly sold to the Spouses Lumbao a portion (107 square meters) of her undivided share in the property (467 square meters in the aggregate) even while the property still stood in the name of her mother Maria from whom She (Rita) inherited the same. This ruling contradicts Justice Brions opinion that pending the settlement proceedings, the undivided rights of co-heirs to the inheritance is at best inchoate; for if such rights were inchoate, Rita would not have been able to sell a portion of her undivided share to the Spouses Lumbao. At best, Rita would have been able to sell a mere expectancy. The question now is: which decision is correct? BLAS v SANTOS No. L-14070, 29 March 1961 1 SCRA 899 Article 776 of the Civil Code defines the inheritance of a person. Article 1347 of the same Code prohibits any contract involving future inheritance. Blas interprets the meaning of Article 1347 in connection with Article 776. DIZON-RIVERA v DIZON No. L-24561, 30 June 1970 33 SCRA 554 The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each

compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises. The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886. VDA. DE VILLAFLOR v JUICO No. L-15737, 28 February 1962 4 SCRA 550 The following decision illustrates the application of the rule that the language of a will must be interpreted in such a way that every expression therein must be given some effect. Therefore, an interpretation which suppresses a provision cannot be adopted if there is another way of construing the said dispositions. BELLIS v BELLIS No. L-23678, 6 June 1967 20 SCRA 358 The formal validity of a will depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time of execution. On the other hand, the substantive validity of the dispositions therein is governed by the laws in force at the time of the death of the testator. DE GUZMAN v INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ G.R. Nos. 61167-68, 20 January 1989 169 SCRA 284 De Guzman does not definitively settle the issue of testamentary capacity insofar as it involves soundness of mind. However, the medical record of the testator should be noted as it influenced to a great extent the factual findings of the probate court and the affirmance of such findings by the Court of Appeals. LEE v TAMBAGO A.C. No. 5281, 12 February 2008 544 SCRA 393 Lee explains the reason for the stringent formalities prescribed by law in the making of a notarial will. It is disturbing that in this decision, the court ruled that the non-notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses and/or the use of the testators expired residence certificate are sufficient to invalidate a will. SUROZA v HONRADO Adm. Matter No. 2026-CFI, 19 December 1981 110 SCRA 388 Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or
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dialect known to the testator. In this case, the testatrix was proved to be illiterate. However, her alleged notarial will was written in English, which in the opening paragraph of the will, was supposedly a language known to her. The contradiction in the concluding paragraph of the will clearly indicated the nullity of the purported will. The procedural lapses of the counsel for oppositor must likewise be noted. Considering that the Supreme Court confirmed the nullity of the will, did such fact entitle the intestate heirs of the testatrix to the property devised under the void will? REYES v VDA. DE VIDAL No. L-2867, 21 April 1952 2 SCUD 53 Every will must be executed in a language known to the testator. While this requirement is mandatory and, as a rule, must be proved during probate proceedings, a failure to introduce evidence in this respect does not necessarily justify the denial of probate. Under certain conditions, knowledge of the language in which the will was written may be presumed. In this case, the probative value of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses must be noted, particularly when such testimony is sought to be controverted by the testimony of an expert witness. BALONAN v ABELLANA, ET AL. No. L-15153, 31 August 1960 109 Phil 359 Article 805 of the Civil Code prescribes the manner in which the will must be signed by the testator; i.e., "subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Balonan confirms that this requirement is mandatory, and that a failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect. It is not important that the person to whom the function of writing the testator's name indicates or writes his own name. But it is imperative that this individual should write the name of the testator. Balonan gives two alternate ways of complying with the statutory requirement. GARCIA v LACUESTA No. L-4067, 29 November 1951 90 Phil 489 Where it appears that the testator caused another person to write his name in the will, such fact must be stated in the attestation clause. A failure to make such a recital is a fatal defect. That the testator affixed the sign of the cross after his name written by another person is not sufficient indication that the testator in fact signed the will, absent a clear showing that the sign of the cross is the customary signature of the testator, or at the very least, one of the ways by which the testator signed his name. NERA v RIMANDO No. 5971, 27 February 1911 18 Phil 450 Article 805 requires that the will must be signed by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of one another. Nera provides

the test of presence. It is not essential that the testator and the witnesses should look at the paper purporting to be the will of the testator at the time each of them affix their signatures. It is sufficient that each of them be physically present at the place where execution will take place and that they be in such position with respect to each one, that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction, they would have been able to see each one affix his signature on the will without any physical obstruction. Is it enough, therefore, that the testator and each of the witnesses be able to see each of them sign the will without physical obstruction - even if there is lack of understanding as to the nature of the document being executed? TABOADA v ROSAL No. L-35033, 5 November 1982 118 SCRA 195 Article 805 requires that the testator should sign at the end of the will. This requirement does not apply to the subscribing witnesses, who may sign in any other part of each page of the will. The duty of the witnesses to subscribe is substantially complied with by any such signature. The failure of the attestation clause to indicate the number of pages upon which the will is written is, as a rule, a fatal defect. However, where the notarial acknowledgement does indicate the number of pages of the will, and the same conforms to an actual count of the pages, the deficiency is cured. A reference to Article 809, in this regard, is appropriate. ICASIANO v ICASIANO No. L-18979, 30 June 1964 11 SCRA 422 Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses should sign each and every page of the will on the left margin. This requirement is, as a rule, mandatory and a failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect. Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one of the pages of the will through inadvertence or oversight (there being no bad faith or fraudulent intent) can be cured by the presentation of a carbon duplicate of the will which contains all the required signatures. This ruling is based on the principle of liberal interpretation of the statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the will is not compromised. It is important, for the proper understanding of this case, to differentiate a duplicate copy of a document from a duplicate-original thereof. CAGRO v CAGRO No. L-5826, 29 April 1953 92 Phil 1032 The attestation clause must be signed by the witnesses at the bottom thereof. If the signatures of the attesting witnesses are affixed on the left margin, or in any other place, the attestation clause would be fatally defective, resulting in the nullity of the will. The opinion of the majority of the Court in this case is diametrically opposed to its opinion in the case of Abangan v Abangan. The technical difference between the factual bases of the two cases should be examined. In any event, Cagro is not a unanimous decision. LOPEZ v LIBORO No. L-1787, 27 August 1948 81 Phil 429
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Article 805 requires that every page of the will be numbered correlatively in letters. The failure to affix the page number on the first page is not necessarily a fatal defect. The pagination requirement admits of a liberal interpretation, particularly if the purpose of the law has been satisfied. In addition, the will need not state that the language used therein is known to the testator. Knowledge by the testator of the language used in the will may be proved by extrinsic evidence, and, may, under certain conditions, even be inferred by the probate court. SAMANIEGO-CELADA v ABENA G. R. No. 145545, 30 June 2008 556 SCRA 569 Samaniego holds that an error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the will. AZUELA v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006 487 SCRA 119 Of note is the decision of the RTC which admitted the will to probate notwithstanding the defects thereof (no signature of witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, no signature of the testator on the left margin of the second page of the will, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used upon which the will was written, and the lack of acknowledgment). As to the missing signature of the witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, the RTC ignore the ruling in Cagro v Cagro (although arguably the ruling in Cagro has a very strong dissenting opinion). As regards the missing number of pages in the attestation clause the RTC invoked the doctrine of liberal interpretation but conveniently ignored the conditions laid down in the case of Rodelas. As regards the missing acknowledgement, the RTC ignored the ruling in Carcia v Gatchalian. It can well be said that the decision of the RTC is one for the books. This case also highlights the fundamental difference between a jurat and an acknowledgment, and based on the distinction, the Court held that a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public. VDA. DE RAMOS v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-40804, 31 January 1978 81 SCRA 393 The law requires at least three attesting witnesses to a notarial will. The witnesses shall be called upon, during probate, to recount the incidents which occurred thereat. To a large extent, admission to or denial of probate depends on the testimony of these instrumental witnesses. However, if contrary to expectation, these witnesses, or some of them, should testify against the formal validity of the will, the proponent of the will may use other evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish compliance with the formalities prescribed by law. A will is not necessarily void because the witnesses declared against its validity. CRUZ v VILLASOR No. L-32213, 26 November 1973 54 SCRA 31 Article 806 requires that the testator and the three witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. Cruz involves a

