1. Sociology: Class 12 NCERT both books 2. World History: Class 9 and 10 NCERT history books 3.

Post Independence: selected chapters from India Since Independence by Bipan Chandra 4. World Geography: 6,7,8 ICSE geography books 5. Public admin part: from ARC reports summary : http://www.4shared.com/folder/9YX5CWCf/2nd_ARC_Report.h tml 6. Ethics: William Frankena [I am not sure whether it is required or not, I have found it generally useful.]
HISTORY 1.Facets of Indian History-Kalpana Rajaram 2.India after Independence-Bipin Chandra 3.India after Gandhi-Ramachandra Guha (Orient Black Swan) 4.Contemporary History of the World (NCERT XII)-Arjun Dev SOCIETY 1.XIth NCERT of Sociology 2.Indian Social Problems-Ram Ahuja GEOGRAPHY 1.Principles of General Geography- NCERT XI 2.Economic of Geography of World- NCERT XI 3.Physical Geography of India- NCERT XII 4.Enviroinment and Economic Geography- NCERT IX 5.Human and Economic Geography- Goh Cheng Leong 6. Geography and You-Monthly Magazine INDIAN POLITY 1.Democracy of work in India-A.S.Narang (NCERT XII) 2.Indian Polity-M.Lakshmikanth PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1.From Government to Goverance-Kuldeep Mathur 2.Social Theory,Development Administration & Development Ethics-Mohit Battacharya 3.Goverance-M.Lakshmikanth 4.ARC Reports on a.) Ethics in Goverance b.) On Corruption c.) On Security d.) Disaster Management INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1.Indias Foreign Policy-Rajiv Sikri 2.Newspaper-The Hindu,Indian Express 3.World Focus Magazine 4.Websites of a.) Institute for Defence and Strategic Analysis b.) thediplomat.com c.) cfr.org d.)satp.org ECONOMICS 1. NCERT XI 2. NCERT XII 3. Economic Survey of India SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1.Hindu 2.Science Reporter 3.Websites a.) Ministry of Enviroinment &Forest b.) MOS & T C.) DOS SECURITY ISSUES 1.Newspaper 2.Frontline 3.Yojana 3.MOHA (Website) PAPER IV 1.ARC Reports 2.cecedusat.com 3.Ethics in Public Life

PM sets in motion eastern industrial corridor It is set on the model of Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor
Author: K. Balchand

NEW DELHI: In less than 10 days of his return from Japan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday set in motion the development of the mega Amritsar-Delhi-Kolkata Industrial Corridor (ADKIC) project. Set on the model of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), the ADKIC will boost industrial development along the Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) that connects Ludhiana in Punjab with Dankuni near Kolkata. The DMIC has received Japanese financial support promising large investments for industrial growth in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana and Maharashtra. The project envisages development of new cities, industrial zones, and world-class infrastructure. The ADKIC not only has a wider spread but also touches the more densely populated and less developed States like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar and Jharkhand. It will start from Punjab and Haryana. The region accounts for about 40 per cent of the countrys population and has been crying for development. Dr. Singh expects the corridor to be a catalyst for growth along this stretch, that will structured around the Eastern DFC and the National Highways along this route. The eastern industrial corridor will also enhance the importance of the inland waterway system by navigating the Ganga from Allahabad to Haldia.

The project will benefit cities like Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Ambala, Saharanpur, Delhi, Roorkee, Moradabad, Bareilly, Aligarh, Kanpur, Lucknow, Allahabad, Varanasi, Patna, Hazaribagh, Dhanbad, Asansol, Durgapur and Kolkata. The Prime Minister has set up a six-member high-level inter-ministerial group to study the feasibility of the project and outline structural and financial arrangements needed to operationalise the project at the earliest. The committee, headed by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Secretary, is expected to submit its report to Dr. Singh within a month. Other committee members comprise the Secretaries of the Department of Economic Affairs; Urban Development; Road Transport and Highways; Shipping; Inland Waterways Authority of India Chairman and Railway Board Chairman, who is also a secretary level officer.

Repression is no solution
Violence against the state is tragic but it contains the seeds of rejection. Only an inclusive approach that respects human rights can eliminate extremism Author: Gopal Subramanium

Perhaps no other chain of events in the recent past has had a more direct and substantial impact on the life of human beings across the world than acts of terror. Terrorism has not only affected our lives directly, but has also allowed the state to intrude in our lives like never before.

Fundamental obligation

Since the security of the individual is a basic human right (and a fundamental condition of the social contract underpinning society), the protection of individuals is a fundamental obligation of the state. In recent years, however, the measures adopted by states to counter terrorism have themselves sometimes been found wanting in terms of compliance with human rights norms. The means and methods adopted by the state have posed serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law, and often this is on account of the zeal of the law-enforcement agencies to give a commensurate response to the terrorist.

The state cannot legitimately respond by resorting to mechanisms that overstep the limits of the law. Thus, a reason why it is important for the state to ensure that none of its measures transgresses the limits of the law is any transgression may have the effect of eroding both its legitimacy and the rule of law, thereby fomenting further unrest and erosion of faith in the Constitution. In the name of combating extremism, repressive measures are also used to stifle the voice of human rights activists, advocates, minorities, indigenous groups, journalists and civil society. There is another dimension: by being able to build up a perception of threat, the state may be able to get away with channelling the funds normally allocated to social programmes towards strengthening the police force and the army. The talkedup threat perception of terrorism (and a few encounters) may wel l be used to justify the acquisition of more weapons. As Professor Simon Bronitt of Australian National University has summed up there is almost a new genus of law: post 9/11 law. Although 9/11 has become a significant force in justifying these laws, the truth is that there is an element of opportunism [by some law-enforcement and state agencies] behind these claims of necessity for new powers and offences. While militarisation and the strengthening of police forces are important in their own right, it is equally necessary to understand the genuineness of the security reasons presented by the state as a ground for abridgment of human rights, many of which are fundamental. Frisking, for example, which used to be considered a grave intrusion upon ones privacy at one point of time, is today normalised and we are all fine with being frisked everywhere.

