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Decei
Dr. Alvaro Morcillo Laiz, born g), sIudied law and poliIical science aI Ihe Universidad
AuInoma de Madrid and aI Ihe lree UniversiIy oI 8erlin (gg-ggg). ln zoo), he
obIained his docIoraIe in poliIical science Irom Ihe RumboldI UniversiIy in 8erlin. lrom
zoo6 Io zoo8, Dr. Morcillo served as a research Iellow aI Ihe Social Science kesearch
CenIer 8erlin (WZ8). ln zoo8, he was awarded a posI-docIoral Iellowship aI Ihe Uni-
versidad Nacional AuInoma de Mxico. CurrenIly he is an assisIanI proIessor aI Ihe
CenIer Ior kesearch and 1eaching in Lconomics (ClDL) in Mexico CiIy.
ConIenI: 1his book gauges Ihe inIluence oI naIionalisI parIies on Luropean policies.
1he abiliIy oI regions - Ihe consIiIuenI uniIs Irom decenIralized member sIaIes - Io
shape LU decisions has been aI Ihe cenIre oI discussions on Luropean inIegraIion
Iheory and oI Luropean Union poliIics Ior IiIIeen years now. 8y combining evidence
Irom Germany, lIaly and Spain, and Irom Iwo LU policy areas - audiovisual and
cohesion - Ihe auIhor shows why and when undersIanding LU policies requires Iaking
regional lobbying oI Ihe Luropean ParliamenI and Ihe Commission inIo consideraIion.
1his IirsI aIIempI Io combine Ihe liIeraIure on "1he Lurope oI Ihe kegions" and on
mulIi-level governance wiIh policy analysis will be illuminaIing Ior scholars and
pracIiIioners inIeresIed in Iederalism, naIionalisI parIies, and Ihe LU decision-making
process as well as Ior Ihose concerned wiIh LuropeanizaIion.
ISBN 978-3-8329-4606-7
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Nomos verlagsgesellschaII, 8aden-8aden zoog. PrinIed in Germany. Alle kechIe,
auch die des Nachdrucks von Auszgen, der phoIomechanischen Wiedergabe und
der UberseIzung, vorbehalIen. GedruckI auI alIerungsbesIandigem Papier.
1his work is sub|ecI Io copyrighI. All righIs are reserved, wheIher Ihe whole or parI
oI Ihe maIerial is concerned, speciIically Ihose oI IranslaIion, reprinIing, re-use oI
illusIraIions, broadcasIing, reproducIion by phoIocopying machine or similar me-
ans, and sIorage in daIa banks. Under q oI Ihe German CopyrighI Law where
copies are made Ior oIher Ihan privaIe use a Iee is payable Io verwerIungsgesell-
schaII WorI, Munich.
Die DeuIsche NaIionalbiblioIhek verzeichneI diese PublikaIion in
der DeuIschen NaIionalbibliograIie; deIaillierIe bibliograIische
DaIen sind im lnIerneI ber hIIp://www.d-nb.de abruIbar.
Die DeuIsche NaIionalbiblioIhek lisIs Ihis publicaIion in Ihe DeuIsche
NaIionalbibliograIie; deIailed bibliographic daIa is available
in Ihe lnIerneI aI hIIp://www.d-nb.de .
Zugl.: RumboldI UniversiIaI zu 8erlin, Diss., zoo)

lS8N g)8--8zg-q6o6-)
Acknowledgements
This book looks at how European regions, particularly those governed by nationalist
parties, decide to collaborate with central governments and other regions on EU policy-
making. This topic has been studied in the past, but in order to explore Europeanization
or the ability of the European Union to transform its member states. Recent literature on
regions has also focused on establishing whether they, together with European insti-
tutions in a multilevel setting, have eroded member states power to shape EU policies.
This book, however, approaches these issues with a different aim to establish whether
regional interests as defined by nationalist parties receive more consideration from
member states, the Commission or the European Parliament than do those of other
regions. While this book makes clear that the autonomy enjoyed by nationalist party-
led regions is no compensation for the lack of co-operation between wider groups of
regions, it also aims to shed new light on the difficulties of coordination within federal
systems. Finally, I examine the lesser known links between regional interests and the
European Parliament. Surprisingly, the European Parliament appears to be a more
effective ally of the regions than the Commission and, even more importantly, has
functioned as an actor promoting agendas that overlap with those of regions and of
cultural minorities.
The policy fields discussed here audiovisual and cohesion policy as well as the
regional cases from Germany, Italy, and Spain, stem from my PhD research. In this
sense, this book is an abridged version of my thesis. However it represents, I hope, a
significant improvement, not only in style, but also in the analysis of the institutional
explanatory variable the norms regulating the access of regions to the Council of the
European Union. I have labelled these norms coordination mechanisms, and to
understand them better I have drawn on Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpfs framework
of actor-centred institutionalism. Most of the research discussed here was conducted
during my PhD and completed in the summer of 2006. Nevertheless, I have addressed
several important contributions to the fields of Europeanization, nationalist parties, and
federalism published after this date.
I seek here to recognize if not repay the debts to those who have made this book
possible. Because the research and writing of this book took many years, I relied
heavily upon the support of numerous institutions and individuals. I am glad to ac-
knowledge the support of the DFG, or the German Research Foundation, which funded
the graduate program in which I participated, Das Neue Europa, at the Humboldt
University in Berlin. The program was later renamed the Berlin Graduate School of
Social Sciences and sponsored by the DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Ser-
vice. Numerous forms of support from both the DAAD and the DFG throughout these
years, including a fellowship, travel expenses to conduct time-consuming comparative
research, and funds to purchase books, are gratefully acknowledged. During the last
stage of my PhD I also benefited from the Marie Curie pre-doctoral program of the
5
European Commission that enabled me to spend eight months at the Centre for Com-
parative Research in Social Welfare of the University of Stirling in Scotland. Soon after
submitting my dissertation I began work at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin
(WZB), where I spent the two following years benefitting from all the freedom ne-
cessary to finish this and begin other academic projects. Subsequently I spent one year
in postdoctoral research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in
Mexico City, which allowed me to conclude my work on this manuscript.
Behind these institutions were a cast of helpful individuals who frequently went
above and beyond the call of duty in assisting my research. Without the engagement of
Gert-Joachim Glaessner and Martin Nagelschmidt, I and many others would not have
benefited from the support of Das Neue Europa and of the Graduate School of Social
Sciences at the School of Social Science of the Humboldt University. I would also like
to acknowledge the support of my supervisors, Peter A. Kraus and, most particularly,
Claus Offe, who has guided me since the earliest stage of my research. Participation in
professor Offes research seminar improved my work and enriched my understanding
of the social sciences. At the University of Stirling, Jochen Clasen was a most gracious
host. At the University of Stirling, I also had several invaluable opportunities for
exchange with Peter Lynch. My academic home at the Berlin Social Science Research
Center (WZB) was the Research Unit Democracy: Structures, Performances, and
Challenges. I benefited significantly from talks with virtually every member of the
research centre. I would like, however, to specifically mention its director, Wolfgang
Merkel, who allowed his team members the freedom to pursue their work and to offer
criticism, Christian Henkes, who was understanding and helpful in every way imagin-
able, and Bernhard Wessels, who provided insightful criticism of my ideas on the
representation of territorial interests of the European Parliament. Sonia Alonso, who
generously shared her knowledge on nationalist parties and Basque nationalism, de-
serves special mention. I would also like to mention Gudrun Mouna who was the true
core of the research area and has become, in the meantime, a loyal friend. A most
productive post-doctoral stay at the UNAM was made possible by Gina Zabludovsky,
who extended to me an invitation to carry out this and another project on the reception
of German sociology in the Spanish-speaking world. Luis E. Gmez welcomed me at
the Centro de Estudios Tericos y Multidisciplinarios en Ciencias Sociales at the
School of Political and Social Sciences of the UNAM. I would also like to thank
Vernica Camero and Alfredo Andrade for helping me with logistics. They provided,
together with Ral Zamorano Faras, hours of good conversation and a most valued
introduction to Mexican academia.
Several Spanish colleagues supported my project of writing a PhD and my academic
career from a very early stage. Among them, I would like to mention Juan Linz, ngel
Rivero, Fernando Vallespn, and Santiago Petschen and his Potsdamer friend Raimund
Krmer. Jos Ramn Montero facilitated my access to the superior facilities of the
Fundacin Juan March. As a guest of the Fundacin I benefited enormously from
countless exchanges with other students. Ignacio Urquizu, lvaro Martnez and Al-
fonso Egea read and commented on my work with intelligence and tact.
6
The following persons have offered insightful criticism of my research at various
stagesGary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Tanja Brzel, Charalampos Koutalakis, Klaus
von Beyme, Charlotte Halpern and Claire Colomb. During the last stage of writing
Erica McCarthy provided efficient and friendly editorial help. In the summer of 2009 I
assumed a new position at the Department of International Studies at the Centre for
Research and Teaching and Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City where I benefitted from
the encouragement and support of my new colleagues and in particular of Ferran
Martnez, rika Ruiz, Lorena Ruano, and Jorge Schiavon. I would like to thank Jesse
Rogers for reading and editing the whole manuscript, and for not losing his sense of
humour while doing so, as well as Julia Klpfer from Nomos for attending my nu-
merous requests regarding the layout of the manuscript.
The support of other individuals also deserves acknowledgment here for their if not
strictly academic contributions. Among these are the approximately one hundred
twenty people I interviewed in Mainz, Brussels, Rome, Bilbao, Florence, Madrid,
Barcelona, San Sebastin and Valencia. These individuals ranged from former Spanish
ministers, committee chairs, rapporteurs, committee advisors and members of the
European Parliament to higher officials and middle-ranks in the federal and regional
administrations in Berlin, Madrid, and Rome as well as Tuscany, Rhineland-Palatinate,
the Basque Country, Galicia, Extremadura and Catalonia. They deserve my gratitude
for finding the time to sit down for interviews, answer questions over the phone, and
respond to detailed questionnaires on the intricacies of member state agendas for
cohesion policy. I hope some of them will read this book, or parts of it, and realize that
their generosity has paid off; they may even gain a new comparative perspective on
issues that are part of their daily and highly specialized work. In this context, I would
like to mention Arturo Garca-Tizn Lpez, who enabled me to access a group of
officials in Spanish politics who otherwise would have been unreachable. My friend
Iigo Cabo and his extensive family were my hosts while conducting research in
Bilbao; they provided me with a glimpse into the wide range of political views within
the Basque Country.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the support of friends and relatives who have sup-
ported me throughout the writing of this book. Many among them are scholars, but all
are close friends. Milena Bchs, Micha Maschke, Jinuk Shin, Orkan Ksemen, Jan-
Henrik Meyer, Cristbal Rovira, Tomila Lankina, Mauricio Tenorio, Claire Colomb,
Grete, Hans, and Ruth Misselwitz, Ulrike Meyer-Hamme, Arturo Garca-Tizn, Pepe
Hernndez, and Alicia Fernndez. I am grateful for the assistance of my sister Mnica
and her husband, Michael Bennett, who patiently indulged my pleas for editorial help
and advice. I would also like to thank others who have given me a hand throughout the
years. Among them are ngel Laiz, Fernando lvarez and Luisa Castejn, Ignacio
Triana and Silvia Morcillo as well as Rafael Morcillo and Isabel Senz, and Gonzalo
Morcillo. My beloved companion and travel mate, Marcella Dallmayer, was a constant
source of support and happiness (if there is such a thing). Two most unlike couples
should also be mentioned here, Sofia Laiz and Jose Luis Morcillo, my parents, and
Consuelo Laiz and the late Javier Cubillo. It is to both of them that this book is dedi-
cated.
7
Contents
Acknowledgements 5
Abbreviations 11
Introduction Chapter 1: 15
Federalism in EU Member States 22
The Impact of the European Union on Regions 25
Coordination Mechanisms and Nationalist Parties in the EU Chapter 2: 29
Coordination Mechanisms in Six Member States 29
Nationalist Parties and the Impact of Integration 43
Research Design 48
Regional Cases 53
Coordinating European Audiovisual Policy in Germany and
Spain
Chapter 3:
65
European Audiovisual Policy and Regional Concerns 67
Regional Agendas 71
The Coordination of the Television Directive 78
Public Broadcasting and Film Promotion 84
The Defence of Regional Audiovisual Agendas Chapter 4: 93
Majority versus Minority Cultures in the CoR 93
Lobbying a Fragmented Commission 99
The Defence of Regional Minorities in the EP 103
Defining the Agenda for the 1999 Cohesion Policy Reform Chapter 5: 113
The 1999 Reform of Cohesion Policy 114
Germany 117
Italy 122
Spain 129
Advancing Cohesion Policy Agendas through Extra-State
Channels
Chapter 6:
139
Regional Associations 139
The Committee of the Regions 144
Contact with the Commission 147
The European Parliament 150
Conclusions Chapter 7: 159
References 181
Index 205
9
Abbreviations
AEBR Association of European Border Regions
AGALEV Anders Gaan Leven
AH Agrupacin Herrea Independiente
AI FAR Autonomia Integrale Fed
ARD Arbeitsgemeinschaft der ffentlich-rechtlichen Rund-
funkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
AER Assembly of European Regions
AREV Assemble des Rgions Europennes Viticoles
BIAs Business Interest Association
BL Basic Law, Grundgesetz
BNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego
BOE Boletn Oficial del Estado
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CARCE Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comu-
nidades Europeas
CC Coalicin Canaria
CCTV Corporaci Catalana Televisin
CDN Convergencia de Demcratas de Navarre
CdP Conferenza dei Presidenti delle Regioni e delle Province
Autonome
CDU Christdemokratische Union
CES Committee on Employment and Social Affairs
CHA Chunta Aragonesista
CI Community Initiative
CiU Convergncia i Uni
CoC Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media
CoM Council of Ministers
COP Coalici d'Organitzacions Progressistes
CoR Committee of the Regions
CPMR Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions
CPPF Consejo de Poltica Fiscal y Financiera
CRP Committee on Regional Policy
CSP Christliche-Soziale Partei
CSR Conferenza Stato-Regioni
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union
CVP Christelijke Volkspartij
DPS Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo
DG Directorate-General
DS Democratici di Siniestra
EA Eusko Alkartasuna
EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EB-IU Ezker Batua Izquierda Unida
EBU European Broadcasting Union
EC European Community
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECOFIN Council of the Economics and Finance Ministers
ECOLO Ecologistes Confederes
EES European Employment Strategy
11
EFA European Free Alliance
EH Euskal Herritarrok
EIRA European Industrial Regions Associations
EiTB Euskal Irrati Telebista
ELA-STV Euskal Langileen Alkartasuna Solidaridad de Traba-
jadores Vascos
ELDR European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EMK Europaministerkonferenz
EP European Parliament
EPP European Popular Party
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
ERDF European Regional Development Fund
ESC Economic and Social Committee
ESF European Social Fund
ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom)
EU European Union
EUZBLG Gesetz ber die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Lndern in
Angelegenheiten der Europischen Unio
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FN Front National
FNB Front Nouveau de Belgique
FORTA Federacin de Organismos de Radio y Televisin Au-
tonmicos
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GP General Provisions
HB Herri Batasuna
ICAA Instituto Ciencias y Artes Cinematogrficas
IC-V Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
Il Centro UDA Il Centro Unione democratica altoatesina
Il Centro UPD Il Centro Union Popolare Democratica
IU Izquierda Unida
LAB Lapurdi baxenabarre
Ladins-DPS Ladins Demokratische Partei Sdtirol
LOAPA Ley Orgnica de Armonizacin del Proceso Autonmico
MAP Ministerio para las Administraciones Pblicas
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MLG Multilevel Governance
MS Member State
MSSD Most Similar Systems Design
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
PA Partido Andalucista
PACTE Pacte de Progrs
PAR Partido Aragons
PATT Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese
PAV Asociacin de Productores Audiovisuales Valencianos
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus
PES Party of European Socialists
PFF Partei fr Freiheit und Fortschritt
PJUPDB PJU steht fr PDB (Partei der deutschsprachigen Belgier)
+Juropa + Unabhngige
PNV-EAJ Partido Nacionalista Vasco Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea
PP Partido Popular
12
PR Partido Riojano
PRC Partido Regionalista de Cantabria
PRL-FDF Parti Rformateur Liberal Front Dmocratique des Fran-
cophones
PS Parti Socialiste
PSC Parti Social Chrtien
PSE Partido Socialista de Euskadi
PSM-EN Partit Socialista de Mallorca Entesa Nacionalista
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol
REGLEG Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power
RETI European Regions of Industrial Technology
RoP Rules of Procedures
RTVE Radio Televisin Espaola
RTVV Radio Televisin Valenciana
SEA Single European Act
SLL Sistemi locali di lavoro
SP Sozialistische Partei
SP! AGA Socialistische Partij+Anders Gaan Leven
SPJ Socialistische Partij
SPD Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands
SSW Sdschleswigscher Whlerverband
SNP Scottish National Party
SVP Sdtiroler Volkspartei
TC-PNC Tierra Comunera-Partido Nacionalista Castellano
TEC Treaty of the European Community
TEU Treaty of the European Union
TWF Directive Television Without Frontiers
UA Unin Alavesa
UF Union des Francophones
UGT Unin General de Trabajadores
UM Uni Mallorquina
UPL Unin del Pueblo Leons
URA Unin Renovadora Asturiana
USF Union fr Sdtirol
UV Uni Valenciana
VB Vlaams Blok
VLD Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
VLD-VU-O Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten+Volksunie+
VPRT s. 56 Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telekommunikation e.V.
VU-ID21 Volksunie-ID21
ZDF Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen
13
Chapter 1:
Introduction
The deepening of European integration, the increase in the number of federal member
states, and the growing prominence of nationalist parties in Europe constitute a chal-
lenge for European political systems and for the European Union as a whole. These
changes, which can be counted among the most important developments in European
politics since the fall of the Berlin Wall, have brought unwelcome consequences for
regions within European member states. Federal member states constituent units have
had to accept a significant reduction of their autonomy in the face of an ever stronger
European Union (EU). As a result, they have been exposed to decisions taken by central
governments in the Council of the European Union without their participation. Simi-
larly, changes have also taken place among federal member states, which have had to
grant to their constituent units the formal right to participate in the European decision-
making process. Through the granting of these rights regions have gained, at least in
theory, access to an array of intra-state channels of interest representation, among
which the most important, but not necessarily the most well-researched, was the right to
participate in the meetings of the Council of the European Union (formerly Council of
Ministers, hereafter the Council Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Jeffery 2000).
These changes were part of a wider transformation of domestic politics in EU member
states widely known as Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Risse,
Cowles et al 2001 b).
The conditions under which regions may gain access to these intra-state channels,
and even express their preferences to the central government, are set by coordination
mechanisms. Coordination mechanisms encompass the rules that regulate intergov-
ernmental relations between central and regional governments within the sphere of
European politics. Whereas the word coordination hints at Fritz Scharpfs work on the
institutional preconditions of coordination, according to Charles Tilly, mechanisms
change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways
over a variety of situations (Tilly 2000: 4; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001: ch.1, ch. 3).
Most appropriately for the context of this book, Jon Elster suggests that mechanisms
are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns (). They allow us to
explain but not to predict. (Elster 1998: 45, his emphasis).
Coordination mechanisms constitute the bodies in which regions, first among them-
selves and then bargaining with the central government, are able to coordinate their EU
agendas. To put it another way, coordination mechanisms constitute actors by estab-
lishing who participates in sector conferences where regional ministers meet to identify
common interests and policy goals. Coordination mechanisms also determine the ma-
jorities necessary to define a common regional position, and establish the extent to
which such a common regional position binds the member state delegation to the
Council. These rules are crucial, as a common regional position constitutes a necessary
15
condition for regional access to intra-state channels. Furthermore, coordination mech-
anisms may even determine who gains the upper hand if regional and central govern-
ments advance opposing concerns. Coordination mechanisms can also be seen as a
specific type of institution that regulates the definition of common European agendas
shared by the centre (i.e. central government) and the regions, and whose aim is ideally
to maximize the aggregate welfare of the member state, as I explain in the next chapter.
In most member states, federalism appears associated with negotiations with the centre
rather than imposition and equality among constituent units. Because of this, decisions
are taken by unanimity or by reinforced majorities and less frequently through hier-
archical coordination. However, this depends on a countrys specific regulations, as I
will argue throughout this study. Coordination mechanisms, in addition, are part of
what Europeanization literature calls domestic structures (Radaelli 2003, 2008) and
federalism literature labels intergovernmental relations (Agranoff 1996, 2004; Bog-
danor 1993). Finally, the interaction between coordination mechanisms and actors such
as nationalist and state-wide parties can best be understood as an example of bar-
gaining within an institutional setting, as proposed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz
Scharpfs in their seminal work on actor-centered institutionalism (1995; Scharpf
1997: 29-34). As actor-centered institutionalism is clearly orientated towards empirical
policy analysis, I will frequently resort to their vocabulary and conceptual distinctions
throughout this book.
Coordination mechanisms regulate the access of regions to intra-state channels of
interest representation, as discussed above. Among them, the most important mech-
anism is the incorporation of the regions concerns into its member states bargaining
stance in the Council. Second in importance is the possibility of allowing regional
representatives to participate in negotiations in the Council as part of a member states
delegation. Hence, coordination mechanisms in all member states control the relations
between central and regional governments during the EU decision-making process; at
the same time, coordination mechanisms are part of a member states domestic struc-
tures and therefore vary by state. Because such mechanisms are intertwined with
Radaellis domestic structure (2003, 2008), whether a region ultimately gains access to
intra-state channels depends not only on the provisions regulating coordination mech-
anisms, but also, and perhaps even more heavily, on the decisions of actors like central
and regional governments. These decisions are shaped by the cognitive orientations and
preferences of regional and central executives. In turn, the decisions taken by regional
and central executives are also shaped by the range of possible courses of action
established by coordination mechanisms. The mutually interdependent character of
interaction among political actors driven by the interactive strategies of purposive
actors operating within institutional settings that, at the same time, enable and constrain
these strategies has been explicitly recognized by Scharpf (1997: 36). While these
terms receive further attention below, by now it may be helpful to note that two of them
cognitive orientations and preferences broadly correspond with what the literature
on Europeanization calls normative structure, which dictates how interests are defined
and aggregated. In the same sense, normative structures also encompass norms, values,
and discourse (Radaelli 2003: 36-37; cf. Scharpf 1997: 62-66). Given that the prefer-
16
ences of nationalist parties differ from those of state-wide parties, I have identified
nationalist parties as the second explanatory variable. In this way I bring wider terri-
torial conflicts back into our account of the Europeanization of federal member states
and of EU policy outputs, as recently proposed by Caitrona Carter and Andy Smith
(2008). Or, to approach this issue from a different perspective, I heed Alfred Stepans
plea for linking federalism and nationalism in order to make a meaningful and power-
ful statement about comparative federalism (2001: 216).
For regions, an alternative to interest representation via intra-state channels is to
participate in European politics through extra-state means. Through this range of semi-
formalized channels, European institutions are able to respond to the impact of the
integration processes upon increasingly influential and numerous regional govern-
ments. Some extra-state channels, such as the Committee of the Regions for example,
were created by EU law, but others are considerably more informal, such as the lobby-
ing of the Commission and the European Parliament by individual regions. In contrast
to coordination mechanisms, extra-state channels like the Commission, the Parliament
or regional associations permit individual constituent units to advance their agendas
separately without cooperation between the central government and regions. These
channels have received substantial attention from scholars because regional impacts on
EU policies through extra-state channels have reinforced multilevel governance the-
ories. Such theories consider regions as actors autonomous from central governments
(Bache 1998; Benz and Eberlein 1998; Constantelos 1996; Grande 2000; Hooghe
1995 b; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001 a; John and McAteer 1998; Marks 1996 a;
Marks, Haesly et al 2002 a; Marks, Hooghe et al 1996; Marks, Nielsen et al1996; Martin
and Pearce 1999; Peters and Pierre 2001). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of these
channels can be disputed for at least two different reasons. First, the effectiveness of
extra-state channels is dependent upon the existence of coordination mechanisms pro-
moting close collaboration among regions and between regions and the respective
central government, as I will argue here. Second, extra-state channels constitute an
attempt to replace formal decision-making rights granted to all regions irrespective of
their size, political clout etc. with informal strategies such as lobbying and coordinated
action by regions whose possibilities of access to these channels are unequal (Benz
1993, 2000 a, b; Dahrendorf 1991; Jeffery 1997 a, b, 2000). In fact, the weak link
between the Commission and these regions suggests that its responsiveness to the
concerns of regions will be limited. In the case of the CoR and of regional associations,
the trouble lies in their lack of formal decision-making powers. Only one of these
channels, the European Parliament, possesses strong yet unexplored territorial links
and decision-making powers. Extra-state channels constitute an alternative, or in some
cases supplementary strategy to the more demanding and formal coordination mech-
anisms. Leaving aside treaty reform and history-making decisions, this book sets out to
ascertain which traits distinguish member states whose regions have been successful at
achieving impacts on European policy outputs. This introductory chapter presents my
hypothesis and then settles two preliminary issues the definition of a federal member
state, and the ways in which the EU encroaches upon regions.
17
My initial hypothesis is that regions impact EU policy outputs only if coordination
mechanisms provide them with access to intra-state channels of interest representation.
If coordination mechanisms fail to grant regions the necessary access to intra-state
channels, they will be unable to compensate for this through extra-state channels such
as lobbying the Commission and the EP. This is because successful extra-state interest
representation requires regions to define a common agenda back at home first. On the
other hand, when a regional impact is made on EU decisions through intra-state chan-
nels, this regional success should be understood as confirming the thesis of the Euro-
peanization of federal systems. According to this thesis, regions increasingly empha-
size cooperation both amongst themselves and with the centre, as this strategy makes it
possible for regions to participate successfully in the EU decision-making process
(Brzel 1999, 2000, 2002).
While this hypothesis may appear self-evident at first consideration, it raises several
controversial implications. First, testing the hypothesis requires a careful study of
coordination mechanisms in EU member states aimed at establishing whether they
actually grant regions access to intra-state channels, the most important of which is
participation in the Council of Ministers. Such an analysis, which has not to date been
undertaken, should go beyond a mere description of the regulations in force. Instead, it
should determine whether coordination mechanisms fulfil the requisites of majoritarian
bargaining and offer the possibility of cross-sectoral dealing, issue-linkage, and side-
payments. Whether a member states coordination mechanisms fulfil these requisites is
difficult to establish beforehand and this is part of what this book will try to accomplish.
The second argument, closely related to the first one, is that in order to confirm this
hypothesis, the explanatory power of alternative variables, such as the range of powers
held by a region, the political entrepreneurship of regional elites or the existence of a
nationalist party, must be controlled for in order to establish that they are secondary, as
my hypothesis claims. Although the literature has considered some of these variables as
conducive to regional leverage (Jeffery 2000; Marks, Nielsen et al 1996), my hypoth-
esis implies that one of them, nationalist parties, may constitute an obstacle when
regions attempt to define common positions in coordination mechanisms in order to
eventually influence European politics. Therefore, the first difficulty, establishing
whether coordination mechanisms are appropriate, cannot be resolved without first
considering the actors operating under the rules established by coordination mechan-
isms. This requires a careful examination of nationalist parties because their prefer-
ences differ from those of state-wide parties, as discussed above. Regions may then
resort to a go-it-alone method instead of the more accessible, but arguably less effect-
ive, extra-state channels of interest representation. An additional argument, which has
frequently gone unnoticed is that nationalist parties are not compelled to take into
consideration the voters of other constituent units (Scharpf 1992 b: 61-62). This makes
it possible for nationalist parties to advance solutions that may conflict with the goals of
other regions, and makes the concept of aggregate welfare less relevant for their pol-
itical calculus. An examination of how nationalist parties modify the operation of
coordination mechanisms raises many intriguing questions. For instance, if nationalist
parties do exclusively pursue the interests of voters in one region, the Spanish federal
18
arrangement could hardly have become so cooperative and so Europeanized as the
German system has as the main thesis of a widely cited book on the subject suggests
(Brzel 2002) simply because nationalist parties play such a prominent role in the
estado de las autonomas.
Finally, confirming this hypothesis would imply that the scholarly interest awakened
in the 1990s by extra-state channels like the lobbying of the Commission was mis-
guided (Balme 1995; Constantelos 1996; Desideri 1995; Fastenrath 1990; Greenwood
1997; Hooghe 1995 a, b; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001 a; Jachtenfuchs 2001; John and
McAteer 1998; Keating and Jones 1995; Mazey and Mitchell 1993; Mazey and
Richardson 1993; McAteer and Mitchell 1996). Most probably, more energy should
have been directed toward explaining what regions were able to achieve through intra-
state channels, how they were achieving it, and whether the use was of coordination
mechanisms was a precondition for regions to make an impact through extra-state
channels. To test my hypothesis, I attempt to pinpoint the impacts that regions were able
to achieve on EU audiovisual and cohesion policy decisions in the late 1990s.

A remark on my use of the term impact is required before I move on to comment on
the related scholarship and further specify my initial hypothesis. In this book I use the
term impact in different ways. In the domestic realm and in order to distinguish the
different degrees to which regions participate in the centres European policy, I will
refer to Herbert Kitschelts differentiation between procedural and substantive impacts
(1986: 66-67). In the European arena, I use the term impact to refer to the ability of
regions either to shape specific elements in the agendas of the Commission, the Euro-
pean Parliament or the Council, or, in a weaker sense, to publicize regional concerns,
incorporating them into the negotiations between the institutions. To consider mere
publicity as a form of impact appears justified, in view of the difficulties that regions
experience in drawing the attention of European institutions or member states to their
own concerns, in particular cultural and linguistic issues (Benz and Benz 1995: 229;
Hooghe and Marks 1996: 76; Jeffery 1995: 256; Kennedy 1997: 2). It should be ac-
knowledged that no individual region is capable of imposing its own preferences on
other actors at the bargaining table in Brussels, but in some occasions a causal relation
between a regional agenda and an EU decision can be traced. Such an overlap, however,
does not imply that the regional agenda is a sufficient condition, or that it was likely the
only causal factor. These distinctions will be useful in differentiating channels of
interest representation according to the possibilities of impacting EU decisions.

In writing this book, I have drawn extensively from multilevel governance theories,
the critics thereof, and from works by scholars of federalism, Europeanization, and
European integration. In this first chapter, I will attempt to frame the links between my
work and the scholarly debate on the role of regions on EU policies and on the impact of
integration on regions. In subsequent chapters I will examine other strands of schol-
arship such as the literature on multilevel governance, cultural pluralism and linguistic
minorities in the EU. I will also be taking into account Europeanization, and repre-
19
sentation of interests in the European Parliament. The next two pages show how my
research departs from existing scholarship.
Multilevel governance (MLG) approaches contribute decisively to my book because
they explicitly consider regions as actors in the policy-making process, even though
they focus on regional contributions through extra-state channels. MLG theories ap-
proach the question of how regional executives contribute to the dispersion of power
from the member states to the European and regional tiers of government by focusing
mainly on extra-state channels. This is because extra-state channels have produced
evidence undermining the liberal intergovernmentalist thesis of member states almost
unrestricted control of the European integration process. Nonetheless, it seems fair to
recognize that MLG also acknowledges that intra-state channels remain the most im-
portant link between regions and the European arena (Hooghe 1995 b; Hooghe and
Marks 1996, 2001 a: 89, ch 5; Marks 1992: 92, 211-213, 217-218, 1993: 407).
1
The fact
that MLG scholarship remains fixated on extra-state channels has been criticized by
Charlie Jeffery. He argues that, the real transformation in the relative roles of sub-
national authorities and the central state in EU policy-making has taken place in the
intra-state arena (Jeffery 2000: 2). He then suggests that the most important vari-
able explaining why some regions have impacts on EU policy outputs is constitutional
strength, understood as the extent of powers a region holds (Marks, Nielsen et al 1996:
61). Additionally, Jeffrey argues that a regions ability to influence European politics
depends on intergovernmental relations, political entrepreneurship, and legitimacy and
social capital (Jeffery 2000: 12-17). While drawing on Jefferys ideas, my first partial
hypothesis differs from his criticism of MLG in suggesting that coordination mech-
anisms, rather than constitutional strength, is the main variable explaining a regions
ability to make impacts on EU decisions.
One of the principal aims of this book is to undertake a more explicit analysis of the
role of nationalist parties in accounting for a regions impacts on EU decisions. To be
sure, these types of parties were among the causes of regional interest representation
explored by Marks and his co-authors (Marks, Haesly et al 2002 a; Marks, Nielsen et
al 1996). In fact, they found that regional governments formed by parties other than
those in power in the centre are more prone to using extra-state channels (Marks,
Nielsen et al 1996: 62), most probably as a strategy to avoid confronting a rival political
partys clout over the member states European policy. Similar ideas are also present in
Michael Keatings work, which moved Jeffery to suggest that governments from re-
gions with a sense of identity expressed through a distinctive party system can more
easily bring their claims into the EU policy process (Jeffery 2000: 17; Keating 1997,
1998 a). Whereas I coincide with other scholars on the significance of this explanatory
1 In at least two publications Marks and Hooghe have provided lists of channels to Europe avail-
able to regions. In one of them (Hooghe 1995 b: 179-191), Hooghe enumerate eleven channels of
which only four could be considered as domestic (right to be informed by the central state, formal
participation in interest aggregation, direct presence in the Council, legislative hoops for treaties).
In the second publication, Marks and Hooghe include nine channels of which three are domestic
(Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 78). From the four channels they analyse more extensively in the same
book, regional presence in the Council is the only intra-state one (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a:
83-89).
20
variable, I suggest that it operates in the opposite direction. Strong electoral support for
nationalist parties may create additional hurdles for the inclusion of regional interests
into the centres agenda, a failure that subsequently prevents regions from impacting
EU decisions.
One important implication of the preceding hypothesis is that if nationalist parties
respond to the existence of coordination mechanisms according to normative structures
or preferences of their own, they may also alter the manner in which coordination
mechanisms work. Even within the same member state, the influence of nationalist
parties varies widely, from being fundamental in some regions to irrelevant in others.
Thus, the alleged homogenization of member states and their coordination mechanisms
that the literature on Europeanization emphasizes may have been overstated. In order to
delve into the consequences of this particular type of actor the nationalist party on
Europeanization, a third partial hypothesis will be tested. According to some accounts,
Europeanization has moved federal member states to establish new structures that
enable them to reach a goodness of fit (Brzel and Risse 2003: 5-6, 36-42; Risse,
Cowles et al 2001 a) between European and domestic structures and to help then better
work with the particularities of the EU decision-making process. For instance, accord-
ing to this theory Spanish regions would have adopted a cooperative federalism similar
to the German model in view of a misfit between domestic and normative structures and
those valid in the European arena (Brzel 2002: 107-116, 211-212). In order to under-
stand this adaptational pressure on EU member states, Brzel and Risse propose a
method that differentiates between two periods. In the first, the goodness of fit is
examined by actors, while in the second, actors react to a potential misfit between the
political opportunity structure on the one hand and norms and identities, on the other
(Brzel and Risse 2003: 63, 65). These two categories were first proposed by March
and Olsen (1989, 1998), who speak of a logic of consequentialism and a logic of
appropriateness (Brzel and Risse 2003: 34-37), corresponding to what Radaelli calls
domestic and normative structures. In a similar vein, Scharpf differentiates between
institutional settings (1997: 37-43) and actors preferences, which include four com-
ponents: interests, norms, identities, and interaction orientations (1997: 63-66). This
book will carefully consider the ways in which both categories interact, including how
formal institutions ultimately shape what regions perceive as appropriate courses of
action (Heimer 2001; Immergut 1998; Offe 2006). Contrary to the prevailing views
(Miz, Beramendi et al 2002), my hypothesis proposes that in federal member states,
actors preferences and institutional settings have remained unchanged during Euro-
peanization rather than being transformed by it. Determining how actor preferences
and institutional settings interact requires further study because, among other reasons,
the preferences of nationalist parties may let them approach the goodness of fit from
specific viewpoints. As a matter of fact, the same EU decision often creates tensions
across the European territory, to which local actors respond by developing disparate
strategies (Carter and Smith 2008). Showing how a specific type of local actor, namely
nationalist parties, responds to such territorial tensions produced by Europeanization is
one of the primary objectives of this book.
21
The last partial hypothesis explores which extra-state channels permit regions to
impact EU decisions. As I have mentioned, extra-state channels, and in particular the
links between regions and the Commission, occupy a prominent place in multilevel
governance approaches to the EU (Benz 2000 b; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Hooghe
and Marks 1996, 2001 a; Jeffery 1997 a; Jones 2000; Loughlin 1996; Marks 1996 a;
Mazey and Richardson 1993; Morata and Muoz 1996; Tmmel 1998), but their
effectiveness has been disputed (Jeffery 2000: 2). Here I will seek to determine whether
the European Parliament rather than the Commission is the institution through which
some regions actually shape EU decisions. Even though the incorporation of regional
concerns to EU policies varies widely across the policy field, the expansion of EP
powers and the territorial links of its members suggest that Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) and regional governments may hedge coincident agendas.
Federalism in EU Member States
Although in the preceding pages I used the adjective federal to refer to Spain and
Italy, this usage is not always universally accepted. Throughout this book I will use the
term federal to refer to six member states: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
2
The term federal is most appropriate for explaining the variety of
institutional arrangements inside this group of six member states because they all are
composed of two levels of government endowed with final decision making powers. At
the same time, these federal countries differ regarding other important features such as
the remit of the regional legislative competences, the intensity and style of intergov-
ernmental relations, and political majorities at both member state and regional level.
Admittedly, to classify some of these six countries as federal is not uncontroversial.
Yet, such an option is sustained by several authorities in the subfield of comparative
federalism (Elazar 1991: 12; Riker 1975: 101; Watts 2000: 10, 18). These three scholars
define federal political systems as those where final decision-making is divided be-
tween the federal and the regional executives according to a catalogue of subjects. The
definition of federalism proposed by William Riker, classic in its simplicity, is as
follows:
Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are
divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that
2 The UK, however, is home to only one region with legislative powers, Scotland. Apart from these
six countries, in Portugal and Finland quasi-federal arrangements exist, but I have not further
considered them in my research. Azores and Madeira possess elected parliaments, but their exec-
utives are appointed by the central government in Lisbon (Pereira 1995). By contrast, lan is the
single Finnish region benefiting from a federal arrangement according to my definition (Gustafsson
1981; Auffermann 1999; Fagerholm 1999; Paasi 1999). However, encompassing a single con-
stituent unit, its belated date of accession (1995), and the reduced size of its only regional legislative
powers, I have opted not to include this member state in my analysis which focuses on decisions
taken in the years following Finlands accession.
22
each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions
(Riker 1975: 101).
Similarly, the definition of federalism by Daniel Elazar, the founder of Publius: The
Journal of Federalism reads:
The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule. Federalism thus
defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent
character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of
sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior
organic ties where they exist (Elazar 1991: 12).
Finally, Stepans more recent definition directs attention to the electoral aspects and the
formation of legislatures in federal systems:
Democratic political systems probably should not be called federal systems unless
they meet two criteria. First, within the state there must exist some territorial
political subunits whose electorate is exclusively drawn from citizens of the sub-
unit and which have areas of legal and policy making autonomy and sovereignty
that are constitutionally guaranteed. Second, there must be a statewide political
unit which contains a legislature elected by the statewide population, and which
has some law and policy making areas that are constitutionally guaranteed to fall
within the sovereignty of this state body (Stepan 2001: 325-326).
In other words, in these six federal member states, authoritative decision-making
powers are territorially divided between the elected governments of the federal centre
and the constituent units. Yet, federal arrangements concern not only self-rule, but also
shared-rule. Self-rule means that for some matters the regions may authoritatively
decide while others the centre has the final word. Shared rule implies that mechanisms
exist to resolve problems that affect the whole federal system. A further property of
federal systems implied in Elazars definition (permanent character) is that they
guarantee the existence of their constituent units. To achieve this, federal constitutions
regulate the fundamental elements of a federal system. They protect both the unity of
the system, the existence of the constituent units and the assignment of a minimum of
autonomy to the regional tier. The juridical expression of this commitment to perman-
ence is the regional constitution, which in the United States is called a state constitution,
in Germany Landesverfassung and in Spain estatuto de autonoma. Similarly, in Italy
both statuti ordinari and speziali exist. Regions in Belgium, Austria, and the United
Kingdom enjoy parallel protection.
3
Eternity clauses (art.79 BL), reinforced majorities
in the Italian constitution (art. 138) or improbable requisites for constitutional reform
(art. 168 SC) guarantee the existence of regions as autonomous political institutions. In
Spain, regional constitutions dictating the catalogue of powers over which the region
decides can only be reformed with the consent of both the regional and federal parlia-
ments. It is precisely this impossibility of the centre infringing on the powers of con-
3 In the first country directly derived from the Belgian constitution, in Austria from the Landesver-
fassung, and in the United Kingdom from the corresponding statutes, like the Scotland Act 1998.
23
stituent units that constitutes the distinguishing trait of federal systems for Robert Dahl
(1986: 114).
In fact, scholars of federalism are very conscious of the differences in levels of
decentralization in federal systems. For example, in the late 1980s Daniel Elazar dis-
tinguished between federal systems such as Austria and Germany and political systems
with federal arrangements. In this second category he included Belgium, Italy, Spain
and the UK (Elazar 1991: 43-46). In contrast, Watts includes Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many and Spain in his category federation and labels Italy and pre-devolution United
Kingdom as decentralized unions (Watts 2000: 13). After the publication of both
classifications, important reforms have strengthened the federal nature of Belgium,
Italy, Spain and the UK, reinforcing the appropriateness of considering them as federal
member states. In 2001 Alfred Stepan did not hesitate in considering Spain and Bel-
gium as both multinational and federal (2001: 315).
More recently, other scholars have crafted indexes of territorial decentralization
confirming both the federal character of these six federal systems and the differences
among them. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Erssons index appears dated, at least for
countries like Spain and Italy, because the authors rely on information from the 1980s
(Lane and Ersson 1994: 224). Since then, levels of decentralization have undergone
profound changes in both countries. Additionally, in a subsequent study the same
authors conclude that it is necessary to distinguish between different degrees of the
traditional federal European countries mainly Germany and Switzerland and semi-
federal ones like Belgium and Spain (Lane and Ersson 2000: 88). In our context, the
more recent Regional Authority Index by Hooghe, Marks, Schakel is more authorita-
tive, as it offers more differentiated and up-to-date information on individual member
states. With the exception of the UK, my selection of six federal member states co-
incides with the EU-15 countries scoring six or more in the ten-point Regional Au-
thority Index (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 193-194; Hooghe, Schakel et al. 2008:
262-266; Marks, Hooghe et al. 2008 a, b).
Although I am using the term region as interchangeable with that of constituent
unit widespread in the literature on federalism, its meaning is impregnated with those
used by authors writing on other topics and therefore requires further clarification.
During the last twenty-five years, the burgeoning scholarship on regions and region-
alism has used the term in numerous ways. These reflect a multiplicity of understand-
ings as well as political and scholarly interests accommodated under the same termin-
ological roof (Anderson 1994: 9). Nonetheless, I do not intend to engage in an ex-
haustive discussion of the literature on regions. Instead, I want to spell out my as-
sumptions about what is common to the regions that form part of the six federal member
states that I discuss in this work. A definition of regions will be instrumental in deter-
mining to which member states my findings apply.
In the context of this study, four main strands of literature on regions are relevant,
though unequally so. First, in the early 1980s, scholars researching regionalism were
mostly attracted by the social mobilization processes localized in certain areas of
Western Europe (Bourdieu 1991; Gerdes 1985; Tarrow 1977). Simultaneously, a se-
cond group of scholars analysed regional mobilization in those European areas as signs
24
of nationalist contention against the nation-state. These authors tried to assess the
possibilities of a "Europe of the Regions" turning into a viable alternative to the division
of the European territory in nation-states (Keating 1985 a, 2000; Nitschke 1999). Fur-
ther, a third group of researchers studied regionalism from the point of view of eco-
nomic policy, economic geography and planning (Hudson and Williams 1999; Rhodes
1995). A fourth group of literature attempted to understand regionalism as a top-down
process of decentralizing competences from the centre to the periphery of a nation-
state. These studies were concerned with the reorganization of the administration, and
were close to a comparative government or Regierungslehre perspective (Keating
1985 b; Mny 1985; Mny and Knapp 1998).
My own definition of region combines elements taken from scholars of the second
and fourth group. These emphases correspond with my focus on regional governments
and parties rather than on social movements and economic planning. The main elem-
ents of my definition derive from the idea of federalism presented in the preceding
section. Accordingly, a region is a politically driven structure of authoritative decision-
making integrated into the second-level tier of government in a federal member-state.
Regions possess their own executive branch and parliament and a range of powers for
which they have the authority to make final decisions. This territorial division of
powers should not be able to be easily altered by the central government, but should be
rather protected by constitutional provisions regulating the procedure of reform. As I
have mentioned at the beginning of the section, in the EU the Austrian, Belgian,
German, Italian and Spanish regions plus Scotland and the Finnish archipelago lan
fulfil these conditions.
The Impact of the European Union on Regions
Understanding how the EU impacts regions is a precondition for gauging how regional
governments and parties set and advance their European agendas. According to the
wording of the European treaties, regions would not take part in the European inte-
gration process, at least not during treaty making and modification. Indeed, in the
European treaties there is almost no talk of regional governments.
4
Irrespective of this
silence, since the Single European Act (1986) regions have increasingly become con-
cerned with the integration process. The main reason for this is that the progress of the
European project relies on the transfer of competences to the European institutions.
This reallocation of powers impinges on regions in three ways. First, regions have been
deprived of some of their powers, which have been transferred to the EU. While the
central government acquired the possibility of exerting those powers in the Council
regional governments lost the ability to decide how to exercise them. Secondly, while
4 Article 263 TEC refers to the Committee of the Regions and speaks of regional bodies. The second
reference to the regions is implicit: art. 203 TEC was changed in order to allow regional ministers to
represent their respective member state in the CoM. Further, the TEC refers to regions as policy-
takers on issues such as cohesion (art. 158), regional imbalance, and declining industrial regions
(art. 160).
25
regions must also abide by EU law, during the implementation process they have fewer
chances of appealing to European institutions than they do of influencing the decisions
of the central government. As a consequence, regions are relegated to serving as en-
forcers of EU decisions. Thirdly, regional governments must cover additional financial
expenses derived from European legislation, even if they have not participated in the
decision-making process. Finally, regions try to wield influence on European policies
with redistributive or distributive effects such as cohesion or research policy (Grote
1993; Hooghe 1996; Leonardi 1993).
A clarification of the implications of the Single European Act (SEA) for regions
should serve to substantiate the preceding argument. By expanding European compe-
tences first, the SEA and afterwards the Maastricht Treaty created an overlap between
regional and European domains. In fact, scholars coincide in pointing out this decision
and the late 1980s as the turning point in which integration began to affect regions
intensively (Bullmann and Eiel: 4, 14; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Jeffery 1997 a, b,
2002 b; Keating 1998 a; Marks 1993, 1996 b; Marks, Hooghe et al 1996; Mazey and
Mitchell 1993). For two main reasons, the SEA had forced regions to give increased
attention to the European community. On the one side, it transferred to the EC powers
formerly assigned to the regional tier or for which the Lnder and Spanish autonomous
communities, among others, were responsible. Among the policy sectors covered by
the SEA that affect the regions we find local economic development (and the attraction
of foreign investment), vocational training and language teaching, local transport [],
the supply of public utilities, environmental health policies, anti-pollution control,
health and safety in the workplace, and consumer protection law" (Mazey and Mitchell
1993: 100-101). Apart from this, the SEA also cut across regions educational policies
(Jeffery 1997 a: 58) and the audiovisual powers of regions (Collins 1994). Moreover,
the SEA granted the EC the power to enact more directly binding legislation, which in
Germany the Lnder had hitherto be able to influence through the federal chamber; they
are also responsible for its execution (Jeffery 1997 a: 59). During the debates in the
federal chamber over the SEA, the Lnder began to perceive integration as a threat
(Bundesrat 1988: 323).
On the other hand, the SEA dealt another blow to the regional economies by making
them adapt to the new conditions of enhanced competition in an integrated market. In
fact, some scholars have claimed that regionalization was actually a strategy to manage
the challenges of the single market (Balme 1995: 169). An even more important corol-
lary of the SEA was the allocation of significant resources to a revitalized regional
policy and the expansion of the structural funds after 1988 (Jones 2000: 88; Marks
1992: 194, 1993). In summary, the SEA affected regions because it restricted their
powers (competition, media policy), imposed tight implementation duties (education,
vocational training) and new financial duties (environmental health, pollution), and
turned the EC into a source of funding for regions (cohesion and research policies).

