1951년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 2 안치용

r'
D A I L Y KOREAN KOREAN DAILY

I.
t
Army
SIC 9628
fin: 962s
25 JUly 1951 1951
Jw
BULLETIN BULLETIB
Military Situation
Highlights
UN activity in the vestern sector vas limited to light contact vith small enemy groups. In the central and eastern sectors, friendly patrol/ encountered stubborn resistance from enemy screening elements.
Several enemy groups of undetermined size made prObing attacks ageinst UN positions in the US IX Corps zone. All UN patrolling *laments in the IX Corps zone made light contact vith the enemy. Relief of front-line units continued. In the US X Corps zone patrolling ROK 7th Division units engaged several enemy patrols. Enemy groups, in squad to platoon strength, prObed US 2nd Division positions while artillery and mortar fire continued to fall on division positions. All other units maintained positions and patrolled.
ROE: CaPital Division units in the ROK I Corps zone continued to meet heavy resistance from an estimated enemy battalion. Enemy groups, platoon to compeny.strength, probed ROK Ilth Division dbservation posts; all attacks were repulsed. All units maintained positions and patrolled.
Naval aircraft flew a total of 250 sorties including 20 support alssions principally in the BOK I Corps zone. East coast air operations vere conducted along the coast from Kilchu to Kosong and inland from Wonsan to Tongyang. Aircraft struck enemy communications, supply dumps and troop concentrations. Surface blockade vessels scored bits on enemy communications and buildings in the Songjin area. At Wonsan, harassing fire vas delivered on gun positions troop concentrations and one factory.
Other UN aircraft flevr 672 sorties, including 401. coolant missions.
Support sorties, totalling 57, Imre largely confined to the US X Corps sone. Armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in 98 areas. Night intruders
To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

Navy
In the IS I Corps zone, all UN units maintained and adjusted positions and Defeated. ROK let Division patrols made contact with several small enemy groups. US 24th Division positions received artillery fire, vbile US 3rd Division patrols received sporadic mortar and artillery fire.
Air
20
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

No.
009
44.0. W
hit enemy installations and taciiitieI in 98 areas. Medium bombers flew 18 effective sorties. The Sariwon marshalling yards were barbed. by 12 aircraft. Other 3-29'1 struck targets with ground control radar assistanee and made photographic reconnaissance flights.
II.
General Situation Political
D103 - 159
Radio Peking has given a slightly new twist to the propaganda sUPPort for Nsm 11's three conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean War. A story datelined Kaesoug reports alleged conversations betveen Chinese correspondents and American and British correspondents, in vhich the two latter groups were unanimous in their desire for peace. A, British correspondent, giving the opinion of British troops, stated that Nam Il's conditions are acceptable; anAserican officer is quoted as expressing similar convictions. Radio Peking ends on the note that the only flaw in the situation is the "American brass." Inasmuch as the broadcast was in Chinese, it was apparently designed to impress the Chinese people with the solidarity of world support for the Communist proposals. Thus US leaders would be exclusively to blame for a failure at Kaesong.
hd ...e
SIC SIC
9629 9629
26 July 1951 26 1951
D DAILY A I L Y
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIB

Highlights Highlights
I . I.
Situation Military Situation
UN forces, generally mslnt8lning maintaining poeitlons, positions, repulsed repulsed rev& several hnemy enemy UM forcca, masreUy probing attacks to patrol probing ettacka and and continued continuedto pstrol aggressively. eggresrlvely.
EEK
the ROK 2nd 2nd DIvIuIon Division sector In the rectar of of tne tns US US /X M Corps Gorp zone, tone, friendly friendly elements elemenAn attack -bet against US ngulseb an attack attrck by a reinforced reinforced enemy enmy battalion. bettaliod. A n attack repulsed an by a 24th 2bth Division Division positions posltione by by tvo t m enemy enemy platoons p18tooxm vas wse similarly e i m l l e r l y turned turned back. back. A i r Observers obrervera rsporhd ROK 6th Air reported ROK 6th Division Divlaion elements element. engsged enspgad an an enemy enemy company. c . considerable enemy comibrable emmy activity activity and and supplies suppliee in in the the Baso-KUmsong-Tungdse Haso-1CruPeong-!k@aa area. area. In the US X C Corps ROC 7th In m p zone, zone, ROK 7th Division Division patrols patrols contacted contacted several several small attacks w against US 2nd 2nd D Divisa#ll enemy eabqy groups. iproupr. Slued S-luad to to platoon plstoon strength rtrerrgth 8tf.Cls i n & U6 idSlim advances advances ver8 were reglatarad registered by by elements o of i the . sion i o n U units n i t e vere uwe repulsed. repulsed. Slight two W UN 147 rounds to artillery tw, E divisions. bivlrionm. ROK ROK 8tb 8th Division Divi8lon positions poaltlona received 14f and fire. rrd mortar m * flm.
ROK resistance from several ROK forces force6 in In the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone met met stubborn rtubborn rerlrtance mveral of the the ROIL ROK Capital Capital Division Xvision made em-up o f up up to to company col~peqy r i a . Elements Blemnk of enemy groups of size. a a slight rllght withdrawal. wlthdraual.
1o.vr3 air sorties sortlea off off both c0tut.e 6 3 mlrceUaneou8 Naval sir coasts totalled 8 86; miscellaneous cmq! enemy Surtaw@-, targets, including inuluding installations installatiom and end troop troop concentrations, conccntntlone, were were hit. h l t . Surface craft the ua6t vest bombarded t the of the Bao Han eatu8ry estuary with with fsce creft in in tbe d h e north coast o f the unreported east blockadb blockade vessels placed unreported results, reeultr, while while in in the the e& voroelr w e d gunfire on enemy targets in taraetr i n the Chongjin, Chowin, Songjin Sollg3irr and 8ud Wonsan Woaean areas. areas.
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew y53 effective sorties, including 413 coMbat. Close support missions totalling 15 were flown in all corps zones. The medium bomber effort vas concentrated on Chinnampo and the marshalling yards at Opa-ri.
II.
leneral Situation
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours. al THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION De - 161 TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF SigRET THIS DOCUMENT.
No.

Nan'
In the UB US I I Corps Corga zone, zone, RCN( ROK 1st lst DiVl8lon Division aad and Us US 3ml 3rd DIvi81on Division p~trols patrols of the ROK ROK lat lst Division Division xwcslved received e w d several beveral enemy enemy platoons. plrtoons. A patrol petrol or ensaged 200 200 rounds raundrr of o f 82 82 mm. mar. mortar mortar fire. firu.
00_9
? &
410
sbRra S h y ?
2; July 1951
SIC (9630 9630 SIC
/ D A I L Y
t. C .
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

e -
Military Situation
Highlights irighlights
Activity Activity along alone the t h e front front was u88 limited limited to ta patrols patrols and and small small probing probing attacks. attacks.
I _ -
Army rn
the ROK lst In t h e VS Iff I I Corps zone, zone, ROK 1st Division Division elements elements reported reported patrol patsol clashes, clashes, while US 3rd u:lile ,Fd Division D i Y l 8 1 0 1 I units units repulsed =pulsed a 8 small'probing small.' proEirq attack. attack. Other Other corps corps units reported no mite rsported no contact. contact.

US US IX IX Corps Corps units u n i t 8 engaged engsged in i n minor minor patrol patrol action. action.
the X Corps zone elements elementa of of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th DiVlSiOn Division msde made a a succeseful successfUl In t h e US X 2nd Division Division reprdbing a attack probing t t a c k and end returned retUrPhd to to positions. poritioaa. Troops Troops of of the t h e US Us 2nd reOther units pulsed enemy Other units of of the the Corps Corps reported reported patrol patrol clashes. claehee. pulsed enemy probing probing attacks. attsCke
In the ROK ROK I Corps battalion-size attack Corpe zone zone an e m enemy enemybattallon-eize a t t a c k was Wae repulsed. repulsed.
Navy Navy
II
UN carrier coasts flew a total total of of 2 229 sorties. UN carrier aircraft aircrert off off both coset6 2 5 3 8 0rtIeS.
of of opportunity opportunity from *om Songjin 8ongjin to to Wonsan. Wonsan. Enemy shore batteries which returned Enemy shore b8tterle8 which returned
In t the east, planes attscked attacked targets h e wt, fargets Surface units bombarded coastal Surface unite bombarded coastal targets. targetr. fire caused the fire caueed no no damage. dmagc.
Carrier aircraft west caaat coast atkcked attacked coa8tal coastal Carrier aircraft and surface units on the west and and communications compnmicatiom targets targets with with good good results. f i S u f 6 .
Air Air
---
UN land-based land-based aircraft aircraft flew f l e w 790 790 sorties, sortieo, including l n c l u d i w 493 493 combat. combat. Medium Medium bombers flew vith unreported resulte results bombere f l e w 18 18 sorties rrortles against Bgaiaet communications communicatloaa points w i t h mrepofted
Of Of 11571 1,571 vehicles vehicle6 sighted, sighted, 394 394 were wre moving mi= south. south.
II TI
General G e ~ e r a Situation Situation l

Political Political
After endless After endleer, demands demEuida in In Communist ComrminlBt propaganda propagnndefor forthe t h e 'withdrawal vlbhdrcrual of of troops f from Kortm, Radio Radio Peiping Peiping under under a a i'yo~wPyongyang datellne dateline broerdcast broadcast foreign troope t o m Kor:a, the following following explanation explanstltm of o r Cummunist Cumanrniet agreement a@?eement with vith UN UN terms terms at a t Kaesong: Kaee~g: "In order to armistice a,greement agreement eo so as as to fulfill fulfill the "In order t o arrive rvrive at at ;In ;An eearly u l y armistice the hopes wo,ld's peace-loving peace-loving people, people, we we agree agree to to tthe proposal initial h o p e . of the vo?ld's he p roporal of your side." .ids .I' THE C C.I.A. NO OBJECTION it. THE . I . A . HAS NO && THE DECLASSIFICATION ,CIF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OB DKB - 162 162 THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. -____
a *
No. NO.
OO9 % 6
slO 9631 9631 Sm
28 28 July July 1951 1951
R E A N DA ILI KOREAN
I.
BULLETIN B ULLETIN
Valitary Situation
Atablighta
Enemy forces pressed numeroun snail probing attack along the UN line from KuMboa to the east coast and strongly reeisted friendly attempte to seize key terrain features in the east leentral sector* Battalion 8320 conoontra. tione were observed opposite friendly limagleast of the "Iron Triangle.'
ln the US IX Corm zone friendly unite repuleed several enepy probing attacks. A friendly patrol east of NUM= destroyed five enemy vehicles. Other UN patrols observed enemy groupo totalling an estinated too battaidtme opposite friendly lines east of the "Iron Triangle." Air obeervers reported
-
500 enemy dug in six miles to the rear of the above concentration.
le the east central Doctor US X Corps units repuleed several attacko by Friendly elemente vere forced to withdraq from an outpoet northveet of Yanggur but elsewhere onopy probing attacke were repulsed. Enepy forces of undetermined strength strongly resisted the advance of friendly elements attempting to seize key terrainfeatures in the arse northeast of Tanggu.
enePy gvouPs up to company dizs,..

442
21;
No.
US I Cone units reported only light contact as enemy forces continued in defensive peoturo in the weatern sector. Air observers sighted an estimated regiment videly dispereed and dugin, in the biry country northvest of the 'Iran A friendly tank vas damaged by an enemy mine field and eon.0 eiderable light artillery fire woo received during operations to recover the tank0
009
Mineral aircraft flew a total of 250 sortiee. Offensive strikes vere directed againot supp.17 and traneportation centers along rail linegi in northe east and north central Korea. Surface vessels continued patrol and bombardment pistions. Experioneed naval:gunfire control parties in the Woman ared report merkemenehip of the Britieh light cruiser Ceylon the boot they have aden.
ln the ROIC I Corps sone units reported several enemy attacks. units patrolled vigorously,
Friendly
Norf
'gore
Mbar UN' aircraft flea a total of 007 corbieos of which 423 Imre combat ndoeiono. There pore only 29 ol000 suprort etriteo, but 273 armed romanaleoateo and 84 night intruder cortiec yere floan. Taelde medium bombers bombed A:march, Threo medium bomboro atItoked enemy troop conoontratione in foraard arena in night bombardmonto yith ground control assistance. Tao other too.plane otrikes'aero directed against highugy bridges on m1)07 rcutoo in the immediate roar of tbo enemy front.
II.
General Situation
No signifioant roporto have teen received in the poet 24 hours.
DEB - 3.63
w'
S7ET
30 30 July m y 1951 1951
sIc SIC 9632 96%
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Pntrciling ?c?z=Z~U UN UH forces rorces in in the the western vestern sector aector made made scattered scattered light l i g h t contact. contact. In the central eastern sectors, UN forces repulsed repulsed a several enemy gproba probing fn the central and amtern 8ector6# tA9 e v d ellsmcy amounts of of supplies and and considerable attacks. attach. Air observers obeerverr reported r e m d large large amourrte troop activity troop rctlvlty in in the the Pyonggang, Pyon#g8ag8Haso 3aeoand andXflmsong Xbnaong areas. areas.
Army Army
Patrolling PatroUing elements clementr of or the ROK I Divieion Division in In the W US I Corps zone zone modn made Division repulwd repulsed ID an aevalpal contacts con&&cta vith small am3.l enemy enew groups. g r o w . The The US Us 25th Dlvieion several with enemy probing PrOb8 k esbdj supported OUpportad by friendly a r t i l l e r y fire# enemy attack and, artillery fire, CePtUraa captured an e m company. c m w . A platoon-strength platoon-strength probing prObing attack attack was vas reprlsed repulsed by by element8 elements enemy O f tha 3rd Division. Division. of the U8 US 3rd
'
In the the uI3 IX C m p r :nne, :+one,ROK 2nd Divi8io.u In US IX Corps Division elements elements wer.e vere attacked attacked by by 6 a Elements of the the US 24th Divleion Division received 8 a psrobprobcampmy-eise p 6 1 1 1 o Tp u p ELements company-size e enemy group upv u e division patrols ing attack nKIlp from (L a platoes-size platooa-size p group while patrols made made several several light contacts. light enemy econtacts.
ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Divirion patrols patrols in in the the Us US X X COITS C a p s zone zone r made m b contact contact 6 vith t h enemy enemy units 2nd Division eiemenk elements eng8ged engaged enemy enemy groups, unit8 of o f varied varied strength mtrength. US UB 2nd u p @ , UF 2nd DiVl6iOIt,tOBetber Divisionstogether v vith mostly m o a * of of squad r q u e d strength. etrength. Elements Elenmxb of or the I F 2nd i t h the Netherlands Betherlamdo Battalion, Battalion, attacked toward toward m and d &xed gsined hi@ high grounil ground north or of 'polrgTongmyon. myon. All other other corps corpe units units maintained mrinfsined positions poel.tions and and patrolled. patrolled.
In the the ROK ROK I I Gorp Corps eontb zone activity activity y88 vas ZiPiifed Matted to to light light patrol patrol contact. contact. A l l unit8 n o d positi0.u. All units maintained positiom.
Navy
Air sorties flommby both east ant west coast naval aircraft totalled 146; no close support missions vtre male. East coast operations, curtailed by replenishing operations, inclvded offensive sorties against enemy facilities in the Wonsan and Hungnam areas. Surface vessels bombarded communications at Wonsan, Chongjin and Songjin. "st coast aircraft struck enemy buildings, supply dumps and communications in -the Yonau, Haeju and Ongjin areas; planes also provided airspot for naval bothardment. In the Haeju vicinity, surface vessels fired on enemy troop concer rations and positions on the north bank of the Han estuary.
2:41'
\416:)1
No. No.
OO9 09
."
1:33BET
Air
Close Other othtr UN UB aircraft aircraft flew f l e w 850 850 sorties, d i e s , including includiDg 501 501 combat cambst missions. misrions. Close support rupport sorties rortie8 were =re flown flm in in all a l l corps corps zones, zones, principally prrincipelly in i n the the central central sector %tile mctor, vbile305 305armed srmedreconnaissance rcconrvriesencoplanes plane6hit hit targets targets in In 126 126areas. areaa. medium targets in e d i m intruders ntruck struck targets Night N i g h t infntdcrs in 163 1 6 3 areas a m a x 5 in in the the enemy's enemy's rear. rem. One m bomber bmer mission laisslon vas vas flown. flovn.
Air total of 1,867 vehicles vehicles st&ted, sighted, of of which vhich 897 897 A i r dbservers obrervera reported re-d at o t a l of Imre apwing moving south. vwe mth.
General Situation Situation 11. II. cknmrl

No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours.
DKB -

164
SE172
sIC SIC 9633 9633

31. lRiLy JUly 1951
31
1 . 9 5 1
D A I L Y X O R E A I BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY KOREAN

I.
Military Situation
Eiplights
Along the UN front the enemy offered neat to moderate resistance to friendly patrols, and at several points light enemy probing attacks mere repulsed.
In the US IX Corps zone, elements of the ROK 2nd Division turned back a small-scale probing attack, vhile ROK 2nd, US 24th and. US 7th Division patrols encountered nemerous small enemy groups. The enemy continued to place 200 to 300 rounds of artillery and
mortar fire daily on US X Corps positions. Enewercups in platoon

strength mere contacted:by patrolling corps elements, while several light prdbing ettatks mere repulsed in the BOK 7th and US ard Division sectors. Advancing elements of the latter division engaged aeveral enemy companies.
ROK I Corps units dispersed several tessll enemy groups and. turned. back one platoon-size probing attack.
UN naval aircraft based off both coasts flew a total of 225 sorties against enemy installations and troon concentrations.
Surface vessels in the vest fired on miscellaneous coastal targets and continumItoMberdment of eneny positions on the north bank of the Ran estuary. In the east, blockade ships fired on enemy shore installations in the Chongjin, Songjin, and Wonsan areas.

atm
g5 Wim
No. lo.
US I Corps units generally maintained or adjustedpositions. inemy groups of squad to platoon strength offered resistance to friendly patrolling elements in the ROK let, US 25th and US 3rd Division sectors, vhile several squad-size prdbing attacks were repulsed by US 3rd Division units.
THE' C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION 'C.I.A. THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OB OF TO DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
009 0 0 9
arar
Army
SE\ET
Air
669 codbat., Enemy targets in 73 areas were attacked by 438 armed
Eamhung, Chinnampo and Kyomipo with unobserved results.
Land-based UN aircraft flew a total of 1,014 sorties, including
reconnaissance Ames. A total of 6/4. medium baraxers radar-bothed
II. General Situation

In contrast to bombastic ROK statements of a few venks ego that South Korean forces alone vould drive on to the Yalu in the event of an armistice, the ROK's Director of Public Information stated on 30 July that foreign troops should retrain in Korea for about a year. These forces would be required for defense and to train RCE forces. It vas estimated the,: the ROK would be able to defend itself et the end of 12 months.
Dica - 165
Political
w
C72
SIC 9634
1 *spat 1951
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
friendly units repulsed several small enemy prdbing attacks in the Elsewhere along the line light patrol central and east-central sectors contacts were made with scattered enemy groups.
MEE
Enemy forces in light strength prdbed positions of US IX Corps elements northeast of KUmhwa and attacked a friendly patrol in the same area, forcing it to withdraw Other friendly patrols operating west of the Pukhan River lathe central sector Observed small enemy groups
Several enemy groups prdbed US X Corps positions east of the Pal= Fiver. Friendly patrols reported contacts vith small enemy groups at numerous points along the front in the east-control sector. friendly units establishedpatrol bases in the area of recently captummift. Thou, northeast of Tanggu.
In the eastern sector ROK I Corps units maintained positions, vith patrols reporting light contact.
Tbe Eighth Army believes that the defensive effectiveness of enemy units in contact has been considerably increased in the past month. Enemy activities have been characterized by a strong and elastic defense. Enemy forces are maintaining closer contact, considering the static nature of the ',Learnt situation, than in similar periods in the past. Buildingup of front-line units with individual replacements and relief of a battered front-line army with a fresh army are indications of the enemy's capability for continued active defense.
UN naval aircraft flew a total of 54 sorties in the Korean theater as veather restricted operations. Patrol aircraft on night heckler missions harassed enemy activities in the Eilchu, Tanchon and Songjin

an
szeir
No.
In the western sector US / Corps units adjusted positions and patrolled with only light contact reported.
24; THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION

TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. , THIS
009_ "III S L -
' v
areas blockade amu along elow the the Korean Korean northeast nortbeaat coast. coast;. Surface craft craft continued continued blockade and and petrol patrol operations operatiom The The cruiser cruiser USS TXS Helena IIalarrs received rrrceivcd a a 105 105 mm. pm. hit hit on aain deck deck in in an an exchange exchanlge of of fire f h w with ulth enemy entuuy shore show batteries batteriea in ia the the on the the main wonran area. M. Wonsan Other UN aircraft flev 219 combat missions of a total of 555 effective sorties Attack and reconnaissance aircraft flew day and night missions over enemy forward and rear areas.
General situation Situation II. 11. oenersl
A recent Psychological Warfare Operations veekly summary states that several reports have beenreceived which indicate dissatisfaction among the Communist troops in Korea over the Soviet role in the war. The bad feeling centers =Russia's failure to provide the much propagandised material support and the lack of actual USSR troop participation even though the Chinese Communist Perces mere committed on "orders from the USSR." Ambassador MUccio reported on 31 July the tentative impeession that the ROK Ministry of Education is unprepared to eabark on an educational rehabilitation program. There is a lack of planning for the post-war period, a shortage of won funds, and a lack of suitable Korean language textbooks, while local facilities and personnel have not neen exploited to the utmost. The AMbassador foreseen a possible danger of educational rehabilitation collapse when the United Nations Command organization now taking an active interest in this phase of rehabilitation surrenders tts responsibilities to UNKRA.
Dia - 166
----
Political Politid
sIc 9535 9635 SIC
2 August A m t 1953. 1 9 5 3 .

I.
Military Situation
Highlights HighLi&ta
Ground action along'the eatire entire front front was was limited limited to to cleehetl clashes betvwn between UN patrols u14 patsole and Bnb scattered rcattered enemy enemy groups. groupa.
Army Anny
Defeneively, the US US lst lrt Cavalry csvslry and and US US 3rd 3rd Divlelone In the the US lls I I Corps Corps Defensively, the Ldvisions in zone, the ROK 7th 7th Division Division in In the t h e VS US X zone, and and the Ccrpltel DiDizone, the X COWS Corps zone, the ROK ROK Capital vision in in the t h e ROK I I Corpr zone 8 l l repulsed enemy vision Corps zone all enemy probiag prdbing attacks attacks of of platoon platoon strength the US I B 24th 24th Division Division in in the M Corps Corps zone zone launchlaunchs t r e n g t h Offensively, the the US IX ed ed a ZL limited limited Objective ob3ective attack attack and end all aU elements elements advanced aavancSd up up to to three threet miles miles without contact. contact. Patrols Patrols of of the the ROK ROK 3rd. 3rd Dlvlsion, I Corps Corga zone, zone, Division, in the the ROK ROK I forced enemy groups withdraw, but but when when the the ommy enemy group group uas was relnfomed reinforced forced groupe to vithdraw, the engegenaenfe between small fundl enemy enany units unite the patrols patrols vere were recalled. Otherwise engagements and friendly iriendly patrols petrole were were general generaL along along the the front. front. and
NaVY
Sixty air aircraft all types. Sixty air sorties wrties were were flown flown by naval rn~va3 aircmft of o f SU. t y p e s . In In the east, railroad car car vere were de8Wyed destroyed ln in the vicinity vicinity of em%, two t w o trucks truck8 and and a. a railroad of Wonsan, Wonaan, while in fn the the west, w e t , sixty sixty buildings buildings were were destroyed deEvtspyed or or damaged damaged and a da a gun gun posiposim c e tion and small Yonan. Surface tion smaU. supply 6upply dumps duorps were were strafed strafed near xmar Haeju BeJu and and Y om. 8 vessels bonibaxded bombarded trassportation transportation 3 jdoctions coast. vesaels a t i o m at at points mints along along the m e east e~dt coast. Three enemy a enemy shore shorn batteries batteries began be* 8 one o m hour hour shelling rhelling of of Hwangto Zhmngto Island, Ielend, phnlng down dovn friendly f'riendly shore shore fire-control fire-c-trol parties. parties. uN ships ships counterfired courrterflred on pinning en2my gun the engua positions. porltioas.
Other UN sire:met missions. O l h r UB sixmaf't flew i l e w 543 543 sorties, sorties, of of which vliich 166 166 were yerc combat c0-t miretons. The 12 among the the US US M /X and and X X aad and 12 close cloee support eupport sorties sorties were evenly divided among ROK ROK I I Corps COrp6 zones. zones. Medium Medium bombers bombers flew f l e w 17 1 7 effective effective sorties, eorties, of of which uhich 11 I L were wre against against the the Sariwon Sariwon marshalling mvahall% yards. yards.

Air Air
27 z7 THE THE C.I.A. C.1.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION

THE DECLASSIFICATION OB TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No.
409 003
II. 11. General General Situation Situation
Ecoaomic Economic
food In pulwn b e 88 food prices in Pusan stood at at 2226.3 2226.3 on on 15 15 J JUne as contrarrted contrasted with with 357.'( 357.1 on on 23 June June 1950. 1950. Between Between 8 8 and and 15 15 JUne Sunc the the price price of of a a 20 20 liter liter measure measure of of rice rice rose from rose from 17,000 1'1,000 won won to to 19,000 19.,OOO won. The The price price of of u8 US greenbacks greebbacks during the the
South Korea's inflation inflation continues continucre to to mount. mount. South Korea's
The index index number nuder of of retail retall The
k dropped dropped a 8 shade, Bhade, which Which drop drop is is generally generally interpreted Interpreted as 811 a 8 measure same m week of confidence confidence in in the the UN. tw.
Political Politicsl
delegation deleetlon as Ma a fait f a l t accompli. accompli.
DKB - 16y

sET
A Chinese news new8 agency agency reporb reports from Kaesoq Kaesong fhat that unofiicial unofficial Cummuniet Communist soulceB sources them these hinted hinted at at a a limited limited Communist CoPPnunist offensive oftensive to to break breek the the impasse w e e at at the the peace peace talks. talks. T h e n e w agency speculate6 The news speculates that that a a succeesful successful limited limited offensive offeneive would would create create a a new new battle line which would would be be preaerrted presented to to the the W UN
,)4
sic 9636
3 August 1951
D A I L Y
I. I.
DAILY KOREAN X O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIm
Situation Military situation
Highlight8 Highlights
positions and and continued maintain patrol UN ground ground forces forces adjusted adjurkd poultions contbued to maintain pstrol contact contact alth Vith the the enemy. enemy.
Army
US US / I Corps Corps units units maintained meinkrined or adjusted postions. poationo. Aggressive Agezressive patrols patrole f from r o m the the ROK lst, US 16t lst C CaNalry, 8 ~ 3 l r y , US US 3rd 3rd and and u8 VS 25th 25th Divirriom Divisions ang;egtd engagd numerD L p n e r ous oua enemy enemy groups group8 of of platoon platoon to to company compaay strength. rrtreagth. The T h e US 118 25th 25th Division Dlvieion ( ~bassumed sumed responsibility reeponaibillty for for the t b ~ BOK RCIK t 9th 9th Dtvision DLvielon sector. sector.
In t h e UB M Corps zone, zoni?, ROK In the US IX ROK 2nd D5vi6lOn Division exemnts elements repulaed repulsed eque8-eited squad-sized probing t h Division probing attacks attach and ancl engaged engaged tvo tvo enemy e n e q platoona. plertoons. Us US 24th and ROK RCK 6 6th patrols patrols engaged engagsd several 6e'(rem,lenemy eneuy groups -up of of up up to to company company size. size.
The X Corps smallTh8 ROK ROK 7th 7th Division, rJiVilJiOn, in in the the US x Corps zone, Zom, repulsed several eevaral wocale attsckrr and scale probing attacks and angaged engaged enew enemy groupe groups OS of squad squad to platoon platoon strength. The a phtoon-etrength platoon-strength problrg probing attack, attack, vhile !Phe ROK 8th 8th Division Dlvialon repulsed repuleed 8 division an est-ted estimated 300 m rounds of artillery fire. division positions pariticna receivel receive1 an u n d e o f artfllery No vas reported reported from No signiflcant eignif?.ca.ntactivity 8ctlvihy WLII from the the ROK I I Corps C o w zone. zona.
I
(Owing to Telecon transmission difficulties, the report on UN naval activities is not yet avaLable.)
A total of 668 effective sorties were flown by landbased UN aircraft, includinf 527 combat missions. Targets in (8 areas were attacked by 269 armed reconnaissance plame3. Medium bodbers,flying & total of 25 sorties, concentrated their efforts against the Sopo and Huillak marshalling yards and the Kyomipo supply cenrar.
TI. TI.
General General Situation Bituatlon
the past past 24 24 hours. houre. No have been been recleved recieved during during the No significant signi?icant repartil have

Navy Navy
T SF4T
&
ea 28
THE C.I.A. C . 1 . A . HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOH THE O F TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS THIS DOCUMENT.
No.
1b 8
009
v
.t
CONYIDENTIAL
4 AuevAt
DAILY i:OREAN BULLETIN

Mi3ttary Situation
Highlighte
In ..:ho US I Corps 2one, ROX let Divieion patrols made several
light centects with the enemy. and US lst CavOry Division elements advenced nlightly. Units of the US 3rd Division repulsed a smell sca-A probing attadk. All other US I.Corps zone units maintsined positiene and patrolled while relief of front line units continued.
.50E 2nd Dilision patrols in the US IX Corps sone engaged several
ple630sized enemy groups while advancing slightly. An enemy force of e2nroxmately two companies forced the withdrawal of US 24th Di ii.ou .31ments. ROK 6th Division patrols engaged platoonsized grmtps, All other zone units maintained positions and patrolled.
In '!;ho US X Corps zone, Rbe 7th Division unite reauleed several
probing attacks.
poetioe,
Actty in
wittdrava7
ofe the the Is'? 139 CCB CU DiVision, ~ l c l n n selsmsats n t of Divfaion, bivouacked bivouacked have the *yiission mission nf of attacking Ximpo Kimpo a airfield i n the ",Be Fausong !-euaongarea; area; h e w %he i r f i e l d on in ?9 O eugult, fi7.Zp ,
1
Litijv:std positi one.

Army
All zone units meintained positions.
Artillery 611 mortar fire fell on US 2nd Division
the BOK I Corps zone was limited to patrolling and Elements of the ROK Ilth Division made a slight
UN latrols TN mcrols in in the the western sector sector encountered encountered moderate to t o heavy heavy central and end eastern eastern ~ sectore, well reeteteece. reo:!.rtLiw,, In the aeotrel C ~ O T well O ~ ddug4e y - i n enemy onemy trooles dtubbornlp ttubbornly reoieted resisted the trams tha UN UN advence. advence
ENTIAL
Document No. No Change In Class. El Declassified Class. Changed To: TS Auth.: HR 70-2 pate:
_plicttra
By:
gp.
Navel aircraft flew A total of 118 sorties. including 15 suroorl; missions. minsfonsD principally a r l n c i p a l l y In in the the US lis X X Corps Corps zone. ~ 0 n 0 East F ~ a s t coaet coast air a 3 operations, o ~p a i ~ t ~ l o r ~ a . still the a t i l l hampered hampered by by fog, fog. were were limited limited to t o offensive offenelvemissions mlseionsin iu $beliambung Hmihun~: area; and aroe; enemy enemy gun gun positions, positiOn8, communications cum*micetr~nn end troop tmop concentratione concentrationr East were struck. atruck. ? h a t coast blockade vessels ?06St?lR bombarded bmbarded rail rei!. and and highway hi@hw4, areas areas in in the the Chongjin Chongjin vicinity v i c i n i t y while, while, at a t Wonean, Wonnun, harassing hareagingand Q A destructi,~ deatiuctiy-, fire was wae placed placed on on troop troop concentrations concentrations and a d gun gun positions. Fositionn.
West coast aircraft, in addition to providing airspot, strict turgetn in the vicinities of Chinnampo, Haeju and Yonan. Surface veseels bombarded communications, troops and anti-aircraft gun positions in tht Haeju and Yonan areas.
ileee Other of combat . Other DE UN aircraft aircraft flew flew 636 638 sorties, sartieeo o fwhich wblcb306 306were were combat. f :lano support aupnort missions siraions were wore flown f l a w in i n all e l l Corps C a r p a zones. eonea), and and 154 1 P armed armed reconneAsa* recoIma.tB3e -: areas .are were also a l s o Etn.lk I'~IL.+*?aircraft attacked ettacksd targets tergets in i n 53 53 areas. arean* Enemy rear areaB total o of 21 ebfoctlm effective a sorti3 72 night n i g h t intruders. intruders, Medium bombers bombare flew a total f 21 o r t i -3 by 72 striking s t r i k i n g troop troop concentrations concentrationr end end the the Chinnampo Chinnampo supply rupply center. aenter,
TI. II.
Ambassador Mucci* reports that US Anbassador Mucci) roporte that Foreign Farsign Minister Miniater Pyun psUn stated etett.i: on rtn 1 Augnet August that I that "limited nlimfted war war cannot caanat stop etop unlimited un2lmited aggression. nggression, ShxJd Should Kof.ii. Kctfd die Korea die deserted...adieu deserted.. .adleu to t o collective c o l l e c t i v e security." socuxity.w The E o 3 Times termed Leimcsd this thle statement etstemont an an "oblique "ob1iau.e attack attack against against the the allied a l l i e d efforts efforttg to Eo comproC'XWTQmiss niee with with the the Communists." Comnunietr~"
August A parade of o f 10,000 10,000 was w&8 reportedly reportedlyheld heldin i nPusan Pusanon on1 1 A u g u ~..)rotestin t,?ratestin say aqv solution solution that that would w o u l d divide divide Korea. Kowa.
On the other other hand, Dr. Dr. R. R. T. Oliver, OliTer, Rhee'e Rhee'e American A0erican public p u b l i c raletiow, l'dFlt~fJE1P consultant. reportedly BOK can do in con8ultant. reportedly stated etated that the the best beat the ROK i n thy t h e circuoc ~ ~ ~ ~ i a stances is Also, as stanoea la "to " t o be quiet." quiet." A l s o , Defense Defanae Miniater Minister Lee Lee characteri;Jad chaxacteri:nd X R "groundless" the report froe "graundlsrs" report that that the the ROK ROE representative representatire would would "withilrew' ' ' w i t L 3 m w ' ' drolar the Kaeaong Kaesong conference if the if the the demarcation demarcation line line was was fixed f i x e d on on the the :lith :L3th Parallel. Perallel
DEB - 169

General Situation Situation
Political
r 6 August 1951
SIC 9638
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
I.
BULLETIN BULLETIN
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forcep in the western and central sectors had several sharp encounters with anew groups up to battalion strength. Along the eastern sector advancing UN patrols encountered light to moderate resistance.
Activity in the US IX Corps zone was limited to light patrol contact with hostile groups up to battalion strength. Over 700 rounds of mortar and artillery fire fell on BOK 2nd Division and US 24th Division positions while patrols made minor, scattered contact with enemy groups. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled. In the US 3:Corps zone, ROK 7th and eth Idvision patrols engaged enemy gronps up to platoon strength.
ROK 3rd Division elements in the ROK I Corps zone made a slight advance. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled, making light contact.
Naval aircraft flew a total of 142 sorties, of which 14 were support missions. East coast aircraft, hampered by weather, flew offensive missions in the vicinities of Songjin, Hungnam and Wonsan, attacking enemy troop concentrations and communication facilities. Blockade vessels in the Songjin and Wonsan areas halberds& troop concentrations, supply depots and communications. In the bolbline area, naval gunfire destroyed a roadblock and dispersed troop concentrations. West coast aircreft, in offensive operations in the Sinchon, Haeju and Yonan vicinities, destroyed enemy supply dumps and harassed communications, while surface vessels boWbarded enemy troops in the Haeju area and gun positions in the Han estuary vicinity.

Navy
ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone engaged enemy groups varying from platoon to company size, while division positions received over 200 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. US 1st Cavalry Division troops forced the withdrawal of an enemy battalion and repulsed several small*scale probing attacks, while other elements advanced slightly. A total of 302 rounds of artillery end mortar fire was received. Other US I Corps zone umits maintained positions and, while patrolling, engaged enemy units of varying size.
30
No.
00 a
Air
Zo7.,4A UN aircraft flew 576 sorties* including 271 coahat elesionG. Sup. r-ort ecte-Aes vera flown in all Corps zones and 69 reconnaissance missions uitaaeA targets in 24 areas. Night intruders hit targets in 35 wean. :t.dium,hreners fley four effective missions* striking principally at enemy
,tvuentd.flaion fac12.ities.
Gencral Situation
Wo aignificant reports Immix:en received during the past 48 hours.
iHta
c
3-.
SIC 9639 BIC 9639 7 August 1952 1951 7
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T 1 8

C. .E.
Military 8itaatlon Situation Military

HighliEhts
Action along the front was generally limited to patrol clashes between AN forces and enemy screening elements. An increased amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire was reported in the east-central sector.
In the US lst Corps zone, patrols of the US lst Cavalry tdvision engaged several enemy platoons, while other elements directed artillery fire against numerous enemy groups of squad to company strength and receivad 119 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire. US 3rd and US 25th Division patrols engaged enemy squad to platoon size units.
Elements of the ROK 2nd Division, in the US IrCorps zone, repulsed un attack by one enemy platoonl engaged several other enemy plateaus and received 66 rounds of mortar fire. US 24th Auld ROK 6th Dtvision patrols net resistance from enemy groups of squad to 'platoon-strength.
US X Corps units reported,increased enemy mortar and artillery fire. An estimated 160 rounds fell on ROE 7th Division positions, 420 iD the US 2nd Division sector and 76 on ROK 8th Division units. Patrols of the ROK 7th and ROK 8th Divisions, ranging up to 4,000 yards to the front, engaged tumorous enemy groups of squad to platoon strength.
No.significant activity was reported in the ROK I Corps moneuxcept in the ROK Capital Division sector, idlers 80 rounds of mortar fire fe11 en friendly positions.
Naval air sorties fran cerriers off both coasts totalled 221. Offensive operations were conducted against enemy troop concentrations Rilitary installations.

Navy
eta
Surface craft in the vest fired on enemy troop positions in the raeju and Sohae-ri areas and continued patro1 duties. ln the east, blockade ships boaberded eitht railroad and highway areas in the vicinity of Chonsjin and fired on enemy troop concentrations and gun positions near Wonsan.
31 3 THE THE
NO. No.
C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOU OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OP TO 07 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
009 009
Air
land.based UN aircraft flev a total of 860 sorties, including 457 com.. Close support vas given UN troope in all corps zones. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft continued strikes against mis:ellaneous enemy targets throughout North Korea, while medium bombers hit 3elected coamunications points.
'eat missions.
11. II.
General General Sitaetion Situation

Socioloisical
A 3 August broadcast from Pyongyang describes the extensive epidemic disease control massures that have been instituted in North Korea since the 1)eginning of the year: It is claimed that over 836,000 persons verevacainated or inoculated against smallpox, cholera and typhus in this peroid. lbese measures allegedly reduced the incidence of smallpox by 23.9 percent.
DKB - 171
I-.-,
= SIC 9640 g640

8 8 August 1951 1951
src
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY

I.
I .
Military Sitiation Sitriation Military

Highlights
tor end launched silvers' counterattacks. patrol contacts occurred.
The enemy of&red determined resistance to UN forces in the western secElsewhere along the front only light
g'ong the remainder of the front,US IX, USXandRONICorps units held

posiVons and pitrolled,euking only light contacts with enemy forces. enemy vehicle traffic between Sinuiju and Pyongyang totals about 600 vaqicles daily and that traffic between Yongdok and PY0135,ang totals about 410 vehicles daily.
Tile Per East Oommasa notes that guerrilla activity in friendly rear tweet, has decreased markldly in recent weks. Unconfirmed reports of orders to tt: guerrillas to assenble southeast of Ingle nay possibly account for the Unrolled activity, although the purpose of this movement is Unknown. A more reseistic reason for ther inactivity, however, is probably the active role of tteROK troops and polies against the guerrillas.
Blockade ships along both csaste continued harassing and interdictory gunfire against various targets, including troop concentrations, limes of communication, buildinge and bridvs.
Naval air sorties totalled 236. Strikes vere made against targets in the vicinities of Kilchu, Songjir4, Pukchong, Bembung, Yonghung, Wonsan, Tongwing and Tongehon in the east, ard against targets in the vicinities of clinnempo, Pyongsan, Ullyul and the Nan esturary in the Itept.

NEx
In the US I '!orps zone, along the western sector, enemy forces offered determinee resistance to UK patrols, and counterattacked several times. The enemy placed an estimated 310 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on positions of the mi lst Cavalry Division southwest of Chorwon.
Army
xir
Land-based UN aircraft flew 63 sorties, including 304 =abet missions. Of 58 close support sorties, 47 veTe flown in support of the US I Corps, and
:re THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
nli
NO..
009 009
the remainder in the other corps zones. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft attacked numerous targets in enemy areas. Afedium bombers flew 19 sorties, aUacking various targets, some visually and same by radar control. AIr Observers reported sighting 790 vehicles in the enemy rear areas, of which 285 Imre moving south.
II.
General Situation
No signifIcant reports have been received daring the past 24 hours.
DI
- 172
SIC SIC 9641 $ 4 1

9 August 9A w t 1951 1951
DAILY L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

I:, 3.
M i l i t i f m y Situation Situation Military

Eighlights
Patrols of units,in the US I, IX and X Corps zones were in contact with enemy group* ranging from squad to comparysize. Advance elements of the US lst Cavalry Division in the US I Corne zone were forced to withdraw slightly wben attacked by enemy troops. On the other hand, US 25th Division pstrols in the same zone forced an enemy withdrawal. In the DS X Corps zone, patrols of the LG 2nd Division encountered two enemy companies and withdrew to avoid envelopment. 2namy mortar and artillery fire continued heavy across the entire front. Contacts were less numerous in the ROK I Corps zone.
Seventy-three naval air sorties were flowa including four in close support of the US II Corps. In the remaining mlssions buildings and vehicles were destroyed in the vicinity or Worsen and Ohuchonhujang in the east and in the Han Estuary in the west.
Surface vessels bombarded rail and highway targets near Chongjin and Songjin and fired on troop areas and gun positions at Wonsan and in the vicinity or the Han Estuary and Haeju.
Land-based UR aircraft flew 310 effective sorties, of 'which 79 were combat missions. Bad weather prevented further. activity and only three close support sorties were flown. Medium bombers were dispatched on only four sorties, including radar scope pbeto missons of Wonsan and Chinnappo.

AESZ
Navy
UN defenses encountered Ugh& light to to moderate moderate reretBlQ forces force8 probing m t l n g enemy e m aefeIlsee sist~mcc. The sistance. occuxred in the the western western and The most ma8t determined determined opposition opposition ocmmed centre2 secotss where where groups g r q of of up up to to company ccapany streneth n?zvmgth mere vere engsged. engaged. central secotrs
Air
'*
C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION 33' THE C.I.A. 33 DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE DECLILSSIFICATIOH 08 THIS DOCUMENTDOCUMENT. THIS
NO., No.
009
XI. II.
G o n u a l Situation situation General

PAlitical
Radio Melbourne reported on 6 August that tvo Brttish soldiers were kll/Ad on 5 August in Pusan and three others wounded when British military police mere called to restore order during a clash between Filipino soldiers and South Korean troops. The report adds that at least five Filipino soldiers and a Korean girl vere also wounded.
A Psychological Warfare Operations weekly report of early JUly states that friction between North Korean civilians and the Communist forces continues. The basis far the friction is, prinarily, the severe hardships placed upon the individual forth Korean as a result of Communist military operations and the lack of consideration far civilian interests. Reference is made to fighting between Chinese Communist broope and local inhabitants over food
URIC
. - 173 173
`tur
ittA7
1"
SIC SIC 9642 9642

10 Anguat 1951 10 Auguat 1951
1 4 i . h i t l y y Sitmtian i4i3.itary Situation

Bijaights
UN patrols in the western and eastern sectors encountered light to moderate resistance. In the central and east-central sectors, the enemy launched several sdnor counterattacks against UN front line units.
ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone engaged enemy group; up to compagy strength, vhile US 1st Cavalry Division patrols made similar contacts; mortar and artillery fire were received by Cavalry Divislom troops during engagements. Over 300 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on US 24th Division positions. All Corps units maintained positions; relief of front-line units continued. In the US IX Corps sone, ROK 2nd Division positions were attacked by an enmmy company, vhile division patrols engaged enemy groups up to platoon strength. Snell enemy groups probed US ith :Division positions; All ROK 8th Division patrols engaged several enemy platoon-sized units. Corps units maintained positions and continued to relieve front line troops.
UE 2nd Division patrols in the US I Cons zone vere forced to vithdraw 1n the face of an enemy platoon-sized attack. ROK 8th Division patrols also engaged groups up to platoon-size. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled.
A ROK Capital Division patrol in the ROK I Corps zone forced au eneny patrol to vithdrav, while other patrolling elements engaged an ,enemy company. ROK 3rd Division patrols engaged several enemy groups up to platoon-size. All BOK I Corps units maintained positions.
Naval aircraft from both east and vest coast carriers flew a total of 231 sorties. East coast aircraft attacked enemy gun positions, troop positions and comaunications facilities from Wonsan to Kilchu. Blockade vessels in the Chongjinvicinity boabarded rail and highway networks. In the Songjin area, naval gun fire vas delivered on troop areas, gun positions, buidges and highvay junctions.

AER
Nov
34
\ sz17.
THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OB OF TO DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
No. No.
009 ~ 0 0 9
West coast aircraft attacked enemy buildings, troop concentrations and gun positions in the Haeju, Ongjin and Yonan areas. Surface vessels continued patrol missione and bombarded troop positions and a factory area.
Air
Otber UN aircraft flew 549 effective sorties, including 281 coMbat missions. Support sorties totalled 32. Other aircraft attacked enemy gun positions, buildings and communications facilities.
11.
US Ambassador Nhccio, commenting on the degree and intensity of feeling within the RON on the subject of the cease-fire, Observes that no new slant has agneared in speeches and messages. Muccio adds, however, that a "high emotional pitch" on the sUbject of unification may be reached at the celebration of Liberation day on 15 August.
DO - 174

General Situation
Alr Observers reported sighting 2,485 vehicles, oflybich 1,180 mere moving south, and & total of Wenemy freighters and supply barges along the northwestern Korean coast.
Pollti& Political
i
1
.-
tr
SIC 9643
11 August 1951
yri
:I.
D A I L Y KOREA'N K O R E A 3 B U L L E T I N DAILY BULLETIN
N;bituy Situation Situation Maitary
EIgnIgt!
Artivity along the front was limited primarily to patrol contacts and included several sharp encounters with enemy groups up to company strength. UN troops in the east-central sector lammehed limited objective attackn.
Army
/r. the US I Corps zone, elements of the US 3rd and 25th Divisions revulaed probing attacks by small enemy units, while elsewhere patrol contacts Tierr =serous.
Attempts by the enemy to prdbe positions of tbe ROK 2nd and US 7th Dic:aions in the US IX Corps zone were similarly unsuccessfUl.
IL the US X Corps zone prdbing attacks vere repulsed by the BOK 7th Diwlaion. Patrols of the US Prid Division encountered enemy mines. The 30K CU; Division engaged in several sharp skirmishes with enemy troops ari elenents or its 16th Regiment launched a United objective attack Which was repUsed by two enemy companies. Other elewnta of this regiment and the divtAtion reconnaissance unit mere attacked by an estimated two enemy com!?ssf.os and fOrted to withdraw. The friendly Przces then counterattacked, secure. the area and repulsed tvo enemy coanbarattacks. The Division's lett) Regiment also attacked fcrvard in its zone but vas repulsed by an
.
enew battalion.
1'1:ere vas only minor petrol activity in the ROK I Corps zone.
Naval air sorties totalled 242, of which 15 were in close support of In offensive operations ncl.th along the coast to Songjin and inland to Yangdok and Pukchong, enemy gun positions, buildings, railroad cars and vehicles were destroyed and troop concentrations attacked.
the WY I Corps.
Land-based u10 UN aSPcrW3 aircraft flew 683 sorties, which 36k were XRnb-Msed flew 683 00rt,let3~of a i which uere combat combat ndsde01.04A. #%Om , ,

Nary.
Air Air
29 close ClollG support 88&h8 ? O W corps CaXrp. areas. U a ' Po The 29 sorties were divided among all four
JT THE
No. No.
C.1.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE C.I.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOH DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. -
-= e
0 09 00
"*
Armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in more than 50 areas. Medi bombers flew 21 effective sorties; targets included the Nvangjiu marshallil yards, Yonpo airfieldl Nyomipo supply center and tvo highway bridges.
AL B-26 some 17 miles north of Pyongyang vas attacked by enemy aircrart but vas undamaged. Royal Australian Air Force planes sighted 12 to 16 MIG 15's flying vest of the Yalu River and an undetermined number east of Sinuiju, but dia not make contact.
II. I f .
General Situation Situation General
DKB - 175
No received furfuring the the past past 21, 24 hours.. hours" No significant a l g n t t t u n t reports report.have have 'been been received
U
SIC SIC 9644 9644
K.
I.
13 August 1951 1951 13 Ausurt
D A I L Y KOREAN E O R E A B BULLETIN BULLET18 DAILY
MUlfrry 8ituatlen Military Situation

Highlights
UN patrols continued to prcibe enemy positions along the entire front. ln the western sector UN forces engaged numerous enemy groups with artillery fire, *Ile in the central sector, several enemy platoon strength attacks were repulsed. An increasing amount of enemy artillery fire was received in the east-central sector.
In the US I Corps zone, all UN units maintained positions and patrolled, making light contact with enemy groups of up to platoon strength.
ROC 2nd Division elements in the US IX Corps sone repulsed a series of platoon-sized attacks while patrols made other minor contacts. All zone units maintained positions and patrolled. Patrolling forces of the ROC 7th Division in the US X Corps zone engaced ismY we* groups of varying size; US 2nd Division elements repuleed severia light probing attacks. Enemy groups and positions along the front were brought under artillery fire. Over 600 rounds of artillery fire fell on ROK 8th Division posttions in the east-central sector. All other corps units maintained positions. Advancing elements er the ROK 3rd Ldviaion in the ROK I Corps zone forced the enemy from high ground in the Xamjang.mi area. All corps units maintained and adjusted positions and patrolled.
Naval aircraft flew a total of 63 sorties. Although east coastair activity was curtailed by repleplehing operations, offensive missions were directed against enemy gun positions, consimications and buildings in the Xilchu and Tench= areas. Blockade ships in the Chongjin and Songjin areas bombarded rail and highwey junctions and other communication' facilities. At Wonsan naval fire was delivered on enemy shipping, troop concentrations, and suppl; and ammunition dumps.
West coast aircraft, flying offensive missions in the Chinnampo, Haeju and. Yonan areas, attacked enemy buildings and supply depots; surface vessels shelled enemy gun positions in the Yonan and Thchon-ni areas and communications at Xhmsan-ni.

AESX
Nem
3 6 THE 34;THE
No. No.
C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION C.I.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
1
009 a , .
lf
SE
Air
Other UN aircraft flew a total of 765 aorties, including 425 combat missions. About 40 support sorties were flown in fl Corps zones, while 230 armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in 80 areas. Night intruders hit targets in 92 areas, Medium bombers flew 20 eefective sorties, boMbi.ng the &trillion marshalling yards and the Haahung supply center.
Air observers sighted 800 vehicles on highways and 13 supply barges ard rata in the Ban River north of the Elmo Peninsula. According to the Far East Air Forces; observation of enemy jet aircraft in the Yalu border areas for the past two days and the possibility of incressed fighter strength at the Antung and Ta Tang Km airbases indicate that eneay mobilities for defending the YaluRiver line have been strengthened. The presence of 80 aircraft at Ta TUng Kan and 50 at Antung increases email/ air defense in being, and enables the enemy to mount a considerable nuMber of night aircraft sorties.
II. 11.
General Situation Gene.ra1 Situation
Lee Bum Suk, present ROK AMbassador in Formosa, is slated as the new defense minister of the ROX.
(Lee, ex-Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the BOK, is., hovever, reportedly anxious to return to his diplomatic poat.)
The North Korean Government has lodged a protest with the UN concernirg the alleged use of poison gan by the "American interventionists."
DKR- 176

Political Political
Psychological
& Y
'11.0
s.00
S".7T
SIC 9645 ssc 9645
14 krguet 1951 14 August 1951

D DAILY A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
I.
BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
Military Situation
RiePights
While UN patrols encountered only light, sporadic resistance all along the line, the enemy launched several minor probing attacks in the central and eastern sectors.
In m zone zone elements elements of of the the ROK 2nd Diviolon minor In the Iff US 31 IX C Corps BOK 2nd Division received received minor platoon-oized Other n IX Corps unite units p patrolled phtoon-oized probing probing attacks attacks for for the the second rrecond day. dsy. Other aLzed vith little vith l i t t l e contact. contact.
The ROK BOK 8th 8th Division Division in the W US X X Corps Corps zone YBS was forced forced to to Uithdrav withdraw elemeats elements a? i t a 10th 10th Regiwnt in the the face face of of a a battalion-sized battilion-8ized attack attack from fkom the the enemy. enemy. of its Regiment in The BOK ROK 7th 7th and md the ths US Iw 2nd 2nd Division Diririon also olso encountered encountered minor minor enemy enetuy probing probing attacks. attacks. The
On the east coast, the BOK Capital Division made a limited attack and maintained a patrol screen.
Naval aircraft flev a total of 227 sorties against enemy targets in North Karea. Major efforts were directed against enemy coastal installations and troop and supply positions in the Wonsan-Rungnam area. Close support missions vere flown for the US I and ROK I Corpa.
A. surface ves8el.s As UBI UN surface vessels maintain& maintained the the blockaac blockade and and fired fired on on *&eta targets in in the the Chongjin, Songjin, Tanchon and Wonran m f coast, Wonsan areas areas on on the the e east coast, a a bombardment bombardment o f tbe o~cur uemt coast coat& south sauth of Chinnampo Chinnampo alloyed allowed friendly friendly guerrilla guerrlLZa forces forces of the K Korean vest t o raakc 8 lending lauding , u s & &stray several aereral buildings. buildiagr. to make a and destroy
.UN land=based aircraft flew 725 sorties,'including 397 combat. A total of 230 armed reconnaissance flights vere flovn in the enemy's rear areas and 70 night intruder attacks vere made. While medium bombers flev only four sorties yesterday, a maxims effort of 71 aircraft vas directed against the enemy capital of Pyongyang today, with the results so far unreported.

Navy Alr
In the t15 I Corpe eo= 0 x 1tbe front, miaor activity US I Corps zone on the uerrtern western front, minor patrol patrol activity accounted accounted for for the the only oaly action. action. Elepsantr, Elements of o f both the l lst e t Coamonvealth Ccemonvealth Divlrion Division and the US US 3rd 3rd Division DiV1820n eotablished e3tablished advance advance patrol patrolbmea. and the bases.
alr
No. No.
!Sx
Q0 0 99 , 0
. V
11. H.
General General Situation Situation
US anti-cease fire fire agitation agitation conconI S Ambassador Aubaessdor Mhccio Uuccio reports reporb that that 'while while enti-ceaae tinues tempo tinues at at about about the the sane (IIIP~ temp in in the the ROK, it i t seema eeem to t o be be "getting "getting more m e and ' Mdccio adda more dlfflcult for f o r the the government gwsrrmnent to t o stir stir up up enthusiasm." cxthuaiamm." Ehrccio adds that more difficult he he suspects suapecta "a na considerable coneiderable nuMber amber of of Koreans" Koreans" have have adopted adopted a a realistic rcslietic atattitude titude towards "de "& facto" facto" division division or of the the country. cmtxy.
Political Political
- 177
SIC SIC 9646 9646
SE\ET
15 m August 1951 15 s t 1951
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETII
I . I.
Military Military Situation Situation
R4hlights
UN forces continued to probe into enemy-held territory, engaging numerous enemy groups of up to company strength in sharp encounters. Some UN units made slight advances against stUbborn enemy resistance.
The T & ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division positions positions in in the the US US IX IX Corps Corps zone zone were were attacked, &;tacked, in but but the the enemy e m forces farces vere uere dispersed. dispersed. Minor M i n o r patrol clashes clashes occurred i n other unit sectors rectors of of the the zone. zone* In the In US X Corps VS C o r p zone zom, UN UNunits unitepatrolled. patrolled and and maintained maintained positions, psitione,
enemy. c I s c I I y .
;ith the the making w i n g only o w light light contacts contact0 vith
In ROK I Corps zone, zone, elnrnts elements o of the ROK ROK Capital Capital DiVl8iOn Division diecovered discovered In the BOK I Corp6 f the m psithe division attacked attacked e enemy posia r minefield a i o c f i e l d east eemt of of Sohung. Sohung. Other units of the ROK llth patrolled, and and the the latter t 1 O M . Elements Eleamntr of the the ROX l l t h and 3rd 3rd Divisions psttolltd, tions. division divirion dispersed dirperscd an an enemy e n e m y company caapany by by artillery artillery fire. ifre.
On the tbe basis barrio of Of information i & O m t % O n from * a various V M f O W sources UOUTCC6 including inClUdh5 prisoners )?OiSOn<trS of Of war, Tank Division, Tank Division, ths the Far Eart East Command crtimtes estimates that the the North Korean Korean lost 105t believed to Pyongyang, has been been f fUlly bslieved to be be located located in in the the vicinity vicinity of Pyongymg, u l l y re-equipped and re-trained sipce since itrr itshlast known appearance coMbat late 1950. MOM 8nd re-trained u t koovn appeumace inin coibnt in in late 1950. F E C W believes that with T-34 type. bsli~@ that 8 this t h i 8 division dirieion is is equipped equipped w i t h 120 1 2 0 tanks of the T-34
striking various various targets targets i in H Naval a aircraft a i r c t a t f flew ilcv a a total totsl of of 316 3 1 . 6sorties oortiea, strn and Yoagbaa-&ng Yongban-dong in the Songjin aad the vicinities of Woman, i n the Ilion, Choagdae-ri, Chongdae-ri Songjin Wonsan Iwn, em&, W Changnyon, C w o n , Ull;u1 Ullyuland andOngjin OagJinin inti;e the west. east, and Surface vessels continued to patrol off both coasts, and to bombard numerous Inland targets along both coasts.

Navy !!Ex
-
In the US r Corps zone, patrols of the ROK lst Division engaged small enemy groups, and received 38 rounds of mortar fire. Elements of the British lst Commonwealth Division conducted a reconnaissance in force, and succeeded in making and holding slight advances. Other units in the zone patrolled, emintained positions, and exchanged occasional fire with enemy groups.
38 38
Army
THE 4 0 OBJEC THE C.1.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS 1 NO OBJEO TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 0 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
-I
Z4a. I
No. NO.
w
Air Air
W - b a a e d UN UN aircraft aircraft flew flew 11024 1 , 0 2 4 sorties, sorties, including including 641 canbet. Armed Land-based 641 combst. A n m e d reconnaisssnca targets in In numerous ~rrm#nwe mas. reconnaissance and other other aircrett aircraft s-ck struck at at vcrriow variowstargets areas. The scheduled pstOrday, yesterday, waa was made made by by 68 68 The strike 6trike on on lyomgyang, pyangVango reported as ocheduled medium medium bombers borabtre with with good good results. reeulte.
Air Air observers obaervera sighted a huge large number number o of f balf-trockrr halfAracks hauling hauling field rield guu guns of of au an estimated srthsted120 SW sim. PIP. in nor&weeteru northwesteru Korea. Of Korea. O f 300 300 vehicles sighted, alghted, 139 139 were =re moving moving south. south. Three tanka tanks vere observed some mlles miles southwest southwest of or Wonsan. Woaasn.
II. 1 1 . General General Situation SitU%ion
No significant signiiicant reports reports huve received during during the the paet 2b hours. have been been received past 24
DKB - 176
.-
-#
I ,
w
16 August 1951
SIC 9647
DAILY KOREAN BULLETiN

Rigblighta
UN patrols continued to prehe enemy defenses encountering stObborn resistance In the extreme western and eastern sec4ors but only light resistance in the central sector.
/a the CB I Corps sone, elements of the ROIC 1st Division forced enemy units of company strength to withdraw, but later were forced back by an enemy battalion. A unit of the 1st Comonweelth Division engaged enemy units of ccupany strength and vas forced to withdraw to its former positions. A small amber at enemy troops attempting to penetrate a US 3rd Division patrol base were driven off. This division reported the discovery of a 120-pound Soviet white phosphorous boob in its sector, but the report is unaccepted by Far last Command pending the results of ordnance and chealcal warfare investigations.
In the IX IX and IC Corps sones, numerous enemy wroups were engaged but they offered only light resistance.
In the ROE I Corps zone, attacking elements of the ROE Capital Division withdrew, under intense enemy fire, to previously held positions. The ROE 3rd Division repulsed Wo enemy counterattacks, one by a unit of company strength and one of smaller scale.
Carrier-based planes flew 166 novel air sorties, imeluding close support missions for thi. OS IX and ROE I Corps. Off the east coast in the vicinity of Woman and north as tar as tiOngjin, antiaircraft positions, bridges, buildings, railroad cars and supply dumps were among the targets destroyed. Off the vest coast several buildings were destroyed in the vicinities of Nanchon, Chinne4o and Yonan.
Surface vessel* completely destroyed a previously damaged rail bridice
near Swain, hit three gun positions and a rail-highway intersection and
merle * road impassable at Wonsan, and bosbarded ten locations along the Ran River estuary near Town.

!Au
k 3 9 TYE C.I.A. C.I.A. THE
Bc73
HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOU HAS NO ilp TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION or THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. . A'
No.
NO
009
'7
Air
Land-based aircraft flew 733 sorties, of which 383 were coMhat. Twenty close support missions were flown in the US It_IX and X Corps sectors. Armed reconnaissance aircraft hit targets in 68 areas. Medium bombers flew only one effective sortie, a night leaflet mission. Vehicle sightings totalled 475, of which 188 were moving south.
1 1 . 11.
dansral Situation situatian General

No significant reporis bare been received during the past 24 hours.
DKB - 179
. 2.
SIC SIC 96148 9648
377
17 17 August A u p t 1951 1951
/ J
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Military Militsty Situation Situation
Highlights
UN u10 patrols potrols encountered encountered light light to t o moderate modera& resistance reriatsnce along slol3g the the front. front. In In the metern western sector, 8cctor, UN Vmr'unit6 'units engpged engaged IeveraI several mderately-reslstiIJg moderately-resisting enemy groups, while vblle in in the the east-central ewt-cex$trel sector sector an enemy enemy campany company oiiemd offered stubbwn stubborn reriafanee. resistance.
US Corps Division troops troops resisted resisted and In the U S XX h (C o r p s zone, ZOM, ROK 2nd Divlolon and dispersed diepereed several s e r a probing probing attacks; attech; over over 160 160 rounds rouada of of artillery ertillery and and mortar mortar fire fire fell fell Corps unite maintained positlone, positions, and on &virion positions. ~ l t l o n r r . Other Other IX II Carps unit6 mintaired and fought fought on division rcattered patrol pstrol clashes. clashes. scattered
An companies to resist advanciw advancing element8 elements An enemy enemy force farce of of several r e ~ e r a companie8 l continues t o resist Other C Corps.units Oi the the ROK 7th Division Divi6ion in in the the US US X X Corp C m zone. gone. Other of ROK 7th m p s .unit8 patrolled, petrolled, Relief of front-line units md resisted re8iated light light enemy e n e m y.probing .probing attacks. Relief unite continues. continuos. and ROK Corps zone established established new new ROK Capital Capitrl Division Division units units in l a the ROK I C o r p zone pomltionr, VhUe other other division division units unit8 maintained maintained positions p i t i o n s and an8 patrolled. patrolled. positions, while ROK 3rd elements ellgnged engaged several platoon-sitcd platoon-sized enemy enemy group0 groups and and BOK 3rd Division Division element8 continued defemlra goaitions. continued to to occupy occupy defensive positions.
Naval aircraft flew a total of 203 sorties, including support missions in all Corps zones.
East coast aircraft, in offensive operations in the Songjin, Hamhung and Wonsan areas, attacked enemy gun positions, communications and shipping facilities. Blockade vessels btSbardel troop concentrations, rail and highway areas and gun emplacements.
Aircraft based off the vest 'Coast flew offensive missions in the Chinnampo and Yonan vicinities striking enemy shipping, supply lines and troop areas. Surface vessels firei on troop concentrations and gun emplacements in the Yorun pr'to. Yonan area.

Navy
ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone made contact with enemy groups from squad to company strength, while US lst Cavalry Division elements bad a day-long engagement with an enemy patrol. Other zone units maintained positions, patrolled and made minor contacts.
' '
I.A. HAS 449 THE THE C. C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECT10 OITECTIO
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 01 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.

WO.
CIQ 9
%so
az'r
Air
UB Isnd-bwed aircraft aircmf'tflew flow a a total t o m of o f 729 729 sorties, srx'tiea, including Including 82 support UN lawlbased support misrions missions and 282 2 & ? other other combat collbat sorties. aortiea. About About 185 1 8 5 araahd armed reconnalessncc reconnaissance airaircraft attacked attacked targets t u @ & 8 in in 73 73 rear swar areas, aress, while v h i l e 66 66 night sight inturders inturdera hit h i t targets targets craft sortie8, vith Medium bomber8 bombers flev flew nine effective effective sorties, with tvo two aircraft aircraft i n 124 324 areas. (~locu. Medium in ehm-bombing Hum-ri and uld the others athen hitting hitting troop troop concentrations. conccntrstlone. shoran-boMbing Nunu-ri
11. II.
General Situation General Situation
P o l i ticsl Political
DKB -,180 -,1& DKB
North Korean Korean Prelnier n8 Premier Kim 11 Il Sung, Sung, i in a "Liberation Day" Day" addrese, address, etated stated that American-caused breskdrovn breakdown of or the the truce truce talks, talks, "they "they thst in i n the the event event of of an an American-earned v i l l be annihilated aMihilated ... not not only only on on land land but but also 83.80 in in the the air." vill
...
*or
SIC 9649 96L9

18 18 August 1951 1951
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

.
41 $4
Highlipts H i g b l i g hta
THE c.1.A. C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTXOI OBJECTION TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION 08 TO DECLASSIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUb!ENT* THIS

UN defenses, encountering encountering the the moet most deterdeterW forces farces continued continued to to probe PJObc enemy defenses, mined resistance and emt-central. east-central sectors, sectors, where where enemy enemy groups groups mined resistance in i n the central c e snd up up to t o company corrl#rpr strength lrtrengkh were vex% engaged. engaged.
Ne*
0 S 9 6 0
AnZ ! % 3 !

Hri BavY
.
Songjin 8angjin area. 8rea.
Patrols Patrol8 of of the the us US I I Corps Carpe units unit6 made made only only minor minor contacts conteCts vith wlth the the enemy. e n . ROK two pla;taona, platoons, while while other corps ROK 1st b t Division Division engaged elagaged an an estimated catimted force f e e of tam attacks vere were units encountered unite encountered smaller smaller enemy enemy groups. group. Small-scale s n r r t - m c a l e probing attack. repulsed by repulsed by elements elementie of of the the US US 1st Ut Cavalry Cavalxy and and US US 25th 25th Divisions. Divirione.
In the US X X Cospe BOK 2nd 2nd Division Divi6ion patrols gatrob engaged engaged four enemy In /X Corps zone, zone BOK platoons and a platoon-atrength plat;on-strength pa~bing probing attack# attack. Friendly p latoo~ and repulsed repllacd s P j r i e w artillery in the WS US 7th 7th Divlaion Division fired firedon onan ane enemy squad.AARM In m quad. ROE6th 6thDivision DIVi8%On patrol wtrol clashed with an an enemy enemy. c company.
US and US X Corps Corps units, units, patrolling petroLlin,g aggressively -8siveJ.y aad making mMmg limited limitea advances, advances, encountered ROK 7th Division sector, encountered stubborn stubbarn resistance. renistsnce. In In the ROK '7th Division sector, elements dementa of of the the division division received received sporadic sporadic small m n l l arms arm6 and 8ad automatic autcgatic weapons ueapon8 fire fire from an an enemy enemy company, caagsoy, while t t w d UneUccessfUly from vhile other elartnfs elements a attempted unsuccessfully to to adadvance. US 2nd Division elements cLsllhed clashed with with MIterol several enwy enemy group. groups of of platoon platoon to comapny strength. to c~dlo~rqr strength. Elemen+% f om Elements o of one regibbnf regiment of of the the ROK ROK 8th 8th Division Division mrrde made a l u t e d advance, abence, while other e v d enemy a limited other element8 elements contacted e several enemy platooar platoons and and received moderate received moderate enemy enemy artillery a r t i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire. fire. No Eso significant 8Qnificant action action vas WBB reported repopted in in the the ROK BOK I I Corps Corps zone. zone.
Naval Naval air sir sorties eorties totaled totaled 135, 135, the majority majority of of which which vere were apninet against enemy enemy target8 targets along along the #e east e m f coast. coast.
resoel. in i n the west Surface vessel* vest bombarded bombarded eight eight enemy enemy pooltione positions in the the Ean Ban R i v e r area. area. In River In the east, blockads blockade ahips ships bonbBlde'd bombarded six six &&road railroad rrnd and highway highway amea in the h o w n i and areas in the vicinity of C Chongjin and rhelled shelled caarmnnicationa communications paints points In in the the
Air A lr
69 attacked by 107 armed armed reconnaissance recollurri8amce aircraft. aircraft. 69 area6 areas were attacked by 107
II. 11.
Qex.B2r&l General
--baaed J N planes f l e w 542 542 sorties, eortiea, including including 2ll conitat. Targeta Land=based l UN flew 211 codbat. Targets In in
situation Situation
DKB 8 1 DNB - 1 181
100 significant; reports r e m a have h v e been received during during the the past paat 24 24 hours. houra. No significant been received
S.
20 August 1951
sc 965
DAILY ICOBEAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Situation
nab lights
Enemy groups up to battalion strength reacted strongly as UN units continued to probe enemy lines. Several enemy counterattacks vete repulsed.
In the US IX Corps zone, elements of the BOX 24 and US 7th Divisions vows end*EdbY smell eneMY groups vhich Imre, inmost cases, repulsed. Coe reement of the US 7th Division vas forced to withdraw after a short advance.
In the US X Corps saes enemy groups up to battalion size lald up the advancing ROK 7th Division. US 2nd Division units repulsed enemy probing attacks. Other Corps units reported no change.
In the US I Corps sone, the enemy launched three small prObing attacks against the US lst Cavalry Division and continued to resist the division's advance. Elements of the US 3rd. and 25th Divisions forced the withdrawal of small enemy groups, vhile making a limited advance.
In the =Isom, one enemy counterattack vas repulsed.
Due to replenishing andladimather, there veva no naval air operations.
Off the east coast, surface units successfully fired on oosnonLentIonn targets tram Chongjin to Wonsan.
ln the vest, an approathing typhocaprecluded surface operations.
Pyongyang, vith good results..
Air Air
UM land-based aircraft flew it2t sorties, including 267 combat.
Mbdiumbeibtra MN 17 sorties, mostly against railroad targets at
A total of 1,00 vehicles vas sighted, vith 1,114 moving south.
4a
''
THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTION THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF 08 TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
No. NO
009
*)>
.
c
\--
--*
II. If.
Oeneral Situation aemral S1tUr;floa

Political
According to &French news agencyrepart from Norm, a UN command investigption of the Cassunist-alleged UN violation of the Naesong neutral sone has "failed to identify ....any UN command military formation" responsible for the violation. The UN communique is reported to have added, however, that the violation may have been "the work of a politically guided civilian group operating under instructions" to create a situation that mi,ghtcause the failure of the Naesong talks.
(Ite general area of Mesons has, since early 1951, been an area of RON guerrilla activity.)
DNB - 182
.--,
t
SC 9651
7$T"
I.
D DAILY A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
I .
Military Situation Situation Mllitary
The most moet significant significant ground ground action action occurred occurred along slow the east-central ea&-central and and eastern eclstern fronts, fronts, where where UN UIY units unit8 encountered encountered determined &termiaed resistance sesistance as a s they they along the the front front UN UIV forces forces Elsewhere along continued to prdbe probe enemy ewmy defenses. defenses. Elsevhere adjusted udjmted positions poeitions and and patrolled patrolled with with light light to t o moderate moderate contact. contact.
Liatag.t.12
2l u g u s t 1951 21 A August 1951
BULLETIN B U E L E T I B
Elements of Division, i in the 116 US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, advanced advanced El-& of the ROK 2nd Division, n the and r recaptured and e c a m d the the area area from f'mm which vhieh they they had had been been forced forced to to withdraw. withdraw, The The US minor while elements elements engaged engaged US 7th 7th Division Divieion repulsed repulsed a 8 m i probing attack whlle several Corps units aaintalned maintained positions positions and 6evera3 strong strong patrols. patrob. Other O w r e rC o q e Units and made made light light patrol patrol contact. contact,
. In advancing elementa elements of of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th D Division forced In the the US t S X Corps C a r p s zone, eane, dmnclxag l~lslon forced an enemy attack. au e m withdrawal wltkdraual and and then then repulsed repilred a a probing Ppdbattack. Other Other advancing advmncing elements encountered and repulsed element8 encountered determined deterrained resistance reoist~ace repulsed several several countercounterattacks. attach. Units Units of of the the ROK ROK 8th 8th Division Division 8lmil8rly similarly encountered strong strong resieresistance While units made made light tancc vhile continuing contlzmhg to to advance. advence. Other Corps C m *&ta light patrol patrol
contacts. COllt8Ct8.
30 Soviet tanks .in in the ~ Songhyon-ni vicinity, about 1 1 3 0 soviet ~ w n - vicinity, n i about nine nine miles miles northwest northst of of Xaesong. Kaesong.
In the BOK BOK Capital Capital Division Division In the the ROK RQK I I Corps Cmpe zone zone, advancing ad~ancingelements of the engaged undetermined m maker ground north of SohwsSohwaengaged an un86terabed r of of enemy enemy troops troops on on high high ground myon magon while vhile other other elements eleme&B continued coatinued to to attack attack north. north. Units Units of of the the ROK 3rd ROE 3rd .Division Division & made (L a slight alight gain. gain. Other other zone zone forcea d forces mahtalned maintained positiolls positions m and patrolled. patrolled,
In In the the east, east, ajar air operations oTerations vere were cancelled by by poor poor weather. westher. Blockade Blockade ves~els i n the the Chongjin Chongjin and and Songjin Songjin vicinities baaabsPded vessels in bombarded four four tall rail and and highhighway wag areas areas and and several several bridges. bri&es, At A t Wonsan, Woman, naval naval fire fire was vas directed on troop on troop concentrations, an an industrial induetrial area, area, and and several s m r d gun gun positions. positions. concentrations,

Navy EEz
In the Us US I Corps zone, and W US Cavalry Diri8ion Division patrols In I Corpa zone, ROK lst l e t &nd 3 lst l6f Cetralry patrols engaged many ranging to laaqy enemy ~ L ~ C P I C groups, FW, Y m a g from from squad SW to company coppsny strength; ~-43th; 170 1 1 9 0 rounds of zwunds Or artillery d i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire fire fell f e l l on on ROK ROK lst 1st Division Division positions. Several probing prating attacks by the Several attacks were =re repulsed repulaed by the US aS 25th 25th Division. Division, Other Corpe Corps units maintained maintained positions unit. positions and and patrolled. ptrolled.
NO No.
Army a
OfY the the west west coast, c-t, veather conditions condstion+ cancelled cancelled both both air aSr and and surface surface Off veather uperatione 41, THE THEC.I.A. C.1.A. HAS H A S NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION operations. ' TO THE DECLASSIFICATION Op DECLASSIFICATION OP
\
S'ibETT
43
THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUUNT. THIS

\
000
Ime
SE
%el
Air A ir
includillg 34 34 support W aircraft flew flew 761 761 effective effective sortiest sortlee including UN land-based landbased aircraft support missions mieaione, and w 326 326 other other offensive offensive sorties. eorties. Strikes S t r i b s in in 89 rear rear areas 82.888 were were made by by 201 sade 201 armed amed reconnaissance reconnaissance aircraft, aircrstt, while while 39 3 9 night night intruders intsvders hit hit dim bcelbers bombers flew flew tu0 two eorties; sorties; one one w leaflet e t miseion mission targets in te,rgete in 61 61 areas. m. Medium and made anB one one photo-radar photo-radar reconnaissance recoanaiseance were %ere made with w l t h good good results. resulte.
Qs
1 1.928were . 9 2 8 moving -vi=
Air observers total of 3,420 sightings, of of M which obfjeme reported reported a a total. 3,420 vehicle elghtbgs, ch south. SOU*.
Situation 11. II. General SitunMon
DNB - 183
NO significant No ainnificant report* report$ have hare been been received received during during tbe the past gapt 24 24 hours. hours.
s1: SC 9652 9652
kuri
U
22 August 1951 22 1951
/"
I.
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
Military Situation
l.ights wights
BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
Enemy activity activity in In the the western western sector sector was ws8 again wain limited limited to t o minor minor patrol patrol clashes. east-central and eastern sectors where UN unite units are attackclsshes. In the eaat-central ing to secure resistance is B@CUr@ commanding Campaandiag terrain, b m i n , Communist =0i8hIlC@ I S described de8Cribed as stubborn enemy regimental strength forced e t u b b m and an an e n e m y attack in I n regiaental streforced a a slight slight UN UN withvithdrawal. d r a m .
AM.
Sharp activity a c t i v i t y flared flared in in the the US US X X Corps Corpa zone zone north north of of the thelivachon Xwuchon reservoir the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division received received a a strong strong attack attack by an estiecrtlreservoir where where the by an mated reinforced enemy enemy regiment. regiment. Farther to esst other other attacking to the east attacking X Corps elements elements received received minor minor counterattacks counterattacks of of up up to %o company company strength. stmngtb.
The ROK I I Copra Coprs on on the the east eaet coast coast made madr! limited limited advances. The The ROK ROK llth 11th Divirrlon, hovever, was wae forced forced to t o withdrew withdrhv by by an an enemy e s q y attack, attack by w o battalions. Division, however, by ttwo battalions.
North North Koreaa Korean soldiers soldlers captured captured in in the the pest past few rev days days in in the US US X X Corps Corps zone have reported reported that that a a "general "general offensive" offeaeive" was waa to t o have have been launched zone been launched during the during t h e night night of of 21 2l August. A-t.
Ba6 weather weather restricted restricted naval naval air air activity activity to t o 25 25 sorties, a o r t i e ~ and ,and hampered hampered the the Bea blockading blockading activity activity of of UN UBI surface surface craft craf't on on the t h e west west coast. coset.
UN on UH surface surface craft craft patrolled patrolleh and and continued continued the the blockade blocon the the east esst coast. coast. haramred the the North Morth Korean Kcwean ports parte of of Songjin, Songjin, Chongjin Chongjin and and Wonsan. Worrsan. Baval gunfire harassed Naval
UN UIf land-based land-baeed aircraft alrcraft flew flew 370 3 0 cothat combat sorties eorties out out of of a a total t o t a l of a i 651. 651. While while only only four four medium medium bomber bmber missions were flora, flown, 175 iumed armed reconnaiasauce reconnaissance sorties aOUtie8 were were directed directed against against targets tatgcets behind behind the the enemy ellsmy lines. lines.
II. 11.
Political Political US CIS Ambassador Auibassactor Muccio Muccio reports reports that that the the news news of of the the US US Congressional COngre6SiOndl comcamlSittee's recommended recommended slash 6lmh of of 100 1cy) million dollar8 mittee's dollars from Korean Korean add aid hse has caused caused "considerable consternation" comternation" in In Korea. Korea. The The local local Korean "considerable Korean press hae has cha,racterised characterized the action ection as a8 "frightening" fY'rj.ghWning" and and "disheartening," "dirsheartening," and the a t s been the the ROK ROE dover-nt Government h has been
sUbjected strong questioning Natio9gAmelNAgnmpmfffftfil a d j e c t e d tto o strong questioning by by thethe Wtior& ~ ~ e ~ l &

Na.a
Air
The western by the Tht western and central central portions portions of of the the front front line held heldby the US Us I I and IX C Corps the period period with with only only eporsdic sporadic patrol patrol a activity und ~ l t p swere quiet during the ctivity Enemy fire was received. received. on both sides. sides. E m e w mortar and artillery f i r e vaa
DICB
- &&
44 r ) +
A -
f
'h z
&
TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF OF TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS

No.
00
7-'
\.A
;ic7T
sc sc 9653 !3653
23 August 1951 2 3 August 1951
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A E BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

J
I . I.
M i l i t a r y Situation Situation Military

hta
UN forces company to h battalion strength attacks attacks in in forces repulsed several several conpmy t t a l l o n strength Elsewhere along the east-central east-central. and and eastern eaet~rn eectors. Elsevhere elow the front, friendly the sectors. units patrolled patrolled with vith minor minor contact. contact. units
An A n enemy e m battalion battalion strength strength attack attack on on a a US u6 IX I X Corps Cory13 unit unit eight eight miles milee northeast of o f Kumhma Kumhwa vas sras repulsed repulsed after after friendly friendly elements elements withdrew Vithdrew 1,000 1,800 yards. yards. northeast Elaevhefe in i n the the zone, zone, IX IX Corps Corps units W t s maintained maintained positions poeftioxm and and patrolled. p8trolled. Elsewhere In In the east-central eaat-central Sector sector enemy enemy forces forces continued con%iruedto to show show strong strong opposition to to friendly friendly efforts effort6 to ta seize seize key key terrain terrain features ferrturea and and eliminate elhainate opposition Northwest of Yeaggu Yanggu enemy ths enemy's Cneay'B salient sslieot east east of of the the Pukhan Pukbn River. River. I?orthwt?et the enemy sttacks forced forced friendly f'riend3.y elements t o withdraw attacks to withdraw from from two two azeas, areas, although although one one of of the areas area8 was waa subsequently subsequently recovered. An the An estimated enemy battalion was enemy battalion naa engaged in r& one o m of of these these attacks attacks and snd. another another battalion-sized battalion-sized enemy encqy group group was w e s s engaged observed in the the area. area. Other US X Cmpe o advance advance on on Corps elenrents elements continued t to observed in high ground ground east east and and vest v e s t of of the the Punch Punch Bowl Bowl. area area against @a.inst moderate modmate resistance. resistanceo
BOK I attack in the the eastern eastern sector, sector, meeting meeting ROK I Corps Corps units unlbs continued to a t h c k In moderate resistance. resistance. moderate
UN mva.. naval aircraft flew as UN flew a total to-tal. of of 94 94 sorties 8ortl.e~ aa weather weather hampered bampemd flight flight operations. Carrier Carrier aircraft aircraft continued continued attacks on on communications cmmunhcatlone centers centere operations. along m t , wh-tle r a f t apttintairmd o a a t d patrol along the northerat northeast c coast, while rurfecc surface c craft maintained c coastal patrol and and blockade. blockade. A i r and off the weot suspended due due Air and surface opmxki0r.u operations off vest coast were suspended to veatber conditions weather conditions.
Other UN aircraft flew a total of 812 sorties, of which 431 were combat. Medium bombers flew 14 effective sorties including an eight-plane attack on the Sunchon railroad marshalling yard:.

Nam 3NaVy_
Alr
No. NO
In western sector, enemy In the western acctpf, US I I corps corps patrols probing pmbenemy defenses defenses l g h t tto o moderate A small sWl enemy enemy probing &tack In encountered l light moderate resistance. resistance. A attack in the Kumhwa Kumhwa area area was va.6 repulsed repulsed by by friendly friendly units. tulita. the
4S THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION

&?!!x
0 0'9
'*
V aqd
\
General Situation Situation II. Generd If.
!Fruce l?egotlatioiw
Admiral. Admiral Joy's Joy's preliminary prellarlnary report report on on the breakoff of of confemnce conference negotiations, negotiations, broadcat broadcast by by Central Central Emits NeVa in in Tokyo, Tokyo, ePtpbesized emPhasized the the f3?audulent fraudulent n8ture nature of of the the Canmunist claim clalm of of an 6 1 )attack attack by by a a UN UDl aircreft. aircraft. According A c c m to fa the the report, the COmnunist Obvious obvious inability inability of of! the *he Communists Conxuuni6ta to to reach reach a a high high level level decision declsian in tn the the interval i n t e d from fpom 22 22 August Auguat to t o noon noon 23 23 August, Augut, the the nature nature of of the the damage damage -- which which ruggerted that small 8nal.i explosive charges chargee (poseibly (poaoibly &remdes) ecsttered suggested that grenades) =re were scattered oi dropied dropped from fWm an an aircraft aircraft -- and and the the statement ststernnt of of a 8 Chinese ChiaA6e soldier soldier that that or the whole incident t h e aircraft had had its ltr lights li&te on, on, strongly strongly suggest suggest that that the vhole wae staged. was staged.
--
--
A preliminary prclMnary report report from from the the 5th 5th Air Mr Force Force indicates indlcertea that that no 1 1 0 0N UI.4 planes plaaee A were in i n the the Kaesong IcBesong area area during during the the night ni@t and and that thst no no UN UN planes planes were vere off off were Force regorta reports that that c course, o m e , lost, lost, or or in i n difficulties. difficulties. However, However, the 5th Air Force an unidentified unidentified plane plane was W&B picked picked up up by by radar radar west weat oZ 02 Kaesong Kes;song at at 2130. 2 l . 3 0 . an
The T h e phraseology phrtLeeology of of the North North Korean Korean announcement announcement that the Khesong Kaeaong cease-fire talk8 talks would would be broken broken off now on" on" l left cease-flre off "from "from now e f t unclear whether whether the the break was w a a a ~ clear-cut clear-cut and and final final one, or whether N m 11 break Nam Il had had intended intended to to leave leave the way w a y open open for for resumption resumption after m e r an an effort effort to to settle settle the the problem problem of of the the the "lboWbing." "bombin&." Whatever the the answer, amwer, there seemed seePred to to be several sewerd. possibilities possibilities open Commmists, most open to to the Commnlsts, most of of them them tied tied in i n with w i t h the approaching approaching San Francisco Conference. Francisco Conference.
DNB - 185.
SET
cl
24 24 August 1951 1951
SC 9654 sc 9654
qy.
I.
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN I C O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

. ~ hhhigts l i & t S
Military mlitary SituatIon Situat!.on
Action in Action in the t h e western western sector oector was vas limited limited to t o patrol pafir01 clashes, clashes, while while to to the up t to two-battalion size size made made probing probing s attacks t h e east east several sever8l enemy enemy groups group6 of up o tvo-battalion ttack8 and counterattacks, all of which were repulsed. and counterattacks, all of which were replleed.
Army
All Corps reported numerous claehes clashes with All five five divisions divisions of of the the US US I I Corps small enemy groups d l enemy groups while conducting conducting patrols petrole and and small m a l l raids. aid de.