Existential realities

Little or no attention is paid to the true causes of resort to violent methods. It is as if the deafening sound of explosions and landmines is used to attract the attention of the state to existential realities. There are grim realities of existence as tribals in this country, and the unfortunate aspect is that their unheard voices fail to make a din in the power corridors. From their perspective, extremism, violence and terrorism become a means to attract the attention of the state. Governments have been non-responsive to peaceful protests and have, in fact, come down heavily on peaceful protesters as they did at India Gate when they relentlessly beat up women protesting in the aftermath of last Decembers gang rape in Delhi. The state turns a blind eye to the violence committed by state actors, and private actors in connivance with state actors, which results in irreversible psychological damage. It is evident that the state has misplaced priorities. Since there is little that the state seems to have done, one can safely say that it does not seem to be aware of the abysmal conditions in which the tribals of Chhattisgarh live.

The state does not seem to be aware that tribals in Madhya Pradesh eat the poisonous kesari dal which is reported to have a paralytic impact. The state also does not seem to be aware that tribal women and other villagers in Maharashtra have to walk miles before they can get drinking water. This feeling of being parentless makes people vulnerable to anti-state ideologies. Having said this, I am not legitimising violence against innocents by invocation of oppression; I am only suggesting that oppression is one of the reasons of unrest which manifests in the resort to violence against the state and insignias of the state. In the Mahanadi Coal Fields Case (2010), the Supreme Court took strong exception to the manner in which the Central government and the Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited had acquired the lands of tribals in the Sundargarh district of Odisha and not compensated them even 23 years later. In fact, 20 years after dispossessing them, the government noted that the land was actually not required! The Supreme Court observed: the whole issue of development appears to be so simple, logical and commonsensical. And yet, to millions of Indians, development is a dreadful and hateful word that is aimed at denying them even the source of their sustenance. It is cynically said that on the path of maldevelopment almost every step that we take seems to give rise to insurgency and political extremism [which along with terrorism are supposed to be the three gravest threats to India's integrity and sovereignty] The resistance with which the states well meaning efforts at development and economic growth are met makes one think about the reasons for such opposition to the states endeavours for development. Why is the states perception and vision of development at such great odds with the people it purports to develop? And why are their rights so dispensable?

Listen to people

The Supreme Courts identification of the issue is not off the mark, and I believe it is quite perceptive of the reality. Studies establish that absolute deprivation by the state has a psychological impact on its people. Therefore, any attempt to combat violence by the state must have within its fold the measures to eliminate the conditions conducive to the spread of extremism, which must include (a) strengthening the rule of law; (b) fostering respect for human rights and provision for reparation for violations; (c) reversing ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, and socioeconomic marginalisation; (d) listening to the people and (e) becoming more responsive to society. The recent events of violence are tragic without a doubt but they contain the seeds of rejection of political structures. Political structures need to build confidence by dialogue,

working on the ground for the uplift of the poor, and must work with an attitude of inclusiveness. While mourning the loss of human life, we must devise innovative systems of engagement, based not on power or hierarchical administration but equality. One wishes ardently that new mechanisms of review with deep and meaningful engagement with the local communities suggested in the Verma Committee on crimes against women be quickly operationalised and deployed. (The author is a senior advocate, a former Solicitor General of India, and a former Chairman, Bar Council of India)

Now, distribution platforms under TRAI radar

Author: Prashant Jha

NEW DELHI: Even as it contemplates restrictions on cross-media ownership to ensure plurality of viewpoints, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has initiated a process to tackle unhealthy market dominance in distribution platforms of the broadcasting space. Last December, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting asked TRAI whether in order to ensure fair competition, improved quality of service, and equity, restrictions ought to be imposed on Multi-System Operators (MSOs) and Local Cable Operators (LCOs). At present, there are no restrictions on MSOs and LCOs, either in operation or in market share. According to data at the end of 2012, cable TV subscribers account for 9.4 crore of a total of 15.5 crore television households, while the rest are Direct-to-Home. There are approximately 6,000 MSOs and 60,000 cable operators. With digitisation, MSOs have become the key link in the distribution of free-to-air as well as pay channels. This week, TRAI issued a consultation paper, which points to the dominance of a single MSO in certain markets like Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Orissa, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. In some cities, an MSO controls as much as 80 per cent of the digital television market. TRAI found that MSOs have misused their market power to stymie the emergence of newer players. Large MSOs can secure content at lower prices and charge broadcasters a higher carriage and placement fee. They can then offer local cable operators a better revenue share to lure them from the smaller MSOs. MSOs have also sought to expand their influence and size, buying out smaller MSOs and cable operators.

The paper says that once an MSO has such dominance, they can make it difficult for broadcasters to have access to distribution networks. Blocking content selectively can also become an obstacle to promoting plurality of viewpoints. In 2011, the Competition Commission of India imposed a penalty on an MSO in Punjab for abusing its dominance to deny a broadcaster market access. TRAI has invited suggestions on possible methods to measure market dominance; whether restrictions to reduce concentration ought to be based on geography or market share; whether it should be applied retrospectively and the time frame for existing distributors to abide by the restrictions; and the monitoring and disclosure arrangement. The industry analysts see TRAIs latest effort in conjunction with its efforts to restrict cross-media ownership. While some feel this is a way of exercising greater state control and will stifle sectoral growth, others have reckoned that this is necessary and timely to check monopolistic practices and vested political and corporate interests driving the industry.