situation where one of the three witnesses to the will was the same person who notarized the same. By reason thereof, the Supreme Court disallowed the will for the reasons stated hereunder. While the proponent of the will relied on American decisions which permit a notary public to be a witness to an instrument notarized by him, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the foregoing decisions to the case at bar. It would seem that the strongest argument against the proponent is the fact that the witnesses themselves are required by law to acknowledge the document. For which reason, it is obvious that a witness cannot simultaneously be the notary public before whom the will shall be acknowledged. A different result may be expected if the witnesses were not required by law to acknowledge the document. It is equally important to note the ethical problem which may arise if the acknowledging witness were the same person who would notarize the document. GUERRERO V BIHIS G.R. No. 174144, 17 April 2007 521 SCRA 394 Guerrero defines acknowledgment and the competent officer before whom it should be made in the execution of a notarial will. The case further explains the reason for the requirement of Art. 806 and the function of the acknowledgment. Guerrero holds that a notarial will acknowledged before a notary public outside of the latters territorial jurisdiction is void. Effectively, the will is not acknowledged as required by Art. 806. GABUCAN v MANTA No. L-51546, 28 January 1980 95 SCRA 752 Incompetence takes various forms. The foregoing case is classic in a very special way as it resulted not only in a waste of time but also of taxpayers' money. The non-attachment of DST does not invalidate a will. GARCIA v VASQUEZ No. L-26884, 30 April 1970 32 SCRA 490 Article 808 of the Civil Code prescribes an additional formality in the case of a blind testator. Garcia holds that if a testator's vision does not permit him to read the document, even if he can see distant object, the testator is deemed blind for the purpose of requiring the observance of the additional formality prescribed in Article 808. Justice Reyes opined that if the testator is blind or incapable of reading the will (as when he is illiterate) the requirement of reading must be complied with in order to enable the testator to object to provisions which are not in accordance with his wishes. While the opinion seems reasonable, Article 808 makes specific reference to a blind person. An illiterate person with good vision was not mentioned in the law. There is serious doubt, therefore, if the provision of Article 808 is applicable to an illiterate testator. ALVARADO v GAVIOLA, JR. G.R. No. 74695, 14 September 1993 226 SCRA 347 This is the second instance where the Court had occasion to
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discuss the meaning of the term "blind testator." Alvarado confirms that a person unable to read the draft of his will, either because of poor, defective or blurred eyesight must be considered blind for the purpose of compliance with the additional formalities prescribed in Article 808. In addition, the Court confirms that inability to read by reason of illiteracy is included within the broader concept of "blindness" for the purpose of the same article. However, Alvarado makes a landmark exception to the rule of strict compliance when it affirmed the probate order despite noncompliance with the double reading requirement. How this decision will affect the courts interpretation of the other formal requirements of the law remains to be seen. GIL v MURCIANO No. L-3362, 1 March 1951 88 Phil 260 Article 809 enunciates the doctrine of liberal interpretation. Accordingly, in the absence of bad faith, forgery, fraud or undue and improper influence and pressure, defects or imperfections in the form of attestation clause or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid, if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with the requisites of law. Gil involves an attestation clause which omitted to state that the testator signed the will in the presence of the witnesses. Such fact was, however, stated by the testator in the body of the will. There is no question as to the genuineness of the will, as even the opponents concede that issue. It is most unfortunate that there was a sharp division in the court. In the original decision, six voted for its nullity and five for its validity. In resolving the motion for reconsideration, six members of the court voted for the validity of the will, five against it. Consequently, the issue remained controversial and far from having been resolved. The text below is part of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. The text of the original decision (which has been reversed) was omitted. CANEDA v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103554, 28 May 1993 222 SCRA 781 Caneda affirms the ruling in Gil v Murciano. However, the results of these two cases are divergent. Gil allowed the probate of the will, whereas Caneda disallowed the will. The factual difference between these two cases should be noted. ROXAS v DE JESUS, JR. No. L-38338, 28 January 1985 134 SCRA 245 Article 810 of the Civil Code requires, among others, that a holographic will be dated. While a complete date is generally required, an incomplete date which sets forth only the month and the year of execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be shown that there was no bad faith, fraud, and undue and improper influence and pressure. Probate is further justified if the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is proved, or otherwise admitted by the parties, and the only ground for opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an incomplete date. Roxas explains the reason for requiring a holographic will to be dated. LABRADOR V COURT OF APPEALS No. L-83843-44, 5 April 1990 184 SCRA 170 The required date which must be indicated in a holographic

will is substantially complied with if the date were incorporated as part of the body of the will. GAN v YAP No. L-12190, 30 August 1958 104 Phil 509 Article 811 prescribes the evidence required for the probate of a holographic will. Gan stresses that if the holographic will sought to be probated is lost, or otherwise cannot be presented in court, the same must be denied probate. This is so because the only guarantee of authenticity (i.e., the handwriting of the testator) is not available for scrutiny. It is equally important to take notice of footnote no. 8 of the decision, which is the basis of the ruling in the subsequent case of Rodelas v Aranza. RODELAS v ARANZA No. L-58509, 7 December 1982 119 SCRA 16 Rodelas traces its antecedents to Gan v Yap, particularly in footnote no. 8 of the latter decision. In an obiter incorporated through a footnote, the court noted in Gan that a lost holographic will might be proved through a "photographic or photostatic copy" thereof, or perhaps even through a "mimeographed or carbon copy". Accordingly, the court in Rodelas reversed the order of the lower court dismissing the petition for probate (as well as the motion for reconsideration) by reason of the proponent's inability to produce the original copy of the alleged lost holographic will. It must be noted that Rodelas did not categorically rule on the admissibility to probate of a secondary evidence of the missing holographic will. It must be noted further that the dispositive portion of the decision ended at the point where the denial of the motion for reconsideration was set aside. It would seem that the logical result of such "setting aside" of the order would be the remanding of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with the aforesaid decision. One final note: the court observed that with a photocopy of the lost or missing holographic will, the handwriting of the testator can be authenticated. This observation must be tested in the light of established principles governing the authentication of questioned documents, for it is sufficiently clear that an analysis of the handwriting of the testator based on a photocopy of the lost or missing holographic will cannot go beyond a comparison of strokes with an accepted standard. Circumstances such as speed of writing and the pressure of the handwriting cannot be tested based on a photocopy of the questioned document. What added value did Rodelas give to existing jurisprudence on the matter? AZAOLA v SINGSON No. L-14003, 5 August 1960 109 Phil 102 The case involves an interpretation of the three-witness rule required under the first paragraph of Article 811. The ruling distinguishes between the execution of a notarial will on the one hand, and the execution of a holographic will on the other. Based on the difference in the formalities required, the court inferred that the first paragraph of Article 811 is merely directory, and that to give it a
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mandatory tenor may result in legal absurdities. CODOY v CALUGAY G.R. No. 123486, 12 August 1999 312 SCRA 333 Codoy is an unusual case with an unusual decision. The bone of contention between the parties was whether or not the oppositors to the probate of a will may yet present evidence against the admission of the will, after they have unsuccessfully made a demurrer to evidence. In short, the core issue is whether the oppositors should be allowed to present controverting evidence after the demurrer was denied. As correctly ruled by the Supreme Court, the oppositors should be permitted to present their evidence. However, Codoy is a controversial decision as it held that the 3-witness rule in Article 811 of the Civil Code is a mandatory requirement in the case of contested holographic wills. Hence noncompliance therewith would be a fatal error. Azaola vs. Singson, a decision penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the requirement in Article 811 is merely directory. Justice Reyes explained in detail the reason for such conclusion. Now, with Codoy reaching a different conclusion, there is now a divisional ruling that is diametrically opposed with a prior en banc ruling. But was it absolutely necessary for Codoy to disturb Azaola? I do not think so. Codoy could have been decided purely on the procedural issue that was raised. To support the conclusion reached by the Court, it would have been sufficient to discuss the deficient evidentiary basis for the admission of the holographic will to probate. It was totally unnecessary to rule that compliance with the 3-witness requirement in Article 811 is mandatory. RIVERA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT No. L-75005-06, 15 February 1990 182 SCRA 322 Under Article 811 of the Civil Code, if the authenticity of the holographic will is contested, three witnesses are required to identify the handwriting and signature of the testator. Failing which, or if the court is not convinced, expert testimony may be resorted to. Rivera presents a critical twist to the provision of law. Oppositor challenged the authenticity of the holographic will and claimed that in fact the decedent died intestate. This would have necessitated the application of the threewitness rule, where it not for the supervening finding of the court that the oppositor is not related to and in fact a stranger with respect to the decedent. Consequently, and despite his opposition, the three-witness rule is not applicable. KALAW v RELOVA No. L-40207, 28 September 1984 132 SCRA 237 Article 814 requires the authentication of any alteration in a holographic will. The failure to authenticate such alterations results in the invalidity of the desired change. However, where the testator canceled the name of the original heir, and substituted in lieu thereof another name, without the requisite authentication, the institution of the new heir is inoperative by reason of a failure to comply with the requirement of Article 814. Should the nullity of the alteration result in the effectivity of the original disposition? The court in Kalaw ruled in the negative, stating among other things, that the intention of the testatrix has become indeterminable. Nevertheless, an examination of