Navy ! E ! l Air A i r
. I I
There US M IX Corps, Corps, but but the the US US 7th There vas vaa little little change chhrrge in in the zone of tthe h e US Division repulsed in Divi8ion r e p u l e d an an enemy enemy reconnaissance reconn~iesance i n force. force.
In BOK 7th In the US X Corps C o z p zone, zone, the the ROK 7th Division Division withdrew withdrew temporarily t e m p o r a r i l y before before The 2nd attack, while while the the BOK ROK 8th 8th Divlaion Division Division repulsed a small small enemy probing attack, met stubborn.resistance stubborn resietance during during a a limited limited advance. advance. BOK ROK I I Corps Corps units unite repulsed repuleed two two small saadll probing probing attacks. attach.
.a tva-battalion twobattalion attack, -8 attack, but but counterattacked counterattacked and and regained regained the ground. ground.
east, UN UN carrier aircraft aircraft fflew only 73 73 sol%iea sorties oving owing tto weather In the east, l e w only o weather Surface operations conditione. operations were also limited. conditions. Surface
Off the weet west coast, or surface off coast, there were no no air air w surface operations. operations.
weather conditione, conditions, UI9 UN lsnd-based landbased aircraft Because of poor veather aircraft flew flev only only 132 sorties, including 1% tncluding 46 46 coMbat. conhat.
11. II.
General Situation Ooneral
Kaesong_ hvce Truce Talke Talks Izaesong
A 23 u g m t North Korearr 23 A August Korean radio braadcast broadcast accutle8 accuses the the US US of of bvillg having plunged the Korean truce conference into "finally plunged i n t o its its biggest crisis." crisla."
breaking off A revealing revealing commentary conmtentary on on Communist Coamnuniet strategy strategy in in breoff the the conconmay be seen ference mny 8een ii in a a 22 22 August article article (written (written prior prior to to the.breek-off) the. break-off) by Alan Winnington correspondent Worker." Alan Winnington, correspondent for for the the British B r i t i s h Communist Contnunlst "Daily "Daily Worker." Winnington notes that "it become becomes increa0ingl.y increasingly clear clear the the Americans Americans are are tryins trying Winnington t o maintain tensione to to pressurize prf388WiZe the the Japan Japan peace peace signatories." signatories." Be warns to maintain tensions measures w vill certainly be taken taken by by the the Koreane KOreans and and Chinese Chinese ... that "further "further maeiure8 lll c e w l n l y be tlitritlf.AcEsiffit_ilrovide a t to o guarsrrtee guarantee tho the = neutrality" u t r s l i t y i ~ of tthe h e ZO=, zone, ir if ~ t p ~ ~ ~ t ~ n c satisfactory answer esticsfactory w v e r for for an aa earlier earlier incident:. incident. TO THE DECLASSI2CITI ITT DECLASSIFICATgOI op 46 4 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT, 3 . 6 DI[B 186 186 DKB
..
l I o a
No, No.
00
SE E
L '
25 25 August 1951 1951
CC sc 9655 9655

I. I.
Highlights ElelignE
UN and repulaed repulsed several several determined determined UN forces forces consolidated newly-won positions and east-central and and eastern eastern enemy counterattacks. coUnterattecks. Action Action was VBB heaviest hesvieet in the east-central enemy sectors unsuccessfully to diS10dge dislodge UN UN u units from vhere the t h e enemy enemy tried tried uneucceeefully n i t s from erctore where strong defense defense positions. positions. strong
krmy
U n i t s of of the the US US I I and and IX IX Corps Corps maintained maintained positions positions and and patrolled, patrolled, Units 600 rounds The enemy enemy placed 600 m8king only only light li&tcontact contsct with vith enemy enemy forces. forcer. The making of in of mixed mixed artillery artillery and und mortar um'tar fire fire on OB UN Ul'?positions poeitions south south of of Otan 0i l l the the western aector. sector.
US US X X and and ROK ROK I I Corps Corpa elements element6 in in the the east-central east-central and and eastern eastern sectors 6e&ors successfully eucce8efully repulsed repulsed enemy enemy prObing probing attacks. sttacb3. Some Some units units made msde slight s l i g h t advances, advances, while othersmaintained vhile others maintained positions positions and snd patrolled. pstrolled.
The The Far Far East E a s t Command Cornrand now mv locates 10CSiXSthe the CCP CCF 20th 20th Army Axmy at at Wonsan Uoneanand andhas has. tentatively accepted accepted the enemy's n tentatively enemy's let lst and 3rd Armored Armored Divisions Divisions a6 as being being iin Korea, but hae not not definitely definitely located locsted them. them. Korea, but has
.NaLU

Air
Naval aircraft, flying flying 52 52 sorties, sorties, struck struck various varioue targets targets along dong the the esst coast c w t from from Tanchon Tanchon to to Wonsan. Wonsan. No sorties east s o r t i e s vere flown floun in in the t h e west. vest.
Blockade vestsels along along the the east e a s t coast coast bombarded Blockade vessels bombarded targete, targets, principally principally railroad and highway highvay facilities, f a c i l i t i e s , from from Songjin Songjin to t o Wonsan. Uonean. An enemy shore railroad and shore b s t t e r y firing firing on on UN UN vessels vessels was va8 silenced. silenced. battery
W U veesele off the the west west coast comet made made no IID enemy enemy contacts. contacts. UN vessels off
Land-baeed a i r c r a f t flew f l e w 501 501 combat combat sorties sorties in in a a total totel of of 849 849 missions. mis6ioae. Land-based UN aircraft Ib t o mnneroue aorties flown flown by armed and night night In addition to numerous sorties armed reconned~eauce reconnaissance and intruder 17 sorties, sorties, attacking the marshalling msr~hdlling intruder aircraft, medium medium bombers flew flew 17 attacking the yurds a t Sinanju SinaaJu and and a a supply eupply center center at a t Chinnampo. yards at
Air observers sighted sighted 2,200 vehicles, southward. vehicles, 970 970 of which were moving moving southward.
If. I/. General General Situation Situation

No significant the past past 24 24 hours. hours. significant rcporte reports have been been received received during the
DrcB DKB - 187 187
Apr THE $? THEC.I.A. C.I.A.
HAS H A S NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION
THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 93 ON TO THE

DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
NO NO.
0 0 9 ---w
', . 3
.' e-
4110$ U
hd
c7T\
sc SC 9656 9656
27 27 August August 1951 1951
DAILY D A I L Y
I.
KOREAN K O R E A N
B U L L E T I N
BULLETIN
Military Situation Highlights
the.east-central and central sectors of t the front, UIi UN forces made In the,east-central h e front, limited gains againat against heavy enemy resistance and l i m i t e d gaina ancl successfully succeesfully contained contained
several enemy counterattacks. counterattacks
!?2x
the Corps zone, all five UN divisions In t h e US I Corpe f i v e UIP d l V i 8 i O n S reported only only patrol clashes clashes with w i t h small small enemy enemy groups. groups.

Navy
Air Air
U I
was a l little heavier, as as minor minor probing probing Action in in the US IX Ur Corps zone wks i t t l e heavier, attacks of the the US attacks by by company-sized company-sized enemy enemy groups groups were were repulsed. repulsed. Elements Elements of 7th Division Division made made limited limited gains wins against against moderate maderate enemy enemy resistance. resistance.
In t h e US US 2nd 2nd Division Divisionstse las heavily heavily engaged engaged when when In the US US X X Corps Corps zone, zone, the company compsny size rlze penetrations penetrations were were made made in i n the the lines llnee of of attached attached ROK ROK tToops. troopse UN counterattacks u10 counterattscks are are in in progress. progress, In In the eastern half of the corps corps zone, zone, UN artillery a r t i l l e r y was wa8 active active against agai.net numerous numerous enemy enemy targets. targets. Action in to Action i n the the! ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone was ybs limited l-ted to patrolling. patrolling.
naval aircraft aircraft flew flew a CL total t o t a l of of 249 249 sorties, eorties, striking striking enemy enemy communicommuniUN naval cation6 targets t a r g e t s along along both both the the west met and and east east coasts coasts of of North North Korea. Korea. catione
Surf8cc ships maintained maintainea blockade end patrol p a t r o l of of coastal coastsl waters vatera and md Surface blockade and bombarded boanbarded key key enemy enew installations. Installations.
Other Other UN UN aircraft aircraft flew flev a a total t o t a l of of 1,051 1,051 sorties, eorties, including including 570 570 combat combat missions. Medium Medlum bombers bombers flew flew 22 22 sorties eorties vith v i t h major major attacks attacks on on the the marmarsahlling ashlling yards at at Kunu-ri I(uw-rl and and Sinmak. Sinmak.
II. 11. General Situation Situation
Political Political
A A Korea Korea Times Time6 article article states etatee that the t h e Korean reaction t to o tthe h e breakoff breakoff in in armistice armiiticc talks taUm vas VM "one "one of of no no surprise surprise at at the the Communist Coxmnist frameup." f'rameup." The The article quoted quoted a a source source close close to t o President Preeident Rhee Rhee as as saying saying the the Korean Korean GovernGovernarticle ment "rather "rather welcomes" welcomes" the the breakoff breakoff "unofficially," "unofficially," but % e s t thing ment but that the "best THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE for the t h e government government to t o do do is I s keep keep quiet." quiet." for 411.Ak TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATIOPJ ì TO DECLASSIFICATION Or 07
q8
No.
THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
-+
--c
004 --wi
newspaper further Avther claimed that that members of o f the the ROK Assembly Asoembly likewise likewise The newspaper were not not surprised eurprieed at at the the lack lack of good good faith faith on on the the part of of the the Communists, Corrmruurlsts, and snd that that they they feel feel President Weeldent Rhee's Rhce's consistent consistant stand stand on on negotiations negotl8tions with vith the the Communists Communists "has "has been been proven proven right." right e
DI(B - 188 188 DKB

StET
sc 9657
28 August 1951
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN THE C.I.A. HAS WO

4111%
OBJECTION
I.
Military Situation
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OW THIS DOCUMENT.
H i g h l i g hts Highlights
NO. No.
D 0-t-"""81114 a-
, . .
secured In UN forces In the eastern eastern and and east-central eaet-central sectors aectcrrs advancing UX force6 secured local objectives against moderate to stUbborn enemy resistance and local objectives qpinet moderate t o atubborn enemy resistance and repulsed repulred counterattacks counterattacks by by enemy enemy groups groups up up to to regimental regimental size. eize.
Army
US US /X H Corps Corps elements element8 repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks attacks at at two two points point8 east east of of Friendly elements element6 continued continued the tht engagement engagement and and occupied occupied advance advance KUmhva. Friendly KUmhwa. positions. po8itlona. In the area In tho area northwest northwest of of Yanggu US US X Corps Corps units m i t e repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks attacks Northeast of Yanggu friendly I n platoon to to company compaay strength. strength. Northeast of Ysnggu friendly elements elements in enemy A n estimated emmy by company repulsed several acveral attacks attacks by company size oiae enemy enemy groups. An battalion forced elements of a US regiment to make a slight withdrawal battalion dentso f ' regiuen.1: t o m a k e a slight withdrawal before the before the attack attack was was contained. contsined. Units UPits of of the the ROK BOK I I Corps C o w captured captured an e m important iprpartant local local objective objective in in the the An estimated enemy n estiurated eastern esstern sector sector against agnlnst light light to to moderate aoderate resistance. rreirtance. A regiment counterattacked ragbent countersttacked in i n an en effort effort to t o recover recover this this objective objective but but was waa repulsed. npulrcd.
captured prisoners prisoners are are reported reported tto have referred referred to to Several recently captured o hsve a by Kim 11 Il Sung Sung for for the the first first part part a general general offensive offemlve personally permonally ordered by of be the greate8t greatest sssault assault hunched launched against against o f Septebher; Septeder; they they expected expected it to be MI forces. forces. UN
UN naval 47 sortice sorties with with flight flight operatione operations -red hoovered by by UIY naval aircraft flew 47 Carrier aircraft bombed bobbed key points on detcrloratiag warther conditions. conditions, Carrier deteriorating weather vest e t coast the the rail rail line lfne along along the the northeast northemt coast. coast. Other aircraft off the w craft continued patrol r a f t continued attacked secondary attukcd lrecondary targets targets in i n the tho Haeju Ea.eJu area. area. Surface c and and harassment haxnsement activity. activity. Air
combat Other Other UN aircraft aircrett flew flew a E total t o t a l of of 547 547 sorties, bartiem, of of which which 221 22l were w r e couibat Four effective medium bobber sorties were flown, with one airwith one airmissions. pis6iom. Pour effcctlve mdiurn boder sorkies were craft bombing the craft bombing the enemy enemy rear rear area area supply supply and and communication communication center center of of' Yangdok Yengdok and the other otber planes plaaee flying flying leaflet leaflet and and surveillance surveillance missions. mimei~.
II.
DKB - 189

Nevy
General Situation No 'significant reports have been received during the past 24 hourk.
SE
'In the western western sector Corps with light ' In the sector US I C o r p a units units patrolled With light enemy edeny were ambushed ambushed in the the Chorvon Chorwon Btca area J e e p of of a a tank-infantry tank-infantly patrol vem contact. Jeeps but but tank tank fire fire dispersed diapereed the the enemy enemy troops. troop.
Novi
SC9658 sc $58
?.$-.-J,
I.
8 August August 1951 1951 29

D A I L Y

Highlights
Military Situation
In area north Evachon Reservoir, the enemy mounted In the the! area north of the the Ihchon mounted several sever8l hattalion-site battalion-rize attacks attacks vhich vhich UN UtQ units u n l t s repulsed. repulsed.
ry
Action Action in in the the US US I I Corps Corps zone zone was was limited limited to to patrol patrol clashes claehes while while elements elanents of of the the US US 3rd 3rd Division bivision regrouped. regrouped. Units of Units of the the US US /X IX Corps Corpe also also reported reported only only patrol pstrol action. actlon.
An enemy An one= counterattack counterattack forced forced a a slight rllght withdrawal withdrawal of of a a ROE ROK regiment regiment which which had had seized aefzed some so= high high ground. gramd. ROE I Corps, Corps, t the ROE Capitd. Capital Division In the ROK h e ROK Division received received a a heavy heavy volume volume elements of the the ROK 11th llth Division of artillery fire. fire. Counterattacking elements Division
-.
forced a a slight sllght enemy enemy withdrawil. withdrawdl.
Owing Owing to to poor poor weather weather conditions, conditions, UN UB carrier carrier aircraft aircraft flew flev only only 33 33 missions on laissiono on the east cast coast coast and and none none on on the the west v e s t coast. coaot. East coast mt coset surface surface vessels oeseela continued continued to to bombard bombard communications CommlniCatiOM targets; trug@ts; on the on the west uest coast, coast, surface surface units upits patrolled. patrolled.
UN UIJ land-based land-based aircraft alrcrSrt flew flev 312 3 l . 2 sorties, sorties, including Including 88 88 combat. combat, Medium bombers flew flew 12 12 missions, mission6, but but the the results resulks have have not not been been reported. reported. Air with 277 A i r observers observers sighted sighted 683 683 vehicles, with r;17 moving mvlng south. eouth.
11. Oeneral Situation II. General

No significant been received 180 eignificant reports rcpatts have have been received during during the the past pMt 24 21, hours. burs. so THE THE C.I.A. No 30 C . 1 . A .HAS HAS POOBJECTIO D D - 190 19 DKB TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 0 DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.

mja
Air Air
ROE 7th In the zone eone of the the US X Corps, however, however, IROK 7th Division Division troops troops repulsed repulsed . the area area several prdbing attacks pirobattachs including Including four four of of b:ttalion battalion strength strength in In the the adjacent to east, the US In the auacent zone to the e a t , ZRS north Reservoir. north of of the Hwachon Hw8chon Reoervolr. 7th Divieion Division and and an an attached attached ROK regiment regiment contained contained several several attacks atfacke from from enemy enemy groups gzwrpe up up to tc, company company strength. strength.
No. No.
009 009
U
30 30
sc 9659 *59
August 1951 1951 August
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

,/// \J."
I. I.
Military Situation Military situation
Highlights
Action vas Action YBS still e t i l l heaviest heaviest in in the the east-central east-central and snd eastern emtern sectors, sectore, wbere where UN UH forces forces made made lindted limited gains gains against se;aiast moderate moderateto tostlibborn Crtubborn enemy enemy resistresistSeveral counterattackfl counterattacks by by enemy enemy groups groups of of up up t to company size ance. Several o company size were were repulsed repulsed by by friendly friendly units units while whth consolidating corusolidating positions gaeitiom on on high high ground. gmuado
X E !
In the the IR US IX IX Corps Corps zone, the ROK ROK 2nd Division Division received received 150 150 rounds rounds of In zone, the of Other units in the corps zone patrolled artillery and mortar fire. artillery end mortar flre. Other units in the corps zone petrolled and and mainmaintained po8iti01~3, positions, making light tained light contacts contacts with with enemy e n e m y forces. forces.
US X X Corps Corps zone, zone, an an estimated estimated force force of of two two enemy enemy c companies attacked In tthe h e US oz~~anla attacked s the ROK ROK 7th the 7th Division, Division, but the the attack attack vas v&8 repulsed. repulsed, The The enemy enemy placed placed approxiapproxlthe US US 2nd 2nd mately mately 110 110 rounds round8 of of artillery u r t i l l e r y fire fjze in in the the division divielon sector. sector. In In the Division engagements with with enemy enemy forces forces of of up up tto company Division sector, sector, several several engagements o company Sporadic anew enemy strength occurred, units made slight strength occurred, as as friendly friendly unlto s l i g h t advances. Sporadic mortar fire sector, Vhih while unlts units of of the the mortar fire fell f e l l in i n the the US 1st Marine Division Sector, Elements 02 of the the ROK ROE 5th 5th and and 8th 8th Divi8ioae Divisions regrouped regrouped and and division regrouped. Eleaents
patrolled. patrolled.
In the the ROK I I Corpe Corps zone, zone, attacking attacking elements elements of of the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division Division In resistance from from an an enemy enemy compsay company along along a ridge, ridge, and, in met stlibborn stubborn resistance i n the the of au an enemy enemy ndmfleld minefield and heavy firt, fire, vithdrev withdrew several several hundred hundred yards yards face of ROK 11th ilth Division Division secured secured a ah hill after meeting meeting eastward. Elements of the ROK i l l after stubborn resistance sad and 120 120 mm. mm. mortar mortar fire fire a at the rate rate of of one stubborn enezry enew reriatance t the one round round
per minute, minute. per
The to Far Gaat East Colmnand, Command, remain8 remains one one of of The enemy easmy pattern, pettern, according according t o the Fur Unconfirmed active active defense, defense, featuring feewing strong strong and and persistent persistent counterattacks. counterattacks. Unconfirmed reports reparts state s t a t e that that enemy enemy forces forces are are regrouping; ngroupbg3 these these shifts shifts could could be be a a preprelude to the offensive vbich recently captured prisoners of war have reported lude to the offenelve which recently captuna prlaoners of war have reported According to to other other prisoners prisoners of of war, war, the the 1BE NK V VII vill begin w ill b c g h on on 1 1September. S e p W r . According I1 Corps is to move from Wonsan to relieve either the NK II or V Corps in the C o w is to mve from Wonsan to relieve either the "IS X I or V Corps in t h e eastern sector before the the next next offensive, offensive, and and the the 1oK EK VI VI Corps Corps iis now moving moving eaetern sector before s now northeast from northeast fron Haeju Eaeju across acrobs the the peninsula, peninsula, possibly possibly to to relieve relieve the the VII VfI Corps Corps The NK Corps is eastern front front ffrom at Wonsan. The HK I I Corps is also reportedly moving tto o tthe h e eastern rom the tht western w s l e r n sector. sectoro Jr1 5' THE THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECT108 OBJECTION . I . A . HAS TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 03 OP TO

\
En.
enemy placed placed Corps units patrolled US I Corpo patrolled and and maintained positions. porritions. The The enemy approximately 70 mortar fire approxiaQ!htely 70 rounds round8 of of artillery art;illery and and mortar fire in in the the US US lst 1st Cavalry Cavalry Division sector. Divlcrion
ww
THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
.-
009
W-
sector is is indicated, Indicated, A possible increase increaee in In armor 8 3 1 1 y ) r near near the the western western sector A accepted at at Sariwon, Sar won, with the the NK NK 105th 105th Tank Tank Division Divlslon (L20 (L20Tanks) IsntrS) tentatively tentat vely accepted aith and and the the CCF CCF lst let Armored Amnored Division Divirlon tentatively tentatively acdepted acdepted in in the the Singye Singye area. area.
Navy mralvy
Naval carriers f flew approximately 117 117 sortlea, sorties, attacking attacking Naval aircraft aircraft from UN carrier8 l e w approximately numerouB targets target8 along along both both coasts. coests. Blockade Blockade vessels vessels off off both coasts cossts conconnumerous t i n u e d to to patrol pstrol and and to to bombard tinued bcabard various various targete, targets, Including including enemy enemy troop troop p i t l o a s in in the theRani:liver E8n River area. area. positions
Air -
II. Situation 1 1 . General Situation
Tao Peiping fall fail to shed any any further 'pwo 29 2 9 August A u g t s t radio radio broadcasts from from Pelphg Both braadcssts broadcasts re-eremine re-examine in in detail light light on on the the fate fate of of the the truce truce talks. talks. Both the by llalson liaison officers officers of of the the the circumstances surrounding surrounding the "investigation" "investigation" by alleged alleged 23 23 August August aerial aerial bombing bom3blng of of Kaesong Kaesong and anb attempt attempt to to place place the the onus onur the talks t s i k e on a the the UN UN Command. c m . for bmakiag breaking off the
rm
DKB - 191 191 DKB

..
KastsmETru Kaeeong Truce Talks
O f 895 895 sorties flown UIU aircraft, airCrait, 528 528 were combat combet miaelona. Of flown by by land-based landbased UN missions. Ta;rgets I n 227 227 areas ere$6 amed Targets in were attacked by 366 armed reconnds8ance reconnaissance planes planes and and 56 Intruder aircraft. aircraft. Medium attacking the Medium bombers bombers flew flev 13 13 sorties, sortles, attacking the 56 night intruder wseag3ung-dong 0upply center, center, Yangdoktand Yaagdok,and enemy enengr troop troop concentrations. concentrations. Maengjung-dong supply
sc sc 9660 9660
31 31 August 1951 1951

I1 II
Military Situation Situstion Military

Highlights lantOlt
Action Action on on the the Korean Korean front front continued continued heaviest heaviest in I n the the east-central east-central sector, sector, vhere met stUbborn resistance and repulsed several where advancing adoancilrg UN u10 elements element6 mst stubborn resistsnce probing attacks. attsclre. probing
!E?x
Army
pwng attack attack on on a a friendly friendly patrol patFol base. probing
Enemy groups of undetermined atreogth strength were were engeged eneAged and and repulsed repulsed by by L n e w group patrole patrols of of the the US 25th 25th Division Divioion in in the US I IX X Corps EO=, zone, and and ROK ROK h 2nd d DiviDivision patrols patrols engaged t m e d one ollt enemy enemy platoon platoon and and dispersed dispareed an an enemy enemy squad. 8quab. In In sion the patrol forced tvo two cllemy enemy platoon6 platoons 7 t h Division Dlviaion sector, aector, an an Ethiopian pstrol the US 7th t o withdrav, Withdraw, vhile vhile the the Bthiopiaa t h k s by to Ethiopian Battalton Battalion rtpulecd repulsed eeperate separate a attacks by one enemy platoon platoon and snd one one company; campany; slight slight advance0 a d e by enemy advances uere were m made by divielon division elementeelements. ROK 6th 6th Division Division patrols patrols dispersed dispersed two tuo enemy enemy squads. squads. ROK
In the a ~ p ezone, the US US X X C Corps zone, ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division elements elements tepulsed repulsed several several platoon platoon strength strength probing p b i n g attacks, and and friendly pstrole, patrols engsged engaged enemy e@squadstrength groups; groups; elements elements of of one one regiment regimznt made msde a a slight alight advance. advance. Platoon company strength attack6 attacks were were reprlsed repulsed by by elemnts elements of of the the Us. US 2nd 2nd DivlDiviand coageny slon. US 1st let Marine Ellarim? Division Division turWd sion. The US turned back back several smclll-ecale small-scale enemy prObing probing attacks attack8 while while division division elements element8 attacked attacked northward. northwardfire was vas placed on on two two enemy enemy companies companies by by the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division. Division.
Navy
adjusted positions. poaitions. Artillery ROK I I Corps Carps units unite generally maintained and adJuated
In east, Task Task:Force 77 planes planes Naval air sir sorties aorties totalled totalled 142. 142. I n the east, Force 77 struck installations and tten e n enemy troop struck at eneaty enemy installations troop concentration6 concentrations alon6 along the the coaat the frontlines, lines, while while surface &ace vtseeb b d a s d e d enemy coast and and acrc88 acme the front vessel* boMbarded enemy coastal targets. West Weat coast cosst a i r c r a f t destroyed 6everal enemy ;buildings aircraft several'enemy buildings coastal targets. and attacked an enemy troop troop concentration, vhile vhile surface c craft continued to to md r a f t continued patrol.
In the the t18 US I In I Corps Carps zone, zone, patrols patrols of of the the ROK ROK 1st let Division Division engaged engaged one one enetny company and and several several enemy enemy groups group6 in in squad squad to t o platoon platoon strength. etrength. US US enemy company lst l e t Cavalry Cavalry Division Division a artillery r t i l l e r y dispersed an undetermined n nudber \ L I p b e r of of the the enemy enemy vhilc divleion patrols engaged while division engaged a reinforced reinforced enemy compsny company and and several several Division elements repulsed repulsed a a ema;ll-scale small-scale enemy enemy rlnaller groups. groups. US 3rd 3rd Division smaller
No. No.
Sit THE C.1.A. se C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION

DECLASSIFICATION TO THE DECLASSIFICATXON . OP __ THIS DOCUMENT.
0 09 OO
Y h
r
\
Air
Landbased Land-bseed UN UNaircraft aircraft flew flew922 922sorties, eorties, of of' which which 537 537 were were coMbat. combat. Six S i r light llght boMbers bombers attacked attacked enemy enemy troop troop concentrations concentratlone with with good good coverage. coverage. Medium targets, including the the Y Yongmi-dong Medium boMbers bombere struck struck at at several several enemy taxgets, on&ml-do~ marshalling marshalling yards, p d s , where where fires fire8 were were Observed obeerved in in the the target target area. -8.
1 1 . II.

Political
DKB - 192
There is I s continued continued keen been Korean interest n the There interest i in the scand~Ls scandals currently currently being aired. aired. Rbee being Rhee reportedly reportedly has hae refused reiused to t o approve approve the tht arrest cvreet of of four four National AsseMblymen Aseemblymen implicated implicated in in the the scandals. scandale. Former Former Defense Defense Minister Minister National S i b Jung-mo Jung-mo still still refuses miuses to to return o t e s t i f y before Sihn return from Japan t to testify before the the courtcourtmartiaJ trying trying the the "Kochang "Kochang Massacre" Massacre" case. case. The The Premier Premier promised promised the National Iiatfon8l martial Assenibly, however, hmver, that that both t a f f Chug AsseMbly, both SiSihn and former Chief Chief of S Staff Chung 11-kwsn Il-kwan wruld be be recalled recalled if If cases cases were were developed develoged against against them. them. would
w
OCI O C I 1936 1936
1 September September 1951 1951 1

I, I.
Hipitshy Situation Situation Military
Highlights
Attaaldng UN Attacking UN forces forcer along along the the central sentral front front mat met heavy heavy resistance reslatancs which %hi& slowed up up the the advance. advance,
Arez
In In the US I I Corp. C o w sone cone action action was limited Umited to to patrol patrol clashes. cla8hos0
Im
Air
In the tho US X Corps C o w sone sone ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division units unite attacking attaaklng north noi-tih of of the the In Hwactkon Reservoir were were heavily heavily engaged engaged by by two two enemy rsgimsnts regiments and were Hua*on Rerrervoir i n i t i a l l y forced f'oroed to t o wlthdraw3 i r strike aided initially withdraw; an a air aided the the units units to to mgain regain the the made limited limited gdae gains against against stubbanr stubborn cop rel o a t ground, lost ground. The US 2nd Division made ristanss, US 1st bt Marina Marine Division Division units u d t s ercountered orcountered strong strong raei@rtance d sistance. US resiotance a and also extensive minefields. ale0 axteneive mineflsldr, y'.
action. ROK I Corps Corpa units units were were involved involved only only in patrol ROK I patrol action,
UI earrier aircraft a i r c r a f t flew n attacks UN carrier flew approXinraWy approximately 125 125 mIsdon8 missions I in attacks agdnet against colnaptnlcationa targets on on the the east east and and west met coasts. coasts, communications targets
Surface r a f t continued continued to t o bombard coastal coastia targets, Surface c craft targets,
Medium bombera bombers flew n e w thirteen sorties8 sorties; twelve twelve of Of themp them, with with unreported unreported rereAir observers sighted sighted d t s , were t Sunchon. Sunchon, A i r obsemrs sults, were against the railroad railroad bridge bridge a at 3,,344 8OUth0 30344 vehicles, vehicles, 1,055 10055 of of which which were Mlving moving south.
UN land-baaed aircraft airoraft flew flew 547 $47 sorties sorties including including 254 254 combat.. conbat. UN land-based
US,25th units in IX Corpa Corps sone rspulaed repulsed an an enemy enemy pmbprobing US.25th Division Mvislon unlts i n the US M attack near near Ktmwha. Kun#tra, Farther Farther east east in in the the corps c o w sone sone elements elements of of the the advancing advancing attack US received severd several cc?unter-attacks counter-attacks US 7th 7th Division Mpiaion met mst stubborn Stubborn resistance resistance and and recsivsd which were werc which forced foraed one one UN UIl unit unit to to withdraw. Withdraw, BOK ROK 6th 6th Division Mvision elements elements whiah taking part part in in the the same a m UN UN advance advance were were able able to t o make make little l i t t l e progress prc~greaaowlng to taking owing to e m resistance.. reelstance enemy
TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF OF 3 TO

No. Bo.
THE C.I.A. C.I.A. H HAS NO OBJECT108 OBJECTION THE A S NO
609
009
If, &moral Situation Situation General II

Disputes between the Disputes between the ROK ROK Anay Ai'lqg and and Air A i r Force Force regarding regarding control control and and utiliutUsation sation of of light light aircraft eirtraft are are beginning begim%ngto t o assume asmum serious serious proportions. proportionso It It is is now now rumored runurrsd that that the the Army A m y will will take take aver over light light aViation aviatlon in i n the the near near future, futuraD certainly by 1 1 Jamary, January, The states he he wilb will not not rerecrrrtaj.nly by The Air Al.r Force Force Chief Chief of Staff 8tat.0~ lease pilOts in in training, The believes leare the the pilot8 T h e US UB Army Army Attache, Attache, Seoul, Seoulo b e l i m s the (%leisof o f Staff Staff of of both both services rervicos could oouLd reaCh reach agreement agreamnt wore I t not not ' fur f ,Chiefs were it pressure from outside outdde military milltar;y. authorities. esrfhndtiea. The pressure frma The ROK Roll Air A i r Force Fome has recently rsoentlp been successfully mrocersWly ufilisod in several several anti-guerrilla been utilized in anti-guerrilla operations, operations, especisUy especially in 6oufhrest Koreao in southwest Korea.
-
DKB
193

f'117
'
DAILY D A I L Y
.
KOREAN g O R E A l V BULLETIN BULLZTIN
t
m
OCI
1937 1937
September 1951 1951 4 Septeuiber

Highlights
In sporadic In sporadic ground engagements, engagaents, UN u14 forces force6 in i n the central central and and easteaetmoderate to meeting central sectors sectors encountered encountered moderate to heavy heavy enemy enenw resistance, resistance, meets enemy groups groups of of up t o regimental regimcntel strength. some up to
Unite the-US I I Corps C o w generally generally maintained positions positione and aad patrolled. petrolled. Units of the.US In the ROK ROK l lst e t Division Division sector, sector, an an unidentified unidentifiedaircraft aircraftf lflew e w over overHrasan Masan and dramped four four yellow yellow flares flare8 1500 l5OO yards yards north north of the the UN peace peaec camp, camp, while, while, and dropped at at the same same time, tie, a a nuMber d e r of of flashlights flmhlights were vere seen aten blinking bllnk5Dg skywards sltywarde to to the northeast. Another unidentified nmtheast. Amther UidcDtified aircraft aircraft in i n the US 3rd 3rd Division Division Sector 8ector dropped a a bod bodb on drapped on the %be main main supply supply route, route, blowing a a six-foot eix-foot crater, and and then then
atrafed several vehicles, vehicles, cauaing causing only only minor damage. strafed several
X n the US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, numerous numrotm patrol pstrol clashes claehea occurred occurred es as UN U l V units unite In the US mmlntalned positions positlow and sad patrolled. patrolled. Two unidentified maintained unidentified aircraft and end three Yak Y a k type type aircraft r i r c r r i t strafed strafed UN UN positions positions in i n the the central central sector sector and and on on the the eastern eQe of of the thc corps corps zone. zom. eastern edge
Heavier encounters occurred occurred in in the the US U SX X Corps Corps zone, zone, with uith UN Ull forces forces Heavier encounters meeting meeting enemy cncw groups group of of up up to to regimental regimental strength. strength. The The activity was vas nrincipally principally in i n the the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Divieion sector eector north north of of the the Hwachon Hvschon Reservoir. Rerrervoir. Other u n i t s in in the the zone, zone, while whlle engaging enemy enemy forces forces of of smaller smaller size, size, units maintained positions p 0 6 i t f O l l r and and patrolled. pstrollcd. maintained
Only Only minor minor patrol patrol activity activity occurred occurred in in the ROK ROK I I Corps C o v e zone. zone.
UN naval aircraft continued strikes against various targets along both coasts, while surface vessels bodbarded shore targets and patrolled.
Land-based flev 885 885sorties, aorties, including including 549 549 combat. combat. Armed Land-based UN UN aircraft airanetflew reconmlsancc night intruder intruder aircraft contimed to to strike strike at at numerous numeroue reconnaisance and and night aircraft continued targets in i n over 350 350 areas. areae. Medium bombera flew 27 sorties, bombers flew sorties, attacking attacking the nilrcmd bridge bridge at at Sinanju, Stnanju, the the marshalling marshalling yards ysr& at sf Chongju, ChoJlgju, and and targets targets railroad in W Wonsan In o m a n and and Chinnampo. Chinmuup. s4THJ3 TEM C. I. A. HAS C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOl OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIBICATION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 08 OF

!SU
Air
4*
\ /
THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.

\
,A,
No. No.
669 009
SE
A Air i r obeervers observers reported sighting 2100 2100 vehicle8, vehicles, with With 892 892 moving moving south south (in the previous pcevious 24 24 hours, hours, over 3000 vehicles vehicles were were sighted, sighted, vith with 1639 ( i n the moving south). UN planes attacked attacked along along several several roads, destroyibg destroying 126 126 and damaging vehicles a d m n ig 329. 3 2 9 .
II. 11.
General G e x t e m l Situation
Political Political
President R Rhee on 2 SepteMber South Korea Kbrea can h e e on September stated atated that South can muster muster 250,000 new 250,600 new troops troop but that that "arms ''mu6 and and tiaining t h i n i n @are are needed" for for them. them.
Radio Pyongyang on on 28 28 August carried curried an an account 8ccoullt of of the the "impressive "Impre66ive Radio Pyongyang welcome" welcome" in In Pyongyang moxqgang accorded to "the "the V Vietnam i e t n a m people people's '8 delegation delegation which vhich had had coyc o Korea Korea to to comfort and inspire impire the Korean Korean people people in in their their struggle... struggle. come t to comfort and and and to to cement cement their their friendship friendahip with v i t h the the Korean Icorean people." people."
.OKB - 194
He cautioned against against a a ncw n e w Communist Colllmunist offensive oifenaive or or a 8 limited limited offensive offensive in in connection connection with v i t h Communist Communist arguments at a t the the San San Franciico Franclaco conference. conference. His statement closed statement closed on on the the note note that that the the sooner 8ooIIcr the the ROK ROK strengthens its its forces forcer with i l l be vith additional additional troops the earlier democratic demodratic natiorrs nations v vill be able able to to attain attain their ultimate t heir u l t h t e aims. aim.
OCI OCf 1938 1938

5 5 SepteMber September 1951 1951
K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY KOREAN

I.
I .
Military Situation Situation

Riplights Hi*lights
Action Action declined declined sharply sharply along along the the entire entire frOnt &nt as acl UN Ull forces forces continued contimied to t o patrol patrol and and to to consolidate consolidate and Bnd adjust adjust their their positions positions on on high high ground. ground.
Army !E!X
UN patrols patrols in i n the the US US I I Corps Corps zone zone encountered encountered only only slight sl@t resistance rtsistanco as groups of of squad squad to to platoon platoon ae they engAged engeged and dispersed diapereed several enemy groups US 3rd Division Division repulrred repulsed etrength. Elements Elements of of the the US lst 1st Cavalry Cavalry and W strength.
several squad-sized squsd-eizcd probing probing attacks. attacka several
Corps zone, In the US IX I31 Carpa zone, small sumll enemy CI#IPY groupe groups were yore dispersed diepereed by US US 25th 25th All enemy activity ceased In in the the US US 7th 7th mB 2nd Division Dlriufon patrols. pa~rols. A l l eneny and ROX ROK 2nd BOK 6th Mvision Division patrols patrols drove drove tvo two enemy enemy Division sector. Aggressive Aggreseive ROK Division sector. pl8tOOM to t o the tbe north. platoons Numerous small Ivumel.0~~ 61miU.enemy enemy groups groups were were dispersed dispersed and end several eeveral small-scale small-scdh probing repulsed by units o of US X X.Corps, althoughenemy probing attacks attack6 were repulsed f the US .Corps, althoughsphmy BOK 7th Division a c t i v i t y vas va~ cheTacttrlzcd ~ aa light. ligbt. Elements Element8 of the fhe ROK activity characterized as reported ceased after lrieodly friendly elements elements had had secured secured a a reportad that tbat enemy enemy action action ccaeed Several h i l l against against resistance rerietance from from an an estimated estlmatad reinforced miniorcod battalion. battalion. Several hill enemy squads squade were vere dispersed Biapepeed by by elements element6 of of the thc US I E 2nd 2nd Division, Divlslon, while while enemy attach enemy units Units in in undoterminad attacks by enemy undetermined strength were were repprlsed repulsed in in the the U8 US 1st sector. lst Maslne Marine Division Division sector.
In the ROK I I Corps l i t t l e enemy enemy activity reported except except Corps zone, little activity was reported i n the ROK n e m y battalion in BOK Capital DlV$8iOn Division eoctor, sector, where where one one e enemy battalion was was driwen driven t o the north to company, engaged by by a a friendly friendly patrol,w patrol,was forced forced north and and one enemy compsny,
vlthdraw t o withdraw. to
Naval elr air eortiea sorties from carriers carriers off off both both coasts coasts totalled totalled 260, 260, vlth with strikes i n the west against coomy installations installations And three strikes in against mlsccllaneoue miscellaneous enemy three troop concentrations, conctntratiom, sad in the eacrt troop and in east against against tramportation transportation target8 targets and and seven seven troop troop areas. areas.
Surface veseels n the vessels i in the west west bombarded bombarded several seVeral enemy enemy gun gun and and troop troop poeltlorre, n the positional, while while i in the east eastblockade blockade shipe ships fired fired on on numemu8 numerous trmeportation transportation targets and shore installations. instsllations. and shore

.
.$$
$r
TO TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION o# Or THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.

No. NOS
THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO 0EJSCTXO)r OBJECTION . I . A . HAS
0 0.9
Air Air
Land-bsstd UN UN aircraft aircraft flew f l t v 678 678 sorties, sortlee, including includ3ng 348 3 4 8 combat. conbat. Close Land-based Clone suppart missiODS mlselons totalling t o t s l l i n g 67 67 were were flown flown in in all all corps corps zones, moas, and sud 157 157 armed urmd support boMber reconnaissance reconrrsiaaance planes planer attacked attechsd targets tar&etr in in 78 78 areas. areas. Medium Xedfum b e e r effort effort WIWB limited limited by by poor pam weather weather conditions. conbitloam. vas
1 1 . II.
No significant rigniflcarrt reports reporte have have been been received received during during the the past paet 24 24 hours. hours. NO
DXB 195 De-195
?y
I,
0
SEt
OCI OCI 1939 1939
Is, September September 1951 1951
6 DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN
Eglltghts 11.WN.arata
UN sectors adjueted adjusted thetheir U I V units unite in in the the east-cantral east-central and eastern aectorr, Activity positions, meeting meeting light light to t o moderate moderate resistance resistance from - 0 i ~ the the enemy. ellemyo Activity positions, the'vestern in the ve8tern sector 8ectm was veld limited limited to t o minor patrol Wtml skirmishes. skirmisheso
In Corps, UN patrole patrols encountered I n the western sector, acctor, held by the US Ifil I I Gorp, encountered Two company strength Ipobhg probing scattered resistance resistsnct from from small small enemy enemy units. UDltm. Tvo scattered camgany strength rewlsed attacks were r e p l s e d in i nthe the US Us lst Is$ Cavalry Cavalry Edvision Mvision sector rsector and 12 enemy T-34 h tanks vere e sighted the -8t westbank bankof ofthe the Win River. T-34 & S were l a t e d along thc River.

Army Armly
.,
Activity in In the the vs US IX IX Corps C o w sone tone was WIBO limited limitad to to minor minor patrol patrol contacts. contSctso Activity
A8 As element. elements of the US US X X Corps Corps adjusted adjusted positions positions in in the the east east central central mector, small rmsll scale scale enemy enemy counterattacks counterattacks were were repulsed. repulsed. sector,
In colutal eastern eastern sector, the ROIC I Corps Corps was vas engaged engaged by by small emall In the coastal ROK I units or of up t ob a t h l i o n atireagth o adjust enemy units to battalion strength aa as ROK ROK units units continued continued tto adjust positions. paeitions
Eta !E!x
flew 78 oorties sorties In in auppodt support of of ground ground units units and and in in UN naval naval aircraft f l e v 78 attacks attacks against against enemy exmay rear re- area area installations. tn8taJ.latlone. A Air i r activity in in the ea8t east . wao wms curtailed Curtailed as as Task Task Force Force 77 7 ' 7 replenished. replenished.
UN surface 6 B C e craft craif patrolled patrolled and banbarded UN boabarded enemy coaetal coastal iastallatlons installations and lines line8 of or communication commanlc8tion on on both both the the east emt and and west west coasts. coaate. and
Air A*
IJN landbased Isnd-based aircraft aircraft flew f l e v aa total t o t a l or ai 868 868 sorties. SOZ%%e60 O UN Of coMbat f the 551 551 colDbat sorties flown, ta, 3 4 were flown, 74 74 were were in close close support support or of ground ground u units, 314 were anned armed recommimance in in the the enemy's enemy's rear rear areas, areas, and and 87 87 were were counter counter air. air. Only reconnaissance m y two medium medium bomber banbcr missions mis8iona were vere flown. flovn. two
J
# '
THE HAS NO NO OBJE& OBJE THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS ON TO THE DECLASSIFICATION% DECLASSIFICATION _ _ THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
~
NO. NO.
09
--L -
SZN
11- General General Situation SitcuLtion II.

Political PoZitical -u3
A opinion A US Us military military observer observer in i n Korea Korea notes notea that that the the tenor tenor of ofpliblid plblic opinion expressed and public pUblic statements txptesees expresses thinly thinly velled veiled expressed in In editorials aad satisfaction aatlrfection over over the the fact fact that tbat an an armistice armistice seems meme to t o have have been been "averted." "averted." Public demonstrations dcmnatratlolu against against the the cease-fire cease-fire talks t d s s have have ceased. ceased.
as 88
DKR DKB

- 196 196
President President Rhee met in in a a recent recent interview interview with with newsmen newsmen is i8 reported reported to t o have have pointed to another Camaauni6t Communist offensive offensive asld and to to have have stated stated polnted t o the imminence Inndnence of amther that the the UN UN should should fight fight back back with with the the "intention "intention of of winning." winning."
. .
.
,I
.-.
1 4
OCI O C I 1940 1940
7 September 1951 7 1951

I. I.
Military M i l i t a r y Situation Situation
Highlie EgY110.11
Enemy Encmy forces forces of of battalion bstealion to t o regiment regiment size size counterattacked counterattacked against agaiast UN troops UfI troope in in the the west west and and vest-central weet-central sectors sectora and and forced forced minor minor withdrawals. withdrawals.
US I / Corps zone, a US l 1st patrol base base came under In the US r t Cavalry Division petrol cane under constant constant attack a%tackby by enemy enemy troops t r o o p which which increased Incremed in I n strength strength from from a a company compaoy base was The patrol patrol base VLLB to to an an estimated eetimated four four battalions bsttalione supported supported by by tanks. tanks. The Division repulsed 3rd Divieion withdrawn Vithdrawn and and defensive defensive positions positions established. eatabliehed. The US 3rd several company and severel &ad two-company tw-coinpmy attacks. attaclke. Elements of a base Elements a US US 25th 25th Division patrol patrolb m e in in the the US US IX IX Corps C o w zone zone were reportedly reportedly cut cut off off by by an an estimated cstimsted enemy emmy battalion. battalion. Other division units repulsed repulsed probing pmbattacks. attacks. Tbe The identification idenlzification of of shell s h e l l fragments fragments recovered in FeCWCm2d in the the US Us 7th 7th Division sector sector as 88 coming comiw from fram Soviet Soviet 132 132 mm. m. rockets rockets has been tentatively East Command. hsrr tentatively accepted accepted by the Far F e w %st Comand. In Corps sector, elements of the ROK 7 7th In the US X Corgs sector, element6 t h Division Dlvision advanced advanced slightly, slightly, engaged engaged an 6 0 . enemy enemy company compc~nyand and established eetablished a a perimeter per5metcr defense defeaec area. arear Elsewhere in Elsewhere i n this .this corps corpfi and and in i n the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone, eone, action action was VBB limited limited to to patrol petrol and and small-scale eaall-ecale probing probing attacks, attacks, all a l l of of which which were were repulsed. repulsed.
Naval naval air air sorties sorties totalled totalled 333, 333, of of which which 40 40 were close close support support missions. IUl~BlOnS. Offensive Pukchong, Barnhung, Bamhung, Wonsan Wonsan and and Offensive air air operations in in the vicinity of Pukchong, the battleline resulted resulted in i n the the destruction destructlon of a a bridge, several aereral buildings, buildings, vessels a started one gun gun position p i t i o n and and several several railroad railroad cars. care. Surface veseels w e d fires fire6 in Wonsan, damaged in a mine depot in i n the the vicinity of of Songjin SongJin and, at at Woman, u d gun gun emplacements, bombarded four @tn gun positions, positions, a a hsghvay highway emplacements, dispersed dispersed troops troops and bombarded troops, gun poeitiono, positions, and and installations inatallations in in bridgl? aaA a a highway. highway. Enemy troops, bridgp and twenty-six area6 areas along the bank of Ban River were also bombamded. twenty-eix the north north bank of the Ean also b&arcdad.
T
The 79 79 Land-baaed aircraft flew f l e w 787 787 sorties, eortiee, of of which which 467 467 were combat. combet. The Land-based aircraft support missions between the US close support missions were were divided divided between US I, I, IX, Ix, and and X Corps Corpo areas. are(LBw Medium bombers Medium b e e r a flew f l e w 29 29 effective effective sorties aorties against againat targets targets which which included included the the Yangdok Yangdok marshalling nsrshslling yards, yards, the Sinanju railroad bridge, bridge, the Wonsan Wonsan Supply supply center, snd the the Chongju Chongju and aad Bwangju Ewangji~marshalling mesehalllw yards. yarda. In 'kIEC.I.AC . I . A . HAS HRS NO NO oBJECIZEgl OBJmXO# center, and THE DECLASSIFIMXW DECLASSIFIGUION 01 &7 10 THE

!E!X
E?!x
Air A ir
ST SUS MOWN/. m l S m C U U E b l T ,
* s
9 A -
Ne.
ìtood
11. Central Situation Situation II. General
atastisisen k 8 0 n g Peace 1_64 T4uLe aika

A A 6 6 September Septeniber Chinese Chinese Communist Communist radio radio broadcast Brwdcaet gives gives the the text text of of Nom is is Quoted quoted General Nam General Nam Il's 11.8 latest latest communication comunication to to the the UN UN Command. Connuand. Nam as aying a8 O a y l n gthat thstthe theUN's U"6 reply reply to t o the the most most recent recent Communist Communist charges charges is $0 "absolutely unsatisfactory" and "mbsolukly uneatlsfactory" and confirms confirms "the "the inescapable inescapable responsibility responsibility of of your your side" aide" for for the the violations violations at at Kavsong. Kawaong.
DKB - 197
%mid U
'HET
qui h d
OCT 194). 1943. OCI
8 September 1951
DAILY ROBEAN BULLTIN

I.
Military Siteation
!Ugh light&
t o battalion ba"ctt.llion UN forces UB forcer repnlaed repaned several sovaral cdunterattacke cduteratbcka by enemy *r?emy groups groiqs up to size tuened clleo In i n the weeL met nnd nad west-central wo82,ccntr;;l sectors, 8 8 C t o ~ tand QW? ~ tW%ad back back a a number zlurnljsr of of light light probing probfng attacks attacks In in the the east-central east-contra1 sector. sector,
In the vest-contral sector, US IX Corps waits repulsed enemy company to battalion-sized attacks northwest of Olthwee Elemente reltevirg an advance patrol beim) under attack forced enemy elements to withdraw and seized advanced positions, permitting the mithdrawal of frieedly elements. Eest of this action, another outpost was attacked by an estimated 450 enemy.troope. Friendly eleElsements withdrew to main defensive positions after repulsing the attack. where In the sector, eneme light probing attacks were repuased.' In the east-central eector, US X Corps units repulsed a number of light probing attacke with the aid of artillery and air support. Triendly elements north of Tanggu adjusted poeitions. Other unite attacking to reduce the last enemy-held higb eround in the "punchbowl area" withdrew in the face of moderate resistance,
adjueted poaiLiono, poeitions, ROK I I Corps Corps unite w i t n in In the the eastern esetern sector mscl;or patrolled patrolled and. ~ i r d .dJueted
Carrier aircraft end surNaval aircraft flew a total of 253 sorties. face craft continued to attack the enemy-held northeast coast, ieflicting damage on importaat enemy rail centers. Other naval aircraft attacked targets along Surface creft bombarded enemy installations on the Han River the west coast. estuary'and maintained patrols off the BSreau west coast
Other UN aircraft flow a total of 716 sorties, of which 405 were combat. The Far Esat Bomber Comwand launched five effective medium bomber sorties, including attacks by three aircraft with ground control radar assistance against enemy forward troop concentration, one aircraft radar-bombing Chinnampo, and om conducttug a a leaflet leaflot drop. drop. one &craft aircraft conducting so THE THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOR TO THE DECLASSIFICATION TO DECLASSIFICATION OB OP

Nam:
Air
Friendly elements engaged in a reconnaisanco in force on the US I Corps left flank, and dispereed a two-company enemy group before retureing to main . friendly positionc. An adjoining I Corps unit continued to advance in s simeler exploratory move without significant contact.
58
THIS DOCUNENT. DOCUMENT.

STieRr
NO. No.
Q09 0 0-9
J
' 7
W
II. XI.
itSlakT
EconomLc Economic. PmbassRdor Muccio has has received received a a letter l e t t e r from the the ROK ROX Minister Minister of of Finance Finance AMbasendor Muccio i n whfcb the latter latter advises Rdviees that that there there was wa6 an an increase Increase of of approximately Approximately 15.5 15a5 in which the Loans t to o UN forcee forces increased fncread billion b l l l l o n won won in In bank bank note note circulation circulatlon during during August. Augufit. Loan6 by 36.8 36,8 billion b l l l l o n won, raising raising the the outstanding outstanding balance balance to t o 291 291 billion. b i l l i o n . This inr Inflationary pressure flationary p r o e w e puihed puehed the the commodity commodity price index index during during Augurt August from from 2,682 2,682 to The Minister Minister of of Finance reporte reports that t o 1,067. 7,067. Thz, that if if the the settlement settlement of the loan loan I s d e l a p d , the the inflation I n f l a t i o n may may get gst out out of of control. control, Muaaio inauires about about the the is delayed, Muncio inouires p o s s i b i l i t y of of a a partial partial settlement settlement of of the the won won advances advancos to to UN OB forces, forcee, since since possibility harvest harvert time time normally mrmlly brings brings a A seasonal se~oonrrlupswing upming in In currency curmncy circulation circulation in i n Korea. Xorea.
DEB - 198
SE
OCI O C I 1942 1942 10 10 September September 1951 1951
K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN I . I.

Military Situation Situation Military
Highlights Along Along the the west-central weet-cen$ral front front attacking attacking UN UN forces forces made made limited limited gains gains units met net heavy against light light to t o moderate moderate resistance. resistance. friendly against lriendly uni& heavy resistance neiatence in the the east-central east-central sector. sector, in
AEI%
US IX H Corps Corps units units made mede lindted limited attacks and and continued continued to t o patrol patrol aggressively. crggFeealvely. Elements of of the the US US 25th 25th and and 7th 7th Divisions Divisions made -de limited limited advances advances against agaiaet Elements light tomoderate resistance l i g h t toapoderate resistancefrom fromenemy enemy groups p u p a of of up up to t o battalion battalion strength. strength. Several Several platoon platoon strength strength probing probing attacks 8ttscLs were uere repulsed reptlsed by by corps corps units. untte. Numerous contacts contacts with with small emall enemy enemy groups group were were reported reported by by friendly friendly patrols. patrols. Numerous
In heavier as In the the US X Corps COltpA zone, zone, enemy emmy resistance reeistance VOA vl~s as UN UM forces forces made made Numerous slight advances advances in in the the ROK 7th, 7th, 5th, Sth, and and 8th 8th Division Mvislon sectors. aectors. Numeroue a d 1 enemy groups resisted reslstedttrc advance of of friendly friendly patrols, patrole, while vhile several several small enemy groups the advance probing attacks attacks of of up to a p m y strength were prdbing to c company were reguleed repulsed with with the the sseietance assistance of artillery artillery and and mortar mortar fire. fire. of
ROK I f Corps Corpo unita units patrolled to the north, north, encountering encountering small small enemy enemy gfoupa resiating several several probing probing attacks attach of undetermined undetermined strength. strength. groups and resisting
Surface Surface vessels vessels in the the west vest firad fired on on 14 14 troop troop positlone positions in in the the Hsn Han ceturry area, while vhile in i n the east blockade h i p bombarded estuary area, blockade s ships bombarded eeveral several raiLrOa13 railroad and and highmy i n the highway arcareas in the vicinity vicinity of of ChongJin Chongjin and and conmnications communlcations points points and and buildingr, i n the the Songjin Songjln and and Wonsan W o m a n areas. arelps. buildings in
N a v a l air n the vest totaled t o w e d 106; 106; air air s ctivity i n the erst Naval air sortie6 sorties iinthewest activity in east vrrs was canceled owl= to %o replenishing replenishing operations, operations canceled owing

Navy LI=
In the In t h e US I I Corps zone, patrols patrols of of the the ROK lst l e t Division D i V l 8 i O n contacted contacted several several Cavalry Division pooltione positions enemy groups groups in i n squad squad to t o platoon platoon strength. 8trength. US US 1st l e t Csvslry enemy US 3rd received over over 100 100 rounds rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillery artillery fire. fire. Units of the US received Division generally generally maintained maintatned positions positions and and patrolled. patrolled, Division
.610 THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF

DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
o.. lo
0 0s 009
? i
I
U
Air
L)
A total of 757 sorties were flown by land.based UN aircraft, including 436 conbat, of which 73 were in close support of US / and X Corps troops. In a total of 14 missions six medium bombers bit the Buichon railroad bridge, one bolbed the Wonsan supPly center, and three.gave close support to UN ground forces.
II.
leneral Situation
DXS - 199
r)
c
>'
OCI OCI 1943 1943
11 1 1September September 1951 1951

I.
r.
~ l i t a r Situation y Situation Military

.Highlights Highlight s

Laz grmor
UN forces forces in i n the the west-central sector continued t o adjust UN west-central sector to adjust position8 positions l i g h t contact contact with with enemy enemy groups groups up up to t o company company strength. strength. On O n the the and made light central and east-central east-central front, front, UN troops consolidated consolidated positions positions along along high ground and and encountered encountered light l i g h t to t o heavy resistance from groups up t o high to strength. b a t t a l i o n strength. battalion
In I n the the US T EI I Corps Corps zone, %one, ROE ROK lst 1st Division Division patrols patrols made made numerous numerous l i g h t contacts with enemy u n i t s up t o platoon strength; o t a l of light units to strength; a a ttotal of 120 120 rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillery artillery fire fire fell f e l l on on division division positions. positions. The The US US rounds 3rd Division repulsed a a small s m a l l enemy enemy probing probing attack attack with with mortar mortar fire. fire. 3rd Division repulsed All Corps Corps zone sone units u n i t s maintained maintained or or adjusted adjusted positions. positions.
In the US IX Corps Corps zone, zone, UN UN units units maintained maintained positions positions and and made made patrol contacts with with enemy envy groups groups up up to t o platoon platoon size. sise. numerous p a t r o l contacts
X Corps Corps zone repulsed repulsed a comcomBOK 7th 7th Division elements in the US X units made made patrol contact contact w with pany sized sised probing probing attack attack while other unite ith numeroua enemy groups. groups. Attacking elements elmenta encountered heavy resistance numerous enemy attacks were repulsed by some f'rom enemy battalion. battalion. Probing attack6 some US tff 2nd 2nd from an enemy Division: elements while while other other elements elements continued continued to t o attack. a t t m k . Attacking Division elements elements of of the US 1st Marine Marine Divieion Division continued continued tto advance iin the,Sohnng element8 o advance n the Sohung area, l s o continued o advance area, Elements Elements of the ROE BOK 8th Sth Divieion Division a also continued tto advance despite despite increasingly resistance. increasingly heavy heavy resistance.
.
ROK n the ROK I Corps sone ROE troops i in zone repulsed repulsed several several probing probing attack8 attacks and made ight t o moderate All division made l light to moderate patrol contact. contact. 'All division units units maintained maintained
posltion8 positions.
0
leanu
Naval air sorties ttotalled o t a l l e d 255 and air sorties and included included 29 29 close close support support
GC) THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOlO OP THE DECLASSIFICATIO# DECLASSIFICATION 0% TO THE THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
NO.
0 0
SR,7
On the the east east coast, coast, naval naval aircraft s i r c r a f t conducted conducted offensive offanaive operaoperamissions. IdsaiOM. On tions Kilchu Hamhung tiom in i n the gilchu, Hamhung and and Komsong Komeong areas, areas, striking striking enemy engun positlone, supply centers centers and and communications o o m n i c a t i o n s facilities. facilities. Blockade positions, supply vessels in vessels In the Songjin Songjin and and Wonsan Wonsan vicinities v i o i n i t i e s bombarded bombarded gun gun positions, peltiom, Aircraft in troop concentrations, cacentrations, supply supply dumps dumps and and communications. cormnunicatione. Aircraft troop the west conducted operations operations in i n ths the Haeju, Ongjin Ongjin and and Yonan Yonan areas, areas, vessels f fired 14 h i t t i n g enemy enemy lines l i n e s of of communications. comrmmications. Surface veasela i r e d on 111 hitting enemy positions in enmy i n the the Han Han estuary estuary vicinity. vicinity,
Air
2,323 vehicle sighting, sighting, with with 858 858 vehioles vehicles Air observers obsemers reported 2,323 moving moving south. aouth.
II, 1 1 ,
A radio broadcast, broadcast, i in Engliah, again again A 10 10 SepteMber September Chinese Communist radio n English, charges UN UN insincerity insincerity in in dealing deallng with with the the Communist-alleged Communlst-alleged violations ViohtioM charges of the Kaesong of hesong neutral neutral zone. zone,. The The broadcast broadcast delcares delcares that t h a t Ilnegotiations "negoMations can proceed on on an equal equal and normal basis basis in order order to to reach...armistice reach...armistice f the United Nations t s arrogant agreement, agreement, only i if Nations forces forces changes changes Iits arrogant and and unreasonable attitude..." attitude,, o n

General Situation General
Keesong Truce Kaesonn Truce Talks Talks
UN ZQI land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew a a total total of of 814 814 sorties, sorties, including ineludiq 200 49 close close support support missions misrsione and and 424 424 other other offensive offensive strikes. strikes. Over 200 49 armed hit targets in 102 102 areas areas and 88 night night Inin, armed reconnaissance aircraft h i t target8 Medium bombers truders targets in i n 248 a 8 areas areas in i n the t h e enemy.rear. endpzy.rear. Medium truders attacked targets flew B-2910 v visually bombed the the Sariwon Sariwon flew 22 effective effective sorties; eight B-29's i s u a l l y bombed marshalling yards yards and end the the Hungnam Hungnam supply supply center. center. Two Two aircraft a i r c r a f t under ground radar concentrations, and nine nine airradar control control bombed several aeveral troop concentretlona, craft c r a f t hit hit the the Namchonjom Namchonjom marshalling marshalling yards yards and and Asand Asand cement cement factory. factory. In were damaged. damagedo 1.n air-to-air air-to-air combat, combat, five five MIC-15'8 MIG-151s were
2 2
4
. L
r w-
406. -
OCI OCI 1944 1944

I , I.
MLLtary Situation Situation Military Highlight 8 BlEhllata
Advancing heavy Advancing UN UN forces forces it in the the east-central east-central sector encountered heavg I n other Other sectors Sectors reoistanoe from frombattalion s i z e enemy enemy units. units, UN forces in resistance battalion size adjusted adjusted positions positions and and patrolled, patroUed, meeting meeting only only enemy enemy groups. groups.
In encounIn the the US U S I I and IX IX Corps zones friendly patrols generally encounenemy groups groups up up to t o platoon platoon strength. strength. One patrol of the the US US 7th. 7th tered tered enemy Division, US day-long engagemedit engagement w with Divlsion, Us IX IX Corps, hOwever, hbwever, fought a day-long i t h an enemy company, and a com$anpsize comPany-size u unit also a patrol patrol of of the ROK ROK e n e q company, nit a l s o freed a of artillery .6th Division, US Ill IX Corps, Corps, to 6th Didaion, t o withdraw. Over 200 rounds of and mortar mortar fire fire fell fell on on division divisioh positions poaitions in i n the t h e US US I I Corpe Corpa zone. zone.
In the US X Corps zone, zone, elements elements of of the ROK 7th Division, In Division, attackattacking toward toward an objective three miles northwest of of Songhyon-ni Songhyon-ni encountered determined resistance resistance from from an an enemy enbattalion. The US 2nd Division determined battalion. repulsed repulsed small-scale small-scale probing probing attacks attacks and then then attacked t to o within 50 yards of an objective approxbately approximately t ten of Yanggu, Yanggu, against against stubborn of e n miles north of from two two enemy companies companies forced forced outpoets outposts of of the the ROX ROK resistanee, resistance. Pressure from lst Marine Divilrion Division 5th Division t o withdraw Withdraw 200 200 yards. yards. Units of the US 1st Division to advanced Changjong against resistance f from advaneed toward toward their their objective near Changjong rom Division repulsed one company two enemy enemy battalions, company strength strength battalions. The ROK 8th DSIPisfon attack, attack against positions occupied by by two enenemy then launched an 6.n attack attack, then latter forced forced a a s slight withbattalions. A counterattack eounterattack by one of the latter l i g h t vlthdraws1 the Division Divirion eventually eventunlly broke broke contact. contact, drawal and the
In the ROK h e ROR ROK I Corpa, Corps, tthe ROK 3rd 3rd Divlsion Division repulsed repulsed an an enemy enemy attack attack of undetermined strength. undetermined strength.
Naval air air sorties eortfes tOt8lled totalled 233, includixlg including 28 close close support support 1ds8iOnS missions In offensive operaoperan offenerive and LJ eortiea flown flown for f o r the US lst 1st Mhrine Marine Division. Division. I 41 sorties ttions i O M along both coasts boasts aircraft aircraft destroyed destroyed bridges, buildings, buildinge, gun gun positions, pOsitiOn8,
4;

AMIE & ! z
Ism
THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE . X.A. HAS
TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS

No. No.
OY
vessels bombarded botbarded rail rail highway highway locomotlves and end railroad railroad cars. cars. Surface vesselrr locomotives areas m o m in in the the vicinity v i c i n i t y of of Chongjin Chongjin and and at a t Wonsan, Wonsen, fired f i r e d on on bridges bridges and and troop troop areas area8 near near Songjin, Songjin, and and shelled shelled ten ten Han Han River River troop troop positions. positiona.
Air Air
Land-based aircraft flew 901 effective effective s sorties of which which 570 570 were were Land-baaed o r t i e s of Most of the 79 79 close cLoss support rrupport missions were flown flown in the the U US S X X combat. Moat sorties; five five aircraft aircraft Corps area. mea. Medium bombers flew 18 effective sorties; Corps bombed the the Manchonjom Wchonjom and and Masan-ni ksan-ni marshalling yards, botbed yards, six struck the Siaanju Sinanju marshallhg marshalling yards, prde, and and one one botbed bombed Wonsan. Wonsan.
II. If,
the North Koreans are unwilling to resume peace negotiations. This unwillingness is reportedly based on the fact that Communist decisions are made by a "joint Soviet-Chinese Political Mission on the Truce Talks" from whom the Korean delegates take orders.. North Koreans are opposed to this, feeling that they should have the "deciding voice in the Korean theater."

General, Situation General
In an In an engagement between 16 16 MIG-15's MIG-15's and and ten F-84'a F-841s i in n the the ChongChongone MIG-15 MIG-15 was wae destroyed. destroyed, An encounter between between 11 11 MIG-15rs MIG-151s jln jin area, one and an an unreported number of F-80gs at' at an unreported unreported location location r resulted of F-8008 esilted i n the loss loss of of one one F780 Ff-80 and and the t h e damaging damaging of of one one MIG-15. MIG15, in
jiselgaar,19.ce:Falics
C .
L)
c'
eg7\
OCI a 1 1945 1945

I. I.
Military Situation Situation
Hirrhllahts DighlkAR
The west-central Tho front front remained rermhtd generally generally quiet, quiet, except in the wes.t.;-centraB and east-central UN unlts units encowbored encountered enemy east-central sectors sectors where advancing U?J reaiet.ance, resistance.
In the western sector, US I Corps elements patrolled in their zone with only minor enemy contact.
US Corps units, north U S IX IX Cospe north of of Chorwon Chorion in in. the .We west-central woat-central sector, sector, met as t they advanced. met scattered scattered resistance resistance and and small s m a l l probing attacks &a h e y advanced, Other Other units d t a farther far*er east east met me% similar s k l l a r resistance reaPetanc43 as BB they theyadvanced.; advanced,

AESE
In the elements continued continued In tsle east-central Etarrt-central sector, soetor, US X Corps @lammtu
attacks to t o secure 8ecure commanding conrmnntPf~terrain. terrab, mental strength were atrenglh was wad encountered encountered and minor enemy enow probing attacks wore repulad, repulsed.
the the Enemy regi? h qresistance reebstmee in 1 x 1up to sag$-
The ROK I Corps along the east coast continued to adjust positions against scattered enemy resistanee.
Nav
Aircraft UN naval W aortfev Aircraft uncles under UN naval co,ntm% control flew 2 241 sorties in in close close nupport support of ground ground units units and and against against enemy e n m m . y rear rear area area installations. inatallatione. Naval surface sa~face craft off off the east a and west coasts coasts mintaicecl maintained the the blcpciksds blockade and and shePLed shelled craft d west e n w shore ehoro installations. installations. enemy
Air
Owing to transmission difficulties, information concerning UN ground-based air operations was incomplete. UN jet aircraft encountered
6111 6 '
4 -7 .
C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOll OBJECTION THE C . I . A . HAS TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF

No. No.
009
009
four with damage to four Soviet-made Soviet-aade NIG MIG jet J e t aircraft aircraft north north of of .fyongyang Pgongyang w i t h no damage to In another another air a h encounter ezleouter east of o f the the Korean-Manchurian Korean-Manchurian either side. either side. In border town border town of of Sinuijuo Sinufju, 53 53 US I S F-86 F-86 "Sabre" T3abre" jet j o t aircraft aircraft encountered encountered 30 30 enemy MIG's, MIGrst with with no no damage damage to %oeither either side. aide.
1 1 .
No significant significant reports reporta have have been been received received during the past pest 24 24
hours, hours.

2 2
on" 1946
14. SepteMber September 1951 1 9 5 1 14
DAILY D AILY
I . I.
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLE'rIN
UN forces forces in in the the east-central eaot-cenlral sector sector continued continued to to make make limited lhdted gains gains In the other against against resistance resistance which which varied varied from from moderate moderate to to stubborn. stubborn. In UN patrole patrols probed'enemy probed'enemy defenses defenses and and made made scattered scattered light light conconsectors, TJN tacts with i t h platoon platoon to to company-size compny-size enemy enmy grouts. grouN. tacts w
US US I I Corps Corp8 troops troops probed probed defenses defenses set set up by elements of the CCF were Contact8 were 2 6 t h Army and and by by the the CCF CCF 64th 6 4 t h Army h n y and a d 140th W t h Division. Diviaion, Contacts 26th limited and limited and involved involved only only small small groups. groups. In the US IX CorCorps sone, zone, advancing foroes forces of of the the L US 25th Divieion Division In E 25th h o enemy enemy forced an undotormined undetermined number number of of tthe enemy to to withdraw. withdraw. An An enemy company attacked elements element8 of of the the ROX ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division but but was was repulsed. company attacked Enemy Enslqy forces forces opposite opposite the US US IX IX Corps Corps consist conaist of the CCF 27th Army Army and elements of the the CCF CCF 26th 26th Army Amy and and CCF CCF 199th 1 9 9 t h Division. Division. elements of
Units of the the US US X Corps Corps continued continued to to advance advance in in their their sectors, sectors, Units of while repulsing several several platoon platoon to while repulsing t o company-strength enemy probing Eneq resistance reeietance to to these advancos attacks. Enemy advances w88 was most most stubborn in the troops facing facing the US X Corpe Corps are from ROK 8th 8 t h Division Dividon sector. sector. Enemy troops Korean lst, let, 12th, Uth, 27th 2 7 t h and and 32nd 32nd Divisions. Divisions. North Korean
ROK 15th ROK I I Corps Corps forceS, forcae, faced by the t h e North Korean 1 5 t h and 19th Divisions, division^, continued continued to.adjust to adjust positions pouitions with onIy only minor minor patrol patrol contacts. contacts.
Latest estimates of of enemy eneq strength strength place 2 210,000 1 0 , 0 0 0 troope troops in the front front Latest estimates line and 392,000 392,000 in in rear rear areas. areas. line and
Naval air air sorties sorties totalled totalled 121. L 2 1 . In sorties along In offensive offensive sorties along both both Naval coasts, coasts, naval aircraft aircraft destroyed destroyed enemy enemy installations inatallations and and communications communication6 facilities. Surfaoe vessels vessels continued conti.nud the the bombardment bombardment of of enemy enemy shore shore facilities. Surface and rail rail and and highway highway nets. nets. installations and installations

AMIE BrnrJT
wim
maqlr
6'S 6 3 THE
1 1
No.
THE
C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION C.1.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOH 08 DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
, 9 0 9
Bir Air
Land-based aircraft aircraft flew flew 949 949 sorties, sortiee, of of which which 592 592 were were combat. combat. Approximately missions were were flown i in Approximately two-thirds two-third8 of of the the 70 close support mission8 n the US U S X Corps sector. sector. Seventeen effective medium bomber sorties s o r t i e e were were target bridge, but the a r g e t was a Pyongyang Pgongyang highway bridge, the flown. The principal t Wonsan airfield Wonsan d r f i e l d and and the the MUnpyong-ni Munpgong-ni marshalling marshalling yard. yard were also bombed. bombed. UN aircraft a i r c r a f t continued continued to t o encounter encounter enemy enemy MIG-15ts. MIG-15's. In I n one engagement engagement UN o s t , and n an enMIGts, one F-51 was l lost, and i in enbetween four f o u r F-51ts F-51's and three MIGfs, counter between between 35 35 F-8615 F-86'8 and and an'unreported an unreported nuMber number of of MIGIs MIG's in i n the the Chongjin area, no no losses losses have have been been reported reported on on either either side. side. Chongjin area,
1 1 . II.
Radio Radio Peiping P e i p h g on on 13 13 SepteMber September ridicules Vice-Admiral Vice-Admiral Joy's Joyts explanaexplanaThe t i o n of tion of the the 10 10 September September accidental accidental UN aJ strafing strafing of of the the neutral neutral zone. zone. The broadcast ends on the theme theme that t h a t the UI?? UN, since it denies denies the the other charges, charges, h a s no no intention intention of of ending ending its its provocative provocative acts acta in i n order to t o resume the has negotiatione, which which have have been been suspended suspended for for 22 22 days. days. negotiations,

Propaganda ATISEN1W
2 2
W
T
...
-rc
OCI O C I 1947
15 1951 . 1 5 september g e p t e m b r ,1951
DAILY
,I
KOREAN
BULLETIN
OW
I. I.
.
'Military Situation Military S ituation
Highlights
'
In of t the Commonwealth I n the t h e US U S I Corps zone, z o n e , , patrols p a t r o l s of h e 1st Commonwealtp Division observed observed five f i v e T-34 T-34 tanlis tanks and h r e e self-propelled self-propelled guns, @ne, while while DiVision and t three 100'enemy of Chorwon came<under eame'under US US 3rd 3rd Division Division 100 enemy in i n a village v i l l a g e west of a r t i l l e r yfire'. artillery fixe, Otherwide'only Otherwi$e only minor minor patrol p a t r o l activity a c t i v i t y occurred. occurred. The CCF 42ndend a n d and65th 6 5 t hArmies Armies replaced replaced the t h e CCF CCF 26th 26th Army Army on on the t h e US U S I Corps Corps f front. ran$
.
In Brigade, a attached to the I n the t h e US U S IX I X Corps Corps zone, zone, the t h e Turkish Brigade, ttached t o t he small enemy enemy groups. groups. A US US 25th 25th Division, forced forced a a withdrawal withdrawal of o f several s e v e r a l small tank-infantry the US engaged an an undeterundeterS 25th Division engaged t a n k - i n f a n t r y task t a s k force f o r c e of t he U 2nd Division troops troois mined number number of of enemy enemy troops t r o o p s and and withdrew. withdrew, ROK 2nd repulsed two small probing a attacks small and one company-size company-eize probing t t a c k s and received CCF 26th The entire e n t i r e CCF. 230 rounds rOunds of enemy enemy mortar mortar and artillery artillery fire. fire. The Army 67tfi Army is is now now in i n position p o s i t i o n in i n the t h e US USIX IXCorps Corpszone zonewhere wherethe t h eCCF CCF 67th A r m y replaced replaced the t h e CCF CCF 27th 27th Army. Army. Army
In I n the t h e US US X Corpi Corps zOne, zone, all a l l units u n i t s continued continued to t o attack a t t a c k against against of the t h e ROK ROK 7th 7 t h Division Division broke broke cOntact colifqct stubborn stubborn resistance. r e s i s t a n c e . Elements of and withdrew withdrew after a f t e r encountering encountering resistance r e s i s t a n d from from an an enemy enemy regiment. regiment; The entire e n t i r e US The U S 2nd 2nd Division Division made small small gains gains a against g a i n s t deterMined deternIioed U S 1st DivisiOn Division repulsed nine probing attacks a t t a c k s durift durir)g opposition. The US An enemy enemy regiment regimept offered offered t h e night n i g h t and then a t t a c k e d iin n iitseector. t s sector. An the attacied stiff stiff r resistance e s i s t a n c e to t o the t h e adVancing advancing ROK 8th 8 t h Division. Division. The North Korean 6th 6 t h and 13th 1 3 t h Division appeared on on the the US U S X Corps Corps front. front. There was was no significant s i g n i f i c a n t activity a c t i v i t y in i n the t h e ROK I Corps Corps zone zone and no no change change in i n enemy enemy identifications. identifications,

Army Ara!
No.
Activity the eist-central sector where fiN 10 A c t i v i t y remained heavy in in t he e ast-central s e c t o r where elements continued to t o encounter encounter stubborn stubborn resistance r e s i s t a n c e fromi f r o enemy units elements continued were si sighted entrenched up to t o regimental.strength. regimental strength. Two enemy enemy regiments were up in i n the t h e immediate immediate r rear e a r of ofthis t h i s sector. sector.
64. THE C.I.A. +THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOfJ DECLASSIFICATION OF OF THIS DOCUNIENT. DOCUMENT.
0.9
.
'v'
Nsvy
Naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s totalled t o t a l l e d 244 244 of of which which 20 20 were were close c l o s e support support Marine Division. Division. In I n offensive a i r operatione air operations missions for f o r the t h e US US 1st 1st Marine missions near n e a r Songjin, Songjin, Hamhung, Hamhung, and and Wonsan, bridges, bridges, buildings, buildings, gun gun positions" positions" f a c i l i t i e s and and and rail r d i l equipment equipment were were destroyed. destroyed. Communications facilities n tthe he v icinity s hort i n e t a l l a t i o n s were short installations were bombarded by by surface surface vessels vessels iin vicinity of Songjin and at a t Wonsan. Wonsan. of Chongjin, Chongjin, Songjin
Air

11.
General Situation Situation hours hours.
Other UN i r c r a f t flew o r t i e s of UN a aircraft flew 846 846 s sorties of which which 517 517were were comba9. comb0. The missions were mainly diyided 115 close close sUiiport support missions divided The approximately approximately 115 ledium bombers bombers flew flew17 17 e f f e c t i v e scfrties sqrties effec-pive between the t h e US USII and andX XCorp's. Corps. Medium tetween a g a i n s t such such targets t a r g e t s ap a3 the t h e Huichon r a i l r o a d bridge, h e Wonsan against railroad bridge, t the Wonsan aqd and report p r d a . The report Chinnampo supply centers, centers, and and the t h e Kowon Kowon marshalling marshalling yards. Chinnampo supply of sighting8 l i s t e d two n tthe h e area of air sightings listed two enemy regiments regiments entrenched entrenched iin area f four o u r miles miles southwest southwest of Nungdong. Nungdong,
s i g n i f i c a n t reports r e p o r t s have been received during t h e past No significant the past 24, 24
OCI 1948 1948

17 SepteMber 17 September 1951 1951

D A I L Y
I. I.
Military S ituation Military Situation
Highlights

Arm
Corps. Corps.
Heavy as UN UN forces forces Heavy fighting f i g h t i n g took took place place oh on the t h e east-central east-central front f r o n t as continued to t o advance advance against a g a i n s t enemy enemy units units entrenched entrenched in i n well w e l l fortified fortified positions. positions.
In I n the t h e US U S I I Corps Corps zone, zone, action a c t i o n was wae limited limited to t o sporadic sporadic patrol patrol Armies, the 65th, small enemy enemy protdng probing attacks. attacks. Three CCF Armies, 65th, clashes and small the 47th and the t h e 64th, 64th, and elements elements of of the the 42nd 42nd are are still s t i l l along along the the I I Corps front. front.
In the US Division repulsed repulsed a a reinforced reinforced I n the US U S IX IX Corps zone, zone, t he U S 25th Division battalion b a t t a l i o n sized s i z e d attack a t t a c k as as well well as as several s e v e r a l platoon platoon sized sized probing probing attacks. attacks. The US 7th Division continued t to patrol vigorously and and reported reported one one small o p a t r o l vigorously units reported little l i t t l e action. action. The 26th and attack. Other corps units probing attack. 67th 67th Armies are are now now facing f a c i n g the t h e US U S IX IX Corps. Corps.
ROK 7th 7th Division Division continued continued to t o advance advance t h e ROK O n the t h e US U S X Corps f r o n t , the On Corpe front, Divisions are f facing the X acing t he X against heavy resistance. resistance. Five North Korean Divisions
Owing to breakdown, to a a transmission tran~ssionbr e a k d o w n , further f u r t h e r information information on on the the Army as as well well as a8 the t h e Navy Navy and and Air A i r Forde Force operations operations is i s not not available. available.
1 1 .
Situation General S ituation
Propaganda
September, Radio Radio Pyongyang Pyonuang broadcast On 15 September, broadcast a a statement statement by Pak Pak Hun foreign minister, protesting protesting the the "unilateral nunilateral ttreaty Yong, North Korean f o r e i g n minister, reaty the United S States t a t e s and its its satellites s a t e l l i t e s concluded concluded with w i t h Japan Japan at at which the
C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOB OBJECTION 66rTHE C '$THE .I.A. HAS
DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OB THIS DOCUMENT.

No.
009
-.
San Francisco.'? The treaty treaty was described described as as an an "unlawful %.nlawf+u.l documentt1which which San Francisco." The document" represents the llmost "most dangerous dangerous rtep step taken taken by byAmerican American imperialiam imperialiam toward North Korea Korea "takes a further further expanding expanding of of its its war w a r of of aggression." aggression." axaotly the the same s m e stand stand as as the the Soviet Sovlet Government." Government.I1 The broadcast attempts exactly t0 i l l now to arouse the Koreans by commenting that Japanese Japanese imperialim imperialism w will now Japanese imperialism which Korea once once again." again." The revival of af Japanese which "challenge Korea the t h e treaty permits permite will will prove prow a a constant constant threat threat to t o Japan's Japan'e neighbors neighbors and and the document is declared declared "illegal llillegal and and null null and tmd void." void." document is
OCI O C I 1949 1949
18 1951 18 September 1951
DAIL.Y KOREAN D A I L Y K O R E A N BULLETI B U L L E T IN. N .

I. I.
Military Situation
Highlights, Highlights
ASEX AEiY
In I n the US I I Corps zone, zone, action was limited to t o patrolling patrolling with with There There are are still three CCF armies and elements of a fourth opposing the corps. still C C F and elements of a fourth opposing the corpe,
the exception exception of of a a limited limited advance advance by by the the US U S 3rd 3rd Division. Division,
I n the the US US IX I X Corps zone, aone, several several small enemy probing In probing attacks attacks were were repulsed. order of battle b a t t l e remains remains unchanged unchanged with with two two CCF CCF armies d e s repulsed, Enemy order facing the IX IX Corps. Corps.
In ROK 7th Division Division repulsed repulsed a a cornpang. company I n the US U S X Corps zone, zone, the BOK 2nd sized attack attack and and then then counterattacked, counterattacked, making making limited limited gains. gains. The US 2nd sized BOK 5th to attack, making making minor minor gains gains against against and IXlK 5 t h Divisions continued t o attaok, strong small enemy enemy counterattacks. counterattacks. Other Other strong resistance. r e s i s t a m . There were several small North Korean divisions Korean divisions corps units units regrouped regrouped or or maintained maintained positions. positions. Five North are facing facing X X Corps Corps units. units,

Naqy
s *
61347\
NO. a68
the east-central east-central f front where advancadvancr o n t where Heavy fighting continued on the In n the the east, east, encountered well well entrenched entrenched enemy enemy groups. groups, I ing UN forces encountered UN there were were numerous patrol TJN units u n i t s made made limited gains while in the west there clashes. clashee
ROK I I Corps u n i t s made made short short gains gains against against light l i g h t resistance. resistance. ROK Corps units North Korean Korean divisions divisions are a r e facing facing the t h e ROK ROK I I Corps. Corpse
T Two w o
A total t o t a l of of 187 187 sorties sorties was flown flown from from east east coast coast carrier8 carriers aa as coastal interSurface units units also also continued continued intercommunications targets targets were were attacked. attacked. Surface dictory fire f i r e on on coastal coastal targets. targets.
There were no air a i r operations operations on on the the west coast. coast. There
t o patrol. patrol. tinued to
Surface units units coneon-
6 6TU1 WE C.I.A. c. I.A. 645

1 1
HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOIS HAS
TO DECLASSIFICATION QB TO TNI: TiiC DZCLASSIFICATIQ3 TNID DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT. /
945-14
Air Air
UN land baeed a i r c r a f t flew 727 727 sorties s o r t i e s including 402 combat. based aircraft 402 combat. Medium bombers bombers flew Medium flew 15 15 sorties, s o r t i e s , including including an an attack attack with with fair fair results results the marshalling yards yards at a t Hwangju. Hwangju. against the
1 1 .
General Situation
No No significant reports reports have have been been received received during during the the past past 24 2 4 hours. hours.

SECirr
2 2
1
t7T
OCI 1950 1 9 5 0 OCI
1 9 SepteMber September 1951 1951 19

D AILY DAILY
K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN KOREAN
I . I.