Roshni will light the way for rural youth: Jairam

Author: Girija Shivakumar

New Delhi: In a bid to further reach out to rural youth in the countrys 24 most critical Left-Wing-Extremism-affected districts, the Centre on Friday introduced a placementoriented skill-development scheme targeting 50,000 persons, mostly tribals. Launching Roshni, Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh said at least 50 per cent of the candidates covered under the scheme would be women and extra efforts would be made to proactively cover Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) on a priority basis. Mr. Ramesh said Roshni would show a new path to the youths being targeted by the Maoists. The programme entails providing beneficiaries aged between 18-35 years with requisite training for the trade or job chosen as per the Participatory Identification of Poor. The launch of Roshni comes soon after the brutal Maoist attack on a Congress Convey in Chhattisgarhs Bastar district in which nearly 16 people, including two senior Congress leaders, were killed. Additionally, Mr. Ramesh said the employment programme would be on the lines of Himayat, being run in Jammu and Kashmir, and two pilot projects being run in Jharkhands west Singhbhum and Chhattisgarhs Sukma districts.

The training will be imparted through public-private and public partnerships. Four training modules of durations ranging from three months to one year shall be taken up to meet the diverse needs of the youth, depending on their entry-level qualifications. Placement-linked, market-driven, fully-residential skills training will be provided in fields such as tailoring, construction, mobile repairing, nursing and retail.

Placement assurance

The training providers will ensure 75 per cent placement defined as continuous employment for three months at higher than minimum wages. Placements will be provided anywhere in India, said Mr. Ramesh. Several training strategies will be used for diverse groups of youths, ranging from school dropouts to those with college education. The training providers will ensure 75-per-cent placement defined as continuous employment for three months at higher than minimum wages. Placements will be provided anywhere in India, he said. The projects will be funded jointly by the Central and State governments in the ratio of 75:25. Six districts each from Jharkhand and Odisha, five from Chhattisgarh, two from Bihar and one each from Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra have been chosen for the scheme, which will be implemented at a cost of Rs. 100 crore over the next three years

WHO investigating Maharashtras polio case

Author: Staff Reporter

Pune: A team from the World Health Organisation is investigating how an 11-month-old infant has been infected with polio virus in Maharashtras Beed district, in spite of stringent efforts by the Health Ministry to control its spread. It is for the first time since March 2012 that the State has registered a polio case. Health Minister Suresh Shetty told The Hindu that he had ordered an investigation and would get the WHO report on Saturday morning.

The infant, hailing from Kanhapur village in Dharur tehsil, has been found to have the Vaccine Derived Polio Virus (VDPV) type 2, a rare strain which is genetically mutated from the strain contained in the oral polio vaccine. The infant was initially admitted to the government medical college in Ambejogai, Beed, on May 3. The child had high fever and suffered paralysis in all four limbs, said A.K. Singare, residential medical office of Swami Ramanand Teerth Hospital, Ambejogai. The child was then transferred to the Latur government medical college on May 16 and it tested positive for VDPV on June 1. VDPVs are further classified into circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus, immunodeficiency-related vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) and ambiguous vaccinederived poliovirus. It is still unclear which form of the virus has infected the child. Officials in charge of the case said the child having been ill for prolonged periods indicated the possibility of iVDPV, which could be further linked to lack of sanitation and health facilities. Though the case has rung alarm bells, health experts say this does not threaten Indias polio-free status. Detecting VDPV is part of the surveillance system but only infections caused by wild polio virus strains like P1 and P3 are counted while declaring a country polio-free, and not a P2 strain which is caused by the oral polio vaccine and hence causes VDPV infection. Indias last case of wild polio infection was reported on January 13, 2011 from West Bengal.

The tariff of Rs. 4 per unit of electricity is unrealistic unless the government subsidises the cost of the first two Areva reactors by Rs. 22,000 crore
More than a decade after Enrons collapse, its legacy continues to haunt Maharashtra. In 2006, the Dabhol power project was restructured into the Ratnagiri power project with public subsidies that, by some estimates, amounted to Rs. 10,000 crore. The project has led a troubled existence and in March this year it announced that it may have to stop servicing its outstanding debt of Rs. 9,000 crore because of a problem with its fuel supply. In spite of this reminder of the continuing long-term costs of sweetheart deals to attract foreign investment in the power sector, a team from the Indian atomic energy establishment left for France last week to repeat the same mistakes. Problem with design

The French company Areva, just like Enron, has been promised a contract for six European Pressurized Reactors (EPRs) by executive fiat, bypassing a competitive bidding process. The reactors will be set up in Jaitapur, which is also in Ratnagiri. No one knows the exact extent of this give-way, because no EPR has been commissioned anywhere in the world. Areva started construction on its first EPR in Finland in 2005, with a promise to complete the reactor by 2009, at a price of just over 3 billion. After eight years, the reactor is still incomplete but cost estimates have ballooned to 8.5 billion almost thrice the original figure. Areva has various excuses, but similar delays and cost increases in the second EPR under construction in its own country point to a more fundamental problem with the EPR design. There is little public data about the EPRs being built in China, but these prices are consistent with those proposed for EPRs in Britain and indicate that each Indian reactor may cost as much as Rs. 60,000 crore. So, the price of the two reactors that the government hopes to commence in the Twelfth Plan period will equal the total plan outlay on science and technology including the departments of Space, Science and Technology, Biotechnology, and research labs throughout the country. What does this imply for consumers? In 2010, the then CEO of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, told this newspaper that the tariff would be below the Rs. 4 figure. More recently, Areva suggested that this tariff holds true, except for small escalations because of the delay in operationalising the project. Both Areva and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) have doggedly refused to explain the origins of this number. In the same 2010 interview, Lauvergeon said that I am not going to give you the details it is not for me to give the price if the customer does not want to give it. The government has also refused to divulge information in meetings with local activists or even in response to parliamentary questions, where it has fallen back on the story that the final price is still under negotiation. However, it is possible to independently estimate the cost of electricity using a study on the economics of imported reactors that the government produced in preparation for the India-U.S. nuclear deal. This was later updated and published by NPCIL. When M.V. Ramana and I applied this framework to the Jaitapur reactors, in a paper for the Economic and Political Weekly, we concluded that the true cost of electricity is likely to be almost four times as high as what the government claims. The figure of Rs. 4 per unit comes from a combination of unrealistic assumptions and a revenue model that provides massive public subsidies to the project. The single most important factor in determining the tariff is the capital cost of the reactor. The government claims that the Indian EPRs will be cheaper because construction forms about 40 per cent of the total cost. Estimates suggest that construction costs in India are about 60 per cent lower than Europe. So, under best case conditions, the government could hope for about a 25 per cent reduction in the total cost. However, the capital cost assumed in the governments study is not 25 per cent lower, but literally 25 per cent of the figure for European reactors! It is this assumption of an unrealistic capital cost that underpins the Rs. 4 figure. The study also reveals how the government plans to set out an exceedingly generous revenue model for the project. For example, it assumes that the project will have access to long-term debt