the provision of Article 830 indicates clearly that "cancellation" is a mode of revocation. Can the institution of the original heir, therefore, be construed as having been expressly revoked by the cancellation of her name by the testatrix? If so, and considering that the subsequent institution of the second heir is inoperative, who inherits the estate of the deceased? AJERO V COURT OF APPEALS No. 106720, 15 September 1994 236 SCRA 488 Ajero upholds the proposition that Articles 813 and 814 do not form part of the requisites for formal or extrinsic validity of a holographic will. Thus, a failure on the part of the testator to observe the requirements of Articles 813 and 814 does not justify the disallowance of the will. However, the relevant provisions may be disallowed. The court further stresses that proof of compliance with the requirements of Articles 813 and 814 cannot ordinarily be dealt with during probate proper, because at this stage, the court's area of inquiry should, in general, be limited to the following issues: (1) whether the instrument submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. VDA. DE PEREZ v TOLETE G.R. No. 76714, 2 June 1994 232 SCRA 722 This case outlines the procedure for the reprobate of a will that was executed and probated in accordance with foreign law. DE LA CERNA v REBACA-POTOT No. L-20234, 23 December 1964 12 SCRA 576 Article 818 of the Code prohibits the execution of joint wills, whether they be for the reciprocal benefit of the testators, or for the benefit of a third person. However, it must be noted that if a probate court erroneously admitted a joint will to probate, the error thus committed would be considered an error of law and not of jurisdiction. Therefore, such an error must be corrected by appeal; failing which the erroneous decision would become final. The foregoing notwithstanding, please note that in the following case, the joint will, while deemed operative with respect to the husband, was considered void as to the wife. The issue of jurisdiction should be noted in particular. GONZALES v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-37453, 25 May 1979 90 SCRA 187 Article 805 requires the notarial will to be attested by at least three credible witnesses. Article 820 prescribes the qualifications of a witness, while Article 821 enumerates the disqualifications. Thus, an issue arises as to whether or not a witness competent under Articles 820 and 821 is necessarily credible as required by Article 805. Gonzales makes a distinction between a competent witness and a credible witness. Furthermore, Gonzales stresses that competence may be proved or inferred; whereas, credibility, which is a matter to be determined by the court, is presumed unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
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GAGO v MAMUYAC No. 26317, 29 January 1927 49 Phil 902 A will being essentially ambulatory, it may be revoked at any time by the testator at any time prior to his death. Article 830 enumerates the modes of revocation. Gago holds that a revocation of the will may be implied if the testator in his lifetime had ready access to the same, and that after his death the will cannot be found. The presumption, while disputable, may be reinforced by testimony regarding the circumstances of the alleged revocation of the will. And if the presumption of revocation should apply, a duplicate copy of the said will cannot be admitted to probate. Please note that in Gan v Yap, the Court had the occasion to opine that a lost holographic will might be proved through a photographic, photostatic, mimeographed or carbon copy thereof. And in Rodelas v Aranza, the court reversed an order of the probate court which dismissed the proceeding based solely on the fact that the original copy of the holographic will could not be presented for examination. TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA MALOTO v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-76464, 29 February 1988 158 SCRA 451 The burning of a will is one of the modes of revocation. Under Article 830, the act of destroying the document must be done by the testator himself, and if done by a third person, it must be executed pursuant to the testator's express direction and in his presence. Maloto reversed the Court of Appeals which upheld the revocation of the will on the basis of sufficient proof of animus recovandi on the part of the testator. While there are various requisites for the validity of a revocation by means of an overt act (which requisites were not discussed in Maloto), this case holds that if a third person executed the overt act of destroying the will, the same must be upon the express direction of the testator and in his presence. Both requisites must be duly proved, otherwise evidence intended to establish the due execution and the contents of the destroyed will might be admissible. If the due execution and the contents of the destroyed will is sufficiently established, the will may be admitted to probate as a will which had been invalidly revoked. RODRIGUEZ v RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 175720, 11 September 2007 642 SCRA 642 Rodriguez emphasizes the need for probate of a will, as mandated in Article 838 of the Civil Code. Without probate, the will is ineffective and does not produce legal effect. In this case, the Supreme Court recognized the testators right, during his lifetime, to sell the property which he had previously adjudicated to his heirs in his will. In this regard, the provision of Article 957 of the Civil Code is worth considering: The legacy or devise shall be without effect: x x x (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. x x x. Article 957 is one of the 7 provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code which pertains to implied revocation of a testamentary disposition. HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM v UMENGAN G.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006 510 SCRA 496