Highlights
Action was wa8 heaviest heaviest in in the the central central sector sector as as advancing advancing UN UN forces forces Action Enemy counterattacks counterattacks forced forced some 8ome local local withdrawals. withdrawals, met met stiff stiff resistance. resistance. Enemy
Max Arrsv
In In the the US US I I Corps Corps zone, zone, ROK ROK lst 1st and and Commonwealth Commonwealth lst 1st Divisions Divisions patrolled with little little contact. contact, Units of the t h e US 3rd Division limited patrolled with Division made made limited attacks and and then then withdrew to the the perimeter; several attacks withdrew to several small enemy counterattacks were were beaten beaten off. off. Four attacks Four CCF CCF armies armies still still face face the the I I Corps. Corps,
In I n the the US US IX IX Corps Corpe zone, sone, US US 25th Division Division units regrouped and sad repulsed one one small small probing pobing attack. attack. Other units reported little pulsed little action, action. Three CCP CCF armies aruies are are still still opposite opposite the the IX IX Corps. Corps. Three
The ROK 7th Division h e US X ROK 7th Division in in t the X Corps zone continued its attack attack against stiff against stiff enemy enemy resistance. resistance. One eneqy enemy counterattack during during the night night forced a slight slight withdrawal. withdrawal, One regiment forced a regiment of of the the US US 2nd 2nd Division Division repulsed repulsed encounterattacks, as as the the division enemy counterattacks, division resumed its attack attadk against against stiff resistance. Another regiment regiment wae w a L p forced forced to to withdraw short distance resistance. Another withdraw a short distance by battalion sized a battalion sized counterattack. counterattack. ROK 5th 5th Division units made made slight slight gains. gains. Division units The US U S let repulsed several several small small counterattacks. counterattacks. Some lst Marine Mkrine Diviaion Division repulsed ROK 8th 8 t h Division Division elements elements were were also also forced forced to to withdraw withdraw by by a a counterattack, counterattack, as thedivision resumed its its general general advance. advance. the division resumed
A total of of 155 155 sorties sorties was flown n attacks A total flown from east coast carriers carriers i in attacks against communications communications targets. targets. Fierce Fierce fires fires were were started started in in Wonsan. Wonsan. S w against Surface units continued continued interdictory interdictory miseione. missiona. face units
No air air missions missions were were flown flown in in the t h e west. west. No
UN 7 3 1 missions including including 443 combat, IN land based aircraft flew flew 731 443 combat. Medium bombers flew 19 bombers flew 1 9 missions missions against against various various targets. targets.
(i7THE 67 THEC.I.A. c. I .A, HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION TO THE THE DXCLASSIFICATIO# OB TO DECLASSIFICATION OF

Air Air
Surface units patrolled. @rolled, Surface units
1 1
THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT= THIS

No. No.
009 0 0 . 9
. .
11,
General Situation
Political Political.
visit by the the llVietnam "Vietnam peoples people's Radio Pyongyang Pyongyang has been playing up a v i s i t by delegation" to Korea, the most most recent recent publicity publicity covering covering a a c call on delegation t o North Korea, a l l on The Vietnam Vice Premier Premier Pak Pak Hun-Yong and and Hong Hong Myong-hui I@ong-hui on on 11 1 1September. September, The tfcongratulatory banner and delegation, after a f t e r presenting presenting a "congratulatory delegation, and gifts1, gifts", expressed "hearty congratulations congratulations to to the the Korean Korean appropriate sentiments by offering hearty The'ricepeople who are a r e fighting fighting heroically heroically ... against against the the common common enemy." enenly.tl Thebricein exchange for blood blood by by the the Korean Korean people... people.., were were a a less experiences experiences gained i n =change source of of profound inspiration to t o the Vietnam Vietnam people." people,
...
i s i t tto o the r o n t on Ambassador h a t during a v AMbassador Muccio MUccio cables t that visit the f front on nto President Rhee President Rhee declared declared Korea Korea and and Japan Japan should should enter enter iinto t o establish establish friendly friendly relations. relations, The President was reported as as negotiations to declaring peace t treaty does n not necessarily declaring that t h a t the signing of of the Japanese peace r e a t y does o t necessarily establish friendly relations relations and t that relations would would come come i into being after after h a t relations n t o being d i r e c t negotiations negotiations are are completed. completed. The The President's Presidentfe remarks are a r e part pa r t of of the the direct present ROK sentiments sentiments in i n favor favor of of a a bilateral b i l a t e r a l agreement agreement which which the the Koreans Koreans hope will to the benefits benefitsof will entitle e n t i t l e them t o the of the the San San Francisco Francisco Conference. Conference. Japan, to entering i into negotiations on the the other other hand, hand, sees see8 no advantage t o entering n t o the negotiations Japan, on and and haggling haggling over over the t h e price price the the Koreans Koreans would would demand, demand.
U. 14 September, SepteMber,
,
1
OCI OCI 1951 1951
20 September 1951 2 0 September 1951

I . I.
Action was heavy Action heavy in in the the east east central central sector sector as as UN UN and and enemy enemy forces forces two 811 enemy enemy attacks, attacks, including one by two and counterattacked. counterattacked. All attacked attacked and regiments, regiment s were repulsed. repulsed

Am
Nam
No air air missions flown in in the the west. west. missions were were flown minor action action against against shore shore targets. targets.
1 1
No. l o.
In the In the US US I I Corps zone, zone, there there were were several several patrol patrol clashes, clashes, but but little little 1st Commonwealth Division sighted three three tanks tanka Division sighted other action. action. Units of the 1st The enemy enemy order order of of and took took them them under under fire fire with with undetermined undetermined results. results. The battle remains of a f fourth battle remains unchanged unchanged with three CCF armies and elements of ourth the on t h e corps corps front. little.action There was little action in in the t h e US US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, although although small amall
enemy attacks attacks forced withdrawals of eneqy forced withdrawals of observation observation posts posts in in the the US US 25th 25th and and probing attacks in @new probing attacks in the the corps corps ROK 6th 6th Division Division sectors. sectors. Other minor enemy There are still two CCF armies facing the zone were repulsed. sone repulaed. There stilltwo armies facing the IX IX Corps. Corps.
Division Action was heavy US X X Corps Corps zone. zone. The ROK 7th Division Action was heavy in in the the US The US US 2nd Division Division continued its advance but ran continued its advance ran into into heavy heavy resistance. The repulsed a counterattack and made made limited gains gains against against repulsed a two two regiment regiment counterattack Division elements 5th Division elements made several several short short gains gains . strong resistance. ROK 5th strong resistance. zone, one one small small In the US 1st lst Marine Division Division zone, heavy resistance. resistance. In against heavy against Division units repulsed an attack by by 8 t h Division enemy attack eneqy attack was repulsed. repulsed. ROK 8th divisions are Korean divisions are facing facing the the X X Corps. Corps. two two enemy enemy battalions. battalions, Five North Korean
"
There was only only one one squad squad sized sized clash claeh in in the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone. zone. There was North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are still still on on the the corps corps front. front.
Two Two
Naval aircraft flew flew 193 193 missions misaions against against east east coast coast targets. targets. SurSurNaval aircraft face units fired fired successful succeasful interdictory interdictory missions. face units
Surface in Surface units engaged in
68 THE C.I.A. 68 THE C. I . A. HAS H A S NO NO OBJECTION OBJECT108

TO TBX THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 0 OF TO 1 THIS DOCUMENT. Til1 S DOCUMENT
A .
it
.
W
. ,
Air
UN land based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 990 990 sorties, sorties, including 645 645 combat. combat. UN 15 attacking railroad railroad targets targets with with f fair Medium bombers flew 1 5 sorties, sorties, attacking air F-861s. Five results. There There were were two two actions actions between between MIG-151s MIG15's and and F-86'~. results. MIG1s were damaged MIG's damaged and and one one destroyed. destroyed.
1 1 .
Situation General Situation
KaesonR Cease F Fire Kaesong i r e Talks
The Communists Communists proposed proposed that that the the first first meeting meeting of of the the negotiators negotiators The ehould deal with with setting s e t t i n g up up "appropriate Ifappropriate machinery" machinerp" for f o r guaranteeing guaranteeing the the should future neutrality of of Kaesong. Kaesong.
A 19 19 September broadcast from Peiping annotinces A annotnces Communist Communist willingwillingness faith ness to t o resume resume negotiations negotiations at a t Kaasong. Kassong. Recalling UN bad f a i t h regarding violations a at Kaesong, the the Communists Communists intimate intimate tthat hat previous alleged UN violations t Kaesong, UN admission of the UM the 10 10 September September accidental accidental strafing strafing by by UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t of of faith enable resumption resumption of of negotianegotiathe zone showed sufficient sufficient UN good f a i t h tto o enable tions. tions.
1
SEC
OCI 1952
21 September September 1951 1951
DAILY D A I L Y
I. I.
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
Military Hlitary Situation

HighliRhts Highlights
Action i n the US U S I I Corps Corps zone zone was was limited United to t o patrol patrol clashes clashes with with Action in the exception exception of a a small small enemy enmy probing probing attack attack which which was repulsed repulsed by by the the US US 3rd Division. One CCF 3rd CCF army and elements elements of of three more more are a r e facing facing the the I I
Corpe. Corps.
Several small amall enemy enemy probing probing attacks attacks were were repulsed repulsed by by US U S IX IX Corps Corps Seyeral units, unita, UN stubborn resistance resistance and and made made only only UEJ tank-infantry tank-infantry task task forces met stubborn limited lFmited gains. gains. Rro Two CCF armies face face the the IX IX Corps. Corps. I n the the US US X X Corps Corps zone zone there there was was bitter b i t t e r fighting. fighting. ROK 7th 7th Division In Unite of of the the 2nd units units resumed resumed the the advance advance against against stiff stiff enemy enemy resistance. resistance. Units Division estimated enemy regiment withwithDivision after after making making tlight s l i g h t gains against an estimated drew drew to t o former former positions. positions. Elements of the ROK also unable unable ROK 5th Division were also to register any t o register any gains. gains. One regiment of of the US U S 1st 1st Marine Mhrine Division was The ROK 8 t h Division Divlsion forced to t o withdraw withdraw slightly s l i g h t l y under under an an enegy enemy attack. attack. The 8th repulsed repulsed a a company company strength strength attack. attack. Five North Korean Xoreandivisions a r e facing facing divisions are the X X Corps. Corpsg
ROK ROK I I Corps Corps units units made made slight s l i g h t gains gains against against light l i g h t enemy enemy resistance. resistance, Two North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are opposite opposite the the ROK ROK I I Corps. Corps. Two

1. 1 .
& z !
The latest l a t e s t estimates estimates of of enemy enemy strengths strengths are are as a s follows: followst The Eneq forces on on the the immediate immediate front: front: Enemy forces
CCF C C F
187,000 187,000
Korean North Korean
281,000 281,000
syr
s +1
94,000 94.000
Bitter n the east-central s UN Bitter fighting occurred i in east-central sector sector a as UN forces forces to patrol patrol continued their t h e i r slow slow advance. advance. Action elsewhere elsewhere was was limited to clashes and small small probing attacks. attacks,
69 THE C.I.A. C.I.A. 69

No.
HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION OF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
0o
Nome
VOW . i
2. 2 .
Enemy reserves capable of intervention: E n w reserves interventions

CCF CCF
241,000
J,@.OOO 140.000
North Korean
381,000 381,000
3. 3.
Trainees Trainees and and guerrillas: guerrillas8
37,000 3'7,000
The t total o t a l of of 699,000 in Korea represents represents an an increase increase of of 60,000 60,000 over over reflects e f l e c t s the acceptance of of two two additional additional previous estimates. estimates, The increase r Chinese Communist Communist armies Chinese armies in i n Korea. Koreao
UN UN carrier c a r r i e r aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n the east east flew 200 sorties s o r t i e s against against coastal coastal Surface units continued interdictory interdictory fire. fire, units continued targets. Surface targets.
There were no carrier c a r r i e r operations operations on on the the west coast. coast. ,There were no patrolled. patrolhd

.
Air
General General Situation
Political P olitical
NaW
Surface units
UN land land based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 1045 1045 sorties sorties including including 606 606 combat. combat. A UN t o t a l of of 18 18 medium medium bomber bomber missions missions was was flown. flown. A A railroad r a i l r o a d bridge bridge on on the the total main line l i n e east e a s t of of Sariwon was destroyed, i r f i e l d was destroyed, and Wonsan Wonsan a airfield was bombed bombed with fair results. results,
11.
The ROK Ambassador to t o Nationalist Nationalist China, China, Lee Lee Bum Bum Suk, Suk, announced announced on on 19 September his resignation from from his post "due "due to t o certain circumstances." circumstances." Lee, in i n his h i s announcement, announcement, praised praised the Chinese Chinese Nationalists' Nationalists' anti-Communist anti-Communist efforts. efforts
According to t o unconfirmed unconfirmed speculation speculation in i n South South Korea, Korea, Lee Lee Bum Bum Suk Suk is is slated to s lated t o replace replace the present present ROK ROK Minister Minister of of Defense Defense Yi Pi Ki K i Bong. Bong.
Kaesow Truce Truce Talks Talks Kaesong
A 20 September September broadcast from from Peiping claims claim8 "new %ew light l i g h t was w a s thrown thrown on on the American violations of the Kaesong neutral tone," when four unarmed ROK Bmerican of the Kaesong zone," when four unarmed ROK soldiers, soldiere, captured in i n the the neutra2 neutral. zone, zone, were were handed handed over over to to a a UN UN liaison liaison officer. The The Communiats Communists state state that that this t h i s is i s the t h e "first "first time" tirnell a a ground ground violaviolaofficer. tion t i o n of of Kaesong was admitted by the UN. UN.
\
OCI 1953 1953

22 September September 1951 1951 22
DAILY D A I L Y
I. I.
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN
Military Situation
Highlights
In I n the US I Corps zone, sone, patrols of of the ROK ROIC lst 1st Division Division and and the the Unite 1st Commonwealth Cornonwealth Division Division made made light l i g h t contact contact with with enemy enemy forces. forces. Units lst of attacks, one of which which of the t h e US US 1st 1st Cavalry Cavalry Division repulsed repulsed several attacks, was in of i n reinforced reinforced battalion strength, strength, and withstood 109 rounds of 3rd Division units en0 a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e while while maintaining maintaining positions. positions. US 3rd enartillery countered land land mines mines which which damaged damaged several several tanks tanks and and vehicles vehicles, but all all countered disabled equipment e q u i p e n t was was recovered. recovered. -Enemy forces opposing opposing the the US US I I Corps Corps u units are still still the the C CCF %emy forces n i t s are C F 65th Army, and elements elements of of tthe CCF @d, 42nd, 47th, 47th, and and 64th 64th W Andes. 65th Army, h e CCF o s .

AZEI
front UN reconnaisreconnaisr o n t as advancing UN Action intensified intensified along the f sance elements, in both the the west-cehtral west-central elements, encounteringheavy encounteringheavy resistance i n both and the casualties on on enemg enemy t h e east-central east-central sectors, sectors, inflicted i n f l i c t e d substantial casualties forces ! forces.
Task forces forces from fromthe n the the US 25th Division Division i in the US US IX IX Corps Corps zone mines, antitank f fire, 132 round8 rounds i r e , and 132 met heavy resistance, resistance, encountering mines, of the Ethiopian Battalion Battalion enena r t i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire. f i r e . Elements of of artillery east, a Farther to t o the east, gaged gaged enemy enemy forces forces in i n hand-to-hand hand-to-hand combat. combat. Farther battalion of forces, estimated estimated of the ROK 6th Division also engaged enemy forces, Other UN units n the tbe units i in to t o be two two companies, companies, in i n hand-to-hand hand-to-hand combat. combat. Other Opposing enemy enemy forces force8 corps zone zone maintained positions positions and and patrolled, patrolled, Opposing in the zone a r e the are the CCF CCF 26th 26th and and 67th 67th Armies, Andes. Corps zone, zone, the t h e ROK 7th 7th Division continued continued to t o attack, attack, I n the US X Corps In ROK 5th Division but made maih no no material material progress. progress. US 2nd Division and BOK but of t the h e US 1st lot units engaged engaged enemy enemy forces forces in i n light l i g h t contacts. contacts. Elements of units ROK eth 8th Division Division units unite Warine Division Division repulsed repulsed an Marine an enemy enemy probing probing attack. attack. ROK Korean 1st, lst, 2nd, 2nd, 6th, bth, and and 12 12 Di.% Diclosed closed in i n assembly assembly areas. areas. The North Korean visions face face the the US US X X Corps Corps units. units.
ROK patrolled, ROK I I Corps Corps units, units, faced faced by by two two North North Korean KoreanDivisions, Division8,patrolled, making light making l i g h t contact contact with with the t h e enemy forces. 117 1o THE C.I.A. C . I . A . HAS NO OBJECTION SE TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION GZ 07
.A
No.
0 9 0 0 0.9
-.--"ir
Han
m a !
Carrier-based Carrier-baged aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 202 202 sorties, sortiea, attacking attacking targets t a r g e t s in in the Wbnsan i in the east, east, and Haeju t h e vicinities v i c i n i t i e s of of Songjin, Songjin, Pulehong, Pulchong, and Wonaan n the and and Chinnampo Chinnampo in i n the the west. west. Surface Surface vessels veseels continued continued the the bombardment bombardment of of communications communications facilities, gun targets both f a c i l i t i e s , warehouses, pTar8hOU8@~8, gun positions, positlops, and other t a r g e t s along both
Coast8 coasts.
patrol reported sighting sighting Soviet Soviet naval naval forces forces apapA naval p a t r o l plane reported parently parently in i n training training exercises exercises in i n the theJapan JapanSea Seaabout about90 90miles milessouth0, 8oUthof Vladiaroatoki: V'!ladbwhk, a t 1220tW, 13300~E. The forces consisted of of s a e t of east at 4220IN, 133001E. seven seven submarines, submarines, two two major major war war vessels, vessels, seven seven destroyer destroyer type type vessels, vessels, two two Catalina Catalina type t y p e aircraft, a i r c r a f t , and and one one conventional conventional fighter fighter plane. plane.
sorties, including including 625 625 combat combat UN land-based land-baeed aircraft a i r c r a f t flew 1016 sorties, 101, Armed reconnaissance missions. Close-support sorties s o r t i e s totaled totaled 101. missions. Close-support a i r c r a f t flew flew 358 358 missions missions against against targets targets in i n numeroUs numerous areas. areas. Strikes aircraft against 28 2$ targets targets were were made made by by night nlght intruder intruder aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Medium Medium bombers against flew 22 22 sorties, s o r t i e s , attacking attacking .various various targets, i r f i e l d s , at at targets, including including a airfields, medium bombers bombersshoran., ahoranEight medium Wonsan, Sondok, Sondok, Sariwon, Sariwon, and and Yonpo. Yonpo. Eight bombed Maeng jung-Dong marshalling , bombed Maengjung-Dong marshalling yarde yards.
11.
Ambassador Muccio, Rhee's 19 19Septentber September Ambassador Muccio, commenting comentixlg on on President President Rhee's h e cease-fire cease-fire should proceed f tthe h e Chineee statement t hat t that the proceed only only i if Chineee CormrmCommun i s t s leave leave Korea and the North Koreans nists Koreans disarm, disarm, considera considers these these views views as as confirming thee's "ba8ic adamant adamant dislike d i s l i k e of of any any cease-fire cease-fire settlement." settlement." confirming Rhea's "basic
attitude, Muccio suggested suggested to to t the h e ubl UN Command Command that that In view of this attitude, t h e "Korean "Korean alternate o t h e UN delegation" o the the alternate t to the delegation" be be ordered ordered tto the Kaesong Kaesong area as a s a precaution against Itany llast a s t minute against "any minute sabotagen sabotage" on on the the part part of of
Rhee Rhee.

Aim
Political Politdcal
srr
w
OCI CCI 1954 1954
24 24 September September 1951 1 9 5 1
DAILY D AILY
I . I.
Highlights Highliphts
In I Corps Corps zone, divisions and and attached attached smaller zone, the four UN divisions In the the US I units maintained maintained positions making only only light light contact contact with with units positions and patrolled, making enemy forces. forces. enemy
"he five divisions in in the the US US IX I X Corps Corps zone, zone, with with the t h e smaller smaller The five UN divisions patrolled, meeting meeting enemy enemy units attached, also also maintained positions and patrolled, of up up to to platoon platoon size 8iZe only. only. forces forces of
In In the the US X Corps Corps zone, zone, the Iff US 2nd 2nd Division Division units units engaged enemy units in one area reached n i t s in forces forces in in several several sharp sharp encounters. encounters. Attacking UN u a in the face face of of deterdetera high ground objective objective but were forced to withdraw in UN counterattack counterattack was unsuccessful, and the enemy mined enemy resistance. resistance. A UN mined enemy Other UN UN divisions divisions forces followed up by by a a counterattack counterattack on on their their part. part. Other forces followed up The US 1st 1st attached smaller and attached smaller units units maintained maintained positions positions and and patrolled. patrolled. The Marine and removed removed 64 64 anti-personnel anti-personnel mines. mines. Marine Division Division located located and
UN UN units units in the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone made made saattered scattered light light contacts contacts with with enemy enemy forces forces while while adjusting adjusting positions positions and and patrolling. patrolling,
Naval airairNaval and Marine Marine aircraft aircraft flew flew a a total total of of 232 232 sorties. sorties. Naval Naval and craft based based on on east east coast coast carriers carriers flew craft flew offensive offensive missions missions in in the the Nanam, Nanam, Hamhung and and Wonsan Wonsan areas, areas, striking striking enemy enemy communications communications and and supply Supply dumps. dumps. and Wonsan vicinities bombarded Blockade ships in in the the Changjin Changjin and Blockade ships bombarded railway railway and gun and and troop troop positions positions highway junctions, junctions, other other communications communications facilities, facilities, gun and one one small s m a l l arms arms depot, depot.

Ne_m
In the east-central east-central sector sector UN reconnaissance elements encountered In the resistance from from enemy forces up to regimental strength and and repulsed repulsed enany forces heavy resistance the front front UN UN units units repulsed repulsed Elsewhere along the several counterattacks. counterattacks. Elsewhere several several several light light probing probing attacks attacks in in scattered scattered brief brief encounters. encounters.
West coast coast drcraft, aircraft, operating in in the the Chinaamp, Chinnampo, Sariwon Sariwon and and ChqolIg Chanyong
71 TX2 -71THZ
ro TO
1
No.
C. I . A . HAS NO OBJECTION C.I.A. T;.L% TH2 DZCLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 08 OF

.*A
009
-11,
e-
' -
areas, lines and and troop troop concentraconcentraareas, struck at a t enemy shipping, shipping, communications lines rail targets west of of Chongju Chongju and and troop troop tions. Surface Surface vessels bombarded r ail t a r g e t s west tions. positions in i n the the Han IanRiver River estuary estuary vicinity. vicinity.
Air
UN land-baged i r c r a f t flew a a total t o t a l of of 884 884 sorties, sorties, inoluding including 54 54 UN land-based a aircraftilew in n the the enemy support missions and 500'Other 500 other offensive offenaive strikes. strikes. Targets i support rear aircraft; 77 night r e a r areas areas were were struck by 299 299 armed armed reconnaissance a ircraftj 7 ' 7 night Medium bombers bombers flew flew 19 19 effective effective sorties. sorties. made 149 l . 4 9 strikes. strikes. Medium intruders made facilities a t Sunchow Suichow while bile Eight aircraft a i r c r a f t shoran-bombed shoran-bombed communications communications f a c i l i t i e s at others h i t airfields a i r f i e l d s at a t Wonsan, Wonsan, Sandok Sandok and and Yonpo. Ponp. hit
IIa
A reiterates Communist willingwillingA 23 23 September September broadcast broadcast from Peiping Peiping r e i t e r a t e s Communist ness broadcast, however, text of the the broadcast, however, ness to t o resume resume negotiations negotiations at a t Kaesong. Kaesong. The text continues to will demand demand UN UN admission admission of o f the the t o suggest suggest that t h a t the the Communists Communists will violations of of the the neutral neutral zone zone before before matters matters concerning concerning alleged previous violations the cease-fire cease-fire can can be brought brought up. up.
he Meanwhile, the Communists have claimed claimed another another violation violation of of tthe neutral British Ccamunist correspondent, Burchett, claims neutral zone. zone. The B r i t i s h Communist correepndent, Burchett, claims in in a a broadcast that t h a t he he interviewed interviewed 11 1 1teen,age teen-age South South Korean Korean boys boys 23 September broadcast who who were were captured captured in i n the the neutral n e u t r d zone zone while performing an intelligence intelligence mission for f o r the mission the UN UN forces. forces.

Talk6 Kaesong Peace Peace Talks
2
OCI 1955
25 25 September 1951 1951
D A I L Y
I. I.
K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN
in UN forces I n the east-central eaet-central sector of the front continued to to enencounter dug-in enemy units units and and repuleed repulsed several several c m n t e r heavy resistance from dug-in contact was was macle made w with orobing attacks. ?robing attacks. Elsewhere only scattered scattered contact i t h small
groups. gYxlps
0
The nine division8 lightly divisions of of the US I I and and IX IX Corps Corps malntained maintained or or s slightly u n i t s no no Patrols mado made only minor minor contacts with units adjusted their t h e i r positions. po3itions. Patrol8 larger than a CCF Army and elements of three three others others face face US I E a company. company. One CCF I Corps troops, troopn, while two two CCF CCF armies a m i o s face face the the US U S IX IX Corps. Corps.
In of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division repulsed repulsed In the US X Corps zone, elements of a probing attack of continued t to attack against against of undetermined strength, strength, and contluued o attack T E 2nd Division resistance from The US from enemy enerqy troops troops estimated e s t b a t e d to t o nuMber number 200. 200. Tho resistar.ce :giment and arul its its attached attached units units repulsed repulsed several several probing probing attacks; attacks; one one .eginent 'attacking i n its ettacking in i t s sector sector made made no progress progress against elements of of an enemy regiment. The !he US 1st Marina i f f e r e n t probing Marine Division Division repulsed repulsed eight eight d different probing regiment. attacks. Five North North Korean Xorean diviaions divisions continue continue t o furnish attacks. Five to furnish the opposition to t o this t h i s Corps. Corpe.
engaged by two two North Korean Korean divisions, divisions, Troops of the Troop t h e ROK ROK I I Corps, engaged encountered smal.1 enemy enemy groups groups while on on patrol patrol missions. miRsions. encountered small
Naval air air sorties sortiea totalled totalled 2280 228, including including 11 1 1close close support support missions misoions Naval ir a c t i v i t y along t h s east Coast air activity the coast for the tihe US U S lst 1st Marine Marine Division. Division. Offensive a for included. attacks on on anti-aircraft anti-aircraft positions, positions, bridges, bridges, vehicles, vehicles, and and a a factory. factory. included attacks Surface I n the the west, west, aircraft a i r c r a f t provided provided support support for for a a UN UN guerrilla guerrilla raid. raid. Surface In vessels vetwels fired f i r e d on on communications cornmudcations targets targets and and gun gun positions. positions,
Air
Land-based UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 827 827 sorties s o r t i e s of of which which 535 535 were were combat. combat. Land-based Over half half the t h e 70 70 close-support clocre-support missions missions were were flown in i n the the US US X X Corps Corps zone. Zoner Over

U I
Ta
THE C.I.A. NO OBJECTION C.I.A. HAS EO OBJECTXOa TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DZCLASSIPICATIW OF OB TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
No. no.
0 0 0.9 09
'Now ' t r
\
OCI O C I 1956 1956
26 26 September September 1951 1931

I. I.
Military ~ l i t Situation Situetloll ~ y
Ugh:LI:Ws
UN forces forces repulsed replasd a a number number of of enemy enemy probing pobfng attacks atttlckR and and made macle slight slight gains gains against against diminishing diminishing resistance rssieknce in In the the east east central central sector. 80CtoP. Elseehere Elsewhere UN ubl troops troops adjusted adjusted and and consolidated conso~dated while repulsing some Borne small small probing attacks. attaeke, probing
Four Corps maintained their pooitiorie positions and Four divisions divisione of of the US I Copper patrolled, repulsed an A attack patrolled, while the the UP 11s 3rd 3rd Division D&toiafon repulaed % t a e k by an estimated 200 enemy enemy troolm. troops. 200
The five divisions divisions of of the US US IX IX Corm The five Corps maintaSned maintained OP or adjusted positions positions while while encouetering encouptering small amall enemy enemy groups p u p s on OM patrol p a t r o l missions, mi8siom. RON platoons. ROK 6th 6th Division Did8ion patrol patrol repulsed repulsed an an attack by two t u 0 enemy enplatoons.
In Corpe zone, BOX 7th and US US 2nd In the the US X COP%one, elements elementer of the ROK Other Divisions Yanggu. Other Divisions combined combined to to take take a a strategic strategic hill h i l l top top agove Ymggu. elements of the Division made d small gains again& against light light r0rethe ROK 7th 7th Division l gain6 slatance and and consolidated consolidated new new positions. position@. sistance

&zz
Alt &E
AEMZ
ROX Uth llth Divirrion Division i in RON I Corp Corps sone zone repulaed repulsed three three ma11 small The ROK n the ROE enemy probing probing attacks. attaeke.
sorties totalled228, Naval air s o r t i e s totalled 228, including including 20 2G close close support ot\pport missione Iufasiona o trammPmIm f f f i c u l t l e s , no to transmission d difficulties, for the US US 1st 1st Marine MarLne Division, Division. Owing t for the information on on naval naval operations operationa is l e available. awiilab3.e, other information
Land-based UN aircraft of w which 514 were were combat. combat, Land-beeed alrcraft flew f l e w 845 sorties eortiers of k l & 52.4 The US ZZFj X Corpe continued to to get the benefit f nearly l l the Corps continued benefit o of nearly a all the cLom close support boMbers fflew aortiee, totalled approximately approximately 60. 60, Medium bumbere l e w 12 effective sorties, which which totalled sorties and Sardok Sondok ad~f'felda. airfields. Far s o r t i e s against against targets targets which which included included Yoneee Xonp and MIG-15ts were deatmyed destroyed o.nd and five damaged damaged but but East Command claims claima that five MIC-15ts no detrdla were given. given, details were
anr
THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIm OBJECTION TiiE . I . A . HAS TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION PP OF TO THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUAIENT. 4
No.
009
"wear
S\\131
XI.. II..
General Cinercll Situation
EOOnomZt3 Economic
In In a a 24 2 4 September North Karean Korean broadcast, broadcast, Communist Communist farmera farmers i in n the the
Pyongyang area pledged their supPort in all-out harvest harvest e effort Pyongyang support i n an all-out f f o r t tto o farmers on the program program assured assured crush "the cruah "the American American imperialists." imperialiste." The famere their listeners lietenere that that they they would would make make their their "tax "taxpayments payments in i n kind" kind" promptIy. promptly.
(Lack of farm manpower, manpower, recent serioua serious flood conditions, (Lack of conditions, and an8 lack lack of fertilizer f e r t i l i z e r will w i l l probably probably cut cut North North Korean Korean grain grain production production this this year.) year.)
Medium bombers flew flew 11 attacking the the town town of of Chinnmpo Chinnampo Medium bombero 11 effective effective sorties sorties attacking and photographing the town of Chongjin and the marshalling yards and photographing the tom of Chongjin and the marshalling yards at at Kilchu. Kilchu, There is a preliminary report of an engagement between 36 F-8618 and There is a prelincl.nary report of an engagement between 36 F-861s and 30 30 MIG-151s MIG-15's in i n which which one one F-86 F-86 was was damaged. damaged.
1 1 .

been received No significant significant reports reports have have been received during during the the past past 24 2 4 hours. hours.
sof Po
O C 3 1957 1957 ou
27 27 September September 1991 19g
DAIL! ROSSIIII
131:11,1,1111ÌN
I.
Military Situation
Ilibliikla
UN units in the west-central sector repulsed a eerie, of sharp attacks from enemy elementainin increased to regimental strength. In the east-central sector UN forces made limited advauces in the face of heavy resistance from units of battalion strength and then repulsed a series de probing attacks. UN sivesaft totalling 238 &petted or engaged ovar ADO
enemy MO's.
In the westen western eeobr sector 02 of the the U8 US I I Gorp6 Corps sone, sone activity In ecCirl.ty centered around around patrol patrol action aation as as enemy en- troope tsoepe in l a eempany saapany strength strength forced foroed patrols pstrole of of RON l lst the ROK a t and and let 1st COmmonuealth Qomnonweal* Division. @ h h i l o n e to to withdraw. WiWer. Artillery Artillery ef the
US 1st let Cavalry Cavalry Divlllfon Division flred firedou on an estimated troop seen earrying 9p. estimated 50 50 e 8ow* e q llroops men aQJnrgiag B 3 A .Did;nioa eleam. recoillems t6 r6 Diviaion elea 57 57 mu, reooillese rifle r%le and ad* o 3.5 3.5 rocket reek& laundher. launaher. I meets repulsed enemy probing attack. attacks but but a a third third attaek attack ments repuleed two two platoon plgtoon sised sired enerqy resulted in hand until eaenemy troops troops rsaahed reached battalion battelion reeulted i n hand to h m d coihat eoabat uutll strength. The action action continued oootiaued to t o gain gain in in intensity lntsneity and end the the eneny m e r c y increaeinorsaoetrongth. The ed hi@ hie strength i e f lull, the After a b brief hill, the enemy resumed the strength to to a a regiment. regimeat. After attack attack but but the the UN Ull division dlvidon troops troops bold 4d.d their thezr positions positlops and and eventually eventually the the enemy drive diminfaher3 diminished*o to-a'medic mall Sane WOO rOlude of ob 400 rOunde endrive 1 1 arms am8 fire. fire, Sens enemy artillery enartillery and and mortar nm-r tii. f d h feIl toll on O(I DSH3rd 1B 3rd Division Dirieloa positions: pmitionr.
US,IX US I X Corps Carpa forces formu patrolled patrolled and and repulsed repuloed several aeweral small small probing probing attacks. attaake Elements of the RON 7th Division in the US I Corps sone resumed their attack against an enemy battalion and other troops of undetermined strength. New positions uses secured after a limited advaece, and mcpb.... ing attacks repulsed. U0 241 Divielon forces repulsed probing attacki. and maintained positions. The attached /*emit Battalion attacked, enS4Sed an enemy regiment, awl withdrew.
RON I Corps Um* were adlustiag positions.
missions for the US lot Wane Division.
Naval air sorties totalled 62, of uhich 15 were close support Few offensive missions veral,floen on the eaat coast as earTier-based planes replenished. Along the vest
\
1 1

413Z
lin
7 4 '
No.
741. THE HAS THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION TO TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
909
_ . .
-T Itliftwor'oe
coast a dumps, buildings, buildings, and and warehouse8 warehouses a railroad car, car, trucks, trucks, supply dumps, were destroyed. were deetrayed.
troops and installations, inflictSurface vessels vessels fired on enemy troops ing damage damage to ing t o gun gun positions positions on on both both the the east east and and West met coasts, coaate,
Air

General Situation
Other UN Which 661 Other UN aircraft'flew aircraft flew 1040 1040 effective effective 'sorties sorties of whhh 661 were W All four o f the the Corps areas meas shared eha~edin 10~0 suppsrb gotbato :All four of in the the 75 75 0 close support Qomb@t, HecUum bomber. bombers ~iiiekAonr'alfhough half were were flown flown in in the the US U S X Corps Gorp sone. sone. Medium lidseionsalthough half Sinanju m marshalling Targets included inaluded the Sinanju a r s h a l U W 3 flew Elew 33 33 effective effective sorties. sorties. Targets yards, pwde, Yonpo Yonpo airfield, airfield, Hamhung Hamhung supply eupply center, center, Songchon Songchoa railway railway bridge, bridel, Sinmak marshalling marshalling yards. yards. A total of 238 US IIS aircraft (F-861e, (F-86Bs,F-801e F-80'8@ and Sinmak F-84'8) sighted over over 400 400 MIGIs MIGls but but actually actually engaged engaged only o n b about about 200. 200. Total Total F-841s) sighted include one MIG destroyed, destroyed, one probably probab17 destroyed, destroyed, 14 d damaged, with claims Include mgd, w f a only o m one one US U S aircraft aircraft lost. lost.
II
No NO significant eigdffoant reports reports have have been been received received during the the past past 24 24 hours, hour&

I. I.
Military S ituation Military Situation
Highlights
OCI OCI 1958 1958
28 28 September 1951 1951
several Fighting along along the t h e front f r o n t continued continued active. active. There were several Fighting b r i s k encounters, encounters, as as UN UN forces f o r c e s repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks a t t a c k s and rescued UN brisk troops that surrounded in i n the t h e west west central c e n t r a l sector. sector. t h a t had had been been temporarily temporarily surrounded

sector sector.
I n the the US U SI I Corps Corps zone, zone, all all divisions d i v i s i o n s engaged engaged enemy enemy forces. forces. A In battalion but was repulsed b a t t a l i o n penetrated penetrated US lst 1st Cavalry Division positions, positions, b u t was and the repulsed one a attack t h e positions positions restored. restored. The The US IR 3rd Division repulsed t t a c k by an estimated estimated 300 an 300 troops, troops, two two other other attacks a t t a c k s by by an an estimated estimated two two campanies, companies, sent a a relief relief column column to t o aid a i d reeonnaissance and sent reconnaissance elements elements who who had had been been mortar fire fell circled by 300 enemy enemy troops. troops. Heavy Heavy artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire f e l l in i n the the corps sector. sector. corps
U S IX I X Corps Corps troops troops generally generally maintained positions positions and and patrolled. Datrolled. US
Division elements, forced t to withdraw temporarily ROK 6th Division elements, however, however, were forced o withdraw division reseby five five enemy enemy battalions. battalions. A d i v i s i o n counterattack remwhen attacked attacked by when
cured the t h e positions and forced the t h e enemy enemy to t o withdraw. withdraw.
7th I n the t h e US I T SX X Corps Corps zone, zone, ROK 7 t h Division Division troops troops maintained maintained or o r adadIn Elements of of the j u s t e d positions while repulsing repuleing several several enemy enemy thrusts. t h r u s t s . Elements the justed US hilltop position and and repulsed repulsed two two a attacks by i l l t o p position t t a c k s by U S 2nd Division maintained a h enenpr enemy forces. forces.
In I Corps zone, zone, the t h e ROK Capitol Capitol Division Division attacked attacked and and se58I n the t h e ROK I the cured t h e high ground approximately three or o r four f o u r miles forward in i n its its
s t r e n g t h in i n Korea is is now estimated estimated at at 684,000, 684,000, Combined enemy enemy ground strength Of this figure of 684,000 f t his f i g u r e of 684,000 a decrease of 15,000 from from the t h e previous p ~ e v i o u sestimate. estlmate. O troops, 271,000 are troops, a r e in i n the t h e combat zone, zone, 376,000 376,000 in i n the the rear areas areas and and the the remainder are North Korean trainees t r a i n e e s or or guerrillas. guerrillas.
ria_v
air Naval a i r sorties s o r t i e s totalled t o t a l e d 218, including 41 +l close close support support missions missione Offensive air operations were con for flown f o r the the US lst l e t Marine Division. Division. Offensive conthe s h i p s on the ducted ducted along both coasts coaets against a g a i n s t various targets. t a r g e t s . Blockade ships
s *
1
No.
1r6- THE THE C.I.A. C . I . A . HAS HAS NO OBJECTIOS OBJECTTOB TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 07 TO
0 09
--
east bombarded railway railway and and highway highway areas, areas, while while surface surface vessels vessels in in e a s t coast bombarded the west fired on troop troop positions. positions.
Air Air
Other UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 1,068 1,068 effective effective sorties s o r t i e s of of which whioh 695 695 were were combat, combat, including including 84 84 close close support support missions, missions, over over 60 60 in i n the t h e US E 3X X Corps Corps zone. Bone. Twenty-two Twenty-two effective effective sorties s o r t i e s ware w e e flown flown by by medium medium bombers. bombers. Targets Sinanju railroad bridge, included SinanJu bridge, Sariwon, Sarivon, Sinanju, Sunchon, Masan-ni Masan-ni and Yangdok yards, Chinnampo supply center, and and Sinmak Sinmak and and Yangdok marshalling yards, eupply center, Sariwon airfields. 62 US a aircraft i r c r a f t (F-861s, (F-8618, Sariwon airfields. There were engagements between 62 F-8418, F-80ts) F-80'~) and end 82 82 MIG's MIG'e in i n which which two two MIG's MIG's and and one one F-86 F-86 were were damaged. damaged. F-84'8,
11.
General Situation
The South South Korean Korean people people continue continue to t o remain remain generally generally silent s i l e n t on on the the The subject has been been made made sibce since President President subject of of Kaesong. Yaeeong. No major policy statement etatement has Rheels Communists and and disarmament disarmament Rhee's blast calling c a l l i n g for f o r withdrawal of of the Chinese Camnunists of of the the North North Koreans Koreans before before resuming resuming negotiations. negotiations.
Political Poli ti c e
The "skeptical "skeptical and and sulking sulking " It attitude a t t i t u d e of of the the Koreans Koreans towards towards Japan Japan has taken taken a a noticeable noticeable change change for f o r the the better. better. While numerous reservareserva= While making numerous tioqa, the t h e ROK tions, ROK government government seems seems to t o have have seen seen the the wisdom wisdom of of abandoning abandoning its its "peace treaty" stand towards towards Japan Japan and now now is is seeking seeking to t o negotiate negotiate a a simple simple treaty" stand agreement "similar llaimilar to to a a treaty t r e a t y of of friendship, friendship, commerce commerce and and navigation." navigation," agreement

Kaesoly? Truce Truce Talks Talk6 Kaesong
2
OCI 1959 1959

29 September 1951 1951
DAIL/ D A I L Y
Military Situation I, M ilitary S ituation
gighlielts HiPhliahtrr

Arm &ax
UN There was was vicious vicious fighting f i g h t i n g in i n the the east-central e a s t - c e n t r a l sector, sector, where one IJN action was waa unit u n i t was forced forced to t o make make a a limited l i m i t e d withdrawal. withdrawal. Elsewhere, action generally limited to t o patrolling p a t r o l l i n g and and minor minor local l o c a l attacks. attacke.
In the ROK lst, 1st, U US Cavalry, and and B British I n the t h e US I Corps zone, zone, t h e ROK S 1st Cavalry, ritish lst l e t Commonwealth Commonwealth Divisions Divisions reported reported only only patrol p a t r o l action. action. The US 3rd Division, however, however, encountered encountered and and repulsed repulsed sevaral s e v e r a l platoon-size platoon-size probing attacks. The enemy unchanged, wlth with one CCF COF arMY attacka. enemy order of of battle b a t t l e remains unchanged, army and elements elements of of three three others others facing facing the the I I Corps. Corps.
In the 25th, ROK ROK 2nd, 2nd, and US 7th I n the t h e US US IX I X Corps Corps zone zone, t h e US 25th, 7 t h Divisions Divisions sustained several s e v e r a l small small probing probing attacks, attacks, which which were were repulsed. repulsed. Action Aotion in ROK 6th heavier, with with t the mounting an i n the ROK 6 t h Division sector s e c t o r was heavier, h e enemy mounting attack Two CCF CCF armies armlea still atill t h e attack a t t a c k was waa repulsed. repulsed. Two a t t a c k by by two two companies; companies; the face the IX Corps. Corps.
There There was waa vicious vicious fighting f i g h t i n g in i n the t h e US X Corps zone, where elements elements t h e ROK 8th 8 t h Division Division were were forced forced to t o withdraw 200 to of the 200 yards during hand to hand fighting. Counter-attacking UN UN forces forcee encountered encountered heavy heavy resistance. resistance. f i g h t i n g , Counter-attaeking US 2nd 2nd Division Divirlon units u n i t s repulsed repulsed more more than than a a dozen dozen small small probing probing attacks. attacks. US Five The ROK ROK 5th 5 t h and and the t h e US US 1st lrst Marine Marine Divisions Divisions reported reported light l i g h t action. action. Five The North North Korean Korean divisions d i v i s i o n s still still face faoe the t h e X Corps. Corps.
was light light action a c t i o n in i n the t h e ROK ROK I 1 Corps Corps zone zone as ab UN forces forcee made There was There limited Two North North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are on on the the ROE ROK I I Corps Corps front. front. limited gains. gains, Two
Luz Ns;ee
A A total t o t a l of of 82 82 carrier c a r r i e r aircraft a i r c r a f t sorties sorCiss were were flown flown along along the t h e east eamt and and west coasts, coasts, as as poor poor weather weather limited l i m i t e d air air operations. operationr. Successful Successhrl attacks a t t a c k s were made made on on communications communications points pointa aad and targets t a r g e t 8 of of opportunity. opportunity. $urface Surface craft c r a f t continued continued to to patrol p a t r o l and and to t o provide provide interdictory i n t e r d i c t o r y fire. fire.
76 7 6 THE THE C.I.A. C.I.A.

ShO,R,7
HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION HAS TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF OB THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
NO No.
n0 a9 s 0
...
AIL u
UN land-based land-based aircraft Rircreft flew flew 1002 1002 sorties, including 661 661 combat. aombat. Medium centers Kyomipo bombers flew flew 28 28 sorties, s o r t i e s , attacking supply supply and railroad centers at e t Kyomipo and Pyongynq. Pyongyang. A total t o t a l of o f 1,$82 1,382 vehicles vehicler was sighted, sighted, with 976 976 moving moving south. 80uth.
II.
General Situation
past 24 No No significant signifioant reports reports have have been been received received during during the the past 24 hours. hours.
Approved For Release 2002106113 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000340070001-2

TOP SECRET
1.100
COPY NO.
39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date:
JUL 3
1951
NOTE:
1.
*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews completed*

TOP SECRET
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression go to our website

2.
3.
This ummaary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for,the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence, It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the ;Office of Current Intelligence.
Comments repteSent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

"A"
items indicating SovietCopmunist intentions or oapabilities
ipportant regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or oapabilities
"10
other information indicating trends and potential developments
Approved For Release 2002106/13 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Re le%asiste 2002106/13 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00040070001-2
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A"
"B"
editorial, managers and Party organizations of magy Soviet enterprises tblerate over-expenditures of raw materials' and natural resources, infringement of technOlogical processes, and the productive losses resulting from such abusep. The Krasnoye Sormova Worka are singled out in this connection because of the mauy locomotive and ships parts produced'that turn ant to be heavier than planned. As a result, this factory is "overexpending tens Of hundreds of tons of materials, and stocks of unfinished goods held there in excess of-norms "have still not been eliminated Pravda cautions the Works Farb Committee and the Gorki Town Party Committee to pay attention to these VIZOCODOMie and spendthrift activities, and warns that Party organizations must intensify the struggle for the strictest economy and thrift "against wastage and uneconomic conduct." (R FBIS, 28 June.51). gICUEED This is a ftrther indication of the apnarent metal Shortage in the USSR that has been reflected in this yearls scrap metal program.
.
Moscow.considers that the port of leningrad may now be closed to. foreigners. While the Soviets have not yet given a categoric answer to queries on this matter, requests for ship reservations have been.recently turned down, once for the reason that "no space was available" and again that, no foreigners would be given space on the two boats concerned from now on. FUrthermore, foreigners visiting legingrad during the past two
USSFL:EMbasev Moscow Believes Communist Cease-Fire Terms Dictated bY ...nigELMilLsS_SEEfre:Ratha-thait.Consderato, commenting.on the terms oftheCoMmunist cease-fire proposals, Embassy Moacow believes that both the choide of Kaesong at the 38th parallel and ihe delay preceding negotiations are primarily for prestigaand propaganda considerations. 'The Embassy points out that while the delay could be designed to enable the Communist forces to improve their military situation, launching an .offensive would boomerang against their alleged peaceftl intentions. .,The Embassy further questions whether the Communist military forces could[, now expect to improve their position materially before cease-fire negotiations, except in the unlikely event that the Communists are dtermined to conClude the Korean war with a large-scale air offensive against UN rear bases and haval vessels. (C Moscow 5, 2 July 51) COMMENT:- In addition to'posaible prestige and propaganda advantages, the Communiats probably consider a delaY necessary in order to prepare their negotiating position for a conference that hap developed quite rapidly. With regard to military considerations, there is aVidence thatCommunist forces in Korea will be capable prior to mid-July of resuming the offensive if they so desire.
'
&flasteSS According to a recent Pravda
120,242,11.7_21ClosedjeFoier_resp, Embassy
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06113 : SIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001.2
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 ; CIA-RDP79T01146A0060070001-2
4ase
TOP SECRET
STAT
"A"
Weeks'have been refased'perMission'te take the boat trip down the Neva rgely in the tumor stage and tbe to-Peterhbf9-The situation i6 still e to Collect pertinent JurorEMbeady indi4atee that it Will cont Notanisatt-This may well. be :anOther step in cutting down Mation. the opportunity for observation in that area. (C Moscow 22009 29 June 51).
'libossadLC4qnUmabe'Ua_2.S._ZasedbNa+io_alist Problems. The . Soviet histbribal periddica4ToprosiItorii has chanted the'previously accepted theory..that since small countries could not long maintain an
existenbe independent of other predatory-capitalist powers, Tsdrist annexations' of Georgia and the Ukraine could be considered the "lesser evil", The magazine claimed that the introdnction of the higher Russian culture and economy to theseLpeoples was not "evil but good". This late twist'will undoubtedly necesSitate. further changes in the "facts" of history and significantlY the periodical also'criticised the history
National minorities in the USSEareAliertainly cognizant of the differences between-the theory. of "national equality" and "cultural autonomy" as proponnded by the Moscow ideologues And the practice of discrimination in favor of the Russian "elder brother" by the Government and Party. Pravdu of 2 July takes the Central Committee of the.Ukrainian Communist Party totask for permitting the encouragement of nationalist tendencies. A poem entitled "love Ukraine which was written seven years ago and recently republished provides gkayg4 with the point of departure for a general warning against nationalist emotions which are the most dangerous and. elusive "survivals of capitalist mores in the people7s minde%
nip
25X1A
25X1
25X t
Soviet Paratroopo'RenortedlvSent fromfiumania to Transoau5220 Militau District. Approochnately2250 men of a Soviet parachute brigade' reportedly with complete war equipthent embarked on 28-29 May from Galati, Rumania bound for Poti end patumi. On 2 'June, 600 paratroopers and 90 female nurses were allegedlt.transported over the same route. 1COM2!Ts There is novevidence of any paratroop units in the Trenscaucausus Military District north of the IranianTurkish border, nor is there..evidence that there are- Soviet paratroops in Rumania. Closest airborne units in the USSR are believed to be north of the Black Sea in the Kiev andTaurib Military Districts. If a troop movement has actually taken place,' it is questionablel Iable to distinguish'paratroops from.regular militaAyunits. There has Men no confirmation of a report from] that paratroop equipment bad been identified on ships vmsoacting Ec-P;. and Batumi. (See 0/OI,Daily Digest, 23 Jumn 51).
I.
1
tektbook otently inns. (floscow Weeka 269 22 June
3.)..COMMENTir
25X1A
25X1
25X1
25X1
n'
51aTERF EUROPE. BUIGARIA.1

Asticqpj
iftlies--4X-Reedinesg_fRESEE2a11.9.
25X1C
f there is nb indication oi any aggressive action-in Bulgaria, despite general Imo confirmation is tension arA ramors in Sofia*, available of Soviet troop movements into Bulgaria, although the size of
25X1C
Approved For Release 2002/06/WSP: 85?-11,13P79101146A000300070001-2
Approved For Relea-2062/961.13'::JCIA,RPP71701146A0004616070001-2

.
TO,k:Oalftei:
the-Bulgarian army has 12100400-404.&-the,paat three months.' [the arm.* ignot .on,.a.-cwar-:foOting,morale. is poor, and the increase in the size'cifithearMay.40Yes much.bodause of the internal
. .
25X1C
25X1C
situationaa frOm external:reason/40,
tamp Although there is-to:fiii*IntliCation of immediate aggressive
intent on the part of:the PulgarigivArOyeHrecent estimates indicate that the Bulgarian Army has.attaiied aoMbet readiness. The fact that special"ists are not only being.retained.in:the army butare even being recalled to duty tends to detraotTrOM thejOageingHestimate that recent increases
25X1A
are for internal controllrapO004y:H

1113"
"B"
According to a Cteeheelovak aide -meMoire,, theliSijet pilot who inadvertently landed in Czechoslovakia wiabe?deliyerst:t6:US.authOritiee at the German border on 4 July. The4et aircraft araltelhflhiPPet'On '5-July to any German border point selected bithetS-autherities,AC Prague %, 2 Jul 51). COMMENTa The USAir Attacheageefhed-preVionily'requested permission to take'custody of the pilot,inlrastkindretUrn hhn personally to the US ZODB of Germany and'had:ASked'that aliS Air Force.tegm-be allowed to come to Prague to take deliVerypf:the,tWO
airorafte :
Bly
FINLAND. Co
the Communists and Social Demedratkmake::williprobably Such gains as be at the expense of the Agrarian ami TsiberalPartiele-of 'the center. As a result of such changes, a.coalition government *Addprobablybe formed similar to the present one but with a.aliehtj.Y:OtrOngarlabor representation., Present party strengths in,the.pietara:aa.tO4oWis-left-:0 Communists 37D Demodrats..55uCenter ....;4grarlana"56; Coalition Party 33; and Right -- Swedish Peoples PartY144,and ?rogreesivea
-.,
being.held on 24 Ally fOr:the'20Q*ati2mf,the Finnish Diet are not expected to produce any etriking/developmentee It Ifni/lost likely that the CommunistSwill gain three'pr:four'seate'in the northern provinces, where they hava done much organizationalwork during recent months. The Social Democrats are alsolikelyrtoygaina feW.seats'dve to their improved organizationaItechhiquiWamengFinnish:labor.
triAl 18/ttPTOpaganda Operation designed to Sear the US in general-and:the DS:preen:and diplomacy'in particular. He accordingly stresses the.need:fOrthejUS presS:and VOA broadcasts to !thaphasize the "worthleisnebe Ote*:4:06nfeeeionsv orevelations% etc.! obtained from Oatis after'be.hak.bonniaeld'incemimfinicado for seventy daye. Brig& oleo oeutionsagainatHOC*401Pefeivnees to Oatist good physical COndition, since; in:hiropinionOhtCoOManists have probably deliberately built up Ostia' physicaloonditioli,nfteilleving extracted the confession, (C Prague 3; 2 Jul
CZECHOSLNAKIA IlmhassrtomMerk*Oatie Tri44According to US Ambaseador Briggs inPrague tht.Gatiej
attk2Letunosiiinisor yetpota,an,,
0. F
.ctiOn', The nationwide elections
..
:J.,
TOP SECRET
Approyed For.Release2602/06/1;-CIA:RDP791-01146A000300070001-2
%w e Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0001,10070001-2
TOP SECRET
"Bet
POLAND: Attaehe Field-Trips ReVeal No Unusual Military Activitz. Recent fieId-tripe by persennel,of the US Etbassy WEa'saw ArMy and Naval Attache& Offides during the latter 4:art .of Jund.revealed no unusual military 'actitity in central, southwest and northwest Poland. The Naval Attache on 22 June observed a total of about 28 small craft near Swinoujscie at the uthuth of the OderRiVer, but saw no unusual activity. Army-Attache on a trip through central and southWest The Assistant Poland 25-27 June observed Polish troops engaged in normal training, some Soviet ndlitary actitity.in the Trzebian area of southwest Poland indicating a possible build-tp, but otherwise nothing that he considered to be of an unusual nature. (S AIUSNA Warsaw 261600Z, 28 June 52; S USARMA Warsaw M4-128-51, 29 June 51).
"A"
RUMANIA:Maas Evacuations Indicate Importance of "National! Security. The US Legatien in Bucharestreports mounting evidence that.the-large scale evacuation of minority populationgroupa and "unreliables", possibly totaling 50-75,000 since 15-June extends along the whole length of RUManials frontier with Yugoslavia to a possible depth of 30 to AO miles. The."general feeling among western representatives" in Bucharest is that theMove is probably "for long-term security border control,and military considerations." purposes related to both Although concurring that these are theMajor notivatinglactors the legation states it is "at a loss to understand" why the evacuation is beingneffected (a) immediately prior to the harvest season in an important agricultural area, an& (b) with such rapidity that transportation burdened that serious accidents.havnresulted. facilities art so overAs a possible reason, the Legation suggests that the Rumanian GovernMent mayvial to complete resettlement of the evacuees before winter. The Yugoslav Government in sAmretest note delivered to the Rumanian Legation in Belgrade on 28 Jure alleges that the evacuation is principally directed against the large YUgoslav minority in the border area and constitutes *a warmongering action* to increase war psychosis and international tension. (S Bucharest 7811 27 Jume 51; S Bucharest 785, 29 June 51; ITID, 28 Juno 51). COMNENTs Although large-scale evacuation of peasants from the Important Banat agricultural area will undoubtedly necessitate emergency harvesting measures, such as use of military personnel, the Rumanian Government probably considers *nationarraecurity a more important consideration. The Rumanian Communists are undoubtedly anxious to avoid a repetition in Rumania of wholesale defections to Yugoslavia and increasing Yugoslav subversive activities, which have already occurred in Bulgaria. Previous information indicates that the evacuees are being sent into the agriculturally important Rumanian Danube plains, where the Government has complained of 4 lag in harvesting operations.
.
"13*
1UGOSLAVIA. US to Warn Tito Government Resardim glatlit. The State Department has advised Aibassador Allen in-Belgrade essential for the Yugoslav Government to be informed that it is of US concern
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06/134 CIA-RDP791-01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Rbease 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146Ahle300070001-2
TOP SECRET
regarding poesible proagoslav,aotivity in Albania. The Department mites that an'indidetion oftS concern over the discrepancy between the Yugo
slav.public position and recent Yugoslav action regarding Albanian refUgees in YugoislaVia should dissuade Tito from engaging'in -any unilateral action inAlbania. (TS SD To Belgrade 1478, 30 June 51), COMMENT: Despite previous eentraryreports,.AMbassador Allen can'find no signs.that the Tito Goteru ment is currently planning to instigate an antilioxha coup in Albania.
"B"
YUGOSLAFIL_RUMANIA4ULGARIA. Satellites Counter Yugoslav Protest of
siRmlaagaajsmEjava&Liak On 29.June Bulgaria and Rumania.delivered notes to Yugoslavia alleging numerous violations of their respective bor
dere during the past two monthee.The Rumanian note charges that Yugoslavia &Spite preVious protests, continuesto engage in "provocative and aggressive actiVity:through numerous violations of 'Rumanian territory, territorial waters, and'airspace". Bulgaria similarly accuses lUgoslavia of failing to heed'Previous Bulgarian protests and lists 18 new "provocations" by YagoslaV frontier troops and aircraft. (R FB1D, 2 Jul 51), CONMENTi The sitailtaneous Bulgarianatmanian presentation of these notes is undoubtedly a'joint maneuver to draw attention away from the Yugoslav protest Of the previoUs diy against Rumania's ruthless evacuation of Serbs from its Yugoslav border.

TOP SECRET
5
Approved For Release 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Re leYse 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004180070001-2
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"Bo
tiBlE
.
.
IRAN. I Iran Mae-Strengthened Its MilitarYForCes in Oil Field Area/ The trffiliiTary Attache in Tehran reports lhat& as oftJuly& the total Iranian ground force at' Abadan is estimated 'Wipe 2,500. Its equipment consista of small Arne mortars& machine &tie and 11 tanks Mounting 77mm. guns. Naval strength ia placed at 500 meilivith several small vessels& whese largeet glint! are four inch. The bulk of-the Tenth Iranian Division is located at Alwaz. some 80intles away from Abadan (three hoUre distant in time). The Military.Attache belieVes the troops now in Abadan are completely adequate to preserve order. The'Iranians are--4Parently now awed by the British cruieer with ite six inch guns'off Abadan and would resist any British efforts to land military forme. Personnel from the British cruiser have already beendenied-landing permissibn. There is no doubt& according to the Military Attache& that any British effort to land would result ih Iranian military action that-would cease only when sufficient British forceswerelbrought in_to defeat Iranian unite. (S US Army Attache Tehran.; 1 Jul 51). COMMENT:- This latest US military-estiMate of Iranian deployment and.Iranian determination to resist isfully corroborated by alLeVeilable reports'. Iranle moves'to strengthen its military forces inAbadan and eleewhere arep_however& probably also aimed at preventing internal disorders:
AFGHANISTAN. PakistawSto s ort Of Diesel Oil to Af histan. On 27 Junevtlig-Coveltrunea o a an s ppe t expor o r g -Wed diesel sal to Afghanistan& presmahbly in brder to ensure maintenance of adequate stocks in Pakiatan until the Iranian oil sitation-becsoMes more clear. A. permanent stoppage of diesel oil shipments to Afghanietan dould rob:Ult.in cancellation of the contract ofMorrison-Knudsen Afghanistan& an American firm currently ehployed on large-scale development projects in that Country. CR Karachi Jt Mks 26, 29 Jun 51; O Kabul 1, 1 Jul 51). COMMENT: Afglianistan is entirely dependent upon Pakistan and the USSR fbr-ItrFetroleum supD.,
GREECE. Kink Calls For Ne* Government OrElections. -According to press Thirgs& tang Paul intervened in the datinet crisis today and declared he would dissolve Parliamentend call new elections ifpolitical leaders Aid not fonn-a Strong ddalitiOn gOvernment: 03 lash PoeV3 Jul 513. COMMENT: The present =isle was precipitated by (1) the unwillingness of Prime Quieter Vnizeloe anci(m-Vice FattierPapandreou to support the US backed.wheat pricing program& and (2) the expressed oppOsition of Papami. dreou-4who resigned on 2 Julyfrom.the coalitionto the-eIectoral law proposed and supported-by VenizeIos and-other-leading Greek political parties.' The VS Embassy in-Athens is stressing the necessity of a stable interim government whieh muuld facilitate the adoption Of vitally necessay economic meastres without whiCh the whole rationing program in Greece might have to be abandoned with severe financial loss to Greece.
-
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002106/13 : CdA-RDP791-01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Release 2002106113 : GlA-RtIP79701146A000,34r0001-2
TOP SECRET plies. Since the of the 3,000,000 Soviets have deliVered to Afghanistan onlY 600,000 gallons of gasoline patched in /950-51 uhder the termS ofaniketotene supposed to be disthe agreement (pee COI Daily 1950Afghan-SOViet trade Bigest0:27, Jun 514-the Petroleum exports from cessation of any Pakistan,will portation system as well as seriouPly affect the Afghan transtheMorrison-Knudsen IT" INDIA. constraction company. Pretest to in Kashmir. India United Nations about Pakistani Border Violations announced todAy that Nations it has Security'Council against a series protested to the United along the cease-fire line in of violations by Pakistan Kashmir during the Minister.Nehru warned past fortnight. might flare into open that,if these violations,Zere n6t checked, Prime border violations by war. (R FBIS Ticker, 3 Jul 51). COMMENT: they both India Minor occurrence along the cease-fire and Pakistan are a relatively line in common arily treated by both sides as routine Kashmir, and they are customcoincidence that India's matters. It is present attempt to probably not aggressive tendencies call attention COMAS just one day after Br. Frank to Pakistan's Graham, UN Representative for /ndia the arrival in India of and Pakistan. "C" BURMA. Burmese C-in-C Concerned Over Militark the Burmese C-in-C, SituAIion: Lt. Gon. recently Attache in admitted,to the US Military Rangeon.that he was with the military'operations against the disappointed sed meager results of various concern oier-BUrmese insurgents. He also Communist border area which he expresinfiltration in the Sino-Burma claiis cannot:be able forces. 0 Rangoon 969, 29 June controlled with present the Burmese Foreign avail51). COMMENT: Ne Win now joins problem of CommunistMinister in acknowledging the forces moving towards increasingly serious they both still the China border, maintain the ing assistance fittion that the although from the Chineee. Communists are not receiv"C" INDONESIA. Continuing Strikes spread strikes, Diminish. GoVernment largely the result of Prestige. WideMohammedan holiday, a.general demand to continue in tion policy and its celebrate a defiance of the Covernmont's ban on strikes in ment has arbitravital attempted to counter its industries. The Governdemanding that rearnItant employers grant a One diminished prestige by in most and a half mediation proceedings month's wage bonus and by political prisoners announcing the release on 5 July. Chinese daily in of 1,000 Keng Po, a leading CPYRGH in non-Co/mast weakness, stated Djakarta, editorializing that on the coordination among cabinet ing, that they aet Government's individually Ministers is lackwonder," the /cella po, and sometimes recklessly. VeP concluted,:,"there are ever CPYRGHT more voices, The present cabinet peaking June of men than its undeniably is composed of a less capable predecessor, and lack of group coordination frequently has
Ina,

TOP SECRET
7
ApprovedForRelease2002/06/13:ClA-R0P79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Rlidse 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146Adeln00070001-2

TOP SECRET
been apparent. However, although it has received little or not support from the Indonesian press since its formation, the Governmentle majority in Parliament remains firm and there are no indications that any immediate issues will cause its fall.
.
"B"
25X1C
CHINA: Re orted Movement ot_29.9109gaiiilield Arn7 Troops into leangtung-Kwengsi Area. Two armies totaling over 30,0000 men, of the:ComMunist 2nd Field Army recently moved into the provinces of Kwengtung and Kwengsi from Iennan according to a Hong Kong press report. This movement was allegedly to aid in the cleanup of gerrrillas in these provinces and to move into positions on the Indochinese border. (U Hong Kong Reuters Ticker, 2 July 51). COMMENTs The loCation of elements of the 18th Army, 2nd Field Army has been recently confirmed in the Canton area [Reasons for this change in the long standing allotment of area respensibility-aangtung being a 4th Field Army sector-are still unknown. Other reports suggest the 19th Army end Field Army, as the second unit involved in this movement. The figure of 30,000, however, indicates only one full army. There has_ been no reliable evidence to indicate that the internal.situetion in these two provinces necessitates employment of additionalftroops, or that any further build-up is planned at the Indochinese border at this, time. The 2nd Field Army, has been charged with the responsibility of "liberatingv Indochina. Activities towards that objective are reportedly under the direction of CHIEN Keng deputy commander of the 2nd FieldArmy.
1
IrenshaisckSiture of US-Viet ECA Pact. The US Legation was informed by a Viet official on 28 June that word had just been received from the French Ministry for Associated States that the,US-Viet bilateral agreement on economic aid could not be signed without the prior approval of the High Council of the French Union. Minister Heath, while conceding that the French are,by'this move acting within legal rights as prescribed by the 8 March 1949 agreetent withjletnem observes that French authorities have been constantly and full consulted during the course of.US-Viet negotiations. He adds that the French Economic Counselor in Indochina had given written approval of the bilateral procedure, that the French did not require'High Council approval . of the pentalateral agreement on military aid, and that the High Council of the French Union is not yet in existence. On 30 June, General De Lattre made the further announeement that the French Government had now proposed certain change's in the text of the agreement.. Minister Heath finds the French action "astonishing" and is at loss to explain it, but he' urges that every effort be made to secure speedy signature of the agreement without exacerbating the feelings of eitherthe French or the Viets. (I Saigon 2346, 29 June 51; 8 Saigon 2364, 30 Aline 51; S Saigon 5, 1-July 51).
25X1C
25X1C
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002106/13 ECIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Relliese 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S1)0070001-2
TOP SECRET
25X1C
IH
25X1c
25X1C:
CHINA..Allesed Sino -Soviet Conference.
110 top Chinese Communist leaders met with two Soviet representatives in Peiping on 4 June. CHOU En-lai reportedly demanded that the USSR vdo somethingrabout excessively heavy Chinese loases in men and materiel in the 'Korean conflict, and complained that Peiping was being distracted from its major objective of Taiwan. The Chinese are said to have been told thnt Soviet- troops are moving into Northeast Manchuria and building up illSiberia) and to have been.promited (a) Soviet aid if the mainland-were invaded and (b) training and eqpipment for Chinese troops .(for unspecified purposes). Ithe conferees agreed to attempt to /*split the solidarity of the UN and to create diversions elsewhere,s to attempt to prevent the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, And to improve transport and road-building.in China to facilitate -trOop movements.' COMMENT: Developments in China are often preceded, or followed, by.reports giving details of the proceedinge of alleged top-level meetings concerned with such developments. In general, it has proved difficult to distinguish the possibly valid material in such reports from plausible rumiors or embroidery of newspaper reports'. The degree of validity of the above report is unknown. 'Although Available evidence suggests that Peiping is prepared to continue with its Korean Commitment, it is possible that Peiping has been concerned Over the magnitude of its losses in Korea, as well as its inability to assault Taiwan, and that Chinese. pressure on the USSR contributed to Malik's cease-fire proposal. There have been'many reports, prior.to the alleged meeting, of the movement of Soviet troops into Manchuria and of a Soviet program of training and equipping Chinese forces in Manchuria; the latter development might explain the former. The USSR has been bound by treaty since February 1950 to come to China's-aid if the mainland is attacked. The final three alleged agreements of the conference relate to known Sino-Soviet objectives.
25X1
25X1A
nos
Hatiallaitnn14,trateslisatattAlittping. During .June Chinese Nationalist naval patrols Intercepted four small merchant vessels -between Swatow and Foochow, Pirates-in the same general-area attacked two veisels and sank the Panamanian ship BUST. (p Far East Trader, 27 June 51 and R FBIS Daily Report, BBB 5, 27 June 51). COMMENT: As a result of such incidents many vessels destined fcr North China ports are being diverted to Whaipoa, the port for Canton. Another result may be a hastening of Chinese Communist plans to occupy offshore islands from which the Nationalists and pirates operate.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : ZIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Relene 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003/0070001-2
Nod
TOP SECRET
"B"
25X1
"B"
Army report cited by FECOM, the enemy retains the capability of:increast. ing guerrilla activity in coordination with future offenses. FECPM adds that continued friendZy control measures, Iow guerrilla strength; struggle,for survival and recent decrease of control and coordination, however, May be expected to confine guerrillas to minor harassing /actions. (S FECOM Telecon 4899; 3 July 51). COMMENT: Indications ' of enemy intnetions to expand guerrilla activities alsoAlave been derived from recent guerrilla POWs as well as from rplawhe hive reported th e formation of new guerrilla units and t e re bilation of the North Korean 10th Division coimitted early this year in a deep infiltration mission against the UNgs main supply routes in
South Korea.
-
KOREA, Increased Guerrilla Activity. Far East Command reports that 'enemy guerrilla bands, quiescent for several months, have become noticeably more active during the past few weeks with over 1400 engaged between 23 June and 1 July. According to a recent 8th
CHINA. Morale Problem of Chinese Nationalist Forces. Suicide and desertion among members of the Chihese Nationalist armed forces has become a problem, according to a senior Chinese Nationalist general. The causes: (1) homesickness, heightened by the backfiring of propaganda promising an early return to the mainland; (2) physical sickness - -tuberculosis is increasing; (3) assignment to "coolie joberand (4) fear of being reported to CHIANG Ching-kuo by his Soviet style political officers. The omnipresence of these political overseers, lis shown hy four of them being plIten a-orlard a chinese Navy tanker running from Japan to Taiwan, che'tedngcsLOwattheship2s compass at all times. An "understudy" captain has been aboard this tanker, in addition to the regular captain for over four months.1 I this practice appears to be inconsistent with another naval practice of sending the regular captain to school for political indoctrination for three to four months. These political commissars of CHIANGgs were put aboard ships about three months ago over the strenuous.objections of Admiral KWEI Yung -ching Commander of the Chinese Nationalist Navy. (S ALUSNA Taipei Weeka 28, 29 June 51). COMMENT: A morale problem has always existed in the Chinese Nationalist forces. It ie generally understood that their contained position on Taiwan has brought about a further deterioration of morale. Any increase in the high 1950 average daily sick rate of 150 per thousand among only those ill enough for hospitilization would seriouslyaffect the combat potential of the Nationalist forces. While the institution of political officers serving with the armed forces is not new, they had not been accorded as much powerand corresponding fear --prior to CHIANG Ching -kuols direction. CHIANG., who is the Gimogs eldest son, Spent some 10 years-training in Russia and is reportedly attempting to emulate the Soviet methods of insuring control over potential defectees in military service, and, in the process, is arousing increasing resentment from all military elements concerned.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved ForRelease2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

TOP SECRET
in
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400070001-2
TOP SECRET
"Aq
25X1
25X1
KOREA. Augmentation Of Enemy Forces in Korea. According to-Far East Command numerous recent rePorts, confirmed and unconfirmed, strongly indicate that the enemy is continuing te_provide reinforcements and replaceMents for both North KoreanHand Chinese COmmunist forces in Korea. Front line Korean Corps have been strengthened by replacements drawn from units:in the Pyongyang:and Wonsan areas. The strength of these units in turn, has been maintained by the consolidation of units assigned to rear area security missions-the reactivation of units dissipated in the defeats'orlast autumn, and.the continuance offrecruitment and training at a relatively high level. Recent 1 reporta have mentioned the activation in Manchuria of new cOrth Korean divisions and their movement into Korea. Numerous sources have referred to the arrival in Kciree of additional Chinese Communist units to replace those recently withdrawn as a consequence of combat losses. POWs have confirmed the preeence in Korea of the 140th Army. Other POWsThave reported that other units of the Fourth Field Army are in Korea in a react role. tend to confirm the movement of sipeable CCF forces aEn;i:i;13 enemy main supply route back of the northiest front in the Sibyon area. (S FECOM Telecon 4893 and 4899; 1 and 3 July 51). tOMMENT: There is ample evidence of a long range program tO bUild-up the North Korean armed forces. The extent to which the Chinese Communists have instituted a rotation of forces to replace units withdrawn remains uncertain. The influence of the ceade4ite negotiations on such long term manpower committenta-; have net as yet been reflected in available information.
25X1
25X6
"CH
TOP SECRET
11 Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For RtItase 2002106/13 : CIA-RDF79T01146AW6300070001-2
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
'tB"
Closer Relations. P. ular Distrust,of 15 Business Ham ers eve that n oc na o, renc e power CURTZn d rec ors o fer.the political, Military, iMperialism" is a seriousdanger US "ederiemic Thesathe attituda exists in nuteroes and-edonomic future=of France. circles.] French comMercial and indUstrial
FRANCE:
25X1C
25X1A 25X1A
25X1
near,future.
"B"
"B"
_
.
defense budget for ITALY. -Proposed 1952 Defense Budget. 'The-proposed almost $700 million. This billion lire, or META year 1952 totals 435.6 chargeable to 1952 of theapproximately $160 million atount includes the appropriation approved earlier this 5400 million supplementary defense chargeible to fiscal year 1953 from -Year as'well, as unspecified advances :Parliament is not expected to take up thie:$400 million appropriation.. 24% of the national budget, the defense budget, which represents-rolighly 26,.30 June 51) COMMENT: The proposed until autumn. (S Rome Joint Weeka is approximately the same proportion Italian defenseS budget for fiscal.1952 would in fiscal 1951. Thie comparison of the total budget as was the case effort. of the Italian defense appear to reflect unfalorably on the scope that Within the next year the Italians;will'actually However, it is believed budgetary apentire $400 million extra-MilitarY Place contracts for theoriginally,sUpposed to be Opent over a three-year. propriation, which was defense be expected to pass'another extraordinary period. The Italians can appropriation within the next year aid a half.
Swise Light Tanka. The Chief of the SWIT2ERLAIt. Swiss Urgently Seek obtain tanke.. He Troops'has Staled it is imperativethat Switzerland countries for this military said that the Swiss were dependent.upon foreign obtained, the technical and He also declared that once tanks are .item.
TOP SECRET
_Apprehensions of a grovairki1717772'75-51iness These fears and IvCOMMENT: in non-Camnuniet circles. are widespread in-France, even signs of US diplomatic dictation appear to US-French a widespread antipathy for any a closer popular support of current Party, be the prindiparthreats toSecretary-General French Sodialist Of the Gvy Mollet, undertakings. take undue adtantage ti1771:his concern last US businese both has ekpressed the NATO arrangein Europe, under Of its opportuni es or influence distrust Of US economic While this:Freneh ment and the Sal-lumen Plan. propaganda till, there are no inflUence is griet fel' the Communists! situation in the ."great_violence":from this catione that they could induce
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : ClAiRDF79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Relate 2002/06/13 : ClA-RDP79T01146A006100070001-2
TOP SECRET
training protleMs in the use of-these tehicles.could be solted hy the .(R Bern.,'Jointleeka 26, 29 June 51) - 'COMMENT: The SWisa have Swiss. apparentlfdecided, the manufacture ofCenturion-57:77,7 for which theY hate obtained licensing rights;-is impraCtiCable at'thid-time, The appeal of the Chief of the Swiss Light Troops is probably designed to bring this problem to the attention of the West. Without the 550 tanks they need, the Swiss will not be able to defend their lowland area--a corridor from Germany into France.
"13"

TOP SECRET
SW1ss Reaction to World Bank Bonds isSua Reflects Anxiet The Swiss press has announced the plans of the International 13ank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to float 112.-year 3.5% interest-bearieg loan on the SAiss market en 3 July.; This is the anat time that the IBRD has publicly floated a loan in Switzerland; previouely such loans have been handled privately. &Ilse bankere reportedly informed the IBRD that on its present terms the loth would fail because Swiss intestors are showing increasing reluctance to acquire ally leng-term obligatiOne, The .US Legation Bern comments, however, that the 305% rate coupled with mediuM termsland low risk factor would ensure he suecees Of the loan, (R Bern Joint Weeka No 26, 29 June 51; NY TiMes 3 July 51) -CONNENT1 The Swiss bankerslobjections to the IBRD are nU7aZilt conditioned by'their desire to get.the best terms possible. It'is,true, nevertheless; that Swiss intestore are becoming. increasingly concerned aven the prospects of inflation in Switzerland and that therefore they are hesitant to purchase fixed-return sbctrities.
Over. Inflation.
-
IIC11
SCANDINAVIK. 'Korean Peace Pnodpects Delay Decision'on Sending Troops tt The prospect of an armistice in Korea is delaying a decision by the Norwegian and Swedish Governments with respect to the UN'S request-of 22 Junta for troops. AtTthe moment neither the NorWegian nor.the Swedish Foreign Ninisters find advisable the meeting of.Scandinatian Foreign Ministers proposed by Denmark-(see OCI Daily Digest,29 June.,51), (R StockhoIM 1; 1 JulY 51; P 0s145.1289 29 June 51) COMMENT: UndionbtedlY, all three SCindinavian Governmente are pleaSed at EETTFUSpedts:of 4 eessation of hostilities in Korea. The Norwegian Foreign Minieter, nevertheiessl'indicated the sympathetic attitude of Norway to an equitable sharing of the burden in Korea. The Swedish Foreign Minister, on the other hand, is undoubtedly greatly relieved at teing able to avoid seridus consideration of SWeden's responsibilities military-wise to the UN, and another public discussion of Sweden's foreign policy,
Korea-.
no ft
2 5X1 C
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : COS-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved For Retse 2002/06113 : CIA-RDF79T01146ASS400070001-2
."C" 'GUATEMALA.
Government MarRegtest Vilthdraimlof US Air Misslen.,: The WAITIVtache in Guatemala hab been informed that President Arhenz is on: seriously considering reguestihg the vdthdrawal of the:USAF Mission the US id., the grounds that the MisSion mill serve no useful purpose'lf materiel.' unable.to provide the Guatemalan Air Force with.eguipment and. realm of action Seems yell mithin the The Attache comments that,'"Such concurred in by the Chief of the Air possibility and would probably be than purply professional grounds rather Force and many of.his officers oft
'
51) any'anti-US sentiment," (C Guatemala,' IR-57-51 USAIRA, A-)9'20.May Permitted the morale and egnipMent.of COMMENT: The Guatemalan'Government largely becausethe Air Force was regarlml the Air Force to deteriorate

TOP SECRET
"B',
Council Refuses to Send Troo s to Korea. The Brazilian.National :razl does not have, at this a une, s a e. on Security ounc than those required for the defense of its moment; "military forces other recommend to the Chief The Council has decided to national.territory". of technical of Staff of the Armed Farces the study of preliminary methods "in geod collaboration and planning whiCh nil permit the implementation (U Rio de Janeiro 2, 1 July..1) time" of Brazil's obligation.% under the UN.: general Lie the appeal of Seeretary COMMENT: The Connell met to discuss Braiilian for the KoreanTwar. /be to tbe UN members for additional troops Only pnblie remains overwhelmingly, opposed to sending trodPsrnetseas. its campaign week's has the Vargas aiministratian.begun &Uri:4. the past two that it will to olereome this public attitude. It is genprally_attepted politically to take several months even te prepare the Brazilian publia As a follow-up of the favor,active participation in UN military actions. rof the Armed Monteiro,-presently Chief of Staff ESC:meeting, General Gois offieials on the Forces, is coMing to the'US to consnit with military participate in the UN action. General Practical zmys in which Brazil may Gois,1 however, has recently retarked that BratiliM efforts "should be of preferentially Utilized in the Atlantic area", and that thei!dofense East. the Weatern Hemisphere might begin in Berlin.or more to:the BRAZIL.
,
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA4RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
Approved Fcheleate 2002106/13: CIA-R0P791011464000300070001-2
Tap eiCRET
a questionable asset to Arbeni during the presidential bainpaign of recent plan to.pUrchase surpltie Spitfire :aircraft from Italy. US representations to Italy, however, prevented this trensactien, arid there are no indications that' Guatemata-viill Soon obtain aircraft.'
as
1950. A desire to rehabilitate:the:Air:Faroe maY be 'indicated by a

TOP SECRET
25X1

.1
Approved For Re laud 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0070001-2
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S
CABLES
3 Jbly 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
fRAN. Tanker Racal t Problem Under Consideration. The US Ambassador in Tehran reports that he saw Prime Minister euggested acceptance by the National Mossadeq on 2 July, and Oil Company of the receipt proposed by AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil ComnarAY) whicluacktobledgea the amount of oil removed, but would not prejudice the outcome of theoll dispute. eventual Mossadeq stated-that such a reservation only if given heyould accept an absolute guarantee endorsement that this will not be used by the A/pc or any other company lifting the oil as an excuse to avoid payment. 51). COMMENT: The receipt (Sp S/S Tehran problem goes considerably further 13, 2 Jbly agreement between the AICC and than Iran on acceptable wording. is not devised to remove the If t method oil frem the areas wheresborage are becoming increasingiy facilities tight, the oil industry will be forced to shut down, Whether or not AMC personnel is available. Since Mossadeq has maintained an intransigent position heretofore, it will be surprising if he does accept a new type of receipt. S Cousa Offers 2 500 US technicians to Iran to .erate Oil Indust The US Ambassador in Tehren reports . that Lee4actars Inc. of Loa has sent a letter to Iranian Angelee Prime Minister of the Iranian National Oil Mossadeq and Board offering immediately toto the Chairman contract to supply up to 2,500 negotiate a US technicians to manage and oil industry in Iran. operate the (C, S/S Tehran 10, 2 Jbly 51)0 major US oil companies have COMMENT: The a tacit understanding not to offer their services to Iran at the present time, inasmuch as the repercussions would far outweigh any advantages which might accrue to them. companies, however, Smaller have not made any such decision. of State was not informed The US Department of this move by Lep-Factors.