In order to test my hypotheses, I compare how regions used both intra- and extra-
state channels to influence the 1999 reform of EU cohesion policy and the European
audiovisual policy. In doing this, I proceed as follows. In chapter two I explore my
26
explanatory variables and select regional cases and policy fields according to them. To
be more precise, after identifying six federal member states where regions hold final
decision-making powers Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, and the UK I then
examine the division of European powers in the first three of these countries. The
results of this analysis, combined with the overall support for nationalist parties, are the
two indicators I used to choose my regions. The second chapter will also briefly touch
on the short history of the selected regions.
In chapter three, the audiovisual policy study focuses on the interest representation
efforts of the Basque Country, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Valencia aimed at influ-
encing the revision of the Television Without Frontiers Directive, the application of the
Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting, and the MEDIA programme.
Whereas this third chapter concentrates on whether the interaction of coordination
mechanisms and nationalist parties made it possible for constituent units to compel the
centre to take up regional concerns into its own agenda, chapter four examines how
regions have advanced their concerns through extra-state channels and particularly
looks at the impact of regions lobbying of the EP on audiovisual policy. To explore the
1999 reform of the structural policy, I take a look in chapter five at the Basque Country,
the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Tuscany. This time my analysis focuses on the frame-
work regulation, the European Regional Development Fund, and the European Social
Fund. This chapter reconstructs the regional agendas for the reform and the subsequent
negotiations between the centre and the periphery to set common objectives; it places
particular emphasis on the role of coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties in
both processes. Chapter six rounds out the preceding analysis by determining which
changes to the regulations proposed by the Commission the regions achieved through
extra-state channels and, in particular, which kinds of amendments the EP obtained
from Commission and Council. Finally, in chapter seven I, reassess my initial hypoth-
esis and discuss the implications of my findings for current scholarship.
27
Chapter 2:
Coordination Mechanisms and Nationalist Parties in the EU
Until now, two fundamental concepts namely coordination mechanisms and nation-
alist parties have remained somewhat unspecified. Yet, these two variables, which
form the core of my research, are not uninspected premises (Becker 1998: 7). Instead,
these concepts reflect a conscious decision on my part as to the scope of the facts I want
to explain. These conceptual choices and their implications for the scope of my re-
search, together with the selection of policies and regional cases, are the subject of the
present chapter.
I break this chapter into four sections in order to facilitate the discussion of coord-
ination mechanisms and nationalist parties. In sections one and two, I will attempt to
provide a clear definition of these two variables. In section three, I will explain the
methods behind my research design, case selection, and selection of policy fields. In the
final section, I will briefly summarize the history of audiovisual and cohesion policy in
the selected regions.
Coordination Mechanisms in Six Member States
When the second tier of government holds a significant range of powers, as occurs in
the case of federal member states, EU decisions will often affect not only central, but
regional governments as well. Regional governments, however, do not have direct
access to the Council, where member states are represented. Such a division of
labour, whose origin is the traditional allocation of foreign policy powers in the hands
of the centre in federal systems, constitutes a particular challenge for federal member
states. This is because constituent units hold extensive domestic competences whose
democratic legitimacy is derived from elected regional parliaments. Furthermore, in
federal member states where regional parties represent national or linguistic minorities,
this problem is compounded. Not only are regions deprived of their powers, but also
their political distinctiveness disappears in the European arena. The Art. 203 of the
Treaty of the European Community (TEC) provides a partial solution to this challenge:
it allows regional ministers to participate in the Council representing the whole member
state. However, the use of this and other intra-state channels requires that federal
member states establish coordination mechanisms. The main objective of coordination
mechanisms is to combine in a single European agenda the concerns of the centre and
the regions, making it possible to jointly defend the concerns of the whole country in the
Council and simultaneously operate as a unitary actor. In order to achieve this, coord-
ination mechanisms must first create the institutional environment necessary for re-
gions to define a common position. In the second place, they must regulate for the
29
subjects, majorities, and the measure in which a common regional position binds the
central government. Finally, coordination mechanisms establish whether the repre-
sentation of the member states in the Council is entrusted to regional governments.
Whereas the previous chapter explored conditions common to the six federal mem-
ber states, this second chapter highlights the differences among their coordination
mechanisms. Usually, federal systems are classified according to aspects such as how
the centre and the federal constituent units divide self- and shared powers, who holds
the residual competences, the array of powers each tier controls, asymmetry, or the
organization of the judiciary (Duchacek 1970: 188-275; Watts 2000: 17-18). Nonethe-
less, since I hypothesized in the introduction that coordination mechanisms constitute
the key to understanding regions ability to shape EU decisions, I have classified
federal member states according to their coordination mechanisms. This analysis is
useful to understanding how bargaining positions in the Council are defined and will
allow me to undertake the selection of cases in chapter two.
As I stated in the introduction, I use the term coordination mechanisms to denote a
specific form of intergovernmental relations (Agranoff 1996, 2004; Bogdanor 1993) or
of domestic structures (Radaelli 2003, 2008) that regulate regional access to intra-state
channels. Although coordination mechanisms serve the same purpose in each member
state, the fact that the specific rules regulating coordination mechanisms differ signifi-
cantly among member states makes their classification and comparison difficult. A
preliminary attempt to classify coordination mechanisms may be found in Table 1. The
influence of regions on treaty-making power and their effect on constitutional reform
appears to be connected to the characteristics of coordination mechanisms. Thus, the
first row shows how regions participate in the treaty ratification process. In federal
member states, coordination mechanisms were developed as a response to the un-
remitting transfer of powers first to the EC and then to the EU as regions demanded a
right to shape the respective member states European policy. This is why, broadly
speaking, coordination mechanisms give regions a greater chance to shape the member
states bargaining position, providing that these same constituent units participate in the
ratification of the European treaties or in the constitutional reforms necessary to adapt
the respective fundamental law to them.
In Table 1, the second and subsequent rows explore the ways in which regions may
contribute to decision-making in the Council, the most important intra-state channel for
regions to shape EU decisions. To use this channel, however, centres and regions must
set common objectives because the votes of the member state in the Council may not be
divided among the different constituent units, making the effectiveness of this intra-
state channel dependent, therefore, on a unitary approach to negotiations. For this
reason, one of the mechanisms' functions is to help regions to define common positions
and to specify to what extent the centre is obligated to adopt them. Whether this takes
place in parliamentary or intergovernmental bodies has been previously used to classify
coordination mechanisms (Kerremans 2000). Irrespective of where negotiations take
place, to benefit from coordination mechanisms, regions from a member state must be
capable of defining a common agenda among themselves, either unanimously or by a
majority, which is what the fourth row indicates. Regions must subsequently negotiate
30
with the central government, but coordination mechanisms differ significantly in this
respect. Whereas some of them require a unanimous agreement between the regions
and the centre, others recognize the prominence of the regional or of the central agendas
depending on the issue at stake. Another significant function of coordination mech-
anisms is to establish whether a regional minister can be part of the member states
delegation to the Council or participate in negotiations. The fifth row indicates the
existence of such a possibility, which would permit regional representatives to monitor
whether the central government actually defends the regional concerns in the Council.
A final set of more secondary aspects determines whether coordination mechanisms
regulate the participation of regional officials in the Councils working groups and in
the committees of the Commission, the so-called comitology, as well as the presence of
regional officials in the member states permanent representation. They facilitate re-
gions access to information and subsequently the formation of their own agendas.
Tanja Brzel proposes an alternative classification of federal systems in her study of
the Europeanization of member states federal systems. She starts with a broad cat-
egorization of federal countries as a dual or cooperative federalism (Brzel 2000, 2002:
53, 93). Her underlying criterion, one with deep roots in federalism scholarship, is
whether powers are clearly divided between the central and the regional executives, as
in the case of U.S. dual federalism, or shared by them, as in the case of German
cooperative federalism. In the case of cooperative federalism, the centre is typically in
charge of framework legislation while the regions are in charge of specifying this law
and implementing them; such a procedure requires intense intergovernmental cooper-
ation. In principle, Spain and Belgium are closer to dual federalism, which appears to
function better in countries where intergovernmental relations are characterized by
competitiveness among actors (Brzel 2000: 23, 2002: 107-116). Nonetheless, ac-
cording to Brzels argument, Spain has gradually developed a system of intergov-
ernmental relations since the early 1980s, mostly to satisfy the necessities of coordin-
ation derived from Spains accession to the European Community (Brzel 2000: 27-31,
2002: 116-134). Intergovernmental cooperation encompasses approximately two-
dozen different conferencias sectoriales in charge of environment, agriculture, energy,
and EU-related aspects of the sector as well as a cross-sectoral conference for European
affairs (see below). How these sector conferences perform as coordination mechanisms
or, in her vocabulary, contribute to intergovernmental cooperation, differs widely from
one policy sector to another.
31
Table 1: Coordination mechanisms in federal member states
1

Coordination
Mechanism
A B D I E UK
Integration Treaty ratification
2
+ + + - - -
Stance in the
Council
Parliamentary
3
- - + - - -
Intergovernmental
4
+ + + - - -
Common Regional
Position
5
- - + - - -
Member States stance in
the Council
6
- + + - - -
Regional Presence in the
Council
7
+ + - -
Access to
information
Regions in the
Councils working groups
+ + + +
Comitology
8
+ + + -
Permanent
Representation
9
+ + + + - +
Source: Own elaboration.
1 A: Austria; B: Belgium; D: Germany; I: Italy; E: Spain; UK: United Kingdom. Apart of a number of
interviews, I relied on the relevant constitutional and legal provisions, most of which are listed
together with informative country analyses in (Prez Tremps, Cabellos Espirrez et al. 1998). In
addition to this juridical perspective and in order to convey a perspective of how coordination
mechanisms actually work I have compiled insights from various political scientists. Most useful
were the edited volumes by Jeffery (1997) and Krmer (1998). Additionally, I have drawn on the
following publications: for Austria (Dachs 1996, 1997; Luther 1997; Pelinka 1998, 1999); for
Belgium (Hooghe 1991; Peeters 1994; Alen 1995; Hooghe 1995 a; Woyke 1999; Kerremans 2000;
Parijs 2000; Sepos 2003); for Germany (Nass 1986, 1989; Fastenrath 1990; Hrbek 1991;
Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper 1992; Mller-Brandeck-Bocquet 1992; Scharpf 1994 b; Hierl 1995; Jeffery
1995 a; Kunig 1995; Jeffery 1996; Knodt 1998; Schnberg 1998); for Italy (Desideri 1995; Prez
Tremps 1995; Sandulli 1995; Chiti, Righi et al 1995/6; Constantelos 1996; Trautmann 1999;
Piattoni 2000; Ciaffi 2001 b; Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003); for Spain (Morata 1995; Ortzar
Andchaga, Gmez Campo et al 1995; Prez Tremps 1995; Roig Mols 1995; Rubio Llorente
1995; Parejo Alfonso and Betancor Rodriguez 1995/6; Juregui 1997; Remiro Brotons 1997;
Ortzar Andechaga 1999; Ross and Salvador Crespo 2003); finally, for the UK, (Bogdanor 2001;
Pearce 2001; Bulmer, Burch et al. 2002; Bianchi 2003; Evans 2003; Ross and Salvador Crespo
2003; Smith 2003; Nagel 2004.).
2 A chamber controlled by the constituent units decides on the ratification of the European treaties.
3 The second chamber has the power to determine the member states bargaining in the Council.
4 In the sector conferences agreements are decided by a majority, and the central government is not
present.
5 Where constituent units determine a common regional position according to the majority rule I have
used +. If unanimity is required I have used -.
6 Where, at least on certain issues, constituent units demands are included in the member states
bargaining position even if the central government disapproves I have used + and if a unanimous
agreement is required - appears.
7 Where constituent units participation in the Council is guaranteed in the legislation I have used
+, but where this possibility is contemplated in the legislation and remains nonetheless unim-
plemented I have used .
8 If the participation of regional representatives in the committees of the Commission has been
guaranteed in the legislation + appears.
32
Thus, Brzel developed the three following criteria to establish the institutional-
ization level of sector conferences: the existence of a legal basis, rules of procedure, and
second-level bodies supporting the conference. She determines the effectiveness of
policy-making according to the number of meetings a conference held and to its output
in terms of joint plans and programs, harmonization of law, and funding regimes, or
convenios (Brzel 2000: 33-34; Ministerio para las Administraciones Pblicas 1996).
This approach permitted Brzel to argue that the necessity of cooperation on European
policy and its implementation led to the irregular cross-sectoral growth of cooperation
routines between the centre and the regions. According to Brzel, these developments
eventually transformed the Spanish dual, competitive federalism into cooperative fed-
eralism (Brzel 2000: 40, 2002: 147).
The classification displayed in Table 1 and the previous characterization by Brzel,
however, may not be sufficient for our purposes here. The classification used in Table 1
explores both the range issues regulated by and the origins of coordination mechan-
isms, but says nothing about how the regional and central governments decisions may
influence their performance. Brzels classification is more precise, but seems to have
been developed ad-hoc to analyse Spains coordination mechanisms and never applied
to other countries; how the specificities of an actors agenda may bear on a govern-
ments performance receives limited attention. Furthermore, coordination mechanisms
must also be examined even more closely. As I will argue throughout this study, while
coordination mechanisms fulfil similar functions in all member states, their specifi-
cities determine disparate regions chances of influencing on EU decisions. Relying on
Scharpfs actor-centered institutionalism, I propose a different classification of mem-
ber states according to their coordination mechanisms, which in turn is based on
Scharpfs concepts of modules, interaction orientations, and modes of interaction. This
same classification will be used afterwards for the case selection.
To begin with, it is necessary to identify two bargaining modules or two games in the
causal chain connecting regional agendas with access to intra-state channels.
10
The first
module, which I will call regional, encompasses the negotiations among the different
constituent units in order to define a common regional position; the second module,
which I will call region-centre, is defined by negotiation between the regions and the
central government. In the first module, common regional positions represent the
outcome of a negotiated agreement between a plurality of actors (Scharpf 1997: 7, 116).
Every concern from region A that is taken up into the common regional position is a
payoff for A, and the addition of these payoffs constitutes the aggregate welfare effect
for regions. In the second module, the common regional position and the centres
agenda are aggregated or not into the member states bargaining stance in the
Council, which represents the aggregate welfare for the member state as a whole. If the
centre takes up the common regional position without altering its contents, the welfare
9 If the constituent units appoint their representatives to the member state's permanent representa-
tion + appears.
10 A third module exists, of course, at the European stage of the decision-making process, but its
institutional setting, modes of interaction, and actors are different ones. They will be analyzed in
chapter four and six, but outside of the framework of actor-centred institutionalism.
33
effect for regions would become part of the aggregate welfare effect for the member
state.
For both modules, coordination mechanisms define the way in which actors and
agendas relate to each other. They subject all actors to diverse modes of interaction
unanimous or consensual negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical dir-
ection depending on the specific country and subject under negotiation. Modes of
interaction differ from each other with respect to the way in which collective decisions
are made, either unanimously, by a majority, or due to an actors ability to change
another actors choices (Scharpf 1997: 72).
These differences constrain the institutional settings in which interactions take
place, as shown in Figure 1. This is because negotiated agreements require, by defin-
ition, the consent of every actor. As a result, they produce high transaction costs and
require an appropriate institutional setting. However, even more demanding than ne-
gotiated agreements in terms of the institutional setting are majority vote and hier-
archical direction. In these two modes of interaction, an actors will may be overridden.
As a consequence, the institutional setting must provide some guarantee that the actor
will collaborate or at least not disturb the implementation of an agreement that the actor
rejected. The second of the institutional settings displayed in Figure 1, networks,
regimes, and joint-decision systems, which is based on unanimous decision-making,
can be broken down into different three subtypes. Two of the subtypes regime and
joint decision are extremely relevant at the time of understanding differences in the
regional modules in Germany, Spain, and Italy, as Figure 2 shows. The fourth institu-
tional setting listed in Figure 1, hierarchical organization and the state, is vital to
understanding negotiations between the state and the regions. From the combinations
of institutional settings and modes of interaction that are theoretically possible, only
two are relevant for our purposes, as marked in bold in Figure 1 (Scharpf 1997: 47).
In addition to establishing rules of decision-making and reducing transaction costs,
institutional settings also constitute actors and influence their preferences, although
they do not determine them. In other words, institutional settings define actor con-
stellations, which describe the players involved, their strategy options, the outcomes
associated with strategy combinations, and the preferences of the players over these
outcomes (Scharpf 1997: 44). Further differences among coordination mechanisms
are born out of the interaction orientations of actors involved in the policy process:
individualism, solidarity, competition, altruism, hostility (Scharpf 1997: 85-89). They
will be analysed below where I explore the distinctive behaviour of regional parties.
To summarize the preceding paragraphs, coordination mechanisms encompass two
bargaining modules in which regional and central governments seek to combine their
individual concerns into a bargaining stance that increases both parties aggregate
welfare. In the two modules, actors negotiate according to three different modes of
interaction (negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical direction) in two
different institutional settings networks, regimes, and joint-decision systems, on the
one hand, and hierarchical organization and the state, on the other. By combining modes
of interaction, institutional settings, and two subtypes thereof, regimes and joint deci-
sion systems, coordination mechanisms in Germany, Italy, and Spain bear decisively on
34
regions chances of shaping the member states bargaining stance. Since actor-centered
institutionalism permits us to distinguish among the different elements of this ex-
planatory variable, Scharpfs approach will be used here to scrutinize some member
states coordination mechanisms and then to conduct my case selection.
German coordination mechanisms present the peculiarity of combining intergov-
ernmental with parliamentary elements. Accordingly, the required majorities change.
To be more precise, in the Landesministerkonferenzen, or sector conferences, where the
regional premiers meet, agreements are defined by unanimity. These are then con-
firmed by a qualified majority in the Bundesrat. The conditions under which the com-
mon regional position expressed by the Bundesrat binds the federal government to the
regional interest are established in paragraph 23.5 of the German constitution: in the
case that the federal chamber holds the power to intervene in a domestic decision that
has been later transferred to the EU or in so far as the constituent units rather than the
federal government have the jurisdiction to make the decision, the federal chamber will
prepare a statement before negotiations at the European level begin (Jeffery 1997 a:
61-63; Klatt 1999: 56-57). The statement of the Bundesrat binds the federal govern-
ment in different degrees, depending on the competence affected. If the issue at stake is
an exclusive federal competence but affects the regions' interests or if the legislative
competence belongs to the federal executive but regions consider they have an interest
in the issue, the federal executive must simply take the statement of the Bundesrat into
consideration. This means that while the federal government must justify why the
German position in the Council deviates from the common regional position, the
federal government will not be held accountable, i.e. in front of the Constitutional
Court.
On the other hand, if the topic affects exclusive legislative powers held by the
regions, their agencies, or their administrative processes, the position of the federal
chamber binds the central government decisively. The implication of this is that the
federal government must adopt a bargaining stance consistent with the common re-
gional position. Berlin can only avoid this obligation by presenting concrete reasons
related to its power of leading German foreign policy. If the centre does not respect
these provisions, including attempts to deny that an EU decision concerns regional
competences and interests, the Lnder may, as they have actually done, ask the con-
stitutional court to declare the nullity of federal decisions on European politics (Knothe
and Bashayan 1997).
35
Figure 1: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings
Modes of
Interaction
Institutional Setting
Anarchic
Field
Networks, regimes,
and joint decisions
Associations, con-
stituencies, and repre-
sentative assemblies
Hierarchical
Organizations and the
State
Unilateral
Action
X X X X
Negotiated
Agreement
(X) X X X
Majority Vote -- -- X X
Hierarchical
Direction
-- -- _ X
Source: Own elaboration based on (Scharpf 1997)
Figure 2: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings Regional Module
Modes of
Interaction
Institutional Setting
Network Regime Joint
decision
Hierarchical organization
and the state
Negotiated
Agreement (Unanimous)
(X)
X
Spain, Italy
X X
Negotiated
Agreement (Consensual)
(X) X
X
Germany
X
Majority Vote -- -- X X
Hierarchical
Direction
-- -- _ X
Source: Own elaboration based on (Scharpf 1997)
Figure 3: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings Region-Centre Module
Modes of Interaction
Institutional Setting
Network Regime Joint decision Hierarchical organization and
the state
Negotiated
Agreement
(Unanimous)
(X) X X
X
Germany, and Spain (shared
powers) Italy (shared and ex-
clusive powers)
Negotiated
Agreement
(Consensual)
(X) X X X
Majority Vote -- -- X X
Hierarchical
Direction -- -- _
X
Germany and Spain
(regional exclusive powers)
Source: Own elaboration based on (Scharpf 1997)
36
According to Scharpfs actor-centered institutionalism, the preceding analysis could
be broadly summarized as follows: for any subject matter, the mode of interaction in the
regional module is negotiated agreement, even though the rule according to which
decisions are taken changes from unanimity in the sector conferences to consensus in
the Bundesrat. Accordingly, actors in sector conferences will first make an effort to
define a common regional agenda supported unanimously by all regions. However,
renitent regions know that they risk being overridden by a reinforced majority in the
Bundesrat at a later stage and that without a common regional agenda constituent units
are unable to shape the bargaining stance of the member state unilaterally. Such an
institutional setting is known as joint decision (Scharpf 1988: 267, 1997: 143). Its
defining traits are a relatively high level of formalization, the threat of majoritarian
decision-making, and a de facto prohibition of actions against the agreement. In con-
trast, in the region-centre module the mode of interaction changes depending on the
subject matter and on whether the institutional setting is a hierarchical organization
rather than a joint decision. If the issue at stake concerns one of the centres exclusive or
shared powers, efforts will be made to define a consensual agreement, but under the
aegis of a centre that in the last instance can set autonomously the member states
bargaining stance. When the issue at stake concerns an exclusive regional power, the
situation is reversed in the sense that if the regions and the centre do not agree the
Lnder have the right to set the bargaining stance in the Council. If the centre does not
assume the common regional position, the Lnder may resort to the constitutional
court, as has happened in past (Knothe and Bashayan 1997). Actor-centered institu-
tionalism appears to be the most appropriate way to subsume legal regulations and
administrative practices rich in details and variations, but its effectiveness should be
also tested with regard to coordination mechanisms in Spain and other member states.

Since accession, the autonomous communities of Spain have demanded effective
coordination mechanisms to participate in Spanish European policy, but results have
been mixed. I dwell at some length on the early years of coordination mechanisms, as
their origins are vital to understanding the troubles haunting Spanish intergovernmental
relations until today. Spanish coordination mechanisms correspond neither to the high
level of decentralization characteristic of Spanish estado de las autonomas nor to the
needs of a multilingual, multinational state with several differentiated regional party
systems (Linz and Montero 1999). Although the preceding claim receives support from
a few scholars interested in the Spanish estado de las autonomas (Aja 1999: 151;
Bourne 2003; Prez Tremps, Cabellos Espirrez et al 1998: 302) it is far from uncon-
troversial. Most authors, among whom Tanja Brzel is the most prominent, have con-
cluded exactly the opposite (Brzel 1999, 2000, 2002; Grau Creus 2000, forthcoming;
Miz, Beramendi et al 2002). Brzel has argued that under the influence of Euro-
peanization, Spains early competitive regionalism evolved in the late 1990s into a
cooperative federalism akin to that of Germany. The success of cooperation on Euro-
pean affairs should have boosted overall activity levels of sectoral conferences and
moved regions to collaborate with the centre on a routine basis (Brzel 2002: 147).
However, the empirical analysis contained in the next four chapters provides evidence
37
suggesting that cooperation on European affairs and the Spanish coordination mech-
anisms are far from a success. The following paragraphs will attempt to establish how
these early attempts to establish coordination mechanisms were flawed.
According to federal officials, in the late 1980s the socialist government was ready
to facilitate the access of regions to the decision-making process, but regional gov-
ernments ended up turning down this opportunity (Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez Campo
et al 1995: 137-159). With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to affirm that these
early arrangements could have resulted in final-status agreements. Admittedly, the
proposals had important weaknesses, for they did not precisely establish how the right
of the autonomous communities to participate in the domestic definition of the Spanish
European policy would be ensured. However, these early attempts emphasized the right
of regions to participate in both the upward and the implementation stage and also
guaranteed the principle of federal loyalty. After a few years of collaboration between
the centre and the regions, these early attempts to establish coordination mechanisms
could have served as a good basis for regions taking up the representation of Spain in the
Council, according to Art. 203 TEC. But if the centres reasonable proposals were
indeed rejected by the autonomous communities, it is necessary to explain the reasons.
As I just said, these early efforts to establish coordination mechanisms appear at first
sight to have created an atmosphere for the conclusion of successful agreements, as
they recognized the right of regions to participate in EU politics. However, both the
Basque and Catalan governments were able to manipulate the negotiations towards
bilateral solutions, which they deemed as more favourable for them. Roughly put, this
fondness of the Basque and Catalan government for bilateral solutions magnified the
difficulty of reaching agreements with the other regions according to the unanimity
rule. Both executives separately sought solutions differentiating between each one of
them and the remaining regions, instead of collaborating with the other autonomous
communities to pressure the centre (Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez Campo et al 1995:
131, 141, 155-159; Prez Tremps 1995: 309). Thus, in a climate of mutual distrust
influenced by the competing interests of nationalist parties, autonomous communities
rejected any final agreement specifying the characteristics of coordination mechan-
isms. Nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country, assumed, not without
reason, that even if they firmly demanded joint solutions favourable for all autonomous
communities, the regional governments controlled by state-wide parties, particularly
the heavily centralized Peoples Party (PP), would not follow suit (Aja 1999: 151).
11
Instead, the Basque government insisted on bilateral relations with the centre on Euro-
pean affairs and for ten years refused to sign agreements on matters previously agreed
upon by the centre and the other regions. For instance, as late as 1994 the Basque
Government refrained from signing the agreement regulating the Conferencia para
Asuntos Relacionados con las comunidades Europeas (CARCE; see Ortzar An-
11 A recent and consequential example of this behaviour is the reaction of the PP Leadership to the
new financial arrangement for the autonomous communities defined by the PSOE central gov-
ernment and the regions. See Rajoy cree que el "caos est servido" pero anima a sus CC.AA. a que
defiendan "sus intereses propios." Europa Press 14 July 2009. See also Aprobado el nuevo modelo
de financiacin con la abstencin de las comunidades autnomas del PP, La Vanguardia, 15 July
2009.
38
dechaga, Gmez Campo et al. 1995: 132). Similarly, the Catalan government was wary
of a detailed regulation of this issue and emphasized flexibility and ad-hoc solutions, at
least until the mid 1990s. Confident of its increasing influence in Madrid and in the
Spanish parliament, the Convergncia i Uni (CiU) partys regional executive bet on
the same strategy as the Basque region, but in a more discreet way. By making bilateral
arrangements a precondition to further talks, the CiU was able to put off regulations that
would bind all regions and settle their differences once and for all. The consequence of
this regional failure to collaborate was a series of barren negotiation rounds, unimple-
mented agreements, and a delay of almost ten years before real progress on the co-
ordination of European policy was achieved in the late 1990s.
The difficult birth of coordination mechanisms was only a harbinger of the com-
plications associated with their operation and with intergovernmental relations more
generally. Spanish coordination mechanisms rely exclusively on intergovernmental
bodies and on the unanimity rule, in contrast to those of Germany. Of course, a terri-
torial chamber, the Senado, exists, but in the Spanish asymmetrical bicameralism it has
remained weak; its committee on European affairs, Comisin Mixta del Congreso y del
Senado para la Unin Europea,

plays merely a monitoring role and is not of further
relevance in our context (Aja 1999: 144-147; Brzel 2002: 97; Grau Creus forthcom-
ing: 105; Prez Tremps, Cabellos Espirrez et al 1998: 307-309). Rather than in the
territorial chamber, the coordination between centre and periphery takes place in more
than twenty sectoral conferences comparable to the German Ressortkonferenzen. In the
Spanish conferencias sectoriales, federal and regional ministers of the same subject
discuss topics relevant to both tiers of government under the chairmanship of the central
governments minister. In contrast to the German and Austrian sister institutions, the
secretariat and direction of sectoral conferences is placed in a federal rather than
regional body. Furthermore, whereas in the German conferences federal representa-
tives may only participate as guests, in Spain the corresponding minister chairs the
meeting of the conference while her department sets the agenda and exerts a great
influence on its work.
In the Spanish coordination mechanisms, European affairs are discussed under the
aegis of the central government. As far as they refer to general aspects of the European
integration process or to the transposition of European law, European affairs are dis-
cussed in the CARCE Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades
Europeas. Its secretariat, to be sure, is placed under a federal rather than regional body,
the Ministerio de Administraciones Pblicas (MAP), a ministry for intergovernmental
relations of sorts. Since the early 1990s, CARCE has dealt with issues of general
relevance for integration policy such as treaty reforms as a complement to the work of
the sectoral conferences, which are policy-specific rather than related to the progress of
the integration process.
12
Although the CARCE differs from sector conferences in
12 The CARCE first met in 1988, was institutionalized in 1992 through an agreement between the
central and regional governments, and its competences expanded in 1994 through a second
agreement. Three years after the second agreement was signed, the Catalan party CiU gained legal
regulation for CARCE in exchange for its support of the first PP government. On the functions of
the CARCE, see art. 3, Ley 2/1997, de 13 de marzo, por la que se regula la conferencia para
asuntos relacionados con las comunidades europeas in BOE n. 64, 15 March 1997.
39
being a cross-sectoral conference, the remaining traits the unanimous decision-mak-
ing and the prominence of the MAP therein are still the same. In fact, the CARCE does
not seem to grant autonomous communities an opportunity to influence the Spanish
European policy, in spite of claims to the contrary (Brzel 2002: 138). In any case, it is
not the CARCE but the sectoral conferences that are the bodies in charge of dealing with
the European aspects of the respective remits; chapters three and five analyse their
performance regarding audiovisual and cohesion policy.
As a consequence of unanimity rule, the deals struck in the sector conferences do not
bind either the central or regional governments unless they consent to them. In 1983 the
Spanish constitutional court banned compulsory agreements between the centre and the
autonomous communities on devolved matters with the aim of protecting the newly
created autonomous communities and their powers from recentralization (Grau Creus
forthcoming: 114, 120-121; Muoz Machado 1983; Rubio Caballero 2004).
13
The
prohibition of compulsory agreements between the centre and the autonomous com-
munities imposed by the constitutional court explains together with the inimical
attitude of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), CiU, and other regional parties to
collaboration why sector conferences and intergovernmental relations in general are
considered by some scholars as the greatest drawback of Spanish federalism (Aja 1999;
Grau Creus forthcoming; Miz, Beramendi et al 2002). Since 1994 an agreement
regulates how they participate in the definition of the Spanish position in the Council.
14
Its language strikingly resembles the German art. 23.5 BL, as Brzel underlines (Brzel
2002: 126), but a careful analysis shows that the similarities between the Spanish and
German sectoral conferences are mostly superficial. Although the Spanish agreement,
like the German regulation, differentiates between EU decisions concerning regional
exclusive powers, shared powers, and the centres exclusive powers, the agreement
mandates completely different conditions for the common regional position to be
adopted by the centre. The agreement establishes that, regarding matters where the
central and regional governments share powers (competencias concurrentes y com-
partidas), an agreement between both levels would be determinant at the time of fixing
the position of the central government in the Council. Further, the Spanish arrangement
also stipulates that if the power to legislate an issue belongs exclusively to the au-
tonomous communities, the regional agenda must be adopted by the central govern-
ment during the negotiations in the Council. But for this to be the case, autonomous
communities must be able to reach a common regional position.
This in effect constitutes a powerful loophole that concentrates power in the centre.
Regarding shared powers, the agreement states that in the case that the central and
13 See the LOAPA ruling, STC 76/83 on the Ley Orgnica de Armonizacin del Proceso Autonmi-
co.
14 Acuerdo de la Conferencia para Asuntos relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas sobre la
participacin interna de las Comunidades Autnomas en los asuntos comunitarios europeos a
travs de las conferencias sectoriales, published in BOE n. 69, 22 March 1995, pp. 9037-9039 and
BOE n. 78, 1 April, p. 10045. The agreement was reproduced in (Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez
Campo et al 1995: 239-244). Eliseo Aja comments that in the late 1990s the increasing importance
of the CARCE moved the actual Basque PM, Juan Jos Ibarretxe to formally request to participate
in the conference (Aja 1999: 215).
40
regional governments do find a common position, the central government will be
forced to adopt it. However, the agreement does not establish any specific consequence
in the case that the central and regional executives do not come to a unanimous agree-
ment. In effect, the centre is free to determine the Spanish position in the Council if the
centre does not first define a common position with the regions. The centre, of course, is
equally free to determine the Spanish position if the regions do not define a common
position among themselves. To put it bluntly, regarding shared powers, regions may
influence the Spanish stance in the Council only if it suits the central government.
Regarding regional exclusive powers, the central government must incorporate into its
European agenda the regions' preference with regard to matters of their exclusive
competence only if autonomous communities previously define a common regional
position. Until 2000, this had never been the case; regions have never agreed on a set of
joint demands (Brzel 2000: 137; Roig Mols 2000, 2002: ch 4). In sum, in spite of the
apparent similarities with the German system, Spanish coordination mechanisms pre-
vent autonomous communities from influencing the Spanish European policy.
An analysis of Spanish coordination mechanisms from the perspective of Scharpfs
typology will make their flaws more apparent and the comparison easier. In Spain, as in
Germany, coordination takes place in two different modules. In the regional module,
autonomous communities negotiate agreements among themselves according to the
unanimity rule. As Figure 2 shows, the mode of interaction, consisting of negotiated
agreement according to the unanimity rule, is further specified by an institutional
setting regime, which is less formalized than the joint-decision setting (Scharpf 1997:
141-145). The game defined by unanimous negotiated agreements in a regime implies
that the threat of majoritarian decisions, as well as a de facto prohibition of railing
against the agreement, is non-existent. In fact, the level of formalization is so low that
coordination mechanisms fail to fulfil some of the characteristics of a regime and may
resemble a negotiation network in some respects. Specifically, two properties of
regimes are missing from Spanish coordination mechanisms: the prohibition of uni-
lateral damaging strategies and effective procedures to settle disputes over the inter-
pretation of the rules establishing coordination mechanisms (on regimes, see Scharpf
1997: 142). Nevertheless, Spanish coordination mechanisms should be considered a
regime in as far as they are purposefully created normative frameworks governing
negotiations among a formally specified set of actors as well as the fact that their
effective outcomes are not determined by the regimes itself (...) but by the subsequent
interactions of parties committed to observe its rules (Scharpf 1997: 141-142).
If we move on to the region-centre module, circumstances differ significantly ac-
cording to the subject matter, just as in Germany. If the issue discussed corresponds to
powers shared by the centre and the autonomous communities, the mode of interaction
negotiated agreement requires a unanimous covenant between the regional level and
the central government to define a bargaining stance in the Council. However, if there is
no agreement among the centre and the regions, the centre regains the power to set the
Spanish bargaining stance in the Council. As a consequence, the institutional setting
changes from regime to hierarchical coordination. Alternatively, if in the second mod-
ule the topic discussed falls under a regional exclusive competence, the autonomous
41
communities may impose their view on the centre, again in hierarchical coordination.
Nonetheless, before they may compel the centre to take up a common regional position,
the seventeen autonomous communities must have previously defined a common re-
gional position according to the demanding requisites of the unanimity rule.

In Italy, coordination mechanisms show characteristics (and deficiencies) similar to
those observed in Spain. According to statutory law, discussions of EU decisions
relevant for regions take place in the Conferenza Stato Regioni (CSR).
15
The agree-
ments reached in the CSR, however, do not bind their signatories and must be con-
firmed through twenty individual covenants between the centre and the regions (Ciaffi
2001 a: 477). In the CSR, the central and regional ministers meet regularly: they met
twenty times in 2003, thirty five times in 2002, and eighteen times in 2001.
16
During the
2003 meetings, the CSR produced about 2700 decisions, but most of them simply
documented the regions' consent to the dispositions already enacted by the central
government. Even more telling, only twenty out of the 2700 decisions referred specif-
ically to European matters. The low level of EU-related activities has not prevented the
establishment of a specific configuration of the conference dealing with these matters,
the so-called sessione comunitaria.
17
In theory, the sessione comunitaria of the CSR is
expected to meet twice a year, but it met just once in 2003 and 2002, no times in 2001
and twice in 2000. The sessione comunitaria met four times in 1999 due to the nego-
tiation of the structural funds, but this was an exception. Apparently, many European
matters are dealt with in the CSR in its default configuration. According to Italian law,
the CSR must examine a yearly act encompassing all measures aimed at adapting the
Italian legislation to EU-law, the so-called leggi comunitarie.
18
However, this amounts
to relegating the CSR to little more than a rubber-stamp body while the central gov-
ernment in Rome retains all final decision-making powers. This malfunctioning stems
from a number of reasons. Among them are the merely advisory role of the regions, the
regions inability to identify EU decisions of importance for them, a lack of confidence
in coordination mechanisms, and the effects of combining the unanimity rule in the
midst of increasing levels territorial conflict (Desideri 1995: 74-75; Desideri and Vi-
cenzo 1997: 105-106; Giordano 2003; Gold 2003; Gmez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002;
Piattoni 2003).
In contrast with Spain, Italian regions enjoy the advantage of meeting in a body
where the centre is not present, the Conferenza dei Presidenti (CdP), similar to the
German Ministerprsidentenkonferenz; the agreements defined in the CdP may be
subsequently presented to the central government in the CSR. Nonetheless, a more
15 See in particular, decreto legislativo 28 August 1997, n. 281 implementing art.9 Law 15 March
1997, n. 59.
16 This and additional information on the CSR is available at its website http://www.statoregioni.it/
(accessed November 2009).
17 Recognized by a statute from 9 March 1989, n. 86, art. 10, comma 1, subsequently modified by the
statutes n. 128/98 and n. 25/99. More on the sessione comunitaria is available from the website of
the CSR http://www.statoregioni.it/sessioneComunitaria.asp?CONF=CSR (accessed November
2009).
18 Act 183 from 16 April 1987 on the coordination of the policies related to the Italian membership in
the EC.
42
fundamental similarity with Spain persists, namely the virtual impossibility for regions
to compel the centre to adopt a certain bargaining stance in the Council. Regardless of
which tier of government holds the power domestically, the bargaining stance is defined
unanimously between the centre and the region or freely by the centre if there is no
agreement. In other words, coordination mechanisms in Italy consist of a first regional
module in which the mode of interaction is negotiated agreement according to unan-
imity and the institutional setting is a regime. In the second module, the mode of
interaction remains the same, but the institutional setting is hierarchical organization.
Whereas all the preceding corresponds point by point with Spain, Italian regions lack
the right to compel the state to assume a common regional position, even when the
subject discussed in the Council corresponds to the, however scarce, regional exclusive
competences.

This section has explained the traits that characterize the coordination mechanisms
of three federal member states. In these three countries, Germany, Spain, and Italy,
coordination mechanisms for European policy establish the conditions under which
regions may set the bargaining stance of the member state in the Council. Some im-
portant differences between coordination mechanisms exist from one member state to
another, however. These can be best summarized in the pivotal role of the unanimity
rule, which makes agreements among the regions during the first module easier in
Germany, where consensual decision-making predominates, than in Spain and Italy,
where unanimity is the criterion employed. Such a difference strongly suggests that the
similarities between the sectoral conferences in Germany and Spain underlined by
Brzel may hide additional complexities. This issue, however, can only be settled by
the empirical tests conducted in chapters three and five.
Nationalist Parties and the Impact of Integration
One of the goals of this book is to show that constituent units with strong nationalist
parties respond to the increasing influence of the EU in distinct ways. Three arguments
make this claim plausible. The first is relevant for all political parties, not only for
nationalist ones, and its importance makes it advisable to discuss at this point. All
parties bear decisively on the workings of federal systems and, in fact, two identical
federal systems and their coordination mechanisms will work in completely dif-
ferent ways depending on how parties behave. This was exactly what was meant by
Riker when he wrote that the proximate cause of variations in the degree of central-
ization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the vari-
ation in degree of party centralization (Riker 1964: 129). Fritz Scharpf has also un-
derlined the importance of political parties in explaining the workings of any federal
system (1988: 267). Hence, a careful consideration of parties, including regional parties
and party systems is a necessary step toward understanding federal systems and their
coordination mechanisms.
43
The second argument, specific to nationalist parties, is that nationalist parties behave
in particular ways, basing party platforms on region-specific claims and adopting
tactics unsuitable for state-wide parties. Nationalist parties make increased regional
autonomy the centre of their program (Winter 1998: 204). These demands, particularly
if they invoke a differentiated national identity, have particular implications for a
country and its party system: they redefine the demos reducing the group of citizens to
which the general interest refers to those living in a region rather than in the country as a
whole. Finally, nationalist parties question the legitimacy of the federal government to
act in a part of the federal territory. In other words, the demands of nationalist parties do
not primarily target policies but the polity itself (Cortona 2001: 189; Winter 1998) and
in particular the federal arrangement (Agranoff 1996; Grau Creus 2000; Guibernau
1995; Kraus 1994; Miz 1999; Miz, Beramendi et al 2002; Miz and Losada 2000;
Morass 1997; Requejo 1996; Winter, Timmermans et al 1997). Coordination mech-
anisms have also been part of this controversy, as we saw in the case of Spain. Apart
from their demands, another feature distinguishes nationalist parties from state-wide
parties: nationalist parties present candidates only in one region, such as the Scottish
National Party, or in several regions as in the case of the PNV or the Lega Nord, and
never stand for election before the various constituencies of a country. In federal
systems, this is not such a great disadvantage because federal systems allow nationalist
parties the possibility of undertaking not only a vote-seeking strategy but also a suc-
cessful office-seeking strategy. Indeed, such systems create separate, self-sustaining
centres of power (Truman 1955: 123). Accordingly, nationalist parties whose con-
stituencies concentrate around one or more of those centres of power may try to size
control of a region by defining an agenda responsive exclusively to the preferences
popular in their respective home-turfs (Scharpf 1992 b: 61-62). However, refraining
from considering other regions preferences may create hurdles for the subsequent
definition of a common position with other regions in coordination mechanisms. This
partially explains the failure of the Basque region to reach a common position with
Catalonia on coordination mechanisms in the 1980s.
The third reason concerns nationalist parties tendency to give prominence to ter-
ritorial conflicts and thereby force state-wide parties to take a stance on the issue
(Cortona 2001; Keating 1998 b: 96). As a consequence, state-wide parties in those
regions experience organizational and policy changes (Houten 2003: 11-13). They may
tend to split into several nationalist parties or simply decentralize their structure
(Hooghe 1991; Mndez Lago 2004). Policy changes refer to the prominence of terri-
torial policy for one or more regional branches of a state-wide party and to their
endorsement of further decentralization (Winter 1998: 240-241). In sum, nationalist
parties compel their competitors to place themselves along an increasingly centrifugal
territorial cleavage and a growingly centripetal left-right axis.
Unfortunately, the available scholarship on nationalist parties is of limited value
when seeking to understand their influence on federal systems and their policy outputs.
A rich tradition of research on the concept and origins of minority nationalism exists. In
broad terms, scholars agree that minority nationalism exists where a political actor such
as a social movement or a political party demands autonomy or outright independence
44
for a territory in the name of a distinctive trait such a national or linguistic allegiance or
of a combination of several traits (Allardt 1979: 10-12; Hobsbawm 1990: 7). The term
minority will be used in this book to refer to the territorially-based populations resulting
from state-building in Europe, like the Scots in the UK, the Catalans in Spain or the
Bretons in France (Layton-Henry 2001; Rokkan, Flora et al 1999; Rokkan and Urwin
1982). Closely related, the concept of a linguistic minority refers to the speakers of a
language that are at a disadvantage, numerical or not, within a region, as the Flemish in
Brussels, or within a state, as in the case of the Catalan speakers in Spain. The term of
linguistic minority, however, should convey more than a purely arithmetic disadvan-
tage. It also implies that the minority language enjoys less status (Fishman 1999),
possess a limited market value (Swaan 2001), or is threatened by language obsoles-
cence (Dorian 2001). We may now move on from the problem of origins of a linguistic
minority to the consequences of such a group being represented by a nationalist party in
the political system. The bulk of the relevant scholarship on nationalist parties focuses
on explaining the origins of nationalist movements and their impact on the party system
rather than on the workings of federal systems or on policy outputs. The performance of
nationalist parties in government as of yet have remained unexplored.
Three examples may illustrate the limited extent of scholarship on the ways in which
nationalist parties influence policy. A scholar as deeply interested in both national
minorities and party systems in Europe as Stein Rokkan has dedicated only a few pages
to the issue (Rokkan, Flora et al 1999: 321-326). In Erik Allardts masterpiece on
linguistic minorities the existence of a nationalist party is an indicator of ethnic mo-
bilization rather than an explanatory variable (Allardt 1979: 59-64; but see Urwin
1983). For Spain, the work of Juan Linz offers multiple insights on the causes of
minority nationalism and its translation into the party system, but few suggestions as to
the consequences for policy outputs (1967, 1981, 1986; Linz and Montero 1999; Linz
and Stepan 1992). Until the mid-1990s researchers had ignored the problem of the
leverage of national minorities in the federal system as a whole, even where its influ-
ence was indisputable, as in Spain (Kraus 1994: 294).
A new stream of scholarship focused on increasingly successful and influential
nationalist parties rather than on movements began to grow after the rise of Lega Nord
in Italian politics (Bull and Gilbert 2001; Gold 2003; Gmez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002;
Holzer and Schwegler 1998; Levy 1996; Tarchi 1998). Subsequently, researchers of
nationalist parties have endeavoured to explain their rise and success (or failure). This
kind of work constitutes the bulk of the research on nationalist parties (Cortona 2001;
Fearon and Houten 2002; Gordin 2001; Houten 2002, 2003). Other scholars have
chosen nationalist parties as a variable explaining the transformation of party organ-
isations or of party systems. Indeed, Pieter van Houten and Elsa Roller have undertaken
research on the challenges for the Catalan branch of the Partido Socialista Obrero
Espaol (PSOE) derived from electoral competition in Catalonia (Houten and Roller
2003). The publications of Ramn Miz and his collaborators exploring the connection
between federalism and nationalist parties in Spain belong to a smaller group of works
exploring nationalist parties impact on institutions (Grau Creus forthcoming; Miz
1999; Miz, Beramendi et al 2002; Miz and Losada 2000). Or, to use the vocabulary of
45
Peter Lynch, they are among the rare works dealing with the influence of political
parties on institutional or any other policy (Lynch 2003; Lynch, Winter et al 2006). In
sum, although Miz and his co-authors, as well as Belgian scholars, have occasionally
tackled the impact of nationalist parties on the centre, including federalism and Euro-
pean policy, the topic nevertheless calls for further attention (Hooghe 1995 a; Kerre-
mans 2000; Sepos 2003).

In order to understand how regions, in particular those governed by nationalist
parties, operate within coordination mechanisms, they will be considered here as
holding cognitive orientations and preferences. As in actor-centered institutionalism, I
assume that, in principle, cognitive orientations, that is an actors understanding of
empirical facts, are correct and uncertainty about relevant issues is homogeneously
widespread among actors. These assumptions, however, will be contrasted with the
material from the case studies. The latter category, preferences, encompasses four
elements: interests, norms, identities, and interaction orientations, which will prove
crucial at the time of identifying the consequences of nationalist versus state-wide
parties strategies for coordination mechanisms. The four elements shaping preferences
must be analysed separately.
To a great extent, an actors preferences are shaped by its interests. Defining the
regional interests is, in addition, a precondition for any regional government to advance
any European agenda either through intra- or extra-state channels; territorial or regional
interests do not exist if an actor does not choose a topic and label it as such. To borrow
Georg Simmels words, space by itself remains ineffectual form (Simmel 1995:
133).
19
Space receives meaning and content, when an actor, i.e. an executive, defines an
issue as a regional interest and declares it worthy of being discussed in the coordination
mechanisms. Admittedly, governing parties may incorporate demands from business
associations or local governments, among other institutions, thus contributing to inter-
est aggregation in the region, but they remain as uncontested gatekeepers. In fact,
regions are seen here as corporate actors controlled by the governing party (Scharpf
1997: 56) or at least, in the case of coalition governments, by the party appointing the
head of the department in charge of a specific policy. While the predominance of the
party is characteristic of European parliamentary systems, the prevalence of the ex-
ecutive branch results from both the technical and bureaucratic nature of European
policy-making (Mazey and Richardson 1995: 354) and the weakness of the regional
associations, both labour and business interest associations (Keating 2000; Kraus 1994:
262, 269; Schmitter and Lanzalaco 1989: 203, 224, 227; Trigilia 1985, 1991).
Rather than considering interests as revealed preferences independent of their
sources and justifications (Scruton 1996: 267), I consider the creation of a politically
relevant interest as a regional governments explicit response to perceived or antici-
pated effects of policy government action or inaction including all its symbolic forms
as well as more tangible locations upon values (Salisbury 1984: 65) and subject to
dispute (Mazey and Mitchell 1993: 96). Put another way, instead of unduly restricting
19 die Inhalte dieser Formen erfahren doch nur durch andere Inhalte die Besonderheit ihrer
Schicksale, der Raum bleibt immer die an sich wirkungslose Form..
46
the scope of social science research (Berger and Offe 1982: 525), I analyse, in-depth,
how regional governments set their preferences for certain EU decisions. Executives
and governing parties, particularly regional parties, may harbour hidden agendas not
necessarily coincident with the interests of the regional constituencies they claim to
represent. To paraphrase Claus Offe, the self-interest of a regional government may
easily dominate its European agenda (1975: 13; Scharpf 1988: 254). Thus, in the
empirical chapters I will combine my emphasis on how regions advance their European
agendas with occasional examinations of the agenda-setting processes.
The distinguishing properties of nationalist parties interests were made explicit at
the beginning of this chapter, but they deserve being mentioned again. Regarding the
substance of their agendas, nationalist parties emphasize territorial autonomy, question
the federal arrangement, and in short try to change the polity rather than the policies
(Cortona 2001: 189; Winter 1998). As for their territorial scope, the interests of na-
tionalist parties are those of a certain constituency rather than those of the country as a
whole. This, however, may hinder the definition of common regional positions
(Scharpf 1992 b: 61-62).
In addition to interests, actors preferences result from norms, identities, and inter-
action orientations. Nationalist parties may differ in these respects from state-wide
parties. Norms establish both which courses of action and which goals are considered
appropriate and valuable. In this respect, nationalist parties present particular charac-
teristics because they may consider appropriate courses of actions that harm individuals
from the same member state, but who live beyond their constituency, and which are
unacceptable for state-wide parties. Similarly, the defence of identity, language, or
symbolic issues, occupies a prominent place among the goals of an actor. The identity
of an actor constitutes a short-cut to establish preferences regarding issues on which
clear options are missing. As an illustration, if a party sees itself as a bulwark defending
a linguistic or national minority against a centralist state, the party may find in its
identity a response to the question of whether it should compromise or collaborate with
the central government. Finally, the concept of interaction orientation should be used
for subjective redefinitions of the objective interest constellation, leading to dis-
crimination among partners even when the factual consequences and the applicable
norms are identical (Scharpf 1997: 84). Five types of subjective redefinitions exist
individualism, solidarity, competition, altruism, and hostility , but in policy processes
the last two are mostly irrelevant because in democratic polities, professionalism and
the raison dtat make actions motivated by love or hate inappropriate (Weber 1922:
13; Scharpf 1997: 85-87). In the late 1980s, constituent units led by nationalist parties
redefined their interest in participating in European politics from a competitive per-
spective, as the origins of coordination mechanisms in Spain suggest. Thus, the most
likely explanation for why they openly rejected the establishment of coordination
mechanisms that would have been beneficial was because these treated all autonomous
communities equally.
This section has explored a number of factors at the regional level that influence the
workings of coordination mechanisms. We have seen that parties that compete on only a
part of the federal territory may succeed in elections without taking into consideration
47
the implications of their party platform for the country as a whole. This explains why
nationalist parties agendas are characterized by their allegiance to some norms that are
irrelevant for other parties and by their disloyalty to other norms respected by state-
wide parties. In addition, their identity is based on advancing the interests of a relatively
small constituency at the expense of the member state as a whole. Among nationalist
parties, the interaction orientation contains competitive elements rather than being
oriented towards solidarity or mere individualism. These traits strongly influence co-
ordination mechanisms and the definition of common regional positions, as chapters
three through six demonstrate. The next section explains how I proceed to select cases
and policy fields that are representative of the variety of federal systems and regional
party systems.
Research Design
This book incorporates two case studies on regional participation in EU decisions, one
related to audiovisual policy in the late 1990s and one on the 1999 reform of the
cohesion policy. Because the characteristics of a policy field influence strategies of
regional interest representation, I chose two slightly different combinations of cases.
For audiovisual policy, the regions observed are the Rhineland-Palatinate, the Basque
Country, and Valencia. For the case study on the cohesion policy reform I replaced
Valencia with Tuscany, for reasons I explain below. Because I intend to give an account
of the explanatory power of both coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties, it
was necessary to undertake not one but two sets of comparisons. This would allow the
separate observation of their effects on regional interest representation in the EU. On
the one hand, member states with different coordination mechanisms are compared
and, on the other hand, an intra-state comparison among two regions from the same
member state with different levels of support for nationalist parties will be considered.
Therefore, in each policy field I look at two member states and at three regions. The rest
of this section explains my selection of cases and of policy fields.

The selection of regions is based on the most similar systems design (MSSD), which
is particularly appropriate for a piece of research focused in a geographic area, in my
case the fifteen Western European EU member states (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32).
The reason why it is appropriate is that the MSSD assumes that similarities are being
controlled for and that the few outstanding differences must explain variation in
outcomes. Hence, I selected regions with the most diverging values in my explanatory
variables coordination mechanisms and support for nationalist parties and with
similar traits in other respects, such as size, GDP, and per capita income (King, Keohane
et al 1994: 140-141; Przeworski and Teune 1970: 33-34).
To be more precise, the case selection focuses on two traits that appear particularly
consequential, whether agreements in the first module of the coordination mechanisms
are taken consensually and whether nationalist parties figure among the actors. From
this perspective, it is possible to differentiate between Germany, where the unanimity
48
rule has been replaced by consensual decision-making, and the remaining federal
member states. Thus, Germany turned out to be the only suitable case for exploring
consensual decision-making. Among German regions, the Rhineland-Palatinate,
which is smaller in terms of population and economic output and not as affluent as other
Lnder are, was more appropriate to compare with the Italian regions and, particularly,
with Spanish regions, as displayed in Table 2. For example, I excluded the three city-
states because of their small size and Lnder such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-
Wrttemberg, and Bavaria because of their large population and GDP. I avoided East
German regions in view of the structural economic problems resulting from their
communist past. Admittedly, certain significant disparities among the selected regions
exist. For example, the Basque economy is markedly smaller than those of the re-
maining regions. However, given the enormous differences between EU regions in
income, GDP and population, my case selection includes regions whose dissimilarities
are if not negligible at least less distorting.
Table 2: Regional Cases Economy and Population (2001)
Region
GDP at
Current
Market
Prices (Mil.
Euro)
Per Capita
Income
(Euros)
Income as
EU
Average
Popula-
tion in
Thou-
sands
Area
Km
2
Rhineland-
Palatinate
91.152.900 22.556.000 110.400 4.034 19.847
Basque
Country
41.891.200 20.252.700 99.100 2.067 7.261
Valencia 63.938.700 15.618.600 76.400 4.073 23.260
Tuscany 82.918.400 23.335.900 114.200 3.547 22.987
Source: Own elaboration based on the regional Statistics from Eurostat, REGIO,
available in the International Statistical Yearbook 2004.
To explore the influence of nationalist parties, I was able to choose from a range of
regions from the different member states that use the unanimity rule. As a strategy to
identify regions where nationalist parties are particularly successful, I first examined
regional parliaments in which they were represented. To measure electoral support, I
added percentages of votes obtained by all nationalist parties represented in parliament
to obtain an indicator of their overall strength in a constituent unit. At the end of this
chapter, Table 8 displays the results for the last regional election held before January
2003, showing that nationalist parties are most successful in Trentino-South Tyrol, Val
dAosta, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and in Belgium. For the reasons outlined
below, the choice of the Basque Country emerged as the best option. Since the demise of
state-wide parties in Belgian constituent units, nationalist parties have received one
hundred percent of votes; this is more than the share that the nationalist parties receive
in the Basque Country, where state-wide parties obtain slightly less than half of the
suffrage. However because of this, Belgium has become a country where state-wide
49
parties are absent from all regional party systems. Thus, drawing on the Belgian ex-
ample would have two significant disadvantages. All Belgian regions present a con-
figuration unanimity rule and extensive support for nationalist parties that could
lead to problems related to multicausality. Additionally, since all regions are governed
by nationalist parties, selecting Belgian regions would make it impossible to conduct an
intra-state comparison exploring how nationalist and state-wide parties react to the
unanimity rule. In addition, Belgian coordination mechanisms lack the regional module
existing in the remaining EU federal member states: from the very beginning negoti-
ations on EU affairs take place between representatives of the Belgian federal gov-
ernment and the constituent units, setting additional hurdles to a comparison with other
countries. In order to avoid these problems, I preferred to exclude all Belgian regions
from my case selection, while relying on both Italian and Spanish regions as alterna-
tives.
Val dAosta has a dominant nationalist party, Union Valdotaine, but it is extremely
small both in terms of its population and its economy (Caponio 2000; Koff and Koff
2000). In Trentino-Alto Adige, another extremely successful nationalist party exists,
the Sdtiroler Volkspartei, but its electoral support is concentrated only in one of the
two provinces, Bolzano. The strength of nationalist parties varies so markedly within
the region that two party sub-systems exist (Brunazzo 2000: 629). Apart from this
electoral peculiarity, the region also presents an institutional issue: not only the regional
but also the two provincial parliaments hold legislative powers.
20
Having discarded the
two Italian regions, I favoured the Basque Country because nationalist parties there
receive even more electoral support than in the other potential case, Catalonia. More-
over, the nationalist and occasionally secessionist Partido Nacionalista Vasco ap-
peared more appropriate than the more moderate nationalist party Convergncia i Uni
dominant in Catalonia in the late 1990s (Marcet and Argelaguet 1998; Prez-Nievas
2006). The choice of the Basque Country as a case study gave me the opportunity to
discuss cultural pluralism in the EU, and linguistic minority issues in particular.
After having chosen the Basque Country, I needed to select another Spanish au-
tonomous community, but this time one without strong nationalist parties. I picked
Valencia in order to undertake an intra-state comparison because it presents the pecu-
liarity of being a region with both a linguistic minority and with a low level of support
for nationalist parties (see Table 8). In fact, the most successful nationalist party in the
region, Uni Valenciana, was barred from the regional parliament in 2000. Thus, the
range of cases includes a second minority region in which the absence of strong na-
tionalist parties gives linguistic issues a different relevance than in the Basque Country.
Table 3 shows my selection of cases for the audiovisual policy study.
20 See art. 116 and 117 Italian Constitution and art. 47 statuto speciale per il Trentino-Alto Adige.
50
Table 3: Case Selection Audiovisual Policy

Unanimity Rule
Consensual
Decision-making
Nationalist
Parties
Basque Country
No Nationalist
Parties
Valencia Rhineland-Palatinate
Source: Own elaboration
As I stated earlier, this book examines regional interest representation in two policy
fields: audiovisual and structural policies. The specificities of each policy field pre-
vented me from using the same three regions in both studies and compelled me to
replace Valencia with Tuscany for the cohesion policy case study. Whereas the Basque
Country and the Rhineland-Palatinate were classified as Objective 2 regions those
with problems of industrial decline such as the area around Glasgow with its ailing
shipyards, or Pas de Calais with deeply troubled textile companies , Valencia is
classified as an Objective 1 region, together with others lagging behind in development
like Andalusia and Sicily. To compare interest representation strategies from Objective
1 and Objective 2 regions would not offer conclusive information about how nationalist
parties use coordination mechanisms, as chapter four will make clear.
The easiest way to solve this problem would have been to find an Objective 2
Spanish region without influential nationalist parties. However, the distribution of
support for nationalist parties in the autonomous communities with Objective 2 areas
made this impossible. In all of Spanish Objective 2 regions, nationalist parties are
strong enough as to have sizeable representations in the regional parliaments. The only
exception, Madrid, is not an appropriate option because of its status as a capital region.
At this point, I opted for choosing an Italian Objective 2 region because, as I showed
previously, Italy and Spain possess similar coordination mechanisms based on the
unanimity rule, but only some Objective 2 regions are governed by nationalist parties.
Among the remaining Objective 2 regions in central Italy, I selected Tuscany because
of its size, more similar to the Rhineland-Palatinate and Basque Country than Molise or
Umbria (see Table 4).
Table 4: Case Selection Structural Policy

Unanimity Rule
Consensual
Decision-making
Nationalist
Parties
Basque Country
No Nationalist
Parties
Tuscany Rhineland-Palatinate
Source: Authors own elaboration
51
The discussion of my research design would remain incomplete without accounting
for the selection of policy fields. Regarding the number of fields, analysing two rather
than one offers important advantages while still remaining feasible for a single re-
searcher. An additional advantage of this strategy is that findings from a certain type of
policy study would also be relevant for another policy of the same type. For instance,
the results from analysing a regulatory policy such as the audiovisual policy would be
highly relevant for other spheres where the EU also acts as a regulatory state (Majone
1994, 1996) like environmental or health policy. Furthermore, the fact that the findings
are applicable to more than one policy field demonstrates the strength of the two
explanatory variables. I chose a redistributive policy and a regulatory policy because I
assumed that the character of an EU decision would have a decisive bearing on the
interest representation strategies chosen by all actors, including regions. I arrived at this
decision following the findings that Theodore Lowi obtained from his research on U.S.
trade policy (1964) and its application by Mark Pollack to the EU context (1994), and
for regions specifically (Cawson 1992: 100-101; McAleavey 1994: 35). Redistributive
and regulatory policies are two types of the three-member classification of policies
proposed by Theodore Lowi (1964: 690-691); distributive policies constitute the third
type, which are also relevant here because both the redistributive policy chosen
cohesion and the regulatory one audiovisual contain distributive elements. Dis-
tributive policies refer to policies that can be disaggregated by unit, and can be fash-
ioned without reference to any general rule; these policies are, in fact, instruments of
patronage. Regulatory policies cannot be disaggregated into their smaller components;
in the short run they involve decisions regarding who will be deprived of an advantage,
viz. Not all applicants for a single television channel or an overseas air route can be
propitiated (Lowi 1964: 691). Finally, redistributive policies refer to broader cat-
egories of individuals, in such a way that the impact of a policy on a certain person can
only be determined as a consequence of the individual being part of a broader group;
this uncertainty can turn regulatory policy reforms into debates about the potential
effects of a policy.
Among EU policies, I selected two areas a redistributive, cohesion policy, and a
regulatory, audiovisual policy in which regions have strong vested interests. Several
reasons justify this choice. Cohesion is not only the European policy with the strongest
redistributive element, but is also a regional one, i.e. it selects territories with economic
problems in order to supply them with financial resources; regional governments have a
strong incentive to try to convince decision-makers of the convenience of allocating EU
funding to address exactly the kind of troubles existing in their respective territories.
Precisely for being a policy deployed by an international organization like the EU, but
at the same time for targeting and recognizing regions as partners (and for the size of its
budget), cohesion policy has also attracted more attention from scholars interested in
regions in the EU than any other policy. In order to benefit most from the available
scholarship, and to be able to contrast my findings with theirs, examining cohesion
policy was essential.
The reasons for choosing audiovisual policy were partially different. My intention
was to pick a polity whose output regions had a strong interest in shaping policy, and
52
also to take account of the prominent part played by nationalist parties and linguistic
minorities in my research. The EUs influence over cultural, educational or linguistic
policy is very limited, apart from the fact that the EU has to solve its own language
question, namely internal communication within its institutions and external with
respect to its citizens (Kraus 2004: 134). However, the EU has extensive powers to
regulate the broadcasting and film markets, which makes audiovisual policy the only
significant exception to the principle of EU restraint in cultural issues.