Lasam emphasizes the necessity of probate. Without which, a purported will cannot be the source of any right and could not be relied upon to establish the right to possession. Lasam further confirms the ambulatory nature of a will, such that at any time prior to his death, the testator may change or revoke it. GALLANOSA v ARCANGEL No. L-29300, 21 June 1978 83 SCRA 676 Article 838 of the Code requires probate as a condition precedent for the effectivity of a will. Probate is limited to a determination of two issues: one, the testamentary capacity of the testator; and two, the due execution of the will. Testamentary capacity has two components: first, the soundness of mind of the testator, and second, the requisite age. Due execution refers to compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. If the proponents of the will are able to prove testamentary capacity and due execution, the probate judge will forthwith issue an order admitting the will to probate. Once the probate order becomes final, the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will becomes incontestable. Res judicata will apply to any attempt to reopen and or revisit the issues of testamentary capacity and due execution. Gallanosa illustrates the inevitable result of an attempt to reopen probate proceedings long after the probate order has become final. It is important to note that the present procedural laws do not permit nor sanction the institution of an action for the "annulment" of a will. MANINANG v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-57848, 19 June 1982 114 SCRA 478 While as a rule the area of inquiry of a probate court is restricted to the twin issues of testamentary capacity and due execution, practical considerations may necessitate an inquiry into substantive validity. This is particularly true if none of the testamentary dispositions could be given effect and therefore, an inquiry into extrinsic validity would be a waste of time. Nuguid v Nuguid is squarely in point. However, while much reliance on Nuguid was made by the oppositor in Maninang, the same was not favored by the court since the nullity of the testamentary dispositions in the questioned will did not appear to be indubitable. It seems that the court sought a determination as to whether or not the oppositor was preterited or disinherited under the terms of the questioned will. However, one finer point of law must be considered. While preterition involves the omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line, the supposedly preterited heir in the foregoing case is an adopted child. It would therefore seem that the more crucial issue is the determination as to whether or not an adopted child should be considered as a compulsory heir in the direct line of the testator. The issue is significant because an adopted child may not have blood ties with the testator, and therefore whether or not such adopted child is a relative in the direct line is disputable. PASTOR, JR. v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-56340, 24 June 1983 122 SCRA 885
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Pastor is a detailed account of the jurisdiction of a probate court, particularly in the matter of liquidating the estate of a deceased person. The appropriate procedure must be noted in the light of the unusual haste in which the probate judge sought to deliver a legacy to the designated legatee. More importantly, the jurisdiction of a probate court to determine the issue of ownership must be noted. QUASHA ANCHETA PENA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE v LCN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION G.R. No. 174873, 26 August 2008 563 SCRA 426 Further to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Pastor, J. v Court of Appeals, this case explicitly permits the partial distribution of the estate of a deceased person prior to the payment of the debts, under specific conditions. JIMENEZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-75773, 17 April 1990 184 SCRA 367 The probate court, as a rule, cannot pass with finality on issues affecting ownership of property. Jimenez holds that this limitation applies also to proceedings in intestacy where an intestate court can only pass upon on issues of title on a provisional basis only. And despite a ruling of the intestate court on the matter, the parties are not barred by res judicata from instituting a separate and subsequent independent action to thresh out the matter. OZAETA v CUARTERO No. L-5597, 31 May 1956 99 Phil 1041 A will executed through undue and improper pressure of influence may be denied probate by reason of the involuntariness of its execution by the testator. However, an allegation of undue and improper pressure and influence must be substantiated by competent evidence to prove that it was indeed exerted. Mere inferences resulting from circumstances surrounding the execution of the will do not suffice to justify the denial of probate, particularly where the execution of the will was attended by respectable members of the bar. In addition, even if such undue pressure and influence were to be proved, the testator would be deemed to have ratified the contents of the will if, having been given ample opportunity to revoke the same, he did nothing until the time of this death. This is because while undue pressure and influence vitiates consent, such vitiation ceases when the undue pressure and influence ceased. Thus, if the testator did not exercise his option to revoke or alter the provisions of the will which are not consistent with his wishes, a presumption arises that he has silently ratified the same. COSO v FERNANDEZ DEZA No. 16763, 22 December 1921 42 Phil 596 Coso discusses the nature of "undue influence" which vitiates the will of the testator. Further to Ozaeta, Coso holds that mere influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will. Influence must overpower and subjugate the mind of the testator so as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. However, the interesting twist of this old case is the fact that the beneficiary accused of exercising undue influence on the testator is a mistress of the testator. Nevertheless, the Court allowed the will, including the disposition in favor of the mistress. In the case of Nepomuceno v Court of Appeals, supra, the Court invalidated a

testamentary disposition in favor of a mistress. A distinction between these two cases is therefore necessary. PASCUAL v DE LA CRUZ No. L-24819, 30 May 1969 28 SCRA 421 Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will. These twin grounds were invoked in this case. While the Court considered only the issue of improper influence and pressure, and summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally important to consider the effect of alleging undue influence and pressure simultaneously with fraud. ORTEGA v VALMONTE G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005 478 SCRA 247 Ortega discusses two issues: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in the making of the will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing mind. NEPOMUCENO v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-62952, 9 October 1985 139 SCRA 206 While the general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practical considerations may compel the probate court to pass upon matters of intrinsic validity. In particular, where a testamentary provision is void on its face, a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v Nuguid, pass upon such provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity. ROBERTS v LEONIDAS No. L-55509, 27 April 1984 129 SCRA 33 Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will may pass property. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that "it is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered the consolidation of the testate and intestate proceedings, and for the judge hearing the testate case to continue hearing the consolidated cases. In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed and in fact enforced the compromise agreement between a stepson and his stepmother, despite the fact that the tenor of the compromise agreement is not consistent with the tenor of the will of the testator. It is important to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja and the ruling in Roberts. Based on the dictum of the Supreme Court in these two cases, is it lawful for the heirs to divide the estate in accordance with a freely negotiated compromise agreement and in the process disregard the terms of the will? Or will such a compromise agreement result in an "anomalous" situation deplored by the Supreme Court in Roberts? DOROTHEO v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 108581, 8 December 1999 320 SCRA 12 Dorotheo distinguishes between the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of a will. It holds that the admission of a will to probate does not
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necessarily mean the provisions of the will can be given effect. The inquiry during probate of the will focuses only on formal or extrinsic validity. Even as a probate order is issued, it is not a guaranty that the testamentary dispositions are valid and would thus be given effect. In sum, extrinsic validity is one thing; intrinsic validity is another. AUSTRIA v REYES No. L-23079, 27 February 1970 31 SCRA 754 The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall be disregarded, unless it is proved that the testator would not have made such institution had he been properly appraised of the truth. Aside from the fact that the false cause must be stated in the will, the opponents of the will are likewise mandated to prove by substantial evidence that the testator would not have made such a disposition had he known the true state of affairs. Therefore, inferences and conjectures are not sufficient to invalidate a provision which is challenged as one made on the basis of a false cause. Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make a particular testamentary disposition is treated in the same way as a mistake, which in contract law, vitiates consent. REYES v BARRETTO-DATU No. L-17818, 25 January 1967 19 SCRA 85 Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line received something from the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited. AZNAR v DUNCAN No. L-24365, 30 June 1966 17 SCRA 590 The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this case. While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854. One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen of the State of California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator was distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account the fact that Article 854 was made to apply. This point needs clarification. NUGUID v NUGUID No. L-23445, 23 June 1966 17 SCRA 449