at an interest rate of only 6 per cent. This is inconsistent with the serious concerns about the projects viability. Moreover, since the yield on 10-year Indian Government bonds has been consistently higher than 7 per cent, even the full backing of the government will not bring the rate down to this level in the open market. So, the government will have to arm-twist public sector banks or itself provide a long-term loan to the project at this throwaway rate. Another subsidy is built into the governments plan to inject equity during the first few years of construction. In the governments revenue model, this money will sit idle for more than a decade until the reactor becomes operational. Assuming, optimistically, that the EPRs are constructed as fast as the Kudankulam reactors, this delay will bring the governments return on equity down from the advertised rate of 14 per cent to an effective rate of only 7.7 per cent. Further delays, which are likely, will reduce this further. When these parameters are corrected, and combined with a realistic estimate of the cost of fuel, the governments own methodology leads to a first year tariff of Rs.15 per unit, even without including transmission and distribution costs. Obviously, this cannot be passed on to consumers, and so the state will have to subsidise the electricity. To bring the tariff down to Rs. 4 will require a subsidy of Rs. 22,000 crore each year for the first two reactors. This Areva-subsidy is a quarter of Indias entire food subsidy bill. There are other serious questions about the project. For example, Arevas reluctance to accept even a small amount of liability is in sharp contrast to its unscientific claims that it has precisely computed the probability of a serious accident in an EPR, and found it to be once in 1.6 million years. But the economics of this project are so appalling that it is possible to separate these issues and even the broader question of the role of nuclear energy in India. Even the nuclear establishment accepts, as WikiLeaks revealed, that the NPCIL [has] paid a high price. The justification for the project cannot be Maharashtras electricity shortage either since at this price it is possible to find several alternative solutions to that problem. Jairam Ramesh admitted that for the government, the venture is significant not just from an energy generation but also from a strategic point of view. Anil Kakodkar, former chairperson of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, explained that India had to nurture French business interests because France helped India when it wanted access to international nuclear markets. Back-room deal This is an admission of an unsavoury back-room deal. However, a moments reflection also brings out the circularity of this argument. France supported Indias efforts because it wanted to sell reactors to India. Why should the country return this self-centred help by paying through its nose? There is a simple but significant political aspect to this entire issue. It is clear that this deal and the concomitant negotiations to purchase reactors from American companies are being driven by pressure from the Prime Ministers Office. The reason that negotiations with Areva have taken on an urgent note is because the governments prospects in the next elections are uncertain. If the next dispensation does not have the same ideological commitment to imported nuclear reactors, these deals may flounder.

Our system concentrates enormous financial powers in the hands of the executive. However, just because the government has the power does not mean that it has the right to rush into a deal that could bleed the country for years to come.

There has been no public debate on the level of watch citizens can be put through, and on what the red lines should be while using intrusive mechanisms
The tussle between government agencies need for a better, faster and real-time interception, surveillance and monitoring mechanism through the Central Monitoring System (CMS), on the one hand, and demands by privacy, civil rights and free speech activists, for ensuring higher privacy for citizens in view of CMS, on the other, is gaining ground. India today has nearly 900 million mobile subscribers, 160 million Internet users and close to 85 million citizens on social media. Internet and social media users are expected to double by 2015. The discussions have been coloured by the startling revelation relating to the PRISM project which, if true, may have meant that the privacy of millions of Indian Internet users could have been compromised, in varying degrees. Meanwhile, closer home, the CMS project, aimed at improving the capability of security agencies to protect national security and fight crime, including terrorism, has also raised serious privacy issues. Shrouded in secrecy First, very little real information is available about the CMS working procedure, technical capabilities and privacy safeguards in the public domain. While governments worldwide remain reluctant to share information about their surveillance and monitoring systems, successive governments in India have fared no better. Key unanswered issues include the uncontrolled use of technical capability and intrusive technologies, which are capable of instant, real time and deep search surveillance. There has been no debate in Parliament or outside about the level of surveillance citizens should be put through or whether there should be red lines when using intrusive surveillance mechanisms, even when technology presents an option. Further, there is no information about whether there are additional safeguards against interception by political authorities, of potential targets carrying out sensitive assignments such as judges, opposition leaders, editors, regulators, advocates, vigilance officials, corporate CEOs, etc. Should there be? How far should the spy agencies take lethal technological capability against their own citizens? Can all technological prowesses be used against any category of citizen, regardless of the level of security clearance they are entitled to? Who decides the correctness and propriety of such authorisations, especially since these are approved by bureaucrats who, in turn, report to political authorities? The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of Right to Freedom, in his report of April 17, 2013, has concluded that apart from increasing public awareness of threats to privacy, States must regulate the commercialization of surveillance technology. Legal infirmities

