PILAPIL vs.

IBAY-SOMERA 174 s653

FACTS: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was married to Erich Ekkehard Geiling, respondent and a German National at the Registrar or Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived for sometime in Malate, Manila and had their only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling born on April 20, 1980. After three and a half years of marriage the private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against the petitioner in Germany on January 1983 for he claimed that there was failure of their marriage and they have been living apart since April 1982. On the other hand, the petitioner filed an action for legal separation, support and property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983 and on January 15, 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany issued the decree of divorce. After five months upon the issuance of the decree of divorce, the private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila, alleging that while still married to the respondent, the petitioner had an affair with William Chia in 1982 and with another man named Jesus Chua in 1983. The case was dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence but upon review, it was then filed to two branches of Regional Trial Court of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner commenced adultery against the private respondent? HELD: The court held that the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is Set Aside and dismissing the complaint of the crime adultery in People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua for lack of jurisdiction and thus the temporary restraining order issued is made permanent. The court ruled that the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, Federal Republic of Germany is then admitted and is legally recognized in the Philippines insofar as the private respondent is concerned and also on the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner had a no legal standing to commence the adultery case under imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit, because one of the jurisdictional requirement is that the one who can file the crime of adultery must be filed by the offended spouse only.

BALOBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS 269 s 259

FACTS: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudisio Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Generosa Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961 and have an older brother Gavino, but also died, predeceasing their parents. Private respondents brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners and claiming that they are the legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina Ubas and that they are entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. But the petitioners denied knowing the respondents and alleged that their brother Gavino died single at their parents residence at Asturias Cebu, Catalina presented witnesses to her marriage with Gavino but there were no documents that will support it due or because these instruments are lost during the war. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina? HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the marriage of Gabino and Catalina cannot be doubted, and that this claim is supported by testimonial evidence by the people who witnessed the marriage between them. And that the law favors the validity of marriage, because the state is interested in the preservation of the family and sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. And that Gaudisio himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees, that on an investigation conducted by Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu that Gaudisio testified that Romanito Balogbog was his nephew. That the parent and child filiation in the absence of titles indicated in Article 265 of the Civil Code, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by Rules of Court or Special Laws.

TAMANO vs. ORTIZ 291 SCRA 594

FACTS: Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda in civil rites. Their marriage remained valid until his death, prior to his death, Tamano also married Estrellita Tamano. Zorayda filed a complaint for Declaration of Mullty of Marriage of Tamano and Estrelita on the ground that it was bigamous. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction because Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and thus Sharia courts should takes the jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sharia Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action? HELD: The petition is denied and the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration is affirmed. The court ruled that the marriage of husband and wife, actions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, maybe commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff and determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff. And that Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree 1083)(, the Sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and muslim laws.

DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS 266 s 572

FACTS: Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo was married to petitioner Robert Domingo, unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz qwhich marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation. While on her one month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman, she further discovered that he has been disposing some of her properties without her knowledge and consent. She confronted him about this but he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother and appointed attorney-in-fact, Roberto Domingo is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. Because of this Delia filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of their marriage and the separation of property. However, petitioner contends that the Declaration of Nullity of their marriage is unnecessary since their marriage is void abinitio. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary? HELD: A final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. One can conceive other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage, such as the separation of their properties. Because of this, private respondents ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS 240 s 20

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari, that the marriage of the petitioner, Leouel Santos with the respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos be declared null on the ground of Article 36 of Family Code. Leouel met Julia when he held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army and exchanged vows by a church wedding. They lived at the house of Julias parents and Julia gave birth to a baby boy, Leouel Santos Jr. Julias parents frequent interfere to their relationship led to quarrels and Julia finally left for United States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after, Julia called for the first time and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract, but she never did. When he got the chance to visit United States for a training, he desperately tried to locate her but he failed. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be declared null under the Article 36 of Family Code? HELD: The petition is denied on the grounds that Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability, that Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing percepts in our law on marriage. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA 266 s 324

FACTS: Petitioner, Chi Ming Tsoi was married to the private respondent, Gina Lao-Tsoi on May 22, 1988. On their first night of their married life, they slept together on the same bed but contrary to the expectation of the respondent, the petitioner just went to bed and slept without having sexual intercourse with each other and the same thing happened on succeeding nights. The respondent had planned to have their private honeymoon at Baguio City but the respondent invited his relatives and same things happened. Thereby the respondent filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of Family Code and that the respondent alleges that the petitioner is impotent and a closet homosexual. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation?

HELD: The decision was affirmed and that under the Family Code, in marriage, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity and one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through a sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.