To test my hypothesis I have selected four regions and two policy fields with im-
portant regulatory and redistributive implications. The case selection, based on a rig-
orous application of an MSSD, aimed to combine cases with different values regarding
the two main explanatory variables: coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties.
The audiovisual policy study examines the agendas of the Rhineland-Palatinate, the
Basque Country and Valencia. The cohesion policy study includes the Rhineland-
Palatinate and the Basque Country, but substitutes Valencia for Tuscany. Whereas this
section concentrated on explaining coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties
and on the selection of the policy fields, in the following section I will address other
relevant characteristics of my regional cases.
Regional Cases
Regional governing majorities, size, and structure of the regional economy help in
understanding how regions set their European agendas. The following pages provide
readers with basic information on the four regional cases without aspiring to be ex-
haustive. In addition, this section offers background information on specific topics
relevant for audiovisual and cohesion policy such as language policy or industrial
conversion. These contents are tailored according to the research design discussed
above, i.e. the reader will find no information on Valencias economic structure or on
Tuscanys TV channels.
Rhineland-Palatinate
In 1991 the SPD of the Rhineland-Palatinate became the dominant party in a red-yellow
governing coalition. This was the first time since the occupying powers created the
region in 1947 that the CDU did not appoint the premier. Since then, the same coalition
under the direction of Rudolf Scharping (1991-4) and Kurt Beck (1994- ) has led the
region through a period characterized by the withdrawal of U.S. and British troops. In
spite of the resulting conversion problems, the electorate rated the achievements of
Becks red-green cabinet in the 1990s positively. The governing coalition received an
increasing number of votes in the three elections between 1991 and 2001. During the
1990s, its party system could be characterized as one of moderate pluralism (see Table
5); no nationalist party has ever been present in the chamber. During the 1990s SPD
53
rather than FDP members controlled the areas relevant to my research, specifically
European affairs and media, which are the responsibility of cabinet-level officers
(Staatskanzlei). Still, I will make occasional references to the department of economy
led by an FDP-minister.
Table 5: Rhineland-Palatinate Electoral Results
21
1991 1996 2001
Party Seats % Seats % Seats %
CDU 40 38,7 41 38,7 38 35,3
SPD 47 44,8 43 39,8 49 44,7
FDP 7 6,9 10 8,8 8 7,8
Greens 7 6,5 7 6,9 6 5,2
Source: Authors own elaboration based on (Woyke 2005: 158).
Because of its location west of the Rhine, allegedly a haven beyond the reach of
Soviet tanks, the NATO countries placed up to fourteen military airports in the
Rhineland-Palatinate. For this region, such infrastructure became an exceptionally
important economic factor during the cold war. Before that, the Rhineland-Palatinate
had been among the poorest German regions (Baltes 2004: 83). This explains the
importance that military facilities held for the regional economy and the severity of the
conversion and unemployment problems that followed the withdrawal of troops. The
Rhineland-Palatinate lost of 67.000 military and 21.000 civil jobs, in addition to about
50.000 indirectly related posts between 1986 and 1997 (Baltes 2004: 86; Gube 2000:
16).
22
On its website, the regional government estimates that the military conversion
led to losses in the regional GDP of 1.636 billion Euros each year. Indeed, in 1997
unemployment reached a post-war maximum of 10.3 % of the labour force. Projects
such as the transformation of a former American military air base into the civil airport
Frankfurt-Hahn helped only marginally to bring down the unemployment rate to 9.2 %
by 2004.
23
In the late 1990s two further challenges for the region existed: the transformation of
agrarian structures and of the media industry. Regarding cohesion policy, the regional
agenda was consequently under the influence of conversion and of the large and
troubled rural areas of the Rhineland-Palatinate. At that time, the reform of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) and of cohesion policy imposed on the Rhineland-
Palatinate an additional challenge on top of military conversion. With regard to audio-
visual policy, the late 1990s were characterized by the technological changes of the
21 Data from (Woyke 2005: 158).
22 Information available from the website of the regional historical archives, the Landesarchivver-
waltung Rheinland Pfalz at http://www.landeshauptarchiv.de/geschichte/landesregierungen.html
as well as from the website of the government of the Rhineland-Palatinate dedicated to the topic,
http://www.konversion.com (both accessed November 2009).
23 Data from the regional statistical office, the Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz at http://
www.statistik.rlp.de/erw/tabellen/erwarbeitslose.html (accessed November 2009).
54
period and by the fusion of the regional public broadcasters of the Rhineland-Palatinate
and Baden-Wurttemberg completed in 1997. However, this was not the first time in
which media developments ranked high on the regional agenda. Television and the
media possess a particular significance for the Rhineland-Palatinate among other rea-
sons because the television station Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), the German
association of public broadcasters (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der ffentlich-rechtlichen
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ARD) and until recently, the
media group KirchMedia had part of their headquarters in Mainz. Apart from this, the
PM of the Rhineland-Palatinate chairs the Rundfunkkommission, where the German
regional prime ministers discuss audiovisual policy issues. For these reasons, the re-
gional government is also an important interlocutor for the German private broadcast-
ers and their association, Verband Privater Rundfunk und Kommunikation (VPRT).
Basque Country
Apart from terrorism, Basque politics is notorious for the polarized pluralism of its
party system. In addition to the left-right cleavage, a centre-periphery split of similar if
not more importance exists. Competitiveness inside the blocks is extremely high,
particularly between the state-wide parties the conservative Partido Popular and the
Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE), the Basque branch of the PSOE; the third party in
this block is the post-communist Izquierda Unida (Linz and Montero 1999; Llera Ramo
1998: 432, 440; Prez-Nievas 2004, 2006). In the nationalist parties block, the Partido
Nacionalists Vasco (PNV) competed in the late 1990s with two other nationalist parties,
Eusko Askartasuna and Herri Batasuna, a leftist party whose most distinctive trait is its
refusal to condemn ETAs murders. The proportional electoral system has regularly
translated electoral results into a parliament with seven parties (see Table 6). However,
this fragmentation is compatible with the dominance of the PNV. The PNV has ap-
pointed all regional prime ministers since 1980, as well as the finance and culture
departments, which are the most relevant for my policy case studies. Between 1984 and
1998, the PNV governed in a coalition with the PSE. As Francisco Llera Ramo re-
marked, polarized pluralism did not produce problems of governmental stability,
thanks to the establishment of coalitions from nationalist and state-wide parties (2001:
25). Simultaneously, the PNV sustained the last PSOE government in Madrid during
1993 and 1996. Afterwards, the votes of the PNV facilitated the appointment of Jos
Mara Aznar as prime minister (1996), and the PNV continued supporting PP legisla-
tion during at least two more years.
After 1998, polarized pluralism was substituted by outright confrontation along the
territorial axis. The most visible (and fateful) symptom of the PNVs new strategy was
the decision to change from cross-cleavage alliances with state-wide parties to a new
agreement with the other nationalist parties. While the PNV had hitherto collaborated
with the PSE to govern the Basque Country and with the PP (which was the largest party
in the Spanish parliament) to govern Spain, in September 1998 the PNV, EA, IU, and
HB signed the Pacto de Lizarra, which brought an end to collaboration with both the
55
PSE and the PP. The new agreement also brought a fourteen-month truce, but after-
wards ETA resumed its campaign of terror in January 2000.
24
In the meantime, a
minority coalition of two nationalist parties, PNV and EA, governed with occasional
support from Euskal Herritarrok, the successor of HB. Polarized pluralism was fin-
ished for good. Obviously, these developments raised additional obstacles for the
collaboration between the Basque and the Spanish government in European affairs.
Table 6: Basque Country. Electoral Results
1994 1998 2001
Party % Seats % Seats % Seats
EAJ-PNV 29.15 22 27.48 21 42.19 33
PSE/EE/PSOE 16.73 12 17.26 14 17.68 13
HB (EH) 15.91 11 17.57 14 10 7
PP 14.08 11 19.74 16 22.83 19
EA 10.07 8 8.52 6
EB-IU 8.94 6 5.57 2 5.51 3
UA 2.66 5 1.23 2
Source: Ignacio Urquizu, unpublished database on regional elections in Spain.
In the meantime, the Basque economy was experiencing serious troubles. Since the
1970s, the Basque industrial sector, specialized in a few basic sectors metal, paper,
and machine tools and energy-intensive fields shipyards , had been seriously
weakened by its dependence on oil and scarce rates of research investment (Lzaro
Araujo 2002: 542, 548, 557; Prez Gonzalez and Dez Lpez 1999: 10). The destruction
of jobs had continued into the 1980s as a consequence both of the lingering conversion
process initiated as a response to the oil crises, and of Spains accession to the EC
(Valdaliso 2003: 56-60). For instance, after 1973, the decrease in maritime transport
seriously harmed the Basque shipbuilding industry, which was specialized in exporting
oil tankers and bulk-carriers whose demand suffered a major setback in those years;
these hardships were particularly felt in Biscay (Valdaliso 2003: 57). Its membership in
the EC compelled the Spanish government to reduce the huge subsidies it granted to the
Basque shipyards and steel mills, as well as to open the Spanish market to foreign
competitors, including South Korean and Japanese companies. After an expansion in
the late 1980s, the brief and acute crisis in 1992-1993 destroyed additional jobs, for
which the weak service sector could not compensate (Lzaro Araujo 2002: 556). As a
result, the unemployment rate reached 24 percent in 1994, and was still slightly over 17
percent by 1998 with a particularly high number of women, young people and the long-
term unemployed (Lzaro Araujo 2002: 544, 546). The high share of lost industrial jobs
turned the Basque Country into the paradigm of an Objective 2 region; the entire region
24 Further information available from the Spanish newspaper El Mundo at http://www.el-mundo.es/
eta/atentados2000.html (accessed November 2009).
56
benefitted from the European funding allocated to mitigate the consequences of in-
dustrial conversion (see chapter five).
A few words on the linguistic and media landscape in the Basque Country, or
Euskadi, will serve to close this short history. The regional vernacular, Basque, or
Euskera, is a non-Indo-European language spoken in the Spanish Basque Country and
Navarre as well as in the Southwest of France (Direction des Etudes et de la Promotion
de l'Euskera 1998; Trask 1995: 92). Basque is completely different from Spanish and
for non-native speakers impossible to understand or speak without previous training, in
contrast to the other Romance languages spoken in Spain: Catalan and Galician. Ac-
cording to the Sociolinguistic Survey of the Basque Country, in the Basque autonomous
community only about 660.000 persons, a fourth of the population, claim to be fluent in
Basque.
25
Their territorial distribution is unequal: more than half of all Basque speakers
are geographically concentrated in the rural areas of the easternmost province,
Guipzcoa (see Table 7). Although the number of speakers reflects an increase of about
180.000 between 1981 and 1996, the situation of the language is considered precarious.
In the 1980s, this had moved the PNV and the Basque Government to initiate so-called
policies of linguistic normalization.
Table 7: Number of Basque Speakers
Province 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
lava 9.686 17.422 22.995 40.479 45.312
Guipzcoa 266.568 294.693 305.403 330.230 337.796
Vizcaya 171.522 201.689 215.219 266.107 273.872
Basque
Country
447.776 513.804 543.617 636.816 656.980
Source: Sociolinguistic Survey of the Basque Country
The PNV has been an advocate of Euskera since 1895, when Sabino Arana, who
wrote abundantly on the Basque language, founded it. PNV party members have seen
Euskera as a distinctive symbol only second in importance to the race (Beriain 1997:
160; Corcuera Atienza 2001: 433, 435; Trask 1995: 66). The prominence of Euskera in
the ideology of the PNV (and of the other Basque nationalist parties) is a trait common
to many other nationalist movements and parties (Linz 1986: 523; see there references
to Joshua Fishman and Karl Deutsch). In fact, during the negotiation of regional con-
stitutions the co-official status of minority languages, their compulsory teaching at
schools, and the control of television were conflictive areas and counted among the
most important early successes of nationalism (Linz 1986: 524). Apart from the ideo-
logical aspect, the PNV can only gain from supporting the Basque language. Since the
early 1980s, it became clear that Euskera speakers show a more pronounced tendency
to identify themselves as only Basque (Linz 1986: 531). Furthermore, supporting
25 This survey is published by Eustat, the Basque statistics agency. It is available at http://www.eu-
stat.es/estad/temalista.asp?idioma=i&tema=99&opt=0&tipo=1&mas=&otro= (accessed
November 2009).
57
Basque ideals allows the PNV to compete with the other parties of the nationalist block
such as EA and EH.
Valencia
In Valencia a minority Romance language, Catalan, is spoken, but no strong nationalist
parties exist. As a matter of fact, state-wide parties have controlled the Valencian
government while nationalist parties have been mostly irrelevant since this au-
tonomous community was established in the early 1980s. Valencia is a Mediterranean
region peripheral from both the linguistic and political point of view: the centre of the
Catalan linguistic area is in Barcelona and the core of the political system is in Madrid.
The predominance of the political centre in the competition between both of them may
explain why the relatively widespread use of a vernacular has not become a source of
support for nationalist parties.
Since the early 1980s, state-wide parties have governed the region, first the PSOE,
and since 1995 the PP, which after 1999 has held an absolute majority. Only one
nationalist party, Unitat del Poble Valenci, was elected to the Valencian parliament
and only on one occasion, after joining forces with the ex-communist party in the 1987
elections.
26
During the late 1990s the Valencian party system scarcely showed any
autonomy from the Spanish system (Franch i Ferrer 1998: 501). When the PSOE
governed in Spain, it managed to obtain majorities in Valencia, two of which were
absolute (1983 and 1991). One year before the arrival of Jos Mara Aznar to the central
executive in 1995, the socialists lost thirteen out of their forty-five seats. This made it
possible for the Partido Popular to form a coalition government with the regional
conservative party Uni Valenciana (UV). From an ideological point of view, its most
salient characteristic is its anti-Catalanism.
While UV voters are exclusively from Valencia, the UV is not a nationalist party
because it does not demand more autonomy from the centre, at least according to de
Winters definition (1998: 204). Rather than the Spanish government, the main target of
UVs criticisms is the Catalan government in Barcelona and what they perceive as
Catalan imperialism. Thus UV, a strongly anti-Catalan party (Climent-Ferrando 2005:
11), belongs to the category of regionalist antinationalism (Kraus 1994: 279) or
conservative regionalism (Franch i Ferrer 1998: 453). In the Valencian political
landscape, anti-Catalanism implies being close to the centralist PP. In fact, the UV
began to participate in elections submitting a common list with Alianza Popular, the
predecessor of the centralist PP. Between 1995 and 1999 the PP and the UV jointly
governed Valencia, but since 1999 the UV has ceased to be represented in the Valencian
parliament. Apart from the electoral and governing coalitions they have achieved, the
similarities between both anti-Catalan parties are reflected in the benefits the PP obtains
whenever the UV loses votes (Franch i Ferrer 1998: 473). The Valencian party system
26 In part, the weakness of nationalist parties in Valencia is a consequence of a proportional electoral
system which produces markedly majoritarian results, i.e. through a 5 % threshold for parties to
obtain seats in the regional chamber.
58
as a whole has been classified as one of moderate pluralism and centripetal tendencies
(Franch i Ferrer 1998: 501).
Throughout Valencia, Catalan has a co-official status but is called valenciano or
valenci (art. 7.1 regional constitution), even though Catalan speakers are not homo-
genously distributed across Valencia (Acadmia Valenciana de la Llengua 2004: 2-3;
Conselleria de Cultura 1989: 41-44) and even though valenciano only presents minor
differences from Catalan. Catalan has never been used in the western fringe of the
region, where only 14 percent of inhabitants speak the regional language, far below the
average value for Valencia as a whole, which is 58 percent (Acadmia Valenciana de la
Llengua 2004: 2). Valencian is most widespread in the coastal areas of the provinces of
Valencia and Castellon (but not in Alicante). The highest concentrations of speakers are
in rural areas and in towns with less than 10.000 people. Valencia speakers are scarce in
cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants (Acadmia Valenciana de la Llengua 2004:
3).
Minor differences between the vernacular spoken in Valencia and in Catalonia
constitute the alibis for a linguistic polemic between the supporters of Catalan in
Valencia and the so-called blaveros, or, anti-Catalan nationalists hailing from Valencia.
Unsurprisingly, the PP and UV have assumed the position of blaveros, they exaggerate
the minute differences between the Catalan in Valencia and in Catalonia, and oppose
stronger links with Catalan and to what they perceive as pan-Catalanism. These pos-
itions often led the regional government headed by the PP to go out its way to emphasize
the minute differences between Valencian and Catalan. On one memorable occasion,
the PP introduced a translation of the Constitutional Treaty before the European insti-
tutions identical to the one presented by the Catalan government (Lpez Lpez 2007:
153-155).
27
Such behaviour aims to legitimize Valencias linguistic and political de-
tachment from Catalonia and links with the Spanish-speaking political centre in
Madrid. This conflict constitutes an instance of what Karl Deutsch considered a
tendency to increase deliberately the differences between kindred, and particularly
between neighbouring countries (Deutsch 1979: 41). Observers committed to the use
of Catalan in Valencia have traditionally seen the support of the two-language thesis by
the alliance between PP and UV as contributing to the current neglect of Catalan in
Valencia.
In fact, the Valencian government, first led by the PSOE and then by the PP, has paid
scarce attention to Catalan. The insignificant increase in the number of speakers since
the establishment of the regional executive gives proof of this. Whereas in 1986, 49.5
percent of the Valencian population could speak Catalan, in 2004, nine years after the
PP gained control of the region, this percentage had increased marginally up to 53
percent of inhabitants (Acadmia Valenciana de la Llengua 2004: 1; Conselleria de
Cultura 1989: 19). In contrast, between 1986 and 2001 the percentage of speakers in
Catalonia under the government of a nationalist party, the CiU, grew from 64 to 74.50
27 See Perales respalda que Zapatero presente la Constitucin europea en valenciano porque est
reconocido en su Estatuto in Europa Press, 5 November 2004. See also ICV pregunta en el
Congreso sobre los motivos del Gobierno para entregar dos copias idnticas de la Constitucin
Europea, in Europa Press, 5 November 2004.
59
percent.
28
Apart from ideological considerations, i.e. Spanish nationalism, both the
PSOE and the PP probably fear that a more widespread use of Catalan would constitute
the ideal social base for stronger nationalist parties. The reluctance to endorse Catalan
has given particular traits to the Valencian audiovisual policy, which I explore in more
detail in chapter four.
Tuscany
Since its establishment in 1970, a leftist coalition dominated by the Italian Communist
Party and then by the Democratici di Sinistra (DS) has governed Tuscany. This region,
together with Emilia-Romagna and Umbria, constitutes the core of Italys red belt. In
this area, the left has controlled local and regional governments since the end of the
Second World War. In the midst of the often volatile Italian political scene, these
governments were extremely stable and inclusive. In Tuscany, between 1947 and 1992,
a coalition including one or more parties unnecessary to reach a governing majority
controlled the region for 90 percent of the time. The average duration of these coalitions
was over 800 days, a mark surpassed only by Emilia-Romagna and Umbria (Vassallo
2000: 64). According to Francesco Ramella, preoccupying signs of leftist decline
appeared in the 2000 elections (2005: 13), however, another observer concluded that
Tuscany remains () red (Floridia 2000: 703). Until that moment political stability
had apparently been linked to the high levels of economic and institutional accom-
plishment. The regional GDP per capita in the 1990s was well above the EU-15 aver-
age. Indeed, Tuscany is the richest among my four cases (see Table 2). The region
encompasses 6.2 percent of the Italian population, produces about 6.6 percent of the
Italian GDP and 7.5 percent of its exports, whose main components are textiles (36
percent), machine-tools (24 percent), chemicals and marble. The share of jobs related to
textiles and tourism in Tuscany is significantly larger than the Italian average.
29
From
the point of view of institutional performance, Tuscany ranked among the top four in
Robert Putnams index of civic culture (Putnam, Leonardi et al 1993: 75-76). In fact, the
Tuscan government is also perceived by other regions as very efficient and reliable
(Putnam, Leonardi et al 1993: 76, 84), a feature which proved to be an advantage for the
regions during the negotiation of the cohesion policy reform. Between 1992 and 2000
Vaninno Chiti, a member of the DS and ex-PCI, was the regional premier. The legis-
lative period central to this study, 1995-2000, was characterized by a continuity and
stability from which the executive benefited (Floridia 2000: 696-698). This continuity
was reflected in the election of another party member, Claudio Martini, as regional PM
in 2000 and again in 2005.
28 Information available from Idescat, the statistical office of the Catalan regional government, at
http://www.idescat.net/cat/societat/soclleng.html (accessed November 2009).
29 Information from the Tuscan research centre on regional policy and programming, the Istituto
Regionale per la Programmazione Economica della Tuscany (IRPET), and available at http://
www.irpet.it (accessed November 2009).
60
Conclusions
This chapter has spelled out concepts such as coordination mechanisms, has explained
my policy-field and case selection, and has presented the main characteristics of the
regions chosen. In federal member states regions exert a certain degree of influence on
the European policy designed by the centre through coordination mechanisms. How-
ever, notable discrepancies exist between those in force in different countries. German
coordination mechanisms, where hierarchical coordination permits the Lnder to dic-
tate the German position in the Council on subjects such as culture, differ from Italy or
Spain, where regions experience difficulties defining common regional positions that
could bind the central government, as the regime requires unanimous agreements. As a
result, Italian and Spanish regions have lost control over matters formerly under their
jurisdiction after the SEA, the Maastricht or the Amsterdam Treaties transferred those
matters to European institutions. Regional governments also react differently to the
repercussions of integration. Nationalist parties, which as we saw are prone to chal-
lenge the institutional status quo, set particularly demanding agendas. Nationalist par-
ties are potentially disruptive to coordination mechanisms, especially if these rely on
the unanimity rule. For this reason, in section three I shaped my case selection to reflect
the different combinations of coordination mechanisms and nationalist vs. state-wide
parties. I then explained their application to two policy fields: the audiovisual policy
decisions in the late 1990s and the 1999 cohesion policy reform. Regional sociolin-
guistic, economic and political characteristics relevant to these two policies were dis-
cussed in section four.
61
Table 8: Index of Support for Nationalist Parties
Country/Region/Party % Country/Region/Party %
Belgium
Brussels (1999) 96.10 % Flanders (1999) continued

ECOLO 18.30 % SPJ 15.00 %
PS 16.00 % UF 0.90 %
PSC 7.90 % VU-ID 9.30 %
CVP 3.30 % VB 15.50 %
SP!AGA
3.10 % German Community (1999) 84.00 %
VIVANT 1.50 % CSP 34.80 %
PRL-FDF 34.40 % PFF 21.30 %
VB 4.50 % SP 15.00 %
VLD-VU-O 3.20 % PJUPDB 12.90 %
FN 2.60 % Wallonia (1999) 88.90 %
FNB 1.30 % PS 24.90 %
Flanders (1999) 96.40 %
ECOLO 18.20 %
CVP 22.10 %
PSC 17.10 %
VLD 22.00 % PRL-FDF 24.70 %
Agalev 11.60 % FN 4.00 %

Germany United Kingdom
Bavaria (1998) 52.90 % Scotland 1999 30.48 %
CSU 52.90 % SNP 27.3 %
Schleswig-Holstein (2000) 6.20 % SSP 2.0 %
SSW 6.20 %
MSP for Falkirk West 1.2 %
Spain
Andalusia (2000) 7.39 % Canary Islands (1999) 36.87 %
PA 7.39 %
CC 36.54 %
Aragon (1999) 24.18 % AH 0.33 %
PAR
13.17 % Cantabria (1999) 13.41 %
CHA 11.01 %
PRC 13.41 %
Asturias (1999) 7.10 % Castile and Len (1999) 5.05 %
URA 7.10 %
UPL 3.67 %
Balearic Islands (1999) 23.71 % TC-PNC 1.38 %
PACTE 4.40 % Catalonia (1999) 48.41 %
PSM-EN 11.63 %
CiU 37.26 %
UM 7.26 %
ERC 8.65 %
COP 0.42 % IC-V 2.50 %
Basque Country (2001) 52.19 % Galicia (2001) 22.43 %
PNV-EA 42.19 % BNG 22.43 %
EH 10.00 %
Navarre (1999) 27.66 %
La Rioja (1999) 5.73 %
CDN 6.81 %
PR 5.73 % EA-EAJ-PNV 5.40 %
EH 15.45 %
62
Country/Region/Party % Country/Region/Party %
Italy
Aosta Valley(1998) 65.10 % Trentino-South Tyrol continued (1998)
UV 43 % Die Freiheitlichen 1.28 %
Fdration autonomiste Ccd-Cdu 10 % USF 2.28 %
Autonomisti 12.80 % Ladins-Dps 1.87 %
Veneto (2000) 4.40 % Il Centro Uda 0.91 %
Veneti d'Europa 2.70 % Il Centro Upd 5.30 %
Fronte Marco Polo 1.70 % Trentino domain 2.50 %
Trentino-South Tyrol (1998) 57.66 % Popolari Alto Adige Domani 1.40 %
SVP 29.21 % AI FAR 1.82 %
PATT 6.00 % Centro Sinistra Mitte Links 1.79 %
Verdi 3.30 %

Source: For Spain I relied on a database elaborated by Ignacio Urquizu (Fundacin
Juan March) and on the web sites of the Spanish regional parliaments. For Belgium, I
have used the electoral database of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, http://
www.vub.ac.be/belgianelections/ and the web sites mentioned in http://www.political-
resources.net/belgium.htm. For Germany I relied on the electoral results compiled by
Stefan Schosser at http://www.wif99.de/wahlen/index.php. High quality electoral data
on Italy is available from the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo in Bolonia at http://www.istcat-
taneo.org. Scottish electoral results are available from the regional parliament at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msp/elections/analysis/index.htm and from the
British Electoral Commission at www.electoralcommission.org.uk. I thank Ignacio
Urquizu for kindly putting his database at my disposal and Pieter van Houten for
sending me his paper and comments (all websites accessed June 2006).
63
Chapter 3:
Coordinating European Audiovisual Policy in Germany and Spain
Since the late 1980s, the attempts of EU institutions to create a truly European televi-
sion market have increasingly encroached upon regional audiovisual powers. More-
over, the ubiquitous position of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG Com-
petition) has become a sword of Damocles suspended over the heavily-subsidized
regional public broadcasters. This increasing assertiveness of the EU in audiovisual
policy has provoked a completely different reaction both from member states and from
regions. Countries like Germany, the UK or Sweden have traditionally defended a
liberal, market-friendly approach to audiovisual policy. By contrast, France, Portugal,
Greece and to a lesser extent, Spain, have advanced a dirigiste audiovisual policy
respectful of the cultural preferences of nation-states (Collins 1995: 9). Deep divisions
are also often found among regions. For instance, the response of the Lnder, endowed
with vast competences in the field and in charge of TV channels that broadcast in a
language with almost one hundred million speakers, is more liberal and less dirigiste
than that of the Basque Country. This region, where around half a million people are
Basque speakers, holds fewer, but still significant audiovisual policy powers and
maintains a vital interest in media as an instrument of linguistic policy and nation-
building. More efforts should be made to understand how coordination mechanisms
and nationalist parties shape the different responses of regions to the same audiovisual
policy initiatives of the EU.
European audiovisual policy itself has received more attention from media re-
searchers (Collins 1994; Marti 2004; Theiler 2005; Wheeler 2004) than the regional
efforts to shape it. Some of them give particular attention to the effects of mass media
and of the European audiovisual policy on the development of European minority
languages (Cormack 1998, 1999; Lopez 1998; Mar 1996; McQuail 2002; Moragas Spa
and Garitaonanda 1994). However, this scholarship has rarely focused on the decision-
making process or on actors and the interests at stake. Instead, media scholars have been
more interested in the effect of European audiovisual policy on whether, and under
which conditions, minority languages benefit from access to mass media. Because of
this approach, most of their research takes the European decision-making process as a
given and ignores regional attempts to obtain a regulatory framework from EU insti-
tutions that respects their local powers and vernaculars.
Similarly, political scientists interested in regions and integration have not accorded
EU cultural policies the attention that they merit (Jeffery 2000: 7; Onestini 1996: 208;
Phillipson 1999: 94). Few scholars interested in Belgian or in German federalism have
undertaken research on the Television Without Frontiers Directive or on the public
broadcasting system (but see Engel 1998; Schmuck 1997; Sepos 2003). While large
volumes of factual information exist on the implications of EU policies for German
65
media,
1
research on the impact for the Spanish 1 is virtually non-existent or dated, like
Bernat Lpezs study on the reception of the First Directive by the Spanish regions (see
also Godoy Garca 1995; 1995). The absence of specific research on the consequences
for Spanish regional efforts of the European audiovisual policy partially explains the
extended assumption that European integration is beneficial for linguistic minorities.
Until recently, most minority parties widely saw European integration as a positive
development reducing regional dependency on central governments and opening the
opportunity for independence in Europe. Nationalist party leaders as well as re-
searchers considered the European Commission to be the ally of regions in their efforts
to improve linguistic minority protection; the EU would respect cultural diversity by
giving minority languages more visibility (Gifreu 1989: 358; Lynch 1996: 198-9).
Authorized scholars like David Laitin spoke of an alliance between nationalist parties
and the Commission to guarantee minority protection (Laitin 1997: 278, 294-5). This
and the following chapter take issue with the preceding account and suggest, on the one
hand, that European integration has undermined cultural pluralism and minority lan-
guages and, on the other hand, that the EP has been a more reliable ally for minorities
than the Commission.
In this chapter, I argue that the coordination mechanisms in Germany and in Spain
related to audiovisual policies differ significantly from each other. In Germany, the
Lnder succeed in shaping the German position in the audiovisual Council of Minis-
ters, and were eventually able to impact EU audiovisual policies. In contrast, Spanish
coordination mechanisms yielded significantly different outcomes, often resulting in
discrepancies between the agendas of the central and regional tiers of government.
To substantiate these claims, I compare the incorporation of the Lnders views in
the German bargaining stance with the role of the Basque and Valencian agendas in the
upward phase of Spanish European policy. My research focuses on the four most
important European decisions on television and film of the last ten years: the revision of
the Television Without Frontiers Directive (hereafter, the Directive), the Amsterdam
Treatys Protocol on Public Broadcasting Service, and the MEDIA programmes. The
first section provides the reader with knowledge of the elements of EU audiovisual
policies relevant for regions. The next section explores the institutional, political and
linguistic factors determining regional audiovisual agendas towards the EU. The third
section examines the regional influence on the German and Spanish position towards
the 1997 revision of the Directive. Finally, the question of regional influence is once
again considered, but in regard to the Amsterdam Protocol and the MEDIA Pro-
gramme.
1 Available in specialized journals including a section on the EU such as Zeitschrift fr Medien und
Kommunikation.
66
European Audiovisual Policy and Regional Concerns
Since the early 1980s, both the Commission and the European Parliament have shown
great interest in developing a common European audiovisual policy (Collins 1994;
Marti 2004; Tonnemacher 2003). More precisely, the audiovisual industry entered into
the radar of the Commission as a result of four developments: technical modifications
experienced by the field, the weakening of public broadcasting monopolies and ex-
pansion of private television broadcasting, the boom of the audiovisual sector in the
early 1990s, and the penetration of European audiovisual markets by American pro-
ductions (Smith 1997: ch 3). After a series of white papers and other documents au-
thored in the 1980s, by both the Parliament and the Commission, and the first Televi-
sion Directive, European audiovisual policy still suffered from numerous deficiencies,
most importantly a failure to reduce market fragmentation, as the Commission itself
noted in a Communication published that same year (European Commission 1990: 4).
This document established three objectives which would become the main pillars of
European audiovisual policy in the 1990s. During this period, the EU set out to enact
rules permitting the free movement of programs, the promoting and financing of
European industry, and the adaptation of the industry to technological change (Euro-
pean Commission 1990: 4). The three decisions studied here correspond broadly to
these tasks, with the Directive and the Protocol aiming at facilitating the movement of
television programs while MEDIA aspired to strengthen the European media industry.
A comprehensive account of audiovisual policy would be beyond the scope of this
book. Thus, after briefly explaining the cornerstone of the European audiovisual policy
and the television Directive, this section will explore the regional audiovisual agendas.

The Directive is the most important single element of the European audiovisual
policy (Marti 2004: 77). It was first enacted in 1989, and revised according to the co-
decision procedure in 1997. On its passage, the Commission and the European Par-
liament changed their strategy from a focus on the creation of European audiovisual
products to a focus on the establishment of a European audiovisual market (Theiler
2005: ch 4) . The Directive also tried to respond to widespread scepticism towards
European audiovisual policies. Incidentally, both member states and regions had ques-
tioned the need for European Community powers to regulate audiovisual policy, which
they deemed as a cultural activity beyond the scope of the TEC, even before the
Commission announced its intention to enact a Television Directive. During the early
1980s, the Commission and the European Parliament had countered these criticisms by
arguing that the economic aspects of television broadcasting, such as the mounting
trade deficit in audiovisual products with the United States, justified resorting to the
Communitys extensive regulatory powers (Collins 1994: 96; Greissinger 2001: 34). In
turn, many member states and regions opposed Community intervention arguing that
the TEC implicitly excludes culture from the single market. According to the argument
advanced by some member states like France and some regions like the Lnder, the
production and transmission of audiovisual works is always a creative activity whose
contents, language, setting, and background necessarily express the particularities of
67
individuals and groups. In other words, audiovisual works are considered to be part of
member states and regions cultural patrimony and for this reason not part of the TEC.
However, the complaints of these member states and regions were eventually overrid-
den when the European Court of Justice ruled that culture and religion are subject to the
Treaty if they manifest themselves through activities relevant for European law
(Greissinger 2001: 36). Eventually, the Maastricht Treaty partially clarified the issue by
stating that the Community would promote collaboration between member states in the
audiovisual sector, and would support and supplement their action in the field if ne-
cessary (Schwarze 2000: 795). In other words, the 1989 Directive and its revision in
1997 constitute episodes in a long-standing conflict between European institutions,
member states and regions on cultural and more precisely, audiovisual policy.

Having introduced the political and legal background to the Directive, I would like to
move on to a discussion of its reform. Of all the aspects of broadcasting that the
Directive has targeted, the present study deals only with those aspects of particular
relevance for regions and their public broadcasters, namely, the quotas for European
and independent producers works, quantitative restrictions on advertisement, and the
concept of event of major interest. A breakdown of the agendas advanced by the most
relevant actors may be found in Figure 4. In particular, quotas and the regulation of
major sporting events such as sports broadcasts have been a source of controversy
because of their potential to affect the content of television programs. Such regulation
allegedly impinges upon both the subsidiarity principle, which implies that the EU
should perform only those tasks that cannot be effectively accomplished by a lower tier
of government, and upon the cultural autonomy of member states and regions. The
main goal of the Directive is to remove obstacles to the creation of a European televi-
sion market that are embedded in the regulations of member states and regions. There-
fore, the Directive establishes the conditions under which governments are compelled
to allow broadcasts that originate in other member states to reach the local audience. To
achieve this, the Directive establishes that broadcasts lawfully aired under the juris-
diction of an EU member state must be given the opportunity to reach target audiences
in any other EU country. The Directive bases this approach in the rulings of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice at the same time as it establishes minimum requirements for all
broadcasters (Drijber 1999: 92). Broadcasts that fulfil these minimum requirements
can only be banned in exceptional circumstances such as content capable of harming
children or of inciting hatred (see art. 22 and 22 a of the Directive).
The 1997 version of the Directive left the quota system untouched. It maintained the
obligation imposed upon broadcasters in 1989 to dedicate a majority of the transmis-
sion time to European works after taking into account programming time dedicated to
news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and tele-shopping (Art. 4).
Likewise, the Directive upheld the obligation for television channels to reserve ten
percent of either their transmission time or of their programming budget to works
created by companies which are not owned by television broadcasters, so-called
independent producers (Art. 5). It is important to underline that, in spite of upholding
quotas, neither the 1989 nor the 1997 versions of the Directive were able to make quotas
68
legally binding. The formulation of Articles 4 and 5 includes the phrase where prac-
ticable. These two words imply that while the Commission may monitor the fulfilling
of quotas (Art. 23 a.2.c), it cannot actually compel broadcasters to respect them by
means of the imposition of a fine. Moreover, the very effectiveness of the quotas has
been highly contested. While the Commission proclaims in its reports that broadcasters
fulfill quotas and that quotas benefit European industry, Germany and its Lnder, in
addition to the UK, claim that the quota system is cumbersome and ineffective (Knig
2002: 811-812; Bernier).
2
The haphazard enforcement of quotas and the absence of agreement on their effects
reflect the deep internal divisions of the Council, the EP and even the Commission on
this issue. It is not surprising that the directorates that are more committed to economic
liberalization, like DG Competition and DG Internal Market, which are among the most
influential inside the Commission, were not enthusiastic about this and other inter-
ventionist elements of the Directive (on the differences between the DGs see Collins
1994: 92). In contrast, DG Audiovisual and Enterprise expressed fewer objections, for
they were somewhat more concerned with protecting the European audiovisual indus-
try. However, this was not the only institution split on audiovisual issues. In fact, the
Council exhibited a north-south divide: the French, Greek, Spanish and Irish delega-
tions favoured binding quotas as proposed by the Commission while the German,
Austrian, British, Danish, and Swedish delegations opposed them (Krebber 2002: 152).
The discussion on whether to reinforce quotas, suppress them or leave them unchanged
was one of the main topics surrounding the reform, if not the main issue.
The Directive limits announcements and tele-shopping in both quantitative and
qualitative terms. Advertising restrictions are important for two reasons. First, numer-
ous obstacles to the mobility of programs were raised by the different advertising
regulations in force in every member state (Drijber 1999: 113). At the same time, these
kinds of restrictions have had some important repercussions for television broadcast-
ers, and for private broadcasters in particular, because they severely restrain a channels
ability to attract revenue. Apart from restricting the amount of advertising, limitations
on content also existed. Such limitations include bans on tobacco, prescription medi-
cation, and alcohol advertising (Arts.12-14). With the exception of a Swedish proposal
to ban toy advertising, these limits did not attract excessive attention from member
states or regions during the negotiation phase of the Directive. The quantitative re-
strictions, on the other hand, were more controversial due to financial implications. The
Directive sets aside a maximum of twenty percent of the daily broadcast for spots and
other forms of advertising and a restriction of an hour maximum applicable to adver-
tisement spots only (Art. 11). Similar limits apply to the quantity of daily tele-shopping
spots and to the number of tele-shopping windows and their minimum uninterrupted
duration (Arts 18 and 18 a).
Since 1997, the Directive has included a provision protecting the rights of viewers to
be informed about sporting events (Art. 3 a). This new article guarantees that in every
2 The biannual reports on the implementation of the Television Directive are available from the
European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/reports/in-
dex_en.htm (accessed November 2009).
69
member state free, rather than pay-per-view TVs, will broadcast major sporting events
originating in EU countries. This amendment is the EPs response to developments in
the market of sport transmission rights. By the mid 1990s, pay-per-view channels
financed by fees and advertising had made use of their larger financial resources to
acquire sport transmission rights. Football in particular was in danger of disappearing
from European free programming. The growing power of pay-per-view channels
served to deprive a large share of the public from the opportunity to watch football on
TV; there were worries about an extension of this pattern to the Olympics, the Football
World Cup, and the like (for the context see Krebber 2002: 141; Zeller 1999: 205-215).
Whereas member states like the UK and France enacted legislation banning certain
sporting events held in the respective territory from transmission by pay-per-view
channels, EU-wide regulation was necessary to compel the holders of transmission
rights in other member states to allow for the transmission, free of charge, of major
sporting events in other member states (Drijber 1999: 118). In order to achieve this, the
Directive calls on every government to draft a list of major sporting events which is then
transmitted to the Commission. If the DG Audiovisual Policy considers the list com-
patible with EU law, the Commission will forward the list to other member states and
publish the list in the Official Journal. Thus, the aim of Article 3 a is to compel gov-
ernments to guarantee that rights-holders in their respective territories do not circum-
vent the lists prepared by other EU countries, but cooperate in the free transmission of
events that other member states consider of major importance. To sum it up, the Dir-
ective contains three elements of the utmost importance for member states and regions,
namely: quotas, advertising regulations, and a list of major sporting events.

In the early 1980s, the Commission and the European Parliament realized the im-
portance of countering the flood of American TV programs and films in order to both
balance the EUs trade deficit and to create a common European audiovisual culture.
The Commission believed that the best way to achieve this objective would be the
enactment of a Directive creating a single market for European broadcasters, which was
modified in 1997 and again in April 2009, by the Audiovisual Media Services Direct-
ive. How the measures adopted in the 1997 reform of the Television Directive affected
vital regional audiovisual interests is the subject of the next section.
70
Figure 4: Audiovisual policy, agendas and output
Actor
Compulsory
quotas
Advertisement
restrictions
Major sporting
events
PBS
RLP - - - !
FC - - - !
GFG - - - !
BC ! ! ! !
V O O O !
SP O O ! !
DGC - - - -
DGA ! ! ! !
EP ! ! ! !
EU Output - - ! !
RLP: Rhineland-Palatinate. FC: Federal chamber (Bundesrat). GFG: German fed-
eral government. BC: Basque Country. V: Valencia. SP: Spanish central government
(Spain). DGC: DG Competition. DGA: DG Audiovisual. EP: European Parliament.
Whereas a minus sign implies that a region opposed a certain policy option, a check
signifies that it supported it. A circle (O) signifies that the actor had no definite
position.
Source: Authors own elaboration.
Regional Agendas
In Germany and Spain, regions hold audiovisual policy powers and administer their
own broadcasters, independent of the authority of the central government. In multi-
lingual member states, audiovisual powers take on a particular significance because
they serve as language policy instruments that regional executives use to promote their
respective vernaculars. In addition to being a valuable language policy tool, regional
TVs are powerful instruments of region-building, political manipulation, and film
industry support. Whether regions can make the most of these powers depends largely
upon EU regulations. Therefore, all regions, and particularly those with multiple lan-
guages and ethnic groups, have an incentive to respond to EU audiovisual policies.
Still, regional agendas vary significantly.
By the mid-1990s the Rhineland-Palatinate and the other Lnder had long defined a
joint and fully-fledged audiovisual agenda that emphasized regional cultural autonomy
and, more specifically, regions ability to define and fund public channels. In contrast,
coordination mechanisms, and particularly the interaction and cognitive orientations of
parties prevented Spanish regions from defining audiovisual agendas prior to the im-
portant EU audiovisual decisions of the late 1990s. After briefly discussing the few
audiovisual concerns common to all regions, I will briefly discuss the regional agendas
in detail.
71
The Lnder jointly advance other audiovisual concerns in the European arena for
reasons specific to the German context. The agenda of the Lnder faithfully reflects the
predominant role that the constitution assigns them in the regulation of culture in
general and the mass media in particular (Berggreen 1994; Tonnemacher 2003: 81). In
fact, the broadcasting powers assigned to the regional level in post-war Germany are
particularly extensive, mostly because the Allies favoured a decentralized structure for
German media (Tonnemacher 2003: 34). For this reason the Basic Law restricted the
federal governments powers to act in the sector, and the Lnder became the benefi-
ciaries of the Allies reluctance to see a state-wide broadcasting authority. Apart from
exclusive legislative power to regulate both public and private broadcasters, every
Land assumed the telecommunications infrastructure of the corresponding occupying
power. With the exception of the Deutsche Welle, a German BBC World of sorts, the
Lnder control all German public channels, which can explain some of the peculiarities
of their audiovisual agenda.
However, this fact did not prevent the German regions from collaborating on audio-
visual matters (Erk 2003: 113). In 1950 all West German corporations began to coop-
erate in the ARD. In 1961, an additional broadcasting corporation, ZDF, was also
founded. This channel would become the largest in Europe due to the Lnder having
signed a series of agreements (Rundfunkstaatsvertrge) with the aim of developing a
state-wide media policy. In addition to their involvement in television broadcasting
through the public corporation they own, the Lnder are also responsible for the legal
control of public and private television broadcasting in Germany through the regional
media monitoring agencies, the Landesmedienanstalten (see Art. 30 BL). These moni-
toring powers include supervising the fulfilment of the quotas and the quantitative
limits to advertising prescribed in the Directive. The preceding developments, com-
bined with the growing importance of television and film, in addition to the continued
loss of regional powers to the federal government and the EU, explains the prominent
position of audiovisual policy powers in the self-perception of the Lnder (Jeffery
1997 a: 73, 2002 a: 6-7; Kleinsteuber and Thoma 1999).
Apart from the above political and economic features common to all Lnder, the
Rhineland-Palatinate defines its agenda according to circumstances specific to the
region. Indeed, the Rhineland-Palatinate possesses particularly strong links to audio-
visual policy. Since the early 1950s the region has chaired the Rundfunkkommission, an
intergovernmental body in which the regional prime ministers unanimously define
common positions on broadcasting matters that the Bundesrat subsequently formal-
izes. Further, television plays a fundamental role in the regional economy. The public
channel ARD, the largest broadcaster in Europe, chose the Rhineland-Palatinate as its
seat in the 1950s.
3
Another large broadcaster with close ties to the Rhineland-Palatinate
is Sat1, which maintained a second headquarters there from 1991 until the inauguration
of a new studio in Berlin in 2000.
4
In view of the importance of broadcasters for the
3 Legal information on ARD is available from its website at http://www.ard.de/home/impressum/-/
id=1888/5sp8sa/index.html (accessed November 2009).
4 Information on the history of Sat1 is available from the website of the current owner, ProSiebenSat.
1, at http://www.prosiebensat1.de/unternehmen/geschichte/3/ (accessed November 2009).
72
region, and in order to fulfil its role as chair of the Rundfunkkommission, the Rhineland-
Palatinate has sought to combine the objectives of all Lnder and of private channels
into its agenda. This has resulted in the Lnder trying to fence off the legislative
competence for regional audiovisual policy, including their ability to fund public
channels, from the powers of DG Competition, while at the same time defending the
freedom of private television entrepreneurs. In addition to the institutional importance
of media for all the Lnder, the agenda of the Rhineland-Palatinate reflects the par-
ticular political and economic significance of broadcasting for the region.

In Spain, the institutional and linguistic context differs significantly from those in
Germany. Three structural traits account for these differences. First, whereas the Ger-
man BL nearly banishes the federal government from the media sector, the Spanish
constitution allows for the existence of both state-wide and regional public channels
and establishes a system of shared legislative powers. Nonetheless, the centre does
retain the right to enact the basic principles regulating the media (so-called ley de bases,
Art. 149.27). Secondly, the financial base of the Spanish channels, which relies on
regional budgets and advertising, diverges significantly from the German fee-based
system (Montero and Brokelmann 1999: 510). Thirdly, the continuing conflict between
the central and regional channels is exemplified by the contentious relationship be-
tween the Spanish broadcaster RTVE and regional broadcasters. This is largely due to
the perception that, in the early 1980s, Spanish legislators showed a remarkable lack of
interest in facilitating collaboration among the public channels (Montero and Brokel-
mann 1999: 520). All in all, the relations between regions, the centre, and their re-
spective TV channels have been outright conflictive, although the basic similarity of
their interests would have recommended otherwise. As a matter of fact, Eliseo Aja, a
constitutional lawyer and a major expert in Spanish federalism, has pointed to broad-
casting as one field where the consequences of poor horizontal coordination are blatant
(Aja 1999: 204).
Both the Spanish constitution and the Basque regional charter, the Estatuto de
Guernica, recognize the regional executive powers right to promote culture and train-
ing in the regional language (3.2 and 148.17 CE and Art. 6.2 EG). According to the
statute regulating Euskal Irrati Telebista (EiTB), the Basque regional TV and radio
broadcaster, the activities of EiTB should be orientated towards sustaining the Basque
language and culture (Art. 3.h). However, in practice, EiTB fulfils two functions that go
well beyond the provisions of the statute. EiTB contributes to nation-building and is an
instrument of the Basque industrial policy towards the audiovisual sector. The first
function is more fundamental and has two elements. Regional channels are used to by
the governing party, the PNV, to propagate its vision of a Basque state (Martnez
Odriozola 2001: 254-255). The transmissions of EiTB increase the intensity of com-
municative exchange beyond the territory of the autonomous community, in all
Euskera-speaking areas, including neighbouring Navarre and the French department
Pyrnes-Atlantiques. The importance of boosting the quantity and quality of shared
information for the nation-building processes cannot be overstated (Deutsch 1966: 96,
101). TV channels have proven to be extremely useful in fostering the idea of nation-
73
hood due to their similarity with other instruments such as books used for the same aim
(Anderson 1991: 37-46; Price 1995: 16). Through EiTB, the PNV supplies all inhab-
itants of the Basque Country with an interpretation of the past and of collective
national identity that the party favours, which has been considered merely propaganda
(Martnez Odriozola 2001: 254-255; Schlesinger 2003: 170). A public regional TV is,
hence, an enviable instrument of nation-building.
In addition to propagating its vision of a Basque state, the PNV uses EiTB as a
language policy instrument. The contribution of EiTB to nation-building is impossible
to fully understand without referring to Euskera. Television broadcasting in minority
languages like Euskera is deemed a precondition for the survival of regional vernacu-
lars (Thomas 1995: 3) because it contributes to establishing a corpus or linguistic
standards common to all speakers in a way similar to that which print media did in the
past (Anderson 1991: 37; Deutsch 1966: 43; McQuail 2002: 74; Thomas 1995: 5). No
less important, EiTB contributes to improve the status of Euskera between speakers,
which is another main element of any language policy (Fishman 1999: 157). The
presence of a language on the television airwaves is important both because of the
higher status gained by the language, which moves speakers to use it outside of the
family setting, and because of the link between national expansion and cultural prestige
(Weber 1922: 627-30). Not only do scholars consider it an axiom that access to tele-
vision is a precondition for minority languages to survive, but Basque media profes-
sionals linked to the regional government, as well as practitioners, have also internal-
ized these views (Zallo 2003). As a high-ranking official of EiTB put it: If people
watch between three and five hours of television a day, there is no hope for a language
which is not spoken on the TV. It is no wonder, then, why regional TV channels have
become such a vital element of the minority regions linguistic policy.
Finally, EiTB contributes to the robustness of the regional audiovisual sector, as a
second and less important function. Film support constitutes the other main tool for
maintaining a presence of the Basque Country and its language in the media. The public
money assigned to EiTB, which is subsequently spent on local productions and in
sustaining the Basque film industry, also allows a minority culture to increase its
attractiveness by endowing itself with expensive, language-dependent products such as
films or TV series (Swaan 2001: 44). To this end, the Basque government has brokered
several agreements between EiTB and regional producers, although collaboration be-
tween them has been difficult (Casado 2005 b: 118, 128; Roldn Larreta 1999: 81, 82,
94). In sum, the importance of EiTB as a linguistic and nation-building instrument
explains the Basque governments resistance to an expansion of the Commissions
powers to monitor public channels.
The preceding arguments should make the Basque governments response to ex-
panding European audiovisual policies easier to understand.
5
In order of importance,
5 Since 1980 the PNV has uninterruptedly controlled the department of culture and the European
affairs services of the Basque administration. For this reason, to equate the regional and the PNVs
audiovisual agendas seems justified. Joseba Arregui, the Guipuzcoan leader of the most separatist
faction inside the PNV, was the minister of culture during several legislative periods. See the
website of the party at http://www.ejgv.euskadi.net.
74
the main priorities of the Basque government are: to defend regional public television,
to promote minority languages access to mass media through quotas if possible, and to
boost regional audiovisual industries. With the exception of the language aspects, this
agenda coincides with the dirigistes objectives for European audiovisual policy
(Collins 1995: 99; Harrison and Woods 2000: 476). The rationale behind the three
elements of this agenda and the repercussions of the television Directive on it merit
further explanation.
The Basque government has sought a transformation of the quotas for independent
works into quotas protecting linguistic minorities (Committee of the Regions 2003 d:
2.5). These kinds of quotas are considered by the Basque government as the only means
to compel private channels in minority regions to broadcast in the respective vernacular
and in doing so reduce consumption of television in Spanish, which is considered an
obstacle to linguistic normalization (Gifreu 1992). In addition, production quotas were
seen as a means to promote the decentralization of the film and TV production industry,
since they usually compel regional channels to invest in audiovisual works from local
production companies. One more reason for the Basque country to welcome any kind of
quota is that such quotas implicitly recognize Europes cultural pluralism and minority
languages.
6
Commitment to public television as a quality service is part of the Basque defence of
EiTB against interventions from the Commission. This partially explains why the
Basque government favoured a restrictive advertising regulation by the Directive,
which would also limit competitors access to revenue. An additional reason is that
actors identified with public broadcasting, particularly if they promote a national,
religious, or other agenda, tend to be in favour of or against advertising according to
their perception of how advertising reinforces their idea of national identity or their
ability to remain in power (Price 1995: 71-73). Finally, the Basque government has
supported the Directives article reserving the transmission of major sporting events for
free TV channels. Indeed, the Basque and other Spanish regional channels consider that
major sporting events belong necessarily to a public broadcasters roster. Indeed, TV
channels depend on mass products and particularly on sports to succeed (Zeller 1999:
206). The Basque executive and EiTB considered the regulation of sporting events as
the single most important element of the Directive because they hoped it would become
the first step towards a right to watch major sporting events in minority languages. In
the Basque Country and in Catalonia sports transmissions are used to attract viewers
unfamiliar with the regional vernacular, since they are an extremely popular and easy-
to-follow form of audiovisual content. In addition to this, sport transmission provide
inhabitants with the opportunity of simultaneously experiencing events, an important
step towards imagining the nation (Anderson 1991: 22-26, 36).
All of this denotes that the Basque government favours a dirigiste, pro-public tele-
vision agenda as a means to defend its own public television stations, as an important
instrument of language policy and nation-building, as well as a way of promoting the
6 As the Basque representative in the Committee of the Regions, Jos Mara Muoa, put it, to use
the European programmes is indispensable, not because of the (financial, AML) means, but to make
Europe conscious of the so-called minority languages.
75
regional audiovisual industry. This agenda has led the Basque government to prefer a
Directive inclusive of quotas, advertising restriction, and a regulation of major sporting
events.