Secondly, while the existing law primarily relates to interception of calls, CMS expands surveillance across Meta-Data which includes CDRs and SDRs. Access, transfer and retention of CDRs is weakly defined under the existing laws. Provisions for authorisation of interception are contained in Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885, Rule 419(A) of the Indian Telegraph Rules 1951, as well as Section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2000, read with Information Technology (Directions for Interception or Monitoring or Decryption of Information) Rules 2009. The Right to Privacy, on the other hand, is protected under Article 21 Right to Life and Article 19(1)(a) Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under the Constitution of India, unless it is permitted under procedure established by law. While the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of interceptions, and monitoring under Section 5(2) of the Act through its order dated December 18, 1996, it subsequently laid down guidelines narrowing the scope of interception down to five instances national sovereignty and integrity, state security, friendly relations with foreign states, public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. With CMS, questions about the mismatch between the privacy legislation and the lethal forensic surveillance capabilities arise. These border on what is now recognised as a human rights issue. Are public order or preventing incitement to the commission of an offence sufficiently vague or broad for the security agencies to practically put through any authorisation request for interception, however weak, under these two heads? Can prevention of crime leave the door open to any agency, getting permission to monitor any citizen without adequate burden of proof? Since the authorities giving approval are not judges, will they have the judicial expertise to make legally valid decisions? Worse still if the surveillance is extra-judicial, how will it be uncovered? Further, interception under CMS can be done instantly and, since existing laws allow government agencies to intercept any phone conversation without the Home Secretarys mandatory permission, for seven days, should this procedure be reviewed under CMS? Should a lower level officers approval be sufficient to begin surveillance? The law also says the directions for interception shall remain in force, unless revoked earlier, for a period not exceeding 60 days, after issue, and may be renewed, but same shall not remain in force beyond a total period of 180 days. In effect, monitoring can continue for half the year. Is this period too long, without a periodic review? If there is a review, is it sufficiently independent and robust? Here again, the U.N. Rapporteur in the recent report on surveillance, recommended that surveillance must occur under, the most exceptional circumstances and exclusively under the supervision of an independent judicial authority. Further that surveillance techniques and practices that are applied outside the rule of law must be brought under legislative control. Meanwhile, there is no consensus on the opposing views between DoPT, the Home Ministry and civil rights activists, two-and-a-half years after a privacy group was set up under Secretary, DoPT, and seven months after the Justice A.P. Shah Committee submitted its Report on Privacy, suggesting a privacy legislation which was technologically neutral, inter-operable with international standards, protected multi-dimensional privacy, ensured horizontal applicability and conformity with privacy principles in a co-regulatory enforcement regime. Ironically, the latest draft of the privacy legislation itself remains a mystery. Lastly, bureaucrats authorise interception without any need to pass judicial muster by securing a prior valid court order. The surveillance is not subject to any ongoing bipartisan Parliamentary oversight either.

Before CMS, the mobile operator who gave access to the targets phone calls for interception was required to ensure that the interception order received had been duly authorised by the persons identified under the Act. This is no longer the case. The government has justified CMS in Parliament, by arguing that CMS, to avoid the recordings from being leaked, circumvents manual intervention by mobile operators, and is therefore more secure, allowing instant access. However, this means that the checks-and-balance system provided by the nodal officers in mobile networks which discovered the illegal request for BJP leader Arun Jaitleys CDRs, leading to the arrest of three persons including a Delhi police constable will no longer exist. Is there a new safeguard? Potential misuse Under CMS, one government official will authorise interception. This will be reviewed and executed by other fellow officers in different agencies but all within the government. What is the guarantee that such permission will be subject to the rigorous due diligence that it deserves? Will every government officer follow the laid down procedure, especially if he knows that all authorisations are covered under absolute secrecy with no chance of public disclosure or scrutiny? What happens if the procedure is violated? Will violations, when discovered, be acted upon since everything remains secret within the government? The identity of targets or duration of monitoring cannot be revealed publicly, even under the RTI, as it falls under specific exemptions granted in Section 8 of the RTI Act. How will mistakes be corrected and misuse prevented? There are other questions that remain unanswered in law. Who all within the government can have access to the Intercept Related Information (IRI), Call Content (CC) and CDRs? How long can intercept information be kept with the government and what is the procedure for its safe keeping especially given a track record of leaked tapes without a single official being found guilty in such instances? Are there any circumstances under which targets, especially when found innocent, will be informed that they were under surveillance? The privacy issues are sufficiently serious both outside India and within. Hopefully, the government can present the Privacy Bill early for Parliament to debate it. Equally it may be time for the Supreme Court to review its guidelines which were written at a time when there were less than a million mobile subscribers and no Internet users. Project documents relating to the new Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) reveal the governments lethal and all-encompassing surveillance capabilities, which, without the assurance of a matching legal and procedural framework to protect privacy, threaten to be as intrusive as the U.S. governments controversial PRISM project. These capabilities are being built even as a debate rages on the extent to which the privacy of Indian Internet and social media users was compromised by the PRISM project. A PIL petition on the subject has already been admitted by the Supreme Court. The documents in the possession of The Hindu indicate that the CMS project now has a budgeted commitment nearly double that of the Rs. 400-crore estimate that senior officials mentioned in a recent briefing to the media. Once implemented, the CMS will enhance the governments surveillance and interception capabilities far beyond meta-data, data mining, and the original expectation of instant and secure interception of phone conversations. The interception flow diagram, hitherto under wraps, reveals that the CMS being set up by C-DoT an obscure government enterprise located on the outskirts of New Delhi will have the