As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the will itself. BALANAY, JR. v MARTINEZ No. L-39247, 27 June 1975 64 SCRA 454 Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless the nullity of the will is patent on its face, the probate court should first pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its substantive validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and Nuguid. Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the husband's right to waive his hereditary right with respect to the estate of the deceased spouse, and his right to waive his half share in the conjugal estate, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code, the court was silent on the validity of the husband's conformity to the distribution of the conjugal estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the wife. Obviously, the court assumed the validity of the renunciation of the husband of his share in the conjugal estate. Such waiver, however, may fall into one of two possible categories, i.e., inter vivos or mortis causa. If it was a waiver effective inter vivos, then it would have amounted to a donation to inter vivos to the wife. That would have been illegal under existing laws. On the other hand, if it was a waiver mortis causa, then the formalities of a will should have been observed, failing which, the waiver would be void. Furthermore, the waiver mortis causa would have required the wife to survive the husband. In either case, the alleged waiver by the husband of his half share in the conjugal estate resulted in a transmission of property to the wife. And consequently, a characterization of such waiver along the parameters mentioned above is necessary and inescapable. The fundamental question, therefore, that demands an answer is whether or not a husband or wife could waive his or her share in the conjugal estate in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a waiver resulting from a successful petition for separation of property, and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the absolute community of property) resulting from the issuance of a decree of annulment or a decree of nullity. It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be assumed, properly or improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the provision of Article 784 which categorically states that the making of a will is strictly a personal act, and that the exercise of testamentary discretion cannot be delegated by a person to another. In any case, Balanay leaves many questions unanswered. Let alone the fact that the decision did not discuss why the husband was not preterited within the meaning of Article 854. CAYETANO v LEONIDAS No. L-54919, 30 May 1984
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129 SCRA 522 Article 854 does not apply in the case of a foreign testator who omits in his or her will the compulsory heirs in the direct line. In the case of a foreign testator, the conflict rule enunciated in Article 16 of the Civil Code applies. Therefore, regardless of whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, the provision of Article 854 of the Civil Code cannot is never meant to apply to a foreign testator. ACAIN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT No. L-72706, 27 October 1987 155 SCRA 100 Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse could be preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved that an adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while given the same rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. It must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not entitled to the right of representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an adopted child finds greater support. SEANGIO v REYES G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006 508 SCRA 177 Seangio resolves a number of legal questions. First, it confirms that where the sole disposition of a purported will is the disinheritance of a compulsory heir, the disinheritance is considered a property disposition. Therefore, the document is must be considered a will because it conveys property. Second, the failure of the testator to institute an heir or to even mention by name any of the compulsory heir, per se, does not constitute preterition. Third, the Court gave an indication of what could constitute maltreatment which would give an ascendant a ground to disinherit a descendant under Article 919. RAMIREZ v RAMIREZ No. L-27952, 15 February 1982 111 SCRA 704 Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a fideicommissary substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because both the first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The beneficial use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at most, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law requires that the first and second heirs must be "one degree apart" from each other. This limitation became the object of two divergent views. One view holds that the "one degree" apart rule refers to one transfer. Ramirez settled the controversy by upholding the more restrictive view. In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of land does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a compulsory heir? VDA. DE MAPA v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-38972, 28 September 1987

154 SCRA 294 Mapa resolved a dispute between two sides of a family with respect to the interpretation of a testamentary disposition obligating the surviving husband to deliver to the nephews and nieces (both on the side of the deceased and on his side) the residue of the entire estate. Claimants advance the theory that the obligation of the surviving husband constituted either (a) an express trust, or (b) an institution subject to a fideicommissary substitution. It will be noted that if the testamentary disposition were to be treated as a fideicommissary substitution, the substitution would have been void since the second heirs are not related to the first heir within the first degree by consanguinity, as required in Ramirez v Ramirez, infra. If the substitution were to be declared void, the surviving husband would have inherited the residue of the estate free and clear of any condition or encumbrance. Consequently, upon his demise, the nephews and nieces coming from the side of the deceased wife would be excluded from participating in the distribution of the properties. It is worthwhile noting that the properties in question were largely from the estate of the deceased wife. If equity were to be taken into account, the decision of the Supreme Court would seem to be correct. However, the decision fail to argue convincingly that the testatrix indeed intended to constitute a trust. CRISOLOGO v SINGSON No. L-13876, 28 February 1962 4 SCRA 491 Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissary substitution is the imposition of an obligation on the part of the first heir to preserve and to transmit the property to the second heir upon the former's death or upon the happening of a particular event. The obligation to preserve and transmit must be done in an expressed manner either by calling the substitution fideicommissary, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to preserve and deliver the inheritance to the second heir. In the absence of either, the substitution would at best be considered simple or vulgar. Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, it inferred that if Consolacion were instituted subject to a fideicommissary substitution, her rights would be limited to that of a usufructuary. This is error, because the first heir in a fideicommissary substitution acquires title to the property, subject merely to the resolutory term of the substitution. Second, while the court ruled that the substitution is simple, it stated in the penultimate paragraph that the substitution shall take place whether the death of Consolacion takes place before or after the death of the testatrix. There seems to be something wrong with the statement. Substitution was premised precisely upon the death of Consolacion, and for no other cause. Therefore, if Consolacion survives the testatrix, as in fact she did survive, then the substitution becomes academic. To allow the substitution even if Consolacion were to survive the testatrix would be to give effect to a fideicommissary substitution, which the same court overturned. The resulting conclusion would be in contradiction with the finding that no fideicommissary substitution was intended by the testatrix. RODRIGUEZ v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-287334, 28 March 1969 27 SCRA 546

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A testamentary disposition prohibiting the alienation of the hereditary estate for a period exceeding twenty years is void. However, the Court has ruled that the nullity refers not to the prohibition to alienate, but to the prohibition in excess of the first twenty years. Justice Fernando made a cryptic statement in the penultimate paragraph of the decision. He opined that the intestate heirs may never even have the right to challenge the question provision of the will which created the trust. Is he suggesting that the said intestate heirs (first cousin of the testatrix) must survive the twenty year period in order to have the personality, at that time, to challenge the trust? If so, is there a suggestion that the successional right of the intestate heirs would ripen only if they survive the period? This point is important for two reasons: (a) the first cousins are relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree, and beyond which relationship with the testatrix is no longer recognized by law; (b) the said first cousins, assuming they do not survive the twenty-year period, cannot, under the present law, be represented by their own respective descendants. RABADILLA v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000 334 SCRA 522 Rabadilla distinguished between a conditional institution and a modal institution, It also discussed the various forms of substitution of heirs. Justice Purisima concluded that in case of doubt, the institution must be deemed modal and not conditional. Following his discussion, he noted that while a modal institution obliges, it does not suspend the effectivity of the institution. On the other hand, a conditional institution suspends the efficacy of the institution, although it does not impose any obligation on the instituted heir. One question that should probably be asked is: what happens to the mortgage in favor of PNB and RPB upon the cancellation of the title of the property in the names of the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla? If the mortgage is to be honored, the heirs of Aleja Belleza will receive the property subject to the encumbrance. On the other hand, if the mortgage is to be cancelled, PNB and RBP will be prejudiced. FRANCISCO v FRANCISCO-ALFONSO G.R. No. 138774, 8 March 2001 354 SCRA 112 The legitime is a portion of the estate of the deceased person which is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs. An attempt to deprive a compulsory heir of the legitime by way of a simulated sale will not be tolerated. The simulated sale will be set aside. In this case, the simulation of sale was proved by the fact that neither of the two buyers of the property had sufficient financial resources to justify their acquisition of the property by way of a cash purchase. And because the decedent had no property other than those parcels of land which he allegedly sold to his illegitimate daughters, the simulation of said sale resulted in the dissipation of his assets and the deprivation of the legitimate daughter of her legitime. The second reason proffered by the Supreme Court in sustaining the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The Courts reasoning was: even if the sale was not simulated, the same violated Aidas