The Valencian agenda regarding European audiovisual policy differs considerably
from the Basque agenda. Indeed, its main trait is its restricted scope: since 1995 the only
audiovisual issue that the Valencian government has determinedly advanced in Brus-
sels was the legality of subsidies to its regional broadcaster. In contrast, the regional
executive had made no visible effort to improve the use of Catalan and other minority
languages in European media. To fully understand the lack of interest of RTVV in
promoting Catalan, a short history of the channel is required.
The nonexistent interest of the PP government in Valencia in promoting the presence
of Catalan in the media has been proportional to its commitment to the language. The
problem of the scant presence of Catalan in the Valencian media did not begin with the
conservative governments, however. Since its earliest broadcastings in 1988, when the
PSOE still governed, the heads of the Valencian TV channel RTVV had shown only a
limited interest in promoting the regional vernacular. Indeed, to opt for a bilingual
regional TV at its inception was a highly indicative step, in marked contrast with the
option of CiU for a regional public broadcaster airing only in Catalan (Moll 1992: 44,
46). Subsequently, a less than optimal initial situation has worsened decisively during
the last ten years, due to the lack of interest of the PP executive in using the Valencian
TV channels to promote Catalan.
The Valencian public broadcaster, RTVV, broadcasts two programs: one in Catalan
and Spanish, Canal 9, and one only in Catalan, Punt. However, the existence of Punt
does not constitute an adequate presence of Catalan in the regional TV, as Canal 9 has a
much larger share of the viewing population. In addition, the journalists of RTVV have
criticized the management for scheduling broadcasts in Spanish during prime time, and
for the scarce audience share obtained by Punt only 1.9 percent (Laguna and Rius
2004: 10-11). Furthermore, these journalists and independent scholars have also high-
lighted the poor quality of the Catalan used in Valencian television and accused the
managers of damaging the regional language rather than improving its standards
(Comit de redacci de Canal 9 1999).
Apart from its treatment of Catalan, the management of RTVV has also attracted
massive criticism of its programs (Garca Parreo 2000: 2). In particular, censors target
the triviality of contents, the personality cult around the regional PM and serious
management irregularities (Laguna and Rius 2004: 7-8; Sindicatura de Cuentas 2001,
2002). RTVV broadcasts information of such a poor quality that it becomes impossible
to follow Valencian politics through the regional channel. Thus, it is questionable
whether RTVV contributes to the proper functioning of democracy, one of the functions
entrusted to public broadcasters.
7
Finally, the Valencian governments limited interest
7 A study of more than 2700 news items aired by Canal 9 during six weeks showed that only thirty-
one referred to Valencian politics. Surprisingly, up to five were critical of the regional executive.
Among other achievements, RTVV broadcasts the highest number of bullfights among all Spanish
channels (Garca Parreo 2000).
76
in RTVV was reflected in a 2002 effort to privatize the channel. The initiative failed
when the Spanish judiciary declared the bid to outsource certain services illegal, in the
midst of protest from RTVV-staff and a parliamentary investigation related to mis-
management. Part of the explanation of the Valencian executives preference for pri-
vatization may lie in the conservative governments indifference towards Catalan.
Entrusting more influence on RTVV contents to the market would have further reduced
the presence of Catalan in the Valencian channel. As Monroe Price has observed,
Privatization can accelerate the incidence of cultural attrition that diminishes citizen-
ship and loyalty (2002: 98). The PP would probably have welcomed the invisible hand
of the market causing further erosion of Catalan in Valencia and of the nationalist
parties social base.
The regional government has combined its neglect of RTVV with its efforts to use it
as a means to support Valencian media producers as middle-term objectives. Through
an agreement between the regional broadcasters to exchange products, RTVV has
attempted to fulfil the investment quotas included in the Directive. However, according
to the Valencian association of producers, regional television has only very recently
begun to meet the terms of the Directive. In spring 2005 the association of Valencian
producers considered that dialogue with the Valencian government was still in its
earliest stages; it expected the regional parliament to enact a statute in 2005 regulating
the sector in a way favourable to the regional producers (Casado 2005 a: 10-11). Still,
this does not necessarily reflect an increasing commitment to Catalan. Rather, the
investment of larger amounts of money in the audiovisual sector probably results from
hopes of an economic boom rather than from linguistic or cultural considerations.
Furthermore this may not be unrelated to failed efforts to privatize the RTVV and the
large number of former officers from Canal 9 that are starting up firms producing
programs for their former employer (Generalitat Valenciana 2005; Laguna and Rius
2004).
Having sketched the Valencia audiovisual and language policy preferences, I will
briefly examine its links to the Directive. The PP regional executive and the Valencian
broadcaster did not feel the need to monitor the reform of the Directive because they
agreed with its contents. This passivity of the conservative government contrasts with
the activities undertaken by the PSOE when the first Directive was enacted. At the time,
the Valencian government organized a series of roundtable meetings, published a book
on the Directive, and organized a meeting between the regional PM and the Commis-
sion. As an explanation for the regional governments lack of interest in altering the
Directive, the former head of RTVV argued that the broadcasting company had no
particular difficulties in fulfilling the quotas, and that the advertising restrictions did not
constitute a threat for a company financed through public subsidies, and that the regu-
lation of major sporting events was seen as part of a war between the PP government
and the Spanish media mogul, Jess de Polanco. Without necessarily taking this ex-
planation at face value, it at least clarifies one point: neither the Valencian government
nor RTVV considered demanding more ambitious quotas for minority languages, ad-
vertising restrictions or support for regional productions. All in all, in the late 1990s the
audiovisual agenda of the Valencian government lacked any link to developments at EU
77
level. Instead, it emphasized the use of RTVV to promote the regional PP executive
rather than Catalan, and rather than offering a quality public broadcasting service to the
Valencian population.

German and Spanish constituent units define their audiovisual policy agendas by
combining issues of general concern for regions with their individual interests. To some
extent, the variables accounting for the differences can be found at the member-state
level as in the case of coordination mechanisms, but other variables operate at the
regional level, like nationalist parties or the sociolinguistic traits of the regional idiom.
In the case of the Rhineland-Palatinate, and of the remaining Lnder, these variables
were translated into the jealous defence of regional powers vis--vis the Commission.
Their opposition manifests the difficulties of combining a single market and the
Lnders protection of cultural autonomy, as Fritz Scharpf has observed while making a
direct reference to the Directive (1994: 138). In order to reduce conflict, Scharpf
recommended lower intensities of regulation (1994: 153). In doing so, he overlooked
the fact that minority regions like the Basque Country consider that the protection of
their culture depends on the enactment of far reaching Directives. For minority regions,
the EU audiovisual policy should guarantee the access of linguistic minorities to the
media by establishing quotas securing the presence of Euskera in television and film,
and should also recognize the right to watch major sporting events in minority lan-
guages. In clear contrast to the ambitious aims of minority regions, the Spanish co-
ordination mechanisms left almost no chance for regions to shape the Spanish bar-
gaining stance in the Council. Coordination mechanisms decisively influenced the
cognitive orientations of the Basque government: until the late 1990s it did not become
aware of the implications of the Directive for its audiovisual agenda. With regard to
Valencia, the most peculiar element of its audiovisual agenda has been its restricted
scope: not the regional vernacular, but the defence of the regional public channel per se
constitutes the most acute preoccupation of the regional government. The next section
explores to what extent coordination mechanisms contribute to the melding of these
agendas with those advanced by the respective central governments. Special attention
will be directed toward the actors interaction orientation.
The Coordination of the Television Directive
The agendas of both the Lnder in Germany and autonomous communities in Spain
display important and legitimate concerns justifying their participation in the negoti-
ations of the new Directive. In order to establish whether their positions were taken up
in the member states stance in the Council, this section changes the focus from regional
agendas to the operation of coordination mechanisms in Germany and Spain. The next
sections focus on how the German and Spanish bargaining stances in the Council
towards quotas, advertisement restrictions, and major sporting events were defined in
their respective coordination mechanisms.
78
In Germany, coordination mechanisms offered a range of possibilities for the Lnder
to influence the position of the centre on European audiovisual policy. Because of the
coordination mechanisms established in the Europaartikel, the Lnder have obtained
privileged access to the Council of Ministers. According to Article 23.5 BL and 5.2
EUZBLG the German bargaining stance in the Council of Ministers in audiovisual
policy issues, and others under the exclusive competence of the Lnder, are determined
decisively by the common regional position after a process of informal negotiations
between the regions in the Rundfunkkommission. After a majority of the Bundesrat
members enact a common regional position, the federal government is compelled to act
on its behalf before the Council. Furthermore, regarding subjects under the exclusive
legislative competence of the Lnder, the legislation recognizes that they have the right
to negotiate in the Council with other member states (23.6 BL and 6.2 EUZBLG). The
federal government eventually entrusted the leadership of negotiations to representa-
tives from Bavaria, the Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein that were ap-
pointed by the Bundesrat, notwithstanding the initial resistance from some central
governments officials. Nonetheless, the federal government retained the leadership of
the delegation (Knothe and Bashayan 1997: 855). Additional intensive contact between
centre and regions took place at the administrative level in a working group based in the
German Home Affairs Ministry where Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein represented the
regions (Knothe and Bashayan 1997; Schmitt-Vockenhausen 1998: 380). In sum, dur-
ing the negotiation of the Directive, the federal government shared its prerogatives as a
member state with the Lnder, allowing the Lnder to direct Germanys involvement in
the negotiation.
Not only were the Lnder part of the German delegation, but the position of the
federal government also mirrored the common regional position, particularly on
quotas. During the revision of the Directive, the Lnder showed the same fierce op-
position to quotas that they had expressed when they were first enacted in the 1980s
(Bundesrat 1994). On the one hand, the federal chamber pleaded for a suppression of
quotas, arguing that they are an inadequate instrument to promote the European audio-
visual industry. On the other hand, if other member states were to resist the suppression
of quotas, the federal chamber argued that the where practicable clause of Articles 5
and 6 should remain in force, so that the member states retain a certain elbowroom
regarding the monitoring of quotas. Apart from the preceding, the Lnder further
pleaded for a more straightforward control method for compliance with quotas. Be-
cause their regional media agencies, or the Landesmedienanstalten, are obliged to
control whether broadcasters fulfil quotas, the Lnder pleaded for a cheaper method of
doing so.
The regional position on advertising exemplifies the trade-offs that are characteristic
of the negotiations between the Lnder. The PM from the Rhineland-Palatinate, Kurt
Beck, and coordinator of the German position at the regional level, defended the
interests of the private broadcasters in the presence of the other regional premiers. The
associations of private broadcasters were critical of any quantitative limits to adver-
tisement, (Krebber 2002: 153; VPRT 2001: 5). For them, advertisement was less of an
important topic, as public broadcasters do not depend financially on advertising rev-
79
enue. However, the other Lnder accepted Becks plea, since this allowed the incor-
poration of the concerns of the private broadcasters in the regional position without
decisively weakening the standpoint of the regions or damaging public television
channels. This concession to private channels was eased by the fact that regions were
also interested in reducing the administrative costs of controlling advertisement limits
imposed upon the regional media agencies.
The rules regulating the broadcasting of major sporting events such as the Olympics
and the football World Cup were the principal subject of controversy during the 1997
negotiations, as I mentioned above. The German regional governments rejected the
amendment introduced by the European Parliament aimed at reserving a number of
sporting events for free-to-air channels (Krebber 2002: 141, 147). As a consequence,
the federal government became the only member state opposed to the list. Several
factors explain the adoption of this position by the regional governments. Certainly, the
first factor is the typical regional diffidence towards an intrusion of the EU audiovisual
regulations into their remit. Secondly, the regional and German attitude should be
understood against the background of a 1.7 billion Euro deal struck by a German firm,
KirchMedia, to broadcast the 1998 and 2002 World Championships on pay-per-view
channels (Krebber 2002: 141, 144). The regulation of major sporting events would have
had the effect of expropriating the giant media company, which is why the conservative
government determinedly opposed the list very early on, even before the Lnder did.
The governing coalition, CDU/CSU and FDP, included a Bavarian party, the CSU,
whose regional PM, Edmund Stoiber, was adamant in defending the economic interests
of the Munich-based KirchMedia. After some dissonance between the hesitant regional
position and firm opposition of the federal government, in March 1997, the regional
PMs unanimously rejected the major sporting events list, which subsequently became
the German position in the Council (Knothe and Bashayan 1997: 857; Krebber 2002:
146).
Eventually Germany voted in the Council against the Directive, among other rea-
sons because of the list. Germany was the only member state opposed to the enactment
of the new Directive, apart from Belgium, which abstained. This does not imply that the
Directive contradicted the German agenda beyond the list issue or even that Germany
was truly against its adoption. Neither does the German negative vote reflect a failure of
the coordination mechanisms leading to a Directive inimical to the German regions
preferences (Krebber 2002: 146, 156-157). Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth
since several important amendments proposed by the Lnder had been included in the
final version of the Directive (Knothe and Bashayan 1997: 857). More specifically, the
Directive included neither compulsory quotas nor advertising restrictions, the two
modifications introduced by the Commission that the Lnder opposed most. In fact,
apart from the list of major sporting events, the main reason why Germany voted
against the Directive is that the centre and the regions knew that its negative vote would
not prevent the Directive from being adopted (Krebber 2002: 146, 156-157). Rather, the
Lnder wanted to express through the German vote against the Directive their radical
rejection of any EU decision regulating the content of broadcasting, as the provisions
80
on quotas and major sporting events intended, incidentally impinging upon their cul-
tural autonomy and their audiovisual policy powers.

According to the legislation in force, the autonomous communities in Spain should
have had a chance to incorporate their views into the Spanish bargaining stance in the
Council. At the least, this is what the tenor of the legislation in force and authorized
scholars maintain (Brzel 2002: 146-147; Ortzar Andechaga 1999: 643; Ortzar
Andechaga, Gmez Campo et al 1995: 196-197; Prez Tremps, Cabellos Espirrez et
al 1998: 286). In conformity with Spanish law, the autonomous communities could
have agreed on a common position on the Directive that the centre would then have
considered when defining its own position in the Council, as explained in chapter two.
8
The reality of Spanish intergovernmental relations, however, was different. Two sec-
toral conferences acted as coordination mechanisms, as they are responsible for dif-
ferent aspects of the Directive, the telecommunications conference (Consejo Asesor de
Telecomunicaciones) and the culture conference (Conferencia Sectorial de Cultura).
The first entity, a highly technical body where quotas and other content-related
problems are not a priority, met ten times between 1987 and 1997. During these few
meetings, the members of the Consejo Asesor de Telecomunicaciones never engaged in
the quota debate or in other discussion related to the Directive (Direccin General
Poltica Autonmica 2000: 67-68). Interestingly, no elected official were actively in-
volved in the negotiations. Instead, the civil servant from the telecommunications
department charged with participating in the working groups and in the informal
Councils would regularly write a report to his superiors describing the state of nego-
tiations in Brussels, outlining his view on the most appropriate bargaining stance for
Spain. If his superiors did not give other indications, which they did not, they would
then adopt that position during the next round of negotiations. The fact that the Spanish
government defines its bargaining stance informally and without significant inputs
from elected officers creates additional hurdles for any attempt from the autonomous
communities to define their audiovisual agenda and is a tell-tale sign of the lack of
cooperation between the two tiers of government.
The second body, the sectoral culture conference, was in charge of programmes and
issues concerning producers, but met rarely during the negotiation of the Directive:
once in April 1995, not at all in 1996, and twice in 1997. During the 1995 meeting, the
regions present in the conference could ex-post facto discuss the topics of the last
Council of Ministers, including audiovisual policy. This was the only opportunity for
them to convey their views to the central government, as the 1997 gatherings of the
conference took place after the endorsement of the Directive. The proceedings of the
1995 meeting will allow us to observe coordination mechanisms in action.
9
With regard
8 The relevant ruling is the Resolucin de 10 de marzo de 1995 de la Secretara de Estado para
Administraciones Territoriales (MAP) que publica el Acuerdo de la CARCE de 30 de noviembre de
1994 sobre la participacin interna de las Comunidades Autnomas en los Asuntos Comunitarios a
travs de las Conferencias Sectoriales, BOE n. 69, 22 March 1995, p. 9037 y n. 78, 1 April, 1995, p.
10045.
9 I am grateful to Jos Mara Prez Medina, at the time posted at the Ministerio para las Adminis-
traciones Pblicas for providing me with copies of the proceedings.
81
to the Directive, the central and regional officials did not discuss matters or exchange
views, let alone incorporate regional concerns in the Spanish position in the Council.
Admittedly, information related to the Directive was disseminated and discussed, but
the information flowed mostly in one direction, from the centre to the regions. The
Spanish minister for culture and the director of the Instituto Ciencias y Artes Cine-
matogrficas (ICAA), the leading body on film-related issues, represented the Spanish
government. The contents of the discussion are equally instructive. During the session,
the Spanish minister communicated the most recent developments on European cul-
tural policy to her regional interlocutors, including the start of the negotiations on the
new Directive. Additionally, a high official of the Spanish culture department explained
the objectives of MEDIA II. After this exchange, regional representatives intervened to
make a few observations on how to obtain funding from other EU cultural programmes,
but no regional representative expressed his or her own opinion, or articulated a de-
mand with respect to the Directive. The rest of the session was, in a way, a briefing on
EU law dedicated to explaining to the regional ministers and general directors the
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle and the implication of Article 128 TEC on
European cultural policy. The substance of this dialogue makes it clear that, at least by
the mid-1990s, regional officials were not as familiar with European law and politics as
their federal counterparts. This lack of preparation undoubtedly curtailed the regions
chances of detecting the implications of a new Directive, not to mention defining a
common regional position or influencing on its contents.
Having explained how the Spanish bargaining stance was defined, I will now pro-
ceed to discuss its substance. Spain had traditionally supported quotas, but only non-
compulsory ones. In principle, the position of the PP was one of continuity, as it
maintained the bargaining stance defended by the PSOE until 1996. By defending
quotas, Madrid aligned itself with the dirigiste agendas of France, Italy, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland versus the market liberal agendas of Austria, Germany, Holland,
Denmark and the UK. The official position was that the Spanish conservative govern-
ment preferred to retain non-compulsory quotas rather than outright eliminate them, so
as to not send a misleading signal that the United States could interpret as a European
willingness to eliminate the cultural exception from the GATT (Forrest 1997: 608;
Pauwels and Loisen 2003: 293-294). However, the Spanish support for quotas referred
only to non-compulsory ones, and did not imply that the executive was convinced of
their advisability or efficiency. In the late 1990s the PP was trying to profile itself as a
liberal party committed to the removal of trade barriers. One of the co-drafters of the
Directive, MEP Gerardo Galeote of the PP, questioned the advisability of quotas and of
a cultural exception in the GATT for Spain. In his own words, the cultural exception
is not necessarily advisable for Spain because to raise barriers to imports to Europe may
complicate the access of the Spanish audiovisual products to Latin American markets.
According to Galeote, his party was, nonetheless, against the elimination of quotas
outright without obtaining a more efficient instrument by which to promote the Euro-
pean film industry. Through these words, he was probably hinting at a side-payment in
the form of a larger MEDIA programme financed by net-payers like Germany, which
82
advanced liberal rather than dirigiste audiovisual agendas. Of course, neither Galeote
nor the Spanish officials considered quotas for minority languages as part of the agenda.
The Spanish government supported the provision proposed by the European Par-
liament demanding the transmission of major sporting events by free TV channels.
During that same year, the PP government had been struggling to pass a statute com-
pelling all Spanish holders of transmission rights for major sporting events to sell them
to operators transmitting through free TV.
10
This statute was widely perceived as an
attack by Aznars government on the centre-left media group PRISA. Its owner, the
media mogul Jess de Polanco, used his football transmission rights to attract viewers
to his pay-per-view TV station Canal +. Apparently, the PP intended to legitimize the
statute it was trying to pass in Spain by underlining the existence of an analogous
European regulation, or otherwise resort to the Directive to prevent PRISA from con-
trolling football transmission rights. Thus, the centre held a stake in the list of major
sporting events, which overlapped with regional governments long-standing interests
in their own channels rights to broadcast football. This, however, had long been a
source of conflict between the central and regional government, as their respective
channels had jockeyed for the right to broadcast football. In fact, the Spanish state-wide
channel RTVE had used its prerogatives as a member to deny Spanish regional tele-
vision stations access to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Membership in the
EBU was crucial for regional channels because until the late 1990s this association of
public broadcasters held most transmission rights for major sporting events like the
Olympics, international football championships, Formula 1 and Wimbledon (Zeller
1999: 205-206, 210).
11
In contrast to the Spanish autonomous communities, regional
broadcasters from Belgium, Germany and the UK have been able to integrate into the
EBU directly or through member-state level associations.
12
In other words, the over-
lapping between the central and regional positions regarding the list of major sporting
events resulted from a circumstantial coincidence of agendas, rather than from nego-
tiations within coordination mechanisms.
All of this confirms that neither the regions first, nor the regions and the centre
afterwards, made genuine efforts to jointly define the Spanish bargaining stance for the
revision of the Directive. Even more, their attitude rendered the coordination mech-
anisms established by law irrelevant because nobody demanded their strict application.
Whereas the centres lack of motivation to include the regions in the negotiation of the
Directive is easy to understand, as the lack of involvement of regions increases the
ability of the centre to defend its own interests, why the regions were unconcerned with
the Directive is not so clear. Nevertheless, this lack of concern can be explained by their
10 El PP aclara que el nivel sociocultural de Espaa hace que el ftbol sea de inters general, El
Pas, 10 June 1997.
11 Apparently, in 2003 the Basque government was still interested in accession to the EBU. In the
opinion drafted by the Basque representative, the CoR Stresses that an initiative providing easier
access to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) for all public television services, whether
regional or national, would help extend broadcasting of events that are of major importance to
society (Committee of the Regions 2003: 7).
12 In contrast, regional parties have called on the state-wide channel to broadcast sports in minority
languages, see CiU and PNV piden a TVE que emita el Mundial en vasco y cataln, El Pas, 11
June 1998.
83
interaction and cognitive orientations. All regions, but particularly those governed by
nationalist parties, distrust the central government and are likely to refrain from par-
ticipation in coordination mechanisms. This makes it difficult for them to assess the
implications of the decisions discussed in the Council for their own agendas.

To quickly summarize this section, the Lnder were able to define a common re-
gional position in large part due to German coordination mechanisms, and were suc-
cessful in getting the federal government to adopt this position. In the Council, Lnder
representatives defended Germanys firm opposition to quotas, further restriction on
advertising, and support for the list of major sporting events. Not only did the German
regions present a united front before the Council, they were also quite successful in
getting almost all of their policy positions adopted, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, non-
binding rather than compulsory quotas were adopted, further advertising restrictions
were not included, and the EPs proposal of a pan-European list of major sporting
events was watered down. In contrast, coordination mechanisms prevented Spanish
regions from wielding any influence on the centres position towards the Directive.
These deficiencies make it difficult for regions to follow negotiations in Brussels and
understand their implications. An enormous distance between the cognitive orienta-
tions of the actors participating in the same institutional setting characterized the re-
lations between the centre and the Spanish autonomous communities, at least in the late
1990s. In order to ascertain whether these patterns apply to other decisions, in the next
section I examine the work of coordination mechanisms in relation to state aid for
public broadcasters and the MEDIA programme.
Public Broadcasting and Film Promotion
As a complement to the Directive, EU audiovisual policy consists of competition policy
elements and a programme to support audiovisual producers called the MEDIA pro-
gramme (Collins 1994: 96-97). However, the functions of these EU audiovisual policy
elements are clearly different. Whereas competition policy aims to prevent European
public authorities from distorting competition among channels through subsidies, the
objective of the MEDIA programme is to support audiovisual producers in surviving
increased competition derived from the single market. This section examines whether
German and Spanish regions have used coordination mechanisms to shape state aid
regulations and the revision of the MEDIA programme in 2000, and whether the
respective central governments eventually adopted their concerns.
Public Broadcasting and Competition Policy
The EU plays an important role in the audiovisual sector through its extensive com-
petition policy powers, which significantly increase the importance of EU decisions for
the agendas of the regions. The Commission uses its competition powers to monitor
84
how member states and regional and local governments finance television broadcasters
through state aid. Like all other public authorities, regional governments are bound by
the TEC, which has ruled that subsidies are incompatible with the common market
(Art. 87.1 TEC). However, the same text partially exempts services of general eco-
nomic interest (Art. 86.2 TEC) and for the promotion of culture (Art. 87.3.d TEC) from
the prohibition; these exemptions make possible the granting of aid to public broad-
casters. An additional provision, particularly relevant to this analysis, is the Protocol on
Public Service Broadcasting, incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.
13
This
supplement to the Treaty attests to the importance of public television and media
pluralism for democracy and social cohesion. Additionally, the Protocol recognizes the
power of member states to define and subsidize the public service remit of their broad-
casters accordingly. Hence, the Protocol reinforces the position of broadcasters in
member states and regions versus DG Competition and the criticisms of private chan-
nels (Zeller 1999: 237).
Through the Protocol, member states and regions attempted to protect their channels
from the consequences of a lingering conflict between private and public broadcasters.
In the early 1990s, private channels had denounced both regional and state-wide chan-
nels in Germany, Italy, Spain, France and the UK, accusing them of unlawfully ex-
tending the scope of their activities to specialised channels like Kinderkanal or docu-
mentary film channels such as Phoenix. Not only did private channels question the
scope of the public broadcasting service, they also accused public TV of illegally
combining subsidies and advertising as sources of finance (Ward 2003: 234). The
sanctions of the Commission might have compelled some public channels to seek ways
of funding specialised channels without using money from licence fees. Sanctions
imposed upon other broadcasters with large debts like RTVE could have led to their
outright collapse. The Lnder perceived this situation as a threat to their channels
because they feared that the Commission would use its competition policy powers to
tamper with public channels. More specifically, they feared that the Commission could
try to define what a public broadcasting service could encompass and what contents
should be excluded from it. For instance, the Commission could then exclude specialist
channels or cheap and tasteless studio productions from receiving subsidies as part of a
broadcasting public service. A further alarming consequence of this approach for the
Lnder was the possibility that the Commission could start verifying that subsidies and
fees were actually being used to finance what the Commission itself had defined as a
public broadcasting system, instead of other activities undertaken by the public chan-
nels. In view of the increasing threat for public channels, and for their cherished media
policy powers, the Lnder and their channels actively engaged in a lobbying operation
13 The tenor of the Protocol is as follows The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European
Community shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the
funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to broadcasting organ-
isations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by each
Member State, and insofar as such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in
the Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the realisation
of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account. See Official Journal C 340, from 10
November 1997, p. 109.
85
aimed at attaching the Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty recognizing the right of
member states to fund public broadcasters and freely define the remit of their public
service function.
The inclusion of the public broadcasting Protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty has
probably been the biggest audiovisual policy success of the Lnder. To advance their
agenda, the Lnder made abundant use of coordination mechanisms, in addition to
taking full advantage of extra-state strategies like lobbying the Commission and seek-
ing allies in the Council. The German federal government contributed to the regional
success with a generous reading of the EUGBLZ, the statute establishing the rules for
the German coordination mechanisms, providing regions access to the bodies prepar-
ing the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Due to the collaboration of the
central government in granting access to intra-state channels, the regional tier, repre-
sented by Bavaria and the Rhineland-Palatinate, participated in the weekly meetings of
the competent federal department. This allowed them to advance the regional concerns
that were ultimately included into a Bundesrat resolution and into the debates preceding
the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (Jeffery 1997 a: 65-66; Schmuck 1997:
230). Regular participation in these meetings moved the regional representatives to
reduce the number of their demands, one of the remaining demands being the inclusion
of a Protocol on public broadcasting. Faced with the indifference of the other EU
countries and driven by the impulse of their regional tiers, Germany, Belgium and other
member states with public broadcasters defended the Protocol despite the Commis-
sions dislike of the initiative.
In clear contrast to Germany, the Spanish government did not invite regions to
express their position on the Protocol. On this occasion, Madrid had two reasons to act
discreetly. The Spanish government did not want to defend the Protocol publicly,
despite its enthusiasm for the initiative of the Lnder, because it feared a retaliatory
action by the Commission in the form of an inquiry into the highly indebted Spanish
channel RTVE. After all, it is not surprising that regional channels were uninformed the
autonomous communities and their channels were left unaware of talks regarding
public broadcasting. As indicated above, the two sectoral conferences responsible for
media policies and issues meet only rarely. Perhaps more significantly, RTVE was fully
informed about the preparation of the Protocol through its membership in EBU (from
which RTVE had previously managed to exclude the Basque and Catalan public chan-
nels, EiTB and the Corporaci Catalana Televisin). Furthermore, RTVE indicated sub
rosa to central government officials which strategy Spain should adopt towards the
Protocol.

After the Protocol was enacted, DG Competition counterattacked so as to weaken its
effect by obtaining a confirmation of its powers to monitor and regulate public chan-
nels. As a first step in this direction, the head of DG Competition, Karel van Miert,
published a discussion paper aimed at contesting the authority of the Protocol.
14
If
implemented, Mierts proposal would have severely curtailed the ability of regional and
14 Van Miert seeks to confirm power to scrutinize public broadcasting aid in European Voice, Vo.
3 n. 33, 18 September 1997.
86
central governments not only to fund but also to define the remit of their public broad-
casting service. The paper attracted massive criticism from member states, regions, and
their TV channels. As in the case of the Protocol, the Commission was internally
divided on the proposal of its Competition Commissioner. For instance, a German
official named the audiovisual commissioner Viviane Redding a resolute critic of
Mierts paper. A Spanish official claimed that during the negotiations on the Protocol
the DG Audiovisual was much more supportive of member states than of their col-
leagues from DG Competition. This saga finished when the Commission ceded and
recognized limits to its competition powers broadly corresponding with the content of
the Protocol (Ward 2003: 248). Why German and Spanish regions also played marked-
ly different roles in the negotiation around the Miert paper merits further attention.
When Miert published his paper, Bavaria lobbied the Commission on behalf of all of
the Lnder in the hope of advancing the Bundesrats position. On this occasion, the
criticisms of the Lnder were strengthened by the massive opposition of member states
to the paper. In any case, the strategy of the Lnder was no more than a continuation of
the tactic outlined two years earlier of jointly advancing a Broadcasting Protocol cur-
tailing the Commissions competition powers. In Spain, in contrast to the previous
occasions, the central regional responses were, at first sight, more innovative. The
central government unsuccessfully invited the regions to express their views on the
Miert discussion paper and collaborate in defending the efficacy of the Protocol. Such a
request was in clear contrast to the lack of contacts regarding the Protocol, but this was
largely due to the fact that the government in Madrid, afraid of a DG Competition
investigation on the RTVE financial situation, refrained from becoming proactive
during the negotiation of the Protocol. However, given its utmost interest in safe-
guarding the existence of its TV channel, and once the Protocol had been enacted, the
Spanish government openly attacked DG Competition plans. Indeed, as an official put
it, RTVE had no need to pressure the government, which did not want to leave the
future of RTVE in the hands of the Commission. As part of this strategy, the Spanish
executive invited regions to two meetings aimed at gathering arguments in favour of
public broadcasting. These were to be subsequently integrated in the Spanish response
to the Commission, but the fruits of this collaboration were somewhat disappointing.
Regional governments and their TV stations made no significant effort to collab-
orate with the central government, in spite of their common interest in preventing the
Commission from restricting the autonomy of the public broadcasters. After two
meetings, the initiative of the Spanish government was shelved and the autonomous
communities organized their own defence outside of the relevant institutional setting,
mainly, the sectoral culture conference. In its place, they resorted to a semi-legal (Aja
1999: 205) association of regional public channels, the Federacin de Organismos de
Radio y Televisin Autonmicos (FORTA), where they prepared a paper for the Com-
mission highlighting the language policy dimension of regional public broadcasting.
Interestingly, the regional collective lobbying effort did not prevent specific regions
from contacting the Commission on an individual basis: the Catalan premier, Jordi
Pujol, travelled to Brussels to defend Catalan regional public television.
87
In conclusion, the Spanish regions have shunned collaboration with the centre in the
aftermath of Mierts paper and have dismissed intra-state channels of gaining access to
the EU. The evidence suggests that regions simply trusted themselves more than the
centre as advocates of regional TV, which seems understandable after fifteen years of
conflicts with RTVE and no precedent of joint lobbying efforts. The strategy of the
Spanish regions contrasts with the German tactic of entrusting the representation of all
Lnder to one or two regions and suggests that, in contrast, Spanish coordination
mechanisms have failed to increase cohesion between governments and promote mu-
tual trust. The differences among the German and Spanish coordination mechanisms
are made more prominent by actors disparate interaction orientations.
The MEDIA Programme
Supporting European film production through the MEDIA programme is the third main
element of the Communitys audiovisual policy. This programme offers financial sup-
port for the production and distribution of films and for the training of professionals for
which producers, scriptwriters, directors, production companies, and distributors may
apply. The Commission started MEDIA in 1986 as a pilot project, which in 1990
became a Community programme. Since then, MEDIA, whose purpose is to reinforce
the audiovisual industry, constituted the reverse side of the regulations aimed at liber-
alizing the European audiovisual market. In 1995 MEDIA II was split into two divi-
sions; the first aiming to reduce the fragmentation of the European audiovisual market
by facilitating the distribution of non-national audiovisual works to exhibition spaces in
the EU. To achieve this, MEDIA Plus supports the production, promotion and distri-
bution of European films. The other division, MEDIA Training, aimed to increase the
quality of European films by improving the skills of professionals in the sector.
MEDIA has a modest budget but it is nonetheless deemed a highly attractive pro-
gramme by some regional governments. The initial budget of 200 million ECU
(1991-1995) was increased to 310 million (1996-2000) and subsequently to 400 million
(2001-2006). The programme has a clearly distributive character with the larger and
wealthier member states receiving more money. From the funding available from
MEDIA II, France receives the largest share, about twenty percent, followed by Ger-
many with almost fourteen percent. The other three large member states from the EU 15
receive about ten percent each (BIPE n.d.: 122). Data provided by MEDIA in Spain for
2004 indicates that the tendency to favour larger and more affluent countries such as
France and Germany has remained unchanged. Nonetheless, many regions across the
EU, even from countries receiving only a small share of the money, decidedly support
MEDIA for several reasons. First, MEDIA tempers the weaknesses in the production
stage of many European films and counteracts European film producers endemic
financial problems and the fragmentation of the European film market (Forrest 1997:
603; Lpez 1995: 52; Theiler 2005: 101-104). Second, as a decentralized programme, it
co-finances offices in member states MEDIA Desks and their regions MEDIA
Antennae. This last type of office provides regional audiovisual firms with information
88
on the support that is available from MEDIA, helps firms to prepare applications, and
becomes part of some regions strategy to profile themselves as film-producing centres.
Thirdly, because MEDIA acknowledges that productions from restricted linguistic
areas merit enhanced support, some regions such as the Basque Country have wel-
comed the programme. These different aspects of MEDIA have provided regions with
diverging reasons to support the programme, although regional agendas for its reform
differ.

Despite initial hesitation, the German regions have defended MEDIA since the early
1990s. Initially, the Lnder were concerned that the focus of the first MEDIA pro-
gramme was directed toward film production rather than toward distribution or train-
ing. This led them to demand changes that would emphasize other elements of the
audiovisual industry, supposedly improving the implementation of MEDIA. Moreover,
the German federal government, which finances a large share of MEDIA through its
contribution to the EU budget, reluctantly accepted MEDIA and has criticized certain
of the programmes financial aspects for allegedly allocating money according to the
Giekannenprinzip, roughly translated as the watering-pot principle. This means that
all member states would receive some money, even if this implies allocating amounts of
financing too small to induce real improvements in the audiovisual industry in any
individual EU country or region. However, the Commission made important changes in
the regulation of MEDIA II (1995-200) and successive versions of the programme. To
some extent, these changes were a response to the German criticisms about MEDIA I
(1990-1995) and to regional lobbying efforts. In addition, the German regions had
requested and obtained from the Commission an upgrading of the MEDIA committee
from a management to an advisory body. Since the Lnder were already participating in
the comitology, the EC oversight committee system of the EU, the upgrading of the
MEDIA committee allowed them to monitor its implementation even more closely.
Overall, these modifications have gained the support of the Lnder and have softened
the German federal governments previous opposition to MEDIA. Overall, it appears
that the Lnder have influenced the development of MEDIA due to their ability to
determine the German position towards the programme.
On the contrary, the influence of Spanish regions over the development of MEDIA
has been negligible. The Spanish government and regions have made no effort to
actively shape the European film promotion programme, particularly in comparison to
Germany. While the reasons are complex, the cast of characters is quite familiar. On one
hand, the Basque Government considers the programme beneficial and co-finances the
MEDIA Antenna in San Sebastin. At the same time, it acknowledges that the positive
repercussions of the programme on Basque film companies, and on film production in
Euskera, are limited, as MEDIA accounts for a negligible share of the subsidies to the
Basque film sector when compared to EiTB. On the other hand, the Basque government
appreciates that MEDIA accords minority languages a special status, as discussed
above, but the Basque government has also ignored the poor implementation of those
provisions an issue which I will address in the next chapter and has abstained from
formulating further demands regarding the reform of MEDIA (2000-2005).
89
In the case of Valencia, links to MEDIA are almost non-existent, among other
reasons because no Antenna exists there. When the Antennae were established in the
early 1990s, the Commission, Fundacin para el Desarrollo de la Funcin Social de
las Comunicaciones (FUNDESCO), the main Spanish partner of the programme, and
three regional governments agreed on opening Antennae in San Sebastin, Barcelona
and Seville. These three cities have attracted the largest concentrations of audiovisual
enterprises outside of Madrid, which has traditionally been the hub of the Spanish
television and film industry. Today, a certain number of producers are located in Va-
lencia, and the regional government is more committed to audiovisual media.
On the other hand, the Association of Valencian Producers (PAV) has demanded the
establishment of an Antenna in Valencia. However, until now it has not obtained the
support of the regional government. In fact, neither Spanish officials nor the MEDIA
Desk in Madrid ever mention the Valencian government as an actor interested in the
European programme. Therefore, the belated development of an audiovisual industry
policy and the lack of interest in promoting Catalan explain why the Valencian gov-
ernment has thus far not tried to shape the financial or symbolic aspects of MEDIA.
At the member state level, the ICAA is responsible for MEDIA. As part of cultural
department, it defines the Spanish position with regard to MEDIA and takes part in the
MEDIA committee and working groups. While the ICAA has been receptive to re-
gional concerns, and since September 1994 a representative of the autonomous com-
munities has accompanied an ICAA official to the sessions of the MEDIA committee,
the ICAA is not particularly preoccupied with linguistic minorities. Whenever changes
in the programme are being considered, the ICAA has indeed listened to the diverse
actors involved in the sector, but the regional representatives of the audiovisual sector
nonetheless have suggested that there would no fundamental changes with regard to the
2000 reform of MEDIA, as the director of the Basque Antenna acknowledged. The
ICAA also noted that the Commission does not adequately take linguistic minorities
into account when allocating subsidies. On only one occasion did a Catalan production
benefit from the special conditions that the regulation of MEDIA establishes for re-
stricted or minority language areas. At the same time, no Basque production has thus far
gained from the enhanced support for production allocated for restricted languages
areas. Nonetheless, the Spanish government has not asked the Commission to change
its policy and the autonomous communities have not insisted that the ICAA try to
improve this.

To summarize, whereas the Lnder have attempted, and to some extent succeeded, in
shaping MEDIA, the Spanish government and its regions have not been able to influ-
ence the programme at all. Since the early 1990s, the Lnder executives have formu-
lated their demands towards MEDIA clearly, tailored the programme according to their
preferences, and carved a more influential role for themselves in the MEDIA com-
mittee. In contrast, the Spanish autonomous communities have adopted a passive at-
titude and have not tried to improve the attention given by MEDIA to audiovisual
productions in minority languages. The Basque government was content with a merely
symbolic recognition of minority languages and the Valencian executive responded
90
with neither approval nor support. While Spanish coordination mechanisms played an
even less significant role during the negotiation of MEDIA which has been handled
through the ICAA the same interaction and cognitive orientations inappropriate for
collaboration were also at play.
Conclusions
The Lnder and the autonomous communities in Spain produced clearly differentiated
but nonetheless consistent responses to a range of EU audiovisual decisions: coordin-
ation in the German case and passivity in the Spanish one. This is surprising, as both
German and Spanish regions possess concerns over audiovisual policies exposed to EU
decisions, and both are thought to be instances of cooperative federalism (Brzel 2002:
211-212). However, only the German representation in the Council advanced the con-
cerns of regions, as some of the Lnder demands were eventually incorporated in the
EU decisions. On the contrary, the autonomous communities in Spain participated
neither in the Council nor in its working groups. The Spanish government did not
defend regional interests in part because the autonomous communities, in contrast to
the Lnder, were unable to realize the possibilities implicit in a revision of the Directive
and to articulate a common set of preferences. As a matter of fact, the passivity of the
Spanish regions on audiovisual affairs did not change until Miert made public his
intention to cap the effectiveness of the Protocol. In this respect, the Spanish regions
benefited from the Lnders interest representation efforts because both adamantly
defended public channels, even though in all other respects the liberal approach of the
Lnder opposed the Basque interventionist agenda. The Lnder and the Basque Coun-
try opposed each other regarding issues where the PNV pleaded for an intense EU
regulation, mindful of the specific problems that minority languages often experience.
Such a strategy equals to demanding a Teilhaberecht, or a right to receive differentiated
treatment according to the right-holders specific circumstances (Forsthoff 1954:
34-36), which is what regulations setting up quotas for minority languages rather than
for productions in all European languages would entail. In contrast, the Lnder and the
Basque Country coincided on issues like staunch support for public broadcasting be-
cause they implied an Ausgrenzungsrecht, or a right to fend off the regional powers, and
set limits to the competences of the Commission.
The evidence collected hitherto strongly supports my hypothesis that regions make
impacts on EU outputs only if coordination mechanisms provide them with actual
access to intra-state channels of interest representation, such as presence in the Council.
This level of access depends on the rules coordination mechanisms establishing the
institutional setting and the mode of interaction. In Germany, the provisions contained
in Article 23 and long-established practices defined an institutional setting that can best
be classified as joint decision. As a result, the Lnder had an incentive to collaborate in
the sector conferences and in the Bundesrat with the objective of formulating an agenda
and subsequently voicing that agenda in the Council. In addition, the mode of inter-
action consensual decision-making contributed in all occasions to the definition of
91
common regional positions. All this, of course, is facilitated by solidarity as a mode of
interaction orientation; the Lnder have collaborated on media issues since the 1950s.
In contrast, in Spain coordination mechanisms have created hurdles to any collabora-
tion among regions because they demand from autonomous communities a unani-
mously defined common regional position, which then must be confirmed by the
central government. These taxing conditions differ clearly from the German system,
and strongly suggest that coordination mechanisms in Spain do not grant regions access
to intra-state channels of interest representation. These difficulties do not only concern
the mode of interaction negotiation according to the unanimity rule , they also affect
the actors cognitive orientations. Spanish regions were unconscious of the implication
of the Directive and uninformed about the attempt to include a broadcasting protocol in
the Amsterdam Treaty. It can be said, then, that regional actors cognitive orientations
do not correspond with the assumption in policy research that actors are capable of
understanding the implication of something like a legislative proposal of the Com-
mission (Scharpf 1997: 62). In addition to the unanimity requirements and a poor
understanding of the issues at stake, the coordination of the Spanish audiovisual policy
had to overcome another hurdle the openly individualistic interaction orientations of
both nationalist and state-wide parties, as demonstrated by the infrequent contacts
between the central and the regional governments. These interaction orientations, to-
gether with coordination mechanisms, explain Spanish regions lack of access to intra-
state channels, the absence of their demands from the discussions in the Council and of
topics like the broadcasting protocol. In spite of the passivity of both Euskadi and
Valencia, some differences between the two Spanish regions are apparent, namely the
dominance of nationalist parties in the case of the Basque Country and of state-wide
parties in the case of Valencia. These findings differ greatly from Brzels character-
ization of Spanish federalism as cooperative. The implications of these differences for
regions extra-state interest representation efforts will be examined in the next chapter.
92
Chapter 4:
The Defence of Regional Audiovisual Agendas
According to conventional wisdom, regional extra-state lobbying should be mostly
ineffective when it comes to audiovisual policy. This is because of the extraordinary
difficulty of combining the disparate concerns of regions whose vernacular languages
are spoken by only a few hundred thousands with those of countries with languages like
English or German which are spoken by millions. Moreover, television is a central
element of member states and regions public spheres, influencing a whole range of
issues from minority languages to national identity. In addition to the above political
complications, a policy targeting such a booming sector as audiovisual policy is bound
to demand attention from actors with extremely diverse ideas on the ideal outlook of the
European audiovisual sector. For instance, protectionist measures, such as quotas, draw
heavy fire from major lobbies like the American Motion Picture Association (Krebber
2002: 153-154). For the Committee of the Regions (CoR) to appear as a unitary actor on
audiovisual matters seems almost impossible because regions divide themselves
among dirigistes and liberals, just like member states in the Council. However, the
multiplicity of agendas and issues at stake has also had positive effects for some
regions, allowing the possibility of identifying allies not only in the Council and the
Commission, but also in the EP. In this maze of interests, regions with both liberal and
interventionist agendas may find allies among member states and European institu-
tions.
In this chapter I argue that coordination mechanisms in some member states help
certain regions to achieve impacts on EU decisions, not only through intra-state but also
through extra-state channels. This suggests that the distinction made in the literature
between both types of channels is misleading because access to intra-state channels like
presence in the Council, which is regulated by coordination mechanisms, bears de-
cisively on the outcomes of resorting to extra-state channels. In order to advance this
argument, I compare regions extra-state interest representation efforts regarding the
same decisions analysed in the preceding chapter. This chapters three sections focus
successively on regional interest representation in the CoR and on their contacts with
the Commission and the European Parliament.
Majority versus Minority Cultures in the CoR
Over the last five years, the CoR has enacted approximately twenty opinions on audio-
visual policy. In these documents, the CoR has uncompromisingly defended public
broadcasting and made clear its support for the European regional audiovisual sector,
but it has also adopted contradictory views on quotas, advertisement, and major sport-
93
ing events. This has not been the only complication; on several occasions, including
during the revision of the Directive, the CoR has failed to issue its audiovisual policy
opinions in a timely manner (1997 d).
1
Still, the CoR agreed with the Directive in
subsequent opinions and resolutions, such as the draft by the Basque representative
Jos Maria Muoa on the implementation of the Directive (2003 d), and has also
enacted an opinion on MEDIA (2000 e). Here I will use these opinions to analyse the
regions agenda on broadcasting and film. After examining the main characteristics of
the CoRs participation in audiovisual policy, the section addresses successively its
opinions on the Directive, public broadcasting, and MEDIA.
The Television Directive
Most European regions have backed the attempt to create a European television market
as embodied by the Television Directive, but have nonetheless become divided over
issues of quotas, advertising, and major sporting events (2003 d: 1.2, 2004 c: 1.7). To be
more specific, the Directive encompasses a number of legal protectionist instruments
that the majority of the CoR members have considered beneficial to regional public
broadcasters and audiovisual companies in an era of market liberalization, but such
protectionist instruments have been resisted due to their dirigiste character by some
regions, fundamentally the Lnder. In order to highlight the diverging views that CoR
members hold with respect to the Directive, in the next paragraphs I discuss in some
detail the views on quotas, advertising, and sporting events contained in one CoR
opinion drafted by the representative of the Basque Country, and in another proposed by
the member for the Rhineland-Palatinate (2003 d, 2004 b). These documents are the
most elaborate expressions of the CoRs views on the subject and are emblematic of the
differences between minority regions and other actors.

The Basque representative Muoa acted as the rapporteur of the opinion on the
Fourth Commissions Report on the application of the Directive in 2003. In its draft
version, Muoa included a recommendation to maintain the quotas both for European
works and for independent productions in the future, and to keep advertisement limits
and the list of major sporting events (2003 d: 2.3, 2.7, 1.8). Interestingly, it was the
representative of the Rhineland-Palatinate, Dieter Schiffmann, who introduced all of
the proposed amendments to Muoas text during the committee work; the amend-
ments targeted the three elements I mentioned in addition to the financing of regional
broadcasters (2003 b). While the commission of the CoR adopted compromise amend-
ments on advertising, finance, and sporting events, Muoas recommendation to main-
tain quotas remained unaltered. In view of this unsatisfactory situation, the Bavarian
and other German representatives introduced further amendments aimed at suppressing
quotas, while the draft opinion continued under discussion in the plenary (2003 e).
1 Unless otherwise indicated, citations refer to documents whose author is the Committee of the
Regions.
94
Nonetheless, the outline that Muoa presented was adopted unanimously by the Plen-
ary without major modifications (2003 d).
One year later, Schiffmann drafted the next opinion of the CoR on audiovisual policy
(2004 c). In his outline, Schiffmann suggested that European institutions should aban-
don the quota system and reinforce the mechanisms supporting the production and
distribution of European audiovisual works:
Further consideration should be given to promoting European cinema and tele-
vision films not, as now, under the quota arrangements set out in Articles 4 und 5 of
the TVWF directive, but rather by providing more backing to production and
distribution through support programmes, (2.12).
On this occasion, Muoa was the only member who introduced amendments, even
though the Basque representative did not try to prevent the German member from
criticizing the quota system. Instead, Muoa proposed to change Article 2.12 through
the inclusion of a reference to the development of a specific support programme for
works of production and distribution (of audiovisual works, AML) of a regional nature
and/or using different European languages (2004 a). His amendments were incorp-
orated into the opinion in part because Muoa wisely refrained from directly chal-
lenging Schiffmanns suggestion against quotas.
Similarly, the differences between the Basque and the German regions were re-
flected in the negotiations of advertising regulations. In the opinion drafted by Muoa,
the CoR welcomed the Commissions determination to maintain the existing quanti-
tative advertising limits (2003 d: 1.14-1.15). Furthermore, Muoa included in his draft
a call for the Commission to regulate new forms of advertising linked to digital tele-
vision. In contrast, the CoR opinion drafted one year later by Schiffmann recommended
that the Commission relax quantitative rules on advertising in order to increase effi-
ciency and reduce red tape (2.5).
Early on, the CoR viewed positively the consideration of a third controversial
element, namely, the regulation of major sporting events. Since the conflict perfectly
exemplifies the clash between liberals and dirigistes, I will discuss the different pos-
itions in greater detail. The CoR was a late-comer to the debate on the transmission of
major sporting events. As the concept was introduced in the Directive during its second
reading in the EP in late 1996, it was too late to bring any influence to bear in this area
by issuing an opinion as the CoR later realized (1997 b: 4). Nevertheless, a resolution
was prepared, which called upon members to use the opportunity granted by the Dir-
ective to draft their lists of major sporting events in collaboration with the regions,
which the plenary adopted unanimously only a few months after the enactment of the
Directive (1997 d). During the debate, the plenary rejected an amendment introduced
by Edmund Stoiber and six Lnder aimed at suppressing from the resolution a mandate
for member states to compel broadcasters to contribute to the development of national
sports (1997 c, d). Despite the German regions efforts, subsequent opinions from the
CoR have re-endorsed the list of major sporting events, which should be applied by
every Member State as part of the public broadcasting service (1999 b: 3.10.1, 4).
Furthermore, the same opinion on sports broadcasting openly attacked pay-per-view
95
TV channels, proclaiming them a danger to the right of everyone to enjoy sports as a
spectator (3.10.1).
In 2003 Muoa again referred to the list of major sporting events in his draft opinion
on the Directives Fourth Report (2003 a). The final version of the opinion proclaimed
that guaranteeing access to major sporting events for the greatest possible number of
citizens is a fundamental aim. The opinion continues by urging the Member States to
take account of their regional and minority languages when broadcasting () sporting
events, and, insofar as possible, to broadcast such events in those languages for the
regions concerned (2003 d: 2.2). According to the Basque drafters, the ultimate ob-
jective is for regional public broadcasters to be able to gain access to those sporting
events, so that they can be aired in Euskera and other minority languages. Finally,
Muoa included an appeal to European institutions to facilitate regional public chan-
nels access to the EBU (1.7), which traditionally administered a large share of all
sporting events rights in Europe. As usual, the Rhineland-Palatinates position differed
from that of the Basque Country (2003 b). Its representative successfully fought a
compromise amendment referring to the list of major sporting events (see 1.24 of the
opinion).
In contrast, Schiffmanns 2004 draft opinion recognized the importance of sporting
events, framed as part of the right to information, but added that the regulation of
sporting events should be flexible (2004 c: 2.11). The opinion further states that the
CoR underscores its view that the rules for broadcasting of major sporting events on
free-to-air television should be flexible, bearing in mind the specific linguistic features
of each individual country (2.11). The last phrase reflects an amendment by Muoa
calling for the inclusion of a reference to minority languages (2004 a). In brief, the draft
opinions and the amendments thereto give eloquent testimony to the differing agendas
for the Directive that the Basque and German regions held. At the same time, they serve
to illustrate their different perspectives about the relation between the European Union
and cultural autonomy.
State Aid to Public Broadcasting
In contrast to their disputes over the Directive, CoR members have aligned themselves
in staunch defence of regional public channels against the Commissions competition
policy powers. The various regional positions on content regulation discussed above
play no role when the survival of the regional public broadcasting service is at stake;
this is the only single significant point of agreement between liberal and dirigiste
regions. In January 1997, the CoR adopted one of its earliest opinions making a case for
the allocation of funding to public broadcasters. Public channels, the CoR argued,
produce programs addressing regional needs, reflecting regional cultures and enhanc-
ing pluralism (1997 a: 3.1.4). In that same year, member states agreed to include the
Protocol on public broadcasting in the Amsterdam Treaty, but the CoR did not clearly
assert its position on the issue. In part, this failure was a consequence of the Protocols
late inclusion in the Treaty after member states signed it in 1996, although the char-
96
acteristic CoR organizational shortcomings may have also played a part. However, in
subsequent opinions, the CoR reiterated its support for public and, most particularly,
regional public broadcasters, notably in an opinion in the convergence green paper
making explicit for the first time the views of the CoR on public broadcasting (1998 a).
In this document the regional chamber states that, notwithstanding the Commissions
competition policy powers, the Treaty and Protocol recognize the capacity of regional
governments to finance broadcasters offering a service of general interest. The rap-
porteurs Risto Koivisto and Nash argued in favour of multiple public broadcasting and
licensing systems in order to better satisfy citizen demands (1998 a: 23.1).
Since early on, the CoR managed to adopt a firm position on the interpretation of the
Protocol due to the leading role played by Schiffmann. In 1999, following the release of
Mierts paper, the CoR published an opinion rejecting the Commissions plans (1999 a:
2.17-2.20). In this and in a subsequent opinion, Schiffmann drew the Commissions
attention to the passages in the Protocol that exempt public broadcasters from compe-
tition law and recognize the authority of central and regional governments to define the
extent and content of this service (2000 d: 1.14). On the whole, the CoR has maintained
a fiercely supportive and surprisingly coherent position on public broadcasting, re-
gardless of the identity or nationality of the drafters.
MEDIA Programmes
The CoR has had no difficulties in defining a consistent, although somewhat unsub-
stantial, position on the MEDIA programme. This does not necessarily imply that the
CoR has served as a channel to publicize, let alone press forward, the regions views on
the programme. Rather, this coherence may be a consequence of the lack of interest of
influential regions like the Lnder in advancing their MEDIA agenda through the
CoR, and of the uncritical attitude of the remaining regions towards the MEDIA pro-
gramme. As on former occasions, the backgrounds of the rapporteurs are quite telling.
Neither Muoa nor Schiffmann, nor any other CoR members involved in the deci-
sions discussed above, intervened in the discussion of the MEDIA Programme (2000 a,
b, f). This can be understood in light of the fact that none of the above CoR members
represent film-producing regions such as Madrid, Bavaria or Paris, but it is more
puzzling that the CoR charged Susie Kemp, a conservative CoR member, with drafting
a CoR opinion on MEDIA in 2000 and again in 2003 (2000 e, 2003 c). These decisions
are rather surprising in light of the fact that no audiovisual companies are located in
Berkshire, which was Kemps constituency. Furthermore, until drafting the MEDIA
opinions, she had never been involved in audiovisual policy. Still, the Commission for
Culture appointed her simply on the basis of her willingness to prepare a draft of the
CoR opinions. For the next phase of MEDIA (2007-2013), Thedoros Georgkis, the
Greek mayor of Iliopoli, drafted a new CoR opinion on MEDIA (2005). He mentioned
languages with a restricted geographical or linguistic range on three occasions, likely
meaning national languages such as Greek or Portuguese rather than minority regional
languages like Basque or Gaelic. Interestingly, the rapporteur was using the CoR as a
97
channel to advance the interest of a member state in obtaining MEDIA subsidies for
films in Greek.
The CoR opinion on MEDIA fails to make any specific demand regarding the major
elements of the programme, including its linguistic minority component, reflecting the
drafters lack of relevant background (2000 c). On the one hand, the CoR celebrated the
emphasis on minority languages and training measures (2000 c: 1.10 and 1.15). How-
ever, the opinion pointed out a number of shortcomings in the proposed regulation such
as improvements in the recognition of vocational qualifications, support for audio-
visual schools, and for networks of centres of excellence in audiovisual training. Ac-
cording to Kemps explanations, it was an expert on audiovisual training, advising her
during the preparation of the opinion, who brought this topic to her attention. It is also
noteworthy that she praised MEDIAs pledge to boost audiovisual production in terri-
tories with a restricted linguistic area (2000 c: 1.12), even though she later admitted that
the information available to her on how the Commission had implemented MEDIA II
ignored regional languages (April Consortium n.d.; BIPE n.d.).
As far as its reception by EU institutions, the CoR opinions on MEDIA fall far short
of expectations. From the perspective of a regional chamber, the CoR has launched
several interesting proposals such as the recognition of training received in other
member states. However, it has also pushed unrealistic goals such as the inauguration of
more MEDIA Antennae (2000 e, 2003 c). Nevertheless, these CoR proposals have all
subsequently gone unnoticed. Given the CoRs traditional emphasis on European re-
gional cultural diversity, acknowledging the Commissions failure to allocate more
funds for production from restricted linguistic areas would have been more appropriate.
The CoRs audiovisual opinions have also failed to have an internal impact among
regional governments. One of the officials charged with audiovisual policy-making in
the Rhineland-Palatinate admitted that the only thing he knew about the CoRs opinion
was that his regions representative, Schiffmann, had been following the issue in the
CoR. The official holding the same position in Schleswig-Holstein simply commented
that the regional executive had received no information on the CoRs audiovisual
activities for the last four years.