capability to monitor and deliver Intercept Relating Information (IRI) across 900 million mobile (GSM and CDMA) and fixed (PSTN) lines as well as 160 million Internet users, on a real time basis through secure ethernet leased lines. The CMS will have unfettered access to the existing Lawful Interception Systems (LIS), currently installed in the network of every fixed and mobile operator, ISP, and International Long Distance service provider. Mobile and long distance operators, who were required to ensure interception only after they were in receipt of the authorisation, will no longer be in the picture. With CMS, all authorisations remain secret within government departments. This means that government agencies can access in real time any mobile and fixed line phone conversation, SMS, fax, web-site visit, social media usage, Internet search and email, including partially written emails in draft folders, of targeted numbers. This is because, contrary to the impression that the CMS was replacing the existing surveillance equipment deployed by mobile operators and ISPs, it would actually combine the strength of two expanding the CMSs forensic capabilities multiple times. Even where data mining and meta-data access through call data records (CDRs) and session initiation protocol data records (SDRs) used for Internet protocol-related communications including video conferencing, streaming multi-media, instant messaging, presence information, file transfer, video games and voice & fax over IP is concerned the CMS will have unmatched capabilities of deep search surveillance and monitoring. The CMS is designed to have access to call content (CC) on multiple E1 leased lines through operators billing/ mediation servers. These servers will reveal user information to the accuracy of milliseconds, relating to call duration, identification and call history of those under surveillance. Additionally, it will disclose mobile numbers and email IDs, including pinpointing the targets physical location by revealing cellphone tower information. Nationwide surveillance The Hindus investigation has also unveiled the mystery relating to the CMSs national rollout. Contrary to reports about it being active nationwide, only Delhi and Haryana have tested proof of concept (POC) successfully. Kerala, Karnataka and Kolkata are the next three destinations for CMSs implementation. Till 2015, two surveillance and interception systems will run in parallel the existing State-wise, 200-odd Lawful Intercept and Monitoring (LIM) Systems, set up by 7 to 8 mobile operators in each of the 22 circles, plus the multiple ISP and international gateways alongside the national rollout of CMS. The aim is to cover approximately one dozen States by the end of 2013-14. On November 26, 2009, the government told Parliament that CMSs implementation would overcome the existing systems secrecy which can be easily compromised due to manual interventions at many stages. In January 2012, the government had admitted to intercepting over 1 lakh phones and communication devices over a year, at a rate of 7,5009,000 per month. Privacy vs. security Currently two government spy agencies the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) plus seven others, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Narcotics Control Bureau, DRI, National Intelligence Agency, CBDT (tax authority), Military Intelligence of Assam and JK and Home Ministry are authorised to intercept and monitor

citizens calls and emails, under the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, The Indian Telegraph Act 1985, Rule 419(A) and other related legislation. Given the major technological advancements in monitoring and enhanced forensic capabilities in surveillance, coupled with the change in procedure which mandates the interception authorization to be kept secret between two government departments with no scope of a transparent public disclosure of who is being monitored, for what purpose and for how long, privacy and free speech activists are protesting and raising many questions. The government, meanwhile, is proceeding undeterred.

AFGAN

As the 2014 U.S pullout from Afghanistan draws closer, New Delhi needs a plan to deal with a fresh wave of refugees
In the courtyard of a New Delhi hospital, Hanifa, an Afghan refugee, walks around offering her services as an interpreter to her countrymen who are waiting for treatment. She is the sole breadwinner for a family of six. Being an interpreter is her only source of income. Hanifas life in India is starkly different from that back at home where she worked in the Afghan Ministry of Womens Affairs and was a prominent women's rights activist. In 2010 she received death threats from the Taliban because it considered her to be a supporter of the western forces and thus an infidel. She was forced to flee to India in 2011 and was recognised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a refugee. Taliban threat Though survival in India is challenging due to the lack of access to employment and uneven integration in society, the prospect of her returning home is unthinkable given the looming uncertainty of Afghanistans fate after the withdrawal of international troops in 2014. We hear of attacks happening everyday even in cities like Kabul. The threat of the Taliban has only grown stronger. We are definitely headed for a civil war after the withdrawal, says Mahmoud Sayeed, another Afghan refugee who fled to New Delhi in 2006 to avoid blasphemy charges after he converted to Christianity. For many Afghans like Sayeed, much like their past, the future too appears to be riddled with conflict and fear. While India works towards strengthening its strategic partnership with Afghanistan, there has been no clear policy as yet on dealing with increasing numbers of asylum-seekers from the wartorn nation. In anticipation of the worsening security conditions in their country, many Afghans are scrambling to find asylum in a country they can call home. In the South Asian region, India continues to be one such destination, apart from Pakistan and Iran. While Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees since the Soviet invasion, it has now set June 2013 as the deadline for the repatriation of around 1.66 million Afghan refugees. Similarly, the Iranian government, hit by a faltering economy, is also pushing for their return. UNHCR led

An estimated 25,000 Afghans are believed to be living in India a mix of traders, medical tourists, students and those fleeing threats to life and persecution (i.e. refugees). Asylum-seekers in India typically include people who face threats from the Taliban, interpreters working for the international presence, journalists, single women, including activists and those facing forced marriage threats, former government officials, etc. According to UNHCR estimates, it has recognised close to 10,000 Afghans as refugees. With Indian consular presence in five districts in Afghanistan, the process of getting an Indian visa has become relatively simple and usually takes two to three days. In the last four months, the number of Afghans seeking asylum is believed to have increased. India has traditionally allowed and tacitly recognised refugees by allowing the UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination and recognising its Refugee Card. Thus, most Afghans view India as the only hope to seek a better life. Living as refugees in cities like New Delhi, is however, daunting. Many Afghans are coming to India thinking that they can seek asylum here if conditions in Afghanistan deteriorate after 2014. However, once they come to India, they realise that life is very tough as a refugee, especially given that you cannot work here, says Sayeed. Most refugees work in the informal sector, characterised by a lack of social security, low wages and exploitation. But qualified Afghan refugees and these are many, including doctors, human rights activists, journalists, etc who arent able to find work that fits their qualifications, find it frustrating. While some accept the situation, others return despite the continued threat to their lives, betting on the remote possibility of a stable Afghanistan post-2014. Long-term visas In June 2012, the Indian government agreed to issue long-term visas to refugees recognised by the UNHCR. Significant in the Indian context, this overtly recognises refugees and enables them to work in the formal/private sector, which is a right under international refugee law. Further, in what appears to be an attempt at maintaining and developing its traditionally friendly relations with Afghanistan, the Ministry of External Affairs indicated in the Lok Sabha in February this year that longer duration stay applications of Afghan nationals entering India with valid travel documents will be considered. Together, these developments hold promise for Afghan asylumseekers, though how these policies will be implemented needs to be seen. In light of the imminent possibility of an increased influx of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan after 2014, a clear refugee policy and implementation strategy would be in Indias best interest.