SECRET
Approved For Rekuve 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0k000070001-2
SECRET
"B"
US Minister ip Ipdechina suggests ctered policy in that US Minister Heath in Saigon, obserVing that the decisive battle for Indochina has yet to be eought and that pressure for this larger battle may came to a head brthis fall, asks the State Department to review its policy toward Indochina. In this connection Heath points out (a) that the French are end will continue to be during the foreseeable future the sae effective barrier to Communist expansion in Indochina, and, therefore, (b) "it is of the greateat importance that harmonious US-French relationsbetaaintained. He asks that the Department direct him to request General De Lattre to take steps to stop anti-American reports emanating from the General's entourage, and to inform the General of our belief that it is necessary for him to issue specific instructions to certain key officials of hie staff to enter into closer relationships with designated political and economic officers of the Legation. Heath also asks authority to inform De Lattre that ECA will discuss its projects and their publicity with designated members of the Generallo staff, that there are and will be no US operations in Indochina beyond those of which the French are informed and that the officer and clerical staffs of all US missions in Indochina have been personally briefed by the Minister to insure that they ftlly understand the importance of the French oontribution to the free world being made in Indochina, and to insure that they not listen to or give encouragement to Improper criticism of French sacrifices and intentions. Subsequently, Heath reported that he gained the impression from a conversation with De Lattre that the General was in correspondence with Faris regarding changes in the status of ECA operations in Indochina. (S, S/S 2355 Saigon 29 Jun 51; S, VS 2365 Saigon, 30 Jun 51),
country..
INDOCHINA.
25X6
"C"
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06113 CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2
25X1

L.
.
FAR EAST F A R EA,sT
%Enemv
Enemy continues to augment augment forces forces in Korea: ontiqyes to m:

antli3-Zu1Y. 51
J
____
lthe s continucontinuthe enemy enemy i is
_--I
jforcesinrea.
ing ing to to reinforce reinforce and and pravide provide replacements replacements fo; for both Worth Worth Korean Korean and and ChGese Chinese Cornmunut Communist Korean corF8 coriis have have been been strengthened by forces in Korea. Front Line line Korean Wonsanareas. areas. The replacements drawn d r a w from units unitsin in the the Pyongyang Pyongyang and Woman strength of these been Btrength theae units, in iDturn, turn,has has beenmaintained maintained by by the the consolidation consolidation of un'its units assigned assigned to torear rear area security security missions, the the reactivation reactivation of of units of ofrecruitrecruitdissipated in i n the t4e defeats of o f last autumn, autumn, and the continuance continuance of training at a relatively ment and training relatively high high level. North Korean the activation in In Manchuria of b f new mw R s r t h KO rean aivisions AM their movement into Korea, Korea.
.;
Numerous sources O the Numerous sources have havereferred referred tto the ararin Korea Korea of of additional additional Chi nest Communist rival in Communistunits units to to replace replace those recently withdrawn as a conseauenc conseguenc of Prisoners of recehtly withdrawn a sa 0f combat losses. Prisoners of the presence In Korea Korea Of of the the 140th 140thArmy. Army. Other Other war have confirmed the prisoners have reported that that other other units units of ofthe theFourth FourthField FieldArmArmrare Rrisoners have reported in Korea Korea i in a relief relief role, na role. [ confirm the movement jconfirm of sizeable Chinese Chinese Communist Communist forces along the main main enemy enemy supply route route forces along to the rear of the the northwest northwest front. rear of
, I
7 2
'#.
Gomrnent: There is i sample ample evidence evidence of a Comment: There long range program to Korean armed armed forces, which t o build build up the North Korean which all foreign foreign troops troopswere werewithdrawn. withdrawn. The, The extent might be significant if all to which the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists have have instituted instituted a a-rotation of forces forces rotattom of to replace replace units unitswithdrawn. withdraw remains retnains uncertain. The influence inflUehceof pfthe the ceasecease-. firenegotiationf! negotiations on. on such long as fire long,term term manpower manpower commitments commitments have not as yet been reflected reflected in in available available information. Information.
*
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE
ATE: 22-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
. .
4 a
1'
2.
I prksltige considerations: prestige considerations:

1
I
IComplunist dictated by Communistcease-fire cease-fire terms dictated

l t h e choice the
7r
2 July 51
'
'
3.
the delay preceding .negoti&tions megodations are are for reasons of of prestige prestige and and propaganda. propaganda. if the delay were designed designed to to allow allow Communist Communist if forces to forces to improve improve their their military !nilitarysituation, situation,the thelaunching launching of of an an offensive offensive would be likely to to boomerang boomerang against against their their alleged peaceful intentions. urther questions questions whether whether the the Communists Communists could could= rurther not expect to improve improvetheir their mili milittry y position position materially materially before before cease-fire cease-fire expect to negotiations, except in the unfikely un kely event negotiations, except event that that they they are are determined to conoffensive against UN UN rear clude the Korean elude Korean war war with Withaalarge-scale large-scale air offensive rear bases and and naval vessels. bases
of Kaesong Kaesong as as the the site site of ' of of negotiations and and
r 1
YT
In addition addition to Comment: In Comment: to possible possible prestige prestige propaganda advan@ges, advanteges, the Communists probably conqder conitider a delay Communists probably and propaganda in order orderto toprepare preparefor foraa conferencethat thathas hasdeveloped developed quite quite necessary in conference With regard i s evidence evidence that rapidly. With regard to to military military considerations, considerations, there is Communist Communist forces forces in Korea will will be capable by by mid-July mid-July of of resuming the offensive I f they offensive if they so desire.
"
I
"
I
I
I
I I
NR
5-
TOP SECRET SUEDE
.- .
. '\
_ThoP_SECBET---SUEDLgo
FAR EAST
Communists feel feel they they enter negotiations 1. 1 . Chinese Communists negotiations with strong position:
I
Army, the Chinese available to the 8th Army, Communist Field in Korea, Communist F teld Commander h General Peng Peng Teh-huai, Teh-huai, advised CCF CCF tactical General commanders on on 1 1 July July that that Chinese Chinese delegates delegatesto to the the cease-fire cease-fire negotinegotiSouth Korean avictorious victoriousarmy, army,that that Sou4I-1 Korean demands demands will be ations represent represent a ignored, and unsatisfactory, the ignored, and that, if if negotiations negotiations prove unsatisfactory, the CCF CCF will 1 on the launch their summer summer offensive, offensive. I same date, the orthe CCF the logistical logistical commands commands lofl.the CCF Third Third and and Fourth Field Field Armies informed informed General General Peng Peng of of the the movement movement of 80,000 new new "volunVolunUS Far Far East teers" fromManchuria Manchuria to to the the Korean front, East Command Command teers" from front. The US endorses the 8th Army warning that, should this report be true, no no endorses the 8th Army warning that, should this report be true, significant concessions concessions can can be be expected expected -- at at least in the political field. field. Further, thetime timegained gainedby bythe theenemy enemyduring during extended extended negotiations negotiations Further, the wouldpermit permit tthemto or would h e m t o concentrate forces equal to o r greater greater than than those those employed during the the April April offensive offensive and andto to construct construct and and repair repair forward employed during forward airfields airfields for close close air air support. support.
--
I
~
'2. Chiang Chiang Kai-shek Kai-shek expresses expresses his hisviews views on on Asian. Asian,. situation:
2 July 51
cease-fire and and armistice.
Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Kai-shek observed observed privately privately to the US Charge Charge at at Taipei on 30 June June that the US . Chinese Communists in Korea badly badly needed a respite respite and and quite quite likely likely would would agree to ,toa a
............................................................................................... : .~...----......~
NI
" . R
-3-
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED ATE: 19-Feb-2010 DATE: 19-Feb-2010
For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
FQR RELEASE ~PPROVED FOR ATE: 17-Feb-2010 [DATE: 17-Feb-2010 VpPROVED
HR70-14 HR70-14
I
.10.12_' _SECRET--
".B"
CHINA. Indications of Chinese Chinese Co Communist o r 3eDtember Indications of CHINA unist Brewrations Pre aratione f for Se tember
Operations. &F<tions.
Talk of o r *end of of preparationi preparations f or.ilend Of Amgust August 31nl'operat;ione l'Ivoperatione
Peiping, iin' n Peiplng, All land, land, sea, units have allegedly allegedly been ordered t to AU. Jea, and air u n i t s have o
,a iitiof ofreadiness readiness by by that t h a t date. data. The 68th b a r n e Division 68th b Airborne Division of 9,000 paratroopers o Antung from the Tientsin area in paratroopers llxr is repoyteqly reportedly en en route t to iits t s implementas implementation kion of of ais this directive directive. p k COMMENT: COMMENTt -This This is i e r the the latest &test in in a series serl of reports alleging Chinese Oonmplnist plans ffor o r eerded anded operation by the end of August.1951. Communist.plans operations Information Information obtained k o on n 2 2.July regarding an alleged 2 March conference of of North North Korean, Korean, Chinese Chinese Communist; Comunist, and officials conference and Soviet Soviet officials stipulated: stipulatedv.(1) (I)comPletion eomj?letlon of of border forts (presumably (presumably on the Korean Korean September.1951; of arm border) by September 1951; (2) (2) expansion of production in in Manchuria Manchuria arm production t to o Rrovlde provide for for 1,500,000 1,500,000 troop8 troopsby bySeptember September 1951; 1951(3) (3) dispateh.of dispatch of 500,000 Soviet.troops to Manchuria by the end of August 1951; and: (4) the Soviets are to complete preparations for World War,III by the.end of September 1951, if the Soviet cease-fire proposal of Julv is unsuc cessful. states that all lourtn.rield Army units located in Southeast China have been
Jim
ordered Ai achieve a state of combat readiness not later the. 15 September 1951; that a s ar comman een ssue o the wet Minh forces in Indochina. The deadline for the air build-up in &Nangtung, Southeast'China, is also stipulated for September of this year.. The Chineee.CoMmunists s are are genera generally accorded the the potentla1 u t u r e operation8 o r , several, of accorded potential for for f future operations h in any any one, oneor,several,of the the border border regions. regions, It It is i s believed t h a t the build-up fi that in Southeastern Southeaatern has been been primarily primarily of of a a defensive defensive nature nature during during recent recent months, montha, China has 'China but this t h i s does does not not preclude precluQe the t h e possibility poseibility of & laUnching Launching an an oft-rumpred oft-rumored but assault asaault into Srho Indochina. Indochina. Indications Indications of of continuing conkinUing; preparations preparationa in i n Manchuria and and Korea Korea tend tend te t~ support support reports reportrs of of Communist Communist intentions intentions Manchuria tb conduct further military Ildllta~y adventures in in this t h i s theatre t h e a t r e if if the-pending thewpendin$ to tonduct further adventurea negotiations Prove prove unsatisfactory. unsatisfactory. negotiations
.
TOP
For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
icr
.#
a %Possibly ftposaibly truen 6 trUe" report report dated dated 29 Nay that an additional 120,000 troopa drawn from the 1st 2nd and 3rd Field Armies are being prepared for service in Korea. these troops which are being formed into a new army (designation anknown).,were to move to Northeast china before 31 Nay. troops can be Moved from t4e. Peipinglientsin area of northeast China to Ule Yalu River within three days by available rail lines. ( 6 July 51). COMMEFT; Numerous reportsl.ndicate that the Chinese Communists have drawn replacements for.service in Korea from regional armies in all parts of China. Other reports have mentioned the formation Of a new field army, the 6th1 from the nucleus of the North China Area Army associated With the Peiping-Tientsin Area.
ialCC.tesereR.AtoteortedFodtoSeme_lal_Coreso
___TOP-SECRET-
8 8
HR70-14 HR70-14
-b
w:
. I
V
TO1_2_5_011,ET--
7 -sL\51
K
Cease-Fire.
nnmmpntia nn RheneR Attityld'n TemArdm
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: ,17-Feb-2010
For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
reports that President Rhee heads the group of responsible persons arousing public opinion against a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel. In reply to a Commission expression of opinion that after haVing 'so inflamed public opinion, the government will find it difficult to readjust its position on conclusion of a cease-fire, Rhee repeatedly stated "they (the Korean people) shall not accept a cease-fire." 1Khee sees the aituation clearly but assumes an extremist attitude from fear the National Assembly will be more extreme. The restraint urged by ranking US officials has been without apparent results. "after an initial disappointment, spirits will adjust themselves to the situation on eondition that there are some reasonable guarantees against renewed aggression." ( 6 July 51). COMMENT: With political rivalry in South Korea placing a premium on nationalistic statements, the Government has placed itself in a position from which extrication following a cease-fire will bring a lose of prestige0 reports that the ROK Cabinet has gone to such lengths as to consider running anti-cease-fire advertisements in US newspapers.
HRX5-74 HR7U-1-4
rn
SUEDE Te,113 SECRET SUEDhe

c
b
, ,
"
-3LA s
NR
2. '111Xnbassador '$&bassador Mucclo Muccio gives gives recommendations recommendations on on cease-fire cease-fire problems:

FAR EAST
I
I
US Ambassador commentUS Ambassador Muccio Muccioin inPusan, Pusan, commentirig onthe theproposed proposedcease-fire cease-fire talks, talks, warns hig on warns any arrangements arrangementsmade mqde should should be based that any on $he the premise preMise that that.no other settlement no other settlementof of territorial terrltbrialand andPolitical political Wilms iesues will be reached in the-foreseeable the ?oreseeable future. Zn.ordei more h order to t o make these these decisions decis$oqs morepalatable palatableto. to the the Republic of Korea .and.to.Asiatic *and.to .Asiatic public opinion, opinton, he recommend8 recommends that the Korean member be t4e given given a a proMinent.position promhent posittioh in the negotiations. negotiations.
I'
W i t h respect to to a a Possible.20 posSible 20 mile m i l e buffer bufferzone, zone, With Muccio cautions e creation Mucci cautions against against m the Creationof ofaathird thirdterritorial territorial entity in Korea administered by by non-Koreans, non-Korew, 'and and suggests suggests that that this this can can be be avoided avoided by by administered st Iineapproximately approximatelymidWay midway in i n the demilitarized demilitarizedzone zonewhich which designating aline
.
-9-
SUEDE SUEDE
APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
Tc/P' SECRET SUEDie SUEDM

1.
WOCJ administration of r e a n regimes. would permit permit .adininistration. of two twohalves halves by by the the adjoining adjoining h Korean regimes. that $outh South Korean, Korean public opinion woulcl line He adds that woultlfind find any any other other dividing line acceptable than. than the Parallel. Muccio Muccio also recommends that more acceptable the 38th 38th.Parallel.. neither the the 40,000 40,000 Korean of war war Who who were Korean prisoners prisoners of were impressed impressed into the North Korean Korean refugees over to. to the KOreanarmy army nor nor the the North North.Korean refugees be turned over Northern authorities, authorities against their will. will.
3.. Reports from various various sources sourcespoint point up up possibility of of late summer summer CommuCommu. nist onmatbns:

The reports are:
(a) (4
Reports from a variety of of sources speak speak of o f impending Communist impending Communistoperations operations in in the late of this year, possibly summer of possibly dependent dependent on of Red strategy during during the the Korean Korean success of cease-fire negotiations negotiations this thismonth. month.
While thereports reports are fragmentary by While the fragmentary and, by nature, beyond beyond possibility possibility of of confirconfir their nature, mation, their general general agreement agreement in in the mation, of date date may may possibly be significant. significant. matter of
t ad i s prevalent prevalent in Les talk is in Peiping Peiping military military cir circles of preparations for operations at "the end of of August, 1951. 1951. " of August, all land sea and air forcesin in Communist Communistair forces China China have have been been ordered ordered to to put put themselves in&@tate of of readiness by by that date. date. The in,4,ptate s 68th Airborne Airborne Division, Division,9,000 9,000strong, strong, i is supposedly en Tientsin to to Antung. Antung. Supposedly en route route from Tientsin
I
b ) r T l s conference of a (b) r a a n , Chinese Chinese Communist Commun st and an Russian officials o icials on on 2 2 March March North B Korean, agreed to to the the dispatch dispa@hof of 500, 500,000 Soviet troops Manchuria by the agreed 000 Soviet troops to Manchuria adding that end of of August, August, adding that Soviet SovietRussia Russia should shouldbe beready ready for for a possible
-4-
TOP S U E D E SECRET SUEDE
.-
TOP SECRET SUEDie

b
World W War bythe theend endo ofSeptember, September,provided providedthat thatcease-fire cease-fire proproWorld a r by f posals posals in in Korea, foreseen foreseenfor forthe themonth month of of July, should should fall. fail.
(4 the (c) the recent establishment of of an entirely new n e i Soviet Army Sovietheadquartersat headquarters at at least least Army level in northern northern Manchuria. Manchuria.
, , I )
all (d) 'fourth A u r t h Field FieldArmy Army units units in in Southeast China have been ordered to reach a a state stateof of .combat combat readiness not not later laterthan than 15 15 September. September. 1
* e h ) - (e) (e) : [ the deadline Kwangtung, SoutheastChina, China,is is set for Sepfor the the air air build-up build-up ih in Kwangtung, Southeast September..
The Chinese Chinese Communists Communists are Comment: The capable of capable of operations operations in in any any one oneor or several several of of the the border border regions. regions. It is prii s believed believed that that the the build-up build-up in in Southeastern Southeastern China has been primarily defensive during recent months, but this does not preclude defensive months, but this does not preclude o f Indications of launching assaultinto intoIndochina. Indochina, Indtcations launching the oft-rumored assault continuing build-up in in Manchuria Manchuriaand andKorea Koreatend tendto tosupport support reports reports continuing build-up that failure result in failureof of the thepending pending negotiations negotiations would would result Inaanew new CommuCommunist onslaught nilst onslaught in Korea.
NR
-5 5-
-TOP-SECRETSUEDE -SUEDE
%Old
--S-",k
1)D
_.1012.._SEOREr
HR70-14
NR
.11BH IlBll
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: ,31-Mar-2010 31-Mar-2010
To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit our website

NE_SECRET6.
The Effect of 'The of Kore K o r s War ar on on-Ci lian Mo ale. In a conversathe US Minister Mfnistei in.SaigOn i n Saigon a a t i o n with with ' the.US tion r ] s t a t e d that-Casualty that 'casualty lists lists and defeats were stated and news news of of Chinese defeats were being carefully uhhhe!Ld from the the public. beim parefull;y1fthlwidfrom public. Wounded Wounded have have been been kept out of the'heavily the heavily populated populated areas areas of of China China proper proper even at the the expense expense of of of denying them b e t t e r hospital hospital facilities. facilities. thembetter o probeed o Korea, t h a t %olwteersn appear that."volunteersil appear reluctant reluctant tto proceed tto Korea, and and described described the general general population population as being being completely completely opposed to t o and and disillusioned disillusioned the with the Red regime, with the'Red'regime. In In addition, addition, Y k h i this s opposition lacks any e f f e c t i v e means for a a successful successful counterrevolution. countbmwolution. Only effective-means Only the the student student and some some worker worker groups groups evince evince any-enthusiasm any enthusiaerm f o r the:current t h e current regime, regime, and for which apparently apparently is is capable capable of of enduring, endurina, in i n the t h e absence absence of of outside outside Which h interferendp, t e r f erend,e, for decades decades to t o come. come e COMMENT$ The above observations hav! been supported by a variety COMMENT:.The above observations.have beeh supported a grea great.variety of-sources,, of sources,, A A recent recent report report on on the the a r r i v a l of of Korean casualties casualties in in arrival the Shanghai etnphasized the the precautions o limit contacts Shanghai area area ehphasized precautions taken taken t to limit contacts with the the local local Populace. populace. with
.' i
I
'
. .
I
!
!
I
!
\
j
I
I
MREA. Taetical Considerations Point to 15-25 JuLyStf2agya. A significant increase'in the numbe south-bound enemy; vehieles sighted approaching the battle area has occurred Luring the past few days. the vplums of enemy vehicle traffic approaches that which 13receeded preVious enemy offenabies A sharp elimb in Vehicle sightings-indicative of reinforcement and resupP17--is a familiar step in the hostile pre-offensive pattern. purew a c t i c a l considerations suggest purely t tactical considerations suggest that the period 15-25 July is the most likely for enemy resumption ofthe.offensive. Although the enemy is capable of earlier Offensive action, present indications point to continuance of screening actions and active defense. Furthermore on unsuccessful termination of armistice negotiations prior to 25 July will enhance the probability of an offensive immediately following termination. whereas prolonged negotiations (one month), ending Unsuccessfully, may. dilctate a continued defensive attitude into middle or late August. t h e enemygs @ ybe Ithe enemyls main main effort m mAy expected in.the west and west-central sectors along the previoubly employed axis converging on Seoul with a secondary effort in the Central .sector towards ehunchon and a supporting'attack in the eastern sector.
H K(0-1 m14 HN
e'
SECTION 1 1 cSOVIST) (SQVIET)
I
1
1
aNERAL. jaaratisuagg nB1t ($HEEALo W c at4 ~ ~ J t e dE e etimate igadiegliropdB_EI.iffszloaeltructKorean ProDosed Buffer Obstruct Korean
Settlement. Conmnrnfst "peaceful" sst%lement settlement iin Korea a are Communist proposals proposals-for for a "peaceful" n Korea re Qettlement. -deseation Of h hOstilities,-withdrawal of opposing force8 forces and t the ~sasation of o s t i l i t f e s , withdrawal of h e establishment befer zone of the the 38th 38th ParalleL. Parallel. of a buffer zoneof of 10 10kiilometers lometere on on either e i t h e r side of COMMENTt A An the Communists COmmuniate estimate COMMENT: n indication tthat h a t the that buffer zone might conatitute obataple i in current negolianegotia't h a t the proposed buffe constitute an obstacle n ourrent tions comentary, In this this commentary, t l o n s was contained contained in i n a 4 July July broadeaet broadcast from fromMersaw. Warsaw, In Warsaw stated Radio Warsaw s t a t e d that t h a t although although the US agreed to t o ceaee-fire cease-fire negotiatione negotiations bebeits in Korea, already there there were were indications indidations cause of i t s "hopeless "hopeless situation" i n Korea, h i s allegaallegethat talks. afrone proof of of t thie t h a t it "intends to sabotage" the the t a l k s , Cited aa.one waa the US intention t to zone, not on both both aides sides of the tion was o "create noreate a buffer zonep 38th 38th Parallel, P p a l l e l , but but only only on on the the northern northern side.". sideo"
-~ ~
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE
ATE: ATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009 IDPPROVED
For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

1.
r.
1 I
. .
News,
TO1---EGLIZT
NR
'!"B" llgll
CHINA. Burmese Ambassadorta Ambassador'sViews Views on onSemslakttgam...0 C o m d s t China. 0Nyint Hyant.Thein, Thein, Burmese Burmese Ambassador to Communist Cornmuniet China China and and previously previously to t o Nationalist Nationaiist China, who departed departed the US US Consul Consul General General in i n Hong H ~ n Kong. g Kong. Peiping Psipilag in i n mid-June, mLd-June, has has been been interviewed interviewed by the would like" like" to to The Tie Ambassador Ambssador offered offered the the opinions opinions that that (1) (1 Peiping Peipirq "really would end Korean fighting, as finds end the the Korean a8 the the regime regime has has taken a "heavy "heavy beating" boatfig" and f inds it "increasingly to explainAhe inadequacy "increaeingly difficult" difficult" t o expLain.,the inadequacy of of Soviet S o v i e t aid, aid, but but (2) (2) Peiping Pelping is i s unlikely unlike4 to t o agree agree to t o any any terms terms not not providing providing for for withdrawal withdrawal of of UN UN forces. f o r t e s ; (3) (3) the t h e regime regiae is i s "firmly n f i A y established eatabllehed in in power," power," but but (4) ( 4 ) Peiping Peiping will will probably probably be be too too busy busy with internal i n t e r n a l reConstruction reconstruction for f o r the next few few years to to devote much energy energy to t o furthering furthering Communist Communiet aims aim in i n Southeast Southeast Asia; and and (5) (5) the t h e Indian Indian Ambassador, Ambaasador, Panikkar, Panikkar, has has become become, "mbrose "moroseand and abstracted,"ie.artly abstracted," partly as a re result of been misled" regarding.Peiping's aa c!f having h a v i n a b s e n "comnletely 'IC regarding Pefping's policy policy toward toward Tibet. COMMENT: Tibet. ,GCNWl "T The Burmese Burmese Ambassador, who who It is is predicted Korea7;73-Seen predicted Chinese intervention iin n Korea,' has been generally generally reliable. reliable. It not known known on on what evidence evidence the the first first of of the the Ambassador's Ambassordor's opinions opinions is i s based. based. However, weeks bas Homver, Peiping's Peipingqs propaganda propaganda for for the t h e past past three three vieeke hae provided strong strong evidence evidence that t h a t Peiping Psiping will will not not modify modify its i t s basic basic original original demand demand for for withdrawal withdram1 of A h s t all a l l sourtes saupces agree that t h a t the t h e Peiping Peipfng all foreign foreign forces f a r c e 8 from from Korea. Korea. Almost of all regime is regims< I s stable, stable, in i n the the sense sense that that internal i n t e r n a l opposition opposition forces forces are are not not capable capable of challenging challenging its i t s authority authority in i n any any significant significant area. area. The The Ambassador's hbaseadorts fourth fourth point point appears appear8 doubtful, doubtful, as as Peiping Peiping has ha8 demonstrated damonstrated in i n Korea Korea that t h a t it it plades places the t h e advancement advancement of o f international international Communiam Colmnunism above above its its domestic donesltic objectives. objectives. .0ther sources have reported Pahikkar's Patikkar's increasing Other sotwoes 1,ncreasing alienation alienation from from the the Peiping Peiping regime. regime.
CHINA. Ambassador to

7
1
~~
-m
4 1,
TktET
NR
' t B " KOREA N o r t h Korean Korean I 1 Corps' Corps1 Rehabilitation Rehabilitation Apparently Amarenth Completed. Comleted. 11130 KOREA. North Far E h s t .Command' reports tha't $of a Far Eibt4ommand..repoortS that inthrkogation interrogation,of a lorth North Korean Korean POW POW
recently captured captured six s i x miles miles southeast mutheast of of Kaesong Kaesoag has has identified identified the the recently North North Korean Korean 8th 8th Division. Division, According According to the the prisoner, prlsoner, the North Korean Oth &h Division's Division's current current mission mission is I s to t o defend defend the the Keepong gaesong peninsula. pe&aU. The prisoner prisoner fUrther stated that the Northl _flivision_itLdefendinriesong esong River Riverwest west of of Kaesong. Kaesong,
COMMENT: This report indicates that the Barth liorean L Corps has been reintroduced on on the the front front after en reintroduced month i in Kumehon area area presumably presumably having spent more than a month n the Kumchon for for rehabilation and and reequipment. reequipment;. Press Press reports reports on on the t h e presence presence of armed armed troops troops surrounding eurrounding the the Kaesong kesong cease-fire ceaas-fire negotiation negotiation of site tend to t o support support the'POW the'P.W report. Thie change i n the the disposition site tend report. .This change in disposition the same same pattern pattern is as that that displayed displayed immediately lmmedately prior prior to to follorvs follows the the offeneive which M e h wa8 led off off hy the North Korean Korean I I the 22 22 April offensive was led Cqrpd Corps'. attack attack acroas across the the Imjin Rivar. River.

win
SUED
..*
S
N
m
I
Korean s settlement: 3. Burmese Ambassador Ambassador comments comments on Korean e : ,
The Burmese Ambassador to Communist Communist China, who left Petping Peiping in in mid-June, mid-June, has informed informed who left the US US Consul General in i n Hong Hong Kong that he believes the Peiping regime "really "really would would like" to Korea, as as the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists have taken to end end the fighting flghting in Korea, a "heavy "heavy beating" and find it "increasingly Yncreasingly difficult" difficult" to to explain explain to to the the ChiChihownese people will, howpeople the the inadequacy inadequacy of of Soviet Soviet aid, aid, He adds that Peiping will, ever, ever, continue continue to t o insist instston on the the withdrawal withdrawal of of all foreign forces from from Korea. Korea.
IPeipiu Peiping appears genuinely desirous desirous of at this time. o f an an end end to the Korean cOnflict conflict at
4. a m
1.
Apsn Armed Forces Security AF~A~S) Security Agency 11 1 1 July 51 51 SUEDE Adepa,1114.7
If A-A,J24) -ILLt
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE :)ATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-201 0 DATE: 14PPROVED
For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

FAR EAST
Comment: I Comment:
11/
III
It
-f
A North +rean Korean message to the "Commander'Commanderin-Chief, ') " signedWart01, " reporting on signedw,N&n$, '' on the 10 July July afternoon afternoon meeting meethigof ofthe thecease-fire cease-fire negotiators, stated stated that that "we l1werefused their
-4 4 --
SUEDE TOP SECRET SUEDE
-T*P-SECRET SUEDke
propositions and and proposed ours, ours," r1 and and concluded conlcluded that the meeting "was 1rwa8 " going nicely nicely for for our side. "
: The North North Korean Comment: The Koreanmessage message prepreto presentation presentation of of the the Communist Communist demands sumably refers refers to demands summarized summarized by Peiping Beiping Radio on 10 10 July: (a) (a) "cessiktion "cessation of of hostile hostile military actions of,. every everysort... sort.. simultaneous withdrawal Communist and of... "; "; (b)@) simultaneous withdrawal ofof Communist and VIC armed forces forces to to a a distance distance of of 10 10 kilometers kilometers from the 38th wallel, Raral lel, and, at the @e same time, discussion discussionof of exchange exchange of prisoners; and and (c) (c) the withWithcfrawal ( ' i n the shortest shortest possible possible time, time, " '* of of all all fore1g4 for&!j forces, drawal from Korea, Korea, "In forces. Peiplng Peiping Radio Radio has has emphasized emphasizedthe thelast last of of these these demands demandsfor for several several
'
months. months,

-6 5-
- T P S E W T SUEDE SUEDE -TOP-SEeRET
Approved For %wise 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A*196840140001-4

TOP SECRET
49286
39
COPY NO.

DAILY DIGEST
STATE, DIA reviews completed. (NAVY referral transferred to DIA.)
For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org

2.
3.
NOTE:
1.
This suMmary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
items indicating SovietCommunist intentions or capabilities
IIBU
important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities other information indicating trends and potential developments
DC"
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003001400014
Date:
JUL 1 2 1951
Approved For Relisse 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004106140001-4
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B"
USSR. Purborted Preponderance of Women Specialists. A recent survey of the Soviet Presa indicates that the.institutes of.the USSR Academy of Sciences, none than a third of the scientific workers are Women. ApproS mately 380,000 women are said to be working as engineers and technicians, while over a million labor in the public health system, The same source reveals that the number of women engineers and technicians has increased by 50,000 since 1950, with many participating widely' in government adminis tration and many elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSRl'union republics and autonomous republics, In addition, 500,000 women are said tobe deputies of the local Soviets, Iknense progress is claimed for women in the national republics, as for eXample it the Mrkmen SSR where they account for 70% of all workers employed in the public health system, In therEareloFinnish it is Teported that 90% of all medical doctors are women, that hundreds of others are engineers, agronomists, and zootechnicians, and that the great majority of elementary and riddle school teachers are women, Similarly, more than 500,000 women in the Belorussian SSR are said to'be specialists with secondary or higher education, and in the Kazakh SSR, 42.2% of all specialists with a higher education are women. COMMENT: Misreported preponderance of Soviet women specialists may be the.result of retaining large numbers of men in the Anny, thereby releas ing to women the numerous specialists' positions available in other fields.
25X1
'A'
25X1
EASTERN EUROPE. FINLAND, Soviet Submarine Possibly Sunk Off Helsinki,. According to information received by the US Naval Attache Helsinki fram Finnish naval sources, three Soviet destroyers and approximately seven emaller craft have been conducting =determinable operations in a 36 square mile area off Helsinki since 2 July, The Finniah sources specullte that a Soviet submarine has sunk in this area, since the operation involves flag and buoy markers, The Naval Attache notes that a 70000 ton car o vessel was sunk by a mine in approximately the same area in 1941. IELSET: No fUrther information is ava on this operation beyond that presented by the US Naval Attache in Finland, who reports that more information may be available about 14 JulY.
25X1
B". VVNGARK. Humaarv Advises US To "Nipd Its Own Business". In a note transgTeSaing diplomatic usage, the Hungarian Government , has categorically rejected the US note of 7 July labbling it a "brazen" attempt to inter fere1n the internal affairs of the Hungarian Republic, The note declares that the open support granted by the Peoples US to Hungarian Fascists And all other, enemies of the Hungarian people, as well as the use (*the American legation in Budapest asworking a spy center, is rendering normal relations between the two countries difficult. Instead of rectifying con, ditiOns in the US where, according to the note, the most elementary rights of freed= are being flouted and a campaign of terror is being waged, the
TOP SECRET
1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79101146A0003001400014
d
Approved For Re lesse 2002110122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W140001-4
TOP SECRET
i COMMENT: In its 7 JulY note the US announced that it would disdontinue its cultural And inforthation activities in BUdapest. However, the US rejected the Hungaridn allegations-regarding the spying activities of its Legation staff in Budapest and labeled the Hungarian charges as a braien and futile atteript to deStroy the deep friendship and confidence of the Hungarian people that the US will not cease to concern itself with their plight.
I
mind ita /aim business."
US Government is attempting to teach the Hungarian people a lesson on baaan rights. The note aplvisma that "thn Onverment of the US better
25X1

TOP SECRET
2 Approved For Release 2002/10122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300140001-4
r,
Approved For Rio liaise 2002/10122 : CIA-RDP79T01146ASS150140001-4

TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (Eastern)
25X6
"B"
MAIAYA. New Political Party to Play Sic Alia,. The US Consul in

Kuala Lumpur estimates that an'extremely important period in Malayan political affairs is beginning. This period was heralded by the announcement in early June of a non-cormunal (i.e., no restrictions as to race or creed) political party by Dato Onn bin Jaffars a skilled politician and recognized sp oke sman of the Malay population. 0=1 s "Independence of Malaya Party" aims at self-government within ten years, the "Malayaniza.tion" of the civil service, and welcomes members from the three major racial comeunities of MalayaChinese, Indians, and Malays. There are indications that Onn cleared his proposals with the British authorities), who, the Consul speculates, nay fear lest outright ppposition to the apparently inevitable trend toward self-determination encourage extremism and the ossible complete loss of the British stake in Malaya. I I COMKENT: Dato Onn reportedly intends to resign from his present position as president of the exclusively Malay "United Malays Nationalist 'Organization." Through his chairmanship of the Federation Governmentos Rural and Industrial .Development Authority he is in a strong position to win popular support for the Independence of Malaya.. Party.
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002110/22 : dIA-RDP79T01146A000300140001-4
Approved For Rao Ilse 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0994;101400014

TOP SECRET
25X6;
MOn
INDOCHINA. French Proposals Delev Signing of ECA .Pact. Proposals for textbal changes in the draft US,Vietnam bilateral ECA: agreement have been transmitted to US EMbassy in Feria by the French Foreign French Economic Counselor in Indochina to Office and by the the US Legation. Although most of the dhanges proposed are of minor importance, the proposals made in Saigon differ somewhat from those made in Pariss a situation which will. delay signing of the agreement fcr Several more weeks. The Legation attaches considerable importance to an amendment proposed by the Economic Counselor which might be construed as giving the French n v?to power over the use of counterpart fundei.
25X1
ITCH
25X1
It 'COIMENT: The Vietnamese g orally consider that the French are cape e of any diplomatic.maneuver. the French c011eborated They recall that with Ho Chi Minh in 1946 in the forcible of nen-Communist organizations in Tonkin. Reported negotiation suppression over a period of Several feelers years hails failed to materialize.
Hints of Cease-fire in Indochina Discuseed:Consul Blancke reports fram Hanoi.that the regional Red Cross delegate has asked if the Consulate could send a code for him to Geneva. Legatidn Saigon has queried message Blancke whether he believes In this connection, the proposed code message is concerned strictly With might relate to such broader political Red Cross matters or whether it matters as prospects for negotiation The Legation would also like to know why the Red Cross does not wish to use French channels and notes that some elements of public opinion; including Bao Dai in Vietnam, fear a possible French-Viet Ranh Compromise settlement if an armistice is obtained in Korea. The leader of the opposition party in Saigon states Dai Viet 25X1 that his party is greatly concerned over a repert that the French-Vietnamese authorities are prepared to offer large concessions to Ho Chi Minh in return for actual Chinese Communist invasion. cessation of hostili.
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10124: CIA-RDP79T01146A000300140001-4
Approved For ReRnie 2002/10122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0993Iy140001-4

TOP SECRET
25X1
"C"
25X1
"C"
Ja Ille al A Govenunent committee invetigatj.ng about midway between southeast island situated &wee, and Western Honshu) has that from 300-400 Koreans estimated are entering Japan of the illegal entrants illegally each month. Most po tical assignments, a e believed to be Communists with important most Of which is leftis COMMENT: The Korean minority c ne sas to Japan's internal security.. idant threat In addition to the approximately legal Koreanresidental 600,000 it is believed that there 400,000 illegal Korean entrants are from 200,000 to now residing in Japan.
"CP
,
.
JAPAN. leftist Koreans Enter
originating in the US, on the unification of Korea after the armistice, are provoking reaction amongst the already a sharp over-sensitiVe ROK officials. tend to support the worst fears Such stories of the ROK on the results of the armistice, 22.14.4RT: There apparently is a widespread ng among ou feeloreans tha7t-The UN may be preparing in the lurch in an overwhelming to leave them rush for "peace." There is that a future settlement apprehension may result in a withdrawal of UN time Mien ROK forces are not troops at a sufficiently strong to guarantee security against the nation's a 'better armed, although Possibly numerically smaller, North Korean force.
FAZIO reports that Semi ve on Score-of Unification4.AMbassador speculative stories, political
KOREA. ROK Officials
25X1
Agency- is Subflended. The Japaneae (hay 12 raided thearer-critirreit-Fe; police on ordered its operations Agency throughout Japan and suspended, The police was operating for the Japanese announced that "Reng ors Communist Party. comp Rengo the only important leftist news agency been the major disseminator n apan, has of ComMunist-slanted press.. Since the Communist Party news to the leftist iS still legal in Japan, Rengo's suspension presumably is based on an ordinance directed inimical to the Otcupation." at "acts This is the latest of a series downs on the CommOnist of crack"AKAHATA" one year ago.. press which started with SCAP.Is suspension of
19,1241allsym
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002110/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003001400014
Approved For Rlikeese 2002110122 : CIA-RDP79T01146Ab96400140001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3 (ESTERS)
25X6
"C"
New- Wage=Prica Padt 'Nearly ReadY. Negotiations for Austria? s fifth wage-price agreement are' reported o' be in the final stage, with .laat details being settled by the Economic LarectOrate (a group consisting-Of all-but two members' of the Cabinet); .:The rent question will be ixistpond until fall. Chancellor Figl has urged-the people to rethin. calm and confident, 'asserting that the Soviets will not back Communist
ASSTRIL
25X1
25X6
Last September, the 'fourth wage-price agreement ain of Communist-led .demonatratians, strikes,. lockouts, end workers.9...ultimatUms, without direct Soviet support. Non-Communist suppert Was obtained because. the eletenth-hour agreement had left no time' to' explain' the pact to the workers. The Present negotiations, hoireter, haVe received mUch publicity. It is not expected that the Soviets will
COMMENTs
effortb tO. j.ncite riota againat the new agreement,
25X1
'
much trouble when the agreement'is announced.
back the Connunist Party,. which,by itself, will not be able to create
TOP SECRET
Approved For Relbssie 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A060496140001-4

TOP SECRET
25X6
awl
French,Uneffected by Iranian Oil Shutdown. refining companies claim that the Iranian shutaown will French oil have no appreci able effect on the Crude oil supply situation in France Since Itan supplies only ten petcent oflrench teciditemente. 51) COMMENT: Iraq is the sourde of almoat threeiourths of French netroleum.i*orts. Before the war the-Westetn of Fret:dela oil, but increased US coneumlition Hemiephete sUpplied Most and French restrictions on dollar_imports revereed-this situation. The-Fre/Joh have been hope ful of increasing oil imports from Latin America,howeVer because they are afraid that hostilities might cut off their Near East supply.
1
25X1
"BP
25X
ITALY. tiVirDefenge Bill Pa:aide LOIset Chamber by Narroflote. The ' CTIZZer of Deputies ef the Italian Parliament approved the controvetsial civil defense bill by the Close Vote of 258 to-240. Since the Christian DaModratic Party hae-.306 defmties and cancount upOn another 12 Republican &Sled, it-ie cleat some orthe-MeMbere Of the-GOvetrmenat Voted against it. These elements 'are belieVed:to.belong mostly to a left4ring group a the Christian Demodrats who feel a more active pregram ofedenomic and social reform should be undertaken. This situation, and,the decline in Christian Democratic strength in the recent electione, convince Observers that important changeb in the Cabinet are urgent... L COMMENT: HThe narro* margin by which the ense bin haon Tiarared,by the lower houSe indidates Civil not Only that dissatisfaction axistsin the Christian Democratic Party, but that. the Christian Democrats are unlikely henceforth to obtain the support of loyaropposition patties gs easilY as they have in the past. 'The strong opposition to the bill is motivated by fear of the additional polite powers it gives-touDefenee Banister Pgcciardi and Interior Minister Scelba. It will therefore be increaSingly difficult for Premier De Gapperi to retain these two Ministers in the Cabinet.
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002110124: CIA-RDP79T01146A000300140001-4
Approved For Rd %Pike 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0963,90140001-4

TOP SECRZT
"B"
25X6
TOP SECRET
a Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300140001-4
strenuous efforts by the US with British and French support, the Swedish-ball-bearing manufacturer SKF, with the tacit approval of the Swedish Government, is not accepting any new orders from the USSR or its satellites for non-standard bearings -(socalled strategic bearings) tsee- CCI Daily Digest, 26 Feb 51 and .2 and is also applying the : tri-paktite forthula of size limitation Mar 51), to standard bearings. Failure of the cocom countries to abide by the restrictions kill undoubtedly result in Swedengs relaxing its controls if confronted by a Polish demand for bearings in return for vitally
needed coal.
POSSible Relaxation of Restrictions on Ball-be ore gn e, re er g r o o a repo a e French-have agreed to -ship strategic ball...bearings to Poland, implied that Sweden might be-obliged to do likewise 'then a new trade agreement is negotiated in October. / I COMMENT: Currently, AS a result of
SWCDEN.
TSF-Tiedis
25X1
Approved For Rallotse 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0043430140001-4

4
TOP SECRET
"B"
_
25X1
I
"B" SAIL Spanish' Ptetender'Denies Negotiations with France en Royal SIT6CZesion. Spanish Pretender Don Juan categoricallnenied to a.US
official in Lisbon that General Franco had aeked him to renounce his rights tothe throne of Spain in favor of his 13-year old son, Prince Juan Carlos. Labeling the story a typicalTranco "trial balloon", Don Juan.said that Francoes representatives in Lisbon "obviously woadmot have the temerity to make suah a proposal to me at they know full mell its rejection would be a foregone conclusion." The Pretender expressed the belief-that Franco is now banking heavily oh US military and economic aid to bolster his.prestige. If Franco.receives this aid, Don Juan added, he.will.continne. his "stalling tactics" and postpone indefin tel A'oractiCal consideration of:the subject of royarsdoceotion. IMOMUENTI Doh Juanes reaction wee fully anticipa e (see WI Dailytigest, 26 June 51 and 11.July 51). Any genuine attempt by Franco, te seek a rapprochement with the Spanish monarchist Oppbeition woad represent a desperate 'neve to forestall the threat to'his regime that:Ageuld-reaultfremlfailin44.0:Obtais4jubittential US'ilonamicrahl
-
De Gaaperi Links Tri-partite Trieste Declaration and Atlantic Amid shouts of "Viva Trieste" and heated questioning by members Fral parties ip theSenate, PreMier De Gapperisstated that (1) Italy cen'Only fellow the policy of the Atlantic Pact, of thidh the tri-partite declaration of March1948 about Trieste is an integral part and (2) Italy desires to solve.the Trieste problem by direct hegotiatien mdth Ytgoitlavia. He rejected prOPOCals for the denuriciation of the peace treaty in retaliatiOn fer-AMGes cutting Off-orTriestine courts from Italian judicial authority, and said that the Government Would try all possible sautions _ _ not exanding an appeatethe Hague International CoOrt. De Gasperi minimiied other bopplaintt voieed aout Trieste in the Senate. Political circles in Roimainterpretthe linking,Of Trieste and the Atlantic Pact as a morning that Italygsnontinned s4herence to the Atlantic Pact might possibly become doubtful if Trieste is not returned to May. Meanwhile, it dpriears that Christian Democratic leaders and nationalists'in Trieste pyig nrnmntinp the current-agitetion 125X1 : In defending the Government's policy tomera Pet us the Trieste ibsterfflasperi appears (1) to have reMained within the formula propoeed by the US$ UK and. France for the solution of this issue and (2) to be cencerned that gromdng lapprocheraent' between Sugoslairia and the West ine be made at the expense Of Italy. In the absence of iniminent xmr any solution of the Trieste ism:is not acceptable to the Italians, moUld strengthen neutralist and nationalistic elements end threaten the stability of the Government.'
Pact.
I
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Reigate 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0t990140001-4
39
TOP SECRET
G a_
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
JUL 12 1951

TOP SECRET
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
Approved For Relaste 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOZ300140001-4

TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGFZICY
25X1
12 Juiv 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"Bu IRAN. rt,-/x_s_Ex..1,,tILowiv.rankanReortedPresentedtoMalis for Ratification, Press reports from Tehran state that Prime
25X1
25X6
Minister a Parliament urging ratification of the Export-Import Bank Lo an. I CONMENTg Although Mossadeq has stated in the past a Iran's income from Lr oil resources should make all'foreign loans unnecessary :he has repeatedly indicated his interest in this loan in his conversations with US Ambassador Grady, If Parliament does ratify the loan, which has been available since last September (see Daily Digest 12 Jul 51), the Export-Import Bank will be placed in a difficult position, There is no assurance at present that income from the Oil will be available to service the loan. Failure to extend the loan, however, will lead to charges by Iran that the US is applying economic pressure'in support of the UK and will presumably further weaken Iranian confidence in the DS,
bill
In
25X1
TOP SECRET
5X6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79101146A000300140001-4
11/4
Approved For Re le*
201OP: aSEGE1 ETA00041901300013
25X1
13 July 1951
25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENTNO.
I/
43/4
El DECLASSMED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTHadt 0.
.FEL'AEWLR:
NO CHANGE IN CLASrr
-Y-,-pgaetr
DATIV
25X1 25X1
Office of Current Intelligence

25X1
DOS review(s) completed.

DIA review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
Approved For Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79700975A0003001 30001-3
25X1A
SUMMARY
USSR
1. 2.
USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments (page Soviet air display reveals new plane types (page 3).
3).
25X1
5.
6.
Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed (page 5). US Ambassacbr regards solution of receipt problem as key to Iranian oil settlement (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
Renewed European Army talks are encouraging (page 7).
25X1A

NEAR EAST
Approved For Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79700975A000300130001-3
25X1A
Appr0ved For Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030 130001-3
USSR
25X1A 1-
USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments:
25X1
are trying to inject both political and territorial aspects into the armistice talks, despite Gromyko's emphasis that such topics were to be avoided.
Comment: Communist propaganda and Peiping Radio's cease-fire proposals indicate that the Communists are attempt--thg to negotiate a return to the division of Korea along the 98th Parallel in order to avoid making concessions on this point in subsequent distussions on a general settlenient. Military preparations point to a Commuhist intention to continue hostilities if they Pail to secure their objective by negotiation. There are intlications that if a cease-fire is achieved Communist demands concerning Formosa, the UN, and the Japanese peace treaty will be advanced at subsequent political discussions in addition to the already explicit demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea.
25X1A
2,
Soviet air display reveals new plane types:
The US Air Attache in Moscow reports getting good long-distance photographs of the new four-engined bomber featured in the 8 July air display. fle estimates the plane to be anethird larger than the TU-4, Soviet version of the B-29, with a long B-36 type fuselage, a sitigle high tail and tractor propellors.
I
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-R0P79100975A000300130001-3
-Deputy Foreign Minister Bogomolov maintained that the Soviet Government is not involved in the Korean affair, and that an armistice was for the military commanders to'conclude. When asked his views of final settlement, togomolov confined himself to saying that the first step was an armistice and that often the first step was the most difficult to take. Ambassador kirk comments that the Chinese and North Korean Communists apparently
Approved Fo r Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00030 130001-3
25XLA
The demonstration included a total of 490 aircraft with six confirmed new types of aircraft, five probable new types and two modifications. Althnugh for the.prasent'the Soviets apparently have adopted the MIG-15 lisitheir standard jet fighter-interceptor, four new jet fighteeprototyPes were demdnstrated. Three of the four were swept-wing planes similar to and perhaps developed from types displayed in the 1949 air show.
The appearance of nine gray twin-jet aircraft and nine gray MIG-15's further suggests that some units of the Soviet Navy have received jet aircraft.

-425X1A
25X1
25>ASroved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030013
01-3
25X1
25X1A
5. Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed:

I

NEAR EAST
the USSR has returned to Iran the 12.6 million dollars in gold that it took from the Iranian Bank during World War U. It is ziottiwn whether the USSR also returned the eight million dollars claimed
25X1
25X1
-525X1A
25gpAoved Fo r Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300 30001-3
by Iran for war-time advances, supplies.and services rendered to the Soviet Union. The us.Embassy in Moscow comments that, in view of the Iranian Government's.neectfor revenue to,replace oil royalties, such a move on the part of the USSR would be designed to stiffen the Iranian Government's attitude on the oil. issue.
Comment: There is no evidence that the USSR has actually returned or agreed to return the gold to Iran, or that there has been progress in the financial negotiations which have been taking place between Iran and the USSR. According to Ambassador Grady,an Iranian delegate to these financial talks flatly denied on 6 July recent Iranian press rumors that some agreement with the USSR had been reached.
25X1A
6.
US Ambassador regards solution of receipt problem as key to Iranian oil settlement:

The US Ambassador has stressed again the importance of solving the problem of the receipts for tanker shipments as a means of breaking the deadlock in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dispute with Iran. To date the British have not conceded the rightof the Iranians to collect receipts on oil shipments, even with the reservation that they were signed without prejudice to the rights of the AIOC. The Ambassador states that he does not believe that the British would be sacrificing their fundamental rights under these circumstances, and that such an agreement would expedite negotiations on other matters., The Ambassador expresses the opinion that if the British are endeavoring to force the Iranians to terms by keeping them without oil revenue funds, such a policy is most dangerous.
25X6
25X1A
25X1A
Approved F or Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300 130001-3
25X1A
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Renewed European Army talks are encouraging:

The Paris European Army talks have been given new impetus by the presence of Chancellor Adenauer's chief security adviser Theodor Blank. French and German differences now appear less irreconcilable. Although the chief French representative was not authorized to offer concessions on the size of the, proposed units and the level of their integration into a European Army, he clearly left the way open for a later French concession by suggesting that this question be referred back to the governments.
Comment: Although no basic changes in the French position on Germany's defense contribution are likely before Secitember, influential officials in the Forsign atice are revealing greater determination to press on toward mutual Western agreement on this question. Bonn has shown a similar determination by sending Blank instead of his subordinates to Paris.
25X1A
However, Blank's proposal to start raising a German contribution to NATO on the basis of the report on the recent Allied-German talks at Petersberg -- while the Paris conference on a European Army pursues its "long and arduous" work -- was flatly rejected by the French representative.
Approved For ReleMeT
Q426 :SEGRIELA006308150001-1
15 July- 1951
5X1

DOCUMENT NO
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH'seleNti
DATEfrat-4
DECLASSIFIED
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. y
tao t
25X1 25X1
REVIEWER:

25X1
DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
5)(1 A
Approved Fo Release 2003109126 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030 0150001-1
SsithaMAR Y
GENERAL
I. Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected
Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philippines (page 3). 3. tGerman support of Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis -Peen weaken2. 4.
by US (page 3).
ing (page 4).
Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers (page 5)
5.
South Korean Prime Minister suggests that President Truman reassure

Korean people (page 5).
25X1
7.
Burmese Commander-111,0Mo/ andSq.cintsitstinconlift wage 0).

NEAR EAST-AFRICA
8.
25X1
Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising

opposition (page 7).
10.
Communists linked to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government

(page 8).
FAR EAST
25X1
25X1A
-2-
2gX1A
Approved For Release 2003109126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030015000 -1
GENERAL
'
1.
Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected

by US;
25X1A
US to accommodate Philippiall demands.
Cowen subsequently informed Dulles that after an unsatisfactory meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo and President Quirino's advisory committee on reparations at which Dulles, views were presented, Romulo stated that Quirino was obdurate in his refusal to sign the treaty in its present form.
25X1A
Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philippines:
An emissary of President Quirino has informed the US State Department that the Philippine Government is seriously considering again promising a Pacific Pact. The intermediary said that President Sukarno of Indonesia had reacted favorably to the idea during his recent visit to Manila and believes that Nehru could be persuaded to participate in the proposed pact. The emissary revealed that Quirino had dispatched unofficial emissaries to Indonesia, Burma and Thailand to discuss the matter and had received favorable responses.

25X1A
Mn Jahn Foster Dulles has informed Ambassador Cowen in Manila that the US has gone as far as is possible to meet the Philippine demands for revision of the Japanese :peace treaty. Pointing out that five years of occupation experience had firmly convinced the US that Japan could not pay reparations, Dulles states it was with great reluctance that the US altered its position on reparations to ease the position of the Philippine Government. He believes that that government is gravely at fault in not having informed its public of the very considerable efforts made by the
ApPAMFor Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300150001-1
Comment At President Quirino's invitation, representatives from most South andSoutheastAsian countries met at Baguio in the Philippines a year ago to discuss the possibility of a Pacific Pact. The only tangible results were agreements to consult with each other on matters of mutual interest and to develop closer economic and cultural relations.
India is interested in developing regional pacts in Asia, but.its whole-hearted participation will be obtained only if it is assured.a.preeminent position. .Pakistan,..while noncerned over regional .security, recently has been promoting a.Near.Eastern Moslem alliance. Indonesia,. Burma and Thailand would be receptive to a pact proposal., while Japan, when eligible, would be anxious to sign one.
r5X1.A
3.
German support a Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis seen weakening:

US officials in Berlin cite evidence of weakening local German support of the Allied position in the current Soviet restrictions which have resulted in a choking off of much of West Ber100 s export trade. Certain large firma and many smaller firms in West Berlin, hard hit by the restrictions, have been ignoring West German and Allied directives and complying with Soviet demands.
The French Commandant in Berlin feels that the West Berliners will not support4the Allied position and that no one has been able to indicate what the Allies. will do if West Berlin trade is stopped and Allied countermeasures, including the proposed move to hold up irnplementation of the new interzonal trade pact between East and West Germany, fall to cause the USSR to back down. He adds that the USSR could afford one or two years delay in the East German Five Year Plan if its objective to force the Allies out of Berlinls achieved.
comment The dragging out of the current Soviet restrictions appears to have succeeded in further dividing the Allies and West Berliners on this issue. Shortly after initiating the restrictions, the Soviet authorities encouraged West Berlin firms to by-pass Allied
25X1A

-4-
25X1A
' Approved For Release 2003/09126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030
50001-1
offices and deal directly with Soviet authorities. This is the first concrete. evidence that large numbers of firms have felt the squeeze sufficientfollow this course.
25X1A
5'
South Korean Prime Minister suggests that President Truthan reassure Korean people:
In a conversation with Ambassador Muccio summarizing the attitude of the South Korean people, the ROK Prime Minister stated that it was not enough for the US to reiterate its exemplary past record; Korean worries stemmed from its intentions in the future. He said that the Korean people believe the US is "calling the whole thing off with victory within its grasp, " and that they are particularly worried over the concessions which will have to be made in order to obtain a cease-fire and political agreement.
of global strategy the US now plans to abandon the Republic of Korea. He feels that the situation is deteriorating and suggests that a statement of
The Prime Minister stated that his people, regardless of the past record, simply do not believe that the US continues to have Korean interests at heart, andlurthermore believe that for reasons
-5-
2 5X1A

FAR EAST
n
25X1A
4.
Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers.
The requisitioning by the UK of two Polish overnment-owned tankers nearing completion in Bstitish shipyards, under defense regulations, " was an action taken most reluctantly, and nly after vigorous US prqtests that the vessels might be used to ship ' ettoleum to Communist China. The UK feared Polish retaliation, and insisted at first that there was no satisfactory legal basis for the seizure. Two weeks ago Foreign Secretary Morrisoripromised to reconsider the matter in light of the Iranian oil crisis.
?ger Ad For Release 2003109/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300r 150001-1
reassurance from a high US official, preferably the President, meeting these Korean suspicions head-on, would have a salutary effect. Ambassador Muccio believes the suggestion merits consideration.
Comment Despite the plausibility of the Prime Minister's analysis of the South Korean situation, there is evidence that the gdvernment itself, through inspired demonstrations and press agitation, is largely responsible for the current feeling. There is little indication that continued remonstrances by US officials have had any appreciable effect upon President Rhee, whose actions continue to be irresponsible and unpredictable.
26X1A
01.E:=Bartnese Comrnan 1.4 r-in Chief and Socialists in conflictg

Serious friction and general deterioration within the Burmese Army are reported by the US Embassy in Rangoon. These developments

15X1A
41t/ibMred For Release 2003109/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0003001: 0001-1

a
are the result of mounting tension between the Burmese Commander-inChief, Ne Win, and leaders of the Socialist Party, which controls the government. The situation is rapidly, reaching a point at which Ne Win must retire (he is reported as contemplating a trip to London) or force a showdown,for power with the Socialistg large private army. With regard to future developments, the Embassy is concerned over, the fact that Ne Win this week conferred with the Chinese Communist Ambassador for over an hour.
25X1 25X1
Comment
to Ne Win could have grave consequences, particularly at a time when Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists is increasing.
Although Ne Win has been considered antiCommupist, he is completely opportunistic and might seek Communist support to maintain his position.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
B.
Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising opposition:

The US Embassy in Tehran has received information from several sources that the Iranian Government may haveReenconsiderably weakened by developments in the past two weeks. Parliament is becoming restive as a result of its realization that the situation has worsened steadily. The cabinet is dissatisfied with the Prime Minister's habit of making decisions without consulting it. The press has also developed a more critical attitude on the handling of the oil issue. The Prime Minister, meanwhile, has announced that a group of physicians will check his physical condition. This has resulted in a spate of rumors on his resignation and a possible successor.
The USsAmbassador, while recognizing all these factors as indicative of a cerckin weakness in the present government, concludes that Prime Minister Mossadeq still has very strong popular
25X1A

-7-
A clash between the Socialists' irregular forces and Army elements loyal
Willed For Release 2003/09126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0003001 50001-1
25X1
support and that no group in Iran has shown a willingness to assume responsibility for any modification of the oil nationalization which is the basis of the Prime Minister's power. The Ambassador believes that for the present Mossadeq can continue in power.
25X1A 10.
Commilatelc d to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government:

The USSR has been definitely linked to the recently uncovered conspiracy which aimed at overthrowing the Ethippian Government and establishthg a "republic. " Total arrests as of 11 July are 43, including two interpreters at the local Russian institute and several other Ethiopian Communist sympathizers. Ethiopian -825X1A
2433ewyed For Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79700975A0003001 50001-1

a
officials have linked the USSR to the mutiny in early July of sixty members of the Imperial Body Guard Cadet School. The local Communist-controlled Youth League is also involved Ramifications of the plot are still under investigation and more arrests are expected.
Comment
25X1
25X1 25X1
25X1A,
.25X1A

The Ethioptan Government, resolutely anti-communist, may be expected to take appropriate action against any of its own subjects involved in conspiracy. It will also express itself strongly to the USSR, whose activities in Ethiopia may be sharply curtailed.
I
25X1
Approved For Release 2003109126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300150001-1

..._.______.........._.
HR70-14 HR70-14
.
I
0 .
2_29p_sEeerr
vtais
/to -S1.1 Cl
-Qv
I
I
i .

ll&l
REA*
edis oeitio
of
aF
. at Central
ector
b
I
I
indicate a redisposition of WY. forces in the east central sector*. that the rehabilitated CCP.27th.Army is in the process of'relleving the cqp 20th Army which has been.defending stubbornly in the Kumsong.qukhan
ROrer area* hirthermore4IMM has tentatively accpeted the.eastward

I
83.
. ,r,
> i ,,,
.APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED DATE 19-Feb-2010 ,DATE: 19-Feb-2010
.p ! i .
2.11-,SEerCE
the CQi' COF 12th 12th ArnIy Army from the wea,.northwest area,morthwest of of C ChorWon to displacement of of t,he homn t o
a location location 12-15 12-15 miles northpa0V-Of'Kumsong. northeas% @ I ?
this
movement of forces forces may may indicate the Poaitioning of a mass of fresh troops w r , Recent reports reporte on on the the COMMENTsRecent i n preparation for'another for'another offensive. offensive in presence fn the t h e eastern eastern sector sector supports supports presence of of Go? CCF reoonns,issanee reconnaissance elements elementain the evidence evidence of t h e mssfng c d t m e nt o f CCF es in the sector of the massing and commitment of CCF fa forces the sector east of the'Hwachon the'Hwachon Reservoir. 2)3WVQir* d K 6 'July July 5 1 ) . . 116 51).
(I
.
acu "C It
Possibkhwlomen t of South Ko~ean&Asoners i n NorthKorean KoreaE': PossWagployment of South Korean4risoners'in Norkh J130 30 ROEpolitical U & f i c a t i o n F ' 111111catkr? Front., 1 ROX,political and indoctrinated indoctrinated in in leadera.taken lepders taken north by by the the COmmunists Commnfsts in i n June June 1950 and Abnchuria have been been returned returned to t o North North Korea* Koreao Mhnchuria have the y b h e Coanunist-sponsored ~ 0 ~ 8 % - S p O Z l S II/Democratic Party for the recently added the mmes names the Unification U d f i c a t i o n of af the the Fatherland', Fatherl8ndlI recently added to t o its its roster, rorster the ot Korean political taken north o f SdUth South Korean p o l i t i c a l leaders leaders who who were taken north as as prisoners prisoners last last summer.' The .The&mnmAsts Ommuniets w will Koreans as a f front summero i l l employ employ the South Korean8 r o n t in i n conconjunction slogans favoring peace and unification. junction with. with slo an8 favoring unification, ( 10 jelly 51).. COMMENT: The Dwcratic Demmeratic Front Front f for:the Lo and and 11 1 1 J?Qy 5 1 7 . _COMMBNT: o r t h e Unification of the Fatherland served as a usOful us&ful propaganda propaganda vehicle f or t h e North of the'Fatherland served'aaa for the North Korean Korean regime r e g h e before before the t h ewar.: waro &A eve9t the alks a re in the eve9.t the cease-fire cease-fire ttalks are successfUl successful and and foreign foreign troops troops withdraw withdraw from from Korea, aorea, the the Nott4 North Korean Korean p o l i t i c a l attacks against against the t h e RON ROK Government Government could coilld very very plausibly plausibly utilize utilize, political a s these these reports r e p m t e describe. describe. such maneuvers maneuvers as
NR
i
! I
!
!
i
_TDP-6ECE
9 9
i
I
I
I
I
I
!
I
,!
W
I'
-B==f=f

___ToP-ezczer-3 3
.-........
HR70-14 HR70-14
iI R
flip

Wirtions support
TC____LP _SWART
cent enemy e t fighter KOREA. EnePOssibE:,k_st. Recent enemy jet J fighter

te that that the the enemy enemy is is estiMate ions t o cover all cf e m capable of extending hia air defensive operations to cover all of Coni s% week week produced produced several several munistheld North Korea. Not only heti the lAst a i r engagements engagements in in the the Pyoagyeng o large-aize air Pyongyang area area hvolvhg involving moderate moderate t to large-size enemy enemy poupa, groups, but but ale0 also evidence evidence of of posdhle poisible enew enemy uae use of of lsrge large external external fuel tanks tanks w e observed. obaemed. Large k s g e silver erilver tanks tanks were o have fuel was were obeerved observed t to have been been dropped by enemy jets in their first pass at UN F-511S attacking Kam:don airf eld northeast of Pvonevan2. the EIG- 5 waa believed capable of a combat recline of more than 400 nautical miles if large tahks (apprOximately 150 gallons) were used.' The tbove sfghtlng, if Ff confirmed, confirmed, would would be d . r . r s U im h a l pupport 61um)ort aP sighting, be the the f first visual of this this POpo(The combat combat radius radius of of the the MIG-,15 MIG-15 with 33 gallon tential capability. eapabiliky. (The tential with 33 gallon_ is estimated s s t i m t e d to t o be be about about 250 250 nautical nautical miles.) miles.) external wing tanks is 17 J * 5 1 1 , . 17 July 51),
(fl
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: 19-Feb-2010
2p5p)r(14d For Re lbagge
2TQP3 3ECREMA008000170001-9
:
18 Slily 1951
COpy No. C
n
7
25X1
11
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT FIEVIEW DATE:
TS S C

DATE
AUTH
0-ai
nREVIEIVER:
25X1 25X1
STATE, USAF reviews completed
Offi ce of Current Intelligence
25X1
TOP SECRET
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
25X1A
Approved F r Release 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030017 001-9
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
,
US and UK move to effect a bilateral Itallan-hpanese peace treaty (Pa4r3).

FAR EAST
eic
25X1 25X1
06, KP
1-taii,
2.
Enemy possibly extending jet operations (page 3).

NEAR EAST

SOUTH ASIA
4. Work on nioeline from Iran to be hastened (nage

25X1
4)0A 3
lyn FIAM5V4
6,
Increased Soviet and Communist activity in Afghanistan (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE
7. Sforza expected to leave Italian Foreign Ministry (page 6).-SINA
r
CE-T1'01416.9')
8. West German Socialists again criticizettkapd British labor units

(page 7).
9.
Franco confirms long-awaited Spanish cabinet shakeup (page 7). -3 m
***
25X1A
-225X1A
Approved For FISX1A elease 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030017 0001-9
-)
GENERAL
25X1A
1.
US and UK move to effect a bilateral Italip-Japanese peace treaty:

US officials have informed Italy that its participation in the Japanese peace treaty is not deemed appropriate and that, instead, the UK and the US are prepared to use their good offices for the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Italian-Japanese bilateral peace settlement.
Comment; The Italian Government has protested against its exclusion from the Japanese peace treaty on the grounds that this would (a) deal a serious blow to Italian prestige and (b) disastrously affect Italian public opinion. The Italian Government has sought to develop the idea that Italy has worked its way back to the family of nations especially
by its staunch support off NATO.
2 5X1A
2.
Enemy possibly extending jet operations
Recent Jet fighter operations support the Far East Air. Forces, estimate that the enemy is capable? extending his air defense to cover all of C mmunist-held North Korea. In a on to several air engagements in the Pyongyang area last week involving moderate to large-size enemy groups, there is evidence of possible enemy use of large external fuel tanks. Large silver tanks were reportedly observed dropping from enemy Jets in their first pass at UN F-51' s attacking Kangdong airfield northeast of Pyongyang.
25X1A

FAR EAST
from the Japanese peace settlement so that the Italian Government will not be pushed into a strong public position in conflict with that of the West. Italy was also informed that the US wishes to avoid antagonizing the Japanese public by putting Italy in the role of a victor.
Ut and the US move promptly to dispel public resentment at Italian exclusion
The British Foreign Office suggerits that the
25X1A
comment Air,Force technical intelligence has for some time reported that the MIG-15 is believed capable of a combat radius of more than 400 nautical miles if iarge tanks (approximately 150 gallons) were used. The above sighting:Al Confirmed, would be the firSt evidence that this Potential has been reached. The combat radius of 4 MIG-15 equipped with 33 gallon external wing tanks is estimated to be about 250 nautical milea.
25X1
25X1A
4.
Work on pipeline from Iraa to be hastened:
The Iraq Petroleum Company plans to speed up work on the pipeline Currently being constructed from Voq to the Mediterranean with the completion 'date set between April and June 1952. This move is part of IPC's plans to increase oil production to meet the deficiencies resulting from the Iranian situation.

NEAR EAST
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
25X11
comment: With the pipeline from the Kirkuk Ant oil field to the rettnery at Eaifa closed, Iraq can export only 7,000,000 t ons of oil per ye The completion of this new 30-inch pipeline will Increase export capacity to nearin million tons -- equivalentito twothirds of Iran's 1950 output.
25X1
r
25X1A
25X1A
6.

SOUTUA$IA
ed s viggag...2.1e
and commul_it_iLwft.nmiiagiftsti an:

Embassy in Kabul reports considerable activity on the part of Soviet diplomats in Afghanistan, as well as rumors of significant/Communist activity withip the country.
The US
Approved For F5X1A elease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030

...
70001-9
25X1A
Soviet Embassy and Trade Delegation personnel in Kabul are moving out of their embassy compound to take up residence in various parts of the city and are mingling to a greater degree with the local populace. Communist publications are now circulating in Kabul and Ialsilabad, and there have been rumors of Communist infiltration into the Afgfian Army. Furthermore, the Communist Iranian Tudeh party has been reportedly active in the Herat province of northwest Afghanistan.
25X1A
Sforza expected to leave Italian Foreign Ministry: Although the domestic political situation remains obscure following the Italian Cabinet's resignation, there is a growing indication that Foreign Minister Sforza will be replaced. According to well-informed Foreign Office circles, however, the final decision has not been made.
Comment: The replacement of Count Sforza, an elder statesman with little political following within Italy, has long been expected. His conduct of foreign affairs has been widely criticized, particularly by nationalistic rightist groups, on the grounds that it has been ineffective in defending Italian interests. Earlier reports have indicated that Sforza might negotiate a Trieste settlement with Yugoslavia and then be sacrificed in order to appease Italian public opinion.

WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
Comment: Growing internal political unrest, which stems fromassension within the ruling governmental clique and from the recent development of an anti-government liberal movement, makes Afghanistan a particularly inviting target for Soviet exploibtion. Soviet diplomats in Afghanistan, many of whom speak fluent Persian or Pushtu, are well equipped to mingle with the Afghan popdlace.
25X1A
Approved Fo Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030017000 1-9
25X1A
8.
West German Socialists again criticizeittand British labor units:

The Social Democratic Party in Western Germany recently launched another bitter attack against the German Labor Service Units maintained in the US and UK zones. The Social Democrats criticize the fact that tpt members of these labor and guard units are removed from Germanyjniisdiction, and allege that there has been a tendency to transform the units into a paramilitary organization. The party further charges that the Allies have reorganized the labor units secretly and without consulting the Bundestag, and it demands iinmediate action to assure that the units do not become auxiliary troops. Government party deputies agree with the Socialists that action with respect to the labor units must not prejudge the question of German rearmament.
25X1
conment: The US and UK together maintain about 86,000 German and other employees under contract to guard installations and provide technical assistance. Although these units are not intended as cadres for a German armed force, the USSR has protested their existence. The Social Democratic Party, which is opposing German rearmament, suspects that an attempt may be made to create armed forces "through the back door"; it therefore opposes the US-UK labor units, as well as the proposal to double the size of the Federal border police.
25X1A 9
Franco confirms long-awaited Spanish cabinet shakeup:
abinet o icers will be retained. They are: Minister of Labor Jose ntonio de Giron, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Martin Artajo,
25X1A 25X1A
- 7 -
General Franco has personally informed the

US Ambassador:1A 'Madrid that a general
reorganization of his government will be announced on 19 July. Only four of the present
22404ved F
Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300170
Minister of the Interior Blas Perez Gonzalez, aild Minister of Air Eduardo Gonzalez Gallarza. Lieutenant General Agustin Munoz Grandee is reliably mentioned as the new. Minister of the Army..
Meanwhile, press reports describe the contemplated cabinet changes as a concession to public opiniont in dernocratic countries,
Comment: This shakeup indicates a general tightening of the internal structure of the regime in order.tkobviate the criticism of inefficiency and corruption throughout the various governmental departments. Minister of Labor Giron has reportedly itold the cabinet that if Spain's economic crisis is to be understood abrbad, there must be some freedom for public criticism within Spain; otherwise, he claimed, it was logical for the US.to hesitate to assist in Spain's economic rehabilitation. Giron is generally regarded as the government member with the greatest influence over the workers within the Falangist organization.
Its4ention of Martin Artajo signifies Franco's eagerness to retain the suppori of the active Catholic elements in Spain.
Lt. General Munoz Grandes is one of Franco's ablest and most trusted generals.

-825X1A
' *
HR70-14
lep-ssepinPBS WB@

C.
s achieved has achieved Voviet ObAectives Achieved Dur i w the & m e . The USSR b apsitit_ajecitreit_g_WAvaihwjag_thejcartenlar.. certain important objectives objectives during during the the course couree of of the the Korean war ldBr and. thus certain important was willing to advance the Malik cease-fire eaee-fire proposal, proposal, Militprily, the &kLb USSR baa to Militnrily, has been able to LI-tiarn many of the new UR weapons perfected srfectad since aince World World War War II. 11. BSccepD rIcept d nearly nearly a11 arm, including Including planes plane6 for atomic weapons, the US has umed all new arm., and and tanks, tanka, affording affording the the USSR D8SR an an opportunity opportunity for for comparison eomparieon with with its I t s own own Specifically, the the USSR uSSR has h e been able to test t e s t (a) (a) Soviet Soviet jet jet equipment. Specifically, planee, whioh although although better better in in speed speed and and maneuverability maneuverability than t b n DS U8 models, modele, planes, which Ere not the Ihe best which the Soviet@ the effectiveness effectivenessof of the the US US are Soviets bava,; have; (a) CO the anti-tank weapons weapone against agalnet the the new new secret caeoret Soviet Boviet tanks. tankc. BQpcmt~dly, ths anti-tank Reportedly, the WSR has ha8 better better bazookas baeookrra and knd napalm napalm bombs bombs than than those those used used by by the the US. US. USSR Politically and and militarily mflitarilr the the removal of of Gen. Qen. MacArthar UcA.rthr from f r o m the the lex Bkr East wae a success succeem for f o r Moscow Moecow since since it it created created US US domestic domestie discord discord tbereby thereby Rest was a contributing to US weakness. weaknese. Propagandistically, Propagandietlca,l+y, the the USSR USlsawfll able to to contributing will be able the Soviet Sooietgeace exploit the peace proposals ropoeala and and truce tructe Which whiah is l e expected expeoted to to be be forthforth1 OOMMWT: COMMFiNTr coming. 119 JUB Jul 51) 51) I 7 coming. P19 appeared to lappeared t o be bo Saviea Soviet F-"Plants" of a "$lants~ a propaganda propaganda nature. nature. The Tha above information information in in this t h i a latest latest should not not be be characterized characterized as as objectives objeotivee but rather rather results reaulte of of report should the Korean Korean war. It is obviously true t h t the that the 8oviets Soviets have been able to lenrn much of new W elnce World W a r II, 11, and learn much US weapons developments since War and tent current US 3.5@ recoillees guns againat test bhe the cuxrent 3.50 bazooka rand and recoilless against new now Soviet tank deeigns. l e equally true true that the tha Soviets S O V ~ have ~ ~ S improved jet jet airairdesigns. It is craft under under development development which which have combat.I The have not not been been seen w e n in in,combcLt.l The Soviet Soviet MIU-15 and and Type Type 15 15 jet Jet fighters fighterm used used in In Korea Korea are are best best described descrfbbd as am being being MIG-15 generally generally comparable coxparable to to the the US US 7-86 F-86 Sabre Sabre Jet. Jet. It is le coneidered likely considered likely that the Soviets Soviete have improved improved verelons o f standard rstandard US n a p a l m bombs bombe and and versions of napalm basoohe bazookas under under development, development, but but there there is is no no evidence evidence that tbat they t b y have have been been available available to to Soviet lsovlet military military forces. foreee.
(I
--
NR
-T013-5130EST-
'APPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 pATE:
-1(kki, tqC
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
NR
-"C"

back
o
d of Cease..4Fire
hes provi.A. ba, _. SW. ti,x on, as o une $ on LUalik,e ceaee-fire proposal, he proposal resulted from consultation in'Moseow in early'June between the $qviets and a.Chinese CosKnrnilrt delegation led by &TU Sha-mhtf. sAlthough Although the the Pefpfng COMmuniat by:LIT:Phaochli. Peiping regime is tlBNdoue" t o end i n Korea, Psiping does does nOt not intend h t m d to to yield yield "anxious" tO end the'flghtlng the'fighting in-Korea:ojeiping .on iits.demands t a demnde for o the UN, t i t l e to Taban .on for admission admission t to the,UN* title-to Taiwan* and participation in.the in the Japanese Japanese peace peace treaty. treaty* a t "poUtical .t.hat "pdlitical demands are unlikely to arise the cease-fire cease-sfire negotiations." mg!&,iations.n demands'are arise !luring duringthe U'JuSy 1 1 , C C"To have re1,4',Ju4 5 5l)., COMMENT ported an an earlrJuneSino-Soviet eaplg:'June Bino-SovietcOnferince conferenceon on. ported the Korean conflict. Peiping has has frequently frsqudntly reiterated reiteratedits i t sdemands demands regarding the UN, Taiwan, and ping regarding the UN.v, Taiwan, and the japanese Japanese peace treaty, but but has has not not made mde clear olear whether whether a a Korean Korean settlesettlethe peacetreaty* ment will w l l l depend depend on on the the satisfaction satiafaction of af those those demands. demnds F - i n o ment no mention of of Peiping's PeQingga denand &emand for for the mention the withdrawal mithdtawal of of all foreign foreign forces forces fpom from Korea which which has has been been specifically specifically reaffirnted Korea teaffirmed for for several several weeks weeks as as essential to a a Ketean Korean settlement* settlemnt, and and which Upoliticaldemand" to which has has already already arisen ariaen as as o a "political demand" in the cease-fire negotiationa, negotiations. the cease-fire
'
r 1
,-53FTMefirr--
6 6
r'
.. ,
W'
:TOP REMET
ttBtf
fIBf1
Commander T Taitijoree.77 is.increaSing antiCo-der a g o r o e 77 reports that the enemy i s increa'sing antiaircraft defenses defenses in in Northeast Northeast Korea'particularly Korea p+rticularly on on the Wonaan-Pyongaircraft Wonsan-Pyongyang and Wonsan-Pyonggang rail lines. lie further report that the increased flak is detracting from bombing accuracy. Jay 51). COMMENT: .This report adds to the observations throughout Communist el orea of the Strengthening of of eneqy enemy anti-aircraft defense.
KOREA. KOREA p l.ftsa-trethensafenthesirINorthea_d&Forea. e w StrenathsnsJ Anti-Aircraft Defenses in Northeast Korea.
/ /
/'
/'-
d ' '

-TOP-SES.RIEL
......__............
.
I
HR70-14 HR70-14
A\1R
"A"
Czechos/ovakian Czechoslovakian Volunteers Volunteers Revorted Renorted in in Korea. Korea. ISoviet troops purporting purporting t to be'Czechoslovakian ISoviet troope o be Caechoelovalcian volunteers vo un eera have h w e been been moving moving recently r e c e n t l y with with their t h e i r supplies onpplies from from AntAntung to t o Sinuijui SinuljI.lr According approximately 20 According to t o the the same same source, eo-&cea there t h e r e are am-approximately a0 MIG type type planes planes etatloned stationed at the the Ginuiju Sinuija a airfield, idth an undleclosed undisclosed number number of of Soviet Soviet i r f i e l d s with planee concealed nearby. nearby. Civilians Civillane are a r e said eald t o have been evacuated evacuated from from planes concealed to Oh'Aryongwan and their t h e i r houses house6 requisitioned requieitioned by Soviet and Chinese Chinese Ch!Aryongwan and Communist troops. Oommanlet troope. About 300 300 Soviets S o v i e t e are a r e reported reported to to be be stationed etatloned in in the. the ChiAryongwan C h 'Aryongwan public school whence they the supposedly eupposedl conduct daily d a i 4 pistol pistol and rifle 20 Jul r i f l e practice. practice. 1 - (( Jnl 51) 51T COMMENT: OOMMERTt There There is is no no available evidence Czechoslovak volunteers volunteers in evidence indicating Indicating the the presence preeence of of Ozechoslovak in Manchuria or Xoreao It is i s possible, poasibleD however, however, that; Korea that eome some Ozechoslovak Czechoslovak n a t i o n a l s may may be attached to t o Soviet Soviet units unite reported reported recently to t o have have nationals oroeeed Into Korea. The presence of crossed the Yalu River Rivei into Korea. .The presence of of an.unknown number of in as technicianso technicians, advieorBD advisors, and and a anti-aircraft Soviet troops on duty i n Korea a8 nti-aircraft operators is i e now generally generally accepted. accepted.
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: ,19-Feb-2010
To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org

llBtl "B"
-
K O W . memy Strength May be be Mitch Much Greater Than Now Hn addition reater lhan Now Accepted, Ac e.td0 In addition Stre th ia KOREA. units currently currently accepted accepted in i n Korea Kora' t o enemy units to'enemy pmy G mp, composeo composeaor or.5-4 ju4 the 20thChinese.Communist 20th Cbinese Cornmist rmy the urOup, i s also a l s o in in armies with a strength of of lO5-l4O,OOO 105-140;000 troops, troops, "probably" "wobably"-is re a t l east f i v e additional Koreae Korea. "Poasiblyll "Possibly" in in Korea Korea a are at least five additional Chinese Chinese Communist CoMmuniat armies, totaling 175,000, and and three three new new North.Korean North Kwean Corps Corps of of at at least least armies,-totaling.1752000, 30,oOO men, 131 2). July juiy 51)+ 51). .CONIONTi C0MMEXt"T The The Strength strength .30,000 men. ( , . of enemy en- units units currently currentlyaccepted acceptedin.Korea i n K c r totals 14.93.000, of which of 265,000 are are Chinese Chinese COIUBl@St8a A reoent race the enemy 265,000 Communists. A now supPortia support,a 5-7 5-7 day.72 division offensive prestmably l o g i s t i c a l l y could logistically could how is b s e d on that these units "probably" Pr "140.19ibly" in :is. based on consideration consideration that:these XOPW a g h t participate ..lorea might participate.
.
(I
'
ItC II "Cu.
.South Korea Progress in Balanc BaLancina Econoqy, ress in Econon 0 Ambassador Ambassador .Sowth o ea Maker$: Make Fro Muccfo reports that that the the N ROK has made made marked marked progress progress in i n balanting. balancing income incolns Muscle reports K has I nt h e past past t w o months, months, . and expenditures and and in i n 'Controlling contmlllng bank oredits In the two .-'and.expenditures bank credit. axpenditures of -expenditures of UN UN forces,, forces, which which far far exceed exceed the the meager meager collections collections from from t h e sale oof f imported .the,:sala imported goode, goods, have have constituted constitUted the the sole sole inflationary inflationary pressur@ pressure out that the impoverished Impoverished and and disrupted. dierupted nf ' a e SignificanCe. eignificancee Pointing Pointing out that the KQPeari'economy sconon\y cannot o absorb h e local costs of of Koreah cannot be be expected eXpected tto absorb tthe local currency currency costs wry-ing on an 8s corrective to carrying-on an extended extended wqr, War, Muccio Muccio again again ILT ur es corrective action action to Fncreaae t h eSupply supplyof of imported bnporte'd goods. goods* ( 20 July July 51). inOeise.the 20
-
..
. ..
( e \
8 8
____.... -
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED IDATE: 17-Feb-2010 DATE: 17-Feb-2010
3 R 7 -14
J
.'
I
N.,
it2FsEcua
*B "Bu
KOREA. &Am CaEable of Attack41Lw1th Little or No Additional Nara Irring as the present tactical situation remains unchanged, the innodiate
pre-offensive indications which in the past have-provided an accurate basis for estimating the probable date of attack, may not be evident, according to US Eighth Army. The enemy is afforded sufficient front line intelligence,through generally close contact, to permit momentary offensive ao;tion without noticeable change in current counter-reconnaissanc, patrolling and probing activity. Recent enemy artillery activity tends to confirm deployment of artillery in forward areas reducing if not eliminating the necessity for last minute displacement and registration. No increase in deserters and stragglers is expected because of the deterreAt effect of the enemy's almost continuous outpost line. Moreover, current weather conditions can and probably havenenabled the enemy to displace troops and supplies into forward areas without detection. Ftrtheri the combat effectiweess of practically all enemy units in contact increassa the probabilitT of their offensive employment. The enemy's capability of moving hie reserve to attack positions 24 hours prior to the attack further reduces ths opportunity to obtain prior-warning of attack. Eighth Army warns that even this movement might be accomplished without detection under present weather conditions. ( 23 July 51)9
..
To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
*4 Y
'*.
4 4
d
CR
d ..4001
CENTRAL DITEXLEENCE ILITELUDENCE A AGENCY WJTRAL WCY
* 1
OFFICE CURRENT INTEmNm INTELLIGENCS O F F E E OF CURHENT DAILY DIG??,ST DIGEST OF OF SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT S/S S/S CABIES CABLES
23 Jly 1951 23 July. 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASl")
. . .
_*. . .. . . . , .
__-I
I
I
I .

.
.
..
.....__...................________.
HR70-14 HR70-14
+
APPROVKD FOR RELEASE ATE% D A T B 17-Feb-2010 17-Feb-2010 'DPPROVEP
Sre
2-1-k
_TOP-13SOBSr-
Ck
99
.
SECTIQN ) SECTION' I I (SOVIE!!' (SOVIET)
' I B t '
USSR. ....q_j_remCs_d_ol_SvetPmmet.KoreanTalks. Breaking silence on the agenda of the Korean discussions, the Soviet press on 19 July reported A TABS !! A S 8 de8 t c h baaed US opposition t to Communist conditiono, conditions. 1 despatch based on on a a Us1 o Communist Pyongyang press comentapy commentarY claimed that t the USg (I) had c categorically Pyongyang h e US:: (llpabsd ategodcally raising question of ofthe of foreign troops troops from from opposed r a i s i n g tthe h e queatiofi t h e withdrawal withdrawal of Korea; and (2) tried by-pass t the-Nalik proposaL in order to Korea; (2) had t r i e d to to by-pass h e MaUk proposal t o obI1 was tain Nam:11 was t ain a a demarcation demarcation omUch %tachto t o northig northff of of the t h e 36th'Peral1e1 9 t h P a r a l l e l .. Nam quoted,as on those those conditions conditions as a6pledgeagatent pledgeagaW new iieu military m i l i t a r y Out-. kiutquoted a s insisting i n s i s t i n g on breaks. anad ahd proposing proposing measures measures f for o r a cease-fire. cease-firee l'hase breaks These included a a deded the the r eturn o f militarizedc-zone return of militarisb&. zone, aa commission comy~iss for control thereof ald .150#00 following c cease-fire. . COMMENTg To POWE s fallowing ea~e-fire. c o 8 TO a t a cease-fire -date'there has been been no no chana change in Communist insistence that-a cease-fire date t h e r e has ih Korea be pegged t to troops. Although Moecow in o the withdrawal of foreign troops. Mbicow -his refrained ffrom direct comment on on the the negotiations, negotiations, Soviet Sadet support has refrained rom d i r e c t comment support -fOr-the detand i is indicated by by its relaying of of Pyongyang Pyongyang press comments. f o r t h e demand s indicated co~lrments, -Ohe such:comment on 24 24 July July iinsisted on the the withdrawal withdrawal of of foreign foreign troops troops One such comment on n s i s t e d on intention to refusall to t o do so.indicated so indicated US i ntention t o ncOnvert bonve~ and charged that t h a t the refusal military South Korea into i n t o its its m i l i t a r y springboard6n epringboard,'c Therefore, Therefore, the the commentary commentary cOnclUded in the interests i n t e r e s t s of of security, security, independence independence and and world world peace, peace, concluded, i nthe ."our representatives representatives iin Knesong resolutely on the the final final solution solution n Kaeeong resolute?^ iinsist n e i e t on
.
.
w. Soviet Press Comment on Korean Talks, Breaking silence on t h e agenda of t h e Korean discussions, the Soviet press on 19 July reported
ofthis of t h i s qUestioni" queetion.'f
. . " /NR
TVF.-SEGBET--
.
'
. an 'anincrease-intheenemesnight increase i n the eneroyfls night air operations in in Korea. Korea. air operatiens
KoflEA. Enemy NfPlht ,Ab-QpsroUsns bawsadmq. I ASOBEA. ,Et_jestreasi'..
1 9 addition to In addition to the h i t and and rAn r;wn attack: attab d l i g h t bomber3, bombep, recent air aetfvity 'the hit of the PO-2 P0-2 light -repentenemy enemy.air activity ~s included.* includad'k'number pmber of of night. night interoeptAons aircraft, pradomi-,bas intereeptiene by by enemy enemy*ircrafts, predomi,hntl,y cOnventional eonvenM,onal fighter fighter typess:and typeas 'and a a continuance continuance of.enemy af enemy night night air air nintly activity' in the the vicinity vicinity of of Wonram. Wonean, aotivity in
night training training acsivIty lsveing conausea as 60Mr. munist air air basee bases in i n Manchuria Msnchwrfo and* and .a apoupof:14,-91s of U-9ss has ha8 been been deployed deployed southsouthmunist group ward to ward t o 84010iju. Sql[qUSjua
Ba o P o an Confirms in ConIims Unrest Un~es.b, in a a North North Korea Kcmaan Province. F%wvincs. Radio Bpdio Pyongyang'on 20 uly commended a Gorp19 unit for fop mopping mopping up U p some some 80 80 a Wrcl Ward Corps unit 'oreactionarybandits' bactionary b r ~ l i k 3 who wwhohave havebeen beenConti:: oontfsr their 'desperate *desperateStruggleff strugglen their in 23 i n the the moUntain mountain area area of of Bwanghae Hwirnghae Province: Prodnee. 23 July July 51). 5 1 ) . ,COMMENT: COaaaaEWT: W t ea a nnieber.of nqx&er of Nprth l e d n g before i n i t i a l advance advance Quite North Korean Korean refugees refUgees r fleeing before the the initial oe Comasnists n Hwanghas lies of the Chineise CommuniSts sought sought refuge refuge i in Hwanghae Province Province which which lies immodiately north d of the the 38th 38th Parallel Parallelon onK~maO8 Koreeewest Smned5.ateI.y north west coast. goost, It 1% is is of of Interest to to note note tht Etadio Ppngyang h e contQmed ctivity interest that.Radio Pyongyang confirms confirms t the con4nued armed armed a activity . of O f these these anti-communiet P n t d - C O d 8 t groups. @?oupY.
'21.'.!NlY 51).
.
.
9 1 -
TgP....SEGRLT--
T o J A w m 5 5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE APPROVED DATE: DATE: 17-Feb-2010 17'-Feb-2010
__..__.._...._......~~.....
,
HR70-14
2S -A3u..1
.visttihrong ong:that there will "derinitelyube efL N e T Pa - truce T K &in.liorea.:. X ~ K S % Z ..s4deVtnat politics1 negotiations f011oping.the truce-would "pave'. thCwaryfOrOOMMUnist Chinags admission to the. UN, .aftpr Oich,:a"greAti WithdraWar'e the US-7th Fleet_froM.Formosan waters ,could.beLachievedA 23 Jul 53.10 ,gammA Soviet officials outside Korea have reachodin have also also etated & a t d categorically sategoricrdly that that a a truce truce will w i l l be. be reachpd in Korea... Korea. ..Such expressions. confidence obViouslyare arenot notbinding binding upon upon the the Cornwet Comtwitst Suah expresaione o fof conf'idenw obv3.oloel.y propaganda, in addition to fwaistfng insisting .negotiatorm negotiator8 in in Koreab. Kcirem Feipingos PeipPngO 8 pmpaganda, upon of a all foreign foraea forces from Korea, has upon the the TrIthdrawal withdrawal of l l foreign has implied implied that that the the queations UN and and t title to Formosa v will queetiona of o f Chiness,representation Chinese re resentation in the Ubl itle t g Fom0sa d U be brought up-in brought up in any an$ subsequent 8u sequent negotiations. negotiatiow.
.
ore "C"
Promgenda.Explsifeation ofnjaesQng Talks. .reportS,that the Chinese CoMmunistO ars supporting withnhotographs their report8 proPaganda.that propaganda that UN UN forces foraaa tn in Korea:are Korea are suing suing for for peace.
_TOP-SUM-3 3
having some to the ecialusiono afttr Assra resift pietares is a losaR paper ef UN repretentetives i waits item that DK fortes sew. surrenderingo ( 23 lel 500 GONMAK:g Communist propaganda can be expected tO exploit suah .fiaturee of the Keesons talks as Communist military control el the cit7 0 the passage ef U repreeentatives through. armed Communiet guarani) and thn preeence of whdte flags on UK ieeto,amt the absence of each flue from Comassiet vehicles. Newevero that Comma:Lot propaganda regarding a "thl defeat" in Korea is not beang generally'aeoepted in China0
'

gjaaaa
the enemy might laurcohnne or more strong o sttaske prior to the completion ef armistiee negotiations. The advantages ef euell local successes would be physical peopession of a desirable objective9 such ate key terrain feature of offensivy or defensive signifiesseeo and.a boost of troop morale0 he tisk ground seats of the PynaggwagAuthwa-Chorientriangle is of sufficient important. te warrant a limited attack. ( 25 Jul, g)0 Tice "Iron Triangle* with its impotent read net and forward eupply positions was utiLivid by the Cenmuniets as a base of operation.' in spring offensive00 Recent eastward displacement ef CCP forees and the "elite of trent line units ia the central eecter have provided a maw of' freak fore.a in position to undertake each alimited attack.
*,
2912gfaRgir44.
,a
,
:.
,
r
22,QP___SECRET--
CENTRAL INTELLIGENS AGENCY
m 1 c E OF OF CURRENT CURRENT INTELLIGENaR OFFICE DAlSY DEEST OF SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT S/S S/S CABISS CBBIZS DAILY DZEST OF
25 25
mmwm
W 1951 1951 ally

. I
SECTION 2,(EASTEI1N) (EASTERN) SECTION 2
XMA. 214X. jairagaLyLle

Isga_khea
anticeasefirs oemphign.
e_l_Latne . 'Ambassador Mnccio reports that ,Secretary .Acheeongs .statement could not:have 'been better timed
with respect to local reaction.. Rhee remarked that the Seoretary4s aptech had eased everyone lnind while. the Prime Minister.cOmMentedv: very reas suring, just what Ihre.wa4ted.." The-National Assembly unanimously approved a message of gratitude6 Acheson indicated 24 Jular 51).0 that despite Comiunist demands at the Kaesong Conference .the US will not withdr,av troops. froth Korea. This assurande of security by the Secretary could provide a graceful wey for South Korean officialdom tO atop the present
=W....
TOLSEERB2.'
1
Approved For Rdse 2ale/B: SEGRETA014600230001-2
25 July 1951
25X1
Copy No. C

DOCUMENT NO,
/IS
SC
CLASS. CHANGED To: 73

NEXT REVIEW DATE;
DECLASSIFIED
AUTH: HR 70DAT
2061
25X1
25X1
REVIEWER:
Army, DOS and DIA
review(s) completed.
25X1
TOP SECRET
For info on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website
Approved Fo r Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00030023000 -2
25X1
-
SUMMARY'
GENERAL
25X1
2.
Turks restate eagerness for membership in NATO (page 3).

FAR EAST
3.
4.
5. 6.

NEAR EAST
Enemy. in Korea can attack with little or no additional warning (page 4). Chiang Kai-shek summarily dismisses naval officers for political activity (page 5).
Iraqi Government reaches agreement with petroleum company (page 5). jordanians charge link between former Grand Mufti and murderer of
Abdullah (page 6).
'
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1
B.
Spanish underground labor groups warn of Communist gains (page 7).

LATIII, AMERICA
9.
Panamanian representative instructed to -withhold papers of Chinabound vessel (page 8).

****
25X1A
25X1A
Approved or Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300
25X1
25X1
25X1A
2.
Turks restate eagerness for membership in NATO:
with the UK and -France a satisfactory safeguard and wants the immediate support of all the NATO countries in the event that Turkey is attacked;

-325X1A
The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow has made the fcillowing statements to US Ambassador Kirk:
(a) Turkey does not consider its current treaties
Approved :or Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030023 0001-2
25X1
(b) The Anthassador, himself, is uncertain of the genuineness of British support of Turkey's application to join NATO, despite the recent British declaration; and, (c) He does not favor, an Eastern Mediterranean Pact for fear that the Arab States' insistence on joining would have disas25X6 trous repercussions vis-a-vis Israel.
25X1A
Enemy in Korea can attack with little or no additional warning:

The US Eighth Army warns that the enemy is now capable of moving his reserves into position 24 hours prior to an attack, and that even this movement may be accomplished without detection under present weather conditions. Furthermore, so long as the tactical situation remaihs almost static there may be no noticeable change in the pattern of enemy activity.
Comment: In the past, the five-day period preceeding the launching of an offensive provided numerous indications of thefl probable date of attack. As yet there is no firm indication of an intent to resume the offensive.

FAR EAST
-425X1A
Approved or eease II,

25X1A
'Is
Il
III
IS
30001-2
4.
Chiang Kai-shek summarily dismisses naval officers for political,

aCtivity:
25X1A
control at its worst "
Comment: Chiang Kai-shek's fear of defections to the Communists or "Third Force" groups has increased the scope and power of Soviet-trained Chiang Ching-kuo's political officers. This is the first report indicating the unprecedented power of Ching-kuo vis-avis a Commander-in-Chief.
25X1A 5.
Iraqi Government reaches agreement with petroleum company: An agreement setting minimum guarantees for thelevel of oil production and Iraqi revenues has been reached between Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company. Under its terms, Iraqi oil revenues will reach apprOxithately 50 million pounds sterling annuallY within three years, a.sum several times greater than the current payment. The agreement, which appears to be the most favorable ever negotiated by any government, provides for renegotiation should any neighboring country obtain more favorable terins.
Comment: From the few details available it appears that the new agreement answers the chief requirements of both

NEAR EAST
25X1A
Chiang Kai-shek on 15 Iuly summarily dismissed la naval officers accused of forming a new clique. Admiral Kwei, naval Commanderin-Chief, was informed of this action by Clhiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's elder son, in time to "save face" by appearing to order the dismissal himsOf. The officers included Kwei's nephew and brother-in-law. No charges have been preferred, since Chiang Chingkuo' s "political officers" would not be able to prove their. allegations. The US Naval Attache states that a long-standing feud between Admiral Kwei. and Chiang Ching-kuo is rumored to be behind this example of "tttought
"
Approved Fa r Release 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300 230001-2
ISX1A
25X1 25X1
1.
parties. Despite the liberal aspects of the negotiated agreement, ratification by the Irani Parliament cannot be assured. I
6.
Jordanians charge link between former Grand Mufti and murderer of

cAbdullah:
25X1A
fighting.
The Jordanian Governor of the Old City of Jerusalem is convinced that the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem is involved in the murder of King Abdullah, but he has not been able to uneover the organization behind the act. The US Vice Consul in Arab Jerusalem reports that Abdullah's assassin was supposedly a member of the "Holy War Fighters, " a terrorist group organized by the Arab Higher Committee during the last years of the Mandate but disarmed by the Arab Legion during the Palestine
25X1
25X1A
5X1A
Approved Fot Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300130001-2
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
8.
Spanish underground labor groups warn of Communist gains:

The Spanish opposition Comite Interior de Coordination, predicting a great expansion of Communist strength, warns that the Spanish people, who are losing faith in US objectives, will turn to the Communists for help against the Franco dictatorship.
In a formal protest against 'any contemplated US economic and military aid to the Franco regime, the CIC reminded the US Embassy in Madrid that Spanish workers represented by the Socialist

-725X1A
Approved F or Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030023 0001-2
25X1
and Anarchist components of the CIC have "firmly decided not to cooperate" in Spain's industrial and, military, effort unless Franco.is.removed.
.
9.
Panamanian representative instructed to withhold papers of China-bound

Vessel:
25X1A
immediately or forfeit its registry.
claimed as early as 9 July that ft had instructed its representatives to hold the papers of any Panamanian flag ship bound for North Korean or Chinese Communist ports.
Comment: The Montesa's papers have been held by the US Consul General in Hamburg,. since the Panamanian representative had no authorization to do so. The Government of Panama
This is the fourth Panamanian flag vessel whose papers have been picked up on the initiative of US officials. In

LATIN AMERICA
Comment The Spanish Communist Party is trying to capitalize on the growing sense of. frustration among the underground leftist groups. So far, all Communist offers of financial aid in exchange for .Communist party. control of a "popular front" have been rejected, because of the overwhelmingly anti-Communist sentiments of the great bulk of the workers within these groups. It is believed unlikely, therefore, that Spanish workers will.make common cause with the .Communists or resort to sabotage against the Spanish defense effort, as indicated in an earlier CIC letter to the US Embassy. The present protest, with its implied threats, is apparently calculated to induce the US to demand the liberalization of the Spanish regime. Without the cooperation of the other leftist labor groups, the CoMmunists will remain an ineffective political.force.
The Panama.Government has instructed its Consul General in Hamburg to hold the papers of the China-bound Panama flag vessel Montesa and to notify the captain to unload its cargo
-825X1A
A2859lAd For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0003002 0001-2
all four.caseS, ..Panama supported the taaction and threatened the masters of the vessels with, cancellation of Panamanian registry. unless the cargo destined for .Communist China was unloaded. In no .case, howeyer, has a Panamsnian official taken the initiatiVe in withholding the papers from such a yeesel.

25X1A
. ,
' *'
.
rige.31) SECRET SUEN6-----nta
HR.70-14 HR70-14
I
NR
2.
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-201 0

,
..
I
FAR EAST EAST FAR
'
r!Y
25 July 51
I
communists strong local attacks in Korea during Communistsmay mav launch lastrowlocal e a d u r - negotiations:,
the h e enemy may Local may launch launch one oneor or more more strong local prior to to the the completion completion of attacks prior of armistice armistice negotiations. negotiations. The The advantages of local advantages of local successes successes wodd objectives and and the improvement improvement wouldbe be the the seizure seizure of of important terrain terrain objectives of troop morale. of morale, The high ground ground south southof of the thePyonggalig-Kumhwa-Chorwon PyonggMg-Kumhwa-Chorwon is of of sufficient sufficient importance importance to warrant warrant a a limited limited attack. attack. triangle is
-3-
M1
Comment: The "Iron Comment: The "Iron Triangle, '' " with with its important road net and forward supply positions, was utilized by and positions, was utilized by the the Q h m u n i a t s as coliamunists as a a base base of ofoperations operationsin inthe thespring springoffensives. offensives. Recent Recent eastward displacement of Communistforces forces and and the the relief e'astward of Chinese Communist ofIront of fresh opfrontline line units units in in the the central central sector sectorhave have put put a a concentration concentration of attack: . troops in position to undertake such a limited attack;
3,.
Possible preparations preparations in in Peiping Peipincr for foran an international international conference: conference:
I
24 1u ly 51
jthe
move i t s offices offices from the L e foriner f o A e r US US to move its compound in Embassy compound inPeiping, Peiping, and andorders orders have have been been issued issued for for the removal of shops had previously of the the anti-American anti-American posters posters that all shops previously been beenrequired required to display. these developments developments point of some some understanding" understanding" between betwden the Peiping regime and and to the "possibility of t o preparattons preparationsfor forholding holding an an "international ''international conference" conference" in in the US, or to Peiping.
Committee of of the the the Central Committee i Chinese Chinese Communist CommunistPartv Party has has been been ordered ordered
Comment; Neither of of these these developments developments Comment Communistpropaganda propaganda has has provided provided has been confirmed by by other other sources. Communist some basis for the the speculation speculation that that the the Chinese Chfneee Communists Communists may basis for may propose a conference onvarious various Far Far Eastern problems. conference at Peiping Peiping an problems. Recent RecentChinese Chinese have provided provided no no indication of of a Communist pronouncements, pronouncements, however, have fundamental change in Peiping's hostility hostilitytoward towardthe theUS US and and fidelity kfdelity to to the the^ *
USSR. USSB.
-. . _
- 4 4-
z.r7
TO,P_SEGRN't"
. . ..
1-P
, .
. ..
. .
..
-.
"a"
ISOZA
:kcicibajosue;
Attet'Ondless demandd in.CoMMunistprOpagandi far-tha Withdrawal of foreign troopafronflorea,'Redio Peiping under a Proligrang dateline broMdaist the following explanation-of Communist compOoMite with the UN refusal to plade the issue on,the KaasOtg'agendas orderto arrive at an early armietice agreement so as to fulfill th . initial hopes of the worldos peace-loving People, wengree to the pro; posal of 3rour-sid66" " The Communist radio in'Vienna ingenionsly explained the settle-4 tent it these termss "For the moment the 4maricans seem to have gained
faingnistatulittatialLsiabfFott#0..
!
I I
an adVantage but the Noreen and Chinese repreaentatives forced the reotenitg of the discussiOns by-postpaning this question of the withdrawal of troopso" -26-guly--5116

. :
. . .
. .
..
. .
I
I
i
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 31-Mar-2010

___TDPSNMETLm-==--
9 9
For a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
Approved For Release
bal
201/QOP:CSEQBELO
1300260001-9
28
July 1951
25X1
Copy No. ex--

DOCUMENT No,
'

DAT
AUTH: H 78.
NO CHANGE IN CLAN. II DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
REVIEWER
25X1 25X1
STATE, USAF reviews completed
25X1
TOP SECRET
For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website
Apprited1IThr Release 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300260001-9
SUMMARY
GENERAL
!Yugoslav official expects Communist concessions in Korean cease-. fire negotiations (page 3). 2. Crashed MIG-15 recovered off Korean coast sage a).
1.
FAR EAST,
3.
Indonesia wants to abrogate Netherlands-Indonesian Union

(Page 4)-
4. Prince Tallal rumored to be en route, to Jordan (pSP 5)5. Egyptians continue to discuss relaxing of Suez Canal restrictions

NEAR EAST
(pne 5)-
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Question of Germany's political status may delay defense contribution
(page 6).
O.
French consider cut-back in defense program (page 7).
25X1A
25X1A
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260 001-9
GENERAL
1.
25X1A
Yugoslav official expects Communist concessions in Korean ceasetire negotfations:
With regard to Soviet-Chinese Communist relations, Bebler believe$ that additional tensions will arise over whose influence should prevail in North Korea.
Comment: Communist agenda concessions regarding the question of troop withdrawal indicate a continued desire to negotiate a cease-fire. However, . Communist demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops cannot be regarded solely as propaganda. It has been a persistent Soviet aim in all areas to secure Western troop withdrawals so as to remove a stabilizing factor and facilitate the
advance of Communism.
25X1A 2.
Crashed MIG-15 recovered off Korean coast: Salvage operations conducted by UN naval forces have resulted in the of a MIG-15 airplane that crashed
25X1A
Bebler estimates that the Communists are insisting on the withdrawal of all foreign troops largely for its propaganda appeal in the Far East, while the USSR in fact will want to keep the US Army pinned down in Korea and to this end that negotiations for a general settlement are prolonged.will make certain
recovery of all the principal parts
cease-fire. He believes that the Communists' desire for a cease-fire will induce them to give in as regards the 38th Parallel demarcation line and the withdrawal of foreign troops, but he is not optimistic about achieving UN observation in North Korea.
Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler remains optimistic that current negotiations in Korea will result eventually in a
A dreSieleftf o r
elease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79100975A0003002 0001-9
offshore west of Pyongyang..
Comment -This will afford the. US:Air-Force itafirst opportunity to conduct a technical study of.themajor-coniPonents,. accessories and equipment of the MIG-15, although several parts of an engine and tail have been examined previously. While the airplane will undoubtedly.be in poor condition as. a. result of the crash And .ex-: poSnie to salt water it is anticipated that many details heretofore unknown can nol be Idetermined,
. .
25X1A
Indonesia has requested the Netherlands to open discussions looking to a revision of the Netherlands-Indonesian agreements signed in 1949. The official designated to negotiate with the Dutch told the US Ambassador. in Djakarta that he will try to persuade the Dutch to accept a bilateral treaty in place of the present Netheriands-Indonesian Union and to obtain the elimination of certain Dutch privileget,
The Indenbsfan official also anticipates approaching the retherlands authorities on the question of Netherlands New Guineas He feels that inevitably this area must pass into hands and that the thoner this fact is recognized by the Dutch,Indonesian the sooner amicable relations
can be achieved.
agitation in Incionesia over the past six months to abrogate the Union_ and substitute a bilateral treaty negotiated by "two sovereign nations. " The Indonesians are determined to break the Union unilaterally, if the Dutch fail to agree to such an arrangement.
Indone.sianE demands for sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea have not, ceased since negotiations over the ' igsele broke down in December, 1950. Dutch-Indonesian relations
will remain strained until a,settlement of this

-425X1A
bidonesia wants to abrogate Netherlands-Indonesian Union:
Comment: There has been increasing
FAR EAST
problem is reached.
AppaUdi Aar Release 2004/08103 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300260001 .9
NEAR EAST
25X1A 4.
prince Tallal rumored to be en route to Jordan:
Prince 'Falai has disappeared from a

sanitorium in Switzerland and may be attempting to return to Jordan, according to a report that has reached the US Minister
in Amman. It is generally feared that his arrival in Jordan at this' point would precipitate a serious internal crisis, as his name is being utilized as a rallying point for forces hostile to the British
and the late King.
25X1
25X1A 5.
Egyptians continue to discuss relaxing of Suez Canal restrictions:

The Egyptian delegate to the UN has mentioned in private conversations the desire of his country to drop the Suez Canal restrictions if it obtained adequate strategic, political and economic "compensation." The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs has again told the US Ambassador in titiro that Egypt could relax the restrictions considerably but could not abolish them.
25X1A
Comment: One means of "compensation" that the Egyptians have suggested is the evacuation by Israel of the southern part of Palestine adjacent to the Gulf of Aqaba, where Israel has been planning to build a port. A guarantee that Israel would not use for aggressive purposes any of the oil Oat might transit the _ Suez Canal to the refinery at Haifa has also been mentioned. Neither. . of these proposals would be satisfactory to Israel. The Egyptians are searching for some face-saving formula, but to date they have only hinted at their willingness to remove the restrictions.
- 5 -

25X1A
5X1A
Approved For elease 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030026 001-9
25X1A'
25X1A
t Ouestion of Germanv4s-political status maV.delay defense contributtom:

to consider the problems intolved in the creation of a new political status, for Germany until after a decision was reached on'a German military contribution, according to the political Advisor to the French.Righ ComMissioner in Bonn. The French expect that
The. French Government had not expeCted

WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
A?task4I For Release 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9
the German contribution to Western 'defense will be determined by early fall, thus permitting a decision (on contractual relations with the Germans by the end of the year.
out, however, that it is essential to reach definitive political conclusions on Germany at the prospective meeting of US, UK and French Foreign Ministers in September and at the forthcoming NATO
Council meeting.
High Commissioner McCloyihas pointed
25X1A
8.
French consider cut-back in defense program:
French officiars are Increasingly skeptical of the fruitfulness of the current NATO hearings on sharing the defense burden and consequently believe French defense plans must be either cut back or programmed over a longer period. Any slow-down would affect production plans rather than French commitments regarding Indochina bases, or manpower. These officials claim that none of the other NATO countries is undertaking awkdditional defense effort involving any real risk to its economy, and that therefore France is assuming a disproportionately large burden.

25X1A
Comment: The Germans are strongly opposed to concluding military agreements until they know fairly definitely what changes in their political status are proposed. Agree. ment ceuld be reached on the military question prior to the conelusion of contractual agreements given a firm Allied declaration of intentions in regard to Germany's political status. The French Government seems increasingly convinced of German good faith with respect to the European Army, and can be expepted to favor rapid agreement on political rights without, however, consenting to a restoration of complete sovereignty until the conclusion of a peace treaty.
ApX416., Release 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9
multilateral NATO approach to rearmament planning, including detailed figures on US assistance; they have consented to continue bilateral talks with the US only because no arrangements for multilateral discussions have been made.
The French still strongly prefer a

25X1A
Comment; Growing inflationary pressures in France, which the prospective weak coalition government is not likely to control, threaten the fairly ambitious French defense program. The last government warned the US that France would be unable to fulfill its ephimitments in Indochina and Western Europe without fuller cooperition from all the NATO countrieS. Both the US Embassy and the ECA Mission in Paris recently deplored the "serious misunderstandings" between the US and French administrations, which had already resulted in a "sharp deterioration" of the mutual confidence necessary for obtaining the desired level and effectiveness of French defense strength.
25X1A
Approved tor Reler 20T0R: 0ISECRE7TA008.8027pO

--
1-8
L.:
29 Itily 1951
Copy No.C./-
25X1

DOCUMENT NO
Vt
REVIEWER
Ed
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S 5001

NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUT./111i
DAT
.
25X1
25X1

25X1
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030( 270001-8
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese peace treaty

(page 3).
2.
bage
3.
Increase in Costa Rican ship registry linked with Far East trade
FAR EAST
US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Japanese at San Francisco (page 4). 4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations (page 4).
2 5X1
EASTERN EUROPE
7.
Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength
25X1A
2 5X1
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A0003002 70001-8
25X1A
GENERAL...
1.
Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese neace treaty.
25X1A
2.
Ifissegue in enetailiralanin rezistrv linked with Far East trade:

Ship registrations under the Costa Rican flag have increased considerably in `the past few months, according to the US Embassy in San Jose. regulations attractive to foreign 1 ship owners are given as the cause.Loose One ship has been reported en route from Bremen to pick up Middle East oil for Vladivostok. Local Costa Rican officials believe that, since Costa Rica is still at war with Germany, touching at a German port could be used as grounds for the withdrawal of registry.
Comment: Approximately 19 ships are now registered under the Costa Rican flag, about double the number registered one year ago. At least five of the larger ships have carried cargo to the
25X1A
25X1A
The Italian Government is favorably considering the acceptance at theNS-UK-French offer to assist in the negotiation of a bilateral treaty with' aliTiap,; even though the Foreign Office has formally protested Italy's exclusion from the multilateratJapanese peace conference and is reportedly, much concerned over the effect of the exclusion on Italian public opinion. The Foreign Office reaction is probably due to the government's awareness that it must initially take a strong position on the issue, primarily in order to maintait_prestige at home.
;.
25X1
-3-
Approved Fo r Release 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300 270001-8
25X1A
Far. East in recent months, and one of these (the tanker Aster) is currently under Soviet charter for trade between Vladivostok and Communist China. In view of _Costa Rica's traditional willingness to cooperate with the US, there is every reason to expect that it would respond to US requests for tighter control of ship registry.
FAH EAST
25X1A
3
The Political Adviser also believes that such a procedure would be inconsistent with the announced conciliatory spirit of the treaty and with recent Occupation concepts; moreover, it would run the risk of rekindling the dormant desire of some nations to perpetuate the victor-vanquished relationship. He also feels that any unequal treatment for Japan would be resented by other Asian nations, and should the US become a party to any such concept of superiority, it might Jeopardize the future of the entlie US security program in the Far East.
25X1A 4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations:
As the result of a conversation with President Rhee the US Ambassador in Pusan believes it will be most difficult during the course of the Kaesong conference to keep Rhee from publicly disassociating himself from the negotiations or from indicating he is being forced to "go along."
25X1A
The US Political Adviser in Tokyo, with the concurrence of..General.Ridgwayi advises against, any procedure which would exclude the. Japanese.delegation from the opening sessions of the San Francisco peace .conference until invited to participate by . a resolution of tba viatoenations.- Repaints out that. in.the light of past experience, the Japanese will be sensitive and tense, suippeting that any real or imagined discriminatory treatment is designed to stigmatize them- as inferiors.
US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Japanese at San Franciscq:
Approved Fo r Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A0003 30270001-8
25X1A
Ilhee feels he cannot publicly do anything which would give the impression that he accepts the partition of Korea. Now that the Kaesong conference agenda has been agreed upon and tit possibility of an armistice exists, Rhee is infnxiated by ROK participation, which implies his approval of any agreements reached. Rhee's present instructions to the ROK representative are to attend "for the time being
only. "
25X1

-5
25X1A
'Approved For Release 2003/11104 : CIA-R0P79100975A00030 270001-8
25X1
25X1A
7. Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength:
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
Yugoslav officials have initially refused to answer an ECA questionnaire which would reveal the extent of Yugoslavia's military
-625X1A
Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP791-00975A00030C 270001-8
25X1A
expenditures, -the strength of its armed forces and other military infor.
mations...Chief of .Staff ,Popovic, .in discussing the. matter with Ambassador Allen, ,promised to report the .inquiry. to Tito and.Kardelli.-but.expressed the personal opinion. that. the information requested was.notoosunensurate with the..amount of aid granted or assured.. Popovic could not understand why ECA, a civilian agency, needed. the information and felt that Yugoslav determination to use the aid in the common cause against Soviet aggression should be sufficient assurance to. the US.
25X1A
comment; Despite its increasing reliance on Western economic and military assistance, Yugoslavia has been reluctant to join any Western-sponsored economic or military orgaeization. For internal political reasons the regime probably considers it expedient to maintain an independent posttion and to continue its program of developing an independent Socialist state.
25X1A
In view of the extreine Yugoslav sensitiveness regarding military information, Ambassador Allen suggests that the US should exercise patience and make the questionnaire as mild as possible in the beginning.
25X1

HR70-14
TsoP SECRET SUEll.d,

OP SECRE
SUEDE
,
NR
Urpt "Bit
6 taesong &esong negotiations.Aere negotiations them has has been a gradual n traffic traffic a.the been.a gradual &orreasa &crease i in volume Qn a l l North Korean conmumications n&mrks, While the ncstworb are
ItOREA. Traffio decline decline nated rwtecj IQ I North w KOREA. Traffic on Nbrth Korean Korean network& networks.' Since Since the the b bStinning
. . . . Comment: This gradual dedline decline may be explained explained by the deerease? n ccmaw Gement: This gradual maybe hvrthe decrease i in bat o m n during B during t h corresponding e corresponding periodo,During During this this period pariod of bat oFiarns the period. of dedecreased t r a f f i c thoro creased traffic there has has been been no no relaxation relaxation of of %ranaaisaion transmission security security which which might haw originated o r i g i n a t g d normally nowally in in a a belief t h a t the end of was might-have belief'that the end of %he the conflict conflict was On the the contrary, contrary, a a high has been i n sight.' sight. On in high dogree degree of of socvrity securtty effectiveness effecttveness has been n addition addition to $0 these securiy p r e a a d i m , cryptographic aryptographic systems systems maintainedo I maintained. In these security precautions have on a l l notworks h i s period. period. have beon been changed changed on all networks except except the the police police during during tthis
volums-pn all North Korean communications networks, lhile the networks are @ti-, the the average average number number of-messages-passed of messages assed ciPAly daily h&S active, has dropped &sipped approximately approximately 30 cente (SUEDE (SUEDE KC/IXBdis 28 Ju1 Jul 51) 30 per per cent. KC/TIB,S, 28
&)
I
I
The abovo factors, factars, while while inconclUsive, inconclusive, indicate, indiaate frm communications The above fram a a communications that (a) (a) the t h e Communists ConmnurLaCs are are in e t a t s o f madiness standpoint that standpoint in a a state of readiness for for any emsemer@nay (b) this readiness may may peint $oink to to a a CommUnist Communist belief onflict gency and and (b) thiereadiness belief that that the the c conflict w l l l not not terminate tnrplinate with the truce hwcs talksO will with the talks.
aw
. _
NR NR
-flep-sBefep-LJUEDE--
31 ity i751
.1)D
m
55
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE.20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 ATE: IDPPROVED
For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
. .
-.
HR70-14 HR70-14
*
Dud SECRET SUED:bel

SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) SECTION 2
/NR
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 C)ATE: 18-Mar-2010 IPPROVED

.

North Koreans .augmenting front line l i n e artillery: artillgry: Mountain MQuntain artillery &illary North Koreans augmenting front and equiped in Man& u r i a h a m reached the North Korean trqined Zing trained and equiped in Manchuria have reached the North Korean 1 T Corps, Corps, units (possib7y of battalion strength) according to to a a recent recent intercept. intercept. These according These units (possibly of battalion strength)
IcOTIpIA, KOREA.
2 2
TOP SECRET SUEDE

I.
. .. .
T6.4" SECRET SUED13,/

have been beon attached attached to t o each each of of the t h e divisions divisionssubordinate subordinateto t othat t h a tCorps Corpsds.. dehave 837, ployed defensively defensive1 on on the the UN U N forces' forces' northwest n o r t h s t flank. flank. (SUEDE played (SUEBB TIK TIK 837,
29 Jul. JUl 5 51; Jn1.51) 1 ; . TIW . M2641 2h[, 31 31 Jul 51)
r .
. .
' Comment: indicated that t h a t each each of of the the front front line line COMmentt. Previous'intercêpts Previous intercepts indicated NorthCorpswas was to t obe be augmented augmentedby by pack pack artillery a r t i l l e r y unitS units whose whose addiaddiNorth7RUnig Corps t i o n a l ffire i r e power o tthe h e enemy'e capabilitional. power and and mobilitywould mobility would add add tto enemy's offeneive offensive capabiltBased on on the the ties, particUlarly particularly in i n the the eastern eastern sector's sector's rugged rugged terrain. terrain. Based ties, latest reported reported locations, .1Julydestined latest locations: the the unlfs units which which left left SlSaiju Sinuijuon onI alyidestined for the the II, 1 1 , III, 1 1 1 , and and V n the r e not o for V Corps Corps i in the eastern eastern sector, sector, a are not expected expected tto affect the timing timing of of hostile hostile offensive offensive operations, operations, if i f such such are are planned. planned. The affeCt the The addition of of new new units units and and equipment equipment is i s in I nline line with with thegradual the gradual buil&w of of addition build...up North forces which has been going on on in i n Manchuria Manchuria and and Korea Korea With with Soviet Soviet North Korean Kerean forces which has been going assistance since the the near near collapse collapse of of these these units units after after the the Inchon Inchon landing. landing. assistance since

3 3
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Re Nese 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00e100300001-6
TOP SECRET
1 August 1951
CIA No. 49291
39
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
DOS AND DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments
Approved For Release 2002/63ig ileiNg.79T01146A000300300001-6
Approved For Redivide 2002106/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011,00300001-6
TOP MOOT
SECTION 1 (SOV/ET)
*BP WAO;
:OiUtoerietion ofinremertg. Sattiarch.Alexandros of Antioch arrived in MoscoW-on 20 july avowedly to discumscompensation for confiscated chmrch 'Icroperty. The Soviet Union is apparently aeeking to delay any decision mn CoMpensation in order to influence the Patriarch. Meanwhile it is
gistathsbauUstitaLomatax-iiatialtsaa
taking propaganda advantage of his visits am= played up his approval

of-the SteckhoIM Appeal, and the US Ebbassy.in Moseowoonsiders that mont WO will be made of his peace pact support in propaganda to the Near East. (C Monody 150, 27 July 51),
CommentS The UM:Rye stepped-up efforts to utilize the Near East OrthodoXChuroh as a means of spreading Soviet influence and power in that area hate been noted for over a year, but the USSR has apparently not yet suebeeded.in achieving control of any group. Mbst Orthodox Near East coMmunities appear to oppose Communism and view Soviet activities,with suspicion, with the possible exception of the Patriarch of Antioch. Act6rd4ng to seyeral seurces, however, he actuAly travelled to Mbscow to aeek compen. satioMfer the loss of revenue. The Archbishop of Istanbul, firmly anti.CoMmuniat-abd believed to be a top figure in the Near East Orthodoxbier.; arehy, recently assured US officials that Antioch would not sstray from the fold."
"B"

TOP SECRET
memoreting Navy Nay, Major General.Korniyenko recalled what he termed the rich revolutiOnarY tradition of the Russian Nov. According to him, from the very beginning of the October revolution.Rtssian sailors were counted among its Shock detachments.
Thal-staatkaRalitglabit.PEL.9.229katigne
In a lecture comp-
'
General Rorniyenko also ahlicathat no other navy in the world has made such great contributions to the development of science and oulture. He cited as exaMples the 85 expeditions undertaken in the Pacific alone fring the last half the eighteenth century, and asserted that bore than 30,000 kilometers of Arctic and Pacific cosatline, islands 'and archipeligees, a "considerable" part of the American continent's coast, and many areas of ASia Africa ost the Antarctic continents were discovered,. ,surveyed and described by Russiai navigators.. (R FBIS, 30 July 51)e
Comments. The recent appointment of Vice Admiral. Ruznetsov as Naval Ministerp'slong with the new emphasis on the real and imagined contributions ,pf the Rusdian Navy, indicates the increasing importance the USSR now .*btaches to the navy.
Approved For Rakesse 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDF79T01146AS1300300001-6
TOP SECRET
."410
The Embassy.in Moscow . by.the Quaker delegation cetsiders that thflordial treatment received seriousness to their visit. ftom the UK showa that the Soviets attached some non-official delegation has Such attention to a Western, non-Communist, Second-hand reports been unprecedented since the immediate postwar years,. Indicate that the Quakers were impressed by Soviet reasonableness in dimcuseing the toseibiiities ofreconciling East.:West difficulties.- The Quakers blamed-the West for intransigence at Paris and felt.that advantage should now be taken of the present change in Soviet tactics, as exemplified by the Dew publication gm and by Mtlikgs talk with the Quakers, to disk. cuss current tensions with.the USSR,
er d
"BR
EASTERN-EUROPE 'BULGARIA', 'Industrialization fails to reach opal. In its report.:ofiAhe.sectind.Onetterof.1954.the.Bulgarien.State.Planning Campmission claims a considerable increase in industrial production, but admits that implementation of the overall plan failed by 2.4 per cent. The commission specifically criticizes the following organizations for their failure to readh plan gots in the fields listeds (a) the Ministry of Industry.-- steel, metal processing and agricultural madhinery;'(b) the electric power and metal processing; Ministry of Electrification (c) the Minietry of Supplies -- food and Chemical industries; and (d) the Central Cooperative Union -- food industry, With respect to certain compmodities BUlgarian industry failed to reach its goals by significant amounts, e.g., electric power (7.2 per cent), electric bulbs (20,2 per centl household utensils and china (13.8 per cent), shoes (33.2 per cent), cheese (11.9 percent) and meat (3.9 per cent). (R FBIS0 30 July 51).
. '
Commead In order to meet the industrial goals set by the Five Tear Plan, .Bulgarta needs considerable outside assistance in procuring machinery which the USSR is'either unable or unwilling to and skilled personnel The chiefs of the ministriees listed above and the Chief of the Thrnish. industrial division of the Central Cooperative Union have been sufficiently criticited by the regime during the past two'years to justify their purge. It is probable, however, that they continue to remain in office as perennial scapegoats for failures that the USSR cannot or will not remedy.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Prothresj Accordinito.a 284uly dcamunique of the.Czechoslovak State Plexutuag Office', the increased goals of thetive4ear Plan have been fulfilbd for the first half of 1951.. Industry as a whole exceeded its targets by
"EP

TOP SECRET
The embasey comments that the visit was successful from the Soviet viewpoint and that the gremlin incidentally gained .good advice on how to Make ita propaganda more convincing to the West,. The enhassy noted that the QUakers, Convinced as they are that good cannot result from force, will not see the relationibetween any current change in Soviet attitude and UN military success in Korea. (C Moscow 158, 28 July 51),
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 :rEIA-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6
Approved For Reloads 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041900300001-6

TOP SECRET
1:3 per cent, and its volume of production rose by 12.5 per cent coMpared with the corresponding period of 1950. The various sectors of industry over-ftlfilled the plan during this period at followsi heavy industry, 100.7 Per cent; light industry, 102.6 per cent; food industry 1003 per cent. The heavy engineering industrYs despite a reported rise in the volume of prodUction over 1950, did not fUlfill its pIan, Shortages Of raw materials, especially non,ferrous metals and rolled steel, as well as poor management, were cited as corps tributing causes. In conparisOn with the first half of 1950$ coal production increased 5.5 per dent, The production of lignite arid coke surpassed the planned iluotae, but that Of hard coal did not. The production plan for electricity also was not
'
Despite the impressive figures representing general ful of engineering productioni hard coal production and electricitY output to meet planned goals means that Czechoslovakia is not meeting the increased Soviet demands for heavy industrial products, The State Planning Office's admission that a shortage of non-ferroun metals exists does not jibe with the eulogisticamments about Soviet aid, but does correspond to known Czech efforts to obtain these very materials clandestinely from the West. Some of the failures can be attributed to increasing labor discontent, increased absenteeiam and aporadic paseive economic sabotage.
fillment$ :the
RUMANIA.

Comments
The communique reports that the volume of Czechoslovak foreign trade during the period was 30.1 per cent greater than in the first half of 1950. The Soviet Orbit's share of this trade rose to 56.8 per cent of the total, ae against 52 per dent in 1950. The communique eulogized the aid of the SoViet Union in providing Czechoslovakia with grain, industrial raw materials, machinery, and food, (R MS, 30 July 51).
failure
GaVernMent Wade u'.l2,...I.,_fSs'_frsat,tpu"tl-fieatel'ieznrua.
fulfilled.
The
attestOf "an iMportant number of spies and.provocateurs..employed by the Yugoslav Security Police" in the interest of the American espionage service" has been- announced by the Rumanian Government. The accused were allegedly instructed to propagate chauvinism among the ranks of the SerMan population in the Banat region on the Yugoslav borderi to agitate for the union Of the Rumanian Banat with Yugoslavia, and to penetrate the ranks of Yugoslav einigres in Rumania. Rumania ftrther charges that many of the accused.have relatives in the Banat whom they were sent in to incite. (B PHIS, 30 JulY 51)0
Comment,s This is the first group of alleged Yugoslav agents slated for public trial in Rumania during the past year. Undoubtedly resulting
TOP SECRET
Approved For Reese 2002106/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0.9600300001-6
TOP SECRET
from'strong Western reaction to Rumania's eviction.ofthousands.of,Banat residertir (see 0/01 Daily Digests, 25 and 27 June, 17 July 51)0he announeement of the arrests sets the stage for the usual Communist props, genie campaign to justify police state measurds.
"Bo

TOP SECRET
Comment: This report points up the frequent disparity in Yugoslav stateMents.. In.his Titograd speech on 13 July Tito declared that the border situation was becoming worse, and more recently Yugoslav leaders expressed some concern that Molotov's Warsaw speech might be the prelude to Satellite aggression against YUgoslavia. There is-no evidence that border incidents have become more frequent or serious, and available lAtelligence appears to support Mtola's statement.
4
YUGOSLAVIAI-Intellicence Chief exrects no Satellite attack in .!Mmediate fUture. :IUgOsIavia-does.not expedfl.Soviet.Satellite.attackin the_ !mediate lfttre, accOtding to Admiral Manola, the Yugoslav Deputy Chief of Staff and reportedly also the Chief of Intelligence. In a conversation with the US Military Attache on 24 July, Mamie stated that border incidents remained oh a small scale and the only indication of danger was an uncon firmed report of.a pontoon bridge installed over the Danube on, the RumanianBulgarian border. The US Military Attache reports that Yugoslav military activities are completely normal; it is his impreasion that Yugoslav leaders are basically unconcerned over the possibility of a general war.
Approved For Refeste 2002106/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0861100300001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C".
SYRIA. Cabinet resigns: Prime Minister Kalid al-Azm and his cabinet have tendered their resignations to thetPresident of Syria. One of the first ministers to resign was a "Hawrani man," indicating, in the view of the US Minister, a deliherate move by Hawrani.and the army to bring about the fall of the Cabinet.; Although Azm might be asked to form another government, Maruf Dawalibi has been mentioned hy many as a.likely successor. Any government headed by Dawalihi would include some Populists Who would permit Parliament to continue with its work. (1 FBID Brazzaville, 30 Jul 51; C Damascus 55, 30 Jul 51). Comment: This report indicates that Colonel Shishakli, the Chief of Staff, continues to be the real power in Syria. Akrim Hawrani, leader of the Arab Socialist Party-and a recent critic of the government, is his close friend. Although a coalition government containing some members ofthe Populist Party - currently in opposition - might be able to progress with the business of government, Mere Dawalibi, who has stated that Syria should ally with the USSR rather than with the US, would as prime minister foster antiAlestern sentiment n Syria.
"B"
Commission to attempt to obtain oil direct from Iran: The project manager for Morrisorktudson AfghanistanJa US construction firm) has been told by the Acting Prime Minister of Afghanistan that a commission headed by the Afghan Minister of Mines Will proceed shortly to Iran to attempt to arrange for oil shipments directly from Iran to Afghanistan. MorrisonKnudsen Afghanistan has been asked to investigate the feasibility of sending Afghan tank trucks to the Iranian border if the Iranians are able to deliver oil products there. Such an arrangement would eliminate present transshipment through Pakistani territory. (C Kabulal, 27 Jul 51).
Comment: Sihce Iranle oil storage facilities are full and its export outlets by sea are closed, Iran probably will welcome the Afghan suggestion. However, difficulties likely to be encountered in diverting Iranian oil carriers from their present internal distribution duties may-prevent effective implementation of any agreement reached by the two countries.
AFGHANISTAN.
..
"B"
BURMA. Situa.tion in dentral Nina deterioratingi A US Embaesy officer who recently spent a week in Mandalay reports that the town is virtually surrounded by Communist insurgents and that attacks on communication facilities have increased in number and intensity. Although there is much speculation that the well-armed insurgents are being suppliethfrom China; the Communists are also receiving arms through sales from government forces. There are no indications that the government is taking steps to halt the deterioration of law and order in the area, and the army apparently is unable to do more than defend the towns,,leaving the initiative in the hands of the Communists. (3 Rangoon 115, 27 Jul 51).

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : Ca-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6
Approved For Re4aase 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A060300300001-6

TOP SECRET
Comment: The situation in central Burma has obviously taken a turn for the worse. Little improvement can be expected so long as friction between C-in-C Ne Win and the Socialists continues and the reportedly alarming deterioration of morale is unchecked. The Communists can look forward to increasing Chinese encouragement and suPport.
193"
HURMA/CHINA. Communist-KUT forces clash in Yunnan: Chinese Communist and Nationalist units have been engaged in heavy but indecisive fighting in southwest Yunnan, according to a spokesman of the Burmese War Office, One highly reliable report mentioned the disarming of a battalion of Chinese Communist troops in Mangshih after the defection of 200 of its members to the KO forces. (S Rangoon 115, 27 Jul 51).
Comment: This report appears to be overly optimistic regarding EMT successes. Reliable evidence indicates that the KMT forces have suffered severe defeats at the hands of the Chinese Communists and have retreated into Burma.
.,"B"
INDOCHINA. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina: The French Foreign Office appears to have receded from its former opposition to the repatriation to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops interned in Indochina, according to the Chinese Nationalist Minister in Paris. .Although emphasizing that General De lattre and the next French cabinet must approve any such decision, a Foreign Office official hinted that it might be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await Chinese Communist reaction. (C Paris 652, 30 Jul 51).
Comment: The Chinese Nationalist Government has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French, however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action might provide the Chinese,Comr munists with a pretext for intervening in Indochina.
This is the second report during the past week that the French position in this matter has been relaxed.
"B"
Vietnam to draft 60,000: The Vietnam Government supplemented its recently assumed authority to conscript doctors by issuing a decree' calling up a contingent of 60,000 ntentra two-month military instruction period. US Minister Heath describes the Vietnam.Governmentle series of mobilization measures beginning 15 July as "the key to De Lattre's policy" since the joint French-Vietnamese declaration of "total war" against the Viet Minh on 19 April. Heath does not believe there will be any great difficulty in drafting 60,000 men. (S Saigon 258, 30 Jul 51).
Comment: The fact that the mobilization measures represent "De Lattre's polidy," and will be executed by Vietnamese who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty to De Lattre rather then by their devotion to the cause of

TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Re !Me 2002/06/13 : CIA-R0P79101146A004300300001-6

TOP SECRET
Vietnamese independence, will tend to limit the effectiveness of the mobilization policy. Previous French refusal to turn over,4,000 rifles to the hard-pressed Vietnamese regional security forces in North Vietnam contrasts with their apparent ability to arm 60,000 Vietnamese under the Francophile central government of Tran Van Huu.
French general and Vietnamese official slain. Thai Lap Thanh, Governor of South Vietnam, and General Charles Chanson, Commander of French Forces in South Vietnam, were killed by the grenade of a Viet Minh terrorist' in the province of Sadao, west of Saigon. (R Press TiCker Paris, 31 Jul 51).
Comment: This incident is a striking exception to the generally declining trend of terrorism in South Vietnam! a high ranking French officer has been killed hy It is the first time that a terrorist. Governer Thai Lap Thanh was, despite his title, a relatively uninfluential figure in the Vietnam administration.
"T"
Comment: Although it i8 true that the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Peiping issued visas to the Chinese, the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta made no effort to inform the Indonesian Foreign Office of the pending arriVal of additional staff members until three days before their ship docked. Even then the Embassy failed to provide names and positions. Indonesia, therefore, considers that the Chinese Government hao deliberately ignored diplomatic procedures, and to date has refused to reconsider its decision refusing entry to the 16 Chinese.
-
Comment: It is not clear what unions participated in the congress. A loose federation of the four Indonesian oil unions - the Oil Workers Committee 'for Joint Action - has been non-SOBSI, although one of the participating unions was a SOBSI affiliate and another was pro-SOBSI. It is probable that these two latter unions and possibly a third, having been unsuccessful in forcing the Committesvto join putsI; have formed their own'organization and have established connections with the Communist federation.
INDONESIA. Oil workers' trade unions decide to affiliate with SOBS'. A congreas of oil trade unions decided on 27 July to affiliate with Communistdominated SOBSI0 Indonesia's largest trade union federation, (R FBID Ticker Djakarta, 29 JUl 51).

TOP SECRET
7
INDONESIA/CHINA. Communist China claims Indonesia violated international ractice: A Peiping release by the New China News Agency on 25 July states that doneeials refuaal to admit 16 new staff members of the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta is contrary to international practice. The release claims that all sixteen had obtained entryvisas from the Indonesian Embassy in China. The Chinese Government has expreseed deep regret over the affair and is taking up the matter with the Indonesian Government. (U Hong Kong 388, 28 Jul 51).
Approved for Release 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6
Approved For Rel
e 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A094300300001-6
TOP SECRET
"C"
Hong Kong shipowner seeks reinstatement of Panamanian re,istry: The Hong Kong firm of Wallem & Co., Ltd., owner of the vessel Marion 00317 gross tons), has cabled its Calcutta agents that "we undertake never to trade with Chinese ports again during the present emergency." These assurances were given in order to regain Panamanian registry, cancelled after the vessel loaded cargo in Calcutta for Communist Chiha. In View of the owner'e aseurances, the US Consul General in Calcutta has no objection to restoretion of the vesiells Panamanian registry. (C Calcutta 86, 27 Jul 51).
CHINA.
.
Comment: Wellem & Co., Ltd., has a long record of dealing with the Chinese Communists. The company's assurances that the vessel will not again call at Chinese ports are probably designed merely to achieve restoration of the ship's papers, so that it may clear Calcutta. If the policy of the Panamanian government continues to hamper Wallem's dealings with Communist China, the company can transfer the vessel to other registry.
"A"
25X1C
25X1A
25X1C
Chinese Communists concerned over losses in Korea: the statement of Gen. Yeh Chien-ying; Chairman of the Kwangtung provincial government and Secretary of the CCP's South China Sub-Bureau, that China should "take advantage of the (Kaesong) Peace negotiations to preserve the core of the Axially," tnd that a continuation of the Korean conflict would have "catastrophie effects on the Chinese Communist forces.
25X1A
Comment: It is ironic that this same Gen. Yeh, severel months ago, publicly stated that it was international Communist strategy to employ the manpower resources of Asian 'liberation' movements to force the Western powers to engage in costly attritional warfare which the latter could not long afford. Chinese Communist casualties ih Korea are estimated to approach 600,000. Although intensiVe recruiting has restored Chinese Communist field forces to their pre-Korea numerical level of approximately 2,000,000, the Chinese have lost a significant proportion - possibly as high as 25 percent of their best-trained and best-indoctrinated troops.
Chiang Ching-kuo gains control of Nationalist press and propaganda: Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's eldcr son, -reportedly became dissatisfied with the efforts of Nationalist press and propaganda spokesman, Tao Hsishing during the current anti-American campaign.
25X1A
He charged that Tao failed to carry out the Generalissimo's wishes and that his subordinates did not denounce the Americans strongly enough. Tao offered his resignation, and it was accepted promptly. Chiang Ching-kuo's immediate subordinate in the political bureau was appointed to replace him.
Comment: This is anotherindication of Chiang Ching-kuo's antiAmerican attitude and his growing strength within the Nationalist government.
TOP SECRET
8
Approved For Rel belie 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006a0300001-6

TOP SECRET
"B"
Chinese Nationalists react to US memoranda on aid controls. Chiang Kai-shek was "considerably upset" by the Department of State memoranda requesting effective supervision.and control of US aid. The memoranda, after some delay, were sent to the cabinet by Chiang on 27 July. Meanwhile, on 25 July the cabinet learned of the US memoranda and held a secret meeting at which Chiang Ching -kuo, the Generalissimo's elder son,opposed the US recommendations. Foreign Minister George Yeh, heretofore considered pro-US, stated, "the, US is forcing the Nationalists to the edge of surrender." This stand obviously was taken in an attempt to regain the Generalissimo!s favor, since the Foreign Minister has been blamed for the.exclusion of the.Nationalists from the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Among those favoring the US suggestions are Premier Chen Cheng and the Governor of Formosa, K. C. Wu. Chang Chun, a former premier and close associate,of 'the Generalissimo, was entrusted with the job of making him realize the consequences of losing US aid. Chang Chun will also attempt to convince the Generalissimo that the anti-American campaign begun over the the exclusion of the Nationalists from the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty should not be overdone and might result in the replacing of the present US Embassy staff by others less sympathetic.
1 I
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: Despite the realization that American aid is essential to their existence, the Chinese Nationaliats apparently are determined to advance their contention that US controls would be an infringement of the sovereignty of a free nation.
If the US remains firm, the Nationalists will be forced to yield to the controls requested. They will, nevertheless, make every effort to free themselves of US supervision.
25X1C
"B"
Non-Communists In the Peinaisillusionedil:

I members of non -Commmnist
25X1C
25X1A
,parties invited to join the "coalition" government set up by the Chinese Communist Party (qcP) in the.fall of 1949 are "very disillusioned with their lot." lhese persons feel that no non-Communist is informed of major decisions before they becoze public, that none occupies an important office, and that they have little authority in the posts they do hold. Further, non-Communist officials receive less real pay than their Communist colleagues and are subject to more severe punishment for malfeasance. Finally, nonCommunist officials must unconditionally obey their Communist superiors, cannot express themselves as nan the Communists, and are regarded by the Communists as inferior beings. The consensus is that non -CoMmunist officials "have become slaves" and that their parties "are only puppets" of the CCP.
TOP SECRET
9
Approved For cialease 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T0114010:10300300001-6

TOP SECRET
"C".
general been confirmed hy all sources and Comment: This account has in puppet parties and their members. is a good summary of the status of the has ordered all Chinese New blow at US missions. The Peiping regime (to) sever xelations" Christian churches and organizations "immediately supported by US funds, and has with American missions and other missions their activities in China." further ordered "all such missions (to) cease of all US missionaries The decree of 27 July provides for the departure reflme or are accused of crimes other than those who are still useful to the (1/ FBID Peiping, 30 Jul 51 ). against the regime.
frank campaign to eliminate US Comment: This step in Peiping's groups into puppets influence from China and to transform Chinese religious It has long been apparent to most of the regime.has been anticipated. Missionaries missionaries that they Wad no future in Communist China. natianals now imprisoned in comprise the majority Of the 25 to 30 US Communist China, and other arrests are expected.
"C"
present level: A Communists plan to continue aid to Indochina,at Republic of Vietnam decision to withhold Overt support from the Democratic reportedly made (DRV), but to continue the "secret infiltration" policy was nay representatives in at a 28 to 30 June meeting of Chinese, Soviet and (a) at this conference include: Canton. Other plans allegedly reached in the border area, the use, if necessary, of Chinese troops concentrated to be infiltrated by the two regiments at one time, up to a maximum of doubling, if necessary, "old method" - i.e., use of DRV uniforms; (b) the with the DRV forces; of the number of Chinese and Soviet advisors on duty China of 1.000 tons each and (e) the designation by the Soviet Union and of supplies permonth to the DRV ther transmitted e For critical security reasons this report is not to United States, withbeyond the borders of the within the United States, or out the express permission of the releasing office).
25X1A 25X1A
have been reported frequently -Comment: Conferences of this nature of the decisions allegedly taken has since November, but no confirmation to enlarge their present aii been received. The Communist potential points is generally conprogram by impleMenting any or all of the above complete road and rail contacts :ceded. Recently intensified efforts.to increased in the near future. with Indochina indicates that such aid may be with USSRIs role in Korean war. A "C" KOREA. Communist troops dissatisfied reveals that several mid-June psychological warfare summary from Korea among Communist which indicate dissatisfaction reports have been reoeived SoViet troops over the Soviet role in Korea. This discontent centers on support for COmmunist failuteAO -Li)._ send much-propagandized material sent to Korea on offensives, and (b) support Chinese Communist troops, (S Psychological Warfare Operations, Soviet orders, with Russian troops.
13-19 Jun 51).

TOP SECRET
1.0
Approved For Ramie 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09000300001-6

TOP SECRET
Comment: While the evidence is inconclusive, any awakening among Communist troops to the actual Soviet position in Korea would be significant.
South Korea wants foreign troops to stay a years The BOK pirector of Public Information announced'on 30 July that South Korea will require foreign troops for defense and, to train ROK forces. He estimates that it will be a year before the South Koreans will be in aTosition to defend themselves. (iR FBID Ticker Reuters, 30 Jul 51).
Comment: This expression of need for external military assistance stands out in sharp contrast to recent bombastic statements of several ranking South Korean officials, including President Rhee. The general tenor of those remarks was that the South Koreans could gcron to the Yalu alone if , necessary.

TOP SECRET
11 Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-R0P79101146A000300300001-6
Approved For Re Nose 2002106/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A094900300001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(NESTERS)
"A"
WESTERN EUROPE. Western European Communists coordinate efforta towardslabor agitation. ND members of the Italian Communist PartyDirectorate are expected to meet with French Communist leaders in Paris during Menet to.coordinate a large-scale program for a peace propaganda campaign and labor agitation in both countries in September,
Comment: Such plans would be consistent with known Communist intentions to exploit rising living, costs in order to sabotage the Western-defense effort. Should the Communists stress labor's economic grievances, as they did With considerable success in France last spring, they would have a good chance of totching off a sorioup wave of strikes.
In the past two years) however, Communist efforts to foment port strikes inWestern Europe for ideological reanons have generally failed, 'and the current intensity of shipping activity in France and the Benelux yountries further reduces the Communists' appeal to the dockers. Despite considerable unemployment in Italian ports, the Communists have also been unable to win significant support for politically motivated strikes.
"AN
FRANCE-ITALY. Prominent Communists visit USSR and Satellites. Jacques buclos, Acting Secretary General of the French Communist Party (PCF), is reported to be on "vacation", possibly in the USSR visiting Maurice Therez. During his absence, Francois Billoux, PCF politburo member, will direct Communist activities. The Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Pahairo Togliatti, is also reported to be planning an early trip to the USSR. Other prominent Italian Communists have recently.left Italy for Central Europe Trith Prague as a possible destination.
25X1A
French and Italian Communist port workers reportedZy met recentlY in Marseille to plan strikes and sabotage for the entire Mediterranean baein at an unspecified time. Communist seamen and dockere are also reported to have met in Amhterdam on 3 July to schedule-a "big offensive" for early-fall in ail Northern European ports.
1
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
CommAt Inasmuch as an official Cominform meeting is reportedly scheduled for the near future, both Duclos and Togliatti mgy have been asked to present official.reports on Communist activities.- Duclos' absence from recent sessions of the National Assembly previously led to the assumption that he had gone to the USSR.
"B"
SWITZERLAND. Eiport controls to be effected largely through "gentlemah's agreement". The -Smiss Government's position on export controls, which Wall
TOP SECRET
12
Approved For Re Image 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A094100300001-6
TOP SECRET
be communicated to the 1 August meeting of the Coordinating Committee's control group, is as follows: (1) The government will put into effect early in August measures agreed upon recently in Bern by the US and the Swiss, such measures to be retroactive to 25 June. (2) The government cannot compel cancellation of old Azontracts, but in practice many companies will cancel or delay execution.
(S Bern 163, 30 JulY 51)
Comment: The government's admission that it cannot in general bring pressure to bear oh Swiss industry is in line with the laissez-faire policy .dominating the Swiss economy. Gentleman's agreements mill not prevent many Swiss industrialiets from acting in accordance with their own interests, even if the East is benefitted thereby,
"C" SPAM UK rajects Madrid note on US-Spanish defense talks.
The British F3Fagn Office has officially rejected- the Spanish note of 21 July which complained about UK-"meddling with SpaniSh Sovereignty" in the matter of US-Spanish mutual defense talks. The Spanish Atbassador in London accepted the British Foreign Secretary's oral rejection which was couched in "mild terms" in preference to a more caustic written answer drafted by the Foreign Office, (S London 593, 30 Atli 51)
ComMent: The Spanish note reflects the Madrid governmentis bitterness at UK Objections to a spenish-US agreement upon which Franco is pinning his hopee for surviVel. The controlled Spanish press has redently adopted a ptern attitude toward critics of US-Spanish defense talks, and asserts that it is a-sign of weakness to appease such "tools of the Kremlin" as the Sacialiet governments of Europe. The newspapers present Spain's willingness to cooperate-in Western defense as a recognition of its responsibilities for pretecting Civilization and peace and they label the British and French governments as unreliable mercenaries.
"B"
.
.
DENMARK-SWEDEN. Suggest Hague Court ruling on Soviet claketd territorial waters. The Danish and Swedish ambassadors at Moscow submitted notes to the Soviet Foreign Offide on 18 July suggesting that Denmark, Sweden, and the USSR agree to submit to the International Court at The Hague the question of whether the Soviet Union is entitled by

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 MlA-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6
(3), The government cannot make a commitment in situations where Eastern and Western buyers are competing, but Swiss industry has a gentleman's Agreement to give priority to Western orders.
Approved For Re Node 2002/06113 : ClA-RDP79T01146A011,1)00300001-6

TOP SECRET
international law to exercise jurisdiction over territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles off its Baltic Sea coasts. (U Copenhagen FDIS-Danish radio, 28 July 51)
Comment: Since 1946 Russian patrol boats have seized a number of Swedish and Danish fishing vessels for allegedly violating the 12-mile demarcation of territorial waters. On 31 August 1950, the USSR rejected a joint Swedish-Danish protest and reiterated its contention that the delineation of territorial waters is the sole right of the littoral state. The Danes and Swedes have been unwilling to adopt any retaliatory measures, and in fact have advised their fishermen to remain safely distant from Soviet shores with the result that actual seizures have been much fewer this year. But they (particularly the Swedes) do not wish silently to acquiesce in the Soviet claim, which they therefore continue to-reject largely for the record.
."B"
Present countermeasures naW include Western refusal to approve the interzenal trade agreement, and a partial embargo on goods to east Germany. ,Mere stringent measuree have not been adopted because of French reluctance to provoke Soviet retaliation. A limited airlift with commercial planes has already begun to move the bilge backlog of Berlin exports bottled up by the Soviet refusal to let them move overland through east Germany. (S Frankfurt Unnumbered, 29 July 51, S Paris 612, 28 July 51)
Comment:
exports to sp6477giclusion of the interzonal trade agreement, which is not-only valuable in itself, but 'serves as a Cover for illegal trede. Failing in this purpose, the Soviets nevertheless observed that the restrictions could .play hob withWest Berlin's economy, a desirable result in the SoViet view. The Kremlin might mull be_willing to dontinue the restrictione
for some time, for though they would result in depriving the Soviet zone of same valuable West German goods, the damage inflicted upon the West Berlin economy Would be proportionately much greater. If, however, the West is able to Move West Berlin exports by commercial or military airlift, the Soviet restrictions would be stripped of their economic effect.

TOP SECRET
GERMANY. Soviet Motive for Berlin trade restrictions. may have shifted. US officials in Berlin believe that the USSR, having imposed restrictions on Berlin exports for such limited objectiVes as speeding the conclusion of an interzonal trade agreement, say now 112.8 these restrictions for broader economic and political purposes. The officials foresee' a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain and develop these reetrictions (centering around ,the demand for certificates of Origin). The officials estimate that the USSR could withstand the present and proposed Allied economic counter Measures for another two months', and even longer, if Soviet Objectives were, on the whole, being served.
The USSR may have imposed the restrictions:on BerlinTs
Approved For Release 2002/06/13 ?-8lA-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when lAviircircedlerfzethsartio SCIVT9PitiniFa3PriftritifigMbaOdstatchd or declossified when fined in form is detache
MUM controle
document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCR I PT ION SOURCE
DOC. NO..
REG I STRY
CIA CONTJkOL NO
DAT
DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOG. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This /orm will be placed on top oi and attached tO each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such Mme as It is downpraded, destroyed. Or transmitted outside o/ CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official dune, relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and Indicate the data of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
RELEASED
DATE
T I Alf
SEEN BY
NOTICE OF DETACIIMEIVT: When this form is detect ed front Top Secret Material it shalt be completed In the appropriate and transmit f d to Central Top Secret Contro /or record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
DISPATCHED
TO
5 IGNATURE
DATE
TIME
S IGNATURE
OFF ICE/DIV.
DATE
space
below
DESTROYED
sr (signature)
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
WITNESSED BY
OFFICE
(Signature)
DA 'LE
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFFICE

1141 PREVIOUS EOIPIONS.
OFFICk
26
TOP SECRET
(40)
Approved For Re Are 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004100300001-6
TOP SECRET
1 August 1951
CIA No. 49291-A Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current not represent a complete coverage of all Intelligence. It does current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
- items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments
"B"

TOP SECRET
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
Approved For Re leave 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,000300001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1
(SOVIET)
"A"
USSR. Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy considered likely. The US riiiMsy in London suggests the possibility that the USSR milL now seek
to re-enter a period of "peaceful coexietence during which it will attempt to increase its own strength while calcUlating that the West May be weakened by unpreparedness, complacency, or edonomic cilia's. :As reasons for shell a Kremlin choice, the embassy points to the USSR's provocation ofWestern rearmament, some other serious failures of Soviet policy over the past three Years, and the apparent Soviet unreadiness to challenge the West in a fullscale war.
Recalling the precedent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 19301s, the embassy characterizes the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat" and an imminent showdown with the West. The USSR may even, for the time being, refrain from further local aggressions 'oh the part of the Satellites, since the riek of thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR careth to incur. The embassy sPeculates that the "cautious" nature of Soviet policy has been upset in the Far East by the "revolutionary fervor" of the Chinese Communists but that the USSR can be more conciliatory in Europe because the Satellites are more malleable. In the embassy's opinion, a renewed attempt to achieve an Austrian Treaty Should be used to test the new Soviet protestations of a desire to cooperate. (S 5/8 London 562, 27 Jul 51)
Commerit: The only evidence of a Possible change in Soviet foreign policies, aside from a professed willingness to settle the Korean War, lies in the trade arid cultural fielde, but activities in these fields haVe not so far involved ariy real concessions on the Part .of the Soviet Government. They have coincided with a rather sharp shift in the propaganda line, apParentIy designed to persuade susceptible non-Communist governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet Union is no longer necessary.
"B" EOM: King unwillinito break off Anglo-Egyptian negotiatiohe. Ihe

,
Dritish Ambassador is to be informed,on King Farouk's orders, that. Salaheddin, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, had not been authorized to state that the Ahglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 would be denounced unless .there were tangible evidence.of progress in the negotiations by mid-August. The Egyptian Prime Minister has been informed of the King's opinion and is expected to respect it. The Royal Press Counselor is not disturbed by the possibility of Salaheddin's resignation from the Cabinet, which already has two vacancies, because he.feels that Salaheddin's following is overrated. (TS S/S Cairo 119, 28 July 51)
TOP SECRET

SECTION 2
(EASTERN)
4.
Approved For Re lea" 2002106113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004100300001-6

TOP SECRET
Egypt's poor showing in the Palestine campaigns convinced Farouk of the necessity for AngloEgyptian defense cooperation. He has previously warned government officials against breaking off negotiations with the British. Specifically, he has informed Salaheddin that he would never be forgiven should he resign over this issue. present strength of Salaheddin's political following, Regardless of the should he resign from the government he would become the focal point for those forces opposed to continuing ties with the British.
SECTION 3
HD"
Comment:
(WESTIMN)
Comment: In June of this year Gruber hoped for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore regarded the deputies' sessions as unnecessary. (See OCI Daily Digest, 5 June 51,) Now, with no prospect of a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitude toward the efforts of the deputies.

ThP SECRET
2
that the continuity of treaty efforts should not be interrupted altogether. Gruber does not feel that there is any present urgency for a meeting of the deputies, although he indicates that another attempt at a treaty could loom more important in the autumn, depending on developments of the next few weeks. Gruber considers that there is a general contact through the Council of Foreign utility in preserving fourpower Ministers or the deputies. (S S/S Vienna 362, 27 July 51)
Gruber looks with favor upon reopening of treaty talks. Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has welcomed US suggestion that negotiations be resumed on the Austrian treaty, asthe he considers it important
AUSTRIA.
..
1
i
HR70-14 HR70-14
SU EDJ -7164)---SEGRETSUEDe
z 4-,51
,)

FAR EAST
. North front line line artillery: artillery: sorth Koreans augmentingfront 2,

Tir $4 :37 837
Iv L I 4.1.1 LCI
Mountain artillery trainedand and equipped e uipped Mountain artillery units trained i n the fhe Manchuria-Korea Manchuria-Korea border in border araaqhave arearhave theNorth NorthKorean. Korean I...Corps, I Corps, accordreachedthe -reached accordThese units, prob-, probintercept, These to a recent intercept. units* nif CY 24V =+ .ably of battalion strength, haveing been attached to each of the divisions subor -ably of battalion strength, have been attached to each. of the divisions suborL rr7 jindinate to 4 W7 &4?dinate tothat that corps,now nowdeployed deployeddefensively defensively on the UN UN forms' corps,. forces'. northwest northwest flank.. flank
North Korean. Military Korean Military
.- .
31. July 5 51. ~ .129y. / ~ 2 $1 0 , July 1 'SUEDE 'BUEDF
v'
-_
-3APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
-TOP-SECilET SUEDE SUEDE
m SUEDE? -TOP-SECRETSUEDe
....Cianmagnt;The Thearrival arrival, a of these. )vell as as these as, as,yell similar artillery, units of the other fhree Three frontline frontline Norm North s i m i l a rmountain, mountain artillery units for for each. each of ,Ko.rean Corps ..indicated,by. other intercepts, w will add.to tothe the emmyts enemVs offenKoreap corps, indicated,by other Intercepts, i l l add terrain.o oft the eastern. sector, sector. qiya capabilities,_particularly particularly in..the.,rugged La the rugged terrala f h @ emtern Aive capabilities, While the movement movement of ofthese these.artillery.units While the artillery unite alone alone is. is not expected sxpecbd to affect, affect the timing. t i m i n g of opmat.i&s, the the addition addition al o fnew new Units Units and, and equipof-y any offensive. .offensiveoperatifins, ment is i spart partof of the the gradual gradualbuild-up builddup of d North Korean forces forces with Soviet a@asststance over a period of several months.. sistance over a pericid, of several months.,
IR
-4
I
..
-TOP-SECRET SUEDE 3BFSEMT SUEDE
Approved For Re Awe 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00600310001-5
TOP SECRET
2 August 1951 CIA No. 49292

Copy No.
iS
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website

TOP SECRET
Approved For RelMe 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79T01146A001e00310001-5

TOP SECRET
SECT/ON 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. Pravda prints article by British Foreign Secretary: As a result of a challenge last month by Herbert Morrison, Pravda printed in full end without alteration an article by the Foreign Secretary which highlighted the internal freedoms of domestic British life and briefly exThe article plained the Ulfle policy and aims in international relations.
was accompanied by a Soviet rebuttal that contradicted Morrison point by point. By agreement the rebuttal was published in full in Britain, appeering in more than twenty morning newspapers. (u NY Times, 1 Aug 51).
Comment: Pravda's unprecedented action may well be part of Moscowls new propaganda line and tactics apparently designed to soften Western anti-Soviet unity. At the same time, however, the publication of propaganda material criticizing the West has not diminished in amount or intensity. There hae still been no mention in Soviet media of President Truman's message of friendship from the American to the Russian people sent about a month ago.
The Soviet cruisers Two Soviet cruisers depart from Baltic area: Chapayev ami'Eheleznyakov were last reported in the Skagerrak early on 17 July after leavinglhe Baltic Sea. Although no further contact has been established, the Ships are believed enroute to the Northern area or possibly the Far East via the Northern Sea route. (S Navy D/D 143, 20 Jul 51).
At the recent plenary session Party limits ignore link with masses: of the Central Committee of the Byelorussian Communist Party, the Minsk Provincial Party Committee was "justly" criticized for ite lack of initiative and its inability to organize farmers and machine tractor station workers for the purpose of raising the province's agricultural output. Party units were once again warned to develop the "creative initiative" of the masses ahd to make the widest possible use of every laborsaving device. The meeting was reminded that a party worker whose link with the masses is "feeble" cannot successfully discharge the tasks en, trusted to him. As an example of this, the speaker cited the case of the Magnitogorsk Town Party Committee, which weakened its link with the primary party organizations by frequently ignoring the valuable initiative derived from below. While the party organization at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Works was reported to have achieved excellent results in implementing the State Plan, the Town Party Committee was criticized for insvSficiently atudying and applying the "considerable" experience amassed by this organization. (R FBIS, 31 Jul 51),

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CR-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For RelMlIge 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79101146A0811100310001-5

TOP SECRET
This is another example of the constant struggle of the Comment: Soviet Communist Party to increase agricultural production by attempting to overcome the apparently permanent sluggiehness of the disinterested agricultural worker.
EASTERN EUROPE, FINIAND, Formation of new cabinet postponed until The Finnish Government has confirmed reports that the forma, Septembers tion of a new Cabinet will not take place until after the Diet reconvenes in September. All parties except the Communists supported the decision to delay the Cabinet reshuffle, which has become necessary because of changes in party strength in the Diet ressilting from the national elee(R,Heleinki 61, 29 Jul 51). tione of 2 and 3 July.
The Diet recessed on 31 July. Postponement of the forma, Comment: tion of the new Cabinet was probably due in large part to the incumbent government's desire to complete ite study of new inflation control mea sures. This delay will also permit more time for inter-party discussions concerning the composition of the new Cabinet and the best means for continuing to keep the Communists out of the Cabinet.
PO/A311. 'Indictment of former Army officers lays emphasis on national deviations The indictment of nine former senior Polish Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes their alleged efforts to create a "Titoist Fascist regimen in Poland and to a lesser extent their criminal, saversive and esnonage activities for the US and UK, The indictment accuses former Polish Communist Party Secretary Gomulka and ex-Minister of National Defense General Spychalski of protecting these officers. It also associates the defendants with other Polish national elements, in, eluding former Socialists, the Mikolajczyk Peasant Party and the wartime partisans who have been brought to trial in recent years.
,
The US Embassy in Moscow reports that the Soviet press has given the indictment a build-up comparable to that accorded the Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949. The embassy points out that the trial may be intended to underline Molotov's recent warning against national deviation. (R Warsaw 510, 30 Jul 51; C Moscow 176, 31 Jul 51),
Comment; Although the majority of the defendants were arrested or disappeared during 1949 and 1950 when the Polish Army underwent extensive purging ef politically suspect officers, this is the first public trial of Polish Army officers. It is the first time since the fall of 1949, when Polandls leading deviatiOnists Gomulka and Spychalski were publicly denounced for Titoism and demoted, that national deviation has been attafled with such vehemence. The extent of play given the problem of

TOP SECRET
Approved For Ralusise 2001/09/06 : CIA-REP79101146A090000310001-5

TOP SECRET
national deviation auggests again, as did Molotov's recent epeech, the strong Soviet preoccupation with this weakness on its strategic European periphery.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : Ca-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Re larMee 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A069860310001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
NEAR EAST. Concern expressed over increase in Comumnist actiVity: The Falronztly. General of the Arab League is "alarmed" over the vigor and violence of Communist propaganda, especially in Egypt, within the last month. He noted that all the propaganda was direeted agaihat the US and wondered if Ahshington.were aware that the Communists Pare shooting the works" in the Near East.
Comments Isolated fragmente of information indicate that Communist efforts in tho Near East are being stepped up: (a) that a Communist demonstration, involving 50 peopllial preliminary to a larger one scheduled for 3 August, ms held in Baghdad on 30 July; (3) plans are being made for alliddle East Peace Congress to meet at an undetermined time and place; (c) a sizeable delegation of students from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are on their way to the World Youth Festival in-Berlin; (d) it is suspected that the ComMunist press in Egypt is subsidized by the Soviet Legation. In addition, events in the Near East, such as the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis and the assassination of Abdullah, offer the Communists ideal focal points for propaganda.
The YugoslavMinister in Cairo also expressed concern to the US Ambassador about the trend of Communist propaganda within the past month. He believesthat "a lot of money is changing hands." (S Cairo 135, 31 Oiay 51; C Cairo 136, 31 Jay 51).
25X1C
Shifts occur in Greek Cabinet: Falb:ringthe dissolution of on 28 July-and the schedulingef national elections for 9 September, the King appointed four non-partisan ministers to the key electoral posts of Justice, Interior, National Defense and Governor General of Northern Greece. There has been some shifting Of-less important ministries: among Prime MiniSter Venezelos' Liberals, but economic posts remain in the same hands. (U Athens 552, 31 July 51).
GREECE.
Prrir&nent
Comment:
It is believed that the appointment of nonpartisan men
to kenroral posts will Provide sufficient assurance of

Perpetuation of Venezelost government should do a viding much needed continuity in economic policy.
great
impartiality.
deal toward pro-
JUDAS: US Minister o tithistic about future of Jordan: The new Jordanian Prime M nister has impressed the US M n s er.in AmMan.with his serene and statesman-like attitude toward his country's future problems. The US representative feels that if hostile or ambitious neighbors can be deterred from interfering, Jordan will remain a friend of the West and an
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : Cih-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For RelLtspie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0611060310001-5

TOP SECRET
element of political and military stability in the Near East.. The Prime Minister has told him that he fears that the MUftits men, in conjundtion with the Communists, 'might capitalize on economib distress induced by the current drought to create disorders which his Arab neighbors would utilize to intervene in Jordan. The Prime Minister stated that he would not perpetuate Abdullahts plan for a Greater Syria and dismissed the idea of a union with Iraq. He promised that his government would enforce strict observance of the armistice agreement with Israel but mould not continue Abdullehts policy of seeking bilateral settlement with Israel.
51).
Comment: Tawfiq Abul Huda has been prime minister twice previously and is widely respected as an astute politician. He is known to be a close friend.of the British Minister, whose guidance will be sought and generally followed on major problems. His government is expected to be short-lived, an previously scheduled general elections will be held on 29 August. MIth the convening of Parliament, which will contain a large number of Palestinian Arabs, a more volatile political situation will exist. Abdullah had trouble with the Arab Palestinians and there is ne available replacement for his firm hand. The situation will be touchy' but if the present calm can be maintained until after the elections, the anticipated internal confusion may not materialize.
-
Government remains firm in denying entry to Chinese EMbassy P771171a: 'Despite a blast from the Peiping radio charging a violation of international law (see O(3I Daily Digest, 31 July 51),-the Indonesian Government continues to stand firM in denying entry'to 16 Additional staff members of the Chinese Communist Etbassy in Djakarta. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office delivered a strong statement to the prees charging that this is the third occasion the Chinese EMbassy has acted without prior authority and has violated diplethatic courtesy.. Two leading Djakarta newspapers editorially backed the government's stand, reviewing the unsatisfactory aspects ef Indonesian-Chinese diplomatic re(C Djakarta 148, 28 July 51). lAtions.
INDONESIA.
Camment: The Indonesian Governmentts stand on the matter continues to be based more upon what it considers a diplomatic insult than upon its concern over Chinese Communist activities. However, the episode has highlighted Communist Chinats diplomatie procedures and may result in a sterner attitude on the part of Indonesia toward the Chinese EMbaseva activities.

TOP SECRET
The US Minister suggests that-UKUS high level policy talks be held to ascertain British views on continued financing of the Legion, the possibility of a major expenditure for militarY base sion, and the extension of bilateral economic aid. (C Amman 51,
night Arab expan31 JUly
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CLRDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Rel lotese 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A*600310001-5

TOP SECRET
INDONESIA. Criticism of cabinet continues: Grave criticism-of the current coalition cabinet was voiced by leaders of two of-the government's supporting parties during the past week. Tadjuddin floor, parliamentary leader of the Greater Indonesian Party, stated that his party would withdraw its representatives from the cabinet unless there is noticeable improvement by the end of August. Engel, leader of the Democratic Faction, declared that the cabinet should be replaced by experts under the leadership of a "strong man" --pteferably Vice President Hatta. A cabinet spokesman subsequently told the press that in order to strengthen the government, all important decisions will henceforth be referred to "consultation party councils" before they are implemented. Pedoman, the independent Socialist daily, commented that this procedure may help if prime consideration is given to the government's basic ills, but that if attention continues to be focused chiefly upon the various parties" relative positions in the cabinet, there is little hope for improvement. (C Djakarta 148, 28 July 51). Comment: The current cabinet is largely composed of men lacking in ability and experience. Although the government has a solid majority in parliament which would permit it to take decisive action, it has taken no effective steps toward the achievement of law and order, increased production, or the control of Communist activity. Should the cabinet fall, a "strong man" government, although technically unconstitutional) might be arranged.
MALAYA. Lack of success in suppressing Malaya's rebels reported: During a recent tour of northern Malaya, the US Consul in Penang was told by prominent British administrative and security officials that no end to the emergency is in sight so long as the Communist-led terrorists retain hope of eventual aid from outside Malaya. The officials are hopeful, however, that efforts to cut off the rebels' food supply and an increase in the home guard will decrease their numbers. It is not expected that the now neutral mass of Malayan Chinese will turn against the terrorists until it is quite clear that the West is winning the world power struggle. (C Penang unnumbered 31 July 51),
Comment: Lack of success by the British in their campaign to destroy the 4,000 to 5,000 insurgents has been interpreted by US officials in Malaya as the reason for the intended resignation of Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations. The General, who devised the "Briggs Plan" to exterminate the rebels, was put in charge of its execution. If the plan had been proceeding successfully, he might have been expected to continue in command.

TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Relate 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00n00310001-5

TOP SECRET
BURMA. Increased smuggling to China reported: The US Embassy in Rangoon has been reliably informed that the smuggling of tires, auto parts, gasoline and oil from Burma to China is increasing. The Burmese Foreign Office, when approached on the matter, assured the embassy that additional measures for the restriction of smuggling and the enforcement of the Burmese Government's policy of non-reexport of scarce commodities were being considered. (S Rangoon 127, 31 July 51). Comment: This information provides further evidence of Chinese interest in exploiting Burmese sources of supply. The general disorder that prevails in Burma, as well as widespread corruption among officials and indifference to the smuggling problem, will prevent the establishment of an effective control system in the near future.
Comment: Although it seems unlikely that Ne Win would fight to retain his job, the Socialists are at a loss to name a generally acceptable replacement and probably will allow him to continue in office.
Burmese reconsidering Japanese treaty: The Burmese Foreign Minister told US Ambassador Key that his government is reconsidering its rejection of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and that a final decision will be reached in the next two or three days. (S Rangoon 132, 31 July 51).
Burmese labor organization loins WFTU: The World Federation of Trade Unions has accepted the application for membership, effective 1 July, of the Burma Trade Union Congress, the labor instrument/of the pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party. (S Rangoon 115, 27 July 51).
2X1C
1
,
1110111111111111sconeren"ce
CHINA. Organizational overhaul of the Chinese Communist Party urged: A / Liu Shao-ch'il the CCP's
:25k1A
'
organizational overhaul" of the Party "to remedy the general decline in quality" of Party membership. The overhaul was o dered to begin owl and is to be completed by the end of 1953.
Retention of Ne Win as C-in-C predicted: The US Military Attache in Rangoon believee that neither Defense Minister U Win nor the Socialist Party can force C-in-C Ne Win to relinquish his post. The MA thinks that Ne Win, upon his return from vacation, will be more amenable to governmental policies than heretofore. (S MA Rangoon SO, 27 July 51).
in April "urgedan
y 51
25X1A
TOP SECRET
7
Approved For Release 2001109106 : CIA-R0P79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Re fiNge 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0661600310001-5

TOP SECRET
Comment: This report is unconfirmed but is supported by the Nay Day 1951 statement of P'eng Chen, Secretary of the Peiping Committee of the CCP, which promised a "systematic and complete reorganization of the Party." Liu Shaoch'i would be the logical man to announce and supervise such an effort. The.CCP has expanded almost 600 per cent in six years; its 5.8 million members are of uneven quality, and a continuing purge is to be expected.
Continued "reign of terror" reported in Shanghai: A British national who left Shanghai:on 26 July reports that the city's "reign of terror has
not abatedtand that
Comment: With the possible exception of the execution figures, this report is probably true.
Polish vessel to carry Ceylonese rubber to Communist China, The Polish merchant ship Kilinpki is expected to call it Colombo in midAugust to load up to 3,000 tons of rubber for Communist China. Credit facilities to finance the major part of this shipment have already been arranged. The Ceylonese prime minister indicates that nothing can be done to prevent the rubber shipments. (C Colombo 58, 30 July 51 ).
Comment: There had been reports that the Communists would have dif ficulty arranging for shipping space because of the inability of Polish vessels to get needed bunker fuel. Apparently, however, the Poles have arranged for the necessary bunkers. The statements of Ceylonese officials suggest unconcern about rubber shipments to Communist China, desfite earlier expressions of a desire to cooperate with the US in this matter.

(b)
(c)
(a)
An estimated 200 to 300 people were being executed daily up to the date of source's departure; Both Chinese and foreigners are "thoroughly intimidated," fearing arrest at the "slightest misstep";
Nearly all British residents now wish to leave the city; and
(d)
Nothing has been heard from three Americans imprisoned in Shanghai, while a fourth,jalmus Kanady, is seriously ill and will be reincarcerated if he recovers. (C Shanghai 415, 31 July 51).
TOP SECRET
8
Approved For Reoase 2001/09/06 : CIA-R0P79T01146A9,110300310001-5

TOP SECRET
The USSR and Stalin omitted from Chinese Army Day s1oganss The 18 slogans approved by Peiping for public use on Chinese Communist Army Day (1 August) make no mention of either the USSR or Comrade Stalin. In contrast, the 35 slogans for Army Day in 1950 included one exhorting "support" for the USSR and one wishing long life to Stalin. (R FBID, 29 July 1950-51). Comment: The omissions from the slogans, plus Chinese Communist studies published on the CCP's 30th anniversary (1 July), have been cited as evidence of "serious trouble" between Moscow and Peiping. Neither the slogans nor the documents support such a conclusion. On the contrary, the document--analyzed at length in the OCI Bi -Weekly Survey of International Communism, 10 July 51 - -strongly indicate that the earlier divergence (1920-35) between Mao Tse-tung and the Kremlin has been repaired over the past 15 years. There have been inconclusive indications, in the past two weeks, that Moscow and Peiping, contemplating the adoption of a superficialiy conciliatory line toward the West, may be encouraging speculation that all is not well with the Sino -Soviet alliance.
25X1A
25X1C Korean cease-fire proposal explained: view of a Chinese Communist official that the Korean cease-fire propose resulted from Peiping's realization of Communist inability to win the war without air support and Chinese inability to provide pilots for Soviet supplied planes. The Peiping regime reportedly was unwilling te subject itself to an "endless drain" ii Ko while Moscow was unwillin to provide the requisite Soviet pilots.
Comment: It is not known whether this report is based on information or speculation. The pilots of jet planes encountering UN aircraft in.Korea have not been positively identified but have been reported to be Soviet. However, ComMunist air operations in Korea to date have been primarily defensive, not of a nature or scope appropriate to an effort to expel.UN forces from Korea. It is possible, and has been reported by many sourbes that Soviet unwillingness to provide either the materiel or the personnel for an offensive operation was a major factor in motivating the cease-fire proposal.
KOREA. Communists hint at local offensives during negotiations: The Communist delegation at the Kaesong Conference meeting of 28 July-stated that due regard must be given to military realities which the present battle-front situation does not reflect. The Communists added that battle lines are constantly changing and could change even during the present negotiations. (S Outgoing State Circular 92, 31 July 51).

TOP SECRET
9
Approved For Refecte 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S9800310001-5

TOP SECRET
Comment: A 31 Jnly PANA report from Eaesong claims that COmmunist newsmen hinted obliquely that their side might have to use force to break the stalemate, in view of the adamant UN stand. General Peng Teh-huai allegedly advised the UN.in a 1 August broadcast to accept the Communist terms or be exposed to "a fatal danger." has been'obvious'for some time that the Communists have the capability of launching at least local offensives. It must be recalled, however, that Communist propaganda was very threatening immediately prior to the Communist agreement to.drop from the Eaesong agenda the issue of foreign troop withdrawal.
It
Comment: Abolition of the decade-long control over price, collection, and rationing of cereals has been a major objective of the Liberal Party, which is wedded to a concept of "free economy." Agitation toward this end commenced during early 1950, when world food supplies appeared ample to assure Japan of its needs. However, under present conditions - -sharply rising world food prices, tightening of world grain supplies, and the shipping shortage, combined with inflationary conditions in Japan --the wisdom of food decontrol is highly questionable. The dangers inherent in an inequitable distribution of inadequate rice supplies have been amply demonsUsted in Japan's history and would be intensified with the present, less-regimented population.
Comment: The Socialists had already refused to participate on grounds of policy; the.People's Democratic Party, although previously supporting the government on foreign policies, reportedly refused to 'participate unless the draft treaty could be debated at a Diet session prior to the conference-something which Yoshida feared would have unfortunate consequences abroad. Failure of the opposition partius to participate will force the Liberal Party to accept the full brunt of expected political attacks bated on the treaty, and may create scepticism among some of the signatory nations.
Plan for non-partisan peace delegation fails: The Japanese Government's plan to send a.non-partiSan Japanese delegation to.the peace conference has failed, according to the Jiji news agency. Prime Ninister Yoshida announced that the delegation will be comPosed of state ministerflnd others whose appointment does not.require Diet approval; therefore, an extraordinary session of the Diet will not be called. ..(R FBID Ticker, 1 Aug 51).