It may not appear particularly remarkable that the CoR does not constitute an ad-
equate channel of interest representation for regional audiovisual policy agendas (Benz
and Benz 1995: 261; Christiansen 1997: 65-66; Hooghe and Marks 1996: 76; Jeffery
2002 b: 344; Loughlin 1997: 157-158; Nugent 2003: 345). Nevertheless, the emerging
picture is of a CoR even less influential than expected. If the regions interested in
audiovisual policy like the Rhineland-Palatinate ignore the CoRs opinions, and allow
representatives from local government without relevant audiovisual policy powers to
draft CoR opinions, regions are in effect encouraging the EP and the Council to do the
same.
More interestingly, it seems that the CoRs irrelevance derives not only from other
actors unwillingness to consider its advice, a possibility that I will examine more
carefully later on, but also from its contradictory opinions, which mirror the cleft
separating minority regions from other members. This split in the CoR has thus far gone
98
unmentioned in the literature (Christiansen 1997; Defoort 2002; Farrows and Mc-
Carthy 1997; Goehring 2003; Hnnige and Kaiser 2003; Jeffery 1995, 2002 b; Lough-
lin 1997; Theissen 1996). The internal conflict between liberal and dirigiste regions is,
however, clearly visible. For instance, the CoR enacted an opinion supporting quotas,
and a few months later issued a second one demanding their suppression; this was also
the case with the opinions drafted by Muoa and Schiffmann (2003 d: 2.3, 2004 c:
2.12). This kind of erratic activity has provided ammunition to those individuals and
European institutions reluctant to take the CoR seriously. Ironically, the CoR opinions
on MEDIA were consistent, but in part because they were perceived as both uncon-
troversial, at least as far as public broadcasting was concerned, and irrelevant.
Lobbying a Fragmented Commission
For several reasons, the Commission should have been the target of regional audio-
visual lobbying. The European executive is responsible for launching most European
audiovisual policy initiatives, including the Television Directive and the MEDIA pro-
gramme, as well as enacting competition legislation and monitoring its enforcement.
However, regions have rarely used the Commission as a channel of interest represen-
tation (Theiler 2005: 90). The reasons for this lie both in the diverging regional agendas
and in the direct opposition between the preferences of regions and of some influential
DGs. In order to explore these issues further, this section examines the divergent
positions on the Directive, public broadcasting and MEDIA adopted by the different
Commissioners as well as the disagreements between them and the regions.
The Television Directive
The Commission and the regions shared only a limited number of preferences regarding
the Directive. This may explain the limited contacts between the EC and the regions,
but it may also result from the inability of both the supranational and the third level of
government to behave as a unitary actor during the revision of the Directive. For
instance, when the Commission published its proposal for a revised directive in 1995,
thirteen of the eighteen members of the College of Commissioners voted in favour of
reinforcing quotas by eliminating the clause where practicable in order to make them
a legally binding element of the Directive. This upgrading was part of the proposal
presented by Marcelino Oreja, a Spaniard and a member of the PP, who was at the time
the Commissioner at DG Audiovisual (Krebber 2002: 152). The Commission was not
in fact a fervent supporter of legally binding quotas, but the commissioners likely
agreed to reinforce quotas in order to obtain a bargaining chip to be exchanged sub-
sequently during the negotiations with the Council, as Daniel Krebber, the author of the
most detailed study of the Directive, has suggested (2002: 155).
In contrast to the dirigiste efforts to introduce quotas, the 1995 Commissions pro-
posal liberalized some elements of the advertising regulation. The Commissioners
99
advocated an increase in the maximal length of daily tele-shopping windows in order to
boost the broadcasters capacity to attract revenue (Krebber 2002: 135). In doing this,
the position of the Commission came closer to the Lnders preference for an expansion
in daily tele-shopping time, but clashed with that of the German public channels ARD
and ZDF and of the Basque government, as they do not rely on advertising to raise funds
(Bundesrat 1998 a: 2). Moreover, the Commission also maintained a similarly liberal
attitude with respect to the frequency and daily amount of advertising time, a decision
that public televisions likewise contested (Krebber 2002: 136-137).
The Commission also supported the list of major European sporting events, despite
internal divisions on this issue. With the EP about to vote on the amendment, Oreja
addressed the Plenary session with the following words: I have noted the European
Parliaments sensitivity to this subject and you can rest assured that I shall be raising
this subject before the Commission, I will be letting them know the feelings which this
House has expressed.
2
In pronouncing these words, Oreja publicly endorsed the
amendment without having previously obtained the remaining Commissioners con-
sent. In this way he was able to avoid subsequent difficulties with his colleagues in DG
Competition who were sceptical about the major sporting events list (Krebber 2002:
143).
Orejas position on the sponsorship of the list of major sporting events was consist-
ent with the Commissions prior protective approach to public channels. In the early
1990s, the European executive had supported public broadcasters and the EBU in the
conflict over sports transmission rights by declaring that these were part of the public
channels remit and a precondition for their success as providers of a public service
(Zeller 1999: 206, 212).
3
At the same time, by backing the list of major sporting events,
Commissioner Oreja was also reinforcing the position of his party, the PP, and of the
Aznar government, which at the time intended to deprive PRISA of football broad-
casting rights (see the section on Spain in the previous chapter).
The Lnder made an attempt to present their views on the Directive to the Com-
mission despite important divergences between their position and those of some DGs.
These differences were related to the upgrading of quotas proposed by the Commission
and the fiercely contested list of major sporting events. Contacts not only with the DG
Audiovisual but also with German members of the Commission were delegated to a
Bavarian official charged with speaking on behalf of all Lnder. In this way, they were
able to reduce the costs of a lobbying operation, which the German regions anticipated
would yield scant results. In contrast to the Lnder, the Spanish regional governments
failed to maintain even minimal contact with the Commission, nor were they able to
maintain contact among each other during the negotiation of the Directive. According
to the former chair of FORTA, the Spanish regional broadcasters association, the
channels of the autonomous communities believed that the statute transposing the
2 See his intervention in the plenary on 12 November 1996.
3 EU-Commission decisions 11 June 1993.
100
Directive into Spanish law could exempt the regional broadcasters from its applica-
tion.
4
In short, the autonomous communities were unable to make the case for either
compulsory quotas, quotas for minority languages, or a list of major sporting events. In
contrast, the Lnder attempted to contact the Commission with joint demands on behalf
of the common regional position, even if only to confirm that the space for collaboration
was limited.
State Aid to Public Broadcasting
The inclusion of the Protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty represented the most significant
development on competition policy and broadcasting in the 1990s. To a significant
extent, this success for public television is attributable to the Lnder and their TV
channels. Together with Belgian regions and the EBU, they set up a group called
Friends of the Protocol that orchestrated a strategy to lobby the Commission, which
initially opposed the Protocols inclusion in the Treaty. The privileged access to the
Council that German and Belgian regions enjoyed, and the hostile attitude of the
European Union executive towards the inclusion of the Protocol, suggests that for the
Lnder, obtaining the support of the Commission was a secondary strategy. Indeed, it
would have been unwise for the German regions to concentrate their efforts on lobbying
this institution, because insofar as the regions strove to curb the Commissions com-
petition policy powers, lobbying its DG Competition could only be a subsidiary strat-
egy for obtaining the support of member states. Instead, the Lnder and their TV
channels concentrated on shaping the position of member states and on placing the text
for the Protocol on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The
Rhineland-Palatinate, which was the representative of the German regions in the IGC,
allegedly played an important role in shaping the tenor of the future Protocol, previ-
ously agreed upon by public TV channels represented in the EBU here. In addition to
placing the Protocol on the IGC agenda, the Lnder strove for the support of a large
number of member states in order to overcome the resistance of the Commission, which
could hardly oppose the Protocol if numerous member states supported it. In contrast to
the Lnder, the Spanish regions and their public TVs were not among the early sup-
porters of the Protocol, unlike the state-wide channel RTVE. As indicated in chapter
three, the autonomous communities are not EBU members and were therefore not
informed about the negotiation of the Protocol.
In contrast, Mierts discussion paper provoked a strong response not only from the
Lnder but also from the autonomous communities. The position of DG Competition
was harshly condemned by the Bavarian position, which, as the representative of all
4 See Las autonmicas no se ven afectadas por la directiva europea de televisin, El Pas, 1 Februar
1991. This state of uncertainty continued until 1994 when Spain became the last member-state to
transpose the Directive into a law binding state-wide as well as regional channels (Ley 15/1994
relativa al ejercicio de actividades de Radiodifusin Televisiva.). The origin of the regions spec-
ulations is exemption for local television channels not connected to state-wide networks from
fulfilling the quotas (Art. 9 of the Directive).
101
Lnder, defended the common regional position enacted by the federal chamber.
Mierts paper received more moderate criticism from the FORTA, which advanced the
views of the less self-confident autonomous communities. Such a lobbying effort had
similar aims, but was separate from the efforts conducted by the Spanish central gov-
ernment. However, the attempts by the FORTA to contact the Commission did not
exclude an encounter between the Catalan PM and the regional television director with
the Commission in which the contribution of regional TV to the preservation of the
regional vernacular was underlined. According to Jordi Vilajoana, the former director
of the Catalan broadcasting company, there was an agreement between the regional
broadcasters establishing the freedom of every channel to defend public broadcasting
by any other means apart from presenting the paper prepared by FORTA to the Com-
mission. Regarding the results of these contacts, Vilajoanas impression was that DG
Audiovisual was receptive to Catalan demands. However, a high ranking official em-
ployed at the Valencian TV contested this. However limited in their scope, the activities
of the Spanish regions against Mierts paper stand out against their passivity during the
negotiation of the Protocol.
In sum, by concentrating their energies on using domestic channels to gain access to
the Council, the Lnder were able to impose the Protocol on a reluctant Commission
and thwart Mierts plans. Conversely, the Spanish constituent units only contacted the
Commission long after the enactment of the Protocol, as Mierts plans threatened to
reduce its efficacy.
MEDIA
Neither the German nor the Spanish regions lobbied the Commission over the MEDIA
programme, but both the Spanish and German regions refrained from doing so for very
different reasons. The Lnder have represented Germany in the MEDIA committee
since the 1990s, where they were successful in advancing their agenda before the other
member states without relying on the Commission. Because of this, MEDIA closely
reflected the interests of the Lnder. As explained above, the Lnder were satisfied with
MEDIA because it focuses on production, training, and distribution, while its decen-
tralized structure includes regional elements and support for small and medium enter-
prises. For the Spanish regions the situation was, however, completely different. The
Spanish representation in the MEDIA committee did not include a regional official
until 2004. At any rate, Spanish regions reacted to these issues in a less positive and
internally more differentiated fashion. As discussed above, the Basque executive wel-
comed MEDIA, not because of money, but because of the programmes recognition of
minority languages. It has not, however, tried to influence its regulation. Similarly, the
Valencian government efforts to lobby the Commission have not hitherto referred to
MEDIA, although the regional producers have expressed their interest to the central
government in the inauguration of an Antenna or MEDIA local office in the region.
An additional reason why the Lnder have accorded more attention to MEDIA than
the Spanish autonomous communities have is that the Commission has reduced the
102
potential appeal of the programme for minority regions. It has ignored the provisions in
the MEDIA regulation favouring languages from restricted areas, in a way which
appears to be characteristic of the Commissions practice in general. For instance, the
Commissions reports on MEDIA analyse the effects of the programme on audiovisual
production in small member states like Greece, but not on regions with minority lan-
guages (BIPE n.d.). This way of evaluating MEDIA reflects the fact that the Com-
mission merely sees the programme as an instrument for promoting audiovisual pro-
duction in member states; according attention to productions in minority languages
would only exacerbate the already considerable difficulties of distributing European
audiovisual works beyond their country of origin. Against this background, the lin-
guistic aspects of MEDIA do not hold more than secondary importance for the Com-
mission.

The regions have not primarily targeted the Commission in their efforts to shape
audiovisual policy. Instead, the Lnder have tried to make the most out of their access to
the Council and to the MEDIA committee, while the Spanish regions did not pursue
access through any means. These claims require some qualification, however. During
the negotiation of the Protocol, the Lnder maintained contacts with the Commission.
Despite the fact that they could not expect any support from DG Competition, they
nonetheless succeeded. Afterwards, when DG Competition published its discussion
paper, both German and Spanish regions directly approached the European executive,
relying on an ally inside the Commission DG Audiovisual. The next section explores
whether the EP advanced other preferences closer to regional agendas than those of
the Commission, and whether they may have contributed more than the European
executive to a regional impact on audiovisual decisions.
The Defence of Regional Minorities in the EP
The EP has shaped audiovisual policy according to fairly consistent preferences,
mostly coincident with those of minority regions. While the EP does not define the
outlook of the European audiovisual policy on its own but rather decides together with
the Commission and the Council, a number of its distinctive elements, notably the list of
major sporting events, can be traced back to initiatives originating in the Parliament. In
addition to underlining the contribution of the EP to the EU audiovisual policy, it is
necessary to explore the reasons why regional and parliamentary agendas coincide. The
strong commitment of the EP and in particular of its Committee on Culture (CoC) to
cultural pluralism and linguistic minorities explains this overlap better than any re-
gional lobbying of the European Parliament.
To collect evidence on the role of the EP during the negotiation of the Directive, the
protocol and MEDIA, I have relied on the procedure files produced by the European
103
Parliament and on parliamentary debates, which constitute the basis of my discussion.
5
Where necessary, I have supplemented this material with legislative documents of the
Commission and the Council and with testimonies of more than twenty interviewees
including the rapporteurs of the 1989 and 1997 Directive, including the chair, and other
members of the CoC. The section first scrutinizes the composition of the CoC as well as
its positions regarding the Directive. I then analyse the negotiation of the Directive and
comment on the position of the EP regarding public broadcasting and the reform of the
MEDIA programme enacted in 2000.
The Television Directive
Establishing the preferences of the actors involved as well as considering them as
internally fragmented will be useful in understanding the parliamentary stage of the
Directive. In fact, the EP confronts a Commission and a Council that are profoundly
divided on audiovisual policy. Whereas the DGs Competition and Internal Market are
liberalizers and increasingly so, two less influential DGs, Audiovisual and Enterprise,
favour a more interventionist approach, as explained at the opening of the previous
chapter (see also Collins 1995: 92). As mentioned above, since the first Directive,
France and the smaller member states like Belgium, Ireland and Greece have fiercely
defended quotas and other interventionist measures (Krebber 2002: 152). Germany has
opposed any audiovisual policy decision vaguely resembling a regulation of broad-
casting content. This opposition has grown under the pressure of its Lnder to prevent
the encroachment of the EU audiovisual policy upon the Lnders audiovisual powers
and the simultaneous resistance of the federal government to subsidizing other member
states audiovisual industry. For different reasons, the UK and Sweden have maintained
positions similar to the German agenda (Krebber 2002: 152). Spain has traditionally
defended quotas, but it seems that since the arrival of Jos Mara Aznar (PP) as PM in
1996 the Spanish government has relaxed its bargaining stance on this issue, as I
explain below in more detail. During the revision of the Directive most actors defended
the same positions they had occupied ten years earlier.
In May 1995 the EP received from the Commission a proposal for a new Directive to
be negotiated according to co-decision. It is during this legislative procedure that the EP
is most powerful, as its authority is akin to the Commissions or the Councils (Nugent
2003: 200, 203). Under co-decision, the EP committee in charge amends the Com-
missions proposal as a step previous to a discussion of the changes in the plenary
(Art. 251 TEC). After this first reading, if either the Commission or the Council does
not accept the amendments adopted by the chamber, the text goes back to the EP for a
second time and, if necessary, to a trilateral conciliation committee composed of the EP,
5 Procedures files are available from the EPs Legislative Observatory at http://www.europarl.eu.int/
oeil/index.jsp. The plenary debates held after April 1996 are part of the digital Archive of Activities
of the EP and may be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/calendar/calendar?
APP=CRE&amp;LANGUE=EN&ARG=titre&TITRE=yes&LEG=L4 (accessed November
2009).
104
the Commission, and the Council. For the parliamentary stage of the Directive, the
chamber assigned the report to the Committee on Culture (CoC). As in other legislative
procedures, the committee and the rapporteur in charge, whose outlooks I analyse
successively, wield significant influence (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003: 344).
A directive including compulsory quotas had been a long-time project of the Party of
European Socialists (PES) and, more specifically, of the Eurocommunists. Thus, the
CoC, controlled by the PES, wanted a Directive with compulsory quotas, but its Euro-
pean Peoples Party (EPP) rapporteurs either opposed them (Karsten Hoppenstedt) or
had an ambivalent position (Gerardo Galeote). In fact, Italian and French leftist MEPs
had unsuccessfully tried to push for compulsory quotas in the 1980s; their objective was
to combine a single European television market with cultural pluralism. A member of
the PES, Roberto Barzanti, who had drafted the report on the first Directive and acted as
a shadow reporter to Hoppenstedt and Galeote, personifies the continuity of the project.
According to him, the PES tried to use its majority in the CoC to align the Directive back
with the PES original leftist agenda. Previously, the PES had used its clout in the CoC
to appoint Luciana Castellina as its chair. She was a former member of the Partito
Comunista Italiano who had close contacts with film studios, actors, and artists. In the
plenary, Castellina argued that the version of the Directive as amended by the CoC
specifically provides for measures designed to create that European market, so that
imagination, vision, and personalities of our children and grandchildren are not left
diminished.
6
This line of argumentation was accompanied by fierce criticism of Hol-
lywood and, more generally, of the United States, and became unabashedly populist in
the following years. This colourful personality was, however, not the only prominent
PES member of the CoC. In addition to Barzanti and Castellina, the PES was also
represented by Corrado Augias, a renowned novelist, among others. Among the French
parliamentarians, we find Nicole Fontaine, who was at the time First Vice-Chairman of
the EP. Additional members committed to audiovisual policy and to public broadcast-
ing were Labour members Philip Whitefield, a film producer, and Carole Tongue, who
served as the Socialist coordinator for the committee and drafted a report in defence of
public broadcasting.
In spite of the prominent role of some leftist MEPs, it would be erroneous to assume
that only PES members and no EPP members favoured an interventionist approach to
the Directive. Like the CoC members from the PES, CoC members from the EPP
opposed the views of the rapporteurs appointed by their own party and favoured com-
pulsory quotas and other dirigiste measures. Indeed, MEPs from Belgium, Greece, and
Portugal, as well as their governments, had traditionally supported interventionist
measures in order to advance either their language policies or their weak audiovisual
industries. For instance, Helena M. Vaz da Silva, an influential journalist and a former
employee of the Portuguese public broadcaster Rdio e Televiso de Portugal, was a
respected conservative member of the committee. Another writer and conservative
member was the Greek MEP Katerina Daskalaki. Daniel Fret, a Walloon from the far
6 See her intervention in the plenary on the 12th of November 1996. The Internet edition of The
Observer cited Castellina as having said that The child's imagination is just Disney because that is
what he watches, 25 February 2000.
105
right, wanted a more interventionist approach, as did the Belgian federal and regional
governments. The Italian delegation also included right-leaning members equally
prone to anti-Americanism, such as Umberto Bossi. In any case, the CoC encompassed
individuals with extremely different backgrounds who advanced a joint vision of
European culture, albeit one characterized by its fierce opposition to the U.S. culture
industry.
However, the differences between the CoC and the Hoppenstedt-Galeote duo were
not much deeper than those between the rapporteurs. Their backgrounds and agendas
leave little doubt as to the diversity of their concerns. The German CDU member was in
his third parliamentary term, and had already accumulated ten years of experience in
broadcasting from his involvement with the German public channels, his rapporteur-
ship on the first MEDIA programme, and several EP reports on satellite telecommu-
nications. In the late 1990s, his main preoccupation was the reinforcement of the
European audiovisual sector in order to make it capable of competing with the United
States and Japan. In fact, Hoppenstedt had a strong interest in technological develop-
ment and defended the installation of an anti-violence chip in European TV sets. In a
personal interview, he argued that quotas, and in particular quotas supporting minority
languages, would have overburdened the Directive.
In contrast, Galeote, the Spanish rapporteur and PP member, was a newcomer to the
EP and to audiovisual policy. In part to justify his appointment as a rapporteur, Galeote
alleged that compulsory quotas could have had repercussions for the access of Spanish
films to the American market. However, the stated political rationale behind Galeotes
involvement in the Directive seems dubious because his background as a lawyer and
university lecturer presumably did not qualify him for drafting a technical and con-
troversial report on television broadcasting (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003: 343, 349).
Another intriguing aspect of Galeotes involvement in the Directive is that obtaining
such an important rapporteurship as the Directive likely required the investment of
abundant resources from both the Spanish PP and the EPP. Although Galeote did not
mention this topic, he probably had been placed as a rapporteur by the Spanish PP in
order to promote the introduction of a list of major sporting events. As the discussion of
the Spanish agenda for the reform of Directive has made clear, during the negotiation of
the Directive in Brussels, the PP was trying to pass a broadcasting act in Spain. Among
other things, this rule forbade Canal+, the pay-per-view TV channel owned by PRISA,
a centre-left media group, from limiting the transmission of football only to subscribed
viewers. A directive including such a list would have legitimized an undertaking that
the Spanish public perceived with a good deal of suspicion.
Rapporteurs contacts with regions are particularly relevant in the present context.
As suggested above, these were neither abundant nor successful. Hoppenstedt even
affirmed that the CoR had not been established at that time. Likewise, Galeote argued
that the autonomous communities were not interested in the Directive and that
minority languages were not part of the debate. In spite of the implications of the
Directive for the regions in Spain, Galeote did not maintain contacts with the PNV
related to the Directive. Conversely, the Basque representative in the CoR commented:
We did not deem it feasible to change things. Discussions with Mr. Galeote are not
106
easy. In any event, Galeotes comments made it clear that the Spanish government was
only interested in defending Spanish quotas, but not in introducing minority quotas
beneficial to the other official languages like Basque or Catalan. Indeed, the PP gov-
ernment would most likely have been ready to forsake all quotas in exchange for
funding of the Spanish film industry. And even this strategy may have merely been an
alibi for the use of the EP as a platform to pursue PP party interests, namely, the fight
against PRISA.
In contradiction to Galeote, Barzanti and other MEPs declared that the CoC did
discuss the implications of both the first and the second Directive for minority lan-
guages. Apparently, this was a consequence of Barzantis support who, being a member
of the Committee of Legal Affairs, had already backed a Parliament declaration de-
manding improved status for Catalan in the European Union (European Parliament
1990), and of the efforts of MEPs with Catalan backgrounds like Josep Verde Aldea,
Joan Colom i Nadal, and Antonio Gutirrez. A number of amendments in fact confirm
the relevance of the topic for the CoC and, to a lesser extent, for the EP. Some of them
dealt with the situation of smaller member states official languages, but they could
only benefit indirectly from regional minority languages. For instance, an amendment
was introduced compelling the Commission to monitor the fulfilling of quotas in
member states with a restricted language area (European Parliament 1996 a: am 33,
1996 b: am 25). Another example of the CoCs dedication to linguistic minorities is that
in the first reading the EP amended the text to refer explicitly to regional broadcasters
(European Parliament 1996 a: am 51). Furthermore, in the second reading the CoC still
insisted on the recognition of member states autonomy to use broadcasting in their
pursuit of language policy goals (European Parliament 1996 b: am 18). In this second
reading, the CoC established and the plenary modified the definition of independent
producers in order to facilitate the broadcasting of productions in minority languages
(European Parliament 1996 b: am 28 to art 1). In short, without dominating the debate
on the Directive, minority languages received a considerable amount of sympathetic
attention from the EP, and the CoC in particular.

During the parliamentary stage of the Directive, the defence of minority preferences
assumed by the CoC set this body apart from the interventions of the rapporteurs and the
liberalizing amendments imposed by the Commission and the Council. In fact, the
disparity between the agendas of the rapporteurs and those of the CoC is crucial to
understanding the final contents of the Directive. In the EP, rapporteurs must acquiesce
to those opinions that emerge as predominant in their committee if they do not want to
see their report modified by their peers. Even though the preceding fact is widely
acknowledged (Corbett, Jacobs et al 2000: 120), the drafters of the report on the
Directive, Karsten Hoppenstedt and Eduardo Galeote, failed to tailor their report to the
preferences of the CoC. In response, the CoC thoroughly altered the document by
introducing 225 amendments. Accordingly, Hoppenstedt and Galeote prompted their
parliamentary group, the EPP, to remove the amendments during its discussion in the
plenary meeting, reverting the report to its original state before its submission to the
Council (European Parliament). While in his first intervention in the plenary Hoppen-
107
stedt spoke of how the Directive could increase the competitiveness of the industry,
Castellina advocated quotas in order to ensure that a liberalised market would not
abolish the right of European cultures to be represented on screen (Europisches Par-
lament 1996: 104). Nonetheless, the EP in the first reading gave its support to the CoC
rather than to the rapporteurs or to the Commission, by a vote of 292 to 195, with
twenty-five abstentions. Among other changes, the text modified the Commissions
proposal so as to tighten quotas and restrict advertising. Even though the Commission
and the Council subsequently accepted some of the changes introduced by the Parlia-
ment, they rejected the compulsory quota regulations including legal sanctions and
reinforced limits to advertising (European Parliament 1997).
When the document was delivered to the EP for the second reading, the CoC re-
drafted the directive in order to bring it closer to the version that was first discussed in
the plenary. To be more precise, the PSE majority in the CoC once more amended the
common position of the Council to re-introduce compulsory quotas with legal sanc-
tions, restrictions on advertising time, and the list of major sporting events. Again, the
CoC adopted a report that was opposed to the rapporteurs preferences. In the plenary,
Oreja announced that among the changes proposed by the CoC, the Commission was
ready to accept the list of major sporting events and the compulsory quotas, but that it
intended to reject the financial sanctions for broadcasters failing to fulfil such quotas, as
well as the restrictions on advertising and teleshopping.
7
Eventually, this second at-
tempt of the CoC fell short when the plenary changed its position on the second reading
in the final stages of the negotiation. This time, the plenary failed to confirm the CoC
amendments re-introducing compulsory quotas, and aligned itself with the Commis-
sion and the Council. What resulted was the final omission of compulsory quotas from
the parliamentary decision forwarded to the Council. This and other changes permitted
sceptical member states like Germany and the UK to reluctantly accept non-binding
quotas with the where practicable phrasing and a diluted version of the major sporting
events list. Despite these significant setbacks, the EP still managed to retain the refer-
ence to financial penalties against broadcasters violating quotas and the CoCs call for
guaranteed access to major sporting events. All in all, the EP maintained non-binding
quotas, some moderate advertising restrictions, and a list of major sporting events, as
displayed in Figure 4. If on second reading the plenary had resisted the pressure from
member states with liberal approaches to audiovisual policy, the CoC would have
succeed in introducing further amendments favourable to regions.

During the negotiation of the Directive, the EP did advance the agenda of regional
minorities, but it failed to attract the required number of MEPs to obtain a majority for
its report in the second reading. Hence, for regions and for the CoC, the balance of the
negotiation was a mixed one the parliamentary stage allowed MEPs to include
amendments and intervene in the plenary defending compulsory quotas, minority lan-
guages, and public broadcasting, but they only obtained a fraction of their requests. If a
7 See debate on the 12 November 1996.
108
few minority-friendly elements of the Directive did survive its reform, linguistic mi-
norities had the EP and, in particular, the CoC to thank.
State Aid to Public Broadcasting
The EP has traditionally adopted steadfast resolutions on public TV channels as guar-
antors of cultural pluralism and minority rights. In its position on state aid to public
channels, the EP has combined its views on these two topics and uncompromisingly
defended minority access to media and public broadcasters. Unfortunately for regions,
it is the Commission, not the EP, which dominates European competition policy.
In documents defending public broadcasting, the EP was successful in modifying
EU audiovisual decisions to emphasize the role that public broadcasters play in fos-
tering cultural pluralism. The most resounding EP decision regarding public broad-
casting was a 1996 resolution, based on a report by Carol Tongue, who was at the time
coordinator for the PES on Culture, Media, Sport, Education and Youth (European
Parliament 1996 d). This resolution calls on the Commission and member states to
acknowledge the important role played by public broadcasters and their commitment to
offering a balanced and pluralistic view of European societies (European Parliament
1996 c: 9, 19). Furthermore, the resolution defends free-to-air transmission of major
sporting events, a demand the EP would incorporate one year later in the Directive
(21), and urges the Commission to support the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)in
its joint acquisition of such rights (12). The motion invites public broadcasters to
strengthen their commitment to regional programming and regional employment and
member states to oblige public broadcasters to follow suit (26, 53). Finally, the
document addresses the role of public broadcasters in reflecting regional cultures (E).
At times, the EP has encouraged the Commission to consider both the cultural and the
industrial aspects of audiovisual products in its regulation of state aid to film production
(European Parliament 2002: 9), pleaded for a waiver of competition law for public
broadcasters (European Parliament 2001: 74), and underscored its importance for
cultural pluralism (European Parliament 2004: 17). In sum, the EP has tried to shield
public broadcasters from the competition policy powers of the Commission.
Most likely, among the reasons for the EPs support of public broadcasting, par-
ticularly regarding the list of major sporting events, is its long-standing commitment to
minority languages. As early as 1981, the European Parliament asked member states
and their regions to guarantee regional languages access to television and to provide
locals with adequate audiovisual training (European Parliament 1981: 1). A few years
later, the Kuijpers resolution extended this demand to commercial broadcasters and
asked member states to guarantee the continuity and effectiveness of broadcasts in
regional and minority languages (European Parliament 1987: 7). Later, in its
resolution on regional and cultural minorities, the EP supported the regional public
medias adaptation to digital technological standards (European Parliament 1994:
10.d). Furthermore, the EP has acknowledged the importance of public television in
facilitating the access of minority languages to the media (European Parliament 1996 c,
109
E, N, O, R, 53).
8
More specifically, by stating that the protection of minority cultures
requires a waiving of the competition law for public broadcasters, the EP has voiced
demands from the Basque and other minority regions. The EP has both defended public
broadcasting and highlighted the necessity of using public televisions to protect lin-
guistic pluralism and regional cultures in Europe.
MEDIA Plus and MEDIA Training
The parliamentary stage of decision-making on MEDIA II (1996-2000) and on MEDIA
Plus (2001-2006) allowed the EP to take up some issues of regional significance to film
promotion. As on other occasions, the discussion provided certain MEPs with an
opportunity to publicize the audiovisual policy demands of their respective regions and
minority cultures. Ultimately, the chamber introduced changes in both programmes
parallel to those demanded by the CoR and by minority regions.
The efforts of the EP to regionalize MEDIA had already characterized the negoti-
ation of MEDIA II. From the viewpoint of linguistic minorities, the main change
introduced in MEDIA II was to declare the audiovisual development of regions with a
restricted linguistic area as one of the key aims of the programme. The EP can claim
credit for having introduced the term region into the body of the legislative proposal
(European Council 1995 a, art 1; European Council 1995 b, art 2.2). Apart from this, the
EP, and subsequently the Council, amended the Commissions proposal to underscore
the regional and linguistic minority aspects of MEDIA, and to apply positive discrim-
ination to applicants from smaller member states and regions with restricted linguistic
areas. It may be seen as impressionistic evidence of the preceding to count the number
of occasions in which the European institutions use the terms regions, language, and
linguistic area in its documents. Whereas in its proposals for MEDIA II the Commis-
sion uses these words on seven occasions, in the EP resolution they are used over thirty
times, and over twenty times in the final decisions enacted by the Council.
9
Among the
changes proposed by the EP, those related to training eventually had more of an impact
on the final decisions than those related to development and distribution, as a DG
Audiovisual Commissioner, Viviane Redding, acknowledged years later.
10
This en-
hanced impact on training has come about because the EP, since the Amsterdam Treaty,
has decided on training primarily by co-decision, a procedure through which the EP
exerts more influence than through cooperation.
During the 2000 reform of the programme, some important amendments focusing on
minority languages tabled in the plenary by one of the political groups, most probably
by the Greens or the European Free Alliance, were rejected by the Commission. In the
8 Calls on Member States to place obligations in broadcasting laws on PSB channels to provide
regional programming in order that regional diversity and identity are protected and enhanced
(Point 53 of the Resolution).
9 For the Commission the relevant documents may be found in (European Commission 1995 a, b);
for the EP see (European Parliament 1995 a, b). The final decisions on MEDIA are (European
Council 1995 a, b).
10 See her speech in the plenary on 5 July 2000.
110
plenary, Redding justified her opposition by claiming that the amendment would
create a sub-programme within the programme. Nevertheless, the Commission ac-
cepted, and the Council confirmed, a minor parliamentary amendment, which upgraded
the subvention to audiovisual projects from linguistic restricted areas from 50 percent
to 60 percent of expenses covered by MEDIA. The EP introduced further relevant
changes, such as the establishment of a European Guarantee Fund for film productions
and enhanced support for small and medium enterprises, in spite of scant regional
lobbying of MEPs. The EP had thus advanced the agenda of the minority regions by
turning MEDIA into a programme more attentive to languages with restricted linguistic
areas. This applies to MEDIA Training even more than it does to MEDIA Plus, because
the EP has more influence over MEDIA Training due to its co-decision powers.