legitime. Therefore, the sale is void. The reasoning is flawed. If the sale was bona fide in that consideration was indeed paid, then Aida would have no cause to complain, because her father Gregorio, in his lifetime had every right to dispose the land for valuable consideration. Aidas legitime will have to be determined at the time of death of Gregorio, at which time, the land had already been validly sold. The Courts argument seems to suggest that the simulated sale was Gregorios way of depriving Aida of her rightful participation in the distribution of his estate. However, there is nothing in the decision that would seem to prove that intent. Indeed, the decision states that Gregorio confided to Aida that the titles to the property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. There is no indication that he admitted to having fraudulently sold the property to the latter. The inference is that the titles were merely entrusted to Regina and Zenaida. Consequently, I fail to appreciate the Courts suggestion that the transfer of the property to Regina and Zenaida was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. In any event, there is merit to the nullification of the sale based on the first theory that the sale was simulated. I do not believe that the second reason preferred by the Court is correct, nor did it support the conclusion. CASTRO v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 50974-75, 31 May 1989 173 SCRA 656 An illegitimate child is a compulsory heir of his or her parent. Under the Civil Code, the successional right of an illegitimate child is conditioned upon the fact of recognition, whether voluntary or involuntary. The requirement of recognition has been abolished under the Family Code. Thus, under the present law, an illegitimate child inherits regardless of whether or not his or her parent recognized him or her as a child. The antecedent facts of the present case occurred while the Civil Code was still in force. Accordingly, the legal issues raised in the case should be governed by the provision of the said Code. However, the Supreme Court applied the more liberal provisions of the Family Code on the basis of the provision of Article 256 of the Family Code which allowed a retroactive application, provided no vested or acquired rights are impaired. TAYAG v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 95229, 9 June 1992 209 SCRA 665 On facts nearly identical with those of Castro v Court of Appeals, supra, the Supreme Court arrived at a diametrically opposed conclusion. It is therefore important to distinguish between these two cases. BARITUA v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 82233, 22 March 1990 183 SCRA 565 While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs of their legitimate child, the parents are secondary compulsory heirs and inherit only in default of legitimate children and decendants of the deceased. Thus, the legitimate parents have no right to demand indemnification for the death of their deceased child, and such right to indemnification properly belongs to the latter's descendants and/or spouse.
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VAN DORN v ROMILLO, JR. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985 139 SCRA 139 A foreign divorce validly obtained by a foreign national in a foreign court against his Filipino spouse produces effects in the Philippines. Van Dorn suggests that the divorce decree should likewise terminate the status of the foreign party as a "compulsory heir" of the former Filipino spouse. It must be noted, however, that the dictum of the court in this respect is merely an obiter inasmuch as heirship was not an issue in this case. ROSALES v ROSALES No. L-40789, 27 February 1987 148 SCRA 69 A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her mother-inlaw. This is because of the absence of blood relationship between the two. PADURA v BALDOVINO No. L-11960, 27 December 1958 104 Phil 1065 The division of the reservable property among the reservees is the subject matter of the following decision. The court rejected the theory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish commentators such as Scaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy. EDROSO v SABLAN No. 6878, 13 September 1913 25 Phil 295 A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The reservor, having inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof, subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and may institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case. It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of registration, may in the proper case extinguish the reserva. SIENES v ESPARCIA L-12957, 24 March 1961 1 SCRA 750 The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2) the survival of the reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate the reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the timeliness or untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to herein from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem fairly clear that the reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said sale, she was the registered owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale executed by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective. Since the reservor was still alive at the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could not have validly sold the same parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the parcel of land, then the sale should properly be construed as a conditional sale - the condition being the survival of the seller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to construed this sale of the reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence the subject matter of the sale would not be the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees thereto, which is conditional. LACERNA v VDA. DE CORCINO L-14603, 29 April 1961 1 SCRA 1227 The reserva applies only where the property sought to be reserved was acquired by operation of law by an ascendant from a descendant who in turn, acquired it by gratuitous title from another ascendant, brother or sister. Thus, where the disputed property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant, there is yet no reserva because there has yet to be a second transmission of the property to another line by operation of law. SOLIVIO v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990 182 SCRA 119 The reservor can never be a descendant of the supposed prepositus. Thus, where properties were inherited from a mother (origin) by a daughter (as prepositus), which properties were later inherited by her son, the son holds the properties subject to no reservation in favor of any relative, since this case is not contemplated by Article 891 which establishes the reserva troncal. In addition, the reserva applies only if the prepositus dies without issue. CHUA v CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V L-29901, 31 August 1977 78 SCRA 414 The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the origin of the reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a certain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in nature. FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO No. 14856, 15 November 1919 40 Phil 480 Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if he himself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of strangers, then the reserva is not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property was devised or willed by the reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable nature of the property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that
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the reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his demise. Third, there is an affirmation that the title of the reservor to the reservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, by reason of the reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to the validity of this proposition in the light of the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is a mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing the title of the reservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory condition. Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an error in the distribution of the reservable property. GONZALES v COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA L-34395, 19 May 1981 104 SCRA 481 Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal. Among other things, it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate of the reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As such, the reservor cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will, nor can the reservor choose who or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable property among the reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in Florentino and quotes substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost. DE PAPA v CAMACHO No. L-28032, 24 September 1986 144 SCRA 281 Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b) a niece of the prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution of the reversionary estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate succession which govern the distribution of the reversionary estate. Please note that brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank fourth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand, the uncles and aunts (collectively referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, following the order of preference, those who rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is a reaffirmation of the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura. CARILLO v DE PAZ No. L-22601, 28 October 1966 18 SCRA 467 Carillo establishes that the rights of a reservatario to the reservable property may be lost by extinctive prescription. Thus a reservatario must institute action to recover the reservable property either within ten or thirty years from the time the right to recover the same accrued. In this case, it must be noted that the ten-year prescriptive period applied on the premise that the possessor of the reservable property was a possessor in good faith and with a colorable title to the same.