UTTRAKHAND

The catastrophe in the Himalaya is the result of deforestation, unchecked construction of dwellings and large-scale building of big dams
A week is a long time in the Himalaya. In the late 1980s, I visited Arunachal Pradesh as a young researcher, with a keen interest in photography. I walked into the middle of the Dibang river, hop skipping over boulders, until my local tribal guide ordered me to return immediately. He smiled and said, Sir, these mountain rivers are like daughters, you never know how quickly they grow up. I was humbled by his knowledge and havent forgotten the lesson. Back to the present. During a just-concluded 10-day visit to the Bhagirathi valley, our research team witnessed telltale signs of a catastrophe ready to strike. At Uttarkashi, we viewed the

destruction caused by the Assi Nadi (a tributary of the Bhagirathi) a couple of years ago. We noticed the rivers waters flow strongly against a number of houses and cheap hotel buildings, precariously perched on its weak banks. The next day we left for Gangotri, but couldnt go beyond Maneri village because a massive landslide had washed away the road about six to eight kilometres upstream. As a result, there was a long line of stranded buses, cars and trucks. Fortunately, the Garrison Reserve Engineer Force (GREF), an arm of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) and the police worked overtime and made sure there was little chaos on the road as it opened. Harsil was biting cold and the rain incessant. We returned to Uttarkashi the same evening and to the safer Dun valley the next day. Deforestation On the television, news of the devastation in Uttarkashi had started pouring in. It was painful to see the buildings, photographed only the previous day, being washed away like toys by the Bhagirathi. There is little doubt that the present Himalayan disaster has been triggered by natural events, but the catastrophe is man-made. Let us address the various man-induced drivers. One, there is ample scientific evidence that the Himalayan watersheds have witnessed unprecedented deforestation over a long period. Deforestation as a commercial activity began during the British Raj and has continued unabated after independence. While official estimates say forest cover has increased in the Himalaya, a number of credible independent studies have found significant discrepancies in this claim. The fact is that forests have been diverted for a host of land use activities such as agriculture, human settlements and urbanisation. Massive infrastructure development such as hydropower construction and road building has taken place. Scientific studies indicate that at the current rates of deforestation, the total forest cover in the Indian Himalaya will be reduced from 84.9 per cent (of the value in 1970) in 2000 to no more than 52.8 per cent in 2100. Dense forest areas, on which many forest taxa (groups of species) critically depend, would decline from 75.4 per cent of the total forest area in 2000 to just 34 per cent in 2100, which is estimated to result in the extinction of 23.6 per cent of taxa restricted to the dense Himalayan forests. Global warming Vegetative cover slows the speed of falling rain and prevents soil erosion and gully formation the precursors to landslides and floods. Dense vegetation, by evapotranspiration, also stops nearly 30-40 per cent of rainwater from falling to the ground, thereby significantly reducing runoff. Besides holding the soil together, forests and soil soak water from the rain, release it slowly and prevent water flowing as run-off. So, deforestation brings about slope destabilisation, landslides and floods. Given that the Himalayan range is geologically young and still rising, it makes the area vulnerable to erosion and instability. Therefore, it is all the more necessary to take land use change more seriously. Two, there is mounting evidence that global warming is fast catching up with the Himalaya. In a recent study, we reported that Himalayan ecosystems have experienced faster rates of warming in the last 100 years and more than the European Alps or other mountain ranges of the world. In such a scenario, we expect faster melting of glaciers causing higher water discharges in the Himalayan rivers.

Expanding settlements Three, expanding human settlements and urbanisation which, besides bringing about land use changes offer themselves as easy targets to the fury of natural forces. While it is important to appreciate the aspirations of the local people and their economic activities, there cannot be a lack of enforcement of land use control laws on the part of local governments and officials. Huge building construction, cheap hotels and individual dwellings at Uttarkashi, on the banks of the Assi and Bhagirathi rivers have been allowed. There is little buffer between the river and the human settlements. Four, large-scale dam building in recent years has caused massive land use changes with ensuing problems in the Himalayan watersheds. Hydropower and allied construction activities are potential sources of slope weakening and destabilisation. Massive intervention in the Himalayan ecosystems through manipulation of rivers and their hydrology, is linked to what we are witnessing today. Most downstream damage in otherwise flood-free areas is caused by dams and barrages, which release large volumes of water to safeguard engineering structures. Dam operators often release more water during rains than the carrying capacity of downstream areas, causing floods. Pilgrims Five, neo-religious movements, linked to changing socio-political developments in India, are responsible for significant human movement into the Himalaya beyond the regions carrying capacity, whether it is Amarnath in Jammu & Kashmir, Kedarnath, Badrinath, Gangotri and Hemkund in Uttarakhand. The heavy pilgrim population has also resulted in the mushrooming of shanty towns, cheap accommodation and numerous ramshackle buildings along river banks. What is the road ahead? There needs to be an integrated policy on the Himalayan environment and development. Enough information is available in the public domain, which only needs to be put together and looked at in a cohesive manner. Himalayan State governments need to consider imposing high environmental tax on visitors, particularly during summer and monsoon months. Heavily sizing down pilgrim numbers in fragile areas must begin. All vulnerable buildings need to be either secured or relocated away from rivers. Governments must impose penalties on building structures within 200 metres of river banks. Hydropower policy must consider building fewer dams and prioritise those that have the least environmental and social costs. Independent and serious monitoring of the catchment area treatment plans proposed by Forest Departments with funds from hydropower companies needs to be carried out and reported to the Green Tribunal.

As lethal as PRISM

Indias surveillance project may be as lethal as PRISM

NEW DELHI:

Project documents relating to the new Centralized Monitoring System ( CMS) reveal the governments lethal and all - encompassing surveillance capabilities, which, without the assurance of a matching legal and procedural framework to governments protect privacy, threaten to be as intrusive as the U. S. controversial PRISM project.

These capabilities are being built even as a debate rages on the extent to which the privacy of Indian Internet and social media users was compromised by the PRISM project. A PIL petition on the subject has already been admitted by the Supreme Court.