The EP has ended up favouring the audiovisual agendas of minority regions like the
Basque Country over those of the Lnder, but not as a result of Basque regional
lobbying. The EP has assumed the concerns of minority regions in the name of cultural
pluralism while minority access to media and public broadcasting have ranked higher in
the EPs agenda than have the liberal approaches to broadcasting and respect for cul-
tural autonomy favoured by the German regions. It has thus not been lobbying efforts
but internally defined preferences that have brought the EP closer to the Basque au-
thorities than to the German regional governments.
Conclusions
The EP has advanced the regional audiovisual agendas in the European arena with a
greater degree of success, and certainly with more consistency, than the CoR or the
Commission. An important contribution to cultural pluralism and public broadcasting
has resulted from the EPs support of quotas, major sporting events, public broadcasting
and minority access thereto as well as reinforcing MEDIA support for restricted lan-
guage areas. However, it has not been the lobbying efforts of minority regions like the
Basque Country that explain MEDIAs contribution to minority regions access to
television and film. Instead this support stems from two factors internal to the EP. The
first is the commitment of the EP to cultural pluralism and minority languages, which is
particularly pronounced in the CoC. In this body, MEPs concerned with cultural plur-
alism generally and those committed to specific vernaculars like MEPs from Flanders,
Greece or Catalonia come together and have an opportunity to use the significant
powers of the CoC to buttress their agenda and try to marshal the support of the plenary.
The second internal factor is the EPs expanding powers. Whenever the EP holds co-
decision powers, as it did in the revision of the Directive and the extension of MEDIA, it
has successfully advanced some demands from minority regions and achieved add-
itional impacts by publicizing their need to access mass media. Even mere publicity of
linguistic minority demands should be considered positively because, as the section on
the CoR has shown, the CoR has had in effect very scarce visibility. In addition, the
failure of the Basque Country and Catalonia to participate actively in the EU decision-
111
making process has been detrimental to the concerns of linguistic minorities. Although
the EP is not an almighty ally, as its only partial success regarding quotas has shown, its
contributions to plurality in the European audiovisual policy clearly distinguish the EP
from a toothless CoR and a split Commission mostly concerned with the growth of the
European audiovisual industry and ignorant of regional minorities needs.
Apart from the overlap between the agendas of the minority regions and the par-
liament, the other main finding of this audiovisual policy study is that coordination
mechanisms in Germany have helped the Lnder not only to advance their preferences
through domestic channels, but also to increase the effectiveness of their extra-state
interest representation. As a complement to the influence the Lnder wielded in the
Council through coordination mechanisms, the German regions also advanced the
common regional position formulated by the Bundesrat through extra-state channels.
This combination of intra and extra-state strategies allowed them to curb the Com-
missions opposition to the broadcasting Protocol and defeat Mierts paper. In contrast,
the Spanish coordination mechanisms have prevented autonomous communities from
using not only intra- but also extra-state channels and from wielding influence on
audiovisual policy. This is because the institutional setting emphasized negotiations
and unanimity, while strong nationalist parties experienced cognitive difficulties and
were moved by their interaction orientation to adopt individualistic courses of action.
Even more, the agendas of the Spanish regions have remained invisible for other actors
because they have neither influenced the Spanish position in the Council nor managed
to publicize their own agenda through extra-state channels. Thus, not even a nationalist
party like the PNV, after twenty years governing a region, was able compensate for the
lack of adequate coordination between autonomous communities. It should be ac-
knowledged, however, that the strategy of the Lnder was more likely to find resonance
among other actors involved in the European policy-making process than the Basque
strategy. While the Lnder argued in favour of an Ausgrenzungsrecht, a right to defend
their cultural autonomy from the intromissions of DG Competition, an idea close to the
subsidiarity principle recognized by the TEC, the Basque Country pleaded for a higher
intensity of European regulation recognizing linguistic minorities, which would
amount to a Teilhaberecht, or a right to receive differentiated treatment (Forsthoff 1954:
34-36), in such a touchy subject as culture. This strategy multiplied the potential
problems derived from the encroachment of the single market upon the autonomy
cultural or otherwise (Scharpf 1994: 138-153) of member states and regions. Even-
tually, a new Audiovisual Media Services Directive passed in April 2009 modified the
Television Directive in order to ease what the Lnder considered an excessive amount
of regulation. These findings reinforce the main idea advanced in chapter one: it has
been coordination mechanisms and not nationalist parties that have accounted for the
presence or absence of regional concerns in a member states agenda and for a regions
ability to make impacts on EU decisions. The next two chapters aim at ascertaining
whether the same two variables coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties
bear similarly on regions ability to shape cohesion policy.
112
Chapter 5:
Defining the Agenda for the 1999 Cohesion Policy Reform
The reform of structural policy approved in 1999 has been tremendously significant for
European politics. The potential results of such a major overhaul have commanded the
attention of all European institutions, member states, and regional governments. The
reason for such continent-wide interest is the large amount of money at stake: 213
billion Euros for the programming period 2000-2006, as well as the link between
cohesion policy reforms, modifications in agricultural policy, decisions on enlarge-
ment, and the approval of financial perspectives (European Council 1999 b). The
prominent role of cohesion policy in the history of European integration makes this
field particularly appropriate for observing coordination mechanisms. Virtually every
European region is motivated to use every available strategy to press forward its co-
hesion policy agenda.
The frantic activity in regions that emerged over the allocation of structural funds has
attracted considerable academic attention. Scholars with various interests have used the
field to test their hypotheses on a myriad of issues, including multilevel decision-
making processes (Hooghe 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001 a; Marks 1993, 1997), the
role of institutions for policy responses to economic crises (Anderson 1992), the sig-
nificance of networks for decision-making (Grote 1997), the territorial structure of
member states (Nanetti 1996), federalism and regional policy (Anderson 1996), and the
redistribution of income across the EU (Anderson 1995; Leonardi 1993). Many of the
works cited in this chapter focus on the implementation stage, where the role of par-
ticular regions is prominent. In contrast to the emphases of the above scholars, my
research explores the less well-known, but not completely uncharted, upward stage
(Bache and Jones 2000: 16, 18; Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 234; Bourne 2003;
Gualini 2003; Jones 2000).
This chapter aims to establish whether coordination mechanisms have provided
regions with the powers to make substantial impacts on a member states strategy. More
specifically, it looks to gauge potential alterations in the workings of coordination
mechanisms produced by nationalist parties participation in areas where such parties
exist. The first section discusses briefly the development of cohesion policy from the
1950s up to the 1990s. The second explains the modification of certain cohesion policy
concepts that were considered during the reform. The three following sections of this
chapter shift focus to the specificities institutional setting and modes of interaction,
among others of the German, Spanish, and Italian coordination mechanisms relevant
for cohesion policy. Finally, in summing up my conclusions I will attempt to draw on
the findings of the last three sections.
113
The 1999 Reform of Cohesion Policy
Enacting structural fund regulations requires a division of resources between pre-ex-
isting commitments and new realities, particularly enlargements and agricultural policy
reforms (Allen 2000: 248-253; Tarschys 2003: 20-30). Yet, cohesion policy has main-
tained many of its characteristics during the transition from one programming period to
the next, in particular after its 1988 overhaul in the aftermath of the SEA (Sutcliffe
2000: 294-296; Tarschys 2003: 23-25). Because of these continuities, a historical
approach to the 1999 reform would best explain its output and the role of regions
therein. This section analyses the history of the structural funds, the development of
cohesion policy and the basic magnitudes of the 1999 reform.
Cohesion policy is financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), the European
Social Fund (ESF), and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). Their
respective focal points include increasing economic cohesion, support of rural and
agricultural areas, financing European social policy and paying for reforms of the
fishing sector. An examination of the EAGGF and FIFG, however, is beyond the scope
of this chapter, which focuses on the negotiations of the regulations containing the
general provisions for all funds and on the regulation of the ERDF and of the ESF.
Several reasons justify this decision. First, the general provisions set most of the fun-
damental elements of cohesion policy, including the eligibility criteria that dictates how
funding is allocated to the diverse objectives and how these funds are managed. The
regulation of the individual funds then defines their scope, particularly which activities
they finance. Therefore, discussing regional claims on all four funds would perceptibly
expand the size of this study without necessarily changing its findings. Second, for the
selected cases, the importance of a specific fund varies from region to region, while the
three regulations analysed here are of considerable importance for all of them. For
example, the FIFG possesses a certain importance for the Basque Country but is ir-
relevant for the Rhineland-Palatinate, which has no fishing sector. Finally, analysing
the negotiation of the ESF offers interesting insights into the connections between the
different funds and the corresponding parliamentary committees in charge, an issue
which I will cover in greater detail in chapter six.
ERDF, ESF and the other structural funds underwent an overhaul in 1988 in the
context of the SEA. Two years earlier, in 1986, the SEA had established a link between
the ESF and ERDF in the form of a regulation specifying general provisions relevant for
all funds. At the time, a new article, today 161 TEC, established that the Commission
would prepare and the Council enact by unanimity the general rules applicable to all the
funds and would establish their tasks, priorities objectives, organisation, and coordin-
ation (Sutcliffe 2000: 293). Additionally, the SEA also provided that the regulation of
not only the ESF but also the ERDF would be enacted by a qualified majority of the
Council according to the cooperation procedure, which was upgraded to co-decision by
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996 (Geyer 2000: 141).
Apart from linking the different regulations of funds in order to increase coordin-
ation among the funds, the SEA heralded the first important increase in the size of these
114
funds (Kleinman 2002: 87). In 1988, the Delors-1 package included the first multi-
annual budgetary plan (1988-1993) providing the means for the expansion of cohesion,
to which member states had committed themselves in the SEA (Allen 2000: 248).
While the structural funds represented only 4.8 percent and 9.1 percent of the 1965 and
1985 EC budgets respectively, the financial perspective for the 1988-1993 reform
almost tripled the amount assigned to cohesion policy to 25 percent in 1992. In millions
of ECU/Euro (at 1999 prices), the rise was from 3.3 in 1987 to 18.6 in 1992 (Allen 2000:
244).
As a complement to the budgetary expansion, the 1988 reform introduced innova-
tions in the field of structural programming, which remained in force beyond 1999.
Among such reforms were the definition of five objectives to be targeted with support
from the different funds, several modifications in the programming process, and the
reinforced role of the Commission in the partnership. Furthermore, this reform intro-
duced the four principles linking structural funds with the objective of economic and
social cohesion enshrined in the Treaty (concentration, additionality, programming,
and partnership; Allen 2000: 254; Sutcliffe 2000: 293). In 1993 the partnership, which
mostly had included regional governments, was expanded to include local executives
and social and economic actors. This move essentially weakened the pre-existing
privileged position of the regional governments. However, partnership was not in-
tended to affect the territorial division of powers in the member states (Allen 2000: 255;
Hooghe and Marks 2001 b: 8, 1044; Pollack 1995; Wishlade 1996: 27-29, 48-50).
Both chapters five and six focus almost exclusively on the twelve months between
the presentation of the Commissions proposals for new structural fund regulations in
March 1998 and the agreement defined in the Berlin Summit in March 1999 (European
Council 1999 b). Although I briefly discuss the Agenda 2000 (Commission of the
European Communities 1997 a, b), I have paid considerable more attention to the
proposal for the new regulations that the Commission published because nearly all of its
clauses were decisive in shaping subsequent negotiations (European Commission
1998 a, b, c). For regions, the Commission effectively created a political opportunity
structure by incorporating the Commissions own preferences into the proposals for the
new regulations. That is to say, the proposals for the regulations largely explain why
regions have focused their interest representation efforts on certain elements of cohe-
sion policy while ignoring others. The positions of the Commission and the other actors
relevant on these issues are summarized in Figure 5.
Before the proposals for new regulations were published, the Commissions Agenda
2000 had announced the main financial elements of the 1999 reform of the structural
funds (Commission of the European Communities 1997 a, b). Through this document,
the Commission sought to respond to both the pressure of the upcoming EU enlarge-
ment, and to budgetary restrictions resulting from the economic stagnation in Germany,
the largest net payer, as well as the pressure to fulfil the monetary union and to the
reform of the CAP (Allen 2000; Axt 1999; Bachtler 1998; Bachtler and Michie 1998:
22-23; Hall and Rosenstock 1998).
1
As with former negotiations, the point of departure
1 Information from the European Commission on its Agenda 2000 is available at http://ec.europa.eu/
agenda2000/index_en.htm (accessed November 2009).
115
for the 1999 reform was the quantity or the amount of available funds and the definition
of objectives for cohesion policy. For the 2000-2006 programming period, the Com-
mission wanted to allocate almost one third of the EU budget, or 0.46 percent of the EU
GDP, to structural operations. From these 275 billion Euros at 1999 prices, roughly 230
billion were assigned to structural and cohesion funds. Ultimately, member states
agreed to assign 195 billion Euro to the structural funds and 18 billion to the cohesion
fund (Allen 2000: 261; Neueder 2000: 90).
2
Ideally, the available funding would be assigned to a few specific cohesion policy
objectives, which explains why the number and the funding available for every ob-
jective experienced significant changes during the 1999 reform. Where there had been
up to seven objectives in the preceding programming period, the 1998 Commissions
proposal put forward only three for the period 2000-2006. The new Objective 1 in-
cluded underdeveloped regions and those Scandinavian countries with low population
density. Industrial areas in decline, rural areas (former Ob.5 b), cities, and territories
dependent on fisheries were assigned to the new Objective 2. Finally, the Commission
wanted a new Objective 3 to combat unemployment in territories outside of Ob.1 and
Ob.2. For the 2000-2006 programming period, Ob.1, Ob.2, and Ob.3 areas received
69.7 percent, 11.5 percent, and 12.3 percent respectively of the funding available. Such
distribution corresponds to 135.9, 22.5 and 24.1 billions of Euros (European Parliament
1999 a: art.7). This is in addition to 18 billion Euros from the Cohesion Fund. Of all
member states, Spain received the largest share of cohesion funding, at 26.5 percent.
Both Germany and Italy received approximately 14 percent. This breakdown indicates
that Spain obtained approximately 56 billion Euros and Germany and Italy about 29
billion Euros each. For all three countries, the largest share targeted Ob.1, which in
Spain amounted to 37 billion Euros, in Germany to 19 billion Euros, and in Italy to 21
billion (Leonardi and Nanetti 2001: 355).
3
The large amount of money assigned to the
Ob.1 regions is crucial to understanding the Spanish agenda for the reform.
This section has clarified the issues essential to understanding how regional and
central executives reacted to the proposals for reform presented by the Commission.
First, I explained how cohesion policy reforms combined continuity and innovation to
respond to the necessities of the integration process and the preferences of member
states. After examining the ERDF and the ESF, I then analysed the development of
cohesion from the SEA and the years up to the 2000-2006 programming period, dis-
cussing in detail the characteristics and the funding available for the various objectives.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the source for the Council and member states bargaining stance is the
procedure file for the corresponding regulation (European Parliament 1999 a, d, b).
3 Leonardis main source is a publication of the Commission, Inforegio News, Newsletter n. 65 from
June 1999, available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/newsroom/archiv_en.htm (accessed
November 2009).
116
Figure 5: Cohesion policy, agendas and output
Agenda Item
RLP FC FG BC SP T I EP EU
Output
Decouple ! ! ! - - ! ! ! !
CI Conver ! ! - - - - - O O
Safety net ! ! ! - ! ! ! ! !
Softer eligibility
criteria
! ! ! - ! ! ! ! O
Longer transition
period
! - - ! ! ! ! ! O
Left Margin - - - ! - - - - -
RLP: Rhineland-Palatinate. FC: Federal chamber (Bundesrat). FG: Federal gov-
ernment (Germany). BC: Basque Country. SP: Spanish central government (Spain).
T: Tuscany. I: Italian central government Italy. EP: European Parliament. A minus
sign implies that a region opposed a certain policy option, and a check signifies a
region that supported a certain policy option. A circle (O) indicates that the actor had
no definite position, or that the output represented a compromised position between
the two options.
Source: Authors own elaboration.
Germany
During the reform, a limited number of issues demanded most of the attention of the
Lnder and of the other actors involved. Of these, my analysis of the reform concen-
trates on the concerns perceived as particularly important by Ob.2 regions and those
relevant for all three cases. In contrast, I have excluded controversial aspects of an
administrative nature, such as the payments by the Commission of the fund contribu-
tions to regional recipients. Because all of my cases are drawn from Ob.2 areas, the
present section concentrates on topics particularly relevant for all of them. I do not
claim to have exhaustively analysed cohesion policy reform, but I have considered
most issues of fundamental importance for regions, and in particular for Ob.2 German,
Italian, and Spanish areas. In selecting these topics, I have made use of documents
expressing regions demands for the reform and, in the case of the Rhineland-Palati-
nate, resolutions of the Bundesrat in addition to the testimony of my interviewees, and
the opinions of the CoR.
In spite of the diversity of interests derived from the disparity of economic condi-
tions in South and East Germany, the Lnder were able to define a common regional
position towards the reform. Before doing so, they had to overcome an additional
obstacle: the fact that that coordination mechanisms for cohesion policy work in dif-
ferent ways than those for audiovisual policy do. In fact, regions exerted little or no
influence on the member states bargaining stance, but did participate as part of the
German representation in the working groups of the Council. This section first explores
117
the preferences of the Rhineland-Palatinate, and then reviews the common regional
position published by the Bundesrat, as well as those of the federal government. Fi-
nally, it evaluates and accounts for the extension of regional influence on the German
position in the Council.
During the discussion of the 1999 cohesion policy reform, coordination mechanisms
allowed the Lnder to request that the federal government take their position into
account and permitted them to participate in the working groups of the Council. In
addition, the legislation in force permitted the regional representative in the Council to
express the German bargaining stance provided that the head of the delegation, a federal
official, agrees (art. 23.5 and 5.1 EUZBLG). The Lnder must previously define a
common position in the Bundesrat if they are to benefit from these coordination
mechanisms, just as is the case regarding audiovisual policy. The main difference
among these coordination mechanisms and those in effect for audiovisual policy is that
in regard to cohesion policy, the federal government merely takes into account
(bercksichtigt) but does not necessarily adopt the regional demands, (art.5.1
EUZBLG) whereas for audiovisual policy the federal government is compelled to
adopt the common regional position.
In order to prepare the 1999 reform, the Landesministerkonferenzen, or sector con-
ferences where social affairs or transport are discussed, exhaustively examined the
proposals contained in the Agenda 2000. To some extent, the federal ministers also
participated in these meetings. The regional finance ministries and the Wirtschaftsmin-
ister- and Arbeitsministerkonferenz coordinated the work of the remaining sector con-
ferences. Subsequently, and in order to define agreements on the most contentious
elements of the Agenda 2000, horizontal cooperation was given a boost by the partic-
ipation of high-ranking politicians. Notably, federal and regional prime ministers ex-
amined the reform through the lens of the work that the Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz
and its supporting bodies had previously done. This preparatory work made it possible
for the regional PMs to unanimously agree on a common regional position at the
Ministerprsidentenkonferenz. After the Bundesrat formalized the position of the re-
gional PMs, it relayed the resulting common regional position to the federal govern-
ment (Bundesrat 1998 b). Thanks to coordination mechanisms like regional presence in
the Council, it was possible for the Lnder to monitor whether the federal government
advanced in all or in part the position of the federal chamber.
Of all the topics addressed in the reform, the Rhineland-Palatinate only emphasized
a restricted number of issues,
4
including the decrease in the size of its rural districts
protected as Ob.2 areas, the duration of transitional support to the former Ob.2 and Ob.
5 b areas, and the issue of military conversion. Policy and political arguments explain
4 To reconstruct the positions of the Rhineland-Palatinate, I relied on the responses to two ques-
tionnaires sent to the officials responsible for the ERDF and the ESF in the regional capital, on
several interviews with their counterparts in Brussels and Berlin, and on a regional government
paper on the future of cohesion policy after 2006 (Rheinland-Pfalz 2003). Additional perspectives
on the agenda of the Rhineland-Palatinate and other individual Lnder were available in the
decisions of the Europaministerkonferenz (EMK) between February 1997 and April 1999 and in the
resolutions and the transcription of the debates of the Bundesrat. These documents captured even
the most divisive issues by including the dissenting positions of individual Lnder.
118
why the regional government placed such a high importance on these topics. The
Rhineland-Palatinate made the defence of its former rural areas with Ob.5 b status its
main priority, as the region is home to extensive rural areas. Its strategy consisted in
criticizing the eligibility criteria for the new Ob.2, arguing that the criteria did not
reflect the problems of troubled rural areas. The second objective of the Rhineland-
Palatinate was to support the safety net, which limited the amount of its population
losing Ob.2 protection in Germany. Thirdly, the Rhineland-Palatinate demanded the
extension of transitional support of up to six years and with a constant intensity of
support to the 20 percent of the regions population involved in phasing out. In addition
to these three main demands, the Rhineland-Palatinate pleaded for the continuation of a
horizontal Ob.3 whose labour policy measures could benefit the inhabitants of the
troubled regional rural districts. Finally, the Rhineland-Palatinate placed great empha-
sis on obtaining an extension of Conver and other forms of support for the conversion of
military sites.
Few of these demands were ultimately included in the Bundesrats common regional
position (Bundesrat 1998 b). The document of the Bundesrat tries to resolve the par-
tially contradictory demands of the Rhineland-Palatinate and the remaining Lnder by
reducing them to a lowest common denominator. During the preceding programming
period, Germany had been in possession of a large share of all protected rural areas
under the old Ob.5 b (Neueder 2000: 87). Because the eligibility criteria proposed by
the Commission would have resulted in a stark reduction of 5 b protected rural areas in
the new Ob.2 system, the Bundesrat called for the outright rejection of these criteria
(Bundesrat 1998 b: 6). In addition, the federal chamber criticized the Commissions
attempt to exclude the execution of Ob.3 measures from Ob.2 areas. In contrast, the
federal chamber essentially welcomed the establishment of a safety net, even though
this device would not prevent Germany from losing a disproportionate share of Ob.2
areas in comparison to other member states (Bundesrat 1998 b: 5). With regard to the
phasing out, or the regulation of the transitional support for regions that are no longer
eligible for support, the Bundesrat agreed with the proposal of the Commission to set
out a longer transition period for Ob.1 regions (Bundesrat 1998 b: 8).
Furthermore, the federal chamber backed wealthier regions in their request for more
leeway for member states and their constituent units when defining their assisted areas
(Bundesrat 1998 b: 11-12). The chamber unanimously endorsed this demand of the
richest Lnder, although internally the government of the Rhineland-Palatinate and
Eastern Lnder opposed any relaxation of competition policy provisions. The reason
for their opposition is that lenient competition rules harm poorer regions whose ability
to subsidize private investment is negligible compared with the resources available to
wealthier Lnder. However, the Rhineland-Palatinate and the other poor Lnder re-
fused to formalize their opposition, which remained internal, in order to present a
common position before the federal government and the Commission. In contrast, the
federal chamber suggested that the Commission should leave the door open to one of
the smaller programmes, or Community Initiatives (CIs), that would deal with con-
119
version and with the consequences of troop withdrawal, which the Rhineland-Palati-
nate demanded.
5
Thus, on the balance, the benefits of the Rhineland-Palatinate accepting the common
regional position were mixed. In truth, the extension of Conver, an issue the govern-
ment in Mainz considered to be crucial, received the support of the Bundesrat despite
the initial opposition of some regions (Bundesrat 1998 b: 8; Europaministerkonferenz
1997: 5). Similarly, the federal chamber shared the Rhineland-Palatinates criticisms of
the eligibility criteria, its dislike of the exclusion of Ob.3 measures from Ob.2 areas, and
also sponsored the safety net, which eventually limited the amount of population losing
Ob.2 support in the Rhineland-Palatinates rural areas. In contrast to the preceding
points of agreement, the Bundesrat did not back the extension of the transitional sup-
port for Ob.2 areas favoured by the Rhineland-Palatinate. Moreover, in order to agree
on a common regional position, the Rhineland-Palatinate was required to give its
support to the Bundesrats stance on competition policy that the richest Lnder had
imposed, although the Rhineland-Palatinate internally disagreed with it.
To determine the leverage of the common regional position on the federal negoti-
ating stance, it is necessary to compare both sets of preferences. Such a comparison
shows that the Bundesrats position had scant influence over the federal government.
Comparing the federal position in March 1997 and in November 1998, four months
after the Bundesrats document, it is apparent that Bonn did not take up regional
demands as expressed by the Bundesrat but instead maintained its original agenda for
the reform (confront Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft 1997; Neueder 1999). Se-
condly, the discrepancies between the federal and regional agendas revealed that the
Bundesrat held relatively minor influence. In spite of regional demands, the federal
government did not prioritize the legalization of Ob.3 measures in Ob.2 areas until the
last stages of the negotiation (Neueder 2000: 88). A further topic of disagreement was
the establishment of a transition period, which the German federal government
decidedly opposed but which regions favoured. However, the initial federal rejection of
transitional support changed in November 1998. From then on, Bonn was ready to
agree to a four-year phasing out period for Ob.1 and a two-year period for Ob.2; this was
a last-minute compromise with other member states rather than a sign of special con-
sideration to the Lnders demands (Neueder 1999, 2000: 88). Finally, the federal
government was equally opposed to an extension of Conver and favoured the elim-
ination of all CIs (Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft 1997).
In spite of the preceding dispute, three main elements of agreement between the
federal government and the Bundesrat continue to exist. All three elements were co-
incident with the strategy of the German government to keep the size of the EU budget
and structural policy constant for the whole of 2000-2006, which would imply an
5 In addition to the preceding issues, the federal chamber gave a great deal of attention to the
management of the funds, which were considered as secondary by Rhineland-Palatinate (Bundesrat
1998 b: 8-9). The Bundesrat censured that the Commission would not further support the agree-
ments of the monitoring committees, but hold the ability to suspend them. The Lnder raised further
criticisms against the Commission because of its regulation of partnership. Its proposal imposed on
central and regional governments the allocation of voting rights to social partners and local gov-
ernments (Bundesrat 1998 b: 8-9).
120
increase in the proportion of money flowing from the federal contribution to the EU
budget back to structural fund operations in Germany (Neueder 1999: 114, 2000: 92).
6
Among the elements of this agreement was staunch opposition to the eligibility criteria
proposed by the Commission, which both the centre and regions considered harmful to
the German Ob.5 b rural areas, and the support for a safety net. Furthermore, the federal
executive and the Bundesrat coincided in the necessity of preserving the ability of
member states and their regions to implement their own regional policy beyond the
European Ob.1 and Ob.2 areas. Thirdly, the federal government and the Bundesrat
wanted to regain from the Commission the power to determine eligible areas and
designate the half of Ob.2 elected according to stringent criteria, a prerogative the
Commission had reserved for itself (Neueder 1999: 113). The two final goals amounted
to an attempt to renationalize cohesion policy and adapt it to German regional policy,
whilst simultaneously reducing the overall German contribution to the budget. This
was part of a strategy favoured by rich Lnder governed by the CDU or the CSU,
Bavaria, Baden-Wrttemberg and Hesse. In the name of subsidiarity, Helmut Kohl
incorporated the demand into the agenda of his CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. His gov-
ernment insisted on this point since the presentation of its first paper to the Prtschach
summit in October 1998. Eventually, the preservation of the necessary flexibility for the
German regional policy was considered one of the major successes of the reform. It
should be noted, however, that during the months preceding the Berlin summit, the new
red-green governing coalition had made concessions on this issue in order to facilitate
an agreement with the Commission and with the other member states (Bocklet 1999: 7,
9; Bundesrat 1997: 539; Httmann Groe and Knodt 2000: 38; Neueder 2000: 86, 92).
Yet, as mentioned above, only a minority comprised of wealthier Lnder sincerely
supported this demand.
The preceding paragraphs contain valuable examples of how coordination mech-
anisms work in Germany. Throughout the reform, the federal government perceived the
Lnder as legitimate interlocutors, as is demonstrated by the intensive exchange of
views between politicians and officials from both levels. This was made possible by the
coordination mechanisms established in the German constitution and the EUZBLG. To
put it in Herbert Kitschelts terms, coordination mechanisms led to procedural impacts
and to the recognition of the Lnder as legitimate interlocutors for of the federal
government (Kitschelt 1986: 67). However, the Lnder ultimately were unable to
substantially impact a federal agenda overloaded with financial concerns. In the case of
the Rhineland-Palatinate, the balance of the coordination process is negative. Of the
three elements on the regional agenda, the federal government opposed the extension of
Conver and refused to back a six-year transitional support period. The criticisms of the
eligibility criteria remain the only element of agreement between the regional and
6 To ascertain the federal position, I rely on a document published by the federal finance department
in March 1997, four months before the commission released Agenda 2000. Although the document
is very brief, at only four pages, it already contains the main elements of the federal strategy for the
reform (Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft 1997). I further rely on two contributions by a head of
division of the same federal department (Neueder 1999, 2000). Whereas in one of the articles he
exposes the strategy of the federal government for the last months preceding the closing of the
Berlin Summit, in the other he evaluates the agreement struck in Berlin in March 1999.
121
federal agendas. Kohls efforts to defend the ability of the rich and rightist Lnder to
grant aid constitutes the only significant exception, but hint at an agreement based on
party politics. I consider this possibility more carefully in the conclusion.
From the perspective of actor-centered institutionalism, the differences between the
coordination mechanisms for cohesion and audiovisual policy can be summarized as
follows. Although the institutional setting joint decision and the mode of interaction
among the Lnder consensual remained unaltered, the mode of interaction among
the Lnder and the federal government changed significantly, from a hierarchical
direction in which the Lnder had the upper hand to a structure in which the centre
dominated. This permitted regions to foresee that their impact on the federal agenda
would be limited. In fact, the civil servants I interviewed were clearly aware of the
restrictions on regions bargaining room implicit in the coordination mechanisms
joint decision and consent in force for cohesion policy.
7
In spite of this, they were
ready to make concessions in order to benefit from the coordination mechanisms. The
government of the Rhineland-Palatinate and of the other Lnder preferred to water
down their demands for the sake of advancing them afterwards through a common
regional position rather than press them forward individually. This is likely because the
mode of interaction between the Lnder consensual strongly promotes solidarity as
an interaction orientation. In contrast, as I argue in the next section, Italian coordination
mechanisms where unanimity is required for a common regional position paradoxically
led to diverging agendas and to partisan conflict.
Italy
In the bel paese the cohesion policy reform began with a new programming approach
devised to solve the persisting Southern question, namely the lingering economic
disparity between the North and South of the county. After several decades of unsuc-
cessful attempts to overcome this development gap, the centre was ready to tackle
regional policy afresh through the nuova programmazione, or new programming. One
of its primary objectives was to involve regions in both the implementation and the
early stages of policy-making. In order to overcome these well-known shortcomings
and to incorporate regional inputs into the Italian bargaining stance, the centre estab-
lished new bodies and procedures (Barca 2001: 842, 847; Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003:
106; Gualini 2003: 620). The work of these bodies, which to some extent altered the
coordination mechanisms described in chapter two, could have been considered a
7 In the words of an official from Rhineland-Palatinate: The chances of a single Land exerting
influence are very reduced because you have to consider the interests of the remaining Lnder if you
want to get a result acceptable for all..
122
success if an unexpected factor, party competition along both the ideological, and even
more importantly, the territorial cleavage, had not disrupted it.
8
This section opens by examining the coordination mechanisms resulting from the
new programming and then discusses the common regional position. After explaining
the conflict over the Ob.2 and competition maps, the section closes with an evaluation
of the reform for Tuscany.
The new programming approach was intended to strengthen collaboration between
the centre and the periphery in order to improve Italian regional policy. This new
approach was intended to consolidate broader changes in regional programming ini-
tiated in 1986 with the abolition of the Casa del Mezzogiorno, and continued in 1993
with the suppression of the Intervento Straordinario (Gualini 2001: 756). The Com-
mission, the Italian parliament, and public opinion had interpreted the failure of the
public administration to spend EU funding available for Italy between 1988 and 1993 as
a confirmation of the necessity for reforms (Graziano 2003: 95). In 1998 Carlo Ciampi,
at the time Minister of the Treasury, proposed the new programming policy which was
intended to link national and European regional programming, through the integration
of co-funding for the Structural Funds in the system of institutional agreements be-
tween State and regions. (Gualini 2001: 766). Ciampi further aimed to incorporate
greater input from local actors into the process through which the targets and strategies
of development policies were defined (Gualini 2001: 766). In this way, Italy could
benefit more from former experiences with cohesion and other regional policies (Barca
2001: 841-842). The first attempt to allow for more regional input in the new pro-
gramming was the reform of the structural funds.
9
The most important organizational consequence of the new programming was the
establishment of a small and influential body, the gruppo di lavoro politiche strutturali.
This ad-hoc body was established to supplement the existing coordination mechan-
isms, the Conferenza Stato-Regioni (CSR) and the Conferenza dei Presidenti (CdP) that
had been ineffective at dealing with previous cohesion policy reforms. This working
group on structural funds, hereafter the working-group, was to act as an interface
between the European institutions, the Italian permanent representation, and domestic
actors. To achieve this collaboration, the working group was incorporated into a section
of the treasury, the Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo (DPS), and was expanded
by the addition of officials from Tuscany and six other constituent units representing the
regions (Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 2). Through this structure, developments at the EU
level would be discussed first in the working group and only then forwarded to the
regional PMs through coordination mechanisms like the CdP, which would then define
8 A note on the sources I use is opportune at this time. The commitment of new programming to
transparency had its reflection in a number of publications edited by the economy department
(Ministero del Tesoro 2001). One of them includes the different common regional positions, the
position of the Italian government in January 2000, and a summary of the positions of member
states towards every article of the regulations. To supplement this information, I rely on interviews
with officials from the central and from the Tuscan government.
9 The attempt was part of the Patto sociale per lo sviluppo e l'occupazione signed in December 1998
by the Italian government, Italian BIAs and unions. The text of the pact is available at http://
www.ecn.org/coord.rsu/doc/norme98/981222.htm (accessed November 2009).
123
a common regional position and transmit them to the central government through the
CSR.
From December 1997 through February 1999, the regional representatives in the
working group advanced five common positions that progressively specified regional
demands (Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 11-37). These positions successively take issue
with Agenda 2000, with the Commissions proposals for regulations, and with subse-
quent documents produced by the Council. They demonstrate that, due to the coord-
ination mechanisms introduced by the new programming policy, the regions, or at least
their officials appointed to the working group, were capable of defining a common
regional position. Essentially, Italian regions demanded a horizontal Ob.3, a longer
transition period for the Ob.2, changes in the performance reserve, and more involve-
ment by the Commission in the monitoring committees, which they argued should be
endowed with reinforced powers (Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 15-19, 24-25). Two
months ahead of the Berlin Summit, the Italian government had assumed most of these
regional demands, including a horizontal Ob.3 (61) and a longer transition period or
other compensation for regions in a phasing-out process (60-61). Furthermore, the
centre and the regions were similarly sceptical regarding the performance reserve (62,
63) and the Commissions new role in monitoring committees (279-81). Although these
extensive areas of agreement prove that coordination mechanisms worked reasonably
well, inattention to certain regional demands would eventually lead to the collapse of
the new programming policy.
General commitment to new programming and cooperation among constituent units
was not sufficient to peacefully divide among Ob.2 regions the amount of protected
population and regional aid that the Commission assigned to Italy. The subsequent
breakdown was largely related to differences in policy, the institutional setting, and
politics. I discuss these topics successively, beginning with the policy-related argu-
ments. From very early on, regions realized that while in the preceding programming
period more than eleven million Italians were living in Ob.2 areas, the application of the
concentration principle would significantly reduce the protected Ob.2 population after
2000 (Gualini 2003: 628; Ministero del Tesoro 2001: 69). This decrease in the protected
population initiated a conflict over which specific regions should absorb the losses. The
second policy-related difficulty emerged from the differing situations of the regions in
central Italy after the previous programming period. To be more specific, some central
Italian regions had large Ob.2 areas and the possibility of obtaining transitional support
if they should lose part of them. In contrast, in northern Italy populous regions like
Piedmont and Lombardy governed by rightist parties had small amounts of population
living in Ob.2 areas and no possibility of benefitting from transitional support.
10
On the
occasion of the 1999 reform, these northern regions were determined to benefit sub-
stantially from the structural funds by obtaining larger Ob.2 areas (Ciaffi 2001 b: 479).
A third policy problem resulted from a reduction in the number of Italian assisted
areas under 87.3.a and c resulting from the more strict application of the concentration
10 Areas considered as being in economic decline included tourist magnets such as Elba and the rest
of the Tuscan archipelago. Similarly, the textile area of Prato was classified as Objective 2,
although, as an official admitted "frankly, it was not in decline."
124
principle to the European competition policy guidelines. Hence, many regions would
lack the right to lawfully grant state aid because of the reduction in 87.3.c areas, in
addition to the elimination of Ob.2 areas, a problem that many Lnder were also
experiencing. The disadvantages of facing significant reductions in both forms of
support were intensified by the new eligibility criteria. Many regions rejected both the
Commissions preference for defining Ob.2 areas at the NUTS III level and the ne-
cessity of using that same statistical unit to define Ob.2 and assisted areas (87.3.c).
11
The linkage between both policies made it extraordinarily difficult for regional repre-
sentatives to draw maps combining the appropriate levels of population in both 87.3.c
and Ob.2 assisted areas (Gualini 2003: 627). In sum, for regions the scenario was one of
decreasing resources in both assisted and Ob.2 areas and of reduced room to
manoeuvre because the Commission had forced regions to define both Ob.2 and 87.3.c
assisted areas at the NUTSIII level (Gualini 2003: 629).
I will now move on from the policy to the polity related problems of the new
programming. The institutional setting, determined by Italian coordination mechan-
isms, also contributed to the looming fiasco. In 1998, the regions had demanded the
appointment of a regional representative in direct contact with the Commission (Min-
istero del Tesoro 1999: 14). The Italian government not only rejected this petition, but
also failed to take up regional demands regarding the clear separation of both Ob.2 and
assisted area maps and of different statistical units for each (Ministero del Tesoro 1999:
3, 11). Instead, the Italian central government acquiesced in the Berlin Summit to the
Commissions demands on defining at least 50 percent of the Ob.2 area in every
member state at the NUTS III level. At the same time, the Italian department of the
treasury was preparing a map based on SLL, the sistemi locali di lavoro (Gualini 2003:
625, 630).
12
At least one region, Tuscany, warned that the Commission would not
accept SLL as a substitute for NUTS III (Ciaffi 2001 a: 453). In other words, coord-
ination mechanisms were preventing actors from accessing relevant information on
what the Commission would consider as unacceptable rather than subject to negoti-
ation. As a result, the wrong perceptions that the regions held about what was feasible
would lead them to advance preferences that eventually made an agreement impossible.
At this stage additional flaws in the Italian coordination mechanisms further aggra-
vated the difficulties regions were experiencing in agreeing on 87.3.c and Ob.2 maps.
Until then, collaboration between civil servants was more effective than among politi-
cians because the predominant interaction orientation among officials with similar
technical background was solidarity. However, in the following weeks it became ap-
parent that the regional PMs distrusted the agreements resulting from administrative
cooperation between regional officials and the DPS in the working group (Ciaffi
2001 a: 455). The regional PMs deemed their officials to be under strong influence from
the central governments department of the treasury. Indeed, the central government
11 Nomenclature d'units territoriales statistiques (NUTS) is a hierarchical division of the territory
of the European Union for statistical purposes that subdivided every member state in three levels
(NUTS I, II, and III) and optionally divided NUTSIII into local administrative units (LAUs).
12 SLL is a spatial unit based on labour market criteria originally developed to identify the distressed
areas targeted by the Italian state aid schemes (Gualini 2003: 624).
125
was taking advantage both of its expertise and of its control over the information flow
from Brussels to cajole regional officers into supporting the positions favoured by the
centre (Ciaffi 2001 a: 476). Because of this, the proposals from the working group
received insufficient attention from the regional PMs brought together in the CdP. Yet
being a political body, the CdP lacked the technical resources necessary to define
alternatives to the agreements of the working group or to effectively overcome the
negotiators dilemma, reaching an agreement and distributing its value (Scharpf 1997:
120-124). Conversely, the DPS would in turn shun the CdP, whose decisions were mere
political agreements without binding force, and try to define agreements with individ-
ual regions. This conflict is a prime example of the problems characteristic of Italian
coordination mechanisms, which were further explained in chapter two. In fact, the
DPS never met with the CdP; only infrequent encounters between the finance minister
Giuliano Amato and the CdP took place in the most dramatic stages of the negotiation
with the Commission (Ciaffi 2001 a: 467). Good connections between the political and
administrative levels were missing and the central government was circumventing the
regional joint bodies.
Ultimately, two decisions sealed the fate of the new coordination mechanisms and
brought party politics back to centre stage. In November 1998 it had become clear that
Rome wanted to use SLL as a selection criteria, a methodology contested by several
regions which were well aware of the negative implications of this decision for them
(Ciaffi 2001 a: 452-453). A second decision, this one adopted by the Commission,
turned up the pressure on regional governments by reducing the Italian Ob.2 population
by almost three million people, setting a ceiling of 7.4 million; such a step multiplied
the difficulty of dividing Ob.2 populations between regions (Ciaffi 2001 a: 479; Gualini
2003: 622, 624; Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 33-34). In February 1999 the combined
effects of the two decisions moved Italian constituent units to abandon coordination
mechanisms. The working group anchored in the DPS ceased to be the interface be-
tween the central government and the CdP.
After the demise of the new programming policy, party politics and a competitive
interaction orientation began to influence the redrawing of the maps. In early 1999 the
regional PMs assembled in the CdP decided to combine SLL and NUTS as statistical
units to define eligibility areas and draw maps acceptable to them (Gualini 2003: 626).
From this point onwards, the centre-left regions in the South began to make concessions
to the rightist regions in the North. Apart from preventing delays in the redrawing of the
maps, centre-left regions wanted a solution that would not discredit the chair of the CdP,
the Tuscan PM who was also the official responsible for the Ob.2 inside the CdP, or
the PM from the Marche, who was also an ally of the government of the ex-communist
dAlema (Ciaffi 2001 a: 455, 461, 475). In addition, for all constituent units it was
becoming increasingly important to find a solution to the redrawing process in view of
the oncoming regional elections scheduled for April 2000 (Ciaffi 2001 a: 475). To
achieve an agreement, the regional PMs used the CdP to bargain among themselves.
They eventually struck a deal, which some regions repealed a few months later, re-
specting the population ceiling but combining criteria based on SLL, NUTS III and
combinations of both. The central government had no choice but to accept the ar-
126
rangement, and between July and August 1999 the DPS translated the agreement into
new maps. In September the central government forwarded the agreement to the Com-
mission, which took only ten days to reject it, as less than 50 percent of the areas were
defined at the NUTS III level (Gualini 2003: 626; Ministero del Tesoro 2001: 63-64).
While Rome spent the next months unsuccessfully trying to convince the Commission
to accept these maps, partisan conflict was about to break the fragile regional agreement
on the division of the Ob.2 and 87.3.c population.
The fate of the maps of the Ob.2 and assisted areas was shaped by the April 2000
regional elections, which took place in the midst of a severe and protracted confronta-
tion between Berlusconis coalition and the centre-left executive in Rome (Pasquino
2001: 372-374). Voters granted Berlusconis Casa delle Libert a landslide victory,
which brought a change of government in two important Ob.2 regions, Liguria and
Latium, which went on to be governed by the rightist coalition (Chiaramonte and
Virgilio 2000: 513-4).
13
The new regional PMs stonewalled any form of dialogue with
the centre by turning the CSR into a boxing ring in which to fight against a federalist
reform of the constitution (Baldini and Vassallo 2001: 86; Gualini 2003: 628). In the
meantime, the Italian government continued negotiating the new maps with the Com-
mission, trying to adapt them to its benefit. By March 2000, the centre was persuaded
that the Commission would accept the latest Italian proposal, provided regions could
manage to redistribute among themselves the loss of 400.000 people from the ceiling of
the protected population (Ciaffi 2001 a: 469). At this point, the four Northern regions,
all of them governed by rightist parties, rejected the existing agreement and defined a
new one, which re-assigned Ob.2 and 87.3.c areas among themselves in order to obtain
more acceptable maps (Gualini 2001), but Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Val dAosta were
cool to the proposal (Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 67).
The Tuscan government played a fundamental role in this showdown by forging the
definitive agreement on the Ob.2 map in June 2000 and accepting a less-than-optimum
deal for its regions (see also Ciaffi 2001 a: 475). To some extent, maintaining the
credibility of the CdP and the new programming policy promoted by the leftist parties
in the centre was almost as important as agreeing on acceptable maps for Tuscany and
the other leftist regions. After further compromises assumed by Tuscany and other
centre-left regions, and due to the subsequent allocations of assisted areas to Friuli-
Venezia Giulia and Val dAosta, these two regions finally accepted the deal (Ciaffi
2001 a: 470; Ministero del Tesoro 2001: 68). The leftist-central government was com-
pelled to accept the agreement imposed by the Northern regions and forward it to the
Commission, where it was approved in September 2000.
To explain such a solution, which implied the demise of coordination mechanisms
and nationalist parties, the role of the territorial cleavage and of nationalist parties must
be carefully considered. Despite the shortage of research on this issue (but see the two
useful contributions by Enrico Gualini 2003, 2004), it is possible to identify three
13 In addition, the elections confirmed the rightist control of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Veneto. The
Left maintained its control of Emilia-Romagna, Marches, Tuscany and Umbria (Baldini and
Vassallo 2001: 92). For Trentino-South Tyrol, where the SVP is the largest party, with twenty-one
out of thirty-five seats, see (Brunazzo 2000: 623. 627).
127
factors strongly suggesting that nationalist parties may have played a major role in the
collapse of coordination mechanisms. First, in the April elections the right seized
control of two additional Ob.2 regions out of the nine where elections were being held.
Two regions may not seem important enough to alter the political equilibrium in the
coordination mechanisms, but a more important change took place in the coalitions
governing the Northern regions. In 2000 the Lega Nord, which had fought the preced-
ing elections alone, joined the Casa delle Libert, resulting in a significant amount of
votes supporting a victory of the right in the Northern regions (Chiaramonte and Vir-
gilio 2000: 533). As a result, in April 2000 a nationalist party entered the government in
four Ob.2 regions, and nationalist parties like lUnion Valdtaine wielded continued
influence while two regions changed hands from a leftist to a rightist coalition.
Secondly, the remaining regional governments adhering to the second agreement of
the CdP on the maps were without exception those where nationalist parties were either
dominant, such as in Val dAosta, or occupied a prominent place in the governing
coalition, such as was the case in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Caponio 2000: 594; Spizzo
2000: 658). This may suggest that the more influential a nationalist party is for a given
constituency, the easier it becomes for its leaders to jeopardize agreements important
for other constituencies, as was the case during the redrawing of the maps. Finally,
because in Italy all major nationalist parties are right leaning, territorial cleavage ne-
cessarily reinforces the right-left cleavage. In sum, considering the controversial so-
lution to the maps problem as the expression of conflict between rightist regions and a
leftist central government, as Gualini does, might be only part of the story. Instead, the
conflict reflects the disparity between two conceptions of territorial relations and of the
Italian state. In coordination mechanisms like the CdP, it was not rightist regions that
bargained with the leftist regions, but Northern versus the Central Italian regions.
The rise of the new programming approach allowed regions to participate in the
Italian quest for a favourable cohesion policy reform as legitimate partners of the
central government. This regional procedural impact was less intense than in Germany,
however. For instance, Italian regions had no access to the Commission, the Council or
its working groups, and at the administrative level, the DPS continued to act as a
gatekeeper restricting access to these European institutions. In addition, the agreements
defined in the working group did not always receive a confirmation from the political
level, the regional PMs assembled in the CdP, or the CSR. The problems witnessed
between the treasury department and the regional PMs indicate that coordination
mechanisms suffered from low levels of institutionalization. This is likely because, if
Italian regions had benefited from access to the Council and its working groups, they
would have realized earlier that the Commission was not ready to accept SLL as a
spatial unit. This could possibly have changed their cognitive orientations as well as
their preferences and may even have avoided the map conflict. Moreover, regions
would have likely not forsaken the new programming approach in early 1999 if co-
ordination had provided them with the possibility of negotiating the controversial maps
directly with the Commission.
In addition to carefully considering coordination mechanisms, a full explanation of
the collapse of the new programming requires an evaluation of nationalist parties. In a
128
country where territorial tensions were increasing, the Italian coordination mechanisms
failed due to their inadequate degree of institutionalization. Nationalist parties, strong
only in the rightist north and northeast, translated this tension into the party system and
reinforced the left-right cleavage. Put another way, the redistributive implications of
the maps pushed coordination mechanisms to the limit, even though party and terri-
torial politics definitively defeated them. In the vocabulary of actor-centered institu-
tionalism, the institutional setting was an extraordinarily demanding one, with requi-
sites of unanimity both for regions to define a common position and for the regions and
the centre to advance a unitary agenda before the Commission. These obstacles, how-
ever, could have been overcome by the interaction orientation solidarity of the leftist
regions, but the electoral victory of nationalist parties further accentuated the indi-
vidualistic interaction orientation of the regions in the North and the East. At this time,
actors resorted to a new institutional setting because, under those conditions, reaching
an agreement within the institutional setting provided by the new programming policy
had become impossible. Whether similar Spanish coordination mechanisms experi-
enced such problems under the strain of influential nationalist parties in the Basque
Country and elsewhere is a question I will tackle in the next section.
Spain
The coordination of the central and regional agendas for cohesion policy reform
quickly became a formidable task due to political and institutional factors. The large
amount of money Spain receives from structural funds makes this issue extraordinarily
complex. Additional elements, as well, complicated the position of the Basque Country
and the other Ob.2 regions. First, because of the large and numerous Spanish Ob.1 areas
encompassing large and populous NUTS II-level regions, such as Andalusia or Va-
lencia, the smaller Ob.2 NUTS III level regions, such as Alava, with less than three
hundred thousand people, became a secondary issue. Second, Spanish PM Jos Maria
Aznar (PP) wanted to extend the cohesion fund at any price in order to emulate his
predecessor, Flipe Gonzlez (PSOE), who had brought about its establishment, in
exchange for Spanish consent to the monetary union. Thirdly, the reform of the CAP
discussed as part of the Agenda 2000 was particularly important for Spain, but pushed
the Ob.2 regions further into the background. Finally, during the years preceding the
reform, the PP government relied on parliamentary support from the PNV, which
represented an alternative channel of communication with the centre.
The Spanish government was unyielding about its strategy to manage this state of
affairs concentrating all decision-making power in the department of the treasury.
Such an approach, not completely unusual in Spain (Molina lvarez de Cienfuegos
2005: 23, 31), eliminated any remaining chance of Ob.2 regions wielding influence on
the centres agenda for the reform that coordination mechanisms based on unanimous
agreements. Additional conflicts emerged from the gradual deterioration in relations
between the PNV and the PP. To demonstrate this fact, this section discusses first to
what extent coordination mechanisms contributed to a common Spanish position, and
129
then it analyses in some detail the preparation of the Basque agenda and its contents.
Finally, it will assess to what extent the Spanish government took up the concerns of
Euskadi and other Ob.2 regions into its position in the Council.
To address these questions, it is first important to note that documents on the ne-
gotiations of the reform between the centre and the regions are almost inexistent.
Materials containing regional demands, joint requests of the centre and the regions, or
even the Spanish agenda for the reform appear to be impossible to find. In fact, the
central government refused to present to the Spanish parliament a document explaining
its strategy for the reform, arguing that publicity would damage their established reform
strategy.
14
Although the attendance of the Spanish ministers at the parliamentary com-
mittee meetings hints at the main elements of the Spanish agenda, the lack of documents
expounding the Spanish position makes it difficult to determine whether the centre took
up regional concerns. This absence strongly suggests that the centre never seriously
considered incorporating regions demands, as required by coordination mechanisms,
because intensive intergovernmental cooperation cannot rely only on non-documented
conversations. In sum, the mere absence of documental sources on common objectives
already suggests that collaboration was less significant than it was in Germany or in
Italy.
In principle, the coordination of the Spanish position on cohesion policy should have
been determined in one of the sector conferences, the CPPF, Consejo de Poltica Fiscal
y Financiera (Ministerio para las Administraciones Pblicas 2000: 55). This body is
specialized in fiscal federalism, although not in cohesion policy. In fact, during the late
1990s the CPPF focused on monetary policy, specifically by monitoring the introduc-
tion of the Euro and its preparatory work conducted at the Economic and Financial
Affairs Council, rather than on cohesion policy. This is the main reason why, since the
first programming period, coordination on cohesion policy has been channelled
through the informal meetings of a subsidiary body, the Foro de Economa Regional.
Originally the Foro was a body established to track the implementation of the funds, but
its mission has since evolved and now includes the ongoing reforms of cohesion policy.
During its meetings, regional officials have an opportunity to express to central gov-
ernments their preferences and expectations regarding the reforms. In turn, the depart-
ment of the treasury updates autonomous communities on new developments in the
Council and its working groups. It is the high-ranking officials of the ministries of
finance that participate in these quarterly roundtables, and not federal or regional
ministers. The Foro does not make binding decisions or any other kind of agreements,
while no minutes of the discussion are taken and no permanent secretariat exists.
Interviewees from the central and regional governments agree that the Spanish de-
partment of the treasury has traditionally occupied a dominant role in the Foro, by
setting the agenda, chairing the meetings, and giving regions scant leeway. It is merely
14 See the explanations of the minister of economy, Rodrigo Rato, to the parliamentary committee on
European affairs on 21 December 1998 in Diario de Sesiones, Comisiones mixtas, VI Legislatura,
n. 127, pp. 2658-2683. To compensate for the unavailability of written sources, I rely on inter-
views with the two officials from the department of economy responsible for the European funds.
One of the officials who assessed the Spanish PM Aznar during the Berlin Summit published an
account of the negotiations (Fernndez Miranda 1999).
130
an exchange of information that takes place in the Foro; true negotiations between the
regions are not even attempted.
Unfortunately for the autonomous communities, such a common regional position is
of crucial importance; however this is not the most significant hurdle preventing re-
gions from gaining the right to make impacts on the Spanish European agenda. Ac-
cording to the Spanish coordination mechanisms, EU decisions bearing upon shared
competencies, such as cohesion policy, the common regional position will be deter-
minant when the central government establishes the Spanish bargaining stance in the
Council. This binding power depends, however, on a unanimous agreement among
regions, as established by coordination mechanisms. This requirement precludes the
possibility of autonomous communities making inroads into the Spanish bargaining
stance. As we saw in chapter two, the obligation for the centre to take up regional
demands appears more relaxed for cohesion policy than for exclusive regional com-
petencies like audiovisual rights. However, coordination mechanisms further establish
that before being obligated to take up regional demands, the centre must agree to the
common regional position (Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez Campo et al 1995: 239-244).
Although the regulation does not go so far in its specifications, it de facto establishes
that if the centre fails to approve the regional position, the power to set the Spanish
bargaining stance in the Council falls back on the centre rather than on the regions. This
apparently illogical stipulation establishes, once more, a double-unanimity require-
ment, first among all regions and then between the regions and the centre. In other
words, the common regional position must be first defined in the regional module, and,
assuming there is one, is determinant in setting the Spanish stance in the Council only if
the centre is able to come to an agreement with the autonomous communities in the
region-centre module.
It is clear, then, that the conditions allowing autonomous communities to access
intra-state channels are almost impossible to fulfil. However, even if the stipulations
established by the coordination mechanisms were satisfied, regions would encounter
further difficulties. In the Spanish context, the problem of faithful implementation and
the negotiators dilemma are particularly relevant (Scharpf 1997: 117-118, 124). All
agreements for which implementation cannot be accomplished immediately so-called
spot contracts demand from negotiators confidence in the other partners readiness
to faithfully implement their part of the deal. However, it is actually up to every
negotiator to decide unilaterally to do so or not. For this reason, regional presence in the
Council, as has prevailed since the early 1990s in the German or Belgian legislation,
and to a limited extent in the Spanish case since 2004, would boost regional confidence
in the centres readiness to act according to the agreements. The corollary of this is that
if autonomous communities were better able to monitor the interventions of central
government officials by participating in the Council, it would increase their readiness to
make compromises.
The second problem is called the negotiators dilemma. Striking a deal between
two parties often requires that at least one actor, the agenda-setter, is ready to expose
itself by revealing its preferences. This makes it easier to reach an agreement, but places
the negotiator in a complicated position at the time of distributing costs and benefits
131
from the deal. In clear contradiction to the preceding requirements, the central gov-
ernment resisted the calls to publicize its agenda for the reform, as mentioned above,
rather than acting as an agenda-setter, although such a decision would have only
marginally reduced the governments absolute predominance within the coordination
mechanisms. To summarize, if we consider the unanimity requirement in both modules,
as well as the impossibility of monitoring whether the centre takes the common regional
position into consideration and the obscurity of the centres reform agenda, it becomes
increasingly clear that the centre has maintained the wherewithal to set and freely
advance its own preferences.
While hitherto I have analysed the difficulties posed by the Spanish coordination
mechanisms, the following pages explore the actual repercussions of the Basque co-
hesion policy agenda on the Spanish plan. In contrast to the Spanish silence on the
matter, the Basque government was clearly vocal about its expectations for the reform.
It prepared and disseminated two documents containing its numerous demands for the
reform, covering all aspects of cohesion policy including rural areas, fisheries, CI, and
the management of funds (Gobierno Vasco 1998, n.d.).
15
In order to highlight certain
peculiarities of the Basque agenda, I present its content according two main axes, the
strategy for its Ob.2 areas and the effort to attract Ob.1 funding to Euskadi.
The Basque strategy for the Ob.2 included demanding a horizontal Ob.3 system,
16
changes in the performance reserve, and a longer transition period. The same three
demands were made by the German Lnder, Tuscany and many other Ob.2 regions
across Europe, but the Basque Ob.2 strategy contained three additional components
that distinguished it from other such regions. First, it sought restrictive rather than loose
Ob.2 eligibility criteria. Through this request the Basque executive attempted to
achieve an increase in the Basque share of Ob.2 funding by excluding other regions that
would not meet strict eligibility. At the time, the problems of Basque industrial decline
were acute, and the unemployment rates were twice the European average (see the
regional portrait in chapter two and Lzaro Araujo 2002: 541), allowing the Basque
government to be sure of the eligibility of its Ob.2 areas even if more stringent criteria
were approved. Of course, several net contributors like Germany, whose regions were
experiencing less severe industrial decline, opposed a tightening of eligibility criteria.
For the same reasons, the Basque government rejected the safety net, a device pro-
ducing a relaxation of the concentration principle and therefore widely welcomed by
many net payers and wealthier Ob.2 regions across the EU. Secondly, the Basque
government was interested in coherence among Ob.2 and 87.3.c areas. The entire
Basque Country had been an Ob.2 area during the preceding programming period and
the government expected that most of it would retain this classification after 2000.
Thus, coherence between both kinds of assisted areas would permit the Basque gov-
ernment to continue granting state aid across all of its territory. In clear contrast to the
Basque situation, most European regions contained only small Ob.2 areas. Therefore,
they wanted to maintain the ability to choose 87.3.c assisted areas outside of their tiny
15 In addition to these documents, I rely on several interviews to reconstruct the Basque agenda for
the reform.
16 See the intervention of the PNV MP in the Comisin Mixta on the 3 June 1998.
132
and scarce Ob.2 districts. Thirdly, to avoid the eventuality of losing Ob.2 areas in the
2000-2006 period, the Basque executive sought the possibility of declaring entire
NUTS II regions, which in Spain overlap with the autonomous communities, as Ob.2
areas. This would have permitted the classification of the whole Basque territory as an
Ob.2 area. In contrast, most European member states and regions favoured smaller Ob.
2 areas in order to undertake structural gerrymandering and obtain areas fulfilling the
eligibility criteria.
The second main axis of the Basque reform agenda was obtaining the classification
of the Left Bank of the Nervin as an Ob.1 area. This was, however, highly unlikely, as
Angela Bourne has convincingly argued (Bourne 2001: 614-615, 2003: 186-211). The
main reason is that the Basque Country had never fulfilled the Ob.1 income criteria,
which should be less than 75 percent of the European average; the lowest was 78.9
percent in 1985 (Prez Gonzalez and Dez Lpez 1999: 13). Second, whereas the Left
Bank encompasses a few districts in the Bilbao metropolitan areas, Ob.1 areas are
drawn at the NUTS II level, which in Spain corresponds to the autonomous commu-
nities. Exceptions to this principle have existed in the past, but in the name of the
concentration principle no exception was granted in the 2000-20006 period (Bachtler,
Downes et al 2000: 24; Bourne 2001: 196-197). Apart from technical, almost insur-
mountable obstacles, the Basque demand was difficult to integrate in the Spanish
agenda for strategic reasons, as I demonstrate further below (Bourne 2001: 199).
To return to a subject raised previously on various occasions, namely the particu-
larities of nationalist parties agendas, the Basque case perfectly echoes the preferences
of the PNV towards reform. The objectives for the reform were defined first inside the
Basque administration by the governmental services involved in European affairs and
regional policy. Later on, local government had the opportunity to express its opinion
on the resulting agenda. While at the time the Basque branch of the PSOE was part of
the governing coalition, a PNV member led the department dealing with cohesion
policy, Hacienda, likely precluding the PSOE from influencing the Basque agenda. A
number of additional details point to the predominance of the PNV throughout the
process. For instance, the PNV government argued that the transborder cooperation
activities financed by the CI Interreg should not be limited to infrastructural and eco-
nomic issues, but instead encompass cultural issues, including support for linguistic
minorities (p. 9). Such a request is a response to the existence of a group of Basque
speakers deprived of linguistic rights in the Southwest of France. A second, even more
telling, example refers to the CI Urban, which tackles the problems of sustainable
development and social regeneration in urban areas. In its document on the reform, the
Basque government dedicated an entire page out of an only thirteen page-long docu-
ment demanding the extension of Urban (Gobierno Vasco 1998: 7-8). This emphasis on
Urban is noteworthy because Urban is a small program with a budget of 700 million
Euros, whose extension would not perceptibly increase structural fund allocations to
the Basque Country. Moreover, urban areas in Euskadi are not large, but they are
affluent. In fact, in the Basque ministry of finance there was some resistance to in-
cluding the reference to Urban in the Basque document on the reform. Despite this
resistance, the issue remained on the agenda. The prominence given to URBAN ap-
133
peared to be an effort to increase the standing in Europe of Josu Ortuondo, a PNV
member and former mayor of Bilbao, who was at the time president of Eurocities. In the
late 1990s, Eurocities engaged in a large lobby operation to force an extension of Urban.
Hence, by endorsing Urban, the Basque government threw its support behind one of the
very few PNV members with European visibility.
All of this leads to the conclusion that the objectives of the Basque Country for the
reform were overly ambitious and even unrealistic. Rather than concentrating on a few
issues like the Rhineland-Palatinate and the Lnder, the Basque agenda was extensive,
as the numerous demands discussed above indicate. As an illustration, the main Basque
paper on the reform documents had approximately twice as many words as the reso-
lution of the Bundesrat comprising the demands of all sixteen Lnder. Moreover, some
Basque arguments, even if technically sound, directly contradicted the few elements of
consensus between the Commission and the member states. For instance, the Basque
government insistently demanded strict criteria for obtaining Ob.2 status, to which
most net contributors like Germany were opposed because it would have prevented
their regions from being eligible for Ob.2 funding. In addition, the Basque government
made the mistake of trying to get the Left Bank classified as an Ob.1 area. Ironically, the
severity of its industrial decline problem put Euskadi in a marginal position during
negotiations.
Having examined the coordination mechanisms for cohesion policy and the Basque
agenda, it is now necessary to analyse its incorporation into the Spanish agenda. While
the Spanish central and regional governments from the Ob.2 areas were able to agree on
a number of rather insignificant issues, they disagreed on the most important ones. The
first group consisted of topics such as the endorsement of Urban and of a sizeable
Interreg, as well as a longer transition period for accession to Ob.2 status and the
coincidence of Ob.2 status with assisted areas eligible for 87.3.c. In contrast, the central
and regional governments disagreed on crucial issues, including stricter eligibility
criteria, which the Spanish government would not support because it would likely have
prevented other Spanish regions governed by the PP like Madrid or the Balearic Islands
from receiving Ob.2 funding. A further conflictive topic was the equal intensity of
support assigned by Interreg to Ob.1 and Ob.2 areas, whose endorsement by the Span-
ish central government would have implied inverting the fundamentals of cohesion
policy from which the country as a whole benefited. Finally, the central government
would have incurred a similar contradiction if it had supported the classification of Left
Bank as Ob.1.
This latter request regarding the Left Bank was the only Basque demand from which
the central government distanced itself publicly. Such a strategy contrasts with the
official position of the treasury department, namely that the centre relayed all the
regional demands to the EU Council of Ministers, but nonetheless gives important
insight into the peculiarities of the conflict on the Left Bank (Bourne 2001: 186 f, 2003:
614). For financial and strategic reasons, Aznars government refused to take up the
Left Bank claim made by the Basque governments, in addition to the technical argu-
ments mentioned above. Calling for its classification as Ob.1 in the Council could lead
to similar demands from other member states, which could then in turn lead to a
134
decrease in the funding available for the large Ob.1 regions in Southern Europe, and
eventually to a reduction in the total funding assigned to Spain. The political atmo-
sphere was not very conductive to cooperation, either. In September 1998, the PNV and
other Basque parties had signed the Lizarra agreement of which the terrorist organ-
ization ETA was also a signatory. Regardless, in view of the refusal of the Spanish
government to discuss the issue in the Council, the PNV orchestrated its own unsuc-
cessful campaign at the EU level. Simultaneously, at home the PNV began to harshly
criticize the Spanish government, which they claimed was harming the Basque gov-
ernments campaign for the Left Bank in the European arena by declining to support the
PNV. The centres resistance to back a demand that was contradictory to its overall
strategy for reform in front of the other member states did not exclude a certain readi-
ness to help out the Left Bank. Before the Berlin Summit, a Left Bank committee
integrated by the members of the PP, PNV and the Basque branch of the PSOE obtained
from the central government the allocation of 700 million Euros for the Left Bank.
Afterwards the criticisms from the Basque Government came to an end (Bourne 2001:
207).
Several lessons can be extracted from the Left Bank polemic. The PP did have good
reasons to find an alternative solution because it was governing in Madrid with the
support of votes from PNV parliamentarians, but the PNV parliamentary support to the
PP government did not yield the results regarding cohesion policy that the Basque
government expected. Even more, it did not avert a public polemic between both
executives that ultimately endangered the PNVs credibility in front of the Commis-
sion. However, the polemic allowed the PNV to promote itself as the only advocate of a
Basque interest it had previously labelled as such, but whose appropriateness was still
highly questionable. The Left Bank conflict highlighted the limits of parliamentary
alliances when trying to shape a complex policy like cohesion without appropriate
administrative routines, namely coordination mechanisms.
It is equally certain that the Basque initiative for the Left Bank was met by resistance
from the centre because it contradicted the key principles of the Spanish approach to the
reform, which was to obtain a large Ob.1 region and an extension of the Cohesion
Fund.
17
The Spanish strategy for the reform emphasized a strict application of the
concentration principle to favour the allocation of the funds to the neediest areas,
namely the Ob.1 areas and those benefiting from the Cohesion Fund (Fernndez Mi-
randa 1999: 159).
18
The centres emphasis on Ob.1 responds to a devastating financial
logic. Spain would eventually receive fourteen times more money from the Ob.1 and
17 Abundant evidence from parliamentary hearings and the testimony of the officials involved in the
negotiation shows that the Spanish government and PP focused on defending the Ob.1 and the
cohesion fund. This evidence permits a reconstruction of the Spanish preferences for the reform
and compensates for the absence of an official agenda. In the parliament, the minister of foreign
affairs had insinuated that the Ob.1 and the Cohesion Fund would predominate on the Spanish
agenda. See the declaration of Abel Matutes during a hearing on 3 June 1998, in Diario de
Sesiones, Comisin Mixta para la UE, n. 107, pp. 2203-4.
18 When the same Spanish official evaluated the Berlin agreement, he celebrated an increase of the
assignment to the Ob.1 from approximately 66 % up to 69.7 % of structural allocations and the rise
of the Spanish share from the Cohesion Fund by 10.38 points, but did not mention the Ob.2
(Fernndez Miranda 1999: 160, 161).
135
four times more from the Cohesion Fund than from the Ob.2 (Leonardi and Nanetti
2001: 355). Conscious of the fact that it was impossible to win on every controversial
issue, the centre prioritized aspects like the Ob.1 and the Cohesion Fund where more
funding was available, and neglected the less lucrative Ob.2. The Spanish officials were
perfectly aware of the divergent interests of Spanish Ob.1 and Ob.2 regions.
19
The same
disregard of the Ob.2 areas informed the actions of the PP members working in Brus-
sels. An influential British MEP remarked that Miguel Arias Caete, the chair of the
Committee on Regional Policy, worried only about agricultural issues and fisheries,
not at all about the Ob.2. Interestingly, the strategy of the Spanish government of
emphasizing the Ob.1 was quite reasonable for some Basque officials. Commenting on
the consequences of the Lizarra agreement and the subsequent deterioration in relations
between the central and Basque governments, the assistant to an MEP from the PNV
remarked from a practical point of view, the bad relations [between the PNV and the
PP, AML] bore no consequences. The central government neglected Objective 2 re-
gions just because it was impossible to win out on everything. In sum, the enormous
amount of money available for the Ob.1 and for the Cohesion Fund made it easy for the
centre to ignore Ob.2.
Ob.2 regions like the Basque Country had no chance of opposing the pull of the 40
billion Euros assigned to Spanish Ob.1 funding by resorting to coordination mechan-
isms. In this case, the requirement of unanimous agreement among regions and in-
compatible agendas devised by nationalist parties focused exclusively on their con-
stituencies led to a negligible Basque impact on the Spanish position in the Council. In
procedural terms, regions were not considered as valid interlocutors, at least not to the
same extent that the Lnder or even the Italian regions were. Indubitably, the Foro was
much less effective than were the German coordination mechanisms established by 23
BL or the Italian new programming policy. In spite of Basque lobbying efforts and
protests, the central government endorsed only demands compatible with its emphases
on Ob.1 status and the cohesion fund. The strong position held by the PNV as a party
supporting the central government served to obtain some financial support for the Left
Bank, but failed to compensate Euskadi for coordination mechanisms requiring unani-
mous agreements. Just as the centre was capable of curtailing any initiative dangerous
to its agenda, the PNV maintained total control over the Basque agenda for the reform.
In Euskadi, it seems as if the self-interest of the PNV was identical to the Basque. Not
only was the Basque agenda self-centred, it was also overambitious and for this reason,
difficult to advance. Fewer and more realistic goals would have increased the Basque
Countrys chances of achieving at least some of them. However, the behaviour of the
PNV is to some extent understandable. The requirement of unanimity embodied in the
coordination mechanisms practically ruled out real and productive negotiations be-
tween the central and regional governments. Nonetheless, the individualistic orienta-
tion characteristics of nationalist parties permitted the PNV to force the situation even
19 The Spanish state secretary for EU affairs, Ramn de Miguel, insinuated in front of a parliamen-
tary committee that some Spanish Ob.2 regions would be happy if the Ob.1 did not receive the
share of the structural funds proposed by the commission. See the transcript of the hearing on 30
June 1997 in Diario de Sesiones, Comisin mixta para la UE, n. 96, p. 2004.
136
more and resort to the coalition power of its parliamentarians in Madrid to advance its
agenda for the reform. Should this strategy be unsuccessful, as it was, the PNV could
always blame the centre and its monopoly over EU negotiations for its failure, as it did.
These findings may now be contrasted with those drawn from the sections on Germany
and Italy.
Conclusions
The cases highlighted above demonstrate that cohesion seems to be too much of a
competitive policy field to allow for regions to wield influence. The institutional
translation of the preceding is that coordination mechanisms impose upon regions more
demanding requirements than those in force for audiovisual policy, which results from
a tighter control from the centre over the member states bargaining position. Even the
German regions experienced difficulties in influencing the centres view on any de-
cisive element of the federal agenda, although the Lnder were able to define a common
regional position and to participate together in the preparation of the German bargain-
ing stance in the Council, thereby making an input that deserves to be qualified as a
substantive impact. Similarly, Italian regions benefited from the new programming
policy that opened up an opportunity to follow the negotiation of the reform in real time
and collaborate with the centre. The regions may even have shaped the Italian agenda
on a number of issues, which would justify labeling their impact on the Italian bar-
gaining stance as not only procedural but also substantive. Still, compared to German
coordination mechanisms, Italys new programming policy proved to be unstable and
unable to contain the conflict on the Ob.2 and assisted areas maps. This failure has
probably put an end to the new programming approach. In contrast to German and
Italian regions, the autonomous communities of Spain failed to achieve a procedural
impact, let alone a substantive one. Domestic coordination in Spain proved to be much
more difficult than suggested by the label of cooperative federalism (Brzel 2002:
147. 207): collaboration between centre and periphery was restricted to meetings at the
administrative level in an informal body and negotiations of some paltry concessions to
Ob.2 regions. The interests of Ob.1 regions and the extension of the Cohesion Fund
absorbed the energies of the Spanish delegation to the Council, which in turn neglected
the concerns of Ob.2 regions.
If we phrase the conclusions of this chapter according to actor-centered institution-
alism, substantial regional impacts on the cohesion policy agenda of central govern-
ments remains exceptional because of the institutional setting. More specifically, only
modes of interaction recognizing the predominance of regions over the centres agenda
like in Germanys hierarchical coordination of audiovisual policy would permit
regions to make inroads in a member states position. Instead, central governments
across the EU hold the last word on issues with financial implications like cohesion by
subjecting agreements to the unanimity rule. This is why, although German coordin-
ation mechanisms for cohesion policy where centre and regions share powers appear to
leave a chance for regions to access intra-state channels, the Lnder were only able to
137
influence the German position in the Council when the interests of some of them, taken
up in the common regional position, overlapped with those of the centre. Such was the
case when Kohl incorporated the concerns of Lnder governed by the parties within his
CDU/CSU-FDP governing coalition. Coordination mechanisms in Italy and Spain
experienced additional difficulties at an earlier moment in the upwards decision-mak-
ing process because their constituent units were either unable to define a common
regional position, as in Spains case, or ended up rejecting the agreement that they had
supported, as occurred in Italy. This happened because coordination mechanisms in
Italy and Spain are based on regimes, rather than on joint decisions, and on the unan-
imity rule rather than consensual decision-making. Additionally, supplementary hur-
dles were born out of individualistic interaction orientation characteristic of nationalist
parties, an expression of the territorial cleavage. At the same time, it appears that the
clout of nationalist parties is inadequate to compensate for the deficiencies of coord-
ination mechanisms. To illustrate this point, the Basque government was unable to
impose its agenda for the Left Bank on the Spanish central government in spite of its
parliamentary coalition with the PP. Even more paradoxically, the Tuscan and other
executives from the central Italys red belt of leftist governments did not benefit from
the existence of a centre-of-left Italian government, but had to make concessions over
the new maps to the Northern regions in order to completely place the blame on their
party comrades in Rome. By contrast, some CDU and CSU Lnder governments did
benefit from their party links with the governing coalition at the centre. In other words,
party politics cannot replace long-standing coordination mechanisms in defining
agreements and common agendas. The next chapter examines how these issues influ-
enced regions ability to shape the 1999 cohesion policy reform.
138
Chapter 6:
Advancing Cohesion Policy Agendas through Extra-State Channels
Since the late 1980s, regions and regional associations have been involved in the reform
of structural funds through intensive lobbying of the Commission and the European
Parliament. This increase in lobbying efforts, fuelled by the large sums of money at
stake and the availability of several channels of interest representation, took the form of
exchanges between regions and the European institutions through the CoR, regional
associations, the Commission and MEPs. Some of these channels allow regions to
express their specific concerns to the institutions, avoiding the trade-offs necessary to
form a shared agenda in collective bodies such as the CoR. As a result, during the
negotiation of the 1999 reform, European decision-makers were subject to a flurry of
lobbying that made it difficult for individual regions to make their concerns heard.
Scholars with different theoretical interests have sought to explain extra-state re-
gional activity during the period of the reform, focusing specifically on whether bene-
fits can be achieved through such lobbying attempts. Since the mid 1990s the work of
Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe has gained a wide following for their explanation of
cohesion policy implementation through multilevel governance approaches (Hooghe
1996, 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001 a; Marks 1992, 1993, 1996 a). Other authors
concerned with interest representation (Greenwood 1997, 2003; Grote 1996; Mazey
1995; Mazey and Mitchell 1993), and with regions more generally (Jones and Keating
1995; Keating 1985 b, 1995 a; Loughlin, Morata et al 1998), have devoted attention to
the reform, and to the implementation of cohesion policy in particular. In spite of the
abundance of research, the vital question of whether regions ultimately shape cohesion
policy remains controversial. In the context of this book, the question can be rephrased
as how coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties bear on the use of extra-state
channels like the EP by regions, as well as on the yields that regions obtain from their
lobbying efforts.
In this chapter, I further analyse two ideas that have been discussed above that
regions benefit from sharing a common agenda, not only in their relations with their
respective central government, but also when lobbying at the EU level. The sections of
this chapter successively explore regional interest representation efforts through re-
gional associations, the CoR, the Commission and the EP.
Regional Associations
In the past, scholars have noted occasions where lobbying by regional associations has
achieved a policy impact on reforms. However, lobbying efforts by regional associ-
ations were not as successful in influencing the 1999 reform (McAleavey 1994). This
139
section is principally concerned with assessing whether regions are still capable of
shaping EU cohesion policy through regional associations and determining which
institutions are receptive to the concerns of such associations.
The evidence used to evaluate these two main questions stems from a range of
associations selected either because of their particularly representative membership or
for their focus on structural problems. The associations examined here are the Assem-
bly of European Regions (AER), the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions
(CPMR), the association of European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI), and
the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). Some of these associations are
strongly linked with the regions analyzed in my case studies; the Rhineland-Palatinate
is a member of AEBR, and in 1999 the Basque Country was a member of AER, AEBR,
and CPMR. Tuscany was also a member of AER during this time and its regional PM
was the president of CRPM. This present section successively explores the agendas and
lobbying efforts of the AER, CPMR, RETI, and AEBR.