SUMAYA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September 1991 201 SCRA 178 The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an innocent purchaser of the reservable property. For the protection of the said reservees, it is important that the reservable character of the property must be properly annotated at the back of the title thereto. However, even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable character of the property, then the reversionary rights of the reservees shall be upheld. NIEVA AND ALCALA v ALCALA AND DEOCAMPO No. 13386, 27 October 1920 41 Phil 915 Nieva ruled that reserva runs only in the legitimate family. MATEO v LAGUA No. L-26270, 30 October 1969 29 SCRA 864 Mateo outlines the procedure for the liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, where in particular, an allegation is made that certain dispositions inter vivos impaired the legitime of a compulsory heir. It must be noted that collation is important only if the decedent left compulsory heirs. Otherwise, collation would be irrelevant. Note, further, that the procedure outlined in Mateo does not take into account the prior liquidation of the conjugal partnership or absolute community, in case the deceased is survived by a spouse. The procedure for liquidating the same are found in Articles 102 and 103 of the Family Code for the absolute community of property, and Articles 129 and 130 of the same Code for the conjugal partnership of gains. NATCHER v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001 366 SCRA 385 Natcher succinctly outlines the procedure for the calculation of the legitime of compulsory heirs. Of equal interest is the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of general jurisdiction over an issue which relates to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. Note that the trial court, after ruling that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in favor of Patricia (his wife) is void; that the deed of sale cannot gain validity by treating it as a donation to Patricia, went further to state that the instrument may, however, be construed as a document pertaining to the grant of advance legitime to Patricia. It is ironic that a document that is void (either as a sale or as a donation) could be the source of a right. On the issue of impairment of legitime, the outcome could be predictable if Graciano left no other asset. Of Gracianos share in the subject property (5,326.85 sq. m,), he donated 4,849.38 sq. m. (or more than 90% thereof) to his children. He sold 80.90 sq. m. or (1.5% thereof) to a third party, and purportedly sold to Patricia 447.60 sq. m. (or 8.4%). Each child received by way of a donation from Graciano some 808 sq. m. while the Graciano attempted to give Patricia 447 square meters. Based on the numbers, it is clear that if anyone suffered an impairment of the legitme, it would be Patricia, the surviving spouse. This therefore raises the question as to whether or not the children were properly advised to seek the annulment of Patricias title to 447 sq. m. parcel of land.
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VDA. DE TUPAS v BR XLIII RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL No. L-65800, 3 October 1986 144 SCRA 622 Vda. de Tupas outlines the procedure for the determination of the hereditary estate of a deceased person, particularly where impairment of the legitime is an issue. The case outlines the step-bystep procedure for the determination of the legitime of the compulsory heirs, as well as the determination of the freely disposable portion, which in turn will determine the validity of donations inter vivos made by the deceased. RODRIGUEZ ET AL. v BORJA, ET AL. No. L-21993, 21 June 1966 17 SCRA 418 Intestate succession is subsidiary or subordinate to testamentary succession. This is because intestacy arises only in the absence of a valid and operative will. Thus, it is inappropriate for an heir to institute proceedings in intestacy if he knows the existence of a will, and neither will an intestate court acquire jurisdiction over the estate of a deceased person, while proceedings in testacy is on-going in another court. Rodriguez, therefore, is authority to the proposition that proceeding in testacy is preferred over proceedings in intestacy. A contrary rule may result in an anomalous situation where a determination of the intestate court would have to be set aside by reason of the admission of a will to probate. MADARCOS V DE LA MERCED G.R. No. 39975, 30 June 1989 174 SCRA 599 The Court had an opportunity to construe the meaning of the words "legal heirs." The restrictive meaning thereof would refer to heirs called upon to inherit by intestacy. The more liberal interpretation would, however, include any person called to succeed, either by virtue of a will, or by intestacy. The dispositive portion of this case must be carefully understood. Both Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain were intestate heirs or legal heirs of the original homesteaders. The Court ruled that they were qualified redemptioners of the property sold. Why then did the Court allow Francisca Madarcos to redeem the property, but at the same time affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as regards the other petitioner, Telesforo Catain? DE LOS SANTOS v DE LA CRUZ No. L-29192, 22 February 1971 37 SCRA 555 De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is barred from exercising the right of representation. BAGUNU v PIEDAD G.R. No. 140975, 8 December 2000 347 SCRA 571 Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within the 3rd degree) excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the decedent (a relative within the 5th degree), even if under the order of intestate succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference. Moreover,

the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of representation in order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer degree because representation in the collateral line is limited to children of brothers and sisters of the decedent. HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No 116775, 22 January 1998 284 SCRA 511 A half-blood nephew is a collateral relative within the third degree. He excludes the children of first cousins, even if the relationship of the decedent with the former is of the full blood. The relative nearer in degree excludes those who are more remote, regardless of the full or half blood relationship. DE LA PUERTA v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77867, 6 February 1990 181 SCRA 861 The right of representation does not extend to the adopted children of the person to be represented. This is because the fictional tie that binds the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopter. Thus, the adopter may adopt an heir for himself, but he cannot adopt one for his relatives. ABELLANA-BACAYO v FERRARIS-BORROMEO No. L-19382, 31 August 1965 14 SCRA 986 As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only in the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned. When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which their predeceased or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of representation is that the nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent. It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree relatives, nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are likewise relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate succession which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992. In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.
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Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles and/or aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation. MALANG v MOSON G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000 338 SCRA 393 The rights to the succession of a Muslim who died during the effectivity of the Muslim Code shall be governed by the said law. Prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the succession to the estate of a Muslim is governed by the Civil Code. The capacity of an heir to succeed is determined by the law in force at the time of the conception or birth of the heir. SAYSON v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 89224-25, 23 January 1992 205 SCRA 321 The right of representation accorded to legitimate grandchildren is reiterated in this case, although there were legal issues raised with respect to such legitimacy. The unavailability of the right of representation to the adopted children was likewise confirmed. The conflicting theory of the petitioners in this case should be noted. DEL PRADO v SANTOS No. L-20946, 23 September 1966 18 SCRA 68 An illegitimate child succeeds his or her illegitimate father to the exclusion of the legitimate brothers and sisters of the latter. The legitimacy of the collateral relatives within the second degree does not create a preference over the illegitimate status of the descendant. Note that under the Family Code, recognition of the filiation of the illegitimate child has been abolished. CACHO v UDAN No. L-19996, 30 April 1965 13 SCRA 693 The Court reaffirms the exclusion of legitimate brothers and sisters of the decedent by the latter's illegitimate child. Note, however, that the Court disallowed the intervention of the brothers in the probate proceedings, since regardless of the outcome of the probate, the brothers cannot inherit from the deceased. Implicitly, the lower court also disqualified the said brothers from claiming any right against the illegitimate son of the deceased by reason of Article 992, when the said court instructed the fiscal to study the propriety of instituting escheat proceedings. CUARTICO v CUARTICO No. 11190-R, 16 November 1955 52 O.G. 1489 Cuartico explains the reason for the barrier in Article 992. The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family. CORPUS v CORPUS

No. L-22469, 23 October 1978 85 SCRA 567 Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is excluded from the inheritance of an illegitimate relative. LEONARDO v COURT OF APPEALS No. L-51263, 28 February 1983 120 SCRA 890 The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of determining his qualification to inherit from a deceased person. In Leonardo, the Court found after looking into the birth certificate of the petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article 992 to claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother. DIAZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT No. L-66574, 17 June 1987 150 SCRA 645 This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There was no showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity. It must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants other than the illegitimate children who were excluded from her inheritance. DIAZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 66574, 21 February 1990 182 SCRA 427 This resolution settled the motion for reconsideration filed by the illegitimate children on the decision immediately preceding. An argument is raised that the word "relatives" used in Article 992 cannot possibly refer to the grandmother of the illegitimate children, but only to the other collateral relatives. The argument stresses the injustice resulting from the fact that while the illegitimate children of an illegitimate child can exercise the right of representation, the same right is denied the illegitimate children of a legitimate child. MANUEL v FERRER G.R. No. 117246, 21 August 1995 247 SCRA 476 If an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father or mother, the latter are barred in the same manner from inheriting from the illegitimate child. Notice, however, that in this case Court took special note that the beneficiary of the estate of the illegitimate child (who executed a affidavit of self-adjudication as sole heir) is not even an heir of the deceased illegitimate child. While the beneficiary was raised by the deceased as his own daughter, she was not formally adopted. It would therefore seem that the State was short-changed because in the absence of any qualified intestate heir, the State succeeds the decedent pursuant to Article 1011. SUNTAY III v COJUANGCO-SUNTAY G.R. No. 183953, 16 June 2010 621 SCRA 142 While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice Nachura sets the
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tone in what could lead to a reconsideration of the ruling in Diaz v Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be mindful, however, that the excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue raised in this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an administrator. VERDAD v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 109972, 29 April 1996 256 SCRA 593 When a surviving spouse inherits, she acquires all the rights and privileges of ownership pertaining to the property thus acquired. Hence, where a surviving spouse becomes a co-owner of property through succession to her deceased spouse, the former is entitled to the right of redemption in the circumstances described in Article 1620 of the Civil Code. Verdad confirms this fact when a widow was granted the right to redeem a property in which she was a co-owner, that her brothers and sisters-in-law sold to a third party without giving her prior written notice. SANTILLON v MIRANDA No. L-19281, 30 June 1965 14 SCRA 563 Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestate shares of a surviving spouse concurring with one legitimate child. In addition to the arguments clearly stated in the text of the decision, it may be stressed at this point that commentators who insist on a 3/4 - 1/4 sharing in favor of the legitimate child adhere to the theory of preference. In short, there the order of intestate succession listed the legitimate children as having first priority in the intestate estate of the deceased parent, and the spouse as fourth, then the law must be interpreted as having given a preference to the legitimate child or children with respect to the hereditary estate, after the legitime of all other compulsory heirs shall have been paid. Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and adopted the theory of concurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude each other shall ratably share the inheritance. Since preference is not inferred from the order of intestate succession, then the free disposal (after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) must be distributed in a manner that would result in the least disproportion between or among the respective shares of the concurring intestate heirs. Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the free disposal might be mentioned. Under the theory of equality, the free disposal is divided equally among the concurring intestate heirs, regardless of the order of intestate succession. Another theory advanced by other commentators is that the free disposal must be proportionately distributed among the concurring intestate heirs based on their respective legitime. PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC v RIGOR No. l-22036, 30 April 1979 89 SCRA 496 Capacity to succeed is determined from the moment of the death of the testator or the decedent. To be capacitated, an heir, legatee or devisee must be living at the time succession opens, except in case of representation whenever appropriate. A testamentary disposition giving a devise to the nearest male relative who would pursue an ecclesiastical career is meant to refer to such relatives living (or at least conceived) at the time of the testator's death. A contrary interpretation may be upheld only if there is a clear intention to the contrary. Nevertheless, the enforceability of such a testamentary disposition is necessarily limited to