MARCOS vs. MARCOS 343 s 755

FACTS: The petitioner, Wilson G. Marcos and respondent Brenda B. Marcos were married twice. Both were assigned at Malacanang Palace, where Brenda as escort of Imee Marcos and Wilson as Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos and eventually became sweethearts. After the downfall of President Marcos, Wilson left the Military Service and engaged in different business and upon failure in any gainful employment they would often quarrel and as a consequence he would beat her and force her to have sexual intercourse with him despite her weariness. Thereby, the respondent filed a petition declaring the nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and further alleged that the petitioner, failed to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards the respondent and their children. ISSUE: Whether or not totality of evidences presented sustains that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated? HELD: The petition is denied, although the court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG 351 s 425

FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Dagdag, 20 years old. They begot two children and lived in a house located at the back of the house of their in-laws. A week after the wedding, Avelino started to leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking spree with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity or marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the NFC. The RTC rendered decision declaring the marriage void under Art. 36 of the NFC which the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in this case to declaration of the marriage void under Art. 36 of the Family Code? HELD: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case, and in regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline no. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.

warrant the

REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO 220 s 20

FACTS: Respondent, Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England during one of ships port calls. Parker lived with respondent on his ship for 6 months until they returned to Antique. They got married 2 years after. After the marriage, respondent obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his pregnant wife in Antique. His mother informed him through a letter that his wife had left after giving birth to their son. Respondent said that he exerted efforts to look for her, but they proved fruitless. He then filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife invoking Art 41 of the NFC six years after. The Republic of the Philippines through the provincial prosecutor opposed the petition arguing that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead HELD: Under Art. 41 of the NFC, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years, however, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry; and that the NFC prescribes a wellfounded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted; that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well founded belief that she is dead; that walking into a major city life Liverpool on London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there cannot be regarded as a reasonably diligent search; that since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirement of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death was denied.

BIENVENIDO vs. CA 257 s 676

FACTS: On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after, without his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita Bienvenido, who he lived with from 1968 until at the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot which was registered in his name. 2 years after, he executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a petition before the RTC seeking the annulment of the sale of the property of petitioner. Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the property in question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good faith. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in presuming the validity of marriage between Aurelio and Luisita? HELD: That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven year period has lapsed; That this exception cannot be invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. Until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed.

ARMAS v. CALISTERIO 330 s 201

FACTS: On 24 April 1992, Teoderico Calisterio died intestate. He was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teoderico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James Bounds on January 1946. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on February 1974. Teoderico and Marietta were married eleven years later without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. On October 1992, petitioner Antonia Armas, a surviving sister of Teoderico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Teoderico, the marriage between the latter and respondent being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Teoderico and Marietta is valid? HELD: The marriage between the deceased and respondent was solemnized on May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on August 1988. Art. 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by explicit mandate of Art. 83, to be deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court. It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.

PACETE v. CARRIAGE Jr. 231 s 321

FACTS: On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alaris filed before the CFI a complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage between here erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete, petitioner, and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and petitioner. She alleged that she and petitioner were married on April of 1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted, in 1948, a second marriage with dela Concepcion; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Pacete filed several motions for extension to file an answer, all of which were granted except for the last motion which was denied on ground that it was filed after the original period given. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare Pacete and dela Concepcion in default, which the court granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. The court also decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis. Hence, the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI gravely abused its discretion in declaring petitioner in default? HELD: The court ruled by citing the provisions of Art. 101 of the Civil Code which provides: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment, and that In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. This provision has been reproduced in Art. 60 of the Family Code, Art. 58 of the Family Code further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. That other remedies have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. Petition was granted; decision appealed from was nullified and set aside.

TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS 256 s 158

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari, whereby the petitioner Emilio Tuason seeks to annul and set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in the petition of the private respondent, Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason, for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to the petitioner. The respondent allege that she and petitioner that at the time of their marriage the petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between them. But the private petitioner denied all the imputations against him and claimed he and the private respondent were normal married couple during their first ten years of their marriage and begot two children during this period and that they have serious personal differences in 1982 only when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case by the petitioner. HELD: The petition is denied and decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed. That the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent had already been final and executory when petition failed to appeal during the reglamentary period. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence.

LEONOR vs. CA 256 s 69

FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio Leonor in San Carlos City. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. Mauricio raised the issue of the alleged non-existence of the marriage between him and Virginia. Meanwhile, Virgina learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City for registration. Hence, she applied for the late registration of her marriage. Said application was granted. The trial court declared said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious. Virginia filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same. ISSUE: Did the court err in refusing to decide upon the merits of the case, that is, to declare whether or not the judgment of the trial court is null and void? HELD: The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under Rule 108 are typographical of clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rule.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS 336 s 747

FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the respondent contraction a second marriage with petitioner on January 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Salley Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed against respondent on Feb. 1998. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy? HELD: Art. 40 of the family code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that, it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.