The AER was founded in 1985 as an alternative body to the Conference of European
Municipalities and Regions, which was controlled by local authorities. Until the es-
tablishment of the CoR in 1994, the AER possessed a certain importance, as regions had
few alternative channels available for making their voices heard. In fact, the importance
of the Assembly lies in its status as the first instrument created by regions to negotiate
regional agendas separately from central governments. (Castro Ruano 2003: 65). Its
most significant achievement was its support for the Commission in the process leading
from the foundation of the Council of European Regions and Municipalities in 1985 to
the establishment of the CoR in 1994 (Castro Ruano 2003: 71). The AER was also very
active during the period in which it was headed by Jordi Pujol, who served as Catalan
Prime Minister between 1980 and 2003. The clout of the organization was diminished
in the wake of the AERs failure to shape the Amsterdam Treaty in a way more
favourable to regions. Its importance was also reduced by its failure to fulfil its main
objective, the institutionalisation of the EU third level in a regional chamber, the CoR.
Since the early 1990s, the number of regions participating in the AER has decreased
significantly.
1
The activities of the AER during the 1999 reform reveal the typical problems facing
associations attempting to coordinate structural policy agendas. While cohesion policy
is far removed from the main focus of AER activity, in 1998 the institutional committee
of the AER established an ad-hoc body whose purpose was to develop strategies to
influence EU policy and to reinforce contacts with the European Commission and
Parliament (Assembly of European Regions 1998: 2). Additionally, the committee on
regional policy of the AER defined as one of its targets that year the development of a
strategy to collaborate with the EU, and especially with the Commission (Assembly of
1 By 2003 the decrease has been so pronounced that the executive bodies of the Assembly have not
made use of a disposition in its rules decreeing the expulsion of members that refuse to pay the
annual quota. Spanish and particularly German regions have left the association; only a few regions
such as Bavaria, Baden-Wrttemberg, Catalonia, and the Basque Country are partial exceptions to
this.
140
European Regions 1998: 3). According to the AER, this would contribute to its goal of
continuing the dialogue initiated with a 1997 AER paper that received a positive
reaction from the Commission. However, the AER was unable to implement this am-
bitious agenda for the reform. In 1998, the year that the proposals for the regulations
were published, the working group did not meet with the Commission. The following
year, the AER committee on regional policy neglected to prepare further documents on
regional policy and did not attempt to lobby the European institutions. The lack of
adequate contacts in the European institutions, which in 1999 were still being de-
veloped (Assembly of European Regions 1999), and the marginal character of the
AERs regional policy agenda, focused on trans-European networks, territorial plan-
ning and environment (Assembly of European Regions 2000: 3), have led to the per-
ception of the AER as an irrelevant actor during the 1999 reform; the consequence is its
insignificance as a channel of regional interest representation. Without continuity and
the right contacts, its lobbying activities did not constitute a valid channel through
which to advance regional views.
A second member of the Platform, the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime
Regions of Europe (CPMR) was founded in 1973, and is organized into five geo-
graphical commissions,
2
a General Secretariat, and its working groups. The Confer-
ence has since concentrated its activities on governance, structural policy, and sectoral
policies such as transport and environment. Among these activities are meetings with
EU and member state officials, in addition to cooperating with European institutions on
their analyses and drafts. The CPMRs mission also requires keeping up with devel-
opments in European politics in order to keep their members informed; it reacts to these
developments, for example, by answering to the Commissions reform proposals on
structural policy or to the White Paper on Governance. Finally, the Conference organ-
ises seminars and contributes to the establishment of links between regions. One of the
regions in my case selection, Tuscany, occupied the presidency of the association in
2002. Indeed, a regional official suggested that this does not translate into hopes for
increased cohesion policy allocations for Tuscany, but instead may serve to improve the
chances of gaining access to decision-makers in the Commission and the EP. It appears
that regions without excessive political weight, but with well-placed representatives in
influential positions within regional associations, may gain at least improved access to
decision-makers, if not actual influence.
The Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions is composed of regions from
the European periphery, and is marked by its focus on policy rather than institutional
issues. Peripheral location, or being an outermost region, constitutes a disadvantage
recognized by the Treaty (154.2 and 279.2 TEC). Furthermore, until 1999 the Ob.6
areas tackled the problems of the northernmost EU regions, and since 1999 the ERDF
has included the problems derived from peripheral location in its scope (Art. 2.1.b.i).
Although these traits make the CPMR more apt to engage in the regional policy dis-
cussion than the AER, its diverse membership likely makes it extremely difficult to
define specific agendas. In fact, between 1994 and 1999, the CPMR represented the
2 Information on the structure of the CPMR is available from its website at Conference of Peripheral
and Maritime Regions of Europe http://www.cpmr.org/.
141
regional recipients of about 74 percent of the Ob.1 funding, 47 percent of Ob.2 funding
and 45 percent Ob.5 b funding (Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions 1997:
8). However, the mixed composition implies that in order to align its objectives for the
1999 reform, the association had to overcome the distributive conflict between Ob.1
and Ob.2 regions.
Initially, the CPMR set wide and ambitious objectives for the reform. These ob-
jectives included obtaining an appropriate budget for cohesion policy, counteracting
the Commissions Agenda 2000 effort to reduce its share of the European GDP from
0.46 percent to 0.36 percent, the inclusion of peripheral geographic areas among the
eligibility criteria, and an increase in the allocations for Community Initiatives from six
percent of all the structural funds proposed by the Commission up to nine percent. This
was aimed at increasing the allocations for Interreg, a CI of great importance for the
association. Incidentally, the CPMR requests did not mention the demand of the Basque
and the other Ob.2 autonomous communities for a de-coupling of the intensity support
from the objective area. Apart from maintaining contacts with the Commission before
the publication of the proposals, the CPMR had prepared a document suggesting
amendments, which was presented to both the CoR and the EP. In 1999 the CPMR
collaborated with the Commission in a conference on Interreg III with organizations
involved in regional cooperation. For its lobbying effort on Agenda 2000, the associ-
ation received only a limited return, as the disappointed tone of a note evaluating the
Berlin Summit reveals: In a situation where one could have expected to count on an
increase in the community effort in favour of cohesion () in fact it is the very opposite
that has been decided in Berlin. (Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions n.d:
1).
Since the 1980s a number of regions with industrial conversion problems have
formed part of European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI), a network of re-
gions suffering from industrial decline. The reason why I discuss this association here is
that during the late 1980s and early 1990s RETI achieved moderate success as a
European lobby (McAleavey 1994: 4). According to Paul McAleavey, RETI convinced
the Commission to fund industrial conversion. Later, when the EU was considering the
elimination of Ob.2 in 1992, RETI mobilized and secured the existence of a cohesion
policy objective favouring regions in industrial decline during the programming period
1994-1999; this lobby action constituted the most cited example of a successful oper-
ation by a regional association (Castro Ruano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 88;
Loughlin 1997; Weyand 1997).
In spite of its past achievements, none of the more than twenty practitioners I inter-
viewed cited RETI as an actor that had made a significant contribution to the 1999
reform or provided valuable information or arguments. Only Josu Ortuondo, a PNV
parliamentarian involved in Eurocities and the Committee on Regional Policy of the
EP, acknowledged that RETI had contacted him to argue in favour of establishing a new
CI for industrial conversion as a compensation for the extinction of the CIs RECHAR,
CONVER and others. The associations failure to advance its agenda could have two
additional explanations. First, having fulfilled its former aims, and in view of the
cohesion policy transformation, RETI may have needed to redefine its agenda. How-
142
ever, the association apparently failed to do so. Second, RETIs demands became
marginal as a result of the consensus on reducing the number of CIs in the name of the
concentration principle. This failure may explain why, by the end of 2004, the associ-
ations office in Brussels was shut down, followed by the closing of the association as a
whole in 2005.
3
The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), founded in 1971, is one of
the oldest regional organizations. In the late 1990s, it successfully lobbied the Com-
mission to finance Interreg, a program for border regions to prepare for further inte-
gration (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 88). Throughout its history, AEBR has demon-
strated a strong interest in transborder cooperation in the EU and Interreg. In particular,
it has aspired to represent its members interests and to inform European bodies ()
about cross-border issues (Malchus 1998: 6). It is the only organization focussing on
frontiers, encompassing approximately 85 out of 115 regions and border regions.
4
On
its website, the AEBR claims that it cooperates on a regular basis with the European
Parliament and its committees, and with the highest levels of the Commission. AEBR
has focused on cohesion policy including Community Initiatives, spatial planning,
trans-European networks, the impact of enlargement on cross-border issues, and has
even addressed institutional issues. These diverse ties indicate that AEBR is likely the
most institutionalized regional association.
Between 1996 and 2004, Joan Vallv was the president of AEBR. Vallv was for-
merly a minister in the Catalan executive and at the time an MEP. During the late 1990s,
his presence in the Committee on Regional Policy provided the association with priv-
ileged access to the European Parliament and represented the interests of its member
regions with regard to the regulation of Interreg III. The interest representation efforts
of the AEBR before the European Parliament allegedly contributed to the establish-
ment of an EU budget line for trans-border cooperation and to the amendment of the
ERDF, particularly Article 4. These two changes made it possible to provide financing
from the pilot projects provision of the framework regulation for the implementation
of trans-border cooperation.
5
In spite of its earlier success, the contribution of AEBR
was limited in its defence of region-specific Ob.2 concerns related to Interreg. Because
some Ob.1 regions are members of AEBR, the association could not support the de-
mand of the Basque Country and other Ob.2 regions for Interreg granting equal levels of
support intensity both to Ob.1 and Ob.2 regions, as Vallv acknowledged. Currently,
the AEBR has focused on introducing the views of frontier regions on transborder
cooperation into the discussions at the EU level, rather than trying to make direct
impacts on EU decisions.
The evidence discussed affirms that regional associations did not contribute de-
cisively to advancing regional agendas during the 1999 reform. Without continuity and
3 After the EU passed the new regulations for the 2000-2006 programming period, RETI made
another effort to relaunch, but by the end of 2004, the association office in Brussels closed and so
did the association during 2005. Information on these developments was available at http://
www.eira.org (accessed February 2005).
4 Information on the history of the AEBR available from its website at http://www.aebr.net/ (ac-
cessed November 2009).
5 See the website of AEBR at http://www.aebr.net/ (accessed November 2009).
143
adequate contacts, AERs lobbying activities were all but futile. In the case of CPMR
and RETI, whose agenda for the reform focused on obtaining an increase in funds
allocated to the CIs, the Berlin agreements were disappointing, as the CPMR admitted.
When asked about their contacts with AER representatives Atlantic Arc, AEBR MEPs
involved in the 1999 reform commented that they had met many or numerous
regional associations. Only when strong links with the associations existed, such as was
the case in Vallvs dual mandate, were my interviewees able to name specific
associations and their demands. This indicates that the associations had an insignificant
impact on MEPs and a similarly scant influence on outputs. Although the evidence
hitherto examined is not enough to support a firm opinion, it appears that the trans-
formation of cohesion in the late 1990s, in particular the stricter application of the
concentration principle, severed the opportunity structure for regions to shape cohesion
policy through these associations, which was linked to the numerous CIs. In short,
associations like RETI flourished for as long as the distributive element of cohesion
policy constituted an incentive for regions to maintain the institutional stability of these
offspring.
The Committee of the Regions
In order to receive inputs from regions on cohesion policy, the Commission established
the Council of Regional and Local Authorities, the predecessor to the CoR. In its
Articles 148 and 161 TEC recognizes the special links of the CoR to cohesion policy
and establishes that the Council must consult the regions before attempting to reform
the allocation of structural funds. This appeared to reserve for the CoR an important role
in the reform of cohesion policy negotiated after its establishment in 1994, while Ob.2
regions were also authorized use this body to advance their agenda for the 1999 reform
(Blanke 2002: 7). In order to determine whether regions shaped the reform through the
CoR, this section examines the CoRs opinions on the reform, the contribution to these
opinions of Ob.2 regions in my case selection, and the reception of those documents in
the Commission and the EP.

In autumn 1998, the CoR released three opinions, one on each regulation proposal
(Committee of the Regions 1998 b, c, d). From the point of view of the regions in my
case selection, the CoRs opinions have largely been a mixed bag: many important
demands from the Rhineland-Palatinate and Tuscany, and in particularly those from the
Basque agenda, were absent from the CoR opinions. For instance, in the opinion
concerning the ERDF (Committee of the Regions 1998 c: 13.3.1), the CoR supported,
with reservations, one of the most important objectives of the Rhineland-Palatinate, the
extension of CONVER, but did not include this demand in its more consequential
opinion on the general provisions. Of the two other principal demands from the
Rhineland-Palatinate, the CoR opinion on the general provisions sponsored one
favoured by all Lnder, the regions request for continued assistance to rural areas of the
144
former 5 b areas, but not the extension of transitional support, which the Basque gov-
ernment did actually pursue (1998 b: 2.1.1.6, 2.1.1.12, 1998 c: 3.2.2).
Similarly, the CoR paid no heed to the most important Basque demands. First, the
regional chamber ignored the Basque appeal for a strict application of the concentration
principle, as well as its criticisms of the safety net. Instead, it decidedly supported the
efforts of Germany and Italy to de-couple the maps of Ob.2 and 87.3.c assisted areas,
thereby effectively undermining Basque pleas for an overlap between both maps
(Committee of the Regions 1998 b: 2.1.1.7). However, the CoR did ultimately endorse
some Basque requests regarding CIs, and more specifically, Interreg
6
and Urban
(1998 b: 1.5, 2.1.16, 1998 c: 5.2.4.12), as well as the extension of the Ob.3 , which was
uncontroversial among regions (1998 b: 2.1.1.9). Interestingly, some passages of the
CoRs opinion contradicting the Basque agenda the safety net, transitional support,
flexible sizes for Ob.2 areas, and de-coupling of the regional policies of member states
and the EU perfectly overlapped with the Tuscan preferences.
Thus far, my analysis of the opinions has shown that the CoR paid limited attention
to the agendas of the regions of my case selection. These regions are considered in the
European context as resourceful in terms of institutions (Rhineland-Palatinate), effi-
ciency (Tuscany) or self-rule (Basque Country). Nonetheless, they wielded no influ-
ence on the opinions of the CoR. Three reasons could explain this. First, Ob.2 regions
left a tiny imprint on the opinions of the CoR simply because they were not involved in
the drafting process. While an effort was made to include the same number of local and
regional representatives and of rapporteurs from southern and northern European re-
gions, and Ob.1 and Ob.2 areas, rapporteurs from Ob.2 areas were delegates from local
governments rather than regional ones.
7
Given the demographic, political and eco-
nomic weight of Ob.2 regions like North Rhine-Westphalia, Flanders or Catalonia, the
absence of representatives from these or the Ob.2 areas in my case selection from the
list of rapporteurs can only be explained through a lack of interest on the part of the
regions. When asked about the reasons behind their passivity, several interviewees
argued that the CoR was at the time an immature institution unable to wield influence.
Even more revealing was a Tuscan officials laconic observation that the CoR defends
cohesion policy, but not the Tuscan interests.
Second, the CoR opinions ignored or left undecided all issues with redistributive
consequences for the allocation of money between Ob.1 and Ob.2 areas. This is likely
due to the zero-sum logic of cohesion policy, which implies that all funding allocated to
the Ob.1 regions is lost funding for Ob.2 regions. For example, the CoR did not demand
a longer transition period for Ob.2, merely because the Ob.1 regions feared that this
6 must give priority attention to those areas and regions whose common minority language and/or
culture straddle the border between them. (Committee of the Regions 1998 c: 5.2.4.12). However,
the appeals from the Basque Country and three autonomous communities for a separation of the
intensity of support obtained from Interreg and the classification of the recipient region as an Ob. 1
or 2 area had no echo in the CoR.
7 The rapporteurs for the general provisions were both from Ob.1 regions, the Galician PM Manuel
Fraga and a minister from Saxony-Anhalt. For the ERDF the PM from an Ob.1 region, Andalusia,
and a Finish major (Ob.2) acted as drafters. For the ESF a similar combination occurs, a Portuguese
member (Ob.1) and a British local government representative (Ob.2).
145
would imply the allocation of more funding to finance the extended transition period.
Similarly, the CoR kept silent about a polemical recital of the general provisions that
included a suggestion about how to allocate shares of Ob.2 funding to the diverse sub-
groups inside Ob.2 like cities and rural areas (European Commission 1998 b: 15). A
third negative consequence is a result of the CoRs policy logic and the way in which it
has operated. In order to obtain a majority of votes, CoR opinions have made too many
concessions to its members in the form of references to specific problems, which
frequently made the opinions self-contradictory and cancelled out their alleged com-
mitment to the concentration of support in the neediest areas (1998 b: 1.1.3, 2.1.1.3).
8
The regional chamber also pleaded for similar criteria to determine cohesion and
competition policy areas and simultaneously proclaimed the autonomy of member
states and regions to develop their own sub-regional economic policy (1998 b:
2.1.1.7). Thus, the CoRs credibility was undermined by its indecision, which weak-
ened regions chances of shaping the cohesion policy reform.
In view of these weaknesses, it is not surprising that CoR opinions received very
limited attention from the Commission and the EP. Their impact is the subject of the
next two paragraphs. Of the three EU institutions, the Commission has the most robust
links to the CoR. These links are particularly strong between the CoR and the DG
Region. During the stage in which the Commission was preparing its proposals for the
regulations, the CoR maintained numerous contacts with the European executive.
These meetings and workshops brought together members of the CoR and the Com-
mission and likely contributed to shaping the resulting proposals by making it clear to
the Commission how the regions would react to the different elements of the Com-
missions proposals. Despite some overlap between both actors preferences,
9
the
influence of the regional chamber cannot be taken for granted, as the Commission may
have maintained those preferences for reasons other than satisfying the CoR. In add-
ition, the Commission frequently followed the CoR on topics where there was a broader
consensus, such as the reduction in the number of CIs, and included in its proposals
some polemical claims from the CoR, most likely in order to please the regions and
obtain a bargaining chip in subsequent negotiations with the EP and the Council. Even
more telling is the fact that the Commission successfully combated some of the more
sensible CoR demands, such as reinforced powers for the monitoring committees and a
more balanced regulation of partnership (1998 b: 2.4.1.2, 2.1.3.3).
8 In the opinion on the general provisions examples abound, e.g. sharing a border with an accession
country as an eligibility criterion for the Ob.2, a long-standing Bavarian demand, or demands for
enhanced assistance to cities in industrial decline, or attempts to use density of inhabitants or ageing
population as justification of support for rural areas, or consideration of territories bordering Ob.1
regions as an additional eligibility criterion (2.1.1.6).
9 In its opinion on the general provisions (1998 b), the CoR highlighted the issues on which the
Commissions proposals and the preferences of the CoR overlapped. Among other topics, the
regional chamber evaluated positively the effects of the Commissions proposals for the future of
cohesion policy (1.3), reduction in the number of CIs (1.3), the proposals emphasis on Ob.1
(2.1.1.1), the new Ob.2 integrating four kinds of problem areas (1.4, 1.5, 2.1.1.2), the provisions for
a transition period (2.1.1.3), for a safety net (2.1.1.5), the role of labour market indicators as
eligibility criteria (2.1.1.6), and the new Ob.3 for human resources (2.1.1.8).
146
Aside from these early contacts between the CoR and the Commission, the views of
the CoR were simply not taken into consideration. Two out of the four most influential
members of the Committee on Regional Policy (CRP) that I interviewed acknowledged
having collaborated with the CoR, but were unable to mention any specific issue in
which the opinion of the CoR was decisive. In a similar statement, the chair of the CRP,
Miguel Arias, said that the members of his committee were familiar with the opinions of
the CoR despite of the generality of their demands. But whereas these three sources may
have just responded politely, in view of their current and former responsibilities, the
remaining CRP members I interviewed admitted off-the-record to having paid no heed
to the CoR; one such member even remarked that the CoR has to do a lot of work in
order to be taken into account. An assistant to one of the rapporteurs firmly asserted,
the EP has never paid particular attention to the CoR, which is an advisory body for the
Council. Finally, another member of the CRP affiliated to a Catalan nationalist party,
declared it is sad to admit it, but the opinions of the CoR played a minor role in the
proposals () of the European Parliament. As it seems, the EP and its CRP paid even
less attention to the CoR than did the Commission.

This leads to the impression that the opinions of the CoR received very limited
consideration on the part of the Commission and had no weight for the EP. In part, this
may have been due to the difficulties that the CoR experienced in aggregating the
regional agendas, and due to the perception that its opinions were poorly articulated and
inconsistent. As for the regions in my case selection, the CoR included in its opinion
some of the demands of the Rhineland-Palatinate and Tuscany, which were part of their
respective countries common regional position and closer to the regional minimal
common denominator, while simultaneously overlooking Basque preferences like the
strict application of the concentration principle. The Basque agenda had been set in the
absence of collaboration with other Spanish regions and turned out to be marginal to the
overall discussion. In spite of all their flaws, the opinions of the CoR clearly conveyed
two demands of the Ob.2 regions: an expansion of the eligibility criteria that would ease
the strict application of the concentration principle, and improvements in the manage-
ment of the funds. It was the EP, not the Commission, that would assume this part of the
regional agenda, as the next two sections demonstrate.
Contact with the Commission
As the Commission is the only body with the right to propose new regulations, it
decisively shapes the final outcome of any possible reform. This is important, because
the Commission also administers structural funds, and may particularly approve or
reject the Ob.2 and competition policy maps. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 1988
and 1993 reforms of cohesion policy prompted regional offices in Brussels to inten-
sively lobby the Commission. These contacts with the Commission have been con-
sidered by scholars as an indicator of an alliance between the supranational and regional
governments (Hooghe 1995 b; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Keating 1995 b; Marks 1992;
147
Mazey and Mitchell 1993; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Prez Tremps 1995).
Nonetheless, scholars have discovered in more recent years that even when regions
contact the Commission they rarely aspire to make an impact on its decisions. Instead,
regular contact between the regions and the Commission served only to keep regions
informed of internal developments and the flow of information (Jeffery 1997 b:
192-193; Marks, Haesly et al 2002 b: 15).
Some preliminary evidence confirms Gary Markss and Charlie Jefferys claims
about the significance of those contacts, but even if their arguments are accurate, the
changing relationships between regions and the Commission during the 1999 reform
would require additional examination. Admittedly, regions rarely influence cohesion
policy through the Commission, simply because they do not intend to do so, as several
of my interviewees acknowledged. However, regional officials in Brussels distin-
guished clearly between their meetings with Commission officials and the interviews
between regional politicians and high-ranking members of the Commission on the
basis that such sessions have clearly different objectives. In meetings with Commission
bureaucrats, regional representatives have confessed to harbouring low expectations
since any agreements fostered in such a setting are not binding and all regions hold
comparable meetings with the Commission. By contrast, the same officials were more
confident of the effect of encounters between elected officials, such as the regional PM,
and high-ranking members of the Commission, such as a commissioner or a general
director. This is why, when an issue of importance for a region is at stake, the delegation
in Brussels organizes a visit of a regional minister or the regional PM to Brussels so that
he or she can meet decision-makers in the Commission and possibly deliver a paper
expressing the regions concerns. If the issue under discussion is complex and critical,
previous preparatory contacts between the regional office and the Commission often
take place. Thus, it could be that regional lobbying during the 1999 reform was not
merely a strategy to obtain information but was also intended to influence the Com-
missions ultimate decision.
Prior to the 1993 reform the Rhineland-Palatinate maintained intense contacts with
the Commission on the issue of CONVER, but these communications were less nu-
merous in the late 1990s. A few years earlier, the Rhineland-Palatinate made a tremen-
dous effort to lobby the Commission in order to obtain a CI promising to address the
problems derived from the withdrawal of troops. Florian Gerster, regional minister for
European affairs between 1991 and 1994, orchestrated an operation to obtain cohesion
funding in the form of the CI CONVER. In order to convince the Commission of the
vast dimensions of the tasks that conversion regions like the Rhineland-Palatinate were
about to undertake, the regional executive invited the commissioner for regional policy,
Bruce Millan, to visit the region, and took him to the former military complexes.
Largely because of these efforts, the Rhineland-Palatinate, Brandenburg and several
other regions benefited from CONVER during the 1994-1999 programming period. In
contrast, in the late 1990s the regional government maintained only intermittent con-
tacts with the Commission with respect to CONVER, although military conversion was
no less important to the regional economy. The main reason for this turn-around was the
lack of receptivity on the part of the Commission, which had diametrically changed its
148
position and was now clearly against CONVER and any other CI that encroached upon
the concentration principle. After realizing the extent of the Commissions resistance,
the Rhineland-Palatinate curtailed its lobbying efforts. As an alternative, the German
Land signalled that to include conversion problems among Ob.2 eligibility criteria
would be an acceptable solution, which the Commission eventually agreed to (1998 b:
art 4).
In the case of the Basque government, abundant resources were invested in lobbying
the Commission, but these efforts failed to be persuasive. The domestic causes of the
Left Bank breakdown were discussed in chapter five, but the Basque Governments
chances for success were also hindered by external causes. Although the Basque gov-
ernment tried to advance other demands
10
through high-level contacts with the Com-
mission, including visits from the Basque PM Ardanza to Brussels, its efforts ultimately
failed for two reasons. First, the Basque government insisted on designating Ob.1 areas
as NUTS III, which the Commission, member states, and even the CoR had agreed to
eliminate. Second, the Basque proposals and strategies were fundamentally at odds
with the Spanish agenda for the reform. Incidentally, resistance to the Basque demands
was widespread even within the Commission where every member of the DG Regional
Policy was against the idea of exceptions to the eligibility criteria for Ob.1 regions.
Eneko Landaburu, the official responsible for cohesion policy and himself a Basque,
eventually explained this to the PNV executive (Bourne 2001: 204-5). To put it a
nutshell, the strict application of the concentration principle thwarted the chances of the
Left Bank of obtaining Ob.1 support. In contrast to the Basque Country and the
Rhineland-Palatinate, the Tuscan government maintained only limited contacts with
the Commission. It kept a low profile, pursued its contacts through the regional office in
Brussels and centred on eligibility criteria and the reform of support to rural areas. The
Tuscan contacts with the Commission were clearly less ambitious than those of the
other two regions.
In sum, contacts with the Commission are part of the routine work of many regional
officials, but such regions only exceptionally aspire to change Commission policies.
Contacts have little to do with wielding influence or with shaping EU policies. In this
respect, this section confirms Markss and Jefferys views on the decline of regional
lobbying of the Commission and its limited aspirations, but it also provides an add-
itional insight into the origins of this change. Intensive regional lobbying of the Com-
mission and the ambition to force the Commission to provide funding to regions were
largely consequences of the relaxed understanding of the concentration principle in the
early programming periods. The CIs and the definition of smaller areas at NUTSIII as
Ob.1, the most distributive elements of cohesion policy, drove regions to lobby the
Commission. My final observation refers to the difficulties that the Basque Country
encountered getting the Commission to adopt its positions in the face of Spains op-
position to Basque demands and in the absence of regional allies. This turn of events
10 Such as the strict eligibility for the Ob.2 opposed Germany and most net payers, the equal intensity
of support for the fisheries sector in all the Cantabric autonomous communities irrespective of
their status as Ob. 1 or Ob. 2 and an analogous demand regarding Interreg that I have explained in
section 5.5.
149
shows anew that without effective domestic coordination mechanisms, effective extra-
state lobbying of the Commission is extremely difficult. The next section investigates
whether those who go it alone have better chances in the EP.
The European Parliament
The main goal of this section is to determine whether regions target the MEPs rather
than the Commission in order to tailor structural funds to their preferences. The answer
is closely related to two explanatory factors, the cohesion policy powers of the EP,
which were expanded after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, and the territorial
links of the MEPs to their constituencies. Both variables suggest that a coincidence
between the regional and parliamentary agendas may have existed and that the EP may
have used its new powers to adapt cohesion policy in ways beneficial to regions. Apart
from confirming the importance of domestic coordination, the expanded powers of the
EP and the territorial links of the MEPs shed light on which interests the EP and the
regions share, and for which policies and parliamentary committees collaboration is
more likely.
The procedure files of the three regulations (European Parliament 1999 a, b, d) are a
fundamental source for this section, which is structured as follows. First, I explore the
EPs powers relevant for the reform and discuss the main figures of the Committee on
Regional Policy. Then, I successively examine the EPs positions on the regulations for
the general provisions, the ERDF and the ESF.

The EPs influence over the reform process derives from its assent procedure and
co-decision powers. According to 161 TEC, the EP participates in the enactment of the
general provisions through the assent procedure, which amounts to a recognition of a
veto power for the EP (Nugent 2003: 200; Scully 1997; Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis and
Garrett 1997). Under the assent procedure, the chamber cannot introduce amendments
to the proposed regulation, but may prepare an interim report well in advance. This
exposes the Council and the Commission to the various perspectives of the EP members
on a given proposal and specifies the changes necessary for the EP to give its assent.
Compared to the assent procedure, co-decision grants more clout to the EP, in this case,
in the shaping of the ERDF (162 TEC) and the ESF (148 TEC). This procedure, which
was also analysed in chapter four with respect to the Television Directive, provides for
the possibility of introducing amendments in a draft legislative resolution, allows for
two readings, and opens the possibility of convening a conciliation committee (251
TEC). In spite of these promising perspectives, the political muscle of the EP was
somehow attenuated by the electoral calendar. The European elections scheduled for
June 1999 reduced the time available for the EP to negotiate with the other European
institutions. The Commission had published its proposals in March 1998 and the
Council had reached an agreement one year later in Berlin. Thus, the EP had only two
months, April and May, to negotiate with the other European institutions and approve
150
the new regulations before its dissolution. As a result, the EPs leverage in shaping the
outputs of the reform was diminished.
In order to understand the parliamentary stage of the reform, it is necessary to
examine the role of parliamentary rapporteurs, something I did earlier in chapter four
regarding the Television Directive. In the European Parliament, individual figures
placed in the right positions rapporteurs and committee chairmen exert a great deal
of influence on policy outputs. During the reform, the most influential figures were
Miguel Arias Caete, the chair of the CRP and a member of the Spanish PP, and the
rapporteurs of the general provisions, Arlene McCarthy, a Briton from the Labour
party, and Konstantinos Hatzidakis, a conservative Greek. Further influential figures
were Daniel Varela, a PP member from Galicia who drafted the report on the ERDF, and
Karin Jns, a member of the German social-democratic party from Bremen and a
rapporteur on the ESF. Their names and affiliation, in addition to the agendas of
influential MEPs and their territorial links, deserve further discussion. According to
both his own explanations and those of his colleagues, Arias dedicated most of his
attention to the shaping of Ob.1 areas and to fisheries. McCarthy saw her task as
defending the interests of Ob.2 areas and cities. Her constituency is in the North West of
Britain, an area with acute problems of industrial decline and home to deeply-troubled
cities like Liverpool. According to his own testimony, Hatzidakis was preoccupied with
Ob.1 areas in southern Europe because Greece was, as a whole, an Ob.1 region. Simi-
larly, Varela admitted that he was particularly motivated because I come from an Ob.1
region. Jns was committed to guaranteeing that the ESF would continue funding
European social policy, as I show below.
In the context of this chapter, other relevant, but not equally influential, CRP mem-
bers included Ralf Walter (Rhineland-Palatinate, SPD), Josu Jon Imaz (Basque Coun-
try, PNV), Joan Vallv (Catalonia, CiU), and Marco Cellai (a Tuscan member of
Alleanza Nazionale). Admittedly, the changes to the Commissions proposals cannot
be explained by referring exclusively to these members of the CRP, but nonetheless it is
frequently possible to identify an MEP with a territorial interest behind an effort to
amend a regulation. Arias, the committee chair, conveyed the idea of how the CRP
works when he asserted that, in the committee there were McCarthy and Hatzidakis
and then some snipers.

Having analysed the relevant powers of the EP and the main MEPs involved in the
reform, the rest of this section examines the actual transformations of the general
provisions, the ERDF, and the ESF regulations. After examining the proposal of the
Commission, the EP demanded a series of significant changes in the regulation of the
general provisions that coincided with regional preferences. More precisely, the CRP
added a considerable number of eligibility criteria and indicators to the proposal, which
were ultimately included in the first report drafted by McCarthy and Hatzidakis in late
1998. Among them were issues of wealth disparities within regions, low GDP, and
decline in the working age population, apart from the consideration of geographical
handicaps like peripheral situation, or being an island, mountain or external border
region (European Parliament 1998 a: 9). Interestingly, some of these amendments
151
coincide with certain regional agendas that CRP members likely assumed. As an il-
lustration, a decline in the working age population was favoured as an eligibility criteria
by the Rhineland-Palatinate and other Lnder (Bundesrat 1998 b: 6). An important
topic for Tuscany and many other regions was particular attention for mountain areas
and islands, which was included in the report most likely due to the intervention of the
Tuscan MEP Cellai (European Parliament 1998 a; Gobierno Vasco n.d.: 9). In contrast,
the PNV representative in the CRP, Imaz, failed to articulate the Basque concern over
agriculture in mountainous areas. However, another main topic on the Basque agenda,
dependence on fisheries, was taken up by the CRP, most likely because the Galician
MEP Varela, whose constituency was also highly concerned with fisheries, could rely
on the support of his party comrade, Arias, and of the EPP. Furthermore, Imaz, the PNV
MEP, fell short of obtaining the recognition of NUTS II as a suitable statistical unit to
define Ob.2 areas. Additional demands voiced by numerous MEPs referred to disad-
vantages derived from geographical situation, the problems of rural areas, and those of
localities dependent on fishing (Rudzio 1999: 232).
Like the German and Italian regions, the EP adopted a sceptical stance with regard to
the coherence between regional and competition policies, which was favoured by the
Commission. The EP argued that, while coherence between cohesion and competition
policies was desirable, the proposal of the Commission would increase rigidity in the
implementation of the funds (European Parliament 1998 a: 10), a claim reinforcing the
position of regions in Germany and Italy. This clearly went against the Basque Coun-
trys preference for overlapping Ob.2 and assisted areas. With regard to phasing-out,
the EP had requested equally long periods for Ob.1 and Ob.2 regions rather than the six
years for Ob.1 and four for Ob.2 that the Commission had proposed. In contrast, the EP
decidedly came out in favour of Ob.2 regions on an extended transition period, thus
distinguishing the EP from the Bundesrat and the CoR, which in this respect were
deeply divided between Ob.1 and Ob.2 regions (European Parliament 1998 a: 10). This,
however, does not mean that this topic was of no importance for the regions. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, the Rhineland-Palatinate, but not the Bundesrat or
the Basque Country had vehemently pleaded for equal treatment of both Ob.1 and 2
regions in the phasing out period. This issue was among the Italian regional demands
for the reform, even though our selected region, Tuscany, was not insistent on it
(Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 7).
The EP strongly supported the regional position regarding partnership the last
element of the general provisions that this section will consider. Indeed, not only did the
chamber back the Commissions proposals of a reinforced partnership, the EP further
demanded that the general provisions specify the privileged status of regions in part-
nerships, their powers, and the right to vote in the programming advisory committees
irrespective of their financial contribution. These demands of the EP perfectly co-
incided with those formulated by the Rhineland-Palatinate and the other members of
the Bundesrat. The German regions aimed at excluding local governments from the
implementation process in Germany, as they had in the previous programming period
(Benz 2000 b: 40; Bundesrat 1998 b: 9).
152
A new procedure co-decision and other regional concerns emerged around the
agenda of the ERDF. Due to co-decision, the EP had the opportunity to use the two
readings and the possibility of introducing amendments to significantly modify the
regulation. From the perspective of this chapter, the first relevant alteration of the
Commissions proposal was the expansion of the funds scope forced by the EP and
aimed at introducing culture and tourism into the regulation (European Parliament and
European Council 1999: 2.2.d). Such an amendment would enable the use of cohesion
funding for the restoration of cultural heritage and attract tourism. A PP member from
Galicia, the parliamentary rapporteur for the ERDF, Daniel Varela, introduced an
amendment widening the scope of the fund to include both culture and tourism, in
response to the Commissions negative attitude towards regional demands that had
been expressed earlier (European Parliament 1998 b: 2, 22, 23). Indeed, the Council and
the Commission did not accept Varelas amendments until the last stage of the nego-
tiation, during the conciliation meeting in April 1999, despite the reported support of
Italy and Spain. According to Varela himself, he obtained the support from the EP that
was necessary to defeat the other institutions, first because the topic concerned a large
number of regions and, second and more importantly, because he could rely upon the
support of the EPP. Put another way, Varela succeeded to push through his highest
priority widening the scope of the ERDF to include culture because his amendment
had distributive rather than redistributive effects. Widening the scope of the funds
would increase the number of regions obtaining funding, but at the same time decrease
the amount of money available to each region. This, like many changes introduced by
the EP, ran counter to the concentration principle.
The second relevant amendment was related to CI Urban, the extension of which the
EP supported early on (European Parliament 1998 a: 36.e, 14). Later, amendment 32 of
Varelas report on the ERDF linked the fund with the development of the Communitys
urban policy initiative (European Parliament 1998 b). The CoR (1998 b: 2.1.16), local
representatives, and their lobbies like Eurocities, led by Josu Ortuondo, a PNV MEP,
were similarly enthusiastic about Urban (on Italy, see also Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 9,
31). However, the Commission and the Council, with the exception of some member
states like Italy and Spain, staunchly resisted the demands of the EP and the regions
because the Commission and the Council were determined to reduce the number of CIs.
The resistance of the Commission and the Council to the request was likely very strong,
because the Council only incorporated Urban into the regulation after the Berlin Sum-
mit in April 1999 (Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 270). According to McCarthy, The DG
staff () wanted to use the money for special operations. () We insisted so much and
said to the Council we would break the deal if there was no positive response. The
MEPs deemed the extension of Urban a major success for the EP over the Commission,
although the amount of money set aside, 700 million Euros, is rather small compared to
the entire ERDF budget.
The failed attempt of some German MEPs to extend CONVER is the final element of
ERDF that will be analysed here. When the government of the Rhineland-Palatinate
realized that the Commission would not support a CI dealing with the withdrawal of
troops, the SPD-FDP regional executive simply pursued a different strategy. Even from
153
the early stages of the reform, the regional prime minister had maintained contacts with
his party comrade, Ralf Walter, from the Rhineland-Palatinate. Walter tried to mobilize
support for a CI tackling the withdrawal of troops. The German regions had included
this demand in their common position towards the reform and some MEPs from other
regions supported Walters efforts. Nonetheless, the CRP only demanded an additional
CI from the Council, as the CRP believed that the EP could not compel the other
institutions to accept more than one additional community initiative. Because of this,
Walter apparently chose an alternative strategy. Instead of requesting a new CI, he
obtained from the CRP an expansion of the funds scope implicitly referring to the
conversion of military sites (European Parliament 1998 b: am 26). Yet this allusion
eventually disappeared from the CRPs recommendation to the plenary in the second
reading. In this context it is noteworthy that in contrast, the Basque MEP Imaz failed to
make any headway at all towards the inclusion of the CIs favoured by the PNV, par-
ticularly Employ or Adapt.
Like the two other regulations, the EP saw the need to significantly amend the ESF.
Here I focus on the provisions most relevant for regions the horizontal character of the
Ob.3 system, the amendment with strong territorial repercussions, and the conflicts
between regional and social policy. Arguably, the most significant change introduced in
the ESF was the extension of the Ob.3 to all regions outside the Ob.1 areas, including
Ob. 2 areas, where such measures were not originally permitted. From the perspective
of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (CES), it was important to main-
tain Ob.3 as a distinctive and coherent instrument present throughout the EU (European
Parliament 1998 c: 10). However, from the perspective of regions, the crucial detail is
that expanding the Ob.3 to include Ob.2 areas would imply a considerable increase in
the number of recipient regions. This effect explains the widespread support that the
measure received not only from the CES but also from CRP, German and Italian
regions, and the CoR (Bundesrat 1998 b: 7; Committee of the Regions 1998 b: 2.1.1.9;
European Parliament 1998 a, c: 10, am 26; Ministero del Tesoro 1999: 5, 16). The
extension of Ob.3 measures to Ob.2 areas suggests once more that the EP was capable
of introducing the kind of distributive amendments regions were frequently unable to
obtain on their own.
In contrast, the EP was unable to assign a fixed amount for small grants awards of
up to 15.000 Euro for voluntary and community organisations to work with the un-
employed , which the chamber, the regions, and even the Commission wanted, but the
Council opposed. This would have permitted a myriad of modest NGOs across the
continent to receive some EU funding. After the second reading, the EP and the Com-
mission had to accept the Councils preference for a different wording of the text, which
established that a reasonable amount should be made available for small grants
(European Council 1999 a: art 4.2), and as a form of compensation that Member States
would have the option of implementing the small grants with up to 100 % financing
from the ESF (European Parliament 1999 d, see information on 21.05.99 and art 4.2 of
the regulation).
The CES introduced two additional amendments welcomed by regions, but the
Commission, the Council, or both ultimately rejected them. The Commission proposal
154
allocated one percent of the ESF to small grants that would be easily accessible to
NGOs, an innovation which the EP, the CES rapporteur, the CoR, and regions with
strong social economy sectors like Tuscany welcomed (Committee of the Regions
1998 c: 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 1998 d; European Parliament 1998 c: am 23). However, the CES
amended the regulation of the ESF in order to fund local employment initiatives and
territorial employment pacts, which they hoped would contribute to a more decentral-
ized employment policy in the EU (Committee of the Regions 1998 d: 2.2.2; Prez
Gonzalez and Dez Lpez 1999: 31; Regalia 2003: 158, 161). Eventually the one
percent allocation was transformed into a reasonable amount by the Council and the
link between the ESF and local employment was watered-down due to the opposition of
both the Council and the Commission.
However, the EP and regions disagreed over the links between the ESF and the
European Employment Strategy (EES). The reasons of the disagreement have much to
say about the differences between the CES and CRP as advocates of regional interests.
In its proposal, the Commission had tried evolve the ESF into an instrument to support
EES (1998 c: art 2.1.c, 2.1.d). This attempt to provide the ESF with an employment
rather than social policy focus, and to provide the regions with more room to manoeuvre
in the implementation of the fund obtained enthusiastic support from the CoR (Bun-
desrat 1998 b: 6-7; Committee of the Regions 1998 d: 2.1.3). Contrarily, the EP, without
fully rejecting these employment policy aims, insisted on using the ESF as a social
policy instrument, in order to support disadvantaged groups such as the long-term
unemployed (European Parliament 1998 c: 23-4, am 14-16). In doing so, the EP was not
acting capriciously, but trying to reduce regions autonomy in spending ESF funding,
which was exactly what Jns and the other CES members wanted. Allegedly, regional
governments target the more easily employable job-seekers in order to achieve swift
improvements in the number of people receiving unemployment benefits and to frame
them as labour policy successes. As a means to prevent this, the CES tried and even-
tually managed to partially redefine the scope of the ESF against the will of regions and
the Commission (European Parliament 1999 c: art 2.1, 2.1.a). The issue is illustrative of
the tension between regional and sectoral interests, in this case social policy interests, in
the EP.

This section has demonstrated that the EP was surprisingly successful as an advocate
of regional interests. Out of the eleven topics discussed in this and the preceding
chapter, the EP and the regions defended broadly similar positions on nine, as displayed
in Figure 5. Only on one occasion did the EP, or more precisely the CES, directly oppose
the regions as it resisted the transformation of the social policy objectives characteristic
of ESF to the labour market priorities of the EES. Ultimately, the EP voiced and
frequently imposed on the Commission and the Council positions overlapping with the
regional minimal consensus identifiable in the CoR opinions dispersion of funding
among all the regions classified as Ob.2 and greater regional autonomy in the man-
agement of the funds. Even so, the coincidence of agendas would have been more
extensive if the committee in charge of the regulation had been the CRP. In the CRP
territorial interests tend to crystallize, while other committees tend to emphasize sector
155
interests. Notwithstanding, it was apparent that the parliamentary amendments bene-
fited some Ob.2 regions more than others. Regions with clearly distributive agendas
(Tuscany) particularly benefited more from the intervention of the EP than those pre-
occupied with marginal topics like conversion (Rhineland-Palatinate) or strict redis-
tribution (Basque Country). However, due to the common regional position of the
Lnder, the Rhineland-Palatinate was ultimately able to introduce an amendment sup-
porting the extension of CONVER, while the Basque Country could not even match
such a modest achievement. In the conclusions to this chapter, a comparison of the EP
with the other channels will make even more apparent the importance of domestic
coordination for lobbying in the EU and highlight the significance of the EP as a
regional advocate.
Conclusions
Of all four available channels, the EP was the only body enabling regions to make
impacts on the cohesion policy reform on their own. The EP introduced amendments
scattering Ob.2 funding across the EU and advocated decentralized management of the
funds, as was shown above. This set of preferences does not correspond to the agenda of
any specific region, but rather represented a minimal regional consensus, namely the
dispersion of funding and regional autonomy shared in particular by Ob.2 funding
recipients. It is for this reason that the demands of the EP frequently overlapped per-
fectly with demands contained in the CoR opinions rather than with those of any
specific region. However, given that the EP ignored these documents, as well as the
lobbying efforts undertaken by the regional associations, the explanation for the co-
incidence of agendas must lie in the territorial links of MEPs as representatives of
constituency or as members of a nationalist party. In brief, the EP cannot assign funding
to specific member states or objective areas, but it can widen the scope of funds. At the
same time, the decisions of the EP are frequently shaped by the territorial links of the
MEPs, which explain why the EP often agrees with regional agendas. Such a claim is
based on the abundant evidence presented in this chapter and more specifically, on
accountability of the MEPs to voters in their constituencies, reinforced in some occa-
sions by MEPs membership in nationalist parties, on the connection between the CRP
and regional interests, and the peculiar set of powers held by the EP. The efforts of the
chamber to expand the scope of Ob.2 funding, together with the opposite commitment
of the Commission to the concentration principle, also explains why the EP contributed
more to advancing the minimal regional consensus than the Commission actually did.
This is surprising given that the Commission has been widely qualified by scholars as
an ally of regions (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 82-86, 114-115; Keating 1998 b: 172,
177; Loughlin 1996: 153-154).
Once more, this chapter presents evidence that regions benefited more in advancing
their agendas of common regional positions than from having elected strong nationalist
parties. This does not mean to say that during the reform the Rhineland-Palatinate
imposed its agenda due to the common regional position defined within the German
156
coordination mechanisms, but there is significant evidence that this region did benefit
from the support of the other German MEPs, i.e. in expanding the scope of the ERDF to
include conversion. In contrast, the Basque government not only lacked allies in the
European arena, but fell into the trap of an extensive agenda full of impractical de-
mands. This was the result of the reckless Basque agenda, typical of nationalist parties
with an individualistic interaction orientation, and of the Spanish coordination mech-
anisms that made the definition of common regional positions and joint lobbying efforts
almost impossible. And not only, the failure of the PNV to obtain the support of the
PP-led central government became a critical problem as the PP had placed a party
member as chair in the CRP and marshalled a significant number of MEPs committed to
defending the Ob.1 funding. One of the topics discussed in the final chapter is whether
domestic coordination mechanisms help regions in Germany and elsewhere to achieve
impacts in fields beyond cohesion and audiovisual policy.
157
Chapter 7:
Conclusions
Since the late 1980s, the EU has increasingly encroached upon the autonomy of regions
throughout Europe. This encroachment has moved regions to challenge the federal
governments monopoly over European policy and to steer the European institutions
toward region-friendly positions. The ultimate objective of regional lobbying is to
obtain beneficial policies and recognition as legitimate political actors; this is particu-
larly important for regions heavily dominated by nationalist parties. The efforts of
regions, however, have been frequently misunderstood by scholars, at least in two
principal respects. First, scholars frequently misgauge factors accounting for the re-
gional sway over the European policies of federal member states. Second, scholars have
not considered the extent of the overlap of agendas across regions, the EP, and the
Commission. In order to improve the quality and availability of the scholarship on these
issues, the present study has redirected the discussion back to politics, and to nationalist
parties in specific. At the same time, this book has emphasized the importance of
coordination mechanisms, which set the rules of the game according to which regions
may bring their concerns to the bargaining table of the Council.
By comparing regional efforts to influence EU audiovisual and cohesion policies,
my research has determined that the interaction between a specific form of intergov-
ernmental relations coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties best explains
the uneven levels of impact that regions achieve on EU decisions. Coordination mech-
anisms, and more specifically the requirement that common regional positions be
achieved unanimously, account for regional interest representation strategies across
policy fields. Constituent units from member states have thus reacted to EU decisions
on audiovisual and cohesion policy according to the same pattern, whether in Germany
through compromise and coordination or in Spain through conflict or passivity.
These findings have wide ranging implications for ideas on how interest represen-
tation shapes EU policies. It is much more likely that an EU policy would address the
concerns of the Lnder rather than those of an Italian or a Spanish region. Regions in
Italy and Spain have only a remote chance of making inroads into the centres position
in the Council, and they also have fewer chances than the German regions for advancing
their concerns through extra-state channels. In addition, resorting to the Commission
has become less effective, at least on audiovisual or cohesion policy matters. Both
market and competition considerations, on the one hand, and a strict application of the
concentration principle, on the other, have reduced the willingness of the EU to take
into account regional agendas. While the Commission has closed itself off from outside
influence, the EP has experienced an expansion of its co-decision procedure, making it
a primary channel through which regional preferences, including minority ones, can
influence EU decisions. Against this background, reaching a common regional position
has become even more important when seeking to confront the Commission or per-
159
suade an MEP, as the success of the Lnder regarding the Broadcasting Protocol and the
failure of the Basque region to defend minority languages has shown.
The rest of my conclusions aim at buttressing these claims by bringing together the
four partial hypotheses spelled out in the first chapter. This present chapter discusses
successively coordination mechanisms, nationalist parties, Europeanization, and extra-
state channels. I close with some considerations on the future of multinational federal
member states.
Coordination Mechanisms
This book began by sketching the impact of European integration on the regions of
several federal member states, emphasizing their lack of influence on the EU decision-
making process. In response, regions have carved out coordination mechanisms in the
federal division of powers to force the state to take up regional concerns as part of its
position before the Council. A detailed analysis inspired by Scharpfs actor-centered
institutionalism has made clear that despite apparent similarities (Brzel 2002), co-
ordination mechanisms in Germany, on the one hand, and in Italy and Spain, on the
other, not only differ significantly, but also account for the disparate responses to EU
policy proposals by regions from the same member state. Put another way, coordination
mechanisms and actors responses to EU policy proposals, rather than their range of
powers (Marks, Nielsen et al 1996: 50-51, 61; Jeffery 2000: 12-14), account for re-
gions ability to shape EU decisions. This section discusses coordination mechanisms,
while the next tries to explain why actors responses differ. I would like now to consider
and evaluate some of the most plausible alternative hypotheses.
Explanatory variables like a regions range of powers, which Jeffery calls consti-
tutional factors (2000: 12), are insufficient for predicting a constitution units ability to
shape EU policies. Admittedly, Jeffery, a knowledgeable scholar of both German and
British federalism, makes a valuable point when he claims that constitutional reforms
influence a regions ability to participate in EU politics. Coordination mechanisms, as
explained in chapter two, are more favourable to regions that participate in constitu-
tional reform or treaty ratification processes. Jefferys variable, however, needs to be
further refined. The concept of the range of powers of a region can be understood as
referring to self-rule, one of the two main aspects of every federal system, together with
its counterpart, shared rule. This terminology, usually traced back to Elazars classic
book Exploring Federalism (1991), highlights the fact that federal systems usually
grant their constituent units a more or less wide range of powers within their respective
jurisdictions as well as some clout on decisions concerning the whole country. In fact,
the range of competences a region holds is a deficient proxy of its influence. Marks,
together with different collaborators, has gradually refined his early regional autonomy
indexes (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a; Marks, Nielsen et al 1996: 51), and recently
launched a more sophisticated index analysis. In his latest version, regional authority
is divided into two domains, self- and shared rule, which possess four dimensions each
(Marks, Hooghe et al 2008 a: 114). For the two domains, as well as the overall category,
160
the three countries in my case selection scored in the late 1990s as follows, 20.3, 9.0,
29.3, for Germany, 21.0, 1.7, 22.7, for Italy, and 18.2, 1.3, 19.5, for Spain (Hooghe,
Schakel et al 2008: 262-266). Although it may appear contradictory that Italian regions
are considered to enjoy only slightly less self-rule than the Lnder or the Spanish
autonomous communities, the scores of the shared rule component appear plausible.
Since the Lnder hold a higher shared rule score than the Italian and Spanish regions, a
regions ability to shape EU decisions appears closely related to the existence of shared
rule provisions, of which coordination mechanisms are an example. Further research on
other member states is needed in order to establish whether low levels of shared rule
always appear connected to coordination mechanisms based on the unanimity rule.
Nonetheless, the high levels of self-rule in Italy and Spain which score higher in the
Regional Authority Index (Hooghe, Schakel et al. 2008: 262-266) than the constituent
units of the United States or Canada are not very useful when it comes to gauging the
influence of Spanish or Italian regions on European policy making. The contrast be-
tween a high level of self-rule and a regions actual influence would confirm that the
European integration process has imposed a loss of power upon regions.
In my research, regions within homogenous member states and minority regions
arrived at opposing responses with respect to the European audiovisual policy, both in
terms of content and in terms of their strategies to advance regional agendas. Likewise,
their ability to shape EU audiovisual policy differs as well. The Lnder were able to
achieve so much because of their common regional position and because of the pos-
sibility of advancing their decision in the Council, both made possible by German
coordination mechanisms. Some of these successes have been reported elsewhere
(Jeffery 2002 a: 6-7; Knothe and Bashayan 1997; Schmuck 1997: 231), but this present
study has gone one step further. Over the course of this book, I have demonstrated that
the way the policy field has evolved exhibits remarkable similarities to the preferences
of the Lnder, who averted most of the dirigiste changes in the Directive, defended their
TV channels from the intromissions of DG Competition, and turned MEDIA into a
regionalized programme. To be sure, their command over the German position was
most consequential because of the fact that their interests coincided with other actors
agendas, as happened with the British and the Swedish options regarding the Directive
(Krebber 2002: 152). Still, it is more than plausible that without the Lnder, the Dir-
ective would be closer to the dirigiste concept of countries like France and regions like
the Basque Country and also that the Protocol would not have come about. Compara-
tively, the Basque government, led by the PNV, made little effort to obtain a more
detailed Directive that would guarantee linguistic minorities a better access to the
media than Spanish legislation did. The PNV eventually failed to achieve its goals.
Spanish autonomous communities, deprived of a common regional position, of access
to the Council or to its working groups, were unable to realize the implications of the
Directive in a timely manner, demonstrating how inappropriate is to assume that all
actors understand exactly what is at stake.
While the cohesion policy reform triggered efforts to coordinate regional agendas in
Germany, Italy, and Spain, Germany was the only country to register positive results.
This second case study on cohesion policy granted us a more nuanced view of German
161
coordination mechanisms and of the institutional settings that allow substantial re-
gional impacts on the central government agenda. Such an impact remains dependent
upon modes of interaction recognizing the predominance of regions over the centres
agenda, a primary example being the hierarchical coordination of audiovisual policy set
down by the German coordination mechanisms. Cohesion policy, in contrast, is a
shared power for which the mode of interaction is negotiated agreement, requiring a
deal between the common regional position and the federal position. For this reason, the
consensual resolution on the cohesion policy reform enacted by the Bundesrat only
marginally constrained the federal government, allowing the centre to still determine
most of the German bargaining stance. Conversely, the Spanish coordination mech-
anisms, whose mode of interaction prescribes negotiations according to the unanimity
rule both among regions and between them and the centre, failed to produce a common
regional position, which is a prerequisite to forcing the centre to take up regional
demands. While the Basque government issued a document with its proposals for the
reform of Ob.2 funding, the PNV got short shrift, first from the Spanish executive,
despite its parliamentary coalition with the incumbent PP, and then from the European
Commission. It is important to point out that the wide range of competences held by the
Basque government, including taxing powers, is not an indicator of influence in Euro-
pean politics. Similar problems were created by the Italian coordination mechanisms,
which are also based on the unanimity rule, when the nuova programmazione collapsed
against the backdrop of concurrent territorial and left-right cleavages.
My analysis has drawn significantly on actor-centered institutionalism, but it is
important to point out that the possibilities of such a framework are far from exhausted.
Actor-centered institutionalism has introduced concepts vital to gauging the responses
of regional and central governments to EU membership while allowing me to analyse
the rules set by coordination mechanisms. The sophisticated approach of Scharpf
encourages scholars to pinpoint the specificities of coordination mechanisms modes
of interaction and institutional settings as well as the properties of actors capabil-
ities, perception, and preferences. Only after a careful analysis of both groups of vari-
ables and of the relations among them is it possible to compare coordination mechan-
isms in different member states and determine their similarities and differences. In
addition, a parallel effort to examine actors allowed me to differentiate between the
responses of state-wide and nationalist parties to the same coordination mechanisms.
However, not all the elements of actor-centered institutionalism were employed, and
two fundamental concepts strategic interaction and equilibrium outcomes were not
discussed here (Scharpf 1997: 10). Whereas I implicitly consider strategic interaction
when explaining how an actor orientates its decision by factoring in the courses of
action of other actors, equilibrium outcomes have not been discussed here. An analysis
of equilibrium outcomes does not appear to significantly contribute to establishing the
levels of influence wielded by regions in my case selection. Nonetheless, it may be
useful to note that the German coordination mechanisms could be best represented by a
cooperative game, and the Italian and Spanish ones by a non-cooperative game. Such a
representation would further clarify the radical differences in European policy coord-
ination among the two groups of countries. A final resource offered by actor-centered
162
institutionalism that was not incorporated was the possibility of formalizing the dif-
ferent courses of action available to actors using game-theory tools like matrixes and
tree representations. Whereas all these possibilities present opportunities for further
research, actor-centered institutionalism has provided my analysis with a conceptual
tool-kit capable of breaking down actors and institutions into their smaller components.
Federal member states and nationalist parties
According to my analysis so far, it should be apparent that coordination mechanisms in
some member states leave regions with very few chances to shape EU decisions.
However, the question of why nationalist parties modify the workings of ostensibly
similar coordination mechanisms may necessitate further elaboration. While the mode
of interaction particularly consensual vs. unanimous decision-making in the regional
module is rather significant, actors do make a substantial difference as well. Nation-
alist parties perceive the structure of costs and opportunities resulting from coordin-
ation mechanisms in specific ways because their preferences differ greatly from those
held by state-wide parties. Accordingly, they do not respond to coordination mechan-
isms in the same way that state-wide parties would. In brief, because nationalist parties
tend to eschew coordination mechanisms, regions dominated by nationalist parties are
less capable of making impacts on the member states bargaining stance and of shaping
EU decisions.
This is likely because nationalist parties tend to define more clear-cut agendas. Such
parties lack the restraints relevant for other regions governed by a state-wide party. As
Scharpf has noted, in an ethnically homogenous country like Germany, the agendas of
political parties, which compete across the country, must take into consideration the
interests of voters in all regions (Scharpf 1992 b: 61-62). By contrast, nationalist parties
standing for election only in one region do not have to fear vote losses if their demands
go against the interests of neighbouring territories. Thus, it would require significantly
more effort to incorporate the agendas of nationalist parties in a joint set of preferences.
This problem is further aggravated when nationalist parties represent linguistic mi-
norities, because their audiovisual and cultural agendas may easily contradict the pref-
erence of other regions. In addition, the agendas of nationalist parties may also run
against that of a central government that sees itself as monolingual, as is the case in
Spain. Moreover, nationalist parties and central governments may be unwilling to
compromise on issues related to politics of recognition, like language or presence in
the Council (Arel 2001; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Offe 1998).
Nationalist parties also encounter higher costs of participating in coordination
mechanisms because one of the key elements of their discourse, collaboration with the
imperialist centre, contradicts the core of their platform. For instance in Spain,
nationalist parties with coalition potential like the PNV and CiU have systematically
refused to appoint ministers to the minority governments that they were supporting in
the federal parliament (Reniu i Vilamala 2002; Robles Egea 2004; !tefuriuc 2009).
Additionally, nationalist parties can opt out of participating in coordination mechan-
163
isms, which is a less disadvantageous option for them than for other parties. Incumbent
nationalist parties, which have no bearing on the centres European policy, may con-
ceivably blame the federal centre for ignoring regional demands and may even justify
their absence from the meetings of coordination mechanisms, even if this prevents them
from understanding the implications of a Commission proposal. Despite bad perfor-
mance, nationalist parties in coalition governments with state-wide parties lose fewer
votes than statewide parties in the same situation (Alonso 2008; Snchez-Cuenca and
Aguilar 2008). In the late 1990s this type of coalition was present in the Basque Country
(Llera Ramo 1999, 2001; Prez-Nievas 2006)and in Northern Italy (Bull and Gilbert
2001; Chiaramonte and Virgilio 2000; Giordano 2003; Mazzoleni 2002).
Using terms from actor-centered institutionalism, the preceding argument can be
reformulated as follows. First, nationalist parties see themselves as the advocates of
minorities that are exploited and subjugated by the central government. This specific
aspect of nationalist parties identity, together with the relaxation of normative re-
straints, the irrelevance of the concerns of neighbouring regions, and the possibility of
an opt-out, makes it easier for them to define clear-cut agendas. Subsequently, in
bargaining modules, these reckless agendas create additional hurdles for the definition
of a common regional position or a bargaining stance. Finally, the interaction orienta-
tion of regions like the Basque Country or Val dAosta has proved to be markedly
individualistic.
Through underlining the importance of actors for any inquiry on the effects of
coordination mechanisms, this book casts a shadow of doubt on the analytical purchase
of the goodness of fit. The concept refers to the compatibility, or lack of it, between a
member states domestic and normative structures, and those at the European level
(Brzel and Risse 2003: 63-65). Accordingly, Spanish regions would have moved
forward from competitive regionalism to cooperative federalism because competitive
regionalism prevented them from participating in European politics (Brzel 2002:
107-116, 211-212). Yet, this book proposes an entirely opposite hypothesis. Since
regions from the same member state governed by different political parties responded
in disparate ways to a supposed state-wide misfit, the existence of this misfit appears to
be contingent upon actors preferences. In other words, whether a political opportunity
structure or, in Scharpfs vocabulary, an institutional setting, is conducive to regional
impacts on EU politics cannot be abstractly determined without considering regional
specificities, i.e. what they define as appropriate behaviour. This is why the institutional
setting proposed to Spanish regions by the central government in the early 1990s was
considered perfectly fit for most autonomous communities, but was rejected by the
Basque government. Similarly, new programming was a valuable achievement for left-
of-centre regions in central Italy, but was rejected by the Northern ones. In fact, fo-
cusing on structures rather than on agencies has been a widespread problem in inter-
national relations and in European studies in general (Gourevitch 1978, 1986; Milner
and Keohane 1996; Waltz 1979). Conscious of this flaw, some Europeanization
scholars have underlined the necessity of considering political leadership in addition to
domestic structures as well as veto points (Hritier 2001: 53; Radaelli 2003: 47-59).
While multilevel governance theories place great important on actors, including re-
164
gions, MLG unfortunately assumes that all actors from the same tier of government
would share a broad common agenda, frequently derived from the calculation of po-
tential costs and benefits (see, critically, Carter and Smith 2008; Marks, Hooghe et
al 1996: 348-349; Marks, Nielsen et al 1996: 42-45). In general, the study of the EU and
of Europeanization could benefit from ideas more responsive to agency and politics,
particularly the territorial conflicts intrinsic to European state-building (Carter and
Smith 2008). Ironically, actors expressing this conflict, like nationalist parties, are
almost completely absent from current scholarship.