twenty years from the time succession opens, in order that the disposition be consistent with the rule prohibiting perpetuities. CID v BURNAMAN No. L-24424, 31 July 1968 24 SCRA 435 The capacity of an heir to inherit is to be determined at the time succession opens. Cid refers to the provision of the Civil Code of 1889 which disqualifies an illegitimate child who has not been acknowledged by his or her putative parents from inheriting. The status of an acknowledged natural child must be established as of the death of the deceased parent in order to entitled such illegitimate child to certain successional rights. Without such acknowledgement as of such time, no successional rights shall accrue to said child. Please note, however, that the requisite acknowledgment has been repealed by the Family Code. This case, therefore, and the pertinent provisions of law referred to herein, shall not longer apply to deaths occurring after the effectivity of the Family Code. DIMAYUGA v COURT OF APPEALS L-48433, 30 April 1984 129 SCRA 111 Article 1043 provides that no person may accept or repudiate an inheritance unless his is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. A compulsory heir who is deprived of a portion of his legitime through a donation inter vivos executed by his father, or through a partition inter vivos made by his father, is not deemed to have repudiated the inheritance to the extent of the shortfall of his legitime, even if in the meantime he had executed an affidavit confirming and accepting his share of the distributed property. GUY v COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 163707, 15 September 2006 502 SCRA 151 Guy holds that a waiver of hereditary share, in order to be effective, must make an explicit reference to the hereditary rights that are being waived. A waiver must pertain to a known or established right. Where there is a waiver of the hereditary rights of illegitimate children, it is essential that their hereditary rights must be established prior to the waiver. Hence, if proof of illegitimate filiation has not been commenced, a waiver of hereditary rights would be premature. The Court made reference to the rule on repudiation of an inheritance. Specifically the Court cited Article 1044 which requires the judicial approval of a repudiation of hereditary rights of a minor or an incapacitated person. It is not altogether clear what Justice Santiago referred to Article 1044. The fact that the mother acknowledged receipt of P300,000.00 on behalf of her minor children and an educational plan for their education (which is the basis of the waiver of claim) is indicative that there was indeed an acceptance of the inheritance. It would seem that Justice Santiago viewed the payment made to the mother, on behalf of the minor children, was the monetary consideration for the waiver of hereditary rights. The question, however, is whether a waiver of hereditary rights is functionally equivalent to repudiation. LEVISTE V COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. L-29184, 30 January 1989 160 SCRA 581
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partition. This was construed as a sale of the parent herself. Article 1052 in part provides that if an heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. This right pertains to creditors, and excludes an attorney who may have a claim against his client-heir based on a contingent fee arrangement. DE ROMA V COURT OF APPEALS No. L-46903, 23 July 1987 152 SCRA 205 Collation seeks to preserve the legitime of the compulsory heirs, and at the same time, to equalize the shares of the heirs in the hereditary estate. As a general rule, all gratuitous conveyances made by the decedent during his lifetime are collationable. By way of an exception, the donor may provide that a particular donation shall not be collationable. In the exceptional case, it is necessary that the prohibition to collate is expressed. Otherwise, no inference can be deduced that the intention of the donor was to excuse collation. VIZCONDE v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118449, 1 February 1998 286 SCRA 217 This is a very important case as it discussed at length the concept of collation. Because of the complicity of the matter, I reserved my observations by including footnotes to the more significant statements in the body of the decision. Based on my personal observations regarding this decision, I would say that I can only agree with it to the extent that the Court ruled that the Paraaque property is not collationable. MANG-OY V COURT OF APPEALS No. L-27422, 12 September 1986 144 SCRA 33 Article 1080 permits a person to make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will. Such partition shall be respected provided the legitime of the compulsory heirs is not prejudiced. The Court held that this partition is not in the nature of a donation nor of a will. It is of a special character which does not even require the execution of a prior will. The partition is revocable at any time during the lifetime of the causante, and does not operate to convey ownership of the properties involved until the death of the latter. CHAVEZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G. R. No. L-68282, 8 November 1990 191 SCRA 211 While Mang-oy holds that a partition inter vivos executed in accordance with Article 1080 is revocable by a person at any time during his or her lifetime, and that such partition will not result in a transfer of ownership to his heirs during his lifetime, Chavez holds that an exception may be taken if the partition has in fact been implemented and that one (or some) of the heirs, with the consent of the person making it, conveys or sells his or her pro-indiviso share to another coheir. Estoppel bars a selling heir from disavowing the sale and from proceeding contrary thereto. The Court, in passing, mentioned that the several sales among the co-heirs did not constitute contracts involving future inheritance. This is because each of the sales among the co-heirs was with the expressed consent and authorization fro the parent who executed the
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Finally, it must be noted that in the case of a partition inter vivos under Article 1080, the law does not specify a particular form. The court opined that such a partition may be made orally or in writing. ALONZO V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT No. L-72873, 28 May 1987 150 SCRA 261 Article 1088 of the Code gives to co-heirs the right to redeem, within 30 days from written notice of the sale, the hereditary property sold by a co-heir to a stranger. The Court has interpreted this provision (as well as the counterpart provision in Article 1623) that the notice must be in writing and sent by the seller to all prospective redemptioners. The Court took exception in this case in view of the peculiar circumstances and waived the written notice requirement. BAUTISTA v BAUTISTA G.R. No. 160556. 3 August 2007 529 SCRA 187

Bautista holds that an action to set aside a void extra judicial partition is imprescriptible. However, the Courts statement that an invalid partition transmits no right is rather disturbing. Notice that it is the death of the decedent that transmits ownership of the hereditary estate to the heirs not the partition that is executed between or among them. In Go Ong v Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the sale of of the property which pertains to the conjugal share of the wife, setting aside only the sale insofar as the portion of the property that is subject of settlement proceedings. In the instant case, Angelica and Alegria already acquired ownership of their respective shares of the property upon the demise of Teodora. Shouldnt the Court uphold the sale to Pacita, and Pacitas sale to Pedro, at least insofar as the shares of Angelica and Alegria are concerned? NON v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000 325 SCRA 652 The omission of a compulsory heir in the distribution of the partible estate, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, will not result in the rescission of the partition. In Article 1104, the law uses the phrase preterition of any of the compulsory heirs. Preterition as used in this article should be distinguished from preterition under Article 854.