TOP SECRET
JAPAN. Government plans to decontrol staple foods: The Japanese Government has received "fundamental agreement" from SCAP to decontrol staple foods (rice, wheat, barley), effective in April 1952, according to the Japanese news agency "Eyodo." (12 FHB, 31 July 51).
10
Approved For Re !tete 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004300310001-5

TOP SECRET
Dollar clause abolished in sterling area trade agreements A new sterling area-Japan trade agreement, MIN being drafted as the.result of a recent conference between representatives of Japan and the UK, reportedly abolishes the clause which provided for settlement of adverse trade balances in dollars. (a FBID, 31 July 51).
Comment: Removal of the threat of a dollar drain very likely will increase JapanIs trade with the sterling area. Japan has been reluctant to place too greet emphasis on sterling trade, however, fearing the accumulation of sterling balances which could not be used in making dollar purchases. Japan also recognizes that the sterling area is unable to supply Japan's needs for foodstuffs, coking coal, cotton, and iron ore, and is therefore hesitant in diverting exports from the dollar to the sterling area.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06nCIA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,300310001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
.September-nrail meeting:
GERMANY. Embassy Moscow believes USSR is showing restraint in Berlin: US Embassy Moscow, commenting on the Berlin trade impasse, considers that the USSR is anxious to avoid showing itself in an openly provocative attitude at a time when "the peaceful coexistence repertoire is playing in other theaters of operation". The Embassy bases this judgment on the cautious Soviet approach to the Bei-lin issue, the sporadic willingness to negotiate with the Allies, and the lack of Soviet propaganda emphasis on the situation. The Embassy feels, however, that the Kremlin hopes to profit fram even softpedalled tactics in Berlin, as long as the West refraiS from taking stringent action. Embassy officials endorse the plan for a liMited Allied airlift, including military planes, as a practical means of easing the present West Berlin export backlog and demonstrating to the Politburo the mass and flexibility of Allied air-power.
The State Department meanwhile recommends a considerable extension of the present partial embargo of West German shipments to East Germany. Although conceding that French objections might preclude the complete termination by the Allies of interzonal trade, the Department urges that at least shipments of all essential and strategic goods to East Germany should be halted, in an attempt to damage the East German economy and force Soviet,capitulation. (S Moscow 167, 30 July 51; S State to Frankfurt 807, 31 July 51)
Government bans second Communist front organization: Op 29 July the West German Government banned the central council of the Communist front

TOP SECRET
lidesvread opposition in NATO to US position on possible Further discussion in the NATO Deputiest meetings of the proposal to hold a Council meeting at Ottawa on 15 September-has led to sharp disagreement between the US and most of the other NATO members. Many members believe the presence of the Defense Ministers is eesential for a decision on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO. lhe UK, with Dutch, Norwegian and Danish support, insists that a decision on the Middle East command structure be reached concurrently. The French are in general agreement with the US in opposing these vieme and desiring definitive action on basic questions such as the proposed European Defense Forces and agreements on Germany, The French join the Norwegians and the Dutch, however, in preferring to abandon the proposal for a September meeting. The majority of the members oppose any serious consideratiOn of the German question or of additional steps for financing the defense effort, and favor giving primary attention to the non-military aspects of NATO problems aside from the admission of Greece and Turkey. (S London 138-139, 31 JulY 51)
WESTERN EUROPE.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ?"lA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Rehm/se 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A096600310001-5

TOP SECRET
Victims of Nazi Persecution (VI% under Article 9 of the Basic Law which prohibits associations directed against the constitutional order. The ban stems chiefly from the VVN's continued support of the Communist anti remilitarization plebiscite in defiance of the government's 26 April. prohibition of the plebiscite. The local organizations of the VVN are not affected by the ban of the central council, but the federal govern:ment has requested the state governments to take appropriate prohibitive action if the local VVN groups continue to follow the policy of the central council. (R Bonn 75, 31 July 51)
Comment: The VVN was formed in early 1947 on a non-party basis, but as it became more and more Communist penetrated and controlled, it:was discredited and lost much of its influence in West Germany. Tho government's ban of the VVN follows similar action against the Communist youth organization on 26 June.
'
New maps are being made with Soviet symbols: HICOG Frankfurt has learned that the East German Government has been conducting a field check of the basic German maps of the zone, and is providing them with the Russian conventional signs and symbols. To execute this program, a central surveying office (VVB Vermessung) was established in January 1951. (C Frankfurt Desp. 3904, 12 June 51)
Comment: Probably the Soviet occupation authorities have ordered the making of these maps, In other Satellites, the USSR itself has completely usurped the mapping functions.
FRANCE. Fears of-German militarism rekindledt All elements of the Paris pWsiThave reacted violently to former German General Ramcke's speech calling for a free German hand in military matters and the release of war criminals. Most commentators consider Ramckets proposal to rearm Germany only upon satisfaction of these demands a threat of a renewed, unregenerate Hitlerism. They are particularly disturbed because the Bonn government permits such rabble-rousing and has failed to take a stand on the warcriminal question. There is unanimity of opinion that both the reintegration of Germany into Europe and the SchuMan Plan are endangered unless German good-will is forcefully demonstrated. (U Paris 681, 31 July 51) Comment: Ramoke was recently released from a French war prison. His remarks upon his return to Germany have been a source of embarrassment to the government, as in the earlier case of a former German general returned
froth Belgium.
Incidents of thip kind are apt to have an ill effect upon the French attitude torard German rearmament. The French originally accepted the idea

TOP SECRET'
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :C1A-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5 1
Approved! ForRelalee 2001109106: CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0310001-5

TOP SECRET
of a German defense contribution reluctantly, but have recently had their suspicions lulled by the sincere approach of the German delegation to the European Army Conference. The French are determined to forestall the recreation of the German General Staff, which would inevitably follow the development of an independent German national army such as Ramcke favors, and aay hint that responsible Germans have such a goal will reverse the progress so far made toward Franco-German cooperation.
US Consul McBride thinks that Juin would consider the Sultan's removal a great-personal victory. Because of the Sultan's outspoken pro-US stand, however, his deposition would be considered a defeat for US prestige throughout the Moslem world. (S Rabat 5, 31
July 51)
Comment: The bitter relations been alleviated since the crisis of between Juin and-the Sultan have not February 1951. Although a rightist oriented French Government conceivably could approve'Juin's scheme, such a government is more likely to relieve Juin energies to his SHAPE command, and to assign so that he 'can devote his full to Morocco another strong military commander in an attempt to make peace with the Sultan.
There is an increasing realization among French officia/s in Paris that the dangers inherent in antagonizing the Moslem world outweigh the dubious advantages of ousting the Sultan. Mhile Juin has ample force to suppress au disorders that might follow his removal of the Sultan, such. 'disorders would provide the Communists with an opportunity to exploit the situation.
FRENCH MOROCCO. Juin again reported to be planning deposition of Sultan: According to a nationalist source,-Resident General Juin again is attempting to obtain official support for the deposition of the Sultan. This step supposedly will be taken clandestinely and immediately in order to eliminate the possibility of foreign opposition, particularly from the US. Juin is said to be convinced that the outcry from the Moslem states would be ineffectual and belated.
AUSTRIA. Soviet paper attacks US High Commissioner: After weeks of charging that the new US military camp at Salzburg constitutes a fortification, and in reaction te US,High Commissioner Donnelly's acausations of Soviet stalling on the Austrian treaty, the Soviet official paper Oesterreichische Zeitung took the unprecedented step of attacking Donnelly personally in a long editorial on 29 July. The paper called issue "hypocritical", "calumniation of Donnelly's remarks on the treaty the Soviet Union", and "babble designed to deceive public opinion". The article used maay arguments to show that the US is converting Austria of raw materials", and concluded that into a "military bridgehead and source the facts clearly demonstrated "who is the real culprit" in denying Austria a treaty. (U,Vienna 374, 30 Jai. 51)
'
TOP S22RET
Approved For Release 2001/09/014: CIA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Re lelee 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001W0310001-5

.
TOP SECRET
Comment: The incident illustrates the usual sensitivity of the USSR to charges that it is responsible for blocking the treaty.
UNITED KINGDOM. Britain sharply protests Nehru's Charges against British generals. Indian Prime Minister Nehru has rejecteda formal British request to withdraw his recent insinuation that retired Britieh Generals Auchinleck and Gracey have been advising Pakistan and operations directed against India. in the preparation of military plans The UK protest in NewDelhi followed an investigation by British officials who reportedly obtained a satisfactory account of the rocent activities of both officers. In indirect response to Nehruls rejection, Prime Minister Attlee subsequently stated in Parlia ment that he greatly regretted Nehru's lending the weight of his authority to such unfounded allegations. (S New Delhi 417, 30 July 511 U FBIS London radio, 1 Aug 51) Britain since 19h7 has striven to maintain an attitude of completritTartiality in all military matters
Comment:

TOP SECRET
NORWAY. Shortage of militarypersonnel may delay MDAP deliveries; The US Ambassador and the Chief of the Military (MAAG), Norway, have recommended postponing Assistance Advisory Group of MDAP material until the Norwegian Defense delivery of the major nortions Ministry has made plans to procure sufficient regular personnel to maintain and utilize US equipment adequately. In the interests of good relations -with NorWay, however, the Ambassador feels that the MDAP Committee be informed before such action is taken. of the Norwegian Cabinet shoUld Also, he believes that if the Cabinet is apprised of the full significance of the recommendation and is shown the need for substantial increases in regular personnel (which has repeatedly been pointed out to the Defense Minister), the government may take the necessary corrective measures. (S London DEPTO 132, 30 July 51) Comment: The factor of adequate regular nersonnel,is the heart of the problem of building up and improving the Norwegian military forces. The historic Norwegian military concept of a small percentage of regulars causes both a mobilizablo force with only officials to react sensitively to proposals Norwegian military and civilian that the regular military establishment be geared to standards determined by other NATO countries. Procurement of personnel, moreover, is made difficult by an extremely low pay scale for regular officerS and NCOs and by a very tight labor market in Norway. The Defense Minister has taken a soMewhat negative attitude toward MAAG and NATO efforts to have Norway begin expansion of its regular force- no change is likely unless officials outside the Defense Ministry are mL.de aware of MAAG appraisals that Norway currently is incapable of utilizing MDAP equipment and has no adequate plan for fulfilling ite Medium Term Defense Plan contribution. (see OCI DailyDigest, 17 July 51)
affecting India and Pakistan
Approved For Release 2001109/0i5: CIA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
)4,_d
Approved For Release 2001109106 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000,119310001-5

TOP SECRET
in order to avoid arousing antagonisms which the Commonwealth ties of the two countries, might place added strain on and which might doom any hope of eventually developing their defensive capabilities in line with Britain's over-all strategy in South Asia. The present incident, occurring at a time of serious tension between the two Asian countries, justified official action on the highest level. No evidence has been received that Auchinleck and Gracey have recently been consulted by the Pakistani high command, although both were employed by Pakistan before retirement, and both have recently been accessible to the Pakistanis for advice.
25X1A
Comment: Political conditions that a revo ution has been scheduled in Ecuador remain unstable, and reports have been received on the average of one a month for the past seven months. revolutionary groups are led by Carlos The two currently most important Guevara Moreno and Minister of Defense Manuel Diaz -Granados, either of whom would set up a dictatorship should he come to power. Two recent events suggest that chances for the initiation of a coup by either are slightly better now than they have been for some time. On 24 July group Guevara Moreno (who had been in prison for over a year for leading a revolution in July 1950) was released on bail. He is therefore again able to assume personal leadership of his revolutionary group, which has remained organized and active during his confinement, On 16 July Minister of Defense Diaz -Granados presented his resignation "for reasons of ill health". Upon President Plaza's request, he agreed to withdraw the resignation, but took a 30-day "sick" leave in Guayaquil. It is probable that in this period Diaz -Granados is attempting to increase his following in Guayaquil, the region in which Guevara's strength is colleen trated (see OCI Daily Digests, 18 and 31 July 51).
:
Formation of leftist anti-administration The Popular Party of Vicente Lombardo campaign coalition Federation of People's Parties of Mexico (FPPM) Toledano will join the in the support of General Miguel Henriquez Guzman as presidential candidate, according to a Mexican news service transmission. The FPFM however, is reported to be ficially silent" on the pact which it "will "ofconclude" with the Popular Party, (R FBIS, Mexico City, 31 July 51)
rel-o-Red:
MEXICO.

TOP SECRET
ECUADOR. Revolutionary plots against the Ecuadoran government:: Carlos Guevara Moreno stated on the night of 26 July that Minister of Defense Manuel Diaz -Granados is making preparations for overthrowing the government, probably within the coming week. He further, stated that he would permit Diaz -Granados to stage the coup, but he, Guevara would then lead his followers in a counter-movement own 25X10 Guevara will initiate action between 7 and 10 counterrevolution. -Granados -led
Approved For Release 2001/09/0611"ClA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
Approved For Relelee 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00441,90310001-5
TOP SMRET
Comment: This unverified report mgy represent an attempt to discredit the Henriquez movement by associating it with pro-Communist and Communist element's in-Mexico led by Lombardo Toledano, wealthy business associate 'of former leftist Nevertheless, Henriquez (a President Lazaro Cardenas) relies on militant agrarian and labor elements for support. In the present presidential campaign, as an independent anti-administration candidate with, well-organized local supporters and some army backing, he represents a significant political influence. It is favor Henriquet above other candidatesl, quite possible that Lombardo would though it seems doubtful that Henriquez would benefit at this time from Lombardo's support.

TOP pECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09R : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300310001-5
TOP SECRET
,, cINCIASSIFIED when WankTOP
I
1
fbc189 Eirglacomentrtivtuattploolstuoutfie "fied when filled in forilliknYuefiliereligneergiumen .
or declassi-

REGISTRY
CIA CON Rp l. NO.
,DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE
I
DOC
NO.
DOC,' DATE
DATE DOCUMENT LOGGED BY
q271?-R
ECE I VED
COPY NO, PUMPER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence or classified Top Secret within the C on Agency A and will remain attached to the document until such time a9 it Li downgraded, destroyed, transmitted outside 01 CIA. Access to Top Secret matter Or is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Toy Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material and indicate period of custody in the left-hane will sign this /Orin columns provided, Each individual who indicate the date o/ handling in the right-hand columns. sees the Top Secret document will sign and
REFERRED TO
OFi ICE
I
RECE I VED
5 I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
NOTICi OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Sec et mate MI it shalt be completed in the appropriate spaoes below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro /or record.
.
DOWNGRADED
TO BY
DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
TO
DATE
T IME
S I GNATURE
OFF ICE/0 I V.
DATE
(Signature)
(Signature)
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY (Signature)
'
WITNESSED BY
IDATE
OFF ICE
BY
(Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
8.73
'
Approved For Release 2001109106 61K-RDP79TOVAVA000300310001-5DATE

1
a ..,
US COITIORp.
TOP SECRET
140/
Approved For Re hinge 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00a00310001-5
TOP SECRET
2 August 1951
CIA No. 49292-A

Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
I.
Approved For Re !sage 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q000310001-5
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
NEPAL.- Chinese Communists desire to open embassy in Nepal: The Nepalese Ambassador to India has expressed his governmentls concern over the Chinese Communist& detire to open an embassy. in Katmandu. The Nepalese Government is faced with two choicest -to display no.interest in the opening of an embaasy and consequently expose itself to A Possible Chinese revival of the debatable question of Nepalese sovereignty; or to agree to establishment an embassy, thereby obtaining Chinese recognitien of Nepal's independent of status but at tho same time enabling the Chinese to-make the embassy a center for subversive activities. (S S/S New Delhi 395, 28 Jul 51)
ComMont: Regardless of the action taken, Nepal probably will be unable to prevent the infiltration of Communist elements from Tibet and India. Both the nature of the terrain and the absence of firm government control outside the capital make it difficult to detect and limit the activities of undesirables, some of whom are already operating in Nepal.
INDIA. India rejects proposed Burmese-Indonesian mediation: The Burmese Ambassador to Pakistan on 25 July revealed to the US Ambassador his govern-. mantis pian to prepose that the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia jointly visit Ne* Delhi and Karachi to offer their good offices toward easing the tension between India and Pakistan. Two days later, however, the Burmese envoy stated that although the Pakistanis and Indonesians were favorably disposed toward the project, it had been rejected by Nehru. (S S/S Karachi 109, 31 Jul 51)
Commentt Burma's concern' over tension between India and Pakistan was evidet7;a-last week by the visit of the Burmese Foreign Minister to New Delhi to inquire if his government could help solve the impasse on Kashmir.
India's rejection of the mediation offer undoubtedly derives partly from a fear of losing face through mediation by two nations it looks upon as "satellites." More importantly, however, India's refusal reflects a confidence in it& ability to maintain independently its-present pawer position vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United Nations, as well as a belief that its current actions will not lead to oPen warfare with Pakistan.

TOP SECRET
1
Approved For Rekiste 2001/01/8$: g
EST01146A0150600310001-5
3 August 1951
CIA No. 49293-A 9 Copy No.
.S/S.C.ABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved For Rebate 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A011.100310001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTMIN)
EGYPT.
1.
These admisaions by the Foreign Minieter do not encourage Regardless of what action may be taken before the Egyptian Parliament adjourns in-midAngust, some state ment About the treaty will have to be made inHthe speeckfrom the throne at the opening of the next parliamentary session. Public ariticism of the treaty, which has been fostered by the government, could force denunciation of the treaty.
optimr3cgr tho future of the negotiations.
2.
PANAMA. Promulgation of decree on shipping delayed. Efforts to broaden the ZFICTig on/shipping.under.the.Panama flag so as to prohibit all calls in Com, munist China or North Korea were reportedly well received by PreSident Arose mane, but have apparently caused delay in its promulgation. Ambassador Wiley reports that oppositioh to broadening the decree is partly based on the arguMent that the ships affected would change to Honduran or Liberian regie try, thus depriving Panama of revenue. (0 Panama City 71, 31_Jul 51; C S/S State to Panama City 57, 31 Jul 51).
Comment: On 29 July, a PanaMa decree penalizing ships under its flag which carry strategic.materials to Communist China or North Korean porte was app-roved by the President and Cabinet, and the signature of President Ares:6 mena was expected on 30 July. If the decree should be broadened to forbid all calls at these ports, it would somewhat curtail smuggling of contraband goods, would eliminate disputes as to the Abfinition of contraband, and

ZoMmenti
SECTION 3 (NESTERN)
Foreign Minister exploiting British treaty issue for domestic pur, The internal policy of the Nerd Oovernment has been a failure, ac. cording to the Egyptian Foreign Minister. It has carried out none of its pnrposes and much corruption and inefficiency still exist. He admitted that in order to divert attention from domestic failures, the Waffled been oter7exPloiting its differences with the UK. GiVen the atate Of Egyptian public opinion, which he admits the Ward has created, the Foreign Minister feels he can follow none but the present policy regarding-British evacuation of the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone. Therefore, before the end of the parliamentary session he Must make a statement that there is no us6 continu ing the negotiations. The Foreign Minister also stated that whether or not the negotiations were continued, he felt that the opposition should be in cluded in the government. Nb other members of the government share this opinion. The British Ambassador feels that when the above remarks were made, the Foreign Minister had no knowledge of the Mingle message that the negotia tions should not be broken off. (TS S/S Cairo 134: 31 Jul 51).
poses,:
TOP SECRET
1
Approved For Re 'Wise 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A6176300310001-5

TOP SECRET
would hinder the acquisition of shipping by the Chinese Communists. While ships affected by the more comprehensive decree might well transfer to some other Western flag, Honduran registry would be relatively unattractive since a Honduran government order iii January 3.90. prohibited Honduran vessels from entering ports of Communist China.

TOP SECRET
2
HR70-14
r.
3
I
EAST FAR EAST
cA5
I. 1. Chinese Communist Communist attitude toward Kaesong discussions:
eY5-
as of midJuly Peiping held the following opinions rediscussions in inKaesong: Kaesong: garding the current current discussions
(a) The are (a) The Chinese Chinese Communists Communists a r e so anxious will grant grant"many "many concessions"; concessions"; to secure secure a a cease-fire cease-firethat thatthey theywill

rnnirnanf. n)*I
(c) terms are so severe UN terms severe as t o be (c) Even Even if UN as to contfnue the the completely completely unacceptable unacceptableto toPefping, Peiping, the the latter latter will will attempt attempt to continue discussions until September, when when "marked "marked changes in U international changes in the international are expected. expected. situation" are
I
(b) The regime will will attempt attempt to to disdis(b) The Peiping Peiping regime cover, during during the the Kaesong Kaesong talks, some means means whereby whereby the talks, some the regime may may the UN UN and and enter the and participate participate in the Japanese peace treaty; and
and that Peiping in its itspropaganda propaganda has haslong long demanded representation in the UN and participation in the Japanese peace peace treaty. alleged that that the theUSSR USSR plans to initiate c loba.1 rew have recently alleged tillties in in September, September, but this assertion has not been supported tilities I
1
mat the Lommunist negotiators at Kaesong have made made certain concessions, CXmmunist nePtiatOrS Kaesong have
1 It is is public public knowledge knowledgzJ
2.
Possilge CCF reinforcements total 350, 000:
A study indicates that in addition to the Chinese Communist units which have been identified and accepted in
Korea, additional units may have arrived whose estimated total strength would be 350,000. This would give the enemy an estimated maximum possible strength of 907, 000 for an offensive.
-3 3 --
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-2010
.--
.
I
_TAAP_SECRET-SUEDw--
comment: s consid rsbly in comment: This total total i is considtably excess of of the 770,000 774 000 maximum, 1.1. pril, maximum,estimated estimatedin inKorea Koreaas.'& as.' of pril, that that inincluded units subsequently identified identified elsewhere as cluded as of of that thatdate.. date. The total force would be equivalent u l l strength divisions. div.isions. This number of of force would equivalent to 90 ffull whichit it has has heretofore heretofore been been estimated estimated that divisions exceeds the maximum maximum which Korea. the enemy is is logistically logistically capable capable of of maintaining m a i n t a i n i n g in inKorea.
'According to a a3 3 August August estimate estimate According to however, available available indications indicationspoint point to continueac ac ve however, to aa continue in Korea until such time a as s the mist forces amense ooy uommunist forces in Korea until such time thepresent presentqrmisarmistice parleys collapse collapse or or appear appear no no longer longer profitable to the enemy. enemy.
1
NR
HR70-14 HR70-14
_TAR/P_SECRETSUEDie
5 P6A-151
ni3
NR
n sive Dreparations noted in in Korea during during past Dast 24 24 hours: hours: 4. m Offensive preparations noted
E ] =
Indications that the Communists may Indications may resume the offensive on the UN UN western western flank have noted in o u r s , / ] been noted in the the past 24 h hours, Enemy Enemy forces forces areahave have suddenly suddenly tightened t ghtened their their counter-reconnaLsance counter-reconna ssance screen. in this area They may may also have have moved movedarmor armor into into the the Otan Otanarea area 25 25 miles miles northeyjt northeast of Kaesong, observershave have sighted sighted tank tank traCks t r e k s and not,d notvd Kaesong, where where aerial aerial observers filling in in ofnntPtaikk. of-antt~dltehm. the filling
recent displacement ofenemy enemyunits unitsin inthis thissector sector whichwould would not Indilndi! a recnt displacement of which anenemy enemytntention tntention to to mount mount an early early general general offensive. offensive. &ate tate an
Comment! Thesehostile hostiledevelopments developments in the ullanagut These areaof of the theKaesong Kaesong conference conference may be designed designed only general area only to to exert exert the negotiations, negotiations, but could could be pressure 6n bn the pressure bepreparations preparationsto to seize seize strategic strategic parSdrrns for the launching launching of offensive, poSitions of a general offensive.
11 N F
-5 5-
RELEASE FOR RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 19-Feb-2010 19-Feb-2010 ,DATE:
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
HR70-14
7 443 5-1 7 t4w 5 1
bi
w
+w-mBmTer-830alre-SXCTION 1 1 (80VIll') (SMIZT) SECTION
'4110
1.
N.y. Bovlet bae88~dorto to Peiping Peivige enroute enroute to to Moscow& ~oacowa I . 'V. Roshchin, Boehchin, Soviet Am Ambassador 3 Ambassador to People's Republic Republic, left by by plane plane on 3Soviet Ambaeeador t o the Chinese Chineee Peoplelo , left August forfMoscow, according according to Radio Peiping. to Radio Pelping. Auguet o r Hoecow, -
Mg. m.
-~1
.
As as is Roshchin's visit Comment: b e far ae ir known, this is is B ~ e h c h l n ~first e v i e i b to Moecow . view of current negotiations negotiations since he returned retarned to to Peiping Peiping in in March March 1950. 1950. In view In Impending conference on the Japanese peace treaty, iC is in Korea and the impending treaty, it Moreover, likely l i k e l y that that his hi8 return return is is for f o r consultation:on coneultatlon on these these questions. queatlons. Moreover, Boehchlnla in Moscow thie time time lende to the recent recent Roshohin's presence presence in Moscow at this lends sfgnlflcance significance.to high,level Soviet diplomate diplomats from return and continued contfnued stay there of of high-level Afghanistan, A f g h w l m t a n , Pakistan Pakistan and and India. India.
NR
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FORRELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: .16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009

11'010-8201111--
w ,41.0
TE5F-BECHET-TOP SECF@T
7.
CHINA. Pre arations for further o erations in Korea reported:

Chinese Communist mical units assigned to Aorea were ordered to reaCh their stations by 10 August, and that the "4th wing" of the Chinese Communist Air Force was ordered to reach its Manchurian base hy 4 August.
Comment: This information has not been confirmed. A "4th wing" of the CCAF has not been identified in Manchuria or elsewhere. that Communist forces have been ordered to be in a state of readiness hy early Septebber.
8. 8.
AlCorrounonsSorinleca_l_g_talksaleed: Communist intentions i n Korean t a l k s allenedt h e following decisions were t a inese Lmomleges that that t the were made made a at a top-level top-lovel Chinese munist conference conference on on 25 25 Zuly: July:
(a) (a)

(b) (b) (c) (c)
r i p -
to agreement" iin the Kaesong Kaesong t o avoid reaching any "definite " d e f M t e agreement" n the talks, but hut
t o mke necessary concessions conceaaions to t o prevent prevent a a "premature llpremature to make necessary breakdown" of of the the Kaesong Kaesong talks; and meanwhile
t o continue continue "military 'hLUtary a c t i v i t i e s " in to activities" in Korea, Korea, preparing preparing
t o launch launch a large-scale offensive n Korea n early to a large-scale offensive i in Korea i in early September. September.
(d) (d)
TOP SECRET
' U
11-701-3-3ECRET----
11.1
reported
I. to -level conferemes conferences axe are continually : A l . ;k g ~ i n *oceedjnns , of tols-level !
i t is the the Communist Communiot i n t e n t i o n to t o prolong prolong the the it intention offensive. Kaesong talks Communist forces are prepared for a major major new new offensive. Kaesong talk8 until un
limportant important developmnts, possibly even Soviet initiation of global hostilities, opmsnts, possibly even Soviet i n i t i a t i o n of global 6 o s t i l i t i e s , are are expected expected !L !t in unconfirmed. I t a early e a r l y September; September: such such reports remain kemairl unconfirmed,

-TopsEettET-
Approved For Re liaria 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Qa86350001-1
TOP SECRET
8 August 1951
CIA No. 49296 Copy No.
sesz
DAILY DIGEST

DIA
and PACOM review(s) completed.
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re lessle 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0ES0350001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (901/IET)
Propaganda reflects increased Soviet interest in East-West trade: An Irvestia article and a Mbscow home service broadcast attacked the proposed US bill for cutting off add to countries Shipping strategic materThe bill was ials to the Soviet bloc as "dangerous to East-West peaee." branded a weapon in the hands of US imperialitts, directed toward-preparation of a new war," and constituting open pressure by the US monopolists on their Western European vassals." The broadcast added a plug for the World Peace Congress resolution calling for an international economic conference in Moscow before the end of the year.
USSR.
Comment: Soviet phraseology attemptrto conceal the Kremlinle con, cern over economic bans against the Soviet bloc while placing emphasis on the so-called encroachment on Western Europels sovereignty.
2.
Second quarter results of 1951 State Plan: Results of the Staie Economic Plan for the second quarter of 1951 were published in the Soviet press on 4 August. Compared with the same period last year, gross value of output rose 16 percent, and productivity of labor increased ten perdent. The spring crop sowing plan was described as having been overfulfilled,, with the total 1951 sown area augmented by six million hectares over that of 1950. The wheat area was expanded by more than four million It is claimed that in state and hectares, and cotton by almost 400,000. cooperative trade, the population of the country sold 14 percent more at comparable prices than in the second quarter of 1950. Iblkhos market sales are also said to have risen in the second quarter of 1951 compared with the same period in 1950.
Yield Comment: Embassy Moscow observed that in format, timing and content, second quarter results parallel their first quarter predecessors and are similarly devoid of practically all meaningful" data. The Em. bassy feels, however, that the trade data may have smile iignificance in that the 14 percent increase in state and cooperative sales appears to be the lowest gain on record in the postwar period (1948 data lacking). The gain of 16 percent in gross industrial output may have been caused by reconversion, but the Embassy eve that it is impossible to know whether the second quarter increase is doe to rising military or civilian production.
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA1RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re Name 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A064100350001-1
TOP SECRET
25X1
4.
30th Annizene,aocli_ans Penile's Republic:
A. celebration
The fact that two such prominent officials as Tarasov and Tunkin were sent to attend the Mongolian festivities reflects the desire of the Soviet Government to lend an aura of prestige to one of ite lesser known, but strategically located Satellites.
5.
25X1
EASTERN EUROPE. 'CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Foreign Office protests Sudeten reiieionist activity in West Germany The Czechoslovak Government has protested to US Embassy Prague against the alleged toleration of "hostile" ex-SUdeten activities in the US zone of Germany. The note reviews previous exchanges on the same subject dating back to 1947 which stress that US occupation authorities have condoned the formation of "independent organizations, whose principal purpose is political activ ity directed against the Czechoslovak Republic." The note refers to a revival of "Bitlerite, Pen-Germen aggressive nationalism", DB support of "German chauvinist militarism". and US promotion of "revisionist activities."
I

Commentt
commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Mongolian revolution was held in Ulan Bator on 9 July. In addition to the Soviet Ambassador Y. K. Prikhodov, the USSR was represented by an official delegation headed by M. P. Tarasov, (Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet). The group also included G. I. Tunkin, head of the first Far Eastern Section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tsyrempilon, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. Other goternmental delegations at the festivities included those from Communist China, Korth Korea, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of Albania.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : Clk,RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re !hog 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004200350001-1
TOP SECRET
Comment: Nearly two million Sudeten Germane have been expelled from Czechoslovakia since the end of World War II. These transferred Sudetens have held numerous meetings in West Germany during which revisionist aspirations were expressed. Such expressions of irredentism have greatly assisted the Czeohoslovak Communist regime in capitalizing on popular fear of West German rearmament and have provided it with an issue around which to rally otherwise divergent Czechoslovak elements. US Ambassador Briggs in Prague suggested in May 1951 that in order to reduce the effectiveness of such propaganda, the US Righ Commissioner in Germany officially dieclaim US support of Sudeten aspirations,
6.
25X1
Comment: Austria will be the only Western country to retain a Consulate in Bratislava, a useful observation post on the Danube.
7.
ALBANIA, Catholic Church nationalized: The Presidium of the Albanian Government recently issued a decree which, in effect, nationalized the Albanian Catholic Church. Under the terms of the measure the Catholic Church in Albania no longer hal any ties with the Vatican The Albanian Catholic Church henceforth will submit to the Canonic code of Rome only insofar as the codeos provisions do not contradict the laws of the Albanian Peopleos Republic. A/banian Catholic clergy will be trained according to the dictates of the Government. Relations with the Church abroad will be conducted through official channels. In commenting on the na.. tionalization decree, the Tirana press stated that at last the Albanian Catholic clergy has thrown off the yoke of the Vatican "which hag religion in the service of American imperialism."
Italy to close consulate in Bratielava: The Italian Minister to Czechoslovakia has notified US Embassy Prague that effective 15 August the Italian Consulate-General in Bratislava wi/1 be closed. This step is the direct result of a "determined buttwauccessful effort" by Czechoslovak border officials to force the Italian Consul-General to open his diplomatic pouch. Czechoslovakia will 10 required to close its Consulate in Milan, Italy,
8.
25X1
Persecution of religious elements in Albania started with the advent of Communist power in 1946. The head of the Albanian Catholic Church, Archbishop Prennushi was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in 1948 and was reported to have died in prison in February 1949. The latest measure against the Albanian Catholics, who total approximately 100,000, formalizes the break with the Vatican.
Comment:
YUGOSLAVIA. Embassy Belgraft_favorp Ingoelav nationals: Embassy Belgrade lifting US visa restrictions on considers that the US program of
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : ClrRDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re Ihreffi 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A049290350001-1
TOP eacnT
assistance to Yugoslavia could be much iMprOved a program of technical if it were combined with training of Yugoelave in the US. goats that a clause be added The Embassy sugto the current temporary visits to the US by the subjects aid bill which would permit aid programs. of nations participating in In this manner Yugoslav nationals could be admitted without weakening existing visa regulations against states. nationals of Cominform The Embassy feels nese to expose its citizens that the US should encourage Yugoslav willing to Western life recent requests f or on-the-job as evidenced by the regime es Embassy points out that there training and scholars:hips in the US. The i 8 very little selected by the regime likelihood that any trainee would be empathetic to the Comdnform anti-Cominform screeni cees in Yugoslavia is extremely since the severe.
25)0

TOP SECRET
A would mateilally program of technical training for Yugoslav nationals and politically assistance programs. enhance the US economic and military Because present US legielation trance of all Communists, restricts the en, those Yugoslav nationals most sent for such training likely to be are not eligible for visas.
__Comments
Approved For Release 2007/03/074: CIA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
ApprovedForRE4002007103107:CWRDP79T01146A022190350014
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. INDONESIA. Bandits and Approximately 200 men Islamic fanatics attack Djakarta port area: fanatics and leftist described by an Indonesian official as nIslamic banditsn attacked on 5 August. Tandjong Priok, the port of The attackers decorated with both earried red flags and Djakarta, Islamdc emblems and wore red headbands pose of the the hammer attack is believed to and sickle. The purequipment. Four have been the ts were killed and procurement of arms and fled eastward. fly captured; the remainder
25X1
2.
25X1
Cabinet adopts five point proposal on Japanese Indonesian Government peace treaty: The Japanese peace treaty has adopted a five-point proposal regatding the expression of support which includes a demand for for Soviet reparations and an the treaty. Indonesia will not and Communist Chinese San Francisco decide whether to send participation in a delegation to on 13 August. until it sees the final text of the draft treaty now expected
Comment: Indonesia has displayed Japanese treaty, and the current relatively little seriously. proposal probably need interest in the The government not be taken had previously reparations would not indicated that its demand very be large and that included in the treaty for even if majority. negotiations, Indonesia Communist China were not would go along with the
INDOCHINA. Vietnam nam Surete in HanoiGovernment bans exit of men of received on 3 August military eget National Security The Vietan official Service in Saigon aged 20 to 45 would directive from the that'henceforth Consulate confirmed be issued exit visas. A check no Vietnamese males that this to Vietnamese directive will result with the Surete by the who have received in the denial of persons grants under the visas legislation. On 5 August Smith-Mundt Catholic diocese of exchange of two Vietnamese Buiehu seminarians from the were stopped bound for the US. I from boarding an Air France plane
Comment: The proximity of this attack Indonesials serious to the capital city Islam which seeks to security emphasizes In addition to the set up a problem. Moslem fanatical Darul numerous armed state by force of arme, there ate been exploited gangs operating in West also Java, some of which by the Communists. The identity Tandjong Priok is undoubtedly have not yet known. of the band which attaaked
25X1
TOP SECRET
5
Approved For Release 2007103107 : CIA-ROP79-1011464000300350N 1-1
Approved For Re Idswe 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000Z10350001-1
TOP SECRLT
Comment: This is the latest in a series of steps by the French Viethamese authorities designed to step up the military effort Viet Minh) and stems directly from against the Bao Bails dedree of 15 July providing for the "mobilization of all national resources." This step, however, threatens to be far more explosive politically than any heretofore taken. The absolute authority of the French High Commissariat for Indochina and the French-sanctioned Vietnam Government has, in the past, been tempered by the opportunity which has been accorded Vietnamese to express their political views at least to the unrepresentative and unpopular extent of refusing to cooperate with an government or of leaving the country-altogether. Compulsory military service under a government which is widely regarded by the Vietnamese as French-dominated, go abroad, particularly and denial of the right to for educational purposes, will cause intense ill feeling. This will be particularly true in the case of projeeted travel to the US, whose educational opportunities are regarded by many Vietnamese as the key to release from subordination to the French. This attitude toward the US is held in virtually all political circles of non-Communist Vietnam? and it is extremely doubtful that the Vietnam Government have curtailed contacts between would strong pressure from the French its nationals and the US except under authorities. On numerous occasions French have manifiested their the alarm at signs of closer US-Vietnam and have taken steps to thwart relations such a trend.
25X1
5.
truce with Viet Vietnamese circlesirM,risreacted Minh alarms Vietnamese: Official

"with some emotion" to the hint dropped by Minister for Associated States Letourneau that negotiations to end "civil war" in Vietnammight follow the the Korean truce talks, according to a French Press Agency (AFP) broadcast from Saigon. French political circles in Saigon were quoted by the AFP as stating that the Letourneau hint, given in an interview with a Dutch correspondent should be regarded as " ust a periodical solnding-out attempt which should not be taken seriously."
Ezia2h_hint_at
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comment: Although there is probably the French Government to negotiate with no serious intent on the part of Ho Chi Minh and although such TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/01): CIA-R0P79101146A000300350001-1
Approved For RGIsage 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW000350001-1
TOP SECRET
intent has been denied by De Lattre, the recollection of French-Viet Minh negotiations in 1946 is still fresh in the minds of the Vietnamese, and even the remotest hint that the French may "sell them out" to the Viet Minh creates painful uncertainty in Vietnam.
6.
CHINA. Soviet and Chinese Communist influence in Inner Mongolia assessed:

25X1
(a)
the Ministers of the Inner Mongolian regime were all Moscowtrained Mongols who spoke excellent Russian; however, the Vice-Ministers were all Chinese, and it was the Chinese who exercised "actual control" over the area; there was no official Soviet representative in Wangyehmiao, nor were any Soviet troops or railway guards observed; however,
(b)

(c)
(d)
(0)
the study of Russian was compulsory in the area (for officials?), and many young Russians had been imported as teachers;
the Mongols wished to establish better rail connections with the USSR hy extending the railway from Aershan to Manchuli or Hailer, but the Chinese Communists would not permit work to be begun on the proposed line; and
(f)
the border with Outer Mongolia was "tightly closed," with no travel except for occasional official delegations from Ulan Bator (the capital of Outer Mongolia).
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comment: The Inner Nbngolian Autonomous Region, a creation of the Peiping regime, adjoins Outer Mongolia and Communist China2s Northeast, occupying a large slice of the area formerly known as Mhnchuria. Little information has come out of the area; I There has long been speculation as to whether the Peiping regime would prove willing and able to prevent Outer Mongolian (and hence Soviet) annexation of Inner Mongolia
25X1
25X1 25X1
25X1
!
las ol 1949, the Peiping regime retained the superior position in the area. However, in the past two years there have been fragmentary reports of increased Soviet and Outer Mongolian activity in Inner Mongolia, and it is possible that the USSR has been steadily increasing its influence in the region.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : 9A-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,6100350001-1
TOP SECRET
7.
Communist advance into Tibet reported:

(a)
The Indian press reports that
Chinese Communist forces are now only 150 miles east of Lhasa and have been identified near the Indian border;
(b)
Chinese Communist officials who have arrived at principal Tibetan trading centers are "virtually in control" of administrative machinery; and the Dalai Lama and Chang Ching -wu (Communist military governor of Tibet) are about to enter Lhasa.
I
1
(c)
25X1
25X1
8.
Political:labor camps proposed for Central-South China: Labor camps for political prisoners will soon be in operation!throughout the CentralSouth China administrative region as a result of plans drawn up at a recent regional conference on "reform through labor," according to a 27 July communist newspaper in Hong Kong. The system, which will be decentralizedet first with prisoners working on local projects, will lay the groundwork for the later use of prisoners on large-scale engineering projects. The US Consul general in Hong Kong remarks that the establishment of a system creating a continuous demand for this type of labor would provide an additional motive for an unendin2 series of ',arraigns to arrest counterrevolutionaries.
I
25X1
Comment: Indications of Chinese Cammutist intent to implement a labor program of this sort have been observed in an increasing number of reports alluding to a decrease in the number of death sentences and a concurrent increase in commutations of sentences to servitude for varying periods. This is among the first observations of intent to employ prisoners in South China; other.reports concerned shipments of corvees northwards. The present development has long been expected.
Comment: Chinese Commanist forces and officials are known to be moving into Tibet, but the extent of their advance is not clear. The Dalai Lama's apparent decision to accept Peiping's termswhich leave him with no sig-. nificant authority- -will facilitate the Commmnist advance. The Peiping regime is expected to be in effective control of Tibet by the end of 1952.
9.
US objects to Chinese Nationalist conscription plans: The reported Chinese Nationalist intention to begin the conscription of 15,000 men on 10 August is diametrically opposed to the recommendations of the US Military Aid and Advisory Group (MAAG) and was announced without prior consultation with officials of that organization. General Chase, head of MAAG,
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007103/07 8CIA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0QQAP0350001-1
TOP SECliET
25X1
told Chinese officials on several occasions that he opposed any increase in the armed forces at this time. The ECA mission to Formosa has continuously stressed that the island's gravely strained economy cannot bear this burden. As a compromise, US officials hope for a deferment or only a oartial imnipmnwtation of this conscription.
I
25X1
10.
KOREA.
Communists take action against disease threat:
Comment: This incident points up the neceasity for establishing effective US political, economic, and military control over the programs supported by US aid. Chinese Nationalist preoccupation with sovereign rights wakes the solution of this particular problem difficult. Considerations of "faxen further complicate the problah, since the conscription program has already received the Generalissimo's signature and nation-wide publicity.
cholera and-typhus in one province alone since January, 1951. These disease prevention. measures reportedly are credited with reducing the incidence of smallpox hi 23.9 per cent.
I
broadcast relates that...over 1136,00lo persons.have teen vaccinated or inoculated against smallpox,
A 3 August Pyongyang
25X1
During the past winter the high incidence of eruptive typhus and hemorraghic smallpox among Communist troops and civilians was a matter of considerable toncern to North Korean authorities.
Comment:
TOP SECRET
Approved ForRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA4RDP79T01146A000300350001-1 9
Approved For Re Mote 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W00350001-1
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
2.
FRANCE. French fear aviation gasoline shortage is imminent: A severe aviation gas shortage is expected in France by Oetbber if the Abadan refinery shutdown continues.- The French are trying to borrow from SHAPE enough gas to tide them over, but they fear that they will not be successful after the freight airlift from-Berlin is started. They believe that the new Soviet blockade of Berlin's exports is timed to take the greatest possible advantage of the growing Western European shortage of aviation gas resulting from the Iranian dispute,
I
GERMANY. West German press expresses concern about Camnunist influence iiirarnst Oerman youfhs In reporting therm-tinier WiTrt75uth Festival now going on in East Berlin, many West German newspapers warn that the Communist youth rally should be viewed by the West as a "significant warning signal", and express grave concern lest the Communists win German youth to their cause while West Germany does very little to arouse enthusiasm among its,o7In youth for Western democratic ideals. Several newspapers publish the remark of a well-known news camnentator that the influence the 25X1 Communist regime is exerting on youth is "more damaging to German reun fi cation than the entire People's Police", 25X6
I
25X1
3.
Comment: The Abadan shutdown has deprived Western Europe of 31 per cent of its processed petroleum imports, Iran supplied only a slight portion of total French petroleum imports, but a relatively high proportion of this ISMB aviation gasoline, and current stocks cannot be entirely replenished from domestic plants. There is no direct evidence of a connection between Soviet-inspired economic trouble in Berlin and developnents in the Iranian oil dispute,
Further progress is made on export controls: Recent meetings of Western Powers participating in East-West trade-Eaarols have, in the opinion of the US delegation, led to "significant further progress toward parallel action" among all countries represented. More than 60 per cent of the critical items on vhich the US had previously been unable to obtain agreement for a strict embargo (US List IA) have now been accepted, bringing to 90 per cent the total number of items so far agreed to for embargo (US List I). In addition, "advantageous"-proposals for handling quantitative controls and exceptions have been adopted, and further progress is likely
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007103/07 : ClktRDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re lewre 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q300350001-1
TOP SECRET
to be made by obtaining at least partial control over the remaining US List IA items.
The US delegates were impressed, however, with the "very firm position", particularly of the UK and France, against a further extension of the embargo on basic industrial exports. These countries showed "grate condern" with their domestic political problems and rejected what they probably viewed as a US effart to impose its will for complete acceptance of List IA.
Comment: Substantial further progresp toward a general embargo on US Liet Trafelis is not indicated. Furthermore, the other participating countries have accepted less than 40 per cent of the 250 items on US Lists II and ITS, which were proposed for quantitative restrictione.only although in practice the US denies them totally to the Soviet Orbit,
The Western European countries are increasingly apprehensive over inflationary pressures, which some leaders are determined to coMbat in part .by encouraging imports. These countries insist that they can obtain urgently needed Eastern products, such as coal, only by offering some critical items in exchange. Furthermore, the Western EuropeanCountries are increasingly sensitive to US leadership and resentful of exceptions approved for individual nations. 25X1
5.
BELGIUM. Decline in export trade anticipated: BelgiumLuxembourg had a favorable balance of trade in June for the first time in 1951, due to a fall in the value 6f imports and a rise in the export level to a postwar high.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : etA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
TOP SECRET
25X1
Although the Belgian press welcomes thefavorable balance of trade, it does not consider it a good sign. It believes the drop in imports foreshadows a decline in exports, and a general slackening of over-all-economic activity. The embassy comments that although no details are available on the sectors affected by the drop in imports, it seems that the decline occurred primarily in imports of textile materials and vegetable prodicte. Imports of mineral articularly coal, shawed an increase. roducts
25Xi
Comment: Belgiam-Luxembourg has had a slight yearly balance of trade deficit. As usual, both before and since World:War II, some decline in overall economic activity probably will be evident during the summer. Activity in the secondary industries, such as textiles, has fallen off considerably since the first of the year because of the lack of world demand. No improve-
6.
Reavy Vote points up Salazarss nation-wide prestige: The Supreme Court today handed down the official returns on the 22 July general elections, which confirmed the choice of General Francisco Craveiro Lopes as the eighth President of the Portuguese Republic. Although the number of abstentions and voided ballots was not published, the unopposed official candidate is estimated to have polled 80 per cent of the total national vote, 25X1
'FOtITUGAL.
25X1
7.
Comment: The real victor in the elections was Premier Salazar. Previotm succegginf the polls had been generally attributed to the vote-getting appeal of the late President Carmona. The 80 per cent vote polled by the regire which, according to a pro-government newspaper, surprised even-the most optimistic observers, indicates that Salazar's party still enjoys a broad base of popular support. With his personal control of the party established beyond dispute, it is believed that Salazar may decide to deal severely mdth corrupt office-holders whose scandalous activities, widely publicized by the opposition during the presidential campaign, are said to have caused him considerable embarrassment. Lopes, who will take office on 9 August, visited Washington in 1943. Reportedly favorably disposed toward the US, he recently saiA that the strengthening of relations with the US will continue to be a basic aim of Portugal's foreign policy,
UNITED KINGDOM. US-UK disagreement over Far East policy seen as probable after Korean armistice: US Embassy London predicts that British differences with the US over Far East policy, nomr held in check in order to preserve a united front in Korea, will probably revive if a Korean armistice is achieved,-..The embassy indicates that the British see an armistice as the first phase in "step-by-step" negotiations leading eventually to a general
.

TOP SECRET
ment is likely-Untildefenee orders are under wsy and inventories-are depleted. In view of.the continued high value of mineral importS, no decline in the steel and metallurgical industries is foreseen at present.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : ClAWMP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re Sete 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A042000350001-1
TOP SECRET
settlement in the Far East, and expect the Chinese Communiets to demand admission to the UN as a prerequisite to an over-all Korean settlement. The eebassy estimates that the present government would find great difficulty.in trying to dodge such a demand in the face of UK public opinion on the issue. On the Formosa issue the embassy reports an increasing conviction of many senior military and civil officials, including Foreign Secretary Morrison, that the island would possess high strategic utility to a hoptile power, but estimates that the cabinet nevertheless might be led to over-rule Foreign Office support of Formosaus continued neutralization should it appear expedient to promote a general Far East settlement. Regarding the future of Korea once the embassy estimates that Britain might a cease-fire had been negotiated, for,a time resist pressure for a total withdrawal of UN forces, but probably would eventually prove willing to accept some face-saving solution. This would relieve the UK of unWelcome responsibi/ities in Korea and though it to eventual political absorption by:the might leave South Korea vulnerable North Korean Communist regime, Foreign Office circles repar such a development as in any event probable.
I
25X1
8.
British still push adoption of their .28 calibre rifIet The British Army will conduct on 10 August a demonstration of the .20 clalibre rifle lit the British Sehool of Infantry. US ArmyAttache London notes a determined'effort to "sell" the new rifle to all interested parties, including other NATO members. Be believes the demonstration has a definite political aspect, as the invitations for American personnel were handled through the NATO Council of Deputies and the political Midir; nf the embassy rather than by his office. I
Comment: UK Defonse Minister Shinmell, on his return to London from the smail arms standardization talks inWashington, reported that "for the present" he had failed to get the new British rifle and annunition adopted as standard NATO equipment, that the whole standardization matter had been referred to the supreme NATO military organization, and that he hoped a report could be drafted in time for the October Council meeting. the British Government Meanwhile, has decided not to request at this time US of any machine tools for production financing of .28 calibre weapons or ammunition.
25X1
9.
UK and German coal shortage keeps Denmark dependent upon Polish in acprihagen estimate that ECA efforts to reduce Mash dependence upon Polish coal hy financing coal imports from the US will have little effects unless Denmark can substantially increase its present imports of coal from the UK and Western Germany. The UK, for example, has
DENMARK.
crCUS oflicials
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :JelA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
Approved For Re lase 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79701146A000300350001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
million exported committed only 1.1 million tons for 1951 as against 2.9 from Britain and Germany, the in 1950. Failing a marked rise in imports quantity from would be a vaitly increased only alternative to Polish coal the US. /
of the UK and West Germany Comment: Since the present coal situation Denmark unlikely without special makes-ariittrease in their shipments to that Poland will be able to exert considerpressure from. the US, it appears strategic goods as payment for coal when able pressure on Denmark to export Reduced UK coal deliveries in October, the current trade agreement expires have also diminished Norway's bargaining position with Poland.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03107 : ClAalP79T01146A000300350001-1
UNCLASSIFIED when bAl*WOCOMAERtilkflISAYIREOYMESAFT:SeTgArAll91011/401ftitediflakel

fled
or declassi-
when fMed in form a detached from controlled document.

I
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE
I
REGISTRY CIA CONMOL NO
7D)
DAT
DOCUMENT RECE I VED
DOC:NO.
DOC
.
IDATE
COPYINO. NUMBER OF P AGES
LOGGED BY
I
This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agenby or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transtnifted outside o/ CIA. Access to Top Secret matter ts limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those Individuals whose official ductei relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /Ornt and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document Will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
ATTE.NTION:
REFEBRED TO
OFFICE
RECE IVED
5 I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When.this form ts detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate space below and ransmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record. .

DESTROYED
By
DATE
T I ME
OFF ICE/DI V.
DATE
DOWNGRADED
TO
I
D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
1
I TNESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
A ASThved For RereVe 2007/03107 : C 41-slibP79T014F6FA ' Y00300350001-1

u"
PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
' 26
9.73
TOP SECRET
MO)
Approved For Rely* 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004)00350001-1
TOP SECRET
25X1
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
if
Approved For Reiethe 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOWS00350001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
TRIESTE. State Department consideriqg postponement of Trieste elections: The Department of State is exploring the possibility of postponing the Trieste elections, as Premier De Gasperi has requested, on the understanding that the Italian Government will seriously try to reach agreement with Yugoslavia on the settlement of the Trieste problem. If this plan is implemented, the Allied Military Government will issue a carefully timed statement that the
elections have been deferred in order to facilitate a mutually satisfactory Trieste settlement in connection with the larger problem of the revision of the Italian Peade Treaty. Before seeking the concurrence of the UK and France for such a step, the Department has requested the comments of US ambassadors in Belgrade and Rome and the US political adviser in Trieste. 25X1
2.
JAPAN. Japan desires peace treaty provision for repatriation: Japan, con, cerned over the unrepatriated Japanese for whom the Soviet Union or Communist China have failed to account, desires the inclusion of a provision in Article 26 of the peace treaty for the return of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, according to a letter from Premier Yoshida to Ambassador Dulles. The Japanese are apprehensive that, without such a clause, if either Communist nation proposed a bilateral treaty identical with the present treaty Japan might be obligated to accept the proposal unconditionally. If the inclusion of such a repatriation provision proves impractical, Yoshida suggests a proto col joined in by the Allied Powers which would specify that the treaty does not prohibit repatriation provisions in subsequent bilateral treaties*
25X1
Comments Article 26 provides that for a period of three years after the peace treaty Japan will not make a bilateral peace treaty with any state which grants the latter greater advantages than those offered the signatories of the San Francisco treaty.
c
3.
Yoshida very likeli feels that a small concession of this nature from the Allied Powers, on a Matter as close to Japanese hearts as the subject of repatriation, will strengthen public support for the peace treaty in Japan,
Japanese promise to establish-overseas agency on Formosa after pease The US Political Advisor POLAD in Tokyo received categorical assurance on 4 August that the Japanese Government will open an overseas agency at Taipei after the peace treaty is signed.
treaty is consummated::

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1
TOP SIMRET
Approved For Re leIde 2007/03/07 : ClA-RDP797011461\002,3090350001-1

TOP SECRET
POIAD states that to time would bind Japan pnblicly to discourage India and ists from joining Nationalist China at others who have severed this us in signing opposed to the Japanese ties with the Nationalthe treaty. Since the British Chinese Government taking are adamantly Nationalists, any overt action in favor of the Japanese in this the US representative the warns that respect US-UK China further pressure on wouthoav ore to policyd displgy the disunity of
r
25X1

TOP SIZRZT
2 Approved For Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
*too
HR70-14 HR70-14
I
-TOP-aftittil-calfa-
JgterceDt euaaests Oonununist mmredunit unit orerations omrations A A garbled garbled North North 11. suggests Communist armored 1 1 , AgsgA. HQBE;B. ;ntervut Korean message of of 6 6 August states etatee that that due due to to a a "(decrease?) "(dearease?) in in attacks Korean message attacks by
enemy bombers because of of rainy rainy weather...we weather.e,we shall s h a l l begin begin (operations?) (operations?) with., With.., . enemy boebers because tank (unit?) about about 20 20 August...." AUgl18taoe.ll (SUEDE,rjm6, North #orean mulitargo 436, North Korean Military.,, tank.(unit?) (SLMMR4 6 Aug 51)0 6A u ~ 511,
whtle this this measage olearly state state that nits COmmen.t;s Uhile message does does not not olearly that armored armored U unite Comments are,being di@OU86ed, it it is is nevertheless nevertheless true true that t h t oeasehss are,being discussed, ceaseless and and in-bensive intensive UN air action actlon has has been been a a major factor factor in i n preventing orea air preventing Gommurrist communist forces forces in K Korea e o d e d that that during from employing armor m o r in in the the 1951 1951 offensives. offensives. It It may may be be r recalled during from employing a similar period period in in 1950, 1950, North North Korean Korean forces emceedad in oomidera similar forces succeeded in deploying deploying a considerable armored armored force foroe around around the the Pusan Pusan perimeter* perimeter, able
NR NR
-T0P-siztET-etran5
13 w 51 13 A Aug 51
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 ,DATE:
For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
HR70-14
v
T01"--SSORkT
NR
12. 12.
the adamant &mnt stand stand Comment: While While the as condoning condoning partition p a r t i t i o n of of negotiations negotiations as a t the the Kaesong negotiations negotiatioas of of General General at a t least preserves the semblance semblance of of UN UN at
13. 13 *
Unification sentiment sentiment continues continues in in the the ROE: ROKr Ambassador Ambassador Muccio, commentUnification Muccio, commenting h g on on the t h e demonstrations demnstrations within within the the ROK ROK against"the against the cease-fire cease-fire without without unification, no basic basic Change change in i n the the line l i n e of of action a c t i o b'advocated advocated in in speeches speeches unification, notes notes no delivered a at While the the Ambaseador'.obserVes Ambaesador observes that ddlivered t frequent frequent meetings. meetings. While that meetings meetings are generally amall small in i n size s i z e and and not not indicative indicative of of a a "strong t8etrongorganizational or anizational are generally effort," effort," he he believes belleves that the the celebration celebration of "Liberation 18Uberation Day" Day" (15 $15 August) August) wiU be aqiLoited to t o "produce llproduce a a high high emotional emotional pitch" pitch" on on :the the theme 0 . f will be.exploited theme of unification. M ication.
Imultak: Comment: While While it it is i s believed belleved that that President Preeident Rhee Rhee and and his h i s follawers followers will ndU. limit U t their t h e i r disapproval disapproval of of the t h e cease-fire cease-fire negoitations negoitations to t o such such meetings meetings and and speedhes speeches as as have have been bean described, described, the the possibility p o s s i b i l i t y always always exists exists that t h a t Rhee Rhee will withdraw Will withdraw his his military military representative representative from from the the Kaesong Kaesong meeting, meeting, thus thus prejudicing prejudicing the UN UN pOSition. poleition.
14.
w*
a of a discussion disc= of the the enemy's 'aemyDs artored armred potential p o t e n t i a l in in Korea, Korea, concludes concludes that that while while recent tank .recent tank sightings sightings do do not not indicate iridicate an an intention intention to t o employ employ armor armor extenextensiVely, number of of recent reports reports suggest suggest an an increased increased armored armored potential potential eivoly, a number (above (above the the 150 150 tanks currently currentlg accepted) accepted) for for future future offensive offensive operations. operations. Reports by FEC0M FECOM are a r e those those concerning concerning the the movement movement of of Chinese Chinese Reports referred referred to t o by e p o r t s received reports received COmmunist Cammunist armored units units into i n t o Korea Korea from from Manchuria. Manchuria. Other r

j
6 6
I
KOREA.. ROK representative instructed instructed tto remain a at Kaesong KOaEA. BOK cease-fire aease-fire repressntative o remain t Kaeaona; negotiations: Ambassador the contents contents of of a a 3.AugUst 3 August letter letter negotiations: Ambassador Muncio.reports Muccio r e p a r t s the by General General Ridgeway Ridgeway from from General General Falk, P a o ROK ROK cease-fire cease-fire representative, representative, received by received Paik notes notes his h i s instructions instructions from from President President Rhee.to Rhee t o be be present present at at i n which which Paik in all a l l meetings. meetings. General Paik makes it clear clear in in h i s letter, l e t t e r , however, General Faik makes it his homever, that attendance attendance is is against against his his personal personal convictions convictions and and that that his his presence preeence does does not signify signify the the ROK Gover 9s approval h e negotiations. not Governmen.'s approval of of any any outcome outcome of of tthenegotiations.
of the the RDK in viewing viewing the the cease-fire cease-fire of ROK in Korea is i s recognized, recognized, the the presence presence Korea Paik, representing representing the the Korean Korean Army, Army, Paik, unanimity of of action. unanimity action.
22gualataramaxasatascussed:. The US Eastern Command, C at. armored potential discussed: TheFar US Far Eastern Command,, in in
13 Aug Aug 51 5 1
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 .16-Dec-2009
bb
To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
; r
U
Top
RET
nentioned muvemenk movement of of-armored into the the combat combat areaarea-i n July have mentioned armred units into particularly i in sector. particulaFu n the western sector.
*
]
~

. .
T
7 7
13 Aug 51.
,,
HR70-14 /1-1R70-14
SECTION .1 (SOVIET) SECTION1 (SOVTET)

NR NR
30 30
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE 20-Mar-201 0 ATE: 20-Mar-2010 11;)PPROVED

Tenhtive Indentification of Soviet fiEhter re&nente In the &nchurlaKorea area8 Prellmhry of radio-telephone radio-telephone traffics traffie intercepted Korea area& Preliminary analysie analysis of intercepted during during b e period period 19 19 Nay-16 May-16 July July suggests suggeets that that two t w o reglmente o v i e t 9th i r Arqy the regiments of of a a S Soviet 9th A Air ArMY
-T-OP-GEGRET-SME-
TOP SECRET SUEDE
14 Aug 51
-DD
ss
,0
4 A
T6-1) SECRET SUEDEr-0

-20P-SEORN-811108-
fighter fighter division ,-risim have have been been operating operating in in the the Manchuria-Korea Mmchuria-Korea border border area. area.
Three. airCraft aalleign ',ensign series series representing representing three three fighter fighter regiment6 regiments Three airdraft believed to the Maritime Maritime Military Military District District to be located in i n the southern part of the disappeared fram f'rm 9th 9th Air A i r Army Army communioatione oommunioationa after after mid-May. mid4ky. On On 19 19 Msy, one disappeared May, one of in tra4fic passed on the the Sovietoperated Soviet-operated groundgroundQf the series reappeared i nt r a f f i c passed oontrolled intercept interoept network network centered oentered at at Antung. Antung. Since 11 11 Zuly July the second secroad controlled of groundof these ensign aalleignseries seriee has has been been heard he& in i n volume volume en m the t h e same 881118 ground("ensign seriee been heard eerie6 has hae not not been heard controlled controlled intercept intercept network. network. The third ctallsign slnoeo (SUEDE, T U f i U U T I s 906, 906, 9 9 Aug Aug 51). 5 1 ) . since.. (SUEDE,UAFSA-242EAUTTS
comment: This suggests that that organised organized units units of of the the This information strongly suggeete FOgrmenGg Soviet Air Bir Force Form are a r e now now stationed stationed in the Manchuria-Xorea Soviet Manchuria-Korea border border area, area, poeeibly possiblY for coMbat far oambat purposes. purpoaecr. The type of s not of aircraft i is not lmowl, known, although although met most fighter fighter aircraft operating operating in in the the area area ate are jets jete or or long-range long-range conventional-engined, conventional-engined, penetration fighters. fighters.
Previou8 indicated direat participation in in the the Previous information information has indicated direot Soviet Soviet participation expaneion of enemy enemy air a h operations operations since since Chinese Chinese entry enLry into into the the Korean Korean war. war. expansion of 811 pilots p i l o t s and and ground ground operators operator8 heard on the ground-controlled All groUnd-controlled iatercept intercept netnetwork have have been Russian, and and communications cornmunitations prOOedWe8 work been Russian, procedures have have shown shown 9th 9th Air Air Amy Army characteristics. Chinese characterietios, Chinese Cannnuniet o * kllied' Communist flight report8 reports have referred referred t to "allied" airoraft, se as distinguished distinguished from from "Chinese "Chinese " n aircraft, aircraf't, and and havoL have and "Soviet "Soviet " aircraft, named Russian flight-&mders, Russian flight-leaders.
.NR
40,P-SEGRET-SIMMI-' 2
'2
14 A Aug 51 34. u g 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Ttzad, SECRET SUEDir

-TOP-SEGEST-StIEDE-
SECTION 2 (ELSTERN)
NR
8. 80

KOREA. X a
* ~ iof i of eN e t h Koreanmilitary m i u t a r y messages indicates i d i o a t e a ta aZ w note ;Mike North Korean new note of urgency urgency In oombat oombat preparations preparations on on the the eastern eastern ftont. front, Priaerily in t h North Primarily concerned concerned d with North Korean IX, If, III I11 and srtld V Corpe,logistical Corpa logistical activity, the messages Korean activity,.the messages detail detail the sendsendh $ of t o these corps ing of 789 789 horses horses.to corps and and receipt receipt by by the the I1 II,Corpo of of mountain mountain
artillery artillery battalions. battalions. (SUEDE, TIK-909, TIL-909, 13 Aug 51). (SUEDE, 13 Bug 51).
Comments Mountain much ta to increase the -8 Mountain artillery a r t i l l e r y and horses will do muoh mobility o f . these theae three three corps. corpse The eastern mobility of eastern seatar, sector, in in which which these these corpe corps are are ourrently to the currently engaged, is is very very mountainous mountainous and and well well suited suited.to the use use of of suah sudh
Eteent b North Korean mtlitsry mi4tary mespages pecent r a brem messaims reflect refleo
urzepc7: e a t
A 113 3 AAugust ugust
equipment, equipat.
G
--TOP-SEGRET-613EDR-
14 Aug 51
' P
'
. + '
9. 9.
1A.,43 SECRET SUEDi.s.

--TOP-SEGRET-19iTEDE--
SM. g-ste &?w.
-the Kaesorvr Conferenoer i d activity at the A recent analysis Communist radio radio aotivity activity in in Kaeeong Kaesong reveal8 reveale.the existence @f of a n a l y d e of Oommuniet the Qtlstenee three communioatlon communication U~-Kaeeong-Fyongyang, links--Kaesongyongyang, KaesongPeiping, Kaesong-hiping, and and SoksanSoksanPyongyang, The The.amsIysis concludes with with the the observation, observation, "It "It fe is intereating interesting &ongying, analyaie conuludee - o ang link to traffic volume deareaeed decreased somewhat someWhat on on the the Kae Kae t o note that t r a f f i o volume with activation o of the Kaeeong-Peiping Kaesong-Peiping link." (SUEDE .(SWE 11 Aug 51), w i t h the aotlvation f the link,n
Comments While this this decrease decrease could crould be interpreted a8 the coneon' &te as eupporting supporting the tention that Conmatxist Communist decieions decisions on on the the oease-flre oease-fire negotiations negotiations are are made made in in PeIPing, there is is no 110 firm firm evidence ePidenae that that this this is is true, h e , Peiping, there

--26P-8-EGRET-WIADIC-
14 Aug 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
-.
ThiA, SECRET SUEDhe

FAR EAST
C calR7CT-14 I MR70-14
Tentative identification of Soviet Soviet fighter fighter redments regiments in 1. Tentative identiifcation of i.n the Manchuria-Korean area:
I
Armed Forces Security Security Armed Agency 9 Aug 4w 51 51 SUEDE
Preliminary analysis analysis of of radio-telephone radio-telephone 19 May May to 16 16 traffic during during the period from from19 July suggests that two regiments of a Soviet July two a Soviet 9th Air Air Army Army fighter division have been operating in the Manchuria-Korea Manchuria-Korea border border area. area.
Previous information information has has indicated indicated direct direct Soviet participation Soviet participation in the expansion expansion of of enemy enemyair air operations operations since Chinese Kore.an war. Allpilots pilotsand andground ground operators operatorshe'ard hebrd on on the entry into the Korean war. All ground-controlled intercept network network have been and communications ground-controlled intercept been Russian, Russian, and procedures have have shown shown 9th procedures 9th Air Air Army Army characteristics. characteristics. Chinese Co;mnunist Cop:munist reports have have referred referred to to "Allied" "ARiedtt and a s distinguished distinguished flight reports and 9oviet1f "Soviet"aircraft, aircraft, as ffChinesevf aircraft,and andhave havenamed named Russian flight-leaders. from "Chinese" aircraft, flight-leaders.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 41ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE. 23-Mar-201 11;1/PPROVED'FOR 0
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

-3-
Three Three aircraft aircraft callsign series series representing 'three fighter regiments believed to be located in the southern part of 'three regiment8 believed located southern part of the Maritime Military District from 9th 9th Air A i r Army Army communications communications District disappeared disappeared from gter On19 19May, May, one oneof of the the series seriesreappeared reappeared in i n traffic traffic passed passed Ytermid-May. mid-May. On Soviet-operated ground-controlled ground-controlled intercept network on the Soviet-operated network centered at at ntung. Since' 11 11 Jnly July the the second secondof of these these calisign callsign series series has has been been heard in Antung.Since The third volume on on the the same ground-controlled ground-controlled intercept third callvolume intercept network. network. The sign series series has has not not reappeared. reappeared.
Comment: This Comment: This information information strongly sugggsts suggests now stationed in the the ManManthat' organbed organiXedunits units of ofthe the Soviet Soviet-Air Air Force Force are are now churia-Korea border border area, area, possibly for comb& combatpurposes. purposes. The The type typeof ofairairchuria-Korea possibly for craft is althoughmost mostfighter fighteraircraft aircraft operating operating in in the the area area a are craft is not not known, known, although re jets penetration fighters. jets or o r long-range long-range conventional-engine conventional-engine penetration
TOP SECRET SUEDE EEREFSUEDE

P4
---r&P---SEGRET SUEDhoi SUEDk

jet r reconnaissance aircraft 2. US 2. US jet e vintercepted intercepted at at40.000 40.000 treet feet in darkness:
ZIIII
Night interceptions interceptions of of an anRB-46 RB-45aircraft aircraft by by a a Night total of seven enemy Jets at altitudes of 35, 000 total o f wven enemy jets altihudea of 55,000 to 40,000 feet have have recently recently been been reported reported over to 40,000 feet over Korean theater. theater. the Korean
Comment: These Comment: These interceptions interceptions clearly clearly demondemonstrate the a very difficult strate the Communists' Communists' ability ability to accomplish accomplish a difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, of coordinaexcelIent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of tion. tion,
These operations operations described described would would require require an an These aircraft with aircralt with a aminimum minimum combat combat radius radius of of approximately approximately 350 nautical miles miles over the the RB-45, RB-45, which whichis is the the reconnaisreconnaisconeiderable speed advantage advantage over and a considerable sance version of could of the B-45. These Theseattacks attacks couldnot nothave have been been accomplished accomplished with the MIG-15 or or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon with 33-gallon wing wing tanks currently currentlyknown known to be in use.
NR NR
TOP SECRET SUEDE SUEDE

Four aircraft maintained Four enemy enemy aircraft maintained formation formation for a period of o f 25 25 to 30 SO minutes while pursuing the BB-45, kB-45, which which was was executing executing evasive maneuverer.' maneuvers.. At the same time, time, single were occurring, At the single interceptions were evasive including a firing pass 000 feet RB-45 was at at 40, 000 paes from from1, 1,000 feet above above while while the RB-45 40,000 including byan anaircraft aircraft that that later later altered altered feet, and and a a collision collision course course interception interception by course and pulled abreast abreast of RB-45. While pursued, the RB-45 emcourse and pulled of the RB-45. While being being pursued, RB-45 employed 100 100 percent percent power, power, giving ployed giving a a ground ground speed of approximately 470 knots.
Approved For Retook 2007/016ip&9IRT01146A0S00390001-7
14 August 1951
CIA No.49305 Copy No.
33
DAILY DIGEST
OSD REVIEW COMPLETE
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.


TOP SECRET
Approved For Reigate 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0ItS60390001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. EMbassm Moscow comments on US-USSR exnharges EMbassy Moscow believes that the VOA campaign publicizing the US resolution of friendship for the
Russian people was the decisive factor whiehlorced the sudden and perhaps defensive shift in policy resulting in the publication of the US messages and the Soviet rebuttal. Recent Enbassy monitoring indicates that a significant segment of VOA broadcasts has reached the Russian audience. Embassy officials note that the Kremlin had a convenient opportunity to lend official stature to many component phases of the "peaceful co-existence" campaign but chose instead the points on a FiVe Power Peace Pact and on "discrimination." The Five Power Pact contains, in a single package, these basic essentials of cur-
The EMbassy concludes that the USSR reply was not meant to lead toward any chanke in the existing relations tetween the two governments.

(a)
(b) (c)
rent Soviet' policys
Recogmition of the CPR,
strain on free world unity in the Far East,
weakening of the UN,
(d). reestablishment of big power diplomacy, and

(e)
cheoking of impetus towerd strengthening of the free world defenses.
25X1
25X1
2.
25X11
Airfield in Sovzone of Germany to receliVe TU-4es (B-29 tyne)s Two current reports indicate that Briesen Airfield located in the Sovzone of Gernams 25X1 will receive a second taxi track an4 44 concrete parking stands in addition to the planned 8,200-foot concrete runway 260 feet in width. Each parking stand is to be circular and 118 feet in diameter. ITU-4 aircraft are to be stationed at this field and that parking stands are to be constructed for
1
this purl:3619e.
Field Comments One of the above reports was substantiated with a master .construction plan Of the new runway including parking stands. The latter were drawn on the plan on 20 July 1951. The 118-foot diameter circular parking stand is adequate for parking and accommodating TU-4 aircraft. This is the first time that parking stands have been included in construction of:any airfield in the Soviet Zone' of Germany. It is also the first time that Soviet officers have mentioned plans for stationing TU.14 aircraft at one of the newly constructed airfields.
1
25X1
TOP SECRET
14 Aug 51
Approved For Rd4saski 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S0390001-7

TOP 'SECRET
Comments TU-Als are not new stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany. 'This spring, type 27 twinjet bombers bedaMe the first bomber aircraft with increased offensive capabilities to arrive in the Zone.
25X1C 3.
EASTERN EUROPE. amingzAism. New technique adopted to perfect Communist
political trialss The-Russians are rePorted to have developed a new teChnique to assure a perfect performanceja-political trials. The new technique, allegedly used at:the Oatis trial, consists of conducting four or five dress rehearsals, complete with a hand-picked audience, during which all mistakes in the dialegue are corrected. If the accused attempts to interject unauthorized statements; the audience is instructed to burst inte laughter. These rehearsals take place until the script is perfected.'
25X1C 25X1A
25X1A
Comments Many theories have been advanced for the lethargy of the defendants at Communist trials, although few facts are definitely known. The monotonoui lack of spontaneity exhibited by the accused and prosecutor alike in the Oatis trial could stem from such preparation. Extreme physical ex hanstion, the application of drugs, and the promise of improved physical cos& ditions may also contribute to the lethargic manner of the defendant.
4,
25X1 A
HUNGARY. Soviet troop departure reporteds The US Air Attache in Budapest transmits-the-report. that Russian 25X1 troops in Hungary are to begin or hive already begun a slow withdrawal to Russia and the Rumanian-side Of the border. This move is to be effected by mid-October'in advance of a possible Hungarian strike against Yugoslavia. The USSR would then aid the Hungarian invasion of Yugoslavia with "volunteers."
Comments No evidence is available of any unusual movement 9f the two Soviet divisions in Hungary; The Hungarian Army which has been apanded from 65,000 to 100,000 since 1950 is generally' considered less prepared for any aggressive action thin are the Bulgarian or Rtmanian armies. Moreover, until the Austrian Peace Treat, is signed, the USSR has a valid reason, provided by the Hungarian Peace Treaty, for maintaining armed forces in Hungary.
Hungary procuring copper through Zurich firmz Metallimpex Budapest has arranged to procure 3,000 tons of electrolytic 99% copper bars through Herman Az, a Zurich firm. The Hungarian importer has stated that he prefers to have the shipment routed through Antwerp or Durazzo (Albania) rather than via Rumania. The US Legation Vienna has suggested that an investigation by the Swiss Government.is in order. The Legation points out that recent information

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : e1A-RDP79T01146A000300390001 11-47
Aug 51
ApproveciForFAeolee2007/03/07:0A-FDP79T01146A11360390001-7
TOP'SECRET
indicates that the Satellites regard Antwerp as the tort thremph whtnh clandestine trade can be diverted most easily.
I
25X1
Comments There have been numerous reports of Hungarian efforts to procure critical raw materials'through interthediaries. The copper would probably be obtained from Rhodesia, Chile,. or Mexico. Shipment of goods through Antwerp or Durazzo, from whence they:would be taken to Trieste for transPortation by rail to Hungary, is quicker and cheaper than shipment through
Rumania..
6.
POLAND. Prosecutor exceptionally violent in trial summation of Army officerss US Embassy Warsaw reports that the prosecutorgs summation of the evidence in the trial of nine former senior Polish Army Officers was extra-, ordinarily violent, even for such Communist denunciations. The defendants were referred to as "foul subversionistspw "mercenary.degenerates," and "the scum of the Polish nation." Their objective was described as plotting "to pave the way for the Anglo -SaXon air pirates to destroy Polish towns, murder its women, aged, and children as they are now 'doing in Korea." The prosecutor dealared that their prinoipal aim was "to brealf the bonds linking Poland with the Soviet area."
25X1
Comments The trial has consittently emphasized national deviationism as being the root 6f the evils in Which the defendants were engaged. Despite the smear tactics whioh the prosecutor used in his summation, it is unlikely that he was able to eraseithe respect which the Polish public bolds for these leaders of the wartime underground.
70
25X1
YUGOSLAVIA, Tito Government not internally endangered. US Ambassador Allen reports that although the unpopularity of Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Xerdelj and possibly Pijade, Atli the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's policies; The AMbaseador-concurs in the opinion of the US Military Attache that:the Yugoslav army would fight loyally, and if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. Allen concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the demand for continued popular sacrifices after the country's past tribulations.
25X1
Comment: The ihrewd appea/ of the Tito regime to the strong nationalism Of the Yugoslav people afforded it internal stability even during the crucial , period of.the 1950 drought. All available intelligence indicates that the Yugoslav Government, although beset with numerous internal difficulties, can effectively cope with them.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :
A-RDP79-101146A00030039A0i411 51
Approved For Rdiear 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Nati0390001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1
3.

atasii:
StateTOP SECRET
INDONESIA. Darul Islam possibly involved in Djakarta port ments from prisoners arrested in connection with the attack on the
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : 81A-RDP79T01146A0003069011b15-2/
Approved For R00,102007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0N190390001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1
Djakarta port of Tandjong Priok (see Daily Digest, $ Aug) indicate that a Moslem religioue leader, Kijahi, was the key figure behind the incident. Also seized at the time of the arresta were hathmer and sickle insignia and emblem 'of the Darel Iglpm nnri 11%n thiitary arm, the Indonesian Moslem Army.
Comment: The Darul Islam is a fanatical Moslem organization entrenched in West Java, which seeks to establish a Mohammedan state by force. Although Darul Islam follozers include certain "Communisttinged" groups (which could-explain the presence of hammer and sickle insignia at Tandjong Priok), the organization is not known to have cooperated in the past with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
. ,
Undoubtedly the PKI hopes to exploit Darul Islam strength in West Java. Whether the Tandjong Priok attack represents evidence of PKIDarul Islam cooperation, however, has yet to be proved.
4.
25X1
THAILAND. Military leaders continue to vie for powert Hostility between Police Director:Phao and General Sarit:(commander Of the Bangkok army garrison) is continuing: The latter is obtaining increasing support from various army elements but is not yet ready to make a bid for power. Phao, on the other hand, apparently prefers to temporize until the elections of March 1952, at which time he hopes to gain control of Parliament and be in a position to dominate Sarit without resort forte. The position ofithe air force in the struggle is unclear.
.It is significant to note, however, that in June the Consultative Council of Political Parties--the PKI-sponsOred national front organizetion--set up a branch in Bandung in West Java. Appointed as general chairman of the branch was a member of the Indonesian Islamic League, an orgardzation which has always been eympathetic to the Darul Islam and which has now joined the government's opposition. The branch secretary of the League is a member of the PKI.
25X1
5.
Cbmment: If at any time between now and the elections Phao believes he is.losing ground in his rivalry with Sarit, he might well attempt a coup d'etat.
CHINA. Chinese Communists strengthen police controls: The Chinese Com. nunist press reveals that the Peiping regime has strengthened its already extensive'police controls over the Chinese populace by
(a) promulgating new, regulations further restricting entry and exit of overseas Chinese and travel to and from
TOP SECRET .5
14 Aug 51
Approved ForRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7
Approved For Rel&ge 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146=140390001-7

TOP 6.EaRET
Hong Kong andliacao;

(b). giving the Ministry of Public Seduriti new powers to control radio appliances and Supplies (with the partial intention and result of reducing the effectiveness of the Voice of America); and (c) 'establishing a central school charged with the training of County and municipal public security, and jUdicial cadres.
.
25)(1
6.
Peipig press claims Communist forces "well pre:pared" to continuewarr ThaPeiping PeOpIelA.Daily, organ of the Chinese Communist Party, asserted in an 11 AugUst.editorial that the Chinese and North Korean "people" are not "afraid of continuing our just war of resistance to aggression." and are "fully confident and well preparedtto continue.
25X1
Cetment: On 5 Atigust, Generaljleng Teh-haai, commanding Chinese Communist forces in:Korea, asserted that the CNIs superiority in weapons "vilkchange,"..and that Chinese forees had%libegun the Astablishment of a peoples artillery and large-scale air forces" with which they would "win greater victories," 5he 11 August.assertion that ComMunist forces are now "well prepared" to continue hostilities implies, or at least threatens, that the artillery arid air Arms are ready for action. HUN field intelligence confirme a considerable build-up in COmmunist Artillery and air strength in the past several months. However, the 11:August editorial iSlargely devoted to asserting thateemmunist China genuinely desires a Korean armistice on the basis of the 38th Parallel.
Comment: The Peiping regime dims,at the total domination of its Subjects in all aspects of their lives. An enormous increase in security organization:SI regulations and operations is to:be expected.
25X1
' TOP SECRET
14 Aug 51
Approved Foribiease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146*00300390001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1
8.
KOREA. A
25X1
rumored: A 12 August ointment of new ROK Defense Minister rumor Nationalist news source in Korea reports a dispatch from a Chinese China, is slated to Nationalist that 1ee Bum Suk, present ROK Ambassador Government. The item notes, in thellOK for the post of Defense Minister reluctande to accept any Cabinet office however, that Lee has expressed diplomatic post. and desire to return to his
I
25X1
\
Comment :
in the ROK, was considered a strong man President Rhee will replace the present indicate that friend of is no evidence to competent official and personal Minister of Defense Yi Ki Bong, a Rhee, with Lea.
of Defense in the Lee; an ex.-Prime Minister and Minister earlY days of the Itepublic. There
9.
limitations are if aerial reconnaissanCe er to UN fo ces FECOM notes da tore& and Coitunist .air capabilities in and the US Far impoied in ceas-f ire agreement: Eastern. Command US Far. Manchuria have been reevaluated by the based on the possibility that hostiliThis new estimate, Eastern Air Force. of the Kaesong talks, notes a ties may cease in the near future as a result Korea should an agreement be reached such considerable danger to the UN forces in over North Korea . In MOW a opinion, reconnaissance limiting UN aerialallow the reoecupation of North Korean- airfields by Commuin limitations might threat to UN aerial nist aircraft, thereby posing a serious the event of renewed hostilities.
'
superiorit/
25X1
IO.
, '
25X1
\
of gas by UN forces: An 11 August radio North Koreans protest use ,Korean note to the UN prothe text of a .North The broadcast iniCoream.teleased "American interventionists:" testing against the use of poison gas by two "bombs" on the city of Yonan broadcast cites the 6 August dropping of August bombing of a North K.orean troav (southwest of Kaesong) and the 7 .".1 atrocities inetallation as usVidenee of these "deliberate
I
25X1
TOP SECRET
14 Aug 51
Approved
ForRelet
2007103/07 : ClA-RDP79T01146A0041039000177
.,TOP .8ECRET
Consent: Korth Korea has previously accused the,114 of 'employing chenical and biological warfare. These accusationa are-probably for Soviet.Crbit internal consumption in order to atrengthen the "hate America" feeling*

TOP SECRET
8 iL Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003003900U1h118 51
Approved For Re leee 2007103107 : ClA-RDP79701146A00010390001-7
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
(MES1ERI)
FRANCE.. Near pro=US French Government is Vinod iwithout Embassy Paris finds that the Socialists: US replacements of Moch and and Mayer in the Defense Petsphe by Bidault and Finance posts, Cabinet shifts of partidular respectively, are the French rearmament and relations withinterest to the US in connection with France's NATO.
.
25X1

affairs
.Bidaalt will have full authrity, ordinate rapidlyFrench policy on North according to press reports to coprespective Contribution. Atlantic defense, including Mile he reportedly Germany's will Minister Schuman in this task, "cooperate" mith Foreign the latter ment of the will be concentrating French position in the Far on deVelopas well as on application East, Indochina, and the of the Mediterranean, coal-steel pool plan, 'The embassy believes that, whatever Bidault's Schaman may turn Out to official relation to be, "it is More than training and interest in probable that Bidault with his desire to be more adtiVe foreign and his long in that field and ill-concealed will exert an influence strictiv domestie asoeits of national beyond the defense", 1
25X1
d'ointherit:
Vice-Premiers mill hold 'preGovernmentfare ardently pro-American supporterS of NATO. Although of b.:mediate Moch had come to...fever Socialist aims to defense a sacrifice coolneas to US leadership requirements, he:reflected and.Was Socialist generally considered The departure of Petsehe, a difficait however, and his replacement with Mayer, negotiator. narrower political supportl-close who has business quarrels with the Socialists, connections, and a record of mill weaken their present of the government, conditional support
amineEtTgrtions in the new Pleven And Strong
Both Bidault and Mayer, who as
2. AUSTRIA.
\
,
:Government plans to deny Minister of the Interior residence pertits to 1FTU emple- lie: Helmer informed US High,Commiss Donnelly on 9 AUgust that the World Federation oner declared illegal in Austria, of Trade Unions had been The minister expiration of two-month teMporary residence stated further that after the .(other than permits, all V/FTU employees SoViet nationals who may permits) would be denied remain for permission to reside in seven menths on temporary however, remains Austria. The US 'skeptical that the Austrian legation, government will be able to
117517Ffih
.
While the past syMpathies of Pleven, Bidault, could be and Mayer for De Gaulle expected-to help soften the the diffieult opposition of the General's Months ahead, the Gsullists' party in position whenever the strategy is middle-of-the-road regime can be to joirLthe opdiscredited.
TOP SE3RET
9
Approved For Release 200710307 : ClA-RDP79T01146A0003090e151.
Approved For Re lelfe 2007103107 : ClA-RDP79701146A0040390001-7

TOP SECRET
take effective action against the WFTU, and expects that achieved other than to Make little can be it clear that the VIFTU Austriartcapital by grace .of contintes in the the Soviet the wishes of the Austrian occvnation authoritils and against people.
25X1
ITALY.
Premier was to press the Soviet Minister than 63,000 Union for the retttn of more Italian'prisoners still held in the Government has evidence that USSR. Although the Italian Italian prisoners are Soviet concentration still held-in sane 56 campe, probably as slave labor, replied to previous Italian the Soviet Union has inquiries with the statement prisoners remain in the USSR. that ho Italian
-Ite Italipilstatiptics on war prisoners elicited by th&UN were preewnabiy commission investigating the wir in the Soviet Union. status of.Priseners of .Premier De Gasperi timed doindide with: (1) his his announcement to recently inaugurated campaign to strength of Italian Communists,by diminish the (2) Italy's propaganda and restrictive intensified drive for revision means; and of the Italian admission.ihto the UN. Dn seVeral pease'treaty and ifi atteMpts'to occasions former debunk Communist claims that Foreign Minister Sforsa, to Italians, has pointed the SeViet Union is to the retention of friendly the USSR. Sforza has also Italian prisonere of war by dwelt on the admission to the UN. Soviet veto of Italy.'s proposed Govermteht apprehensive aver possible loss of US aheese aneolive oit: market for Italian' The Italian Foreign Office amendment to the Defense Act, has protested the Anderson suspending oils, cheese', or limiting US imports df fats, etc. fromWestern European countries which export materials to Eastern Europe., strategic The Foreign Office points hit two typical Italian out that it would products olive oil and to conflict with US policy cheese, and would appear favoring the economic recovery of countries within
,TOP SECRET
bOinthent:
return Italian war prisoners: DW-Msperi'has announced that one of his first acts as Foreign in tha nevicabinet
De Gasperi trges USSR to
intervention.and by the absence Strong support of the WFTU Element in the by the Soviet Allied Commission and consequent the Austrians have led US hesitanay bn the part of observers to believe that move Slowly in declaring the Austrian officials WFTU a "menace to public will register aS required by safety", if it should Austrian law, or an illegal should not. The MOVO to deny residence perMits to secret society, if it probably be regarded, therefore, WFTU pereonnel should as merely part of the general campaign which the Austrian harassing Government is apparently willing to undertake.
'
Comment; Although by the US legation effective action againstencouraged to take all possible the WFTU, the in its measures by the Austrian Government has been liMited possibility of Soviet of clear legal justification.
25X1
10 Approved For Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003011a0
91
,
"
Approved For Re 1E416007/03W CIA-RDP79T0i14000141,0396.004:7

TOP:SECRET
the framexmrk of ER4.1S.,-13mbassY-Rohe bel*Od..".thejtalian protest:is more than-justified"'-sihaelit,:woul&be.,,most 4iffichlt to explain tb the cheese and oii:prodhOO'PO....P9*,faCed'Ilidth
half of their reePective:exPert:Marketa. assists up defense-preductiona

I
the loss of One-third:and oher
25X1
to all countries Ori.the other hand; since these two products had a total,yalua ef $1jJ. MilliOn for this:peried, the loss of the US market:lor:Italian Cheese end olive 61r:exporters would have a dignificant effect on Italy"s foreigh exchange.poeitiOn.
the same period, thei*rd'OplYA:per cent ahd5 Per:bent reePactiva.347 of total Italiamekports
While Italian exports Of cheeSeahdOliVe oil for the first four mopths of 195IMere approxiMately-33'per ta the US Cent and 61 per cent reapectiyely of total Italialt*Perts of thSse doMmodities for:
Comment,:
5.
25X1
Commentt The:commentaier'is-editor ot the Small: Liberal Party"s hows paper, -which had 6.relatiVely low.eirculationO Nevertheless, the views expressed represehtl4e_opihionof that large 'segment eftheHphblic composed principally of,bubinesie men,,.which ihaiSts-that Switzerlan4 keep open its normal chdrInels of trade with all countries,:
.
bWiTZERLAND. Reaesertibn of neUtralist poSitionsfirlEastgibat'trade: A commentator on the Bern radio denies that the recehtJZ-Swiss:conVersations on export Oohtrole involved apy agreement-en:the:Part of the Swiss, and asserta that Switzerland is unwilling triliecoms:,inyolved mith either the East Or the Xest in any kind of enbargo faVor :one side to the detrimentof the other wohld,rhe declares,:hean "giviheup the neutrality mhich is writteriAlito our cohstitutien and interhationaI agreements". He further comments that Switzerland mbuld be taking sides and,forsaking its neutrality if it adopted the US suggestion that it prohibit pXport to the USSR of goada:manufptured et home from rew materials obtained fram the West.
.
25X1A
TOP SECRET-
Approved For Re ledge 2007/03/0721:CIA-RDP79T01146A00030033 g
Si
Approved For Re lasie 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S160390001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1
7.
UNITED KINGDOM. Serious decline in steel produotion foreseen: ECA London reports that a critical reduction in British steel output is expected in 1951. This will be due primarily to an estimated lag of one million tons in ingot capacity which has resulted from: (a) drying up of German scrap exports,
(b) inability to purchase adequate iron ore supplies in world markets,
The British contend that the US has been getting most of the available German scrap exports.and is the most favored purchaser of continental Steel. 'Although the.British'Oevernment has started a blast furnace expandion program, and hes begun to develop iron ore resources in parts of Africa, UK domestic production is unlikely to exdeed 16 million ingot tons in 1951 and 1952.
GodMent: A steel shortage now'appears as an added serious factor in the difs deteriorating economic situation. The latest production estimate now anticipated is 147.2 million tons less than peat long-range estimates for this period. The Government is hard-pressed to'fulfill defense cammitments for the reariament program, whieh by increasing cOnsumption is largely responsible for the steel shortage.

(c) a shipping shortage, and (d) inadequate blast furnace capacity.
25X1
8.
BRITISN'GUIANA. Significant gains made by CoMmuniet-oriented party: The Communist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP) has gained-wide support in British Guiana in the year-and-a-half since its formation, and all evidenop indicates that it will meet with continuing success in ite current Campaign for recruiting additional members. Formed early in 1950 hy Dr. and Mrs. Cheddi Jagan, a couple with kneWn Pro-SoVidt, anti4S sympathies, it is the only political party which has ever commanded a significant following in the colony. Membership in Marohcas announced by Mrs. Jagan during the party's first congress stood at 3,0607-a figure which was probably not grossly exaggerated and *doh assumes significance with the realizatixv: that the membership fee, although small, ill not easily raised by the average
'
TOP SECRET
12
14 Aug 51
Approved For Re lahieb 2007103107 : CIA-R0P79T01146A0040390001-7
TOP SECRET
The remarkable strides which the party has made in 18 months are explained by the fact-that it is the first group ever to hold out any hope to British Guiana's poorly paid, inadequately housed workers for improving their miserable standard of living,
Guianese.
The party has cleverly used tactics which attract tbe widest possible support fram lower-income groups. Byplaying-up the poor conditions which most of the Colony's peoples under actually do work and live, PEP leaders have created considerable unrest and have rather successfully presented party as tbe rallying point for those the dition, the party has sought to align dissatiefied With their lot. In aditself with some Of the organized labor unions* Its connections with the Guiana IndustrialWorkers' now seem to be firmly established, and Union it is probable that the Jagans at least nartially were responsible for the workers' union from the non-Communist recent separation of the bauxite Man Power Citizens' Association*
25X1.
1 If PPP influence continues to increase (and there is every indication that it will), Com-. munist capabilities for hindering Canada and the US through atrike the flow of British Guiana bauxite to and.sabotage activitiea will'increase respondingly (9% of US requiroments corcome from British Guiana).
sign on the British Guiana scene in December 1950 of a second was the formation political partythe National Democratic Party ,organized by hon-Communist leaders and also designed toappeal 'income groups, As yet, however, to lowerit has not had great success, in members, and has given no promise recruiting of beeoming an effective opponent PPP. of the
9.
One slightlyhopeful
4.9.221,_Ngfj.
refine The US Consul reports -sow emending A 20 wage increase. The company's per cent counter-offer was refused by the renudiated their, bargaining_committee workers, who which had accepted the offer." The Netherlands Government mediator is negotiating. The refinery operating at reduced capacity on is-now an emergency basis.
:
I
'Strike re Orted in Aruba oil thatWv:re ry wor ars s ruc on
The Lego Oil and Transport Company, Ztd, Oil OMIT-jersey) operates the world's second largest of Aruba (Standard haa a normal output of oil refinery which approximately 490,000 barrels daily, satisfaction has been present right along in both Aruba and Labor disit apparently is nowcoming Curacao, and to a head as a reSult of the national petroleum situation which general interhas led ths workers to believe are in aistronger bargaining that they position*
Comment:
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300364111g7 51
Approved For IRS3/410se 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A81115300390001-7

TOP SECRET
The main grievance of labor has been the wage differential and general preferential position given to certain foreign nationalities. During WorldMar II this wage policy operated against the Chinese employees of the tanker fleet and produced a long strike which seriously hampered the importation of crude petroleum from Venezuela. The present cause of dissatisfaetion 12 possibly a sharp rise in the cost of living -which has not been offset by a proportionate upward adjUstment of tagots cost of living bonus to its employees. Lego has exercised rather close supervision of organized labor in its plant. It wisely has encouraged establishment of the Lago Employee Council (employee advisory committee) to .confer with management on labor problems while simultaneously using it as a device to combat the rise of labor unions. Of the numerous sporadic efforts at unionization, one formal Union has managed to risethe ArUba Labor Union. It has been used primarily' to further the political aspirations ot its president, Henry Eman, The union apparently has attracted enough dissatisfied workers to its ranks and has gained sufficient 'strength to declare this strike in an effort to force company recognition.
10.
SWEDEN. Government grants asylud to Polish nutineers: The Swedish govern:76=as granted political refuge to the 12 polish naval.mutineers who southern Swedish port of Ystad on 2 August,
I
25X1
25X1
The Swedes were able to escape a conflict between their Comment: humanitarian implges and-their pride in strictly observing international law because there is ne extradition treaty between Poland and Sweden, and the Swedish law of 1913 specifically exemptedrmutiny as a crime requiring extradition. In the case of such a conflict, the goVernment would undoubtedly make a great effort to find some legal loophole or overriding political reason to maintain its humanitarian record,
11,
ARGENTINA. Peronista Party urges denunciation.of opposition: The Peronista Party has urged all medbers to tell police of any "attempts to promote sabotage" and has advised them that the time has coMe "to wipe out the swine made daring by oUr tolerance". The statement followed the arrest of 80 raillkey engineers and a number of Radicals and Socialists, All of Wham were accused of plotting a campaign of terrorilm and sabotage to spread disorder on the eve of the 11 November elections.
I
25X1
Cednenti Peron has denounced all non-Peronistas as traitors. The constant call for action against the opposition and foreign interests could resUlt in violence, as election activities are intensified. On occasion official newspapers have published names and addesss of anti-Peron elements,
TOP SECRET
14 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7
Approved For Releka 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0014.0390001-7

TOP SECRET
arid often Peron hae advised workers to keep a supply of baling wire "to hang the opposition".
12.
Cannon: As the 1952 elections approach, the administration Will probahly become increasingly hesitant to admit international obligations which might be regarded as adverse.to'national Sovereignty and welfare. The Mexican public does not appear Convinced, at present, that the Eastlest struggle involves an hmnediate threat to Mexico. Unless a new crisis arises, therefore, it is possible that domestic political'considerations will serve to inhibit'expressions of agreement With, or support of, various US international aims.
13.
25X1
PANAMA. President's new legal advisor: President Arosemena has appointed RTFrilo J. Alfaro as his legal counselor. Alfaro accepted the office without Salary which may indicate-a deSire to remain aloof from the present Weak administratiOn. Clearly, though, he plans to'play an important political role. i
1
Comment: Ricardo J. Alfaro has been prominent in Panamanian governments throughout Panama's history. His first position was that of Under Secretary Of Foreign Relations in 1905, two ysars after the establishmmnt of the Republic. Throughout his career he has maintained a reputation for financial honesty.
In recent years, he has been obdurate and ultra-nationalistic in negotiations with the US Embassy. in Panama on,issues of bilateral interest, but has been cooperative withmembers of US delegations at internatienal conferences, especially when problems of international laW were under dipcussion. The Embassy reports that he is currently exerting his influence in favor of strong measures, which are advocated by the US, to ban Panama flag vessels from visiting Chinese Communist or North Korean ports.
MEXICO. Administration seeks te'avOid publiciiing Military cooperation with OS: In response to a US auggestion'that an exchange of notes might serve to revalidate the US-Mexico reciprocal agreement fer the transit of military aircraft, a Mexican Foreign Office spokesman has indicated that it would be well not to question the validity of the agreement and to assume that it has not expired. In a strictly confidential oral reply, the spokesman stated that the exchange of notes would have to be ratified by the Senate, and--although ratificatiOn would be, likely-tpolitical opposition might be encountered which would lead to undeeirable public debate,; The proximity of the coming presidential electiona was giVen as a factor which "might also complicate matters". The US Embassy comments that these remarks "would seem to confirm the present.well-known policy of the Mexidan government to avoid any action which might:in anyway be interpreted as a military commitment". 25X1
TOP SECREZ
15 14 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED 'when bARP-FRYPREERETROleasea2007/03107
4ECIA-WEIPY9410414aUghdii5girded or declossi001-7
fit:id when filled in form is detciched from controlled document.
DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET

REG I STRY
0
NO.
DOCUMENT DESCR I PT ION

SOURCE
-CI A CONTR
50-S OATE'DOCUMENT RICE I VED

LOGGED BY
DOC.INO.
_DOC . !DATE
COPY! NO .
NUMBER OF P AGES
NUMB R OF ATTACHMENTS
OFFICE
S I GNATURE
ed from Top Sec NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO

below et mate WI it shall be completed In the appropriate space
D I SPATCHED
TO
BY
Central Intelligence Ageney Top Secret document received by the ATTENTION: This form tettl be placed on top of and attached to each it is downgrade& destroyed, Or to the document until such time as official Or classified Top Secret Within the CIA and will remain attached limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose Iran milted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material wilt sign this forM duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and and indicate period of custody in the lelt-hand columns provided. right-hand columns. inchcate the date of handling in the SEEN BY RELEASED RECE I VED DATE OFFICE/DIV. REFERRED TO 5 I GNATURE T IME
DATE T IME
DATE
DESTROYED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
By (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (gignatur )
(Signature)
DATE
WH(Signature)
OFFICE
proved For Re Wiec2007/03/07: CIA-11415P79T0114 6A000300390001-7

'
OFFICE
Fqkffi
9R ni'pov ! ONYOìiit
uTOP SECRET
140)
Approved For Relegate 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP_TaT01146A06134100390001-7
TOP SECRET
14 August 1951
CIA No. 49305-A

Copy No.
25X1
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence-
Approved For Re le 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00401)0390001-7

SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
10
Government accepts latest draft of Japanese peace.treatv: President Quirino, with the concurrence of his special 15man.advisory committee, has agreed to accept the language of the latest draft of the Japanese peace treaty.
I 1
MILIPPINES.
25X1
2.
Meanwhile, Minister Heath in Saigon argues against offering the Associated States observer status, stating that such a halfmeasure would cast more doubt on the independence of the Associated States than would their nonattendance at the lonference.
signatories of Japanese treatv: The UK Foreign Office is opposed to,inviting the Associated States to the San Francisco treaty- conference as Dobservers," feeling that this would stir up the question ofChinese Nationalist observer status. The Foreign Office plans to delay its reply to a formal request from CaMbodia that it be invited to sign at San Francisco pending Indiats response to UK attempts to persuade India to sigh the treaty. Apparently. the Foreign Office believes that India will delay its reply, thereby blocking an invita tion to the Associated States,
INACCHIN West weighs choice be-Mien India and Indoehinese states as
25X1
25X1
SECRET
14 Aug 51
HR70-14
V'
TOP SECIZER
NR

Communist. Air Force.
7..
..
German FOWs al e e to flyjets in Man4wriat about 300 German prisoners-of-war have been sent from Kommomolsk to Mukden and Changchun to pilot jet aircraft for the Chinese
Comment: ComIlentr
Although G e m P ~ Ehavei5fi.nI Uerman POWs have often peen reported amohg,Soviet advisorytechnical personnel in Shanghai, it is doubtful that the USSR would entrust jet aircraft to them.
r
L
TOP--SEGELET-
6 6
15 1 5 Aug 51 51
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 09-Dec-2009 DATE: 09-Dec-2009 IDPPROVED
A w Db
w'
-Ter-RIEORET
NR NR
3.116,
KOREA.
North KrOeans to use civilian in POW returns:
North Korean Authorities are othering refugees and ordinary citizens together in tear area camps. These people riaportedlylill be designated pr4soners cf war and used in eny'exchanke of *isoners growing Out of the Khesong
cease-fire- talks.
Commenbi
The great disparity between the large number of prieeners
of warlactbythe UN.forces and the Small nuMber held Wthe Communist

forces may have induced thelbrth Koreans to resort to such a stbterfuget however, this activityis Unconfirmed.
I
TOPSEGRET7
.
NR NR
15 Aug 51
w
,
1 .
Teil-SEGRET--
4.
AOK unification activities may be eMbarrassing North Korea: AMbassador. Ikea Peale that.the strange.failure.of the North Korean propaganda mechanism to seise upon MK anti-oease-fire and unification aetivities may be due to eMbarrassment. He Observes that unification sentiment in North Korea is equally as strong as in the ROK, and that the volume of ROE activity has probably had the*effect of "stealing the.thunder from the North Koreans." Koreanso" North
UM.
5.
It has has previously k v i o w l y been observed that that despite despite the the intensity intensity with With pomments It 22mmants been Observed w w c h the the ROK g0vemxmn-t m a pushing uniflaatlon line, n whiCh ROK government wae pushing the the.unification line,me&nge meetingsheld had i in support of of this thia stand stand were were not not large large and and seemed seemed to to be be disorganized. disorgani5ed. support
NI

10P-SECRET%kPmXEY
AOK unification activities lagging: AMbassador Muccio reports that anti-cease-fire and pro-unification activity,while still at a high pitch, is "certainly not increasing...." Mucci() observes that the subject "has taken on the aspects of an old story" to many Korean and that the government is meeting increasing difficulty in arousing enthusiasm. He observes, In addition, that a "considerable nuMber" of Koreans herve become more realistic and are oreoared "to accept de facto division...."
2 2
15 Aug 51 51 1 5 Aug
HR70-14 HR70-14
*
L
'
11013-633RET-BUIE111
NR
&rth Jsme= uoabat &orm reaeive additi o n dweaconos. weaponas A 1 August 10. um. Xorth Korean dombatlorusreceive additional Auguat ULJiiA. meesqe f r o m the the North Narth Korean Korean artillery artillery commander oanrmander at.Front a t Front Line Lirie Headquarters Headquartere message from to the the artillenrystaff artillery staff at a t Supreme Supreme Headquarters i n Py t h e roreto Headquarters in Pyongyang reports reports the
21and and30 303111,15 J e of lO&O 3 aati-aircraft ceipt, between 21 of 104480(maohine (machine guns?), 1 163 anti-aircraft 11 2 2 4 ~ artdllery 1 rifles 1 122-imm artillery (howitzers (howitzers ?) ?) and and 194 194 anti-tank'rifles. anti-tank'rifles. (SUEDE 040 1 1 Aug A u ~ 51)e 040 51).
-rt
11.
Gas ahortaae shortwe olaaupa Dl a m e s Communis ta t i o n at a t Ka esopg;: An Bn'8 Auguat Gas Communist deleaation Keesonal 8 August message from from the the'hesong Conference Group Group to to Pyongyang Pyongyttng deplores deplores the the fact fact that that message Kaesong Conference worktlis is in poor condition "due o the lack gasoUne." ca one wore "oommunioat4ona in poor condition 0due to t the lack of of gasoline...0. (SUEDE, 34, 34, 8 8 Aug Bug 51). 5 1 ) .
.
; : = =
Gasolipe shortages have-been fiaulty t o C munlet qommen701 Gasoline Shortages have-been a a oonetant constant U difficulty to Communist S;Ommen$s foroee in mare than than 66 bionthe, mOnthe. forcesin Korea Korea for for more
/NR
-Terii-3-9213T-s-tazs16, Avg 51.
i n Come& Convaents It It is is believed believed that that this this report report probably probably refers refers to to xlflee rifles inThe stead of of machine maohina guns, gunrs, and and anti-aircraft anti-aireraft machine machine guns guna inetead instead of of rifles. rifles. The stead preeenoe of of 31 31 m e d i u m artillery (222-mm howitzers) presence medium artillery pieoee pieces (122-mm howitzers) in in the the forward forward are-areas-if confirmed-6i oonfirmed- dll ffrs power ofof the three NortlhICorean if willconsiderably considerablyincrease increasethe the fire power the three NorWKorean oork under undw Front Front Line Line Headquarters. Headquartere, corpe
~ PPROVED FOR RELEA8E RELEASE 'APPROVED IDATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
b-1)
5_S
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
_.
HR70-14
v
-TOP-SECRET
SECTION 1 1 (SOVIET) SECTION (SOVIET)
1 .
USSR. U rn.
Kremlin takes fill full credit.for KOreags liberation Kremlin credit for Korea*e, Uberation from A.om Japanese; Jaoaneee a to.the.6th.Annivereary.of Korea's liberaliberaA Moscow broadcast broadeast deiroted devoted to .the 6th .Annfvereazg of Korea18 t$onp extolled of tions, extolled the the Soviet Soviet UnionQrr Union'e udecislve' *decisive role role in in the defeat of
.hi
-
'
Japan the subsequent arbrequent liberation liberation of of Korea. Kmea. Stereotyped charges charge0 Japan and the traced US violations uviolatlons of obligation8 obligations f'rm from tha the moment moment of of Korea's Korea's llbliberation" the Xarean Korean people." people.N 'The orationn to,the t o the "armed intervention intarvention std.:net againet the The broadoaet broadcast r reiterated e i t e r a t e d that the "entire "entire peace peace oamp, camp, headed headed by by the the SorSoviet l e t Union, Union9 58 is on on t the h e side side of ofAhe the Korean Xorean people people who are a m confident oonfident of t h e i r abilities abilitlar and and their their might, their might,
pravda alio pUblished a TASS dispateh from Korea which expressed the Korean.people's "feeling of deep gratitude and love for the Soviet Union and its armed forces which liberated Kores,from Japen.". This marked thevfirst occasion in a long, time that urese_published heavy North Korean =aim+ for the USSR.
Comments Comntents Moscow again avoided avoided comment comment on the current situation Moscow again situation in Korea, a characteristie Soviet.propaganda i n Korea, charaoterietie dr df Soviet propaganda since s h o e the the beginning beginning of the Korean Korean h hoetilities. of o s t i l i t i e s . However, However, exasperation e x m p r a t i o n with firmwith the Vpr UR firmnee6 at at ESesong Kaesong was waa suggested suggested in in the the North North KoreantZonmiunist Korean*~Caanmuniet etabness statemeats selected seleoted for for pdblication.in publfeation I n the the Moscow Mosoow press. press, ments
NR NR
TOP SECRIV
16 Aug,51
[~PPROVED-FOR RELEASE APPROVED-FOR RELEASE [DATE: .DATE: 09-Dec-2009
1 I
4b
TOP WORST
EIL1 -
5.
5.
CHINA.
Ti"irit Japant
authorities in Canton in late July, it was revealedAhab.thi.peiplJag regime 8UthOr

(a) (a)

(b) (b)
Columnists allegedly to resume Korean confiiet;i4ttadklormosa and
at a moting,Oalledhe CoMmunist
will Eaesong talks talks for for a aY "ft* w i l l prolong the Raesong e w monthan'inorder to reorganize reorpdqe their their forces; forces;
together ferces leaven; together with with the the ussa, USSR, will will attack:4apan;**14:119$ attack Japan "wh
and and
(c) (c)
will larill "liberate UberatellFormosa, Formosa, although althoughCommnhiat Conmuaiet losses lcrses are are expected expected t r 3 eaUal e a h l those:of thoee.of the t he HlahJlland Oamaian anainst tO mainland campaign againet the the Natiohaliets Nationalists.
,COments Comment t cided late 'July July ta to prolong prolong the the Kaeeolig Kaesong t talks for/amPriWer .4N, therecided in late a b 'for a QLO after offensive iin Korea and and to to a attack FOimoSa.and/or Japan after to t o returns r e 8 w t the h e offensive n Korea and/Or Asia, ..Althougha top7leVelftiscussion arad/or certain certain countries countries of o f SoUtheast Southeast Asia. ~1uthough a top-level di8CUSeiOn
the:ghilie*COMunists
16 Aug 51
10
U
101"emecl.tET
ur
of such have taken taken place a at the time time stated, stated, it it r remains doubtful such topics topics may have t the e w i n s doubtful
0 es not no co e k MMm ormosa and and Japan operations operations does colrPait tih8 sts t o the alleged Formosa
aao eaege
-I
at is still no no reliable reliable evidence evidence of of a a Slno-Soviet Sino-4oviet a t any definite time. time. There is to Formosa or Japan, Japan, or or t to invade Southeast 4outheast Asia, Asia, in intent t o assault either Formosa o Invade the next next seVeral the several weeks.. weeks.
N F
7. Agym. h Korean beration.Da f : a o ans mention mentio- ninht ni t f 7. KOREA. NO North Korean " "Liberation D a y t t slogans : oOf f perticular erest in-thelong slogans'recently.issued the G T Iiin n~ te res ~ t in the long liat<of u s t , d slogans r e c e n t b ism%%y the
North Korean radio to commemorate 15 August 1945, Korea's liberation day, are those exhorting various branches of the armed forces to strive "to annihilate and clean up the enemy under any combat conditiona." "Night formations" of the "Air Force of the Republic" are instructed to "refine "]Khgineers" are your Martial arta and yeurselves with advanced air arts.'" instructed to perfect themselves in the laying of "river.croseing bridges," and "tankmen" are ordered to "drive your tanks into the heart of the enemy positions...."
~
Comment: While for morale While slogans slogans are a r e frequently frequently employed employed for morale purposes, ppoees, it by the the North North Korean Korean a air force is menit is l e interesting interesting that that night night :flying S b i n g by i r force tioned: tioned. The The incidence incidence of of night night attacks attacks on i r c r a f t over North Korea has has on UN UN s aircraft risen week at rlsen from from nil nil four four months months ago ago to t o several several encounters encounters per week a t present. present,
I
16 Aug Aug 51 51 16
NF
-Tet"MtliE-T-
7 7
Approved For Re Erse 2001/09/06.LCA-KQE,7,2T01146AS300420001-3d
TOP SEW:, LI
17.Aupst 1951
c* No. 49308
Copy No.
?5
DAILY DIGEST
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re Ititale 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S.10420001-3

TOP SEICRET
SEOTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
2.
POLAND. possibility of further 'flaps against US following US/S closing: US Embassy Warsaw believes that further Polish Government action against the possible as a follow-up to the closing of the usIs office. The Embassy feels that, while the Polish Government's note proteeting the closing:of the
Polish Research and Information Service office in New York May have been deSigned primarily for propaganda use, it may also te used as the basis yor (1) the expulsion of the Embassy information officer, or (2) the proseCution of USIS Polish personnel. The Embassy points out that tbs Polish note spew cifically states that "only diplomatic immunity.has protected the responsible ones from the merited legal consequences" of1IISIS: allegedly,-criminal activities. (S Warsaw 151, 15 Aug 51).
Comments LIS EMbasey Warsaw originally believed that there would be.no specifid steps taken against US personnel working for the USIS office. Except for the language of the latest Polish note there are no indications of poseible future steps against US personnel of USIS.
:
3,
DS Military Commander Trieste evaluates PugoelaV etabilitv: The US Military Commander in Trieste believes that the Yugoslav Army will remain loyal while it is organited and carefully watched. If the Yugoslav forces were confronted by overwhelming military power, they would retreat to already prepared defenses in the mountains, since the Ytgoslave ere probably counting on guerrilla tactics rather than front line action in the event of an invasion. The source considers it likely that popular resentment toward the Tito regime, Cominformist and royalist sympathies, and historic Serb-Croat differences would weaken the Tito regime in the event that it became involved ia hostilities. (CGTRUST TRIESTE 8, 15 Aug. 51)
ructoSLAVIA.

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: The upward revision of norms will substantially redude ths already low standard of living of the Czechoslovak Worker and add to his discontent with decreased rations and increased regimentation:
EASTERN EUROPE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 1h:ward revision of norme planned to "To raise the productivity of labor and to lower proincrease production: duction costs." is the aim of the norm revision for 1952,,according to a statement by Czechoslovak Minister of,Reavy Industry Kliment. He descHbed the curient wage systed as disjointed, and stated thet, if the average wage rates are being exceeded by 80 to 100 percent in virtuallY all heavy industriAlenterprises, the present norms must be "soft." Wages, ha added, late been allowed to rise, but productivity has lagged far behind. Kliment emphasized that the upward revision of the norms must be accomplished/by the adoption &IP Soviet Stakhanovite techniques, the operation of more than one machine at a time by the worker, and by he introduction of two or three work shifts where necessary. (PRID, 13 Aug 51).
Approved For Faidase 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A*0300420001-3

TOP SECRET
official! that, The Yugoslav Government has recently told SS the arrival of modern eas its military capabilities were increased by if mountains the quipment, it would. become lees necessary to retreat into Yugoslavia, factors are present in attacked. Although the foregoing divisive following a Cominform attack on the: a resnrgence of national patriotism country would.tend to counteract them.
Comment:
4.
Unions-will meet in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: World Federation of Trade of Trade Unions The Executive Committee of the World Federation Berlin: general WPTU condecided at their July meeting in Vinnna to hold the next in Berlin in mid-November,
Communist meetings Comment: East Berlin is as far, west as international and it is easily can still be held without running'into visa difficulties, add to other accessible from Soviet orbit ports. The WPTU conference Would World Peace Council meeting evidence, ouch as major youth meetings and the of inter's, is being built up into a center held there this year, that Berlin national Communist activities.
25X1C
25X1A

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re Age 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A064160420001-3

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
GREECE.
Papagos' initial speech rouses little enthusiam*
Marshal PePagoat
.
EMI-electoral speech, delivered on 11 August, influenced few wile were
not already persuaded. Dispassionate in both content and delivery, the speech disappointed those who hoped for a fighting statement or an emotionally inspiring declaration. Commenting that Papagos could have come closer to the public mood with a "throw the rascals out" speech, the Embassy reports that the Marshal is apparently sincere and firm in his determination to avoid mud-slinging and recrimination. (C Athens 787, 14 Aug 51).
Comment: Papagos opponents have not been inhibited by the Marshal's restraint. Neither the King, who is currently the C-in-C of the Armed Farces, nor the Liberal Prize Minister has hesitated to take adVantage of his position to weaken Papagos. Despite the Marshal's determination to conduct a fair campaign, he may eventually be persuaded to adopt the tactics of his opponents.
2.
INDIA. Food ration raised: The food ration, which was cut to 9 ounces during India"s critical period of shortages, has been restored te its . original amount of 12 ounces per day in over half the Indian states, according to a Food Ministry statement on 8 August. The other states have been advised to restore:the 12 ounce ration as soon as stocks become available. .(R FBID Far East, 10 Aug 51),
Comment: The moderate success of India's long struggle to obtain food grains seems to have brought at least temporary relief.
25X1C
3.
25X1C
25X1A
BURMA. Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma disintegratir General Li Mi's Chinese Nationalist forces, which were recently defeated by the Chinese Communists in Yunnan and driven beak into Burma, are now looting Burmese villages. many Nationalists have deserted and that the morale of those remaining is
25X1C
very low. ME.M.11
The Burmese have just dispatched 600 additional troops to Kengtung State to control the Nationalists. Two battalions were committed,to the TOP SECRET
3
Comment: Other reports have been received that Li Bi's army is disintegrating. Their.looting activities, however, may cauee Burma again to raise on an international level the question of the Nationalists' violation of Burmese territory.
17 Aug 51
Approved For Reh like 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S000420001-3

TOP SECRET
same area several weeks ago. The diversion of these forces will further weaken the government's efforts to contain the Burmese Communist insurrection.
25X1C
4.
Sino-Burmese CoMmunist activity reported: reports that, according to a Burmese who attended a conference at Paoshan (Yunnan) in July: (a) Naw Seng, the Burmese army rehegade, is in Khnming and his followers are being Mu:Lined near Paoshan; (b) there are an estimated 2)500 Chinese Communist troops at Paoshan;

TOF SECRET
(c) Than Tun', the Bur-mese Communist leader, is highly regarded by the Chinese and is in radio contact with Peoshan and Kunming;
.
(d) at the Paoshan conference it. was decided to station Chine5e-Com1u15t troops along the Sitio-Burma border.
i
25X1A
Comment: Many sources are reporting increasing coordination of Chinese and Burmese Communist activities along the Sino-Burma border.
5. INDONESIA. Indonesian Government undertakes forceful anti-Communist action: MilitaryPolice in the past few days have arrested several hundred people
including some high officials of the Ministry of Labor, Communist Farty chieftains atd leaders of several Communist uniona. The police also searched the offices of the Communist Party and:the Communist labor unions and the homes of several Parliament members. (1/ FBID Ticker Djakarta, 16 Aug 51).
Comment: Serious incidents of apparently coordinated violence-through out Indonesia from 4 to 6 August -- including an attack on 'the Djkarta port area by 200 to 300 men wearing COmmunist insignia have alarmed the Indonesian Government sufficiently to force it to take strong action for,the first time against the Communists.
-
'
These developments, in addition to reported Communist plans for nationwide demonstrations on 17 August, led the cabinet to order drastic action "within the bounds of cocisting laws and regulations" against ."anti-national movements."
17 Aug 51
Approved For Reiebed 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004/0420001-3

TOP SECRET
"Conservative" Indonesians have stated, howeVer, that unless sufficiently serious ineidents continue) it is doubtful that the government will persist in its forceful policy and that the Communists will be permitted to develop their strength unopposed.
6.
CHINA. Peiping denounces Japanese peace treaty conference: Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-iai, in an official statement of 15 August, made the following points regarding the Japanese peace treaty:-
ally unacceptablee
(a) Peiping regards the US-UR draft treaty as "basic-
(e) Peiping believes that a peace conference should be attended by all states that engaged in armed conflict with Japan during World War II, and Peiping is prepared to "exchange views" on a "joint(Japanese),peace treaty" with all Such states.
(R FBID Flimsy, Peiping, 15 Aug 51).
Comment:
7.
Disaffection reportedly widespeadiamong Chinese Communist military: A Chinese source reports widespread:dissatisfaction among the Chinese Communist military with.the Peiping regime's Korean venture and with C-in-C.Chu Teh's "lowered prestige." Another source corroborates the latter point and adds that an estimated 70 per cent of the Communist
conceivably could become a source of embarrassment to both Peiping and the USSR, especially if the USSR should choose to sign the draft treaty. However Chou's last point suggests that Moscow and Peiping may be contemplating the calling of a separate peace treaty conference.
was public knowledge that 1177551 had accepted its invitation to attend the San Francisco conference. Chou's statement

states;
-
(b) the treaty is "in reality...for preparing a new. war " is'hostile" to Communist China and a "Menace" to other Asilin
(c) Peiping continues to endorse proposals regarding the peace treaty; completely the USSR's
(d) Peiping, unless invited to participate in the preparation and signing of a Japanese peace treaty, will consider the treaty "illegal" and "null and voide and
This statement was issued after it
TOPSECRET
17 Aug 51
Approved For Ram& 2001/09/06 : CIA-ROP79T01146A0S00420001-3

TOP SECRET
military have "nationalist" sentiments as opposed to the 30 per cent who are "internationalists." (C Hong Kong 661, 15 Aug 51).
Comment: It ii unclear whether the sources are speaking of the Peiping regime's top military leaders, or of the officer class as a whole, or of the armed forces as a whOle. Frequent reports of disaffection among the leaders have never.been confirmed. While there 113 fragmentary evidence that Chu Teh has lost some part of his former power, his prestige as one of the top four or five in the Peiping hierarchy remains unimpaired.
8.
Chinese Nationalist agents receive favorable treatment hy British: The US Consulate General in Hong Kong was reliably informed that a branch office of the Chinese Nationalist guerrilla liaison office was recently raided, While the main office remained untouched and is still functioning. Several persons arrested in the raid were allowed to depart to Formosa after necessary arrangements were made with the British Consul in Formosa and fines paid. The American Consul General notes that this is the first evidence that the Chinese Nationalist Government is in a position to negotiate with the British in these matters, and that all Chinese Nationalists agents in Hong Kong will have considerably improved freedom of action if they can depend on being returned to Formosa when arrested. Independent anti-Chinese Communists, mho ere receiving increased :attention from the Hong Kong GovernMent are in a. much les favorable position, since they can expect only jail or deportation to the mainland if apprehended. (S Hong Kong 595, 13 Aug 5)3.
Comment: This report, if true, represents a change in.the British position and indicates a softening of their attitude toward the Chinese Nationalists. It assures the Nationalists of more control over the guerrillas operating in China, and consequently weakens the "Third Force" Movement.
9.
Chinese Nationalists accept Proposal for supervision of US aid: The Chinese Nationalists, in response to the US memoranda requesting

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIPARDP79701146A000300420001-3
Although it is doubtless true that the military has not been thoroughly indoctrinated with the tenets of "proletarian internationalism," the political commissioner apparatus is an effective instrument of Stalinist control and there is no evidence of the functioning of a significant anti-Stalinist group at any level in the armed forces.
17 Aug 51
Approved For Re IAA 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP7911)1146A000W1420001-3
TOP SECRET
effective supervision and control of VS aid, 'in Taipei that they have appointed a special Premier to deal with reduction of the budget expenditures. The Chinese GoVernment states the advice of US representatives on Formosa.
have adviee&Ahe-US Charge committee headed by the deficit and control of it will be gratefulto have
(9 Taipei 212 13 Aug 51)o
22mmat: A report of 10 August stated that the cabinet was divided on whether or not to accept the UR memoranda. Furthermore, at that time Premier Chlen Cheng admitted privately that the Nationaliata had no plan to propose, but desired practical suggestions from the US.:
10.
KOREA. Rhee seeks amendnent to ROK constitution: President Rhee, in a "Liberation Day" speech, discussed the subject of two constitUtional amendments that he urges the National Assembly to adopt. These amendments provide for the election of the president by direct poPular vote And the.setting up of a,bi-cameral legislature. Rhee further declared that he, personally; had no interest in these amendments and that his sole cOndern "ie o secure democracy for the sake of the fUttre of the Republic." (R FBID 15 Aug 51).
Comment: These constitutional amendments were suggested prior to the June electionp in 1950. While President Rhee has always tacitly favored them, this is the first known occasion on which he hae made a public statement urging their adoption. Although hip potivations in bringing.the matter Up now are still obscure, it is likeli that this move is a further step in the Presidentls campaign to-asoure hie:as cendancy over the National Assembly,
26X1A
1
11.
Conment: Mile certain types Of German rockets are known to have a burning period that would extend up to 750 yards, an additional pos., .sibility exists that the observed missile might have been a largecaliber air-borne artillery tracer shell. This is the first reported instance of a Communist airborne attack employing anything larger than machine gune and snall caliber cannons.
Communist Air Force night interceptor uses "rocket ,,Cohmunist aircraft over North Korea made four attacks oh UN airdraft during the nights of 11 and 13 August--two by jet-type and two by high-performance conventional-type aircraft. Of particular interept is the 12'August deternined night attack on a US reconnaissance bomber north-of Pyongyang. The enemy aircraft, identified as a twin-jet "believed to be a Type-8,"-fired a rocket which nissed the US plane andipurned out 1,000 yards away. Neither aircraft was danaged in this encounter. .(a Ax 2686 FEAF, 14 Aug 51; S AX 2685. FEAF 14 Aug 51; S AX 2660,FEAF,H13_Aug 51; S AX 2700 FEAF,'14 Aug 51).H

-TOP SECRET:
7
Approved For Release 2001N9/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300429001-3
17 Aug 51
Approved For Re letled 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009,00420001-3

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
2.
FRANCE. Assembly Committee resolution on Japanese Peace Treaty Worriet naraila Minister: A Foreign Office official has revealed.that-Foweign Minister Schuman is somewhat upset over the Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee's adopticai of a Gaullist-sponsored resolution decrying the government's stand on the Japanese. Peace Treaty. The resolution4as especially critical of France's omission from the group of "inviting powers" for negotiation of the_Treaty, and of the failUro to.invite the Indechinese states. Schuman plans to present the Foreign Office position.to.this committee in an off-thetrecord talk next week.
Government concern over Gaullist efforts to make political caPital of the Japanese Peace Treaty has induced the Foreign Office again to request that the Associated States of Indochina be invited to the peace treaty conference. (C Paris 996, 13 Aug 51)
.
policrigilded-by.the widespread popular suspicion that the US tends to
3.
ignore French Wishes. In the present instance, there is considerable sentiment within the Cabinet itself that France should have been given a major role in the handling of the Japanese Treaty.
Deputy Permanent RepresentativeThuicis Lacoste has expressed the "personal vise that France would.be strongly tempted to vote for admission of the Chinese'Cemmunists to the UN if they held out the prospect-of A "Kaesong in Indochina". He inquired whether the US would modify its position on

Cc:aliment:
GERMANY; West Germans are indignant over Allied economic moves: The West Uermans, sensing the approach of virtual independence in their internal affair*, react sharply these days to any restraints or direction fromthe Western Ocoupation Powers. Indignation bee been intense overAhe decisions of the RUhr Authority on German coal export quotas and the insistence of the Allies upon the full payment of German occupation costs. The Germans . appreciate that the Ruhr Authority will soon be superseded by the Schuman Plan; meanwhile, they resent its decisions having tbe effect ef curbing lest Germany's robust industry. .Finance Minister Schaeffer Ma demanded a GerMan-Allied treaty on defense costs, deplaring-that the occupatien-dosts must not be set unilaterally by the Allies. Newspapers report that the coalition parties and the opposition Social Democrats are united in a common front against the Allies.on both issues. The press speaks.of "high political tension" in Bonn,-and foresees not only a crisis in German-Allied relations, butSlso'in German internal politics and economics.
GaUllist efforts to embarrass the government in its foreign
French backing hinted. for Chinese GomMunist UN bid: .French, UN
TOP SECRET
17 Aug 51
Approved For Re le* 2001/09(06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040420001-3

TOP SECRET
,
Admitting the Chinese in the event of a Korean armistide. 15 Aug 51) H

;
(S NY:233,
Cement: While the French have been extremely desirousOf obtaining some TOFF1-7 non-intervention guarantee for Indochina, this is the first intimation that France would consider bargaining with commpnishina DU its admiseion to the UN. This "personal view" may be a feeler, but there is little likelihood that France would act against US wishes on this point.
4.
Comment: If M. Saillant approaches Vienna by air and Aveids read transit of the Western zonbs, tail or Allied occupation authorities cannot prevent hie return. The Amstrian Government is not:likely to Undertake additional provocative measures on ite own initiative without support. This means that strOng Allied any action would have to be taken by mho hate not,,however, indiCated the French, an intention of,preventing Austria. hie return tO
.
5.
NETHERLANDS. HRetision of Dutch-Indonesian agreements: ferabasti A:special :Indonesian Ambassador is on his way to the Netherlands for talks With Dutch Government the on replacement of the Union Statute by national treaty. Other agreements an ordinary interon Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, mad& at'the December 1949 round table conference, will also have to be studied, according to the Ambassador. CR FB1S.6Hilversum, 14 Aug 51) Comment: Defense .and internal economic problems have lately over shadoiiiMESideration of the Dutch-Indonesian relationahip by the Dutch GovernMent and iiress. The Union Statute, soVereign be head Of the Dutch-Indonesian which prOvidee that the Netherlands Union, is essentialZy d natter of preStige for the Dutch and has:never been implemented. Abro&tion of the Statute, either because the Dutch accede to Indonesian-threats lateral action Or because the seek to prevent additional'Ioss of unieconomic interests under other Dutch Of their portions of the 1949 agreethents; probably fUrther weaken the Dutch would Government.
.
AUSTRIA. EkcluSion fram Austria of 1FTU Secretary-General oonSidered: INT'ariaien at ths Austrian capital indicates that Louis Saillant, SeCretary General now in prance, may return !FTU by air to his Vienna poet abeut 20 August, The US Legation,opposes harassment effectiVe action pretenting'SaiIlantieretnrn as sudh but suggests that wouldleerionply embarrass 1FTU activities in Vienna. Austrian_authorities have previously asserted that the MFTU le considered an illegal organization and-that reisidence permits for its employees will be denied. However, expuleion of-1FTU personnel has been believed impopsible so long as the Sotiet occupation authorities provide protection. (S Vienna 597, 14sAug 51)
TOP SECRET
9
17 Aug 51
Approved Fot Relate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000490420001-3

TOP SECRET
6.
ITALY: Italian Communists speed sabotage program: Twojneibers of the COERUhist Party's central committee recently briefed.the:directing:grOup of the Milan federation on the party's program for inprOving:itS.nabotege petential. This'potentiai in the.metallurgical-mama4e4)06-4Etty::"4-:-. described as "already well organized"'and ib,ekpeated,WbeUtilized. "toward the end:of the yearn.: It was stated that the Italiah:Cemntnists had trained 27 expert saboteurs,and hoped in line with the organization of sabotage to have 50 by the end ofthe year and their operations "for the past eight squads on en interhational_level months" in WesternEurope, Yugoslavia, Greece, Africa, Asia and America. They also.had:fleeeded,, Was said, in planting at least one agent it "in every militarfleadquarters".
25X1A

The UK remains
It wee-emphasized that ComMuniet party members poseeSsinOwar Material" mnst hide or destroy:it, hot only for security reasons, but also-because: at the suitable Moment, "the most modern equipment" Will be 'evailable'. Mith referenee to the Milan municipal 25X1A election, it was asserted tha.tthe:eitteme left was the real victor because the election result's showed:demiliiiiiiidarity between the Conmninjs.q sind the
pro-Communist Sodialietev.i
_
-Cement There have been no other reports that internationally ized sabotage squads have been operating organ., in apy of the arepOntiened co,c7 cept Yugoslavia. It is known that considerable nnmbers Of Eoviet-Satellite-agents have been penetrating Yugoslavia ih acontinuous strean,:but there haVe been no reports of,sabotage, Although the Italian, nilitartautnorities maintain they, have: weeded Communists out of top7leVel positions, it Trobable that the Comunists have succeeded IniMainteining 'where they have accese to important agents in'pests: information. '
7.
UNITED KINGDOM. -British foreeee favorable grain contraet_With 'USSR* british delegation w ic ie curren Th0 y nego a ng qr a-coarse gr contract With SoViet, representatiVes feels confident thetTthe USSRYwill 4Sree to supply bY mid-1952 all of the 4000,000,:tehs,requeptect.bY the UK. (nmoo tons' were nearly delivered during the paet discussions are being carried year4H Theugh'the, on by commodity level representatives) is believed that the Soviet delegation it has the requisite a binding agreement at London. authority to sign The British hope thatHa bilateral.:agreement Will be practically completed when the Econonic_Comniesion'for.EUrope((ECE) neeting on East-Neat trade convenes at Geneva on 20 August.S-giondon853, 13 Aug 51; NY Times) 15 Aug 51) : ..H ----,...r .:,.,,.
...
dollar area because of Briteints critical dollar-ehortate.;' If the-Ourrent.negotiations are completed before the FOB EastWeet:trede talks begin, the Ws opposition to a total economic blookade'f the poviet
'
convinced that substantial and qSnoalrain must be obtained,from quantities of timber Eastern Europeen_couptrieSthan from:the rather
Comment"
'
TOP SECRET
10
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-R01379101146A0003004/61M
Approved For Relent 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Sd0420001-3

TOP SECRET
Union will then be quite clear. (A timber contract was signed Mat me:1thbetween the UK and the USSR.) The speed with which the grain negotiations are ComMencing contrasts sharply wd.th.the SoViet delayint.tactica-in fonner Years and suggests that the USSR aldo feels..it advantageous to secure the commerdial contract. Ifan agreement is reached before the Geneva: meeting, the USSR can use it for propaganda for closer economic relations with Western European countries.
.8.
The SecretaryNorway that hid center., satiens with the Swedibh Prime Minister indicate thatJleuttality sentiment is currently stronger in Sweden than ever before. (S StoCkholm 171; 14 Aug 51)
SWEDEN. .Trp e'Liereeirte-neutrality firily entilenched: MTEWM.. of t6 UN has informed the US Ambassador to
ComMent: This assertion of the continuing alliaR;(7"-Mreign policy is supportedby other firmness of Sweden's "no evidence. Stronger.confidence in this Policy is probably due in part to Sweden's suceess inHebtaining vitally-needed radar equipment from the US (see OCI Daily Digest, 24 Mgy 51), which has largely removed-such doubts as the Swedish GoVerthnent may have inwardly harbored that its non-adherence tO NATO was isolating Sweden from the West and adversely affecting ita defense capabilities. At the same time, Sweden has been evincing an increased willingness to cooperate With thelffest in such matters as the limitation of strategic exports to the SeViet Orbit and the informal communication of military information to NATOnations, provided that Sweden's "freedom of action" is not Lnpaired by any legal treaty obligations.
'
9.
ARGENTINA. Meat exports to Britain temporarily Suspended: On 15 August the government ordered that.meat shipments to Britain be suspended for 10 doge, or until the critical supply situation in Argentina is relieved.' Shortly before the suspension order, it werned cattle producers'that if they,did 'not ship their cattle to market, "they would regret it". (trig). Prensa.(NY); 16 Aug.51)
Comment: A moderate meat shortage has been created in Buenos Aires by the cattlemehis refusal to 'accept prices offered by the government'a packing plants. .The order suepending exports is probably designed to..assure a plentiful sUpply of meat for the thousands of workers which the government will bring into Buenos Aires to attend the 22 August peronista_ political rally. At this meeting, sponsored by the government-dominated Confederation of Labor Unione, Peron is expected to accept the workers' "demand" for his re-election.
.
TOP SECRET
11
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-R0P79101146A000300420001-3
17 Aug
51'
TOP SECRET
ferkINCI.ASSIFIED when
0606c6FOStReleasett20041/09/06)0tAtROP7OTOPMW100030 tritnotrirsiaor declassi-
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

REG I STRY
C I A CONTROL ND.
V 93 0
DOC DOC
. 1 NO.
.
I
DATE DOCUMENT RECE I VED
DATE
COPY NO. U B R OF PAGES

I
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF ATTACHME TS
I
ATTENTION:
or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transhtitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official dutieS relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period o/ custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
I
This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
REFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECE IVED
S I G ATURE
RELEASED
DATE
TI
E
SEEN BY
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: V/hen this form is detect ed from Top Secret ?nate fat it shall be completed in the appropriate space below and t ansmitted to Central Toy Secret Contro for record.
DO
TO
NGRADED
BY
D I SPATCHED
TO
DATE
71
E I GRA URE
OFF IC /DIV.
DATE
DESTROYED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
(Signature)
BY (Signature )
OFF ICE
W ITNESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
DATE
I 40
Roved
ust Portvious
For
aieWse 2001/09/06: CataDP79T0 4:19Ab00300420001-3

TOP SECRET
FORM
8.73
06
00000000
Approved For RelArie 2001/09/06 ,:ncja-ERIDMT01146A001400420001-3
IVY bCEET
17 August 1951
CIA No. 49308

Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCy
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligenc e.
ApprovedForRSIbude2001/09/06:0,44213P79T01146A00400420001-3
SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR not expected to demand reparations pt JAA.ano&veaca conferences The Department of State does mot, share .Thilippine concern that Soviet maneuvers at San Francisco will revolve around the reparations issue. The Department points out that Sviet proposalsi:which Gromyko has indicated will be renewed at San Francisco, so far have been wholly geared to winning favor in Japan: In particular there have been no suggestions li prior Soviet notes that Japan should pay reparations, The Department further observes that since India also opposes reparations, efforts of Indonesia and Burma to form a common front with India in this respect have not succeeded. (C, S/S State to Manila 5600 15 Aug 51).
Comment: The USSR may be hesitant to raise the reparations question because Soviet postwar removals from Manchuria have presumably created a delicate issue between the USSR and Communist China
Img.
2,
INDOCHINA US.Minister in Saigon urges.Presence of Indochinese states at San Francisco conference: In view of the Soviet decision to take part in the Japanese peace treaty conference, Minister Heath believes that the:issue of the Associated Statest participation has been intensified, and that fail, ure to invite them is "less than ever defensible." Heath believes that in addition to wedge-driving on larger issues, the Russians may defend the legitimacy of the Ho Chi Minh government, recall Vicbyls and Bao Dal's war,. time collaboration with the Japanese, and challenge the Western nations to pubmit the Vietnam problem to elections or international investigation. Moreover, the Russians may bid for French support of their overall position at'the conference, by dangling before the French the prospectS of a guaranitee for the Tonkin frontier, Heath believes that under these circumstances to withhold an invitation to the Associated States would take on the charadter of appeasement, and that by a forthright defense of our own position we may even enhance the solidarity of the Western and Western-oriented Asian nations. ( S, S/S Saigon 383, 15 Aug 51).

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
'
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3.
PANAMA, Newly appointed US Ambassador in Panama suggests further delay on shipping decree: On 14 August, Ambassador Wiley informed Panama's Foreign Minister that, if the Panama Administration should want legislative authority in Order to iamb astrong decree banning ships from ca;ing at .Communist China,
'SECRET
Approved ForRelease 2001/09/061CIA-RDP791-01146A00030042000133
51
Approved For Rehire 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A014000420001-3
SECRET
postponement of action on the decree until the National Assembly convenes on 1 October would not be an excessive delay. The AMbassador believes that the decree as now drafted might actUally serve as a blueprint for the. evasion of controls and might offer new life to unethical and illicit trade. In answer to the Foreign Minister's expression of concern over the possi bility that a postponement of promulgation would cause palicity adverse to Panama in the US press, the Ambassador replied that the US press would closely analyse the text of any published decree and that to promulgate an inadequate decree also might have unfavorable repercussionn. (Sp S/S Panama 137, 14 Aug 51).

SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/0t CIA-RDP79T01146A00030042000173sug
HR70-14 HR70-14
G,
F . t.
'v
-B3P-MOFST
NR
!
!
13.
KOREA.
New Chinese Conmiunist arny group may be enroute to Korea: recant reports.suggest.nstrOnglym the movement of the Chineae Gommuniat 5th Army Group, 4th Field Arnr, from south C h i n a to =le it not clear clear whether t h i s composite compoeite force, made up up China to Korea, Korea. 'While it ie is not whether this force, made from other other 4th 4th Field Fleld Army A m y units, units, will w i l l be used used as 88 an an integral integral unit unit or or for f o r rerefrom placement purposes, purpoaee, it it is i a noteworthy noteworthy that that the the 140th,Division, W t h Division, Chinese Chinese CommhCoarmuplacement niat 47th 47th Army. Arm. 15th 15th Arm Grour,. ia I s now now accented in '&rea 8 a a combat combat unit. unit. niat Army Group accepted in Korea 8 as
1
,,'
NF
ffrOP-SECRET-
20 Aug 51
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 09-Dec-2009 DATE: 09-Dec-2009 'APPROVED
CD
For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website
.'.
While as as yet Introduction into Comment: While yet an an unconfirmed unconfirmed movement, movement, the the.introduction into Comntt Korea of an an additional fresh Chinese Conmnnist COrmunist troops troops would would add conconadditional 105,000 freeh However, the siderably eiderably to t o the the Communist tkmnuntet offensive offeneive potential. potential, Hawever, the problem problem of of supplying the Comrmnisfs' Communists' losuppJying these these new divisions would further complicate the @ . 8 u C 8 l position. POSitiOn. gistical
' 1 4 .
'munist armored unit'reoorled Chinese Coitmwd e t armored unit reported jm,Ktrea4. I n Korea1 Com 1 tio:ChinaseComnst:garmored vthicle two Chinese C o d s t %m!ored vehicle divisions" dAviei6&" mni with a total or *wu "so T T-35 armed vehicbs'f vehicles" moved moved from fromthe witn t o t a l of -35 -e!d the Harbin Harbin area area to t o Korea Korea for employment followinR "the "the breakdown a~cs." T I for employment:following breakdown of of the the cease-fire cease-fire ttalks."
I
I
.
~
units. unita
a d d i t w A o has r has been,movedinto nto Korea. Korea. Curr ently accepted o dst additranirmor been.moved Currently accepted C Communist armored strength in however, i,s ip only l 148 T-34 tanks,-reflecting tanks, reflecting the armred etrength i n Korea, however, . 4 8 T-34 Tank Division Division and and independent independent armored armored equipment of the North Korean 105th Tank
Comment: Comment :
~-
.1NR NR
I
I
-RIF-SECRET-wHmmT-
20 Aug 51
8 8
HR7n-14 . ., HR70-14
I.
*.
Tifep-sEeRgr-stmaNR
NR

9. 9.
eveal move move of of North North Korean Korean VI VX Corps: O m - 8 Several Several recent reoenti 11B4A. Intercepts m-e-r reveal intrroepte reveal reveal that that the the North North Korean Corps, garrieoning wesQ ooarat intercepts Korean VI VI.Corps, garrisoning the the west coast irouth of Oi Pyongyangp P g o q y q , an8 two of t e eubordhate dlvislone have have disdisSouth and possibly pOssibly two of I its subordinate divisions plaaed eastward. (STEDE, (SUIDE, TIK-9&, Aug 5 1 , CINGFE Sl&8=344). Placed eastward. 1IZ-940,18 18 Aug 51, MOPE:SP-344).
The final final destination destination and and the the reason reason for for this this move are not not yet yet OommenVt 'The move are llrhed. However, Hwever, the the VI eomndtfed clear4 established. VI Cmpe, Corps, well well traimd trained an8 and not not yet yet committed to aombat, miasrion in ia to combat, has his been been performing performing an an iateznal internal en8 and coastal coastal eeourl.by security mission Hwanghae province, pnminoe, south csouth of o f Pyongyang, Pgowgang, and and thie this m o m may mey foreshadow foreshadow its its Hwanghae mOve
mu,
appearanae aa a a comdbat acnnbat unit appearance as unit in in the the vestern western acuter,, Sector,
-Tor-eigena-sunt
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE. 20-Mar-201 0 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
TOP SECRET SUEDE
21 Aug 51
93
55
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
Approved For Refwie 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOS00440001-1
TOP SECRET
21 August 1951
DAILY DIGEST
State
ept., USAF reviews completed
To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit our website

TOP SECRET
This suthmary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Re WS 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0094440001-1
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. EMbassy reports curbs on foreign air travel Within USSR: EMbassy Moscow considers it possible that a largtiaitlift into Siberia and the Far East may be the cause of added travel testrictions which have been im posed on members of its military staff.
Comment: Restrictions on the moveMents of,the Eabassy staff within the USSR are-of long standing and are part Of.the Soviet internal security pattern. However, recent added restrictions on air travel could be due to an airlift tO the Far East in view uf the US5R2s commitments to aid Com munist China,
2.
NEWS resumee Softer tonelin Moscowls.dUaluropagandas The most notable articles in the thirdAssue of-NeWs2 the Soviet Englishlanguage journal supposedly dedicated to the impretement of East-4est relations, denied any change.whatsoever inSoviet foreign policy, urged USUSSR trade expansion, andsditorialized on the principle of noninterference in:the internal affSirs of other countries. Another article denied that the USSR failed to demobilize after the war and asserted that the present strength of the Soviet armed forces is approximately the same as in 1939.
Field comments %bag:ay Moscow noted that, apart fram familiar in sinuations that US policy is detrimental to the interests sf many countries and to Htitain in particular, the News editorial seemed to imply that harsh judgments of each other's economic and political systems should not pre vent two sides from working out trade and political arrangementso The emphasis on Soviet-American trade reveals the Ktemlinos hopes for reioval of US controls. (R Eabassy Moscow 2912 17 Aug 51).
Comments The pinch of trade reprisals against iron curtain coun tries probably accounts for the softer line employed in the articleLplead ing for Eastjest trade. However, there is no dearth of the "hate,America" and "warscare" themes in the propaganda output of other Soviet media.

TOP SECRET
The trend was first observed a month ago and.travel eastward is hardest hit. Other directions affected:inaude Odessa. The official Soviet excuse for placing_curbs on air travel.is the need to give priority to the movement of freight, the consequent diversion_of aircraft for haul ing cargo and the_resulting shortage of passenger, space. (S Moscow Weeka 33 17 Aug 51).
21 Aug 51
Approved For Re lie4 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0d114440001-1
TOP SECRET
3.
Russians claim'US annulment of trade naCt causes discords The Soviet Union's hote.of 19 August .on.the_US.dedision:to-cancel the 1937 trade pest makes the'point that the US.waS-the one t0 request renewal of the agreement in 1942 for an indefinite period. The note also states that American renunciation contradicts the, alleged desire for improvement of Soviet-American relations which vas .expressed by the US in the TrumanShvernik.exchange, (11 New York Times, 20 Aug 51)0
Camnents The Soviet protestucoming_almOst two months after the US notified the USSR of ite actiontiwas'Probably' delayed until the Soviet Government had deeided on the. form Of its reply to President Truman's message and ..the Congressional resolution.
USAF
25X1
5.
Moscow visits of Soviet officials from Pakistan may be related to expansion of Soviet activities2 The Karachi press reported that M. M. Volkov; Second Secretary in charge of Cultural Affairs of the Soviet EMbassy left on 12 Zu1y for a temporary visit to Moscow. Voikov was described as a specialist in South Abian affairs and one of the most active members of the EMbassy. US EMbassy Karachi noted that the USSR Ambassador to Pakistan, A. G. Stetsenko, and Trade Counselor Brobjes, who left on TOP SECRET
2
21 Aug 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1'
Approved For Re Itetie 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A06060440001-1
TOP SECRET
17 May and 14 June respectively-2' are still absent and. are presumably in Moscow. (1 Karachi' 1843, 13 July 51).
Comments Observers in South Asia haVe.recently noted the strides made by theCoMmuniete'in reversing..the traditiOnal trade routes in the area in favor of cloSer-ties with the_Sotiet-bloo, In view'of the apparent success of thie4olioy2.the presence in:Macaw of the Soviet Ambassador to Kaiachi together with Soviet Officials in charge of economic and cultural affairs suggests further, efforts to extend Soviet influence along these lines.
Kremlin barter, for_return_of.ohildren-claimed as Soviet citizens: The Soviet.Governmentlas.offered to:alliowlSotiet Uitizen" Maria Pyrz to leave the Soviet Union if some children.reviously claimed es Soviet citizens will be "permitted" to leave the US.
Field comment: Maria Pyrz is a US' citizen who desired to leave the Soviet UniOn.butwas refused.permission.by the Soviet Government. In 1948 the Kremlin made a similar offer to exchange certain persons of US citizenship-for those Same children claimed by the Soviet Union. The present barter-offer is-believed to be'inspired not by huManitarian con-. siderations but by a desire to.build up-the current propaganda' charge that it is the'US which impedeti freedoM.oriovement of persons.' ( C Moscow 242, 10 Aug 51; C SD to Moscow 1-40 17 Aug 51).
25X1C
7
EASTERN EUROPE. POLAND. Re- 'rted- lanS tor marked expansion of Polish Merchant Marines.' hmprimary'ob jectiva oftheria ish Merchant 'Marine is.to-eXioand its present 270,000-ton 'fleet to 600,000. To achieve this ged12-Poland must'resort to the purchaSe of shipping-fron auteide.the extended fleet of ships is expected to nearly double..the 12 ships. currently plying the China trade routes.
25X1A
1Soviet control of the Polish Merchant Marine was initiated during discussions betWeen the USSR and-Toland in OctOber, 1949, ultimately resulting In a reorganized Polish Merchant. Marine. Since these discussions former nersonnei have been ornAlully plaoed by new officers andMen. 1
'

5X1C
TOP SECRET
re -
Comments Other sources have reported the reorganization of the Polish MerChant Marine at the beginning of 1951 as well as increasing Soviet control over most of its activities.
21 Aug 51
Approved For INgotise 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146Abee300440001-1
TOP SECRET
S.
RUMANIA. Swiss4lumanian trade agreement signed; The Rumanian press bss announeed.the'conclusien'of.a.one.year.trade.agreement with Switzerland. According to the Bucharest announcement, Switzerland Will export machine 'tools, miscellaneous installations and machinery, electrical equipment, instruments, dyes, and'pharmaceutical products. in return-for Rumanian cereals, fodder plants, lumber,, chemicals and fuel. oil.
Comment; Trade and financial.negetiatiOns'begun im November 1950 between the SWiss and Rumanians_were terminated, reportedly because of Rumanian intransigeance over Swiss clahns for:Coipehsation for nationalized property. A Swiss delegation returned; to Bucharest in April.
.
.
Conclusion-of a trade agreement undoubtedly indicates that arrangements acceptable to'both sides.on.controtereial issues have been made, including,-in addition-te nationalized property Olaims, some adjustment of the Rumanian.Governeent assertion. that.funda.deposited in Swiss banks by . former Foreign Minister.Cretzianu. were official rather than private funds. The US Legation in Bucharest had previOnsly been informed by the Swiss Charge in BuCharest that Switzerland did-not:contemplate including in its export items-fletritegio_war material^ but Would consider meeting Rumanian demands for Swiss equipment for two power stations.
-
The US Legation in Bucharestunderstands, bat has been unable to confirm, that an agreenent was simultaneously concluded whereby Rumania agreed to. payeent of about 20 percent of the claims of Swiss citizens for property'nationalited by'the Rumanian Government. (U Bucharest 67, 10 Aug 51; C Bucharest SO, 13.Aug 513.
TOP SECRET
21 Aug 51
Approved For Re
e 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09db0440001-1
TOP SECRET
sECTION 2 (EASTERN)
.IRAN.
25X1C
25X1A
Kashani, 1has indireet contacts with the Soviet bbbassy. He is representea as haying told the embassy that, tith the government facing cial crisis, now is a tipropitious" an imninent finantime to show Soviet goad will by Iranian gold it has held since its occupation of Iran during World returning the reports state that he is interested War II.. Other in the abolition of the monarchy anachronism and the establishment of as a useless a Prderation of Islanic iet influences. republics under Sor-
Cabinet reportedly developinc Mrah Tashani, a top religious leader in Iran, is reportedly invelved in paign to undermine the present Prime a tamMinister.
Internal opposition to the present Iranian
25X1X
11
25X1A
Comments
the USSR have been rumored before.
While he has continued to support the present Prime Minister tional Front Party he belongs, Kashani to whose Nahas recently been particularly vocal urging a united Islam, and these in speeches may have given rise to the port. above refThe opposition of various Iranian elements hostile to the present meni is.not yot sufficiently governstrong to bring about the fall ister. of the Prime Min2.
111g, First Indian-made aircraft under oes trial fli hts: midi-Tairor .a.basic. rainer
sucoessful trial flights in mid=August.
pr o. ceo by
Comment/ There is no evidence that Lebanon is actuallymediating India and Pakistan: between India has refused previous offers offices. Pakistan, however, of mediation or good has been seeking the support against India, and the Lebanese of other countries Minister is probably doing that he the situation. can to ease
INDONESIA.
"Cf Mrte
gnmedi.atjng in Icashfl1frdjpUth, Karachi.is mediating.between lhe Lebaneae Minister to Pakistan.and.India in.an attempt Kashmir problem, according to to settle the a broadcast from Cairo on 19 August. Ticker Beirut, 19 Aug 51). (U FBID
PAKISTAN

influence.
-
an opportunist. &mulls efforts to secure the return Presumably, 114 of Iranisul gold would imply of a government the institution more amenable to Soviet
Kaehani is a rabble-rouser and
Contacts between Kashani and
The first Indiandustan Aircraft, Ltd., made (S NOW Delhi,
Weeka 33, 17 Aug 51).
Overseas Chinese usightseeing group bound for tour of Communist ge-sca e org ze oe ega on o ese in .nes o TOP SECRET

5
21 Aug .5.1
Approved FVelease 2002105120 : CIA-RDP791-01 e000300440001-1
TOP SECRET currentIy-en route to Canton. The visit China eince the Communist Victory is Indonesian-born who *ere selected from grouP numbers 64-Chineee, 33 of them approxately four-months and the ,all parts of Indenebia. The tour will 1St and Peiping, thence to Thrieri, delegates will proceed froth Canton to Hahkaw Tsinan, and Hangchow, presumably Mukden, and Harbin, and finally to Tientsin, return'to Indonesia to act as apostles they will get a ted carpet tour and'will 51). of the new China. /(l Hong Kong 668, 16 Aug Chineee in Indonesia has increased Comment: Anti-Communist sentiment'among Fro-Nationaltst riewspapera are quite surprisingly during the ast six months. been unsuccessful in achieving vocal, and in several cities the Communists have control of the local Chinese associations, into army: The Celebes guerrillas force rejects scheduled incorporation Kahar.Muzakar has ordered hie DefenseMinistry.has:confirmeitheHreport.that By doing so he can:4,000 guerrillaS back to the jungle in the Sodth Celebes. into the Republican A;my: The celled theittagaddt incorporation, en 17 August, with Commander, in announcing failure of settlement Fest Indonesian Territorial that "there have obtained proof the guerrillas stated that the armed forces issue in'an the exploit are Still ceraim elements which desire to 18 Aug 51; R a certain purpose." CR FBID Ticker Djakarta, effort to FRIO Ticker Makassar? 17 Aug 51). in March that the ComComment; government's efforts to restore in-
25X1 C
muniats had ternal security in the South Celebes,

further
.
guerrilla
beensuccesitfainThdirrin
L----___IrepOrted
f:
25X1C
5X1 C
gn.
.
for Indochina invasion: ainese Communists re orted re ari MvisCor are Aroops.of.the_Chinese.Comnunis collecting food -: of southern Yunnanwhere whey are 5 assembling September. Indochina during and telling local inhabitants that they-will:attack
(S SOPD 381, Bangkok C-6,'17 Aug 51).
:
Comments portel 25X1X .port at

'
not be discounted.
resumed hip duties as Supreme Cormander Ne Win returns: Lt. 'General He Win month's leave. (S Rangoon 59? 18 of Burmats.armed.forces on 14 August after a TOP SECRET
Approved ForRelease2002/05/20 :
25X1C
has been reThe presence of the 39th Division in the Fohai area also appears to suPThe above information Itndt.the Chinese Communists are planning opera and Thailand which would be ations against Li Mils Dationailst fordes in.Burma With Ho Chi Minh. launched from Yunnan.and northern Indochina in cooperation to undertake overt operations are prepared If the Chinese Communists, however, their attempting to sweep through anYwhere in Southeast Asia, the possibility of to limited objectives ahould the entire area instead of restricting themselves
CIA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1
6
21
Aug 51
Approved For Reba 4e 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79101146AM00440001-1
TOP SECRET
Aug 51).
Cammentt
regarding% lints imminent remotal frOm office. ilt is likely, however, that Defense Minister.11 Win and the Socialists have reduced the general's inhuence and naw exercise a greater degree of control over the armed forces than they did previously.
This action ends all speculations for the time being at least,
Zo:mmentt In the matte:, of the Japanese peace treaty, Burmese fears of in,curring.Chinese.Communist have tot been completely.allayed and will continue.to affect a decision as to whether or not to attend the conference.

TOP,SECRET
Burma may attend San Ftandieco:conferences The US Eftbassy inRangoon reports..thatthe.BUrmese.Government.may:reverseltself and accePt the invitation, te the Japanesdpeace conference in view of the SoViet Union's,decision to attend. The Burmathe Might feel that the Soviet Union's presence weuld permit Burmese attendanoe by removing the poseibility of antagonizing Communiet China. .The embassy points out, however, that such action would not necessarily signify a. willingness to sign the treaty. (S Rangoon 199, 18 Aug 51),
9.,
THAILAND.
25X1A
25X1A
General Phao commences tour, The Director General Of the Thai rolice, ugust'to tour. Entope and the US. RFBID Taipei, 15 Aug 51).
Mae has for some time intended to visit the King in Switzerland, He undoubtedly hopes to win Royal faVor and thereby considerably enhance his prestige in preparation for becoming, some day, Thailand's Premier and de facto ruler.
Ceranieritt
but CM-gilt coup ettempt delayed his departure.
10.
INDOCHINA. Vietnam official:says press concern re Japanese treaty is government-. inspired: The nress shief mit the .North Vietnaminformation Service toldaUS.. vice-consul that the Central Government bas-ordered his service to ftake enough noise" to keep the Japanese treaty issue before the public. The source said that as a result many Vietnamese ire npw interested in whether Vietnam will be in vited to the treaty conference., but that a greater number take the view that if' Vietnath's participation is vetoed on the ground that Vietnam lacks independence, the French maybe pressurod_into granting further concessions. The source stated that:people in North Vietnam are far more worried about mobilization and earning a living than &bout the treaty issue. (S Hanoi 105, 20 Aug 51).
Of a,governt: mental attempt to distract public attention from domestic issues by magnifying international relations.
Cbmmentt Mir: report tends to confirm earlier evidence that the alleged concernofthe Vietnamese with the treaty issue consists largely
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : 91A-ROP79101146A000300440001-1
21 Aug 51
Approved For Re [bete 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S60440001-1
TOP SECRET
U. CHINA.
Appointment indicates growing importance of China's aviation industry: An indication of the growing importance of China's aviation industry is the recent appointment of a veteran Chinese Communist military leader.as director of the Aviation Industry Bureau under the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The new director is Ho Chang Jung, concurrently Vice Minister of Heavy Industry. The former director, according to the same Peiping broadcast which announced HO's appointment, was demoted to deputy director. (U Hong Kong 703, 17 Aug 51).
12.
25X1X
Violence declining in "suppression of counterrevolutionaties" campaign: The US Consul General in Hong Kong notes that, of 923 alleged "counter revolutionaties" reported in the Communist press as sentenced during 3 to 9 August, only 19 were reported as executed. This evidence of the declining 25X1X violence of the suppression campaign is supportedl
p
adivce given Mayor Ch'en Yi by the Shanghai Unamber of Uommerce to the effect that the "execution with fanfare" policy was "seriously affecting" popular morale. The U4 Consul General concludes that, although other recent arrivals from Shanghai have not noticed a decline in executions, the weight of evidence indicates that this is so. (S Hong Kong 694, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: Communist and other sources indicate that the percentage of those executed has declined considerably in recent weeks. Neverthe less, the campaign continues withcnrtdiscernible decrease in scope, and its purpose is precisely that of "seriously affecting" popular morale, i.e., convincing the Chinese people that present or future opposition to the regime is hopeless. The Communists aim to make their subjects totally subservient, and are clearly prepared to kill several million Chinese to that end.
13..
Chinese Communist agents for Southeast Asia to be trained: An Over seas Chinese Institute opened on 20 August at Nan Fang University in, Canton and is accepting "politically pure" overseas Chinese students between the ages of 18 and 30. Entrance standards are low, and the students are to be maintained by the State. The US Consul General in Hong Kong comments that the Institute is likely to emphasize political rather than academic training and may become an important source of cadres for aubversive work among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. (S Hong Kong 694, 17 Aug 51).
TOP SECRET
5X1C
Comment: The first mention of the Aviation Industry Bureau in Communist broadcasts was in June 1951. It is improbable that the Chinese have facilities for more than assembly arid minor repair of aircraft. An early I I claimed that such facilities were set up recently at 19aiyuan in North China.
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : Clg-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1

21 Aug 51
Approved For Reitel4e 2002105120 : CIA-ROP79T01146A0611860440001-1
TOP SECRET
Comment:.. Undoubtedly a major objective of the new Institute is training of young persons for the both overt and covert assignmeuts east Asia. in South-
14.
Comment: The Daily Digett of 14 August reported strengthening the regime's police earlier regulations controls. Every aspect Of Peiping's subjects will the lives of be affected by these burgeoning security measures.
15.
KOREA. .Weather may explain The US Far Eastern Command, inactivity in North Korean airfield conStructions last few weeks in airfield commenting on the sharp decline during the construction that the weather "has been activity in North particularly inappropriate for Korea, observes of airfields. FECOM cautions, however, that construction" extensive UN air action against Communist airfields, coupled with the Communist ability to launch effective' counter-air sorties from Manchurian bases alone, may be responsible cessation of airfield for the construction activity in North Korea. Telecon 5062, 20 Aug 51). (S CINCFE
16.
25X A
25X1C North Koreans re orted to have received 'et aircraft craft from the USSR: 1 tanks and naval the following to have supplied information: The Northkorean air force jets, in early received 60 NIG August, concurrent with the return pilots from Soviet training; of 165 North Korean 270 tanks were received with the intention of prior to mid-August equipping a tank corps; the North Korean navy division for each North Korean requested a transf Soviet Union. of "ships" from the

25X1C
Peiping issues new security regulations: Communist China's of Public Security has Ministry. issued additional regulations amusement places and printing controlling hotels, and engraving shops. mitted near military organizations of any kind, and Hotels are not perguest registers daily. must submit their forms for any governmentPrinting firma must have permission to print official agency or to make official effort to prevent the seals--obviously an forging of official Aug 51). documents. (S Hong Kong 694, 17
25X1A Comment: Although the amount of is unconfirmed, it is known equipment received that the USSI is continuing and pilots trained heavy weapons in small to supply needed in the USSR to utilize amounts and is training personnel such equipment. It is considered in Manchuria or North Korean request for doubtful that any naval craft would be granted by the USSR.
17.
1
25X1A
Communistssgain claim Korean General Nam Il on 19 UN violation of Kaesong's neutrality: North August lodged a formal complaint alleging
Approved For Release 2002/05/

9
RDP79T01146A000300440061-1
21 Aug 51
Approved For IRAs/se 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00440001-1
TOp SECRET
violation of the Kaesong neutral area by never 30 armed'men of your siden. who ambushed a Chinese Communist patrol. An immediate investigation of the incident by the UN military command "failed to identify the armed bands as belonging to any UN command military.formation." However, the UN communique concerning the investigation raised the nposeibility....that the shooting was the work of a politically guided civilian group operating under instructions to crente an atmosphere of tension which would tend to support the breaking off of the current military armistice conference.n AFF Tokyo, 20 Aug 51; R FBID, NCNA Peiping, 20 Aug 51).
Comment: Kaesong and the surrounding countryside has been an arta of operations for antiCommunist and ROK guerillas since late in 1950. There is no evidence available indicating that this incident was instigated by the ROK.
18.
JAPAN. Opposition parties agree to participate in treaty conference: The opposition parties have agreed to participate in the Japanese peace treaty conference; according to Reuters. The Democrats will have one member,as
a delegate, one as an alternate, and two on a 12man Diet mission that will accompany the delegation. The Socialist party will be represented by two members on the Diet mission. (1 FBID, Reuters Tokyo, 18 Aug 51):
Comment: Decision of the opposition to participate will strengthen the delegation in the eyes of the Participating Allied nations, should make the treaty more acceptable to the Japanese public, and should weaken political attacks on the government. By not participating in the main delegation: however, the Socialists apparently are preserving their opportunity to oppose the government on this issue after the signing.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : St-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1

21 Aug 51
Approved For RielAse 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146S0300440001-1
TO11 SECRET
MOTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GERMANY. Coal trains to West Berlin are stopped by East Germans: The East German-controlled Roichsbahn suddenly refused to permit the movement of extra coal trains to Berlin on 17 August, stating that the rail paths were needed to move the harvest, and that Berlin has enough coal. These trains had been carrying over 15:000 tons of coal a week from the Ruhr (C to West Berlin., by agreement between the East and West Germans. Berlin 267, 18 Aug 51)
25X6 2.

TOP SECRET
11
Comment: This move may be a Soviet retaliation to the West's action in bringing legal east-west German trade to a halt on 3 August. The retaliation was probably deferred until the Berlin Youth Fostival was nearly over. In January of this year, the East Germans closed the Mittel land canal lock, through which Ruhr coal had previously moved, and since that time coal shipments to Berlin have boon difficult. West Berlin's coal stockpile is sufficient for about three months.

21 Aug 51
Approved For Rdtodse 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A64600440001-1
TOP SECRET
3.
AUSTRIA. Union of Independents purges press. The press service of the Union of Independents (VDU) announced on 14 August that the bi -weekly paper, Der Angriff (The Attack), is no longer, associated with the VDU. The publisher and editor of the paper has been expelled from party ranks for disloyalty. Der Angriff will be replaced by a new publication, Die Arbeiterfront (Workers' Front). (R FBIS -Graz radio, 14 Aug 51)
4.
Minister of Interior foresees period Of internal calm: Minister of the Interior Helmer has informed High Commissioner Donnelly that., in his personal view, no now world crisis need be anticipated prior.to next June. Be regards the internal situation in Austria as similarly stabilized and believes the government competent to meet any Communist disturbances. The Minister, however, expects Communist efforts to create unity fronts in the September trade union electiohs, and warns that futther economdc deterioration would contribute to Communist success. He has no evidence of increased Soviet military activities, but reports that the Soviets are bringing quantities of road building equipment into Austria. (S Vienna 8774, 16 Aug 51)
Comment: Minister Helmer did not disclose the source of his general optimism and, on the whole, his capacities as a world-prognosticator may be discounted. Allied observers- -particularly.on,tho occasion of the communist riots in Vienna last-fall - -have not fully shared Helmer's belief that his police force is a match for any Communist challenget his sanguine attitude should perhaps, be considered in conjunction with Foreign Minister Gruber's pressure for reiumption of Austrian treaty talks. Heimerls Socialists have previously charged that blanm for the current economic crisis - -the meat shortage - -rests upon the Ministry of Agriculture, headed by People'S Party Minister Kraus.
5.
NETHERLANDS. Anti-US feeling in the Netherlands is growing: The US Ambassador to The Hague states that confidential and informal reports from unofficial US observers reveal a growing feeling of resentment toward the US on ihe part of the Dutch, who allege that US political

TOP SECRET
Comment: Austria's burgeoning "fourth party", which has long had press troubles 'with the occupation authorities because of its allegedly neo -Nazi and openly anti-Soviet editorial policies, appears to have acquired internal press troubles. The establishment of a working class publication is significant of recent efforts of the VDU to retain and enlarge its following among labor, after the recent presidential elections demonstrated the existence of such a following. The VDU aspires to develop a b.road, supra-party base, and seems willing, therefore, to sacrifice a militant approach.
Approved ForRelease2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1 12 21 Aug 51
Approved For Reheese 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146Aablet00440001-1
TOP SECRET
and economic poliey'is becoming "increasingly dictatorial and arbitrary

as respects Europe. ft
25X1C
25X1A
fa high -ranking Dutch Government official in the Ninistry of the Interior declares his intention of cooperating fully with the US in international &grit:Monts aimed at the USSR, despite the possible opposition of his government. he implied that several Cabinet members fear that US actions might become "so aggressive as to provoke war," an attitude characterized by the souice as ufAlliig for Communist propaganda." (C Hague 180, 17 Aug 51; 17 Aug 51)
Comment: -Although there is evidence of a growing anti-US feeling in the Netherlands, it can hardly be considered as stemming entirely from Communist propaganda. The Dutch, faced with a worsening economic situation, have given a bad press to the Kem Amendment and the recently-announced ECA Productivity Program. The Netherlands undoubtedly fears that the loss of its voice in world affairs would force the country to abide by the decisions of the big powers.
'
The ever-present Dutch resentment against,the US role in achieving Indonesian independence is currently accentuated by the Indonesian detondo foi revision of the Dutch-Indonesian agreements and the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. Dutch cooperation in US policies probably will be harder to achieve in the future, and the current anti-US attitude may jeopardize implementation of the Dutch defense program.
6.
UNITED KINGDOM. -Britain sceptical of proposed Palestine Commission conference: file Foreign Office has displayed "chill scepticism" toward the proposed meeting of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) in Paris on 10 September,. and has in effect instructed British representatives in Middle East capitals to make only general replies to queries regarding the meeting. The Foreign Office considers the invitation to the meeting ill-timed, and emphasizes the need for a preparatory "educative process" in the Diddle East. The Foreign Office indicates concern that the UK, though not a member of the Commission, failed to receive advance notice of the impending invitatiOn; and it also questions the practicability of a number of the proposals to be suggested at the conference. (C London 936, 17 Aug 51)
Comment: The proposed meeting of the PCC is intended to bring togather representatives of Israel and the Arab States in an endeavor to promote the solution of st least some of the problems currently vexing their relations. The impatience displayed by the Foreign Office reflects

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002105/20 :19A-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1

21 Aug 51
Approved For-laplease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146W00300440001-1
TOP SECRYT
the deep concern currently felt in the UK over what is regarded as a general weakening in the entire British position in the Middle East over the past six months, and suggests that the Foreign Office is for the moment not disposed to be conciliatory on any Middle Eastern questions.
7.
B.
Death of Chibas probably will not bring serious political roperCUBA. cussiona: The death of Senator Eduardo Chibas y Rivas, leader of the "Ortodoxo" party, and 1952 presidential aspirant, probably will not bring serious repercussions to the political situation in Cuba. Chlbas shot himself on 5 August after a weekly broadcast in which he called on the people to aWaken to what he called corruption in the government. ..Bad Chibas lived, he probably would have had little chance to secure the presidency due largely to his proven instability. Once considered the leading presidential aspirant and "the man to beat", .Clibas derived his strength, at least in part, from the fact that the government had not yet decided on a candidate. Recently his position began to deteriorate as certain segments of his party began working in harmony with Communist leaders. More recently Chiba& prestige suffered considerably as a result of his failure to prove charges of graft against Minister of Education Sanchez Arango and several other government
officials.
Chiba& ooncentrated campaign to discredit the gOvernment and Oreate distrust of .all its acts did have some effect on the general public. However, it appeared that public reaction was redounding more in favor of ax-president Batista, another presidential aspirant, than to Chibas Many Cubans who applauded Chibas for berating the government himself. rather than for any qualities he may have had as a statesman. apparently were giving their support to other candidates as election time approached.
While some Orthodoxos will now return to the government group, the opposition leader Batista will probably derive the most benefit from the passing of Chibas. TOP SECRET Approved ForfUlease 2002/05/20: 6A4RDP79T01146A000300440001-1 21 Aug 51 14
This is the first report that such instructions have boon Comment: issued to any Latin American Communist Party. Colombian Communists would probably be capable of performing the assigned task.
25X1A
COLOMBIA. Communists collecting detailed personal information on Colombian diplomatic and consular representatives: In accordance with instructions from the Cominform, Colombian Communist leaders are collecting information orrthe diplomatic and consular representatives of Colombia in the US, UK, and France. The information desired included detailed knowledge of the subject's debts, vices, and weaknesses.
\ill
TOP SECRET
declassi-
UNCLASSIFIED when
I

I
blbenterWRITROMeniaaL012/0920Spergitzmny-rattratiolyskr44upglaodoeid.ior

CIA CDNT

SOURCE
ye.
REG I STRY
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED

DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
Cory Ito.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
ed from TOP NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this /orm is detac, and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro tor record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
'

Secret mate tat it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
D
I
TO
d by the Central Intelligence Agency to each Tap Secret document receiv ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or attached to the document until such official or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who Each individual who sees the Toy Secret document will sign and and ndicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. right-hand columns. Indicate the data of handling in the SEEN BY RELEASED RECE I VED DATE OFFICE/DIV. REFERRED TO SIGNATURE TIME
TIME BATE
DESTROYED
Br (Signature)
SPATCHED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY1(Si
gnat ur e)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
Ap roved For Re 4'62002/05/20 : CIA1061579T0114000300440001-1

Pict oust
lot., I
FORM
LOA 'vet
Wbli
TOP SECRET
140)
Approved For Re Nice 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A094960440001-1
TOP SECRET
2.1 August.1951..
a-
CIA No, 49310-A

'10 THE DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of 'Current Intelligence. Comments represent the -immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Noose 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW6300440001-1
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
EGYPT. Foreign Minister again insiste denunciation of treaty with Britain is inainents ..The.Egyptian Foreign Minister has again informed the US AMbassador in Cairo.that he thinks he will formally announce Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty before the end of the Egyptian Parliament's present session. (TS, S/S Cairo 2169.113 Aug 51; U News Ticker, 19 Aug 51),
usla
Syrian Prime Minister issues statements favorable to the West: The ne4 Syrian Prime Minister has issued statements to the local press which reveal a favorable attitude toward the West. He is quoted as saying: "Arabs cannot face the dangers of this perplexed world alone. Neutrality is imaginary when we are weak.... I do not advocate alignment with the Western bloc for love of this bloc, but to repel the dangers threatening my country."
The Prime Minister, however% also has cautioned that there is a great " difference between his beliefs and government policy formulated by the (Cs, S/S Damascus 94, 16 Aug 51). Cabinet.
The.forthright and realistic statements attributed to the comment; Prime Minister are in sharp contrast to the neutralism and open antiWesternism so commonly voiced in Syria. The Army and its Chief of Staff are the real rulers of Syria; there is no evidence that they have assumed a proWestern attitude.
2 5X1 C
2 5X 1 A
mg. ;nternal opposition to the mreeent Iranian Cabinet reportedlY developings Mullah Kashani, a top religious leader in Iran, is reportedly
,involved in a Campaign to undermine the present Prime Minister. Kashani, 'has indirect contacts with the Soviet Enbassy. He is represented as having told the ethbassy that, with the government facing an imminent financial crisis, now is a "propitious" time to show Soviet good will by returning the Iranian gold it has held since its occupation of Iran during World Wgr II. Other reports state that he is interested in the abolition of the monarchy as a useless anachronism and the establishment of a federation of Islamic republics under Soviet influences,

Comments
The Igyptian Foreign Minister, according to his various stateComment: ments, apparently cannot decide on a date for the treaty's denunciation. A few days ago he told the US Anbassador that he intended to delay abrogation until probably October. le Egyptian press is quoted on 19 August to the effect that the Foreign Minister would not denounce the treaty during the present session of parliament whichwill be concluded within a few days.
Kashani is a rabble-rouser and an opportunist. TOP SECRET
Presumably,
Approved For Release 2002/05120 : ilA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1
Aug 51
Approved For Re4eete 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C4600440001-1
TOP SECRET
Kashanils efforts to secure the return of Iranian gold would imply the institution of a government more amenable to Soviet influence. Contacts between Eashani and the USSR have been rumored before.
While he has continued to support the present Prime Minister to whose National Front Party he belongs, Kashani has recently been particularly vocal in urging a united Islam, and these speeches may have given rise tO the above report, The opposition of various Iranian elements hostile to the present government is not yet sufficiently Strong to bring about the fall of the Prime Minister.
25X1A
40
IRAN.
National Front Deputies reportedly urge continuation of oil talks: Three National Front Deputies have agreed to urge Prime Minister Mossadeq not to break off the current IranianBritish oil discussions,
I
25X1A
Comment: The three men mentioned have all been ardent supporters of oil nationalization. If this report is correct -- and it may well be2 since an increasing nuthber of Iranians apparently now favpr coming to some sort of agreehent with the UK in the oil dispute -- it would seem to indicate that the move toward settlement of the oil question had penetrated the Prime Minister's own party,
5.
PAKISTAN, Government accepts invitation to Japanese Peace Conference: Pakistan's acceptance of an invitation to the Sah Francisco Conference has "gone forward," according to Sir Zaftullah Khan the Foreign Minister, Sir Zatrullah hopes to head the delegation if conditions in Pakistan permit him to leave the country. (00 S/S Karachi 173, 17 Aug 51),
6,
Britain now willing to invite Indochinese states to Japanese The UK Government has instructed its High Commissioner in India to inform the GOI that, having "duly noted the views of the Indian Government," the UK nevertheless finds it desirable to invite the Associated States to the San Francisco conference. (C, S/S State to London 10420 18 Aug 51).
treaty conference.:
INDOCHINA.
Comments The altered position of the UK, which has previously been reluctant to invite the Associated States in view.of India's unfavorable attitude* virtually assures the attendance of the Associated States at the conference.
TOP SECRET
2 21 Aug 51 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1

.
Approved For Re Ieise 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00940440001-1
TOP SECRET
7,
CHINA:
25X1X
Pe
Is Forei
Office
e:
.;nese peace
treaty:
,
on 16 AugUst that he had been celled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive a copy of Premier Chou Entlai's 15 August statement on the Japanese peace treat'. The ministry's spokesman emphasized to the charge the importance of the conclud ing paragraphs of Chouge statement. (S, S/8 The Hague 189, 17 Aug 51).
Chouts speech suggests the possibility that, after the San Francisco conference, Moscow and Peiping will.call A separate conference of the Soviet bloc and those nations that do not sign the USUK draft treaty at San Frandisco,
8; =maw,
putch are dissatisfied with the present Japanese peace treatr draft: The Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister is soiewhat doubtful whether his country will sign the present draft of the Japanese treaty especially if the Indonesians refUse to sign it. He hopes that some revision will be posSible at the San Francisco conference, despite the US and UK statements that the draft is "final." Certain modifications of Article 14 (reparations) would make the treaty acceptable to the Dutch. .00 S/S The Hague 187,
Cotments The Dutch fear that the reparations clause as it now stands will result in the Netherlands being responsible for the claims of its citizens who suffered from the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Other reports indicate that, even though the Dutch demandi for revision are not act ed'upon, the Netherlands may sign the treaty with reservations,
Comment: The last three Paragraphs of the Chou statement declare that, if Communist China does not-participate in the "preparation, drafting and signing" of a Japanese peace treaty, Peiping will consider the treaty "illegal" and "null and void," These paragraphs also express agreement with the Soviet position that a peace conference should include all the states Whose armed forces were in conflict with Japan in World War and affirm that Peiping is prepared to "exchange views" on a Japanese peace treaty with all such states,
.
II,
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
TOP SECRET
Approved ForRelease2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300440001-1 3 21 Aug 51
Approved For Re leapt 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004111360450001-0
TOP SECRET
22 August 1951
CIA No. 49311

Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Sta e Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
TOP SECRET
ApprovedForFASise2001109/06:04442DP79T01146A00300450001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
US Lend-Lease goods 'still 'sold in USSR: Embasay Moscow nOtes that US lend-lease goods are still being sold to the Soviet public, at mitmessed by an Embassy officer who recentlyeai a Ruisian purchasing 300 rubles worth of radio tubee, tnciuding Xany of DS manufaCture. The Russian upon inquiring of the salesgirl for Glavelectrosvyazhyt (chief administration.for eleotrical and communicitions-eqUipment sales) whether he would be able to 'continue bUying US tubes, was told that up to now the supply of US tubes was adequate. (C Moscow 301, 20 Aug 51)... USSR.
:
2.
25X1A
Interior New pOstal 'security Measures re orted in Lithuania: has r6Minister General Bartasiunas cently issued new security' measures requiring all postal shipments. letters, parcels and telegrams ciroulating withtn Lithuania to carry the sender's name and address. Letters and parcels destined abroad must reportedly be presented for inspection at Special postal sections of the Gorkoim (Town Committees) or Raikoms (Regional Committees) before mailing. SPreading rumors and gossip by mail is said to be punishable just as if circulated by word of mouth. Minor Offenses are to be hnadled by 100 to 1000 ruble finaa issued by local NVD organs. The V710 is authorized to hand over the more serious cises to the State ?toss,cuter.
Comment: Further cOrroboration iS subMittefly-the Embassy which, itselicFiTaaly Purchased an RCA 6F6 tube tannfaatured in 1944 for the US Army and Navy. The newly evineed SoViet interest in expanded trade with the West may partially reflect fears of future shortages of such essential electrical appliances and radio tubes as appear to be still easily obtainable from abroad.
25X1C
5X1X
regnlationsave It is possible that additional Se Comment: been IET7317ed in the Lithuanian SSR as a rwault of Mote that took: in 111no on 4 June 1951. -(See place . ug 0/dI Dai y Miges
jlcurity
3..
EMbassy Moscow convinced of post-war fall Prom grace of Zhukov and Kuznetsov: Embassy Moscow believes that the post-war faiI715Fai grace of General Zhukov and Viceairal KnznetsoV was 'clearly demonstrated hy the publicity denied to them in recent "Vweril but accorded te suoh titans as Konev, Rokossovsky and Vasilevsky: The Ehbassy recalls that Kuznetsov, as-full admiral, was apparently tried by a oourt of honor in 1948, downgraded three ranks, and aceording to some reports deprived.of his freedom. Similarly ZhukoV although not downgraded, was
TOP SECRET
1
22 Aug 51.
ApproveciForFaree2001/09/06:0PAMP79701146A061t0450001-0
TOP SECRET
'
given peripheral assignments at Odesed and Sverdlovsk, was eclipsed by other marshals, and received shabby treatment in films depicting the fall of Berlin. According to-the Ebbassy, local repOrts picture Yumashev as ailing in recent years, although he_was seen at the 1951 May Day and other functiens. The Embassy doubte :that he was transferred in order to assume "higher duties." (S Moscow257, 13 Aug 51).
Comment: Marshal Zhukov recently re-emerged into prominence at the Polish liberation anniversary, and it is suppeoted that he is slated coven important military post. In July,XUsnetsov was reappointed Minister of the Navy.
.
4.
..
The Commissioner pointe to Communist gains,in that the bulk of the youth obeyed Communist directions entirely, foreign participants were probably impressed, and the Feetival:as a whole provided the Communists with a wealth of propaganda material,
MoCloy is convinced, however, that the FeStital tOok an unexpeoted turn of importance to the 77est when at least 600000 of ite delegates defied.Communist regulations to visit lest Berlin: Many of these youthr made full use of facilities prepared for their reception, pieked up propaganda literature, and participated in group discusiions, often voioing anti7Communist sentiiente. MoCley gained the impression that the proportion of the East German youth won over to Communism is not as large as had been feared.
The Festival provided no reliable evidence on the attitude of Russian or Satellite youth since they had no opportUnity to join the Mass visits to West Berlin. (S Frankfert 1566, 19 Aug 51, Sect. 1 of 2; S Frankfort 1566, 19 Aug 51, Seot. 2 of 2),
Comment: The mass visits of youth:: to the Meet sectors pf Berlin -in many cases induoed merely by curiOeity -- are not deemed a reliable index of the true extent of youth support of the East German regime.

TOP SECRET
2
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. High ComMissioner MoCloy reperts'en ComMunist World Youth Festival: ln a preliMinary analysis of the recently coneluded World Youth Festival ii Beilin, US High COMmisitioner MoCloy observes that the Communist's were undoubtedly successfel in gathering a very large number Of youth and Marshalling them in Smoothly run mass meetings and parades. He feels, hOwever, that East German participants, knowingly or unknowingly, had engaged in anti-Communist activities on a mass scale during the festival, and that the potential for a resistance movement among them has been clearly demonstrated:
22 Aug 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP791-01146A000300450001-0
Approved For Refbete 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A005100450001-0

TOP SECRET
25X1C.
5.
EASTERN EUROPE.
ALBANIA.
Focid nppl .
ithrove i
Th food situation in
25)6C
ved during ile.y and June
It is iePorted that:teat bread in great quantities is replacing the meager'ration-of"corn breed Which had been
enforced for some time. 1111111111.,--25X1A

Comment:.
-
Although the report of "great quantitiesT'mak be exaggerated, the food situation probably has improved. In the spring of 1951, the Albanian Government reduced the oenpulsOry deliVery quotas of agricultural products hy 25% and the USSR sent-5000 tons of wheat to alleviate a deoline in food production. Previously; the food supply was reported to have dropized as a result oflhe-drought, the lack of incentive in the oolleotive farm system and the government's requisitioning of grain.
6,
Comment: The current trial, with ite forced publio attendance proballTri-Intended to terrorize the populace into submission.
7.
HUNGARY. Renewed efforts being made tO overocime-eoonoido difficulties: A recent article in the Hungarian Communist Party daily dealt with the ourrent important taski faeing-the Communists: (1) having the grain threshed and delivered; (2) guarantieing the success of the production competition; (3) Inc:reading the number of agricultural .cooperatives.
Cajolery, threats, awards and iipriSonthefttthave all been used to get the harvest in; howeter, there are reports tilatTsons grain deliveries are lagging. The'latest step in the move to laerease production by the recruitment of 160,000 new workers is a decree forcing thetaged and maimed into Various types of presCribed lailors. 'An intensive oaMpaign to recruit 5,000 new miners is evidence of serious shorteoMings in Hungarian coal production. In addition, press reports presage a reduction in the number of rail passenger schedules aimed it economizing 15,000 tons of coal yearly. (6 MA 2619 Blpst, 15 Aug 51; R MA 2624, Blpst, 17 Aug 51; FBIS), Comment: Periedio drives to alleviatahe deteriCrating Hungarian economic situation have failed to achieve more than momenterrsumess.

TOP SECRET
3
Trial of "spies" revealsinternal difficulties; A trial of seventeen vterrorist kulaks" accused of espionage and spreading false information has begun in Tirana-before anHaudience of 2,000. The'aecused are charged with collaborating-with American, Yugoslav and Greek agents, killing Communist Party offieials and attempting to recrUit agents locally for their diversionary activities. .(UIPBID, 20 Aug 51).
22 Aug 51
Approved For Rel
2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00b0a450001-0
TOP SECRET
The measures used increased control, Produetion competitions, higher norms -do not correot the basic troubles which include obsolete machinery; lack Of raw materials, a'dearth of skilled teohniclans, and the absence of labor incentives.
8.
.YUGOSLAVIA.
Yugoslavia refusee to attend Bin Franciec Conference, Assistant Yoreign Minister Vilfan has infornumITS Ambaseador Allen that the Yugoslav Governmenthas depided.not to attend the SenloranOisco Japanese Treaty Conference because of the remoteness of Yugoslav M.06= stantiVe interest.in-Japanese affairs. Vilfan explained.that, although his government recegnized the-deciaiatiOn'ef war an Japan made.bY ihe Yugoslav London Government, Yugoelavia would find-it embarrassingto take a position on a nuMber of qUestioniwhioh will probably arise at. the Conference. (C Belgrade 219, 20 Aug 61).
Comment: Yugoslavia had previcUsly indioated that it would deolineITT7.7131tation. By refusing toattend, the Yugoslav Government can aVeid taking a stand on Chinese Communist participation in the treaty, a:question that w111 probabiy'be raised by the.Soviet Union. It oan also evade the aWkwardness ot signing a lenient Japaneee treaty at a time When it is opPosing all suggestions to revise the more punitive Italian Peaoy Treaty.

TOP SECRET
22 Aug 51
Approved For Re Illua 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S10450001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
IRAN. Senate approves Export-Import Bank loan: The Iranian Senate has approved by a wide majority the Export-IMport Bank loan previously passed by the Lower House and the Senate Committee. (U Tehran 707, 19 Aug 51).
In addition, the US Army Attache in Karachi reports that the' Pakistani Army in the Lahore area is defensively disposed and that it displays calm and confidence despite the fact that India's total armored forces are drawn up about 30 miles away. (S Karachi Weeka 7, 18 Aug 51; USARMA Karachi DWH 112, 17 Aug 51).
'
Comment: This information further substantiates the belief that Pakistan will not initiate armed warfare with India.
3.
NEPAL. Organized pro-Communist student activities appear for the first time: The Gpvernment.of Nepal refused passports to members of the Nepal Students' Federation who wished to attend the Communist-sponsored East Berlin Youth Festival, according to a 12 August press report. A Karachi radio broadcast of 15 August stated that students in Katmandu, the capital of Nepal, demonstrated on 14 August for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. ( s New Delhi Weeka 33, 18 Aug 51; R FBID Far East, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: These are the first reports Of organized pro-Communist student activities in Nepal.
2.
PAKISTAN. War hysteria is lacking: The US Embassy in Karachi states that the Pakistani people will be ',very angry" if India proceeds with its declared intention of supporting the election of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir, but that Pakistani public opinion will accept whatever action is taken by the government to prevent the election. The embassy believes this action will take the form of an appeal to the Commonwealth countries, to the UN Security Council, and possibly to a special session of the UN General Assembly to halt the elections.
Comment: The loan, approved by the US in early 1951, had not previously been ratified by the Iranian Parliament. If the loan is made available, Iran will be able to continue with its badly needed economic.development program which is currently stalled for lack of funds. However, concern has been felt that implementation of the loan at this time would be interpreted as pressure on Greet Britain in favor of Iran; Conversely, failure to implement the loan would appear to Iran as undue pressure in support of Great, Britain.
'
TOP SECRET
5
22 Aug 51
Approved For Reling2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00940450001-0

TOP SECRET
4.
INDONESIA, ommunist arrests will cont nue: A cabinet member told US Ambassador Cochran that,recent:widespread arrests were based upon definite information that subversive elements, including Communists, turbances on 17 August and planned disHe said that arrests would had plans for further action from 21-24 August. continue until :wirer:of the known were in custody. instigators
Pringgodigdo, Chief of President Sukarno'a staff, that Sukarno himself had been intimated to chiefly responsible for the decision Cochran strong action against subversive to tnke elements. Pringgodigdo bility which the President said the responsihas taken weighs heavily that Cochran seize every upon him. opportunity to support and encourage He suggested Djakarta 278, 18 Aug 51). Sukarno. (C
5.
INDOCHINA. French mints osition in Indochina little im rovedni The US Army Attache in Saigon believed io be 'ter standing French tactical estimates that, notwithsuccesses in Tonkin, the overall position of French Union forces strategic is very little improved obtained last fall. over that which He believes that-various the infliction of a four to favorable factors, including one casualty rate offset by improved Viet Minh on the Viet Minh, are nearly organization, arid logistics. recruitment, troop disposition
The process of reinforcing French forces and training and non-commissioned native commissioned officers has been slow, an attrition rate of,ten and the attache believes that to one would have to be French Union forces to seize maintained in order for and retain the initiative defeat of the enemy. and insure the (S USARIAA Saigon, MC 206, 18 Aug 51). Comment: This is an unusually pessimistic estimate, particularly view of official French claims in that the Viet Minh has been and decimated in battles badZy defeated during the past few months. French Union forces, although roughly equal in numbers to the Viet Minh, are better armed. those of They possess control of Indochina, air and sea are far better supported undisputed logiatically access to a greater reservar of fit manpower than the eneMy. and have barring Chinese Communist intervention, Thus, the Viet Minh would appear a four to one attrition rate on to promise steady improvement Military position. of the French

TOP SECRET
6
Comment: It is of some significance that Sukarno ponsible for the government's was personnally resdecision. The cabinet opinion that decisions is of such diverse are nearly impossible. be increasingli Sukarno's leadership will required should inter-party rivalry in ihe cabinet continue,
22 Aug 51
Approved For Retese/6 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A064140450001-0

TOP SECRET
6.
Chinese Consul predicts ChinaVietnam diplomatic exchange: The ChineseConsul General in Saigon announced before a meeting of Chinese community leaders that the exchange of diplomatic representativeS between Vietnam and Nationalist China is "just around the corner." (S Saigon Weeka 33, 20 Aug 51).
_Comment: The French authorities have discouraged the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nationalist China and Vietnam in accord with their continuing'policy of nonprovocation with respedt to the Chinese Communists,
7.
Comnent: During the year ending 30 June 1951, Panamanianregistered shipping engaged in trade with Communist China increased threefold. In many cases the vessels have been registered under the names of dummy companies, with Chinese Communist interests suspected as being the bene ficial owners. The projedted transfer of vessels to other registry indicates that, in the absence of parallel action by other countries, Panama's decree will not effectively discourage merchant shipping from the China trade.
8.
Chungking claims suppression of 154.000 "bandits": Chungking radio claims that "banditsuppression" troops, in the first six months of 1951, "put oUt of action" more than 154,000 anti,-Communist guerrillas-in the Southwest region (Szechuan, Sikang, Yunnan, Kweichow). FBID, 20 Aug 51).
'
Comment: In June 1950 Peiping admitted the presence of 400,000 "bandits" in the Southwest region alone. In November 1950, Peiping radio asserted that "remnant bandits" had been wiped out in the Southwest.: Communist figures on "banditsuppression" are unreliable even for Communist figures, as many or most of the guerrillas listed as "put out of action" are simplY- dispersed, thereafter to resunp activity and to appear in subsequent lists of those "suppressed." AJS Army G-2 estimated in July 1951 that about 75,000 antiCommunist guerrillas were still active in the Southwest.

TOP SECRET
7
CHINA. Hong Kong shipowners withdraw vessels from Panamanian registry: The Panamanian Consulate General in Hong Kong has made public a decree approved by the Panamanian cabinet (but awaiting presidential signature) which forbids Panamanianflag ships from calling at Communist ports and also prohibits the carrying of strategic cargo to Hong Kong and Macao. Shipping firms in the colony are now applying to the Panamanian Consulate General for revocation of their shipping registry. It is reported that shipowners are planning to switch to British, Portuguese or Indonesian registry. (U Central News Hong Kong, 21 Aug 51).
22 Aug 51
Approved For ReltIS 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A06040450001-0

25X1X
9.
TOP SECRET
25X1A 25X1A
25X1X Soviet "airborne division" allegedly in Tientsin: inl'eiping alleges that the Soviet "68th airborne division" s been in Tientsin since April 1951, engaged in training Chinese troop's inthe area. The Soviet Communist division is said to comprise six battalions with paratroop of 120 officers and 2,304 men, (da received),
Comment: No Soviet 68th rifle or aLrborne division, army or army corps has been identified. Travelers from Tientsin in the past few have not reported the presence months of Soviet military units --other than technical personnel- -in the advisoryTientsin area. While the above be dismissed, its validity is report cannot questionable.
10.
11.
KOREA. Communist plans for a sixth phase offensive to a recently captured Chinese reportedj According' 140th Division, 47th Army, his Communist soldier from the newly arrived company political officer stated that his
.TOP SECRET
Comment: General Mao mas trained in Russia and returned to China in 1937 to become one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted lieutenants. In 1943 he was appointed head of the CAF office in Washington charge of purchase functions for to take knowledge that he has long been the Nationalist Air Force. It is Common Commander and a trusted favorite a rival of Chou Chih-jou, Nationalist Air of Chiang. phether the dismissal made for the reasons stated in was the presidential a political mandate, or whether it was move, is not clear. It is, however, as a token of good that it was made faith to the US as a-result of possible the acceptance by Nationalist China of the 20 July memoranda.
-rankin Nationalist air re esentative in the Formosa: A Taipei US recalled to press report of 21 August revealed the immediate recall to Formosa of Nationalist suspension and Ghinats top-ranking air representative in the US, Air.Lt. Gen. Nho Pang-chu. A later report the same day announced the dismissal of executive assistant to Nho. ,The two and recall'of Colonel Hsiang Weih7suan, men were accused by the presidential mandate of "dereliction duties and disobedience offenses were listed as: of of orders," Nhots (a) failure to.account for funds used for the purchase of military equipment for the Air Force; (b) dereliction of impeding the fighting power duties of the Air Force; (c) espousal of.the "disloyal" staff cause of members; (d) refusal undermining the government's prestige to hand oVer public funds; and (e) by spreading rumors'. speculates that neither of .the The report men will return to Formosa, mean certain punishment, as but rather will use their knowledge it would the prestige of Nationalist China to undermine in the.US in the capacity of political refugees. (U PANA, Taipei, 21 Aug 51).
22 Aug 51
ApprovedForRe642001A09/06:0A-RDP79T01146A081140450001-0
TOP SECRET
.division was holding the line in order to permit troops in the rear areas to prepare for a sixth phase offensive. The up Far East Command concludes, reasoning from the fact that similar statements by'political officers have preceded previous offensives, that an enemy offensive will be launched if current ceasefire negotiations fail. CINCFE-Telecon 5066, 21 Aug 51); Comment: The us lar.East Command still estimates that Communist forces in Korea have'the capability of sustaining a major offensive for a two. week period.

TOP SECRET
22 Aug 51
Approved For Relen 2001/09/06 1/4,SINEERT01146A0017350450001-0
/SECTION 3
(1ESTERN)
1.
GERMANY. Prospects for ratification of Schuman Plan deteriorating: Recent deVelopments indicate that prospects for a prompt ratification of the Schuman
Plan by the West German ParliaMent (lower house) are deteriorating. Key delegates of the two minor parties of the government coalition have expressed the view that ratification mould be impossible under the present circumstance; and that half of their factions might refuse to support the Plan mhen the' Parliament reconvenes in September. Although HICOG officials believe these ,claims to be exaggerated, they acknowledge that GerMan anger oVer the recent Ruhr Authority and Saar issues is certain to delay ratifidation of the Plan and-strengthen the hand of the forces opposing ratification, (C Bonn un numbered, 15 Aug 51; C Bonn 118, 17 Aug 51)
2.
Pleven GOvernment proposes token aid for Churchschools and sets dates: The first meeting of the new Pleven government has resulted in action on the wage and school questions, which embittered the recent Cabinet crisis, and the dates for fall elections. The government's decision to raise the minimum wage, however, is far from satisfying even the non Communist unions. Aid to churchschools took the form mainly of an agree ment to Seek Parliamentary approval of an increase of $2500 in credits for secondary school scholarships. The main controversy, aver aid to church primary schools, was to be resumed 21 August in the Assembly, with the Government taking no initiative. Cantonal elections for renemml of half the membership in each of the general councils of the 90 departments are scheduled for 7 and 14 October, while special elections to fill 12 vacancies in the Council of the Republic (upper house of Parliament) will be held on 30 September. (R Paris 1077, 18 Aug 51)
FRANCE.
Zation
Comteht: This Government may find a general solution of the wageprice and churchschool problems virtually impossible of attainment since the Cabinet is deprived of the Socialists' participation in its deliberations and yet must bargain for their support in the Assembly. Meanwhile the anticipation of fall elections has Stiffened considerably the positions of both the Socialists and the proCatholic Popular Republicans on the churchschool Issue, the former fearing lossea to the Communists, and the latter to the Gaullists. Although the cantonal elections will turn largely
Comment: On 12 July, prior to its recess, the lower house passed the law ratifying the Schuman Plan in the first of three readings necessary to secure final ratification, Although the three Government parties at that tithe presented a solid front in supporting the Plan, the debate indicated that aRy adverse developments, particularly in the Ruhr Authority and Saar issues, might considerably increase the Chancellor's difficulties in securing approval at the time of the final reading of the bill.
TOP SECRET
10
22 Aug 51
Approved ForRetft02001i09/06 :NIEMT01146,46t104450001-0
upon local questions, they will afford some measure of popular reaction to political developments
since the June' elections.
3.
Coitment: In general, restrictive business practices are in keeping with time-honored procedures prevailing in Austria and recent US complaints Of the "medievar organization of Austrian business have caused resentment. US and Soviet opposition merely delays and does not annul the objectionable law. It would appear unlikely, therefore, that the Austrian government will offei a measure mere acceptable to the American viewpoint.
Werld,Council for Peace surveys Vienna as conference site: zeneral secretariat of the World Council The for Peace has requested the Austrian Committee of Fighters for Peace for a survey of the feaSibility of,convoking a.convention in Vienna in October. The US Legation is concerned that the meeting may coincide with Communist agitation within the ranks of labor -anticipated in Austria this fall. (C Vienna 631, 16 Aug 51)
13ukr
pommentp The advantageous position of the Austrian capital (and Berlin) as aicenter of internationcomm,Jistfront org nations is becoming increasingly evident. Th.Wellgial=2Peace, fart sand,' WOrld FeAgration 442,emocraticand
.

'Nome
AUSTRIA. US opposes Austrian anti-cartel law: US High Commiesioner Donnelly refused to give his consent at the Allied COuncil meeting of 17 August to the new Austrian cartel control the law reversed.the position enunciated the law. The US objection to previous meek in the Executive CoMmittee of the.Allied Commission and is of non-interference in internal Austrian a departure from the US policy legislation. US Commiseioner Donnelly asserted that the law was contrary to the interests of consumers and to us conceptions of sound business practices. He particularly objected to exemptions accorded to large sectors of the business community, and to registration provisions which, he alleged, mould merely formalize the existence of cartels. Despite US and Soviet agreement in opposing the-law) Commissioner Donnelly pointed out that the Seviet occupation itself was responaible for numerous Austrian monopolies; the Communist press in turn alleged that US opposition was only "ostensible" since cartels are a consequence of the Marshallization of Austria. .(U Vienna 668, 20 Aug 51)
tempt to establish Austrian_headquarIttS_AiLallaw_the. edergionmaraiWFTU into Vienna... In the absence ve travel controls, the US Legation is considering the possible usefulness of Wide publicity as a countermeasure. Propaganda would stress that, in view of the Austrian attitude, agencies of international,commnnismoould remain in Vienna only with Soviet protection. The migration Of zilch agencies to Vienna, Soviet intentions to terminate in the therefore, reflects unfavorably upon foreseeable future its Anstrian occupation.
!
Cr
TOP SECRET
WI
11
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP791-01146A000u0R4M91-0
Approved For Rdirate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A9(d00450001-0

TOP SECRET
5.
25X1C
25X1C ITALY. Role of Communistpara-Military organization modified. Elagt paramilitary organization (apparato)
The Com-
25X1A
no longer considers insurrection feasible in case o war, but is prepared to undertake sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The' COmmunist Party shifted its policy in accordance With Soviet directives issued after Tito's defection, and abandoned the aim of obtaining power through armed revolt. Having "disinterested itself" from the apparato which nnmbers about 50,000, the Party seeks to undermine the Italian state in divert way so as to facilitate the "liberation" of Italy by the Soviet armies when the time COMBS' The Communist Party.never organized sabotage schools or courses ih the theory of guerrilla warfare., While 'the percentage of Communists among the enlisted men of the armed forces is the same as among the country'S population, there has been practically nopenetration amon the officers and NCOls and none at All among the carabinieri and police.
Comment: The increased efficiency of the Italian:armed forces and police makes armed revolt less attractive. However, there haveTbeen,no other indications that the Communists have desisted frem.consolidating their apparato, whose strength US observers still estimate at 75,000. The alleged non.Lexistence of Communist sabotage schools conflicts with reports that the party has recently been training w4)1ert.aaboteurs (see 00I Daily Digest, 17 Ang 51). While Communist penetration Among the armed forces is probably not significant, considerable infiltration has been reported among the pelice, particularly in rural areas and north Italian industrial centers.
6.
UNITED KINGDOM. Latest public opinion poll shows decline ih Labor Party su ort: According to the Gallup Poll taken in July, popular support for e Conservatives increased for the first time since February, While that for the Labor Party correspondingly dropped. The respective percentages: far those who had made up their minds are:

February
Jime
July 39 49
Labor Conservative
37i 51*
41
48
The apparent reversal of trend is considered surprising for it was widely believed that the Labor Party would continue to make inrOads in the Censervative Party lead throughout the summer. (R London, Joint Weeka No 33, 17 Aug 51)
-
Commeht: An increased meat ration, the Festival of Britain, and warm weather which held in abeyance the effects of a coal shortage were considered' all favorable factors for sustained Labor Party popularity at least during the summer months. Tkmmver, it may be that rising prices and a belief that
TOP SECRET
12
22 Aug 51
Approved Forftlese 2001/09/60i)9M79T01146A0
00450001-0
the government is not protecting'British interests abroad has overshadowed these factors in the public mind.
GOV$1rnment adopts anti-strike measurekr TheNetherlands ARTIPAI les1 Indies Government is taking the following action as a result of the recent Dago refinery strike: (a) Dismissal of the Dovernor of Aruba for his failure to talcs police action when so ordered;
7.
(b) DePortation of twelve Surinam and British Guiana agitators suspected of Communist leanings; (c) Strictest application of police measures; and (d) Introduetion of new legislation limiting the legality of strikes.
Tbe action is due, in part, to the complaint of the Lago Oil and Transport Company to the Governor that'nrotection has been'inadeqUate and that the (C Curacao 7, number of threats to American personnel must be stopped. 20 Aug 51)
Comment: 'The employees of the Lego Oil and Transport Company (Standard Oil of New4ersey) returned to work on 18 August after A strike lasting a week. Operations at the refinery had been reduced to 65 per cent capacity. Thedispute was Settled with the aid of a government mediator and the emPloyeed obtained a 16 per cent general wage increase. No serious disorders, antagonisM; Or afiti-US attitude were manifested and there was no evidence of Communist activity. The government's action will do much toward lessening future strike threats,
-
racial

TOP SECRET
22 Aug 51
1JNCLASSIFIED when litipirdgethreffEReSsettpdottogagp:*Astagetrerpoiti*Aegtbodosgoeice or declassiA firtd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
I
..,
TOP SECRET
. . .

REG I STRY
CIA CONTROL NO. DATE DOCUMENT LOGGED BY

ECEIVED
DOC.I NO.
DOC.:DATE
COPTi NO.
'
NUMBER OF PAGES
I
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or cffissided Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transinitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose defteial dutia relate to the matter. , Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form ond indicate period o/ custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and OWLIChte the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
.
I
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
RELEASED
DATE
T IME
SEEN BY
S IGNATURE
OFF ICE/D I V.
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect ed from Top Sec et material it shall be completed ffi the appropriate spaces below and t ansmitird to Central Top Secret Contra for record.
I
DO NGRADED
By

DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
TO
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
(OUTSIDE CIA)
To
(Signature) (Signature)
BY
(Signet ura )
I
W !TRESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF ICE
1
4Wroved For PlJegise 2001/09/06 : CYAT-fIDP79T01145A000300450001-0

PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
nee Ler
FORM
0773
'TOP SECRET
( 40)
fro
Approved For Re
e 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S00450001-0
TOP SECRET
23 August 1951
CIA No. 49311-A 3a Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. le does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Rebate 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0b1400450001-0 SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Burmese attitude toward Japanese peace treaty still unresolved: A. high bfficial of the Burmese.Foreign Office informed tis Ebbassy Rangoon that a Cabinet decision will probably be required to determine whether or not Burma will attend the Japanese Peace Conference. Since many cabinet officers are out of town, a delay of several days is anticipated. The em bassy suspects that the Soviet Union's decision to attend may have radically altered Burmese thinking in favor of.joining the conference. The EMbassy also feels that the Cabinet's final decision is likely to be influenced by the Government of Indonesia. (S, 8/8 Rangoon 201, 18 Aug 51),
Comment: US AMbassador Cochran reported from Djakarta on 21 August that the Indonesian Foreign Minister was attempting to gain governmental and parlia mentary approval for participation in the conference, ard that a final decision in favor of attending was imminent.
BURMA.
2.
INDOCHINA. Vietnam Mgr demand reparations from Japan: The Vietnamese Govern ment's note to the US Legation pleading Vietnam's case for attendance at the Sanhe:lois= conference indicates a desire for some measure of reparations. Previous discussions with the Vietnamese had given US officials the impression that Vietnam did not intend to make an issue of reparations. The Vietnamese note suggested that reparations in the form of trade privileges or Japaneee teohnicians would be favorably considered. (S, 8/8 Saigon 420, 19 Aug 51),
:wont: The French have vigorously championed Vietnam's right to at tend the conference, while indicating that no request for reparations would be made on behalf of Vietnam, Vietnamese insistence on reparations, par ticsularly in the forms suggested above, could be expected to conflict with Frenoh reluctance to tolerate the reentrk of Japanese goods and influence into Itdoohina,
3.
allagrall.
Romulo has told the-US &ham in Manila that President Quirino hae decided
to send him to Washington as AMbaseador and, accordingly, would not include his name among the approved Liberal Party list of senatorial candidates. (C, 8/8 Manila 719, 18 Aug 51).
Ommepts Rumors that Romulo would run for the Senate hod been inter preted to indicate that Quirino was preparing the wey for him to become an eventual candidate for the presidency. Although he is a popular figure in the Philippines, Romulo at present lacks the close political connections necessary to ensure his election to the highest office.

pomulo to be Ambassador to US:
SECRET
Seoretary of Foreign Affairs
22 Aug 51
Approved For Re le 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0bab0450001-0

SECRET
4,
JAPAN. Strong criticism of peace treaty appears in press for the first time: A columnist in the YUkan Yomiuri on 16 August strongly'criticized..the cheerful and festive attitude of the Japanese 'Government and peoPle toward the peace treaty. Contrasting thia with the deep resentment held by the Japanese following the Treaties og Shimonoseki and Portemouth, the article etated that this is a time for the Japanese to be in mourning and in deep grief.. The US. Political Adviser comments that this is the most critical statement;yet to appear in a large daily newspaper,and, while not typ ical of the prevailing sentiment, it undoubtedly represents the unexpressed sentiments of some Japanese and might be indicative of a future thought trend.. (8, 8/s ToXyo 351, 18 Aug 51).
Comment. It is considered probable that a reaction against the treaty, centering areund the territorial clauses, will set in following the treaty's signing. The Socialist Party, which has continued to maintain its opposition to the treaty, is undoubtedly banking on this prospect to die:Credit the government and enhance its own political future,
5:
British official'raises question of Japan-China treaty: In the course of a conversation about the Japanese peace treaty, a British Embassy officer in Washington asked Ambassador Dulles whether the US interpreted the US-UK uhderstanding about China as preventing the signature of a peace treaty. between Japan and any Chinese government until after the coming into force of the main Treaty of Peace. In reply, Dulles pointed out that the principle involved was that there should be no Allied coercion upon Japan to adopt a course regarding China which might prejudice Japan's best interests for the future. He added that it would be normal that the.Japanese Government would quickly seek a peace with the Nationalist Government, but that such a peace should not assume that the Nationalist Government, would bin4 pal:1A anl'ailChinese, flIfin (S, S/S State to Taipei 7631, 17 Aug 51). The British Cabinet originally rejected the compromise formula, which deleted all references to China in the treaty, on the grounds that the participation of Nationalist China through a separate bilateral treaty was made possible at Japan's discretion. In view of this attitude, the UK would be very unlikely to approve a policy which would encourage Japan to conclude a.quick, though limited, treaty with the Formosan government,
Comment:

SECRET
2
22 Aug 51
Approved ForRelease 2001109/06 : CIA42131279T01146A000300450001-0
Approved For Rel4eo4 2001/09/06 : CIA-R111279T01146A00S0460001-9

0
TOP SECRET
23 August 1951
CIA No. 49312
DAILY DIGEST
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
TOP SECRET
ApprovedForReleN42001R09/06:=42DP79T01146A006140460001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: yive Power Peace Pact campaign to be clitaxed 1)3 signature drive in USSR' The Soviet prase reports that the Soviet Peace Committee will held a plenary meeting on 28 August to "discuss conducting a signature campaigd in the USSR for the World Peace Council apPeal for a-Five Power Peace'Pact and plans for an All-Uhion Conference of Peace Partisans.". (R Moscow 310, 21 Aug 51). A Moscow AP diepatch dated 21 August etateli that a mammoth campaign for auch signatures:was already going on throughout the Soviet Union.
Comment: Thb delayed entry of the US8R into the signature campaign initiated last February by the World Peace Council, follows .the same procedure Moscow used in the 1950 Stockholm appeal to ban the atomic bomb. The USSR may wish to conclude ite eignature campaign so that the final figures can be announced in time for a meeting of the World Peace Council reportedly.scheduled for October in Vienna or Helsinki.
25X1X
2.
EASTERN EUROPE: eiger of Satellite airlines under Soviet direction reported. he state-owned airline companies of Eastern Europe were incorporated on 20-July lnto,the Soviet CiVil Air Fleet (Aeroflot). lids decision was reportedly taken at a conference in Moscow about 15 July. Control of themerged Satellite airlines has been asiumed by Soviet General Zigarev, representing Marshal ronkoV Chief of Aeroflot.
25X1A
av.
25X1A
Comment: There is no other information available On the alleged merger. Such an amalgamation would be a logical development, since it would partially rectify the operational and maintenance difficulties which have beset the Satellite-airlines, The eliminatien of duplicate routes and the establishment of central repair facilities would considerably mitigate chronic shortages of planes, spate parte and trained personnel. The Soviet Union already actively participates in the joint-stock companies which control the Hungarian and Rumanian civil airlines.
3.
ROLAND: Maes movement of political unreliablee reported under way: US Emb 'Warsaw reports that following the end of the trial of ex-Army officers a mass movement of politically unreliable elements apparentlY began from the Warsaw area. Among the groups affected are: officers of the Polish armed forces who were members of the wartime underground resistance; relatives of political prisoners, and businessmen who have been deprived of their enterprises. Moat of the unreliables are being relocated in other parts of Poland. Thel officers in the armed forces who were in the wartime Polish underground, however, are being moved to undetermined areas outside of
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : dA-RDP79T01146A00030046131931k9g .51
Approved For Relate 2001109106 : CIA-RDP791-01146A0661160460001-9
TOP SZOB.ET
Poland.
The first contingent consisting of 130 fliers was deported in mid-August. (C Warsaw. 165, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: The US Embassy noted in June that it was receiving numerous reports of dissidents being evicted from Warsaw and other Polish cities. Similar reports have been received in recent months from all the Eastern European Satellites.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :tlA-RDP79T01146A000300E9QA9g -31
Approved ForReles062001/09/06:CIA-RDP79T01146A0010100460001-9
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
JORDAN. Economic crisis materializing: Jordan is rapidly approaching a serious economic crisis caused by the 60 per cent failure of its wheat prop and intensified by the gradual disappearance of the windfall capital brought in by the wealthier Palestine refugees. Government officials fear that starvation conditions will lead to disorders on which the Communists, whose activities have become more apparent, can capitalize. They assume that the US can grant Jordan a loan to carry it through the winter. /he US Minister in AmMan recommends consideration of all possible soirees of relief in anticitation of a formal request. (R Amman 62, 20 Aug 51).
Commsnt: The Prime Minister previously msntioned his concern over the economic situation which he feared might lead to internaLdisturbances that would encourage Joidan's Arab neighbors to intervene. (See Daily. Dig est 2 Aug 51)4
2.
SYRIA. US help sought to Justify pro-Westernism to Arabs: The Syrian Foreign Minieter has informed the US Minister in Damascus that the new government is :disposed to seek a broader understanding with the West and acknowledges the need for Western help in solving Near Eastern problems. Past experiences make the Arabs suspicious, however; and the US will be held to a strict account. Therefore, in the Foreign Minister's view, the US must help Syria to produce tangible results to justify cooperation with the West. ;(C Damascus 101, 20 Aug 51).
Comment: The Prime Minister has expressed similar pro-Western sentiments to the local press. UN action on-the 20 AuguSt report filed by General Riley, the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation, setting forth Israeli non-compliance with the UN resolution concerning the SyrianIsraeli border dispute, could produce sOme tangible results for the Syrians.
3.
Comment: Continued wagon shortages could result in the loss to the US of 20 per cent of its anticipated 1951 manganese imports from India4 The Indian railways are probably unable to handle manganese shipments beeause of the necessity of distributing imported food supplies. .If railway capabilities are further curtailed by strikes, one of which is still pending, exports of manganese to the US will be even more drastically reduced.
INDIA. Shortage of rail facilities impedes manganese exPorts to US: %The 'Shortage of rail facilities in India is seriously impeding normal exports of Manganese to the US. Shipments'during the first seven months of 1951 were 60,000 tons below expectations. (S New Delhi 569, 10 Aug 51)0

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/0i : CIA-RDP79-101146A000300460a01ag 51
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Qp0460001-9
TOP SECRET
4.
Government refuses to Permit establishment of Indo -Afghan air A proposed air service between India and Afghanistan has been blocked by the Pakistani GovernMent for the reason that the route would be over a "prohibited area." (ii FBID, Far East, 20 Aug 51). Comment: The Himalayan Air Lines, an Indian company, has been attempting to establish a Delhi-Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar-Kabul air route. not surprising, cobsidering It is the existing tensions between Pakistan its two neighbors, that permission for and such a route has been denied.
servicei
PAKISTAN.
Comment: The cabinet appeared willing to participate until the sudden outbreak of criticism in response to the Soviet decision to attend the conference. Such criticism,sa reflected chiefly in Masjumi Party,news papers, contends that if Indonesia attends the conference it will become involved in conflicts between Russia and the US which would endanger the government's "independent" foreign policy. Since the government's position, however, has included official'. support of Communist Chinese add Soviet participation, it ie likely that Indonesia will send a delegation to San Francisco.
6.
BURMA. Communists mount heavy attack in central Burma: Five hundred Communists who raided Pyinnana ib central Burma on 21 August were beaten off after a four hour battle with government forces, according to Reuters report. (U Reuters, 21 a Aug 51).
Comment': Despite the pronounced movement of Burmese Communist forces northeastward towards the China border, they have retained considerable strength in their former stronghold around the Pyinmana-Yamethin central Burma, where the government's axis in position has deteriorated steadily. during the paet few months.
7.
Official predicts Burmese refusal to attend conference: A high official of the Burmese Foreign Office predicted that the Burmese Government would notjoin the Japanese peace conference despite the USSR's decision to attend. He stated that since Burma did not intend to sign

TOP SECRET
5. 'INDONESIA. Cabinet hesitant on Japanese treaty decision: Foreign Minister Subardjo told US Ambassador Cochran that the Indonesian Cabinet has postponed its decision on participation in the Japanese peace treaty conference until 24 August. He said party leaders feel some uneasiness over the fisheries and trade issues. Subardjo himself and is doing his utmost to insure Indonesian is anxious to visit the US ence. participation in the confer(S Djakarta 296, 22 Aug 51).
4 Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300460110149g 51
Approved For Re Ione 2001/09/06 : CIA-R0P79T01146A0QG600460001-9
TOP SKCRET
the treaty there was no point in sending a delegation to San Francisco. The source also stated that the Asian countries might negotiate a separate treaty with Japan. (S Rangoon 208, 21 Aug 51).
8.
PHILIPPINES. Huks and army reported preparing for anniversary day of 26 August.: With the approach of 26 August, anniversary day of the Philippine revolt against Spanish rule, the Huks are increasingly active and.the armed.forces have been placed on a special alert. (It AFP Manila, 22 Aug 51).
Comment: relative lack harassment by holidays have by noteworthy

would concede in Korea for
The increase in Huk activity has not been significant. Their of activity is due in part, at least, to their continued the armed forces. Special alerts of the security forces on become routine, although such occasions have not been marked outbreaks in recent months.
25X1X
9.
25X1X
CHINA. Peiping reporte Japanese Peace Treaty:
rtici ation in
25X1A
eip,ng wou e wi ing o ma e concess ons regar ng a er zone in Korea in exchange for assurances of "militart'security" and participation in the' Japanese peace treaty. Source states that Peiping's present policy in Korea is "to avoid further 'losses...and await Soviet moves," and that Peiping "Will not allow the talks to break down" des ite the "coin letel unease table" nature of UN terms.
Comment: It is plausible that Peiping would be willing to trade a few miles in Korea for an invitation to the San Francisco conference. Several sources have reported that Peiping intends to prolong the Kaesong talks, even if UN terms remain unacceptable, until Conmunist forces in Korea, with Soviet assistance, are prepared to launch a new major offensive. It is doubtful that had access to top-level Sino -Soviet decisions, and the of this report has not been established.
.
25X1X
I , 1
I25X1X
1
25X1C
25X10
' 25X1A
Soviet "South China Liaison Office" reported. the establishment in late 1950 of a Soviet "South ChMITA-111M.ceninaiaisat in Canton. This office is said to channel to Moscow Chinese requests for Soviet aid and to control some 1500 Soviet advisory-technical personnel in .South.China. the USSR has established this liaison office for the purpose of "tightening its control" over military, political and economic matters in South China, alleges that Chinese Communist authorities in the area vidll not in the future need to refer important matters to Pei ing but are to a.peal to the liaison office for "adVide."
10.
25X1A
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00030046000-9tha 51
Approved For Re !ewe 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001400460001-9
TOP SECRET
2p(1C
,Commentr reported much the same information some months ago... t ip reasonable to assume that the. Soviet adVisory-technical 'program in china; which employs at least. 10,000 and perhaps 20,000 Soviet nationals, has a branch office in South China; The estimate of 1,500 in.the South China.area is plausible and is supported by fragmentary reports from many points. While the Soviet advisory-technical program throughout China doubtless contributes substantially to the ex., tension of Seviet control over Peiping's military-Tolitical-economic appaTatus, it is imProbable that Chinese Communist regional authorities accept Soviet didtation in major matters without reference to Peiping.
11.
25X1C 25X1C
'
' 25X1A
The Indians are.eaid to have proposed, inter alia, that .(a). the USSR and Communist China not attempt to promote'Communism in India, (b) India be granted certain Commercial rights, and (c) Peiping come to India's defense if the latter ia attacked. The Chinese are said to have demanded that the Indian Government (a) recognize the:Communist Party of India as a legitimate political party, .(b) SUpperty.internetienally,ailprogressive proposals' of the USSR and Pei in and c influence
projects'.
'
Comment: The headquarters of the rePorting office evaluates this report as "doubtfUln and notee that its details are inconsistent. Available evidence indicates strongly that it is a fabrication. In February 1951, it was rumored that Peiping and,New Delhi were discussing possible conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance; these rUmors were denied by New Delhi. There was then and is now no reliable evidence that such discussiona have been under;:j..11 taken.
Indian representative allegedly ne otiating secret treaty with Pei inR: a personal representative of Prime s er ehru was in Peiping in July
25X1C
25X1X
12.
25X1X
Chia
25X1A
Kaiehek orders 20 per cent budget cut:
on 1 Aug Generalisaimo Chiang Kei-ehek requested'the cabinet to prepare a new budget showing a general reduction of 20 per Cent. 'He s ecified that no items were to be aingled out for reduction.fl
25X1A
' Cotment:
of the budget deficit: It was reported on 2 August that the cabinet suggested a budget cut of 25 per cent. However, since only six per cent of expenditures are for administration, it is doubtful that this item can be cut much, particu larly.as secret aervice activities are reported to be on the increase.
NatiogalT-Goyernment of the 20.July 4 memoranda recommending a reduction
The Generalissimo's order is a result of the aCceptande by the
TOP SECRET
Approved ForRelease2001/09/066:.CIA-RDP79T01146A000300460001-923 Aug 51
Approved For Re laNte 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0d9.90460001-9
TOP SECRET
13.
Chiang Kai-shake's elder son heads 'secret Service coordinating agency: Chiang Ching.7-kuo; the%Generalissimols elder- son who hedds-the Political
:
25X1A 25X1A
Department of the Ministry of National Defense, has been named head of a newly organized "Materials Group." This organization, composed of five units totaling 'approximately 200 employees, was established by the Generalissimo during early August and is attached to his office. Its duties are to coordinate the work Of all secret service agencies.
14.
KOREA. South Korean drought will cut rice crops While central Korea has suffered from torrential rains during the past few weeks, rice-rich south,western Korea has receiyed an average rainfall of only One inch since early July. A prelitinary survey of the drought-affected area reveals that the rice crop in this.normally fertile region may be cut as mach as 30 per cent below previous estimates. (K FBID Flimsy, Central Neve Taegu, 22 Aug 51).
Comment: The cumulative effectof the lack of farm labor and animals, the small fertilizer Application this year, and the drought may cause even more serious troubleS for the South Korean economy than had been previously
expected'.
16.
Congressional recemmendation for aid slash shakes Korea: Ambassador Muccio reporta.that the ps Foreign Affaits Committee's recommendationnfor a 100 million dollar cut in aid to Korea haa caused "considerable consternation" there. ROK Prime Minister Chang was subjected td severe questioning by the National Assembly on the issue, and local newspapers have termed the action as "frightening" and "disheartening." (U Pusan 172, 22 Aug 51).
Comment: The ROK has received similar shocks before; they have had the salutary effect of shaking ROlccomplacency over the prospect of an indefinite continuance Of large-scalellS aid.
JAPAN. SocialiSt factions unite in anti-leftist move: The right and center factions of the Socialist Party haveagreed to unite in an effort to end control by the party's left-wing faction. At a conference held on 20 August,

TOP MCRET
.ComMent: The Organization of the Materials Group is probably an answer to the redommendation ny the American Military Advisory Group that the political Department be deactivated because it constituted a major obstacle to the group's program. The east along of operating the Political Department was reported to have exceeded the cost of maintaining four army divisions. It appears., however, that rather than eliminating the Tblitical Department 'the generalissimo may simply have changed its name.
Approved ForRelease2001/09/06 C1A-RDP791-01146A00030046000139Aug 51
Approved For Re leee 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00;9800460001-9
TOP SECRET
the two factions decided on a basic policy of anti-CoMmunism paign to rally as many Socialists and a camas possible to the movement. Kyodo Tokyo, 20 Aug 51). (R FBID
Comment: The numerically superior leftwing of the party has so far been able to resist right-wing efforts to modify the three-point platform (opposition to a separate treaty, opposition to US bases, and neutrality). Criticism of the party's unrealistic stand has increased since the Japanese delegation at the meeting abstained on a resolution to .recent international Socialist this latest effort to force the party oppose Communism. The success of toward a more pro-US policy,- may be dependent upon 'Soviet tactics at the peace treaty conference.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :pA-RDP79T01146A000300460001-9

23 Aug 51
Approved For Res *se 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T0114641600460001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
WESTERN EUROPE. Divergent British and French approaches are apparent in The US observer at the Economic Commission'for Eaet -West trade talks: Europe (ECE) meeting on East-West trade which opened this week in Geneva, is "impressed with the sharp differences" between the position of the UK and that of the other Western European delegations.
The UK hopes mainly that this meeting, if it achieves anything, wil1 . generate pressure on the Soviets to come to early terms with the UK in the bilateral negotiations previously initiated. The UK is principally desirous of obtaining up to one million tons of coarse grain, but is not prepared to present a list of goods in exchange.
France intends to comply fully with Chairman Myrdal's suggestions for an exchange of information on both grain requirements and counter-deliveries. The French list of goods available for export to Eastern Europe covers a rather wide range, principally construction equipment, Machinery such as small tractors and textile machines, textiles, and cargo ships of unspecified tonnage. France is determined "to go to all reasonable lengths" in this meeting in order both to obtain.more background information on possibilities of trade with the USSR and to make it impossible for the Soviets to blame France should the meeting fail. The Danes plan to pursue about the same tactics as the French, and have met a negative response in approaching the British for a pooling of purchases and deliveries.
The US observer considers that Western European collaboration is ."clearly desirable" should this meeting have results, since no nation except the UK would otherwise avoid the "excessive danger of Soviet blackmail." (S Geneva 164, 21 Aug 51) Comment: In recent bilateral negotiations the Soviet Orbit has been doingThsonard bargaining, with decreasing success, to obtainWestern
'
strategic materials in exchange for needed commodities.
The Western European nations, faced with a decline in their living standards, are eager to obtain cheap Eastern European it materials and In addition) both France and the UK are intensifying their foodstuffs. search for non-dollar industrial markets in view of the declining opportunities to develop sales to the dollar area.

TOP SECRET
2.
AUSTRIA. Government adopts emergency measures in current meat crisisi Elicormc Control Board on 20 August decided to retain prevailing price
The
lA-RDP79T01146A0003004600a114
Approved For Rekese 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S00460001-9

I !
'
TOP SECRET
ceilings for meat products and to improve the supply situation by increasing imports.. Augmented deliveries from YugOslaVia and Denmark are expected to mitigate the shortages; a ministerial committee will examine the problem of increased foreign exchange allocations tO pay for the foreign supplies. Beginning 24 August, two meatless days a week will be enforced and penal measures will be applied incases of infractions, Spokesmen for the meat industry continue to shift responsibility elsewhere, blaming price ceilings, exeessive Austrian exports, and inadequate supplies of foreign and domestic meat for the crisis. i(11 FBIS-Ravag and Red4filite-Red0 20 Aug 51) Comment: Having previously enjoyed a highly favorable supply situation, AUstrirri-Tiow faced with the problem of almost total unavailability of meat products. Although post-war recovery of the Austrian livestock industry showed signs of levelling Off last year, doMestic production approaching pre-war levels and increasing imports lend Substance to the allegation that the sudden shortage is largely attributable to farmer resistance to price ceilings. It is unlikely that the Government mill soon tolerate any upward adjustments in meat prices.
ECA proposes emergency assistance in Austro-Polish coal dispute: EPA Washington has advised the US Legation in Vienna that the US is prepared to Ship an additional 1002000 tons of AmeriCan coal on an emergency basis, should trade negotiations with the Poles for coal be broken off. If Austrian transportation facilities can handle the'emergency shipment, US coal transported to Austria during the months of August and Septemiber will, under the proposed plan, total some 500,000 tons. Should agreement with Poland ultimately be reached, the additional coal will be stockpiled. (S EDAM Control 7423, 17 Aug 51)
Comment: Austro-Polish trade negotiations have been stymied for some iieeks-Wei-Folish demands for embargoed ball bearings in return for Polish coal essential to.Austrian industry and public utilitieS (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 Aug 51), A suspicion that the magnitude of Polish-demands may have been exaggerated by Austrian negotiators has proved unfounded, and the original estimate that the Poles are requesting some $600,000 worth of embargo-type goods is now believed accurate, inasmuch as the proposed oneyear trade agreement will provide Austria with a ndllion metric tons ef Polish coal at the rate of 80,000 tons per month, it is apparent that the emergency shipment of US coal will be a temporary solution.
CORRECTION: In a recent report on Soviet purchases of almonds ip southern Italy (see Daily Digest, 20 Aug 51, Western Section, Item #7, pp. 12, 13) it was stated that US EMbassy Rome was disturbed not only by the politiCal leverage which these purchases might give Italian Communists in the local
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/061(plA-RDP79T01146A0003004602:9114
Approved For Rel4eke 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79T01146A01)&0460001-9
TOP SECRET
elections, but also by the possibility that the purchased products would be used for the cultivation of bacilli and hence for bacteriological war fare. However, sweet almonds, which have a number of pharmaceutical ap plications, are not used in any recognized bacteriological media. It is possible that almonds might bp used in small quantities to enhance the growth of certain bacteria. These cultures, however, need not necessarily be intended for bacteriological warfare.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :RIA-RDP79T01146A000300460001-9 23 Aug 51
TOP sECRET
.
,UNCLASSIFIED when lapisn-698cfrefficterietast t2d1,41/09/19P CfAtleZDFF9t0+1116A0EIODEPIgseat4 or declassifiMd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
i
I

I
DOCUMENT DE SCR I PT I ON
SOURCE
1
REGISTRY CIA CONTHL NO.
DOC
.1 N0.
V V 3/7-
DOC.: DATE
COPY' NO.
LOGGED BY

,
ATTENTION:
or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or Wan:Mined outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those Individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Scare Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will signform and indicate the date o/ handling in the right-hand columns.
I
This form will be placed on top col and attached tO each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
REFERRED TO
OF FiI CE
RECE I VED
S I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I PRE
SEEN BY
5 I GNATURE
OFF I CE/D I V.
DATE
T I ME
DATE
NOTICIE OF DETACHMENT: When IhIp /WM is detached from Top Sec et mate tat it shall be completed ' in the appropriate spaces below and transmiti el to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
I

DESTROYED
BY
D I SPATCHED
TO
(Signature)
(Signature)
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY
(Signaturo)
I
W !TRESSED BY
BY
(Signture)
DATE
OFF I CEI
I
ADATE
OFFICE _as:r r DE F LEE pproved FoP Release 2001/09106 : um-RDP79T01146A000300460001-i.
13.73
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
TOP SECRET
(40)
Approved For Re Nate 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004004600014

t.
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Curl. ,at Intelligence.
Approved For
e2001/09/06:CIA-RDP79T01146A0W00460001-9
SEldEhl
SECTION 2 (EASTERI)
1.
PHILIPPINES. US.EMbassy in Manila forecasts Huk military disintegration: MeTalitary disintegration of the Huke as early ad November appears likely if present pressures are centinued, according to the US EMbassy in Manila.Unless a weig aad victorious event in November,w promised by their leaders, is sufficiently successful to ensure eventual victory, the Huk rank and file mill cease its struggle. The embassy- adds that there is reason to belieVe that the Chinese Com-
=mists are quietlyorganizing a stronger, more disciplined and moreclan-
21 Aug 50.
Comiment: HUk leadership has long been recognized as Commmmist but the s1174171FI of the movement has been solidly babed on agrarian discontent. With the armed forces providing the countryside witha certain.degree of security and with.a mild improvement in eoonomic.prospects, support from this quarter becomesdifficult to maintain.
.
The prediction of a "big event" inNovember is obscure but may derive from a Hi& belief that tho elections at that time will inevitably be as corrupt as those two years previously and that a resulting popular revu1.sion toward the goverment will enable the Huks to bid for power.
There have been several recent reportsdndicating increasing Chinese participation in the Philippine Communist movement and increasing dependence by Huk leaders upon. Chinese Communists.
2.
AUSTRALIA.
Gpvernment questions wisdom of sTareasien of all discussion at Sal Francisconle Depailigaôf ERIeihal*Affiirs cplesTionS thrlasirafilltk of-EPosing completely rigid procedures for the San Francisco
conference in advance and in isolation from the actual. conference atmosphere. It feels that a firm stand is possible without the suppreseion of all discussion, a move whieh might alienate. some Asian support. (S S/S Canberra 64, 21 Aug 51).
Comment:. The US has indicated that a full exchange of views on the treatyrg-Tas is contemplated, but thatino major revisions will be made. This expression of concern undoubtedly stems from a Tear that possible US attempts to frustrate.SoViet obstructionisMat the conference mightlend credence to.Soviet claims that the treaty is a white mants "dictate."
SECRET
destine forcerith which eventually to supplant the links.
.(S S/S Manila 737,
23 Aug 51
HR70-14
T450P SECRET SUED13INR
High level S o"advisers" v i e t lfadvlseren disauss the arrivalof of Korean Korean 19. Bigh_leVsl Soviet discuss the arrival 1 9 . Imam. KCREAhSSR. " ournali ournali tos t s A 28 28 June June message from Sukharev, message from Sukharev, a Soviet adviser t to o the North North orean a a rforce, rforcs, whioh wag to t o be be passed to to Ra~uvaev, orean which was Razuvaev, chief chief adviser at Supreme Supreme

4-G4LEBORETMDZ7 7
i?----F Headquarters, states: "A group of Korean jourm%liats (has arrived?).
Headquarters, states: "A group of Korean journalists (has arrived?). (send?) (send?) 2 2 trucks." (SUEDE, 5 1 ) . (SUEDE, AFSA-23A4/704/KC/TIB-13, AFSA-23A4/704/EC/TIB,13', 23 23 Aug Aug 51).
Urgently
Cammenti Comment; Razuvaev Razwaev is i s also also the new Soviet Ambaasador AMbassador to North Korea. W hllexesaage is ofno no particularimportance importanoe as aa it it stands, stands, it While-1777essage is of particular it may may be be speculated that that the t h e term term "journalist" lljournalistll is a cover name for Korean8 speculated a cover Koreans who who have reoeived some form form of of specialized specialized training training either either i n Mancthuria n the received some in Manchuria or or i in the USSR. USSR. In connection recent recent covert covert reports have alleged tthe h e return In this this connection return of a number of Korean pilots who have received aircraft training in the U S % . Korean pilots USSR.
20.
24 24 Aug 51 51
1)1)
'
'
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 ATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
55
_.
HR70-14
Ned
-TOP-SECRET-
NR
8. 80
CHINA
Chinese Communists r7logrtedlv prenaring_for"cgmina" world wars Ithe Peiping regiMe issued "circular orders" to all Party and government organizations'"to prepare for a coming world war."
Comments Reports for -8 Reports have have been been reoeived reoitvbd periodically periodically f a r more than two two years, the outbreak of t the years, especially especially during during the the first few few months monthe after Che he Korean regime was p preparing Korean conflict c o n f l i c t in In June June 1950, 1950, that t h a t the Peiping Peipingreglrns r 6 p y i n g for definite datej.all such reports reports haPa haSe been been global hostilities h o s t i l i t i e s at a t some some d e f i n i t e date; all suoh invalidated by events. invalidated eventso It It is is true true that that Peiping Pelping is I s preparing preparing for for an an WIWIeventual global conflict, CoMmunists, like like all all S Stalinists, ere tual c o n f l i c t , as a8 the Chinese Communiata, t a l i n i s t e , We o o m i t t e d to t o the t h e view view that that a a "final "final conflict" c o n f l i c t n is i s inevitable. inevitable, Moreover, Moreover, committed Pefpiqg has ha8 been been preparing preparing since e i n c r its It8 intervention Intervention i n Korea f o r a poeeible Peiping in for possible expandon However, expansionof of the the Korean Korean conflict. confl ict. However, ittAs q?estionable questionable that ltris t h a t Peiping Peiping wouldmula-' widely d d e l y circulate a i r a a l a t e its i t s knowledge knowledge or o r expectation bxpeotation of o f an an imminent imminent world world war. War.
9.
1

(a)
2121agifiresup,munistiaramizAtime_AnglAinsbalastsuLantwenta_ars....allogfals
I
preparing" f for new ofThe Chinese Chinese Communists Communiata are "feverishly Mfeverlehlypreparing" o r a new fensive in feneive i n Korea, in i n the t h e event event of of a a failure failure of of the t h e Kaesong Kae8ong talks, talks, and "about '@about one million million new and one new troops troops are are pouring pourlag into i n t o the t h e battlebattle-
front* j front";
f dlj fail;
1 I
(b) Two at in l late July (b) Two Soviet Sovfet infantry infantry divisions dlvieions arrived a t Mukden In ate J u l y and rumored to t o be be held held for f o r action aotion in in Korea Korea if i f the t h e Kassong Kassong talka talks are rumored
*IJA:-,.;'
TOP-SZCRET6
24 24 lug Bug 51 51
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 'APPROVED DATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009 DATE:
179 " 9 9
-TOP-SEeRgr-regiMents of t the 18th D DiviTwo Soviet anti-eircrattlisttllery a n t i - a i r c r a f t :alrbfllery regiments h e 18th idsion arrived and will oion arrived in i n Dairen D a l r s n at a t -Oa the end end of ofJuly' July'and dll be be tranS-' trans'to Mukden; ferred t o Antung and Mukden; The CCM inManchuria Manchuria has has been been building building up up for f o r action acitlon in i n Korea Korea CUP in for Japan "in "in the the event event of of a aW thitd war"; f Japan P d world w ar"~ and f o r 'invasion invasion oof and Poeng Teh-huai has been replaced replaaed as ad Chinese Communist Peeng Communist aommanding commanding officer in offioer In Korea bv,Nieh by Bieh Juna-oheh. Junp.ohen*
(a)
(d)
(e)
Dinatents
I I

-TOP-SEKIRET--
The The assertion assertion edmost ' that t h a t one one million new new troops troops are w e "pouring" mpouningn into &rea Korea i is r a moat certainly osrtainu false. f a l s e . There is l a no no confirmation of the arrival a r r i v a l of Soviet t Soviet divisions divisions a at Mukden and no new Soviet groUnd Dairen. ground unite unite are are known to to have arrived at Dairen. an an imminent imminent Sino-Soviet operation against against Japan Japan are era o f available evidence.. eviderroe. Pyongyang not supported by the bulk of Pyongyang radio radio Menle&identified Teh-huai as August; lllieh Nieh Jung-ahen Jung-chen f i e d Pleng P'eng Teh-huai a8 in i n command aommend in i n Korea on 23 Augusfj is i a believed believed to t o be be in in Peiping. Peiping.
24 Aug 51 24 Pug 51
~~~
HR70-14 HR70-14
' NR
21. 2 1 .
mnchuria-based rle t a on photo reconnaissance mission8 Several MIG-150s and YAK-1718, TAK-171s, both both j jet fighter aircraft, were echeduled scheduled to to c carry MIGI150s et f ighter a i r c r a f t , were arry reconnaissance mission mission from Uaoyang Liaoyang iin south Manchuria Manchuria on out a photo reconnaissance n south 22 August. August. According t o aU S . A i r Forca analysis, analyais, this this is i s the &a first first in:into US.AirForce 22 to photO reconnaissance reconnaissance mission6 missions i in Manchuria. tercepted reference t o photo n Manchuria. (SUEDE, 51) (SUEDE, Air Force Force Roundup Roundup 182, 22 Aug 51).
Commentg T This h i s message message implies, implies, and and provides provides the the first first evidence evidende Comment8 source, t that aircraft in Manchuria 8re are equipped equipped with with cameras. cameras. from any source, hat a ircraft i n Manchuria Communist a aircraft been noted noted i in Kbrea t to be engaged Communiat i r c r a f t have occasionally been n Korea o be in i n what appeared to t o be reconnaissance reconnaiasance missions. missions.
c
lisacharecoasscont Seveial
23.
NR
KOREA, KOREA, Nutihjor_n_Lgors1111)edagi_ing_r_graj2ea'sm'awtoes N9rth Korean I cor^8 mas be withdrawinn t o renrougg Recent North Korean messages indicate indicate t h a t the from the the Korean that the Mg: NK I I Corps Corps may may be be withdrawing withdrming from front f r o n t to t o regroup. regroup, Artillery Artillery units units of of t h e NK 8th Division displaced the NK 8th Division have have displaced aboUt 40 miles northwest northwest of of the last l a s t reported reported location of t the h e division about 40 in i n the t h e Kaesong Kaesong area. areao Another Another message indioates that t h a t elements of t h e 47th 47th message indicates elements of.the Division, also a160 part part of of the the I I Corps, Corps, may may likewise likewise be modng north, Thi8 Division, moving north. This l a t t e r message message further further indicates indicates that t h a t the the NK NK 17th 17th Mechanized Mechanized Division Division is is latter now now subordinate subordinate to t o the fihe I'CoiTs.-. X Corps,-. (SUEDE, (SUEDE, THK g TIK 974, 974, W W 286 286 H H 150, 150, U, 24 h Aug
51). 51)0
Having recently recently detached detached the t h e NK NK 19th 19th Division Division to;partaiparc Commentt ~ m e n $ S Having t i c i p a t e in i n the the movement movement of of the the NK NK VI V I Corps Corps to to the t h e eastern eastern sector, sector, the the ticipate NK NK I I Corpe Corps may nay have have withdrawn withdrawn to t o regroup regroup and and to t o integrate Integrate the t h e 17th 17th MechanMechanized ized Division. Mvision, The The addition addition of of the t h e 17th 17th Mechanized Division which Mechanized Division which has been out out of of the t h e combat combat zone zone since since the t h e abortive abortive May M e ; y offensive offensive will w i l l signifisignifibeen oantly increase increase the t h e potential p o t e n t i a l of of t h e NK I Carps and may indicate indicate that t h a t it it cantly the NK I Corps and has has been been assigned assigned a a combat combat mission. misoion, Total Total North North Korean Korean tank tank strength strength has has
9 9
27 27 Aug Aug 51 51
FOR ~PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEAS ATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDATE: 20-Mar2010 IDPPROVED
TIOP SECRET SUEDE I
been estimated estimated at a t 150 150 tanks, tanks, of of which which 120 120 are a r e accepted of t he been accepted a5 as part part of the A n estimated estimated 40 40 to to 105th Division located located in i n the tho Pyongyang Pyongyang area. apeao An 105th Tank Tank Division 25 tanks tanks are are believed believed to t o be be in in forward forward areas areas in i n the the western western sector, sector, 25 possibly associatod With k i t h the the 17th 1 7 t h Mechanized Machanized Division. Division. possibly associated
24. 2 4 .
12,Mv-adjeleattrAeLLINzarjae_e2LILt2Zaegauga E luxuries sent Kaeso 8 In'the I n the late late r o k : off), gotiation8 had afternoon of 23 August (after negotiations had been been b broken off), General General Nam 112 I1, chief ohief Communist Communist. delegate delegate to ta the the Kaesong Kaesong talks, t a l k s , instriacted irnstrkcted tthe he Nam fe, Chief "Chief, Department Department of of General General SuppPytt Supply" to to aend send him him tsquUicklyv "quickly" foodstuf foodstuffs, (SUEDE, missed POL, cigarettes, and and "all %ll kind liquor liquor of POL, cigarettes, kind of high high quality,n quality." (SUEDE, missed missed, SK-A-1147, SK-A-1147, 23 23 Aug Aug 51). 5 1 ) . t o missed, to
'

25. 25
8While it it is $8 possible pomibla that t h a t Nam Nam Ills Ilnsnama name is is being being used used Commanta Nbile on a 8 regular regular resupply ra8upply message message for f o r the the Kacsong ossibility on Kaesong delegation, delegation; the the p postibility sxists h a t Nam r entertainexists t that Nam le is eontanplating contemplating some some f5m form of of celebration celebration o or entertainment, is no known Korean, Chinese OF Soviet hopday f o r which ment. There There is no known Korean, Chinese or Soviet holiday for which be intended fntendsd in i n the the near near future. future. these luxuries,might lwcurlee might be these
. .~
-TOP-OBERIBT-SiEDE10 no
27 51 27 Aug Aug 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
.
i
Li
-TOP--SEG1ET-
HR70-14 HR70-14
rI
-~
NR
'
40 4 ,
CnImTnntl t Damnda seeks to allay fear of US &bombs Reoent Rodent North North Korw-ao.e3.ted that the the US cannot use use atom atom bombs f Korean propaganda asserted that US cannot bombs because because o of the MIG-15 jets, and etated that the USSR has both atomlo asd hydrogen the 14IG-15 jets* and.stated that the USSR has both atomic and hydrogen bombsb Concurrently, %he latest lateat issue ieme of of Moscow's Moacowa8al: w & Ilistg printed bombe. Concurrently* the printed an an erticele on on the t h e big big role role that that atomic atomio energy energy w i l l play Ain the the great great conCOBarticle will play "in atruction of Communism*" hmunim,n not only only for for "the "the building buildlng of of canals canals ind anddesist' struction of not but also " a colossalAnantity of cheap electric power.' 24 Aug 51;1 1 24 Aar:51).
T h e refereme etthis this time tirne to to a a eubject rarely used in goods .The reference at stbject rarely used in Communist propaganda suggests suggests a Soviet deaire o allay e a m of Communist%propaganda a Soviet desire t to allay any any f fears of US US atomic reprisals reprierale Should should the the Korean Koreannegotiations: negotiations break break down. down, The The New atomic D e article s az-ti.de aleo Bervee t oaugment auaplentthe the current current "peace" "peace" campaign campaign for for It= also serves to atomic energy control control as as defined in the E[remlinpsP IWPQS~~ for S a Five atomic energy defined in the Kremlinle proposals for a Five Power Peaoe Peatxi Pact. Pa& Power
.
219 i4u.14051
I
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE
3vHBeBr
DATE: 18-Mar-2010 ATE: 18-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
2 2
/NR

I
U, 11.
KOREA. KOREA.
Korea: Soviet troops reported in i n Korea: in Korea i in m2d-July of of the presence earned from contacts i n North Kbrsa n mid-duly
Kaechon, north of of Pyongyang troops: 3,000 near Gechon, of he o lowing Soviet troops: on t the Chongchon river; 400 i in Sariwon; and and 200 i in a town town near Pyongyang. Pyongyang. h e Chongchon n Sariwon; na
(1
24 Aug 51). 24 5 1 ) .
TOP -SECRET
10 10
27 Aug 51
..#
.
TOP SECRET
Copnent: While i t has has been been fairly f a i r l y well w e l l accepted accepted that that certain certain Cqpment: While it organized Soviet Soviet u n i t s are.serving are .serving covertly covertly i n Korea a8 kechnicains and organized units in Korea as technicains and a n t i a i r c r a f t gunners, gunners, the t h e presenoe presenoe of of a concentration of 3,600 near antiaircraft a concentration of 3,000 near Kaechon i s unconfirmed. unconfirmed, It It is e n t i r e l y possible t h a t small Soviet units Kaechon is is entirely possible that small Soviet units a r e located located in i n Sariwon Sariwon and and near near Pyongyang. Pyongyang. are
-
... "
1 2 . lg.

(1
A revealing revealing commentary commentary on Communist Communist. s t r a t e g y a t Kaesom: Communist.strategy at Kaesong: A on Communist s t r a t e g y i n breaking off t h e ctmference a t b e s o n g y be .seen in a 22 strategy in breaking off the conference at Kaesong m may be seen in a 22 August a r t i c l e ( w r i t t e n p r i o r t o t h e brsak-off) by Alan Winnington, August article (written prior to the break-off) by Alan Winnington, I I D a i l y worker e correspondent o r the r i t i s h Communist Winnington notes correspondent f for the B British Communist "Paily Worker." notes that "it becomes increasingly c l e a r t h e Americans a r e t r y Winnington i n g t o maintain that "it becomes increasingly clear the Americans are trying to maintain tension to to pressurize pressurize the the Japan Japan peace peace signatories." signatories .I' He warns t h a t " f u r t h e r tension Pa warns that "further measures w i l l c e r t a i n l y be taken by the Koreans and Chinese.. .to guarnatee moasures will certainly be taken by the Koreans and.Chinese...to guarnatee rovide a s a t i s f a c tory h e zone, f the t h e neutrality!' n e u t r a l i t y 1 ' of the of tthe zone, i if the UN UN does does not not provide a satisfactory answer for an e a r l i e r incident. m C N A F'eiping, 23 Aug 5 1 ) . answer for an earlier incident. ?CNA peiping,
.
23 Aug 51).
This is i s the the first f i r s t incident incident nated h e Communist Communist assocComment: This Comment: noted of of t the assoc-. i a t i o n of t h e coming Ja anese peace t r e a t y signing with t h e Kaesong talks. iation of the coming Japanese peace treaty signing with the Kaesong talks. It is I s interesting i n t e r e s t i n g that that Winnington's innington's 22 22 August August a r t i c l e was not r e l e a s e d It article was not released 23 August August after a f t e r the t h e talks t a l k s had had been been broken broken off. u n t i l 23 until off.
'
TOP-SECRET
11 11
27 u g 51 5 1 27 A Aug
---T-012-SEGRET-SUEBE-
HR70-14
SECTION 1(SOVIET) (SOVIJSC) SECTION 1

1. 1 ,

Korean Korean delegates'. delegates,
-T-OP-SB9RET-51-HIBE-
Iga. goviet radio link v i t h Nora K o r e a p o e s i b l ~trwmits Moecw~sinstruoTraffic analyaie analysis indicates that a Soviet militarg military 'biome on on truce truce t talkes jiioae e l k y Traffia mission in directives Erom from Moscow i in with ~d.8Slon in Korea Ko~eanay m a ~ rbe receiving dirsotivee n connection wl.th Kaesong truoe the b060Xlg tl'U00 talks. bB@.
August, radio in this mission During August, radio messages were originated originated i n volume by t h i s mission radio with headquarters of the Mariand transmitted transmitted on a r a d i o net ne% linking it it w i t h the the headquarters PhrL time ryUlitary t Voroshllov, messages interinterMilitary District District a at Voroshilov These were were the the first firstmessages mission since cepted from the miseion sinoe April. April,
It AprilIt is i e believed that that the.absence the absence of such such messages during the period period A prilAugust A u g u s t was wa8 due due to t o the the fact f a c t that t h a t they they were wore transmitted &&tted by an an alternate means of communication, It now now appears appeare that the load placed communication, probably probabb by by landline. landline. It sxceaslve on result truce t talks was excessive on landline communications conununicatfons as aa a r e s u l t of of the %mce a l b waa enough to enough t o force force this this traffic traffic onto onto radio. radto.
The The Voroshilov VoroahUov terminal tbl.minal of of the the radio radio link link serves semes also a l s o as a a relay relay point point messages passing between between Irlaecow Moscow and the mflitarg military mission, mission, and it has been for mearvagea been noted that moat of the the messages originated noted that moat of messages reaaived received by the mieeioa mission have have been been originated in Mbscow. *weaver, in Moscow. Moreover, other other evidence svfdenae suggests auggesta a a change change at a t Moscow Mosaow in I n the the direction direatlon or af the the mission, mlsaion, and and that that the the content oontent of of" the the messages messages could could be be largely RU-TIB 1422, largely diplomatic, diplamatie, (SUEDE, (SUEDE, RD-TIB 1422, 23 23 Aug Aug 51). 51),
Comments The volume volume of of messages meleeages apparently apparently passed psssed between this t h l s mission mission C a m m a t o The and Moscow Moscow during August August may well direct with the well indicate indicate a d i r e a t connection connectdon wlth the Eaesong Kaeeong truce Affairs in t r w e talks. talks. If If so, soo the the Ministry Mniatxpy of Foreign Foreign Affaire i n Moscow Moscow may m8y be using as a meam means o of transmitting instructions instructions tto theNorth wing tne the mission a@ f trammitting o the North
Observers Obeervers at,the a t . t h e conference, oonierence, reporting a a difference diffarence in i n attitude a t t i t u d e between between the the Chinese.Communist Chinese Communlet and and North North Korean Koraan negotiators, negotfatoro, have have commented commented on on the the mbre more uncompromising maompromising position p a i t i o n of of the the latter. l a t t e r , It It appears appear8 likely, Ukely, therefore, therefore,
11
28 Aug 51
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 DATE. IDPPROVED
1))
-m
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
Tier' SECRET SUEDE

-Tell--BEIGRET-SUBDEr
that the the position position taken taken by by Nam Nam Il I1 may, in the the f i a analyeis, o be a that may, in final analysis, prove prove t to m o r e correct correct reflection refleation of of Soviet Soviet policy policy than more than that that of of the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist delegatee, who have have maintained maintained direct direct contact aontact with w i t h Peiping. Peiping. delegates, who
49P-883REN--SUZDE2
28 51 28 Bug Aug 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14
'
b
.\
--TevP-SECRET E T SUEDEwr' SUEDE*
-Let pt-us
ciI
NR
FAR FAR EAST
limn -;y440 7//-4-/
3. Indicrtions o Communist offensive sive in Korea m e a noted:
Armed For s Security

SUEDE SUEDE
04frafreancy 2-7, 28 Aug 51

11 f q 28 28 A Aug 5 1 ug " SECRET SE CRET "A
CINCFE Telecon
,
641
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 24-Mar-2010 DATE: 24-Mar-201 0 IDPPROVED

-5-
f Communist Additional Additional evidence evidence o of Communistpreparations preparations for a a new new offensive has appeared in communicacornmunicaof war tions intelligence intelligence and and in in recent recent prisoner prisoner of reports.
The Chinese Communist communication net drop changed callsigns changed callsigns on 9 August August and and a a sharp drop Communist signal activity was in Chinese Communist 22 to24 24 August. August. It reported in in the period from 22to is i s noteworthy noteworthy that the Communists Communists have have usually usually changed changed callsigns callsigns and limited radio transmission transmissionin inthe theperiodprecedling period preceding an.offensive. an offensive.
from the the 'North North Korean of A message from Korean Ministry of reveals that a a political political conference conference is to be held held shortly in Transportation reveals North Korea. In the past, the the holding holding of of such a conference conference has has been been a a preoffensive indicator.
both Chinese Chinese Communist Communist and and NOrth Ndrth In addition, both of war war captured capturedduring during August August have reported enemy enemy plans Korean prisoners prisoners of a "sixth "sixth phase phaseoffensive" offensive" to tobe belaunched launched on on or or about about 1 1 September. September. for a for
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14
NR
8.
9,

KOREA. am.
Preeenoe of new Chinese Comwfet Division oonf&r~~e+ A 28 August ateLcs,Ls_PresenceofnewchbromuastDied.noores A 28 August Chineee oonfinna the the presence of the the 139th Chinese meseage message confirms presence of 139th Chinese Chinese Canmmniat Communist division division 294, 30 30 Aug A u g 51), 51), (47th Arq) in North Korea, (SUEDE, (47th Army) in North Korea. (SUEDE, TM-1003 TIK-1003 H H 155 155 W W294,
Comments while the the 140th 140th Division Division of of the the 47th Comment: While 47th 99mEp Army ha6 has previously previously been been identified i n Korea Korea, this identified in this is Is the the first first evfdenoe evidence that that the the other other elements elements of of the 47th ere i; in Korea. Koreao the Oth Army are
A North Korean North Korean divfaion a s t f l l e s s t o be strengthened: _2,=j_adivaionartiestressuedNKore: A North Korean
artlllexy meseage indfoatee that that a a 12oPrm consisting of of three three artillery message indicates 120mm mortar mortar battalion, battalion, consisting oompanles of of four fuur guns guns each, eaeh, is is to t o be be activated activated in in each eaah North companies North Elorean Korean division. division. This battalion battalion will will be be in fa addition addition to to the the companies companies previously o be This Orevionsly known known t to be (SUEm, TIK-1003 organic to t o each each of of a 8 division's divieionle three three infantryregiments. ~nfantrylegiments, (SUEDE, organic TIK-1003
H 155 294, 30Aug Bug 52). 51>, R 155 W W294 30
w i be l l be reoalled that NorthKorean Koreanfront front line line corps corps recent2y recently gounI: It It will recalled that North The activation actfvation of of 120mm received mountain mountain artillery artillem units. units, The received 120mm mortar mortar battalioms battalions will add add considerably cronsiderably to to the &e heavy heavy weapons weapons support support of of the the North North Koreans* Koreane. will
TOP SECRET OUEDE
w:
31 Aug 51
TOP SEdRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE *APPROVED 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE:
ID'a)
55
V
-T0P-SECHC2_,
HR70-14
SECTION 1 1 (SOVIET) SECTION (SOVIET):
1. 101.
L:
sov
Ai D
on from S
1.the.Soiriet.Third
nadivootok*
AitlfiViiion-Otationed in Sakhalin was ordered to enter the Korean-War-8s VoInnteera*when tha Cease-fire negotiation0 break-down,* .Thiti division, which has-150 first.line coMbat planes is moVing to Vladtmatok where, after regrouping it will go to Madan :nd Dairen to await further. orders.
__
~
~~~
Contents There Thereis l eno 110 information hformatbn that that a a unit mit of of' this this specific rpebifio However, due t to paucity of reportreportHowewer, o the pauoify ing this arm, area a Soviet places could l n g on this a move move of of some ~ome Soviet air Bfr unit unif between betmen two places have occurred have ocaurred without withoutdetection., detection,
designation has designation has been been on on Sakhalin, smkh;alin,
'"
m?
NR
TOP-SEONET
1
ArAug 51
31
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR.RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009
To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
.
8.
KOREA. Additional r.eports of the presence of of "Soviet nSoviet Puppet" t r reports of troops KOREA. 171;rth.Koreal 2 , Far i t i n g several O-,20 Far East East Coxnitand, Command, c citing several rsaent recent repcrta reports m r t h Kay; 0
of t the presence of of Caucasian Caucasian troops troops Iin NorthKorea, Korea, s stats that of h e presence n North tates t h a t the multiplicity reports demand a attention m u l t i p l i c i t y and oonsistency consistenoy of the r e p o r t s "logically demand ttention degree af of credence.ty credence." One of and socke sorlpe degree t a t e d tthat h a t by of these reports reports s stated by 23 2 3 August a a "Soviet Woviet ruppet Puppet Force" Force" had had crossed crossed the the Yalu Yalu River River and and was was on on the t h e way way to t o the t h e front f r o n t line; line; others othore mentioned mentioned the the presence presenoe of of Soviet Sovie't and "Caucasian" "Caucasian" troops troops with with armor armor hear near. Kumchon. Kumchon. FEGOM coments that and FECOM comments the presence of of Caucasian Caucasian troops troops as as far far south.as scruth-as Kumchon Kumchon "appears Itappearer poesiblan possible" but t that h a t the nationality, nationality, s aize i z e and and type type'of of tthe h e force force a are re notclear. not. clam. (S 5330, 30 30 Aug Aug 51). 5 1 ) . (8 GIHCPE CINGFE Telecon 5100,
Comment: The The presence presence in i n North North Korea Korea of of a a limited M t e d number number of of gomaent: non-Oriental troops, anti-airdraft artillery units and and techtedhnon&iental troops, Chiefly chiefly a nti-aircraft a r t i l l e r y units nicians, is is considered considered probable. probable. nicians,
HR70-14 HR70-14
r
w
"TOP-850R5T---
N F
20. 20.
3,000 Bunparian and Rumanian troops were observed moving south from Pyongyang on 1 August. These troops. in North Korean one uniforms, were equipped as infantrymen, division of Soviet and one of Czech troops were quartered in the vicinity of Chongju, north of Pyongyang, in the period 6-9 August.
Both Rumania have contrlbuted contributed Rumania and and Hungary Kwgary are are .known known tto o have Comment; Both medical teams teams to t o the t h e Communist Communist forces f o r c e s in i n Korea. Koreao The recent spate of of reports Caucasian Communist Communist troops r e p o r t s concerning Cauoasian troops in I n Korea is i s believed to to have been caused oaueed by by the the presence presence of o f Soviet S o v i e t technical, teohnical, advisory advisoryand and anti-antihave been in aircraft personnel who have been reliably r e l l a b l y reported as being i n North Korean Korean rear rear areas. areas.
21.
agjatja_kusln_Asay_faUlzartgAiluatiLlsuatzsa_QUaLgir_grins Pputh Kor1 of -tF : Disputes Diaputes ROK Army Amy and and Air Air Force regarding regarding control control and and utilization u t i l i z a t i o n of of between the t h e ROK It is l i g h t aircraft aircraft are ar0 beginning to t o assume aasume serious serious proportions. t i s now light proportiona. I rumored that t h a t the t h e army army will w i l l take take over light l i g h t aviation aviation in i n the t h e near near future, fhture, c e r t a i n l y by 1 1 January. The A I Force h i a f ef t a t a s he t certainly Ail. Force CChief of 3Staff s states he will not release t h e pilots p i l o t s in i n training. training. release the the t he

Z.
ZO
111103
3.
'f0P-950RET-13
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009
4 Sep Sep 51 4
bb
..
t
, &
Chiefs could reach agreement were it Chief6 of of Staff Staff of of both both ser-vices 88-vices could it not for for The ROK Air Air Force has ha8 recentrecentpressure from outside military preaaure military authorities. authorities. The anti-guerrilla l y been suocesefully utilize utilize rn ih several a e voperations mesly been successfully peoially in southwest southwest Korea. Korea. pecially in
cil
Commqnta, While While the the ROK ROK Air Air Force Force is ia very very small, small, its i t a recent reoent antiantiCornmenth succeaaea have have demonstrated demonstrated its potential guerrilla successes potential for for the maintenance maintenance cannot afford afford two two air air forces. forces. It is ie of internal internal etability. e t u b i l i t y . The ROK cannot of probable that U US S suggestion suggestion could clear up up this t h i s squabble. squabble.
NR
-.
. . .
b
14 14
4 4 Sep Sep.51 51
HR70-14
_TLIP_SEGRE-T-EME---
4. 4 .
jNf
56 5.
6.
76
8\

'
mg& Communist message mentions "next Oammunfat mesaam mentions 9mxtoambaionns o a m w 1 g n " s
Another Another reference to to thi-"next campaign" %?kext campaign" io i e contained contained in In a a recent recent Chinese Chinese Communiet Cammunist message, message. ln In the past, to,refer to p e t , the Communists Canrmunists have have generally generally used the term "campaign" ncampalgnll t o refer t o offensive 1016/4 297/kl57/ 297/E157/ SIB-355, SIB-3550 2 2 Sep offensive operations. operations, (SUEDE, TIK l016/b Sep 51). 5 1 ) ,
Comments the n n e a c % cwpalgn," reference t to "next campaign," and add6 adds I s the the third third referano8 o the Comments This is to expect another ahother offensive. offensive. t o the the weight weight of of evidence evidenoe indicating indicating the the Communists Comuniste expecrt
Identity of Conxnunieta alleaedly k i l l e d in Kaesona area revealed8
According mu report, According to an U S A report,while whileNam NamIl lland andaaCommunist Communist neWepaperman newdpaperman refer refer to as "MP's" " a at t o the the men men allegedly allegedly killed killed at Kodusan-ni K c d u s a n - n i sa WPtst8 