The documents in the possession of The Hinduindicate

that the CMS project now has a budgeted commitment nearly double that of the Rs. 400crore estimate that senior officials mentioned in a recent brie.ng to the media. Once implemented, the CMS will enhance the governments surveillance and interception capabilities far beyond metadata, data mining, and the original expectation of instant and secure interception of phone conversations.

The interception .ow diagram, set up by C- DoT of New Delhi

hitherto under wraps, reveals that the CMS being

an obscure government enterprise located on the outskirts and .xed ( PSTN) basis through

will have the capability to monitor and deliver Intercept Relating on a real time

Information ( IRI) across 900 million mobile ( GSM and CDMA) lines as well as 160 million Internet users, secure ethernet leased lines.

The CMS will have unfettered access to the existing Lawful Interception Systems ( LIS), currently installed in the network of every .xed and mobile operator, Mobile and long distance all who were required to ensure interception only after they were in ISP, and International Long Distance service provider. operators,

receipt of the authorisation, will no longer be in the picture. With CMS, authorisations remain secret within government departments.

This means that government agencies can access in real time any mobile and .xed line phone conversation, Internet search and email, targeted numbers. SMS, fax, web- site visit, social media usage, of including partially written emails in draft folders,

This is because,

contrary to the impression that the CMS

was replacing the existing surveillance equipment deployed by mobile operators and ISPs, it would actually combine the strength of two expanding the CMSs forensic capabilities multiple times.

Even where data mining and meta- data CDRs)

access through call data records ( used for Internet

and session initiation protocol data records ( SDRs)

protocol- related communications including video conferencing, streaming multi-media, instant messaging, presence information, file transfer, video games and voice & fax over IP is concerned the CMS will have unmatched capabilities of deep search surveillance and monitoring. The CMS is designed to have access to call content (CC) on multiple E1 leased lines through operators billing/ mediation servers. These servers will reveal user information to the accuracy of milliseconds, relating to call duration, identification and call history of those under surveillance. Additionally, it will disclose mobile numbers and email IDs, including pinpointing the targets physical location by revealing cellphone tower information.

Nationwide surveillance

The Hindus investigation has also unveiled the mystery relating to the CMSs national rollout. Contrary to reports about it being active nationwide, only Delhi and Haryana have tested proof of concept (POC) successfully. Kerala, Karnataka and Kolkata are the next three destinations for CMSs implementation. Till 2015, two surveillance and interception systems will run in parallel the existing State-wise, 200-odd Lawful Intercept and Monitoring (LIM) Systems, set up by 7 to 8 mobile operators in each of the 22 circles, plus the multiple ISP and international gateways alongside the national rollout of CMS. The aim is to cover approximately one dozen States by the end of 201314. On November 26, 2009, the government told Parliament that CMSs implementation would overcome the existing systems secrecy which can be easily compromised due to manual interventions at many stages. In January 2012, the government had admitted to intercepting over 1 lakh phones and communication devices over a year, at a rate of 7,5009,000 per month.

Privacy vs. security

Currently two government spy agencies the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) plus seven others, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Narcotics Control Bureau, DRI, National Intelligence Agency, CBDT (tax authority), Military Intelligence of Assam and JK and Home Ministry are authorised to intercept and monitor citizens calls and emails, under the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, The Indian Telegraph Act 1985, Rule 419(A) and other related legislation. Given the major technological advancements in monitoring and enhanced forensic capabilities in surveillance, coupled with the change in procedure which mandates the interception authorization to be kept secret between two government departments with no scope of a transparent public disclosure of who is being monitored, for what purpose and for how long, privacy and free speech activists are protesting and raising many questions. The government, meanwhile, is proceeding undeterred.

New Criteria For Granting Special Category Status

The government has constituted a six-member expert committee under Raghuram Rajan, chief economic adviser in the finance ministry, to finalize the new criteria to determine backwardness of states for granting special category status. The other members of the expert committee constituted by the finance ministry are Shaibal Gupta, a member of the Asian Development Research Institute in Patna; Bharat Ramaswami, professor, Indian Statistical Institute; Najeeb Jung, vicechancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia University; Niraja G. Jayal, a professor at the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University; and Tuhin Pandey, adviser, Planning Commission. The Terms of Reference of the Committee will be:

To suggest methods for identifying backward States on the basis of measures such as the distance of the State from the national average on a variety of criteria such as per capita income and other indicators of human development To suggest any other method or criteria to determine the backwardness of States To suggest the weightage to be given to each criterion To recommend how the suggested criteria may be reflected in future planning and devolution of funds from the Central Government to the States To suggest ways in which the absorptive capacity of States for funds and their ability to use the funds to improve well-being can be assessed

and used to influence devolution to incentivise performance. concept of a special category state

Existing Criteria For For Special Category Status

Hilly and difficult terrain Low population density or sizeable share of tribal population Strategic location along borders with neighbouring countries Economic and infrastructural backwardness Non-viable nature of state finances

Who Grants Special Category Status: National Development Council comprising the Prime Minster, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers and members of the Planning Commission, has the power to grant special category status to States.

Brief History

The concept of a special category state was first introduced in 1969 Initially three states Assam, Nagaland and Jammu & Kashmir were granted special status Later on, eight more States have been included (Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Sikkim, Tripura and Uttarakhand) Special-category states get significant excise duty concessions that attracts industries to relocate/locate manufacturing units within their territory The Planning Commission allocates funds to states through central assistance for state plans. Central assistance can be broadly split into three components: Normal Central Assistance (NCA), Additional Central Assistance (ACA) and Special Central Assistance NCA, the main assistance for state plans, is split to favour special category states: the 11 states get 30% of the total assistance while the other states share the remaining 70% The nature of the assistance also varies for special category states; NCA is split into 90% grants and 10% loans for special category states, while the ratio between grants and loans is 30:70 for other states The 12th Finance Commission recommended the Centre give only grants, and leave it to the states to raise loans. Since then, this formula is restricted to Centrally-sponsored schemes and external aid

Financial Assistance

Unlike the Planning Commission, the Finance Commission does not distinguish between special and non special category states in its allocation