Before continuing with these conclusions, a few remarks on the concept of regional
impact are necessary. At the onset of this study I mentioned the four ways in which I
would use this term. These were procedural and substantial impact in the domestic
arena and the parallel categories at EU level, the introduction of topics in the debates at
the EU institutions, and significant contributions toward shaping an EU decision. The
preceding chapters have witnessed regions making all four kinds of impacts, although
remarkable differences across member states and policy fields have been found.
Whereas the question of which countries grant regions an opportunity to make impacts
at the domestic level has been discussed above, I refer below to discrepancies across
sectors. In light of this study, regions are able to make substantive impacts on EU
decisions when coordination mechanisms combine qualified majorities to define com-
mon regional positions with a formal right to feed their views into the member states
agenda, an accomplishment that only the Lnder has achieved on audiovisual policy
decisions. Belgium, whose coordination mechanisms are based on the unanimity rule,
has a small number of constituent units. Regarding impacts through extra-state chan-
nels, the European Parliament increasingly gives regional demands both visibility and
an opportunity to advance their agendas. This boost to regional demands, particularly in
the case of audiovisual policy, is due more to an overlap of preferences held by the
regions and by the EP than to an increase in the influence of regional lobbying.
The method I have used here to evaluate impacts consisted of first comparing re-
gional agendas with those of member states and European institutions, and then com-
paring these with EU decisions. Whenever regional agendas and decisions overlapped,
I attempted to identify the reasons, in particular whether the coincidence was the result
of a negotiation taking place within coordination mechanisms, the regional lobbying of
EU institutions, or the result of endogenous preferences. In addition, my method com-
bined a careful examination of both policy outputs and actors internal rather than
revealed by subsequent courses of action preferences and agendas, which consti-
tutes a triangulation of the testimonies of competing actors, and a policy-tracking
strategy (Elmore 1979; John and McAteer 1998: 108-109; McAleavey 1994: 8-9;
Mndez, Wishlade et al 2008: 281; Scharpf 1997: 60). To be sure, my claim of regions
ability to achieve impacts necessarily implies extraordinary difficulties, among which
the most important problem is multi-causality or which of the actors interested in the
same goal ultimately produced the desired result. In addition, the difficulties of as-
sessing a causal link between a regional lobbying campaign and a decision from the
central government, the EP or the Commission add another layer of complexity.
165
Nonetheless, problems of causality are inevitable for any study aspiring to clarify
whether the regional activities around EU matters make a difference. However, I be-
lieve my approach to determining regional impacts on the centres agendas or on EU
decisions has shown to be more justifiable than using the number of meetings as an
indicator of cooperation (Brzel 2002: ch 8; Grau Creus forthcoming: ch 4) or focusing
on the self-perception of the regional officials in Brussels (Marks, Haesly et al 2002 a).
Europeanization of federal systems?
The results of the present study modify our vision of European policy coordination in
multinational federal states, which makes it particularly relevant for the literature on
Europeanization. Actors preferences and coordination mechanisms, also called insti-
tutional settings, have remained unchanged in both Spain and Italy, and are far from
having become examples of German-style cooperative federalism under the clout of
Europeanization. Their incapacity to make impacts on the member states bargaining
stance in the Council, not to mention their failure in shaping EU policies, should
eliminate any doubts about the accuracy of this claim. Changes in federal member
states have played a prominent role in the scholarship on Europeanization generally, but
in particular in Thomas Risse and Tanja Brzels work, as mentioned in the introduction
(Brzel 1999, 2000; Brzel and Risse 2003). The core of her argument is that after an
initial period of confrontation between the centre and the regions on how the costs
derived from European integration should be shared, the autonomous communities
changed tactics in view of the disappointing yields obtained (Brzel 2002: 1-2, 93-102,
148-149). According to her thesis, the original misfit between the institutions and
standard operation procedures of the estado de las autonomas, on the one hand, and
the necessities of European integration, on the other hand, forced regions to change
their rules of appropriateness, or normative structures. As part of the same process of
transformation, Spanish regions subsequently agreed with the centre on new rules or
domestic structures on how to deal with European affairs in a manner that permitted
Spanish federalism to achieve a goodness of fit. Even more, these efforts apparently
became so successful that they moved the regions to abandon competitive regionalism
and collaborate with the centre. This change was visible not only in European politics,
as it also affected other policies where the Spanish centre and its regions share powers,
eventually transforming Spain into an instance of cooperative federalism (Brzel 2002:
34, 124-134, 149, 211).
Brzels work is most relevant to this book since her research design closely re-
sembles my own; she compared domestic coordination of European policy in Germany
and Spain, although her analysis emphasizes environmental policy. Her argument
about Spains cooperative federalism is particularly relevant because of its reception by
a wide audience, and because of its significance as one of the few comparative studies
of European policy coordination in federal member states, apart from being the only
study that referred to Spain. Brzels thesis has been widely accepted both among
scholars of Spanish federalism (Grau Creus forthcoming: 116-126; Miz, Beramendi et
166
al 2002) and those interested in Europeanization (Bulmer 2009; Koenig-Archibugi
2004; Menz 2003; Radaelli 2003). One of the aims of this book was to show why
Spains estado de la autonomas was far from adopted cooperative federalism as a
consequence of Europeanization.
Contrary to Brzels claims, I have demonstrated that no cooperation existed be-
tween the centre and Spanish regions on audiovisual and cohesion policy in the 1990s.
The fundamental implication of this finding for Brzels work is the absence of the
alleged effect Spains transformation from competitive regionalism to German-style
cooperative federalism for which Europeanization should be the cause. Not only has
the institutional setting, or domestic structures in the vocabulary of Europeanization
scholars, remained unchanged under the spell of an alleged Europeanization, but
actors in Spain and Italy are also far from having internalized ways of behaviour
similar to those widespread in the European arena, such as consensual decision-mak-
ing, readiness to make concessions, and trust (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Since the
autonomous communities lack any effective co-decision powers on EU policy, Euro-
peanization, or the impetus for profound institutional change (Brzel 2002: 2), ap-
pears to be missing from Spains cooperative federalism approach. As a matter of fact,
other scholars of Europeanization have underlined that Europeanization is more prone
to change a member states policies than its domestic structures (Radaelli 2003: 40,
2008).
Apart from a critical examination of Brzels research, this book has attempted to
contribute to the scholarship on Europeanization. I have found that Scharpfs proposal
is better suited to identifying the variables accounting for the reactions of domestic
actors to membership in the EU. How domestic actors respond and how domestic
structures change under the influence of the EU has attracted considerable energy from
Europeanization scholars; in particular, researchers have focused on the relative im-
portance of domestic institutions, norms, and actors resources in explaining Euro-
peanization (Brzel 2002: 2-6; Brzel and Risse 2003; Featherstone 2003; Gualini
2004; Mndez, Wishlade et al 2008; Radaelli 2003, 2008; Risse, Cowles et al 2001 b;
Schneider and Hge 2008). However, Brzel and Risses concept of goodness of fit,
or even Radaellis distinction among domestic and normative structures, appears to not
be as effective as actor-centered institutionalism, which combines insights from public
policy research and game theory. Recently, Caitrona Carter and Andy Smith have
encouraged EU scholars to enhance their analysis with tools from public policy analysis
and (even more relevant in the present context) to give greater attention to territorial
conflicts in EU policy making (2008: 265-267).
At least two important objections could be raised to counter my claims. First,
whereas my results have proven to be accurate regarding audiovisual and cohesion
policy, regions could act in cooperative ways with regard to policies like environment
(on which most of Brzels research focuses), or on consumer protection. This objec-
tion correlates with the problem of the generalization of results across policy fields and
countries, and I therefore discuss them together. A second objection, equally important
and plausible, refers to potential differences in the levels of coordination depending on
whether the upward or implementation stage is observed. I will attempt to address these
167
two objections by resorting to theoretical insights from actor-centered institutionalism
and by examining in some detail Brzels research on the upward stage.
There are numerous and overwhelming reasons why the workings of coordination
mechanisms or sector conferences will not vary significantly depending on the policy
field. In fact, it appears implausible that the Spanish sector conferences operate ac-
cording to the precepts of cooperative federalism when dealing with environmental
policy or EU affairs, as Brzel claims, while excluding regions from EU decision-
making when tackling the coordination of cohesion or audiovisual policy. This seems
even more unlikely when we consider that the coordination mechanisms, actors, and
preferences that are derived from competition between state-wide and nationalist par-
ties are almost identical across policy fields. In addition, a number of theoretical ar-
guments equally suggest that coordination mechanisms in Italy and Spain are unable to
produce unanimous agreements among regions, cumulated welfare, or cooperation.
Coordination mechanisms are neither Europeanized, nor do they represent a step to-
wards cooperative federalism.
In the 1990s and well beyond, Spanish coordination mechanisms failed to produce
an agreement on a common regional position despite the fact that in theory such
agreements would not have been impossible to reach. Although a common regional
position would have favoured certain regions, and might have neglected and even
harmed others, this type of negotiated agreement under the unanimity rule would still
have been possible through side payments or issue linkage (Scharpf 1992 a: 16). These
kinds of transfers, however, require deals to be made across sectors, primarily because
in a specific policy field the same region almost always loses (Scharpf 1992 b: 85).
Furthermore, negotiated agreements under the unanimity rule require continuous bar-
gaining along time as well as an institutional memory rather than informal bodies ,
trust among actors, and an external agenda-setter or a neutral entrepreneurs useful
leadership (Scharpf 1992 b: 85, 91). Coordination mechanisms both in Italy and in
Spain are, unfortunately, quite far from fulfilling these requirements, as this analysis
has made clear.
Sector conferences, which have a low political profile or are simply staffed with civil
servants, have the disadvantage of meeting irregularly or not at all over the course of
several years. Moreover, they lack adequate administrative resources capable of be-
coming institutional memories. This function could be fulfilled by minimal support
staff or by an external agent capable of tracking which regions should get a large payoff
from adopting a common position and which have already benefited from coordination
in the recent past. However, this task could not be accomplished by bodies like the Foro
de Economa Regional, which lack even minutes of its meetings.
Moreover, side-payments and issue linkage presuppose trust among the subscribers
of an agreement, while in practice regions frequently mistrust each other. Moreover,
confrontation both among regions and between regions and the central government has
been common in Spain, as the conflicts over Catalan in Valencia depicted in chapter
three and the exclusion of regional channels from the European B have indicated.
Similarly, the maps drawn by the Italian centre-left government have produced suspi-
cions among the rightist northern regions during the cohesion policy reform (Gualini
168
2003: 625). Trust is also necessary for the implementation of agreements, but regions
that are excluded from the Council cannot monitor the fulfilment of such agreements. In
the absence of a neutral entrepreneurs leadership, a regional actor could assume the
function of an agenda-setter, but in practice the centre, which chairs sectoral confer-
ences in Spain and the CSR in Italy, has acted as a Trojan horse. Central governments
led by state-wide parties use party-links to influence the decisions of regional govern-
ments within coordination mechanisms. All in all, there is little reason to believe that
environmental policy-making is not subject to the same rules of negotiations within an
institutional setting, as are other policy fields.
While my empirical evidence is drawn from the upward stage, in which regions try to
shape the bargaining position of their respective member state, Brzel relies mostly on
the implementation of environmental directives. The different stages on which we
focus could thus be the origin of the differences between her conclusions and mine.
Without questioning the value of research on the descendant stage, the trait distin-
guishing German coordination mechanisms is, however, the ascendant stage, as Brzel
acknowledged when she praised Spains option for a cooperation system similar to the
German one on EU matters. In her own words, regional losses are compensated for
through cooperation between central and regional governments in the formulation and
representation of the national bargaining position (Brzel 2002: 133, my emphasis).
Regional losses are the transfers of regional exclusive or shared powers to the EU, as
explained in chapter one. Subsequently, Brzel conducts a qualitative analysis of the
upward stage, which has the effect of making the Spanish coordination mechanisms for
environmental policy appear irrelevant simply because the autonomous communities
are unable to unanimously define common regional positions (Roig Mols 2000, 2002:
ch 4). In fact, Brzel acknowledges this when she writes that Spanish regions have
largely refrained from formulating joint positions to be formally considered by the
Spanish government (2002: 137), but she does not reassess her claims on the simi-
larities between the German and Spanish coordination mechanisms. Instead, she tries to
diminish the importance of the upward stage by arguing that for regions it does not
matter whether the centre or the EU enacts framework legislation (2002: 206). Yet,
during the period that her analyses covers, the autonomous communities were insist-
ently requesting the participation of regional representatives in the Council rather than
in the implementation stage, something of which Brzel is also conscious. This
demonstrates that the issue was not without importance for regions (Brzel 2002: 48,
112, 125, 203; Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez Campo et al 1995: 155-159). Just as regions
are concerned with the upward stage, scholars should accord more attention to how the
conflicts around policy formation, in particular actors responses to the relation be-
tween territory and policy-sector, shape policy outputs (Carter and Smith 2008: 266).
In addition to her analysis of environmental policy coordination, Brzel also relies
on quantitative evidence regarding the number of meetings of the sectoral conferences
(2002: 140-143). However, several significant issues remain unclear, most of all be-
cause her main source is a document released by the Spanish government compiling the
activities of the sector conferences, which mostly refers to the implementation stage
(Ministerio para las Administraciones Pblicas 1996). The book contains the minutes
169
of sector conference meetings, penned by central government officials. These minutes,
however, serve to record the testimony of the agreements arrived at rather than of the
agendas advanced by the participants, the sources of conflict, or the failure to conclude
shared agreements. But this is not the only reason why the document gives priority to
testimony of cooperation and plays down conflict. The fundamental aim of the docu-
ment was to highlight any real or alleged improvements in the performance of the
coordination mechanisms achieved during the term of the outgoing official who com-
missioned the document. The purposes for which the information was collected was
probably known to Brzel since the officials from the Ministerio de Administraciones
Pblicas did not try to conceal the bias of the outgoing official who commissioned the
document. In fact, Brzel pointed out the biased character of the document in an earlier
article on the issue (2000: 33), but failed to do so in her book (2002: 139). Although
such a warning is absent from this last publication, Brzel does admit that her source is
inadequate to reconstruct the negotiations between the centre and the regions since the
summary of the minutes does not give much information about the respective input of
the different actors or about their mode of interaction (2002: 139). Indeed, her source
says nothing about whether the meetings of the sector conference deal with the upward
or the implementation stage of EU decisions, nor does it indicate whether any bar-
gaining actually took place. As the analysis of audiovisual and cohesion policy has
made clear, the meetings of the sector conferences serve only as briefing for regions;
they more closely resemble tea-time than rounds of negotiation. Brzels claims about
the cooperative character of European federalism concern the upward stage, but draw
fundamentally on a biased document that mainly refers to the implementation phase.
The discrepancies between my claims and Brzels discussion of cooperative fed-
eralism appear even more justified in the light of the work of other researchers. My
claim that nationalist parties decisively bear upon the workings of coordination mech-
anisms is confirmed by the work of Mireia Grau, who uncovered important deficiencies
in the Spanish sectoral conferences, such as scarcity of agreements and lack of incen-
tives for regions to participate (forthcoming: 116-126). The Basque government, ac-
cording to Angela Bourne, has used strategies alternative to sector conferences to
advance its agenda, but numerous conflicts and limited returns for Euskadi are the only
results to have come from this strategy (2001: 250, 263, 2003: 203, 2008). Finally, my
account of the Spanish coordination mechanisms is further confirmed by Rachel Jones,
who concluded that cooperation between the centre, which dominated the formation of
the Spanish European policy, and regions, is limited and directed by its self-interests
(2000: 178, 189). Interestingly, Jones forecast further regional inroads in the centres
monopoly over European policy, which in light of my own research appears to have not
occurred. These works buttress my claim that membership in the European Union has
failed to turn the estado de las autonomas in anything close to cooperative federalism.
170
Regional Interests in the European Parliament
Despite the aloofness of the Commission, regions have managed to shape EU policies
by conveying their common regional position to the EP, whose agenda on specific
topics, particularly distributive and cultural minority issues, has coincided with theirs.
This study constitutes the first attempt to identify the consequences of their shared
agendas for specific policies. As I have previously identified, these shared policies have
served to fill a significant gap. Ten years after the expansion of the parliaments powers
by the Amsterdam Treaty, accomplished scholars of regionalism still continue to
underestimate the importance of the EP for regions (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: ch 5;
Keating 2001: 150-154; Nagel 1994: 557-559, 1999: 102). However, a few authors
have pointed toward the existence of some common interests between the EP and
regions. For instance, almost fifteen years ago Arthur Benz and his co-author noticed
that the EP was more important for the incorporation of regional interests into EU
decisions than was previously thought (Benz and Benz 1995: 261). Other authors
concerned with interest representation have also vaguely referred to institutional as-
pects inviting collaboration between the EP and regional interests or the CoR (Mazey
1995: 95; Raunio 2003: 15-16). Occasionally, the literature on regional interest repre-
sentation has also turned up explicit references to the usefulness of the EP on advancing
regions cohesion policy interests (Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 226; Greenwood
1997: ch 9, 2003: 242) or on introducing a regionalist agenda (Lynch 1998: 201), but no
specific study on the advancement of regional interest in the EP has been attempted.
More attention has been received by organizational aspects relevant for nationalist
parties, such as the incorporation to the European Free Alliance or the importance of
European elections for nationalist parties (Lynch 1996: ch 6, 1998: 198; Raunio 2003:
15-16; Winter 2001: 4, 21; Winter and Gmez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 493). Nonethe-
less, even after the expansion of the parliaments powers, accomplished scholars of
regionalism continued to underestimate the importance of the EP for regions (Hooghe
and Marks 2001 a: ch 5; Keating 2001: 150-154; Nagel 1994: 557-559, 1999: 102). In
sum, ten years after Benzs observation of the importance of the EP as a channel for
advancing regional interests, the relevance of the EP for regions deserves greater
attention still. This section successively highlights the consequences for EU policies of
the link between the EP and regions, the instruments available to MEPs to advance
regional interests, and attempts to answer why they do so.

The EP translated its commitment to cultural pluralism into an effort to include
quotas, robust public broadcasters, and additional MEDIA funding in the European
audiovisual policy. As for cohesion policy, the EP included distributive elements in the
structural funds regulations, as preferred by regions, and tried to grant the regions more
autonomy in the implementation of the funds. Thus, it is clear that certain developments
in the EU the greater commitment to market liberalization, control of state aid, and
strict application of the concentration principle have turned the EP into the main
advocate of regional interests in the European arena, and have relegated the Commis-
sion to the role of an influential interlocutor on routine matters that only occasionally
171
shares its agenda with some regions. Incidentally, the growing importance of the EP
contrasts with an apparent decrease in the importance of regions interests combined
with the increasing significance of local or even member states concerns in the in the
CoR.
In fact, the EP has served as an optimal channel for regions and other special or
minority interests. Thanks to its formal decision-making powers and its visibility, the
EP gives greater resonance to regional demands that would have no impact if articu-
lated elsewhere. The RoP endows individual and small groups of MEPs concerned with
territorial, minority or other specific interests with abundant resources to advance their
agendas, particularly when compared to other member states parliaments (Corbett,
Jacobs et al 2000: 105; Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 235; Mazey 1995: 95; Shephard
1999: 149). An additional characteristic confirming the importance of the EP is the
influential role of rapporteurs and committee chairs as well as the powerful committees
offering individual MEPs a chance to propose amendments. In the EP, committees are
relatively strong and specialized and possess their own identities (Bowler and Farrell
1995: 241; Judge and Earnshaw 2003), but are not necessarily representative of the
plenary as a whole. MEPs have further pooled resources by coalescing into political
groups like the European Free Alliance and establishing intergroups, which benefit
from additional rights (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Corbett, Jacobs et al 2000; Shephard
1999). Due to the RoP and the organization of the EP, a committed MEP placed in the
right office can wield significant influence over EP decisions.
Having established how the EP and more precisely, MEPs in strategic positions
can be useful for regions, it is necessary to determine the reasons why these MEPs
should be interested in advancing regional concerns. Early on, EP scholars acknowl-
edged that its members played a role as territorial representatives (Raunio 1996: 379),
while some of the most prominent among them, like Mark Shephard and Roger Scully,
maintained that regional representation is more important for MEPs from smaller
constituencies like the UK and Ireland (2002: 163-169). Unfortunately, scholarship on
the representative roles of the MEPs has accorded less importance to cultural differ-
ences in subsequent publications (Scully and Farrell 2003: 285). Nonetheless, this
study could produce evidence in the sense that the defence of territorial interests is
important even for MEPs from centralized parties like the Partido Popular in a single-
constituency country like Spain. This suggests that the defence of territorial interests is
significant for a larger number of MEPs than most research would suggest. Indeed, the
territorial link, intrinsic to parliamentary representation, explains the preference of
most MEPs for a dispersion of cohesion funding and greater regional autonomy in its
management.
Such a territorial link can be accurately assumed for most MEPs, but further research
is required to ascertain the intensity, specific decisions and types of policies with which
the link determines the decisions of a parliamentarian. As for cohesion policy, scholarly
publications, as well as the evidence analysed in chapter six indicate that in the 1990s
MEPs with reinforced territorial attachment, such as experience in local or regional
administration, tended to specialise and concentrate in the CRP, particularly if they
came from poorer member states (Bowler and Farrell 1995: 230, 242). My findings on
172
the readiness of MEPs and of the wider relevance of territorial links to support the
request of regions receives further corroboration from Kolja Rudzios work (1999).
According to Rudzio, the EP has consistently pleaded for increases in the cohesion
budget, the geographic expansion of the policy, and a widening of its scope. This is
because the EP favours the expansion of non-compulsory expenditures and is not
responsible for paying for cohesion policy spending. His research on the preferences of
the EP as a whole corroborates my own findings on the interests and personal alle-
giances driving specific MEPs support of regional agendas.
The reasons why policy options propitious for cultural pluralism received unyield-
ing support from the PES and from a steadfast CoC also deserve careful attention. This
support was to a certain extent successful, that is, the EP curtailed decisions that would
have left minority regions worse off and introduced several improvements of some
significance. The difficulty of the EPs successful defence of minority culture, despite
the opposition of the Lnder and of some member states, needs to be underlined.
Minority cultures were lobbying for a dirigiste policy with detailed levels of regulation,
which would amount to a Teilhaberecht, or a right to receive differentiated treatment
(Forsthoff 1954: 34-36). Such a strategy would necessarily complicate the potential
problems derived from the encroachment of the single market upon member states and
regions cultural autonomy (Scharpf 1994: 138-153). Interestingly, Spanish nationalist
parties like PNV or CiU had favoured similar regulation at the member-state or regional
level, but never obtained the necessary support from state-wide parties. Thus the EPs
traditional commitment to minority rights can be explained by the coincidence of
preferences among a group of MEPs concerned with cultural pluralism and active in the
CoC and among MEPs from minority regions like Catalonia or Flanders. Both groups
of MEPs have been determined to make use of their prerogatives to strongly push for a
climate favourable to minority languages and cultural pluralism within the EP. Even
though parliamentary committees like the CoC are not necessarily representative of a
chamber as a whole, but of outliers preferences (Brown, Davis et al 1997), the clout of
the EPs committees in the parliamentary decisions stage explains the unremitting
commitment of the EP to cultural pluralism. By advancing its own preference for
cultural pluralism, the EP was simultaneously giving a boost to the audiovisual pref-
erence of minority regions like the Basque Country or Flanders. In any event, the
preceding paragraphs contradict claims suggesting that an alliance between minorities
and the EP is not possible because the chamber is inimical to nationalist parties (Laitin
1997: 297; Loughlin 1997: 160).
While the EP has received only limited credit for its defence of cultural pluralism,
the Commission has attracted surprisingly scarce criticism for its liberal audiovisual
policy. Compared to the Parliament, the Commission has focused more on creating
large audiovisual markets where productions from linguistic minorities become in-
creasingly less visible, in addition to the use of the instruments available to counteract
this, like quotas for minority languages. This lapse of qualified observers requires an
explanation. While the first reason is, according to my argument, that the relevant
scholarship has emphasized policies with other kinds of implications for the future of
173
minority languages instead of audiovisual policy, the second explanation refers to the
supposed ally that regions have set their sights on for decades: the Commission.
This analysis has shown that the available scholarship focuses excessively on very
specific aspects of European policies affecting minority languages. For example, the
cancelling of real property market restrictions to outsiders who may not speak the local
language and regulations on product labelling represent two of the relatively less
important issues discussed by scholars concerned with the impact of the EU on lin-
guistic minorities (Keating 2001: 146-147). EU cultural subsidies have also attracted
considerable attention, although subventions to minority languages granted by pro-
grammes like EBLUL, LINGUA likely amount to only a tiny proportion of the budget
of a regional TV station like EiTB or CCTV (Daz Noci 1999; Generalitat Valenciana
2005; Mar 1996: 79, 86, 89: 210-212). Bruno de Witte has examined from a legal
perspective how the free movement of workers has actually been a threat for minority
languages (1991: 292, 300). De Witte has also discussed the admissibility of subsidies
to publishing, translation and other activities on the basis of linguistic criteria (1991:
298). Finally, the normative implications of the Framework Convention for the Pro-
tection of National Minorities have attracted the interest of Peter Kraus, who has also
produced a critical examination of the linguistic regime in the EU institutions (2003,
2004: 127-132, 2008). The decisions analysed by these authors are indisputably sig-
nificant, but the repercussions of the audiovisual policy decisions studied here on
linguistic pluralism appear to be even wider.
Rather than focusing on the legality of subsidies to cultural activities, the freedom of
movement, or the status of minority languages, an accurate assessment of cultural
pluralism in the EU requires an accurate assessment of audiovisual policy. Its impact on
regions stems from the incontestable fact that television is the only major issue where
cultural pluralism and minority languages meet the European Single Market. Through
the market-creating powers of the TEC, the EU may shape television broadcasting, an
activity of the utmost importance for any language policy, and incidentally for nation-
building as well (Brzel 2002; Deutsch 1966: 43; Fishman 1999: 157; Mar 1992: 121;
McQuail 2002: 74; Thomas 1995: 5). In contrast, the EU lacks the power to regulate
issues of interest for minority languages like primary education, access to civil service
jobs, or the language with which a citizen communicates with member states public
authorities, in part because these remain in the domain of the Council of Europe (see
also Kraus 2004: 128-132; Kraus 2008: 105-110; Witte 1992: 278-280). In cases where
the EU has truly impinged upon cultural pluralism, such as the regulation of television
markets, it turns out that the Commission has done very little for linguistic minorities.
The scholarly focus on topics other than audiovisual policy partially explains the
lack of criticism of the Commission for its neglect of cultural pluralism and minority
languages. A further explanation, however, relates to the apparent, but not very ef-
fective, alliance between the Commission and the regions. Such an alleged pact be-
tween the European executive and the third level was an important topic for the schol-
arship on the Europe of the Regions during the 1990s (Bullmann and Eiel 1993;
Castro Ruano 1998; Hooghe 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Jones and Keating 1995;
Keating 1998 a; Petschen 2003). Scholars were most likely led astray by the inclusion
174
of partnership in cohesion policy regulation and by the attractiveness for scholars
critical of the nation-state of seeing both the EU and regional levels as chipping away at
member states powers (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 82-86, 114-115; Keating 1998 b:
172, 177; Loughlin 1996: 153-154). Moreover, nationalist parties had assumed that
integration would be respectful of cultural diversity and therefore uncritically sup-
ported the integration process (Brzel 2002: 137) while scholars found that nationalist
parties will increasingly incline for an independency in Europe option (Lynch 1996:
44-49, 198-9, 201). This attitude was extended, not only amongst party leaders, but also
among scholars interested in languages like Catalan, at least until the mid-1990s
(Gifreu 1989: 358, 1996: 136). Michael Keating has spoken of the Commission as a
patron of regional minorities, and cites language experts like Salvador Cards and
Bruno de Witte (1998 b: 163). Even David Laitin, an authority in the field of language
policy, has suggested that the Commission would make a pact with regional leaders
exchanging a monolinguistic regime for the EU for a waiving of competition law for
public TVs (Laitin 1997: 278, 294-5; see also Kraus 2004: 153, 157-9). Posterior
developments have not confirmed Laitins prediction, as I noted in chapter four.
Another important question concerning the EP is to what extent my findings are
relevant for other sectors beyond audiovisual and cohesion policy. The EP also pos-
sesses co-decision powers in several fields typically impinging upon regional matters
of concern like environment (175.1 TEC), vocational training (149), consumer pro-
tection (153), industrial policy (157), and research policy (166.1). In principle, terri-
torial interests could play a role in the MEPs decisions on all of these policies because
they have clear spatial repercussions or impact the competencies of regional govern-
ments, but several factors considerably restrain the potential weight of territorial con-
cerns. First, redistributive decisions with localized and predictable consequences will
likely restrain those who support the decision to the potential recipients among all
MEPs and regions. Moreover, redistributive decisions usually require the agreement
not only of the EP but also of the Council on side-payments (Pollack 1994: 111), further
diminishing the significance of an alliance between the EP and the regions. Wider and
more stable alliances of MEPs will only be capable of advancing regional concerns as
far as parliamentary log-rolling makes it possible to include distributive elements
(Lowi 1964: 692, 695).
The significance of the EP as an advocate of regional concerns does not only depend
on the availability of co-decision powers, but also on internal, organizational factors.
EP committees with low turnover, whose members possess specific technical skills and
agendas of their own, appear to less likely to see themselves in the role of territorial
representatives, or to take up the concerns of regional lobbyists (Arter 2003; Bowler
and Farrell 1995; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; Shaw 1998: 237-239; Shephard and
Scully 2002). In this case, an overlap of parliamentary and regional agendas would be
more difficult, as was shown in the case of the interaction of the ESF with the CES,
which had a strong preference for redistribution, and the CRP, which tried to feed
distributive elements into the regulation of the funds. The CES eliminated distributive
measures favoured by regions and the CRP and reduced regional autonomy in the
implementation of the ESF policies, as was shown in the last section of chapter six.
175
Research policy constitutes another policy field where regional and functional interests
overlap, however, functional interests are most likely to predominate because research
policy is characterized by a very stable power structure based on the Industry, Research
and Energy Committee and dominated by French, German and British MEPs with
backgrounds directly relevant to R&D (Banchoff 2002; Grote 1993; Muller, Zenker et
al 2003). MEPs from Southern Europe trying to obtain perks for their constituencies
from the Industry, Research and Energy Committee will probably find it difficult to
advance specifically territorial interests. If this turns out to be the case, it could be
examined in future studies targeting research policy.
A final qualification to my thesis on the ability of the EP to advance regional agendas
refers to two constraints on the wherewithal of the chamber to advance regional con-
cerns. It is incontestable that the EP is restrained by the reach of the Council and the
Commission, but this also varies considerably across policy fields. The EP has little
influence on CAP, competition and on other policy fields, and none at all on other fields
like trade. Thus, regions will abstain from lobbying the EP on these issues because even
coincident agendas would remain inconsequential. As shown above, even where the
parliamentary and regional agendas perfectly overlap, there is no guarantee that the EU
will take up regional demands. Not only is the influence of the EP constrained by the
wherewithal of the Council and the agenda-setting powers of the commission, but the
EP is also excluded from some core EU policies like trade and competition. The EP as
an ally of the regions is not all-powerful.
European Policy in Multinational Federal Member States
Rather than leading to cooperative federalism, European integration has turned Brus-
sels into another arena in which the centre and regions battle for influence. The Basque
attempt to broaden the presence of Euskera in television through the Directive, some-
thing which had proved to be unachievable in Spain, is one of only numerous examples.
Some nationalist parties now see the EU as a liability, which is unsurprising given the
failure of the Basque effort to shape the Directive, the unimpressive record of MEDIA
in promoting minority cultures, and the absence of minority languages from EU insti-
tutions. In the 2005 referendum on the European constitution, Spanish nationalist
parties like the Catalan ERC and the Basque EA asked their supporters to vote against
this document. While the causes are certainly numerous, decisions systematically
neglecting the necessities of linguistic minorities likely contributed to the alienation of
millions of Europeans and their political representatives. In this respect, the EP could
possibly improve relations if the CoC maintains its vocation as minority advocate, but a
few changes implementing current regulations would also help. Despite agreements
among member states prescribing otherwise (Corbett, Jacobs et al 2000: 23, 24), Spain
is still a constituency encompassing 40 million people and should be divided into
regional electoral districts. If the EP, the only institution reflecting the diversity of the
EU, benefited from further expansions of its powers, the EU could see valuable returns
in the form of a badly needed boost of legitimacy for its institutions and policies.
176
To worsen this regrettable state of affairs, in Italy and especially in Spain, the
incorporation of territorial demands to the European policy of federal member states
has become even more difficult because of nationalist parties reservations about co-
operation with the centre on EU affairs. This situation, however, might be open to
change, as suggested by the available scholarship on how coordination mechanisms in
Belgium, Austria, and the UK work. In certain aspects, the Belgian system resembles
the Spanish estado de las autonomas, but in others it is closer to the German federal
arrangement (Kerremans and Beyers 1997: 45; Ortzar Andechaga, Gmez Campo et
al 1995: 241). Nationalist parties are influential in both Belgium and Spain, and every
constituent unit can veto common positions, but one crucial divergence does exist
between the two cases. If a Spanish region does not support the common regional
agenda, this prevents the definition of an agreement in the regional module. As a result,
the centre regains the unrestrained power to decide the Spanish bargaining stance in the
Council. Contrarily, if a Belgian constituent unit disagrees with the views of the other
governments, Belgium must abstain in the Council; every Belgian region or community
may impose its veto in the single module where both tiers of government negotiate.
The preceding paragraphs permit us to hypothesize why the Belgian system has
worked reasonably well between 1994 and 2000 Belgian constituent units failed to
reach an agreement on only four occasions (Kerremans 2000: 41). This constitutes an
important caveat to my argument over the inability of nationalist parties to shape EU
policies. In Belgium, coordination mechanisms provide the centre and the constituent
units with good reasons to collaborate, namely a realistic perspective to influence the
Belgian position in the Council. All actors involved make concessions for the sake of a
common agreement that will allow every government to use the Belgian votes in the
Council of the EU to advance at least parts of its individual agendas. To be sure, the
most important trait distinguishing the Belgian system from the German one its
emphasis on unanimity is at the origin of the impossibility of countries with large
numbers of regions like Italy or Spain to arrive at common regional positions. For
constellations with many actors, Scharpf has recommended consensus (Scharpf 1997:
144), but it is difficult to imagine how such a rule would perform outside Germany, and
in countries with no Bundesrat and a strong territorial cleavage.
In contrast to Belgium, the Austrian and British arrangements assign regions very
limited formal rights in domestic EU policy-making, but provide a number of informal
ways for them to transmit their concerns to the centre. While in Austria informal input
takes place through intergovernmental relations and the regionalized structure of pol-
itical parties (Bergsmann 1998; Dachs 1996, 1997; Luther 1997; Morass 1997), in the
UK the Concordat regulates how regional concerns may be incorporated into the British
bargaining stance. Both systems allow for regional ministers to represent the member
state in the Council, thus providing a method for constituent units to participate in
mechanisms that grant the centre the last word on the bargaining stance. In the view of
qualified observers (Bogdanor 1999, 2001; Bulmer, Burch et al 2002), both arrange-
ments would break down if one or several nationalist parties appeared. In the short term,
this is not relevant for Austria, but if the British conservative party were to seize power
in Whitehall and give short shrift on EU matters to a Labour-SNP coalition in Edin-
177
burgh, the Scottish government would likely resort to the exit option and the Welsh
government would be tempted to do the same (Bulmer, Burch et al 2002). In other
member states like France or Sweden, where the regional level has no legislative power,
there are no constituent units that fit the definition of region found in this book.
Nonetheless, there is one observation especially relevant to these countries. If the
German Lnder choose to put all their political capital toward contesting unwanted EU
decisions on audiovisual policy, which is one of their exclusive powers, then it appears
to be futile to ask whether French or Swedish planning regions make substantial im-
pacts on EU decisions.

Unfortunately, the latest territorial reforms in Italy and Spain can hardly alleviate the
deficits of coordination mechanisms. In Italy, a coalition of conservative, regional, and
liberal forces have favoured the establishment of a territorial chamber to replace the
current Senato. The negative results of the June 2006 referendum averted the possibility
of using a second chamber composed of senatori elected in the regions to represent
territorial interests (Mazzoleni 2009; Pasquino and Bull 2007; Roux 2008). In contrast,
in Spain, the PSOE government that was appointed in the aftermath of the 2004 election
has given a boost to coordination mechanism and initiated reforms that have permitted
regions to participate in the Council and its working groups, among other activities.
1
Because the institutional setting and unanimity requirement have remained unchanged,
the possibilities of actual negotiation between the regions and the centre are limited.
Nonetheless, autonomous communities have begun to define common regional pos-
itions, even if these are quite unspecific. There is so far no proof that common regional
positions have had an impact on the Spanish bargaining stance.
The Catalan Estatut enacted in 2006 is another instance of nationalist parties strat-
egy of seeking bilateral relations with the centre on European matters. The new regional
constitution reproduces the existing coordination mechanism for European affairs, but
on the basis of unanimous bilateral agreements. Yet, important hurdles will make it
improbable to seek an implementation of the relevant provisions. Some of these dif-
ficulties are of general significance, like the absence of an appropriate bureaucracy
around sector conferences capable of acting as an institutional memory and of facili-
tating deal packages, while some others refer to specific regions. For instance, the
difficulty of justifying Catalan (or Basque) inputs in the Spanish European agenda
without allowing other regions to do the same suggests that intergovernmental relations
on European matters will change only marginally. In any event, to anchor the veto
power of regions in their respective estatutos will not improve coordination mechan-
isms. As this analysis has shown, the problem lies precisely in the large number of veto
holders, as well as in their disparate preferences.
The present study endeavoured to accord these parties the significance they deserve
in analyses of federal systems in order to make a meaningful and powerful statement
1 Resolucin de 28 de febrero de 2005, de la Secretara de Estado de Cooperacin Territorial, por la
que se ordena la publicacin de los Acuerdos de 9 de diciembre de 2004, de la Conferencia para
Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas, published in the BOE n. 64, 16 March 2005,
pp. 9372-9376.
178
about comparative federalism (Stepan 2001: 316). Thirty years of democracy have
empowered Catalonia, the Basque Country and the other autonomous communities
with high levels of self-rule (Hooghe, Schakel et al 2008: 265, 273), but the eighteen
Spanish governments remain equally resilient to the appeals of coordination mechan-
isms. Furthermore, to change perspective from intergovernmental relations to political
allegiances, Spain is almost as far from becoming a multinational state as it was in 1978.
Rather than a nacin de naciones Spain is a nacin con naciones, a state with several
contentious regions within. The extreme differences between the Spanish system and
other regional party systems give testimony to this, and modify decisively the ways
coordination mechanisms work.
Occasionally, this study may have come across as an invective against nationalist
parties. It goes without saying that nationalist parties express a legitimate option in a
democracy, characteristic of this present age of identity. If anything, the Valencia case
exemplifies in contrario that nationalist parties deserve credit for defending cultural
pluralism and minority languages. What this means is that reforming coordination
mechanisms and the EP appears more plausible than waiting for the demise of
nationalist parties in federal, multinational EU member states.
179
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203
Index
actor see also identity
identity 47
regions as unitary actors 29, 93, 99
actor constellations 34
actor-centered institutionalism 33, 35,
46, 122, 129, 137, 160, 162, 164
and German coordination mechan-
isms 37
and Italian coordination mechan-
isms 43, 125
and Spanish coordination mechan-
isms 41
and the study of Europeaniza-
tion 167
equilibrium outcomes 162
formalizing courses of action 163
modes of interaction and institutional
settings 36
adaptational pressure 21
Amsterdam Treaty 27, 66, 85, 86, 92, 96,
101, 114, 140, 150, 171
Assembly of European Regions
(AER) 140, 141, 144
assessment procedure see European Par-
liament
Association of European Border Re-
gions (AEBR) 140, 143, 144
audiovisual policy
quotas for European works 68
actors preferences 70
autonomous communities prefer-
ences 106
CoC preferences 105, 106
Commission preferences 103
CoR preferences 98
EP preferences 111
Lnder preferences 73
list of major events 70, 71, 80, 83, 84,
95, 96, 100, 103, 106, 108, 109
Party of European Socialists
(PES) 105
Party of European Socialists (PES)
preferences 106
quotas for independent producers 68,
107
quotas for minority languages 77, 83,
91, 101, 173
Spanish preferences 82, 87, 107
Valencian preferences 77
cleavages
cross-cleavage alliances 55
left-right cleavage 55, 129, 162
territorial cleavage 44, 128, 138, 162,
177
co-decision procedure see European
Parliament
cognitive orientations 46, 84, 92, 128
cohesion policy
actors preferences (figure) 116
as a redistributive policy 52
Basque preferences 132
definition 52
EP preferences 155
preferences of Italian govern-
ment 124
preferences of Italian regions 124
preferences of Rhineland-Palati-
nate 118
preferences of the Bundesrat 119
preferences of the German federal
government 120
preferences of Tuscany 127
Spanish preferences 134
Committee of the Regions (CoR)
audiovisual policy preferences 98
Committee on Culture (CoC) 103108,
111, 173, 176, see also audiovisual
policy., see audiovisual policy.
Committee on Employment and Social
Affairs 154, 155, 175
205
Committee on Regional Policy
(CRP) 136, 142, 143, 147, 150
and Community Initiatives 154
and eligibility criteria 151
composition 151
Common regional position
and coordination mechanisms 30
and nationalist parties 44, 48, 61
and the EP 112, 156, 171
and the German federal govern-
ment 35, 61
and the Spanish federal govern-
ment 61
defined in the first module 33
Germany 79, 91, 112, 117, 137, 161
Italy 123, 137
Spain 82, 91, 112, 130, 137, 161
Community Initiative 117, 119, 132,
133, 142, 143, 148, 153
competition 26, 34, 45, 47, 84, 85, 87,
96, 97, 99, 101, 109, 110, 119, 120,
123, 125, 146, 147, 152, 159, 168,
175, 176
competitive regionalism 37, 164, 166,
167
Conference of Peripheral and Maritime
Regions (CPMR) 140142, 144
consensual agreements
and constellation with many ac-
tors 177
and Europeanization 167
as a mode of interaction 91, 122,
163
in the Bundesrat 37, 43, 48
conversion see also industrial decline.
cooperative federalism see federalism.
coordination mechanisms
Germany 35, 79, 86, 119, 151
Germany and the Bundesrat in com-
parative perspective 177
Council of European Regions and Mu-
nicipalities 140
cultural exception 82
decouple of Ob. 2 and 87.3 117
DG Audiovisual 70, 71, 87, 99, 100,
102, 103, 110
DG Competition 65, 69, 71, 73, 8587,
100, 101, 103, 112, 161
DG Enterprise 69, 104
distributive policies see also European
Parliament, see also policy
and case selection 52
and ERDF amendments 153
and regional associations 144
and the EP 171
as components of other policies 52
definition 52
Tuscany 156
domestic structures 16, 21, 30, 164, 166,
167
Environmental policy 166, 168, 169
ESF
small grants 154
Europe of the Regions 25, 174
European Employment Strategy
(EES 155
European Employment Strategy
(EES) 155
European Parliament (EP) see audio-
visual policy, see cohesion policy., see
Committee on Culture, see Commit-
tee on Regional Policy
as an extra-state channel 17, 22
as an extra-state channel alternative to
the Commission 22, 66
assessment and co-decision proce-
dures in cohesion policy 150
co-decision powers and audiovisual
policy 111
co-decision powers and MEDIA
Training 111
co-decision powers and the
ERDF 114, 153
co-decision powers and the ESF 114
206
co-decision powers in other policy
fields 175
committees 172, 175
distributive policies 154, 171, 175
expansion of co-decision procedure
in cohesion policy 159
intergroups 172
minority interests 171, 172, 174
redistributive policies 175
resources available to MEPs 172
Rules of Procedure 172
territorial interests 143, 150, 151,
171
visibility 172
European Popular Party (EPP) 105107,
152, 153
European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) 27, 114, 116, 118, 141,
143145, 150, 151, 153
European Regions of Industrial Tech-
nology (RETI) 140, 142144
European Social Fund (ESF) 27, 114,
116, 118, 145, 150, 151, 154, 155,
175
Europeanization 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 31,
37, 160, 164, 166, 167
federalism
comparative and territorial con-
flicts 17
cooperative 21, 37, 91, 137, 164,
166168, 170, 176
definition 22
differences among federal member
states in the EU 24
indexes of 24, 160
self-rule 23, 145, 160, 179
shared rule 23, 160
financial perspectives 113
France 45, 57, 60, 65, 69, 70, 73, 82, 85,
88, 104, 105, 133, 161, 176, 178
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 82
General Provisions on the Structural
Funds 114, 144146, 150152
Germany
Bundesrat 35, 72, 86, 119, 151
Landesministerkonferenzen 35
Ministerprsidentenkonferenz 42,
118
Ressortkonferenzen 39
Rundfunkkommission 55, 72, 79
Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz 118
goodness of fit 21, 164, 166, 167
identity see also preferences.
and the goodness of fit 21
and actor-centered institutional-
ism 21, 46, 47
and preferences 47, 164
and the party system 20, 44
see committees 172
implementation 121, 169
and partnership 152
and regions 26, 38, 113, 152,
169171
and trust 131, 169
Germany 152
of agreements 169
of cohesion policy 139
of cohesion policy in Italy 122
regions and the ESF 175
industrial decline 51, 132, 134, 142,
146, 151
institutional misfit 21, 164, 166
institutional setting 16, 21, 33, 34, 37,
41, 162, 164, 166, 167
interaction orientations 21, 46, 47, 126,
129, 138, see also preferences.
and coordination mechanisms 34
and redefinition of interests 47
definition 47
in Germany 92
in Italy 125, 126, 129
solidarity 92, 122
types 47
207
interests 35, see also interaction orien-
tations., see also preferences
aggregation in a region 46
as revealed preferences 46
definition of 46
Ob. 1 vs. Ob. 2 136, 137
of German private channels 79
of the regional government vs. the re-
gion 47
of the regional government vs. the re-
gion 133, 136
self-interest of regional govern-
ments 47
self-interest of the Spanish govern-
ment 170
territorial 151, 155, 178
territorial vs. sectoral 155
intergovernmental relations
and coordination mechanisms 16
and federalism 16
Interreg 133, 134, 142, 143, 145, 149
issue linkage 168
Italy
central Italy 51, 60, 124, 138, 164
Conferenza dei Presidenti (CdP) 42,
123, 126128
Conferenza Stato-Regioni (CSR) 42,
123, 127, 128, 169
Dipartimento per le Politiche di
Sviluppo (DPS) 123, 125128
new programming 122, 162
Northern Italy 127, 128, 138, 164
Senato 178
Joint decision 34, 36, 37, 91, 138
Kirch Media 80
Lega Nord 44, 45, 128
logic of appropriateness 21
logic of consequentialism 21
majoritarian decisions 34
and coordination mechanisms 16, 30
and modes of interaction 34
MEDIA
Antennes 8890, 102
distributive character 88
implementation 89, 98
Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) see also European Parlia-
ment, see European Parliament
territorial interests of 172
misfit see institutional misfit
modes of interaction 33, 34, 37, 41, 43,
162, 163, 170
negotiated agreements 33, 34, 37, 41,
43, 162, 168
hierarchical direction 34
majoritarian decisions 15, 165
modules
region-centre 33, 36, 37, 41, 131
regional 33, 34, 36, 37, 43, 50, 131,
163, 177
Motion Picture Association 93
multilevel governance 17, 19, 22, 139
nationalist parties
and the redefinition of interests 47
interaction orientations 48, 138, 164
normative structures 21, 164, 166, 167
norms see preferences.
Partido Popular (PP) 38, 39, 55, 56, 58,
59, 76, 77, 82, 83, 100, 104, 106, 107,
129, 134136, 138, 151, 153, 157,
162, 172
Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE) 55,
56, 108
Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol
(PSOE) 38, 45, 55, 56, 58, 59, 76, 77,
82, 129, 133, 135, 178
Party of European Socialists (PES) 105,
109, 173, see also audiovisual policy.
payoffs 33, see also incentives.
perception
self-perception of the Lnder 72
208
wrong perceptions and regional pref-
erences 125
policy
public policy and the study of the
EU 167
types of and relevance of results
across policy fields 52, 167
political opportunity structure 21, 115,
164
preferences
and coordination mechanisms 16
and Europeanization 16
and institutional settings 34
as normative structures 16
four elements 46
of nationalist parties 17, 21, 44
of nationalist parties and common re-
gional positions 44
self-interest and the definition of pref-
erences 21
PRISA 83, 100, 106, 107
Protocol on Public Service Broadcast-
ing 27, 66, 67, 8587, 91, 96, 97,
101103, 112, 160, 161
public broadcasting
access to media and minority lan-
guages 74, 76
interests of regional channels 83
public policy see policy
redistributive policies
and case selection 52
and side-payments 175
and the Council 175
and the CRP 175
and the EP 175
definition 52
regulatory policies 52, see also policy
and case selection 52
definition 52
research policy 26, 175, 176
sector conferences
and cooperation 31
Germany 35
Germany, and audiovisual policy 55,
72, 79
Germany, and cohesion policy re-
form 118
Germany, and mode of interac-
tion 91
Spain 31, 39, 40, 168
Spain and audiovisual policy 81, 82,
90
Spain, and audiovisual policy 81
Spain, and cohesion policy re-
form 130, 168
service of general economic interest
(86.2 TEC) 85, 97
side-payments 18, 82, 168, 175
Single European ACT (SEA) 25, 26,
114, 116
Spain
Conferencia para Asuntos Relaciona-
dos con las Comunidades Europeas
(CARCE) 39, 40, 81, 178
Conferencia Sectorial de Cultura 81
Conferencias sectoriales 31, 39, 40
Consejo Asesor de Telecomunica-
ciones 81
Consejo de Poltica Fiscal y Fi-
nanciera (CPFF) 130
Foro de Economa Regional 130, 136,
168
Instituto de la Cinematografa y las
Artes Audiovisuales (ICAA) 82, 90
Senado 39
Spanish regions
individualistic interaction orienta-
tion 92
structural programming 115
Sweden 65, 69, 104, 161, 178
Treaty of the European Community
(TEC) 25, 29, 67, 82, 104, 112, 114,
141, 144, 150, 174, 175
209
Tuscany
and the CoR 145
unanimity rule 31, 32, 34, 3743, 49, 51,
61, 72, 80, 92, 95, 118, 119, 129, 131,
136, 137, 159, 161163, 165, 168,
169, 178
United Kingdom (UK) 22, 24, 27, 32,
45, 65, 69, 70, 82, 83, 85, 104, 108,
136, 145, 151, 160, 161, 172, 176,
177
withdrawal of troops 53
United States 23, 31, 5254, 67, 70, 82,
93, 105, 106, 161
film industry 93, 106
trade policy 52
withdrawal of troops 53
Urban 133, 134, 145, 153
Valencia
limited interest in the vernacular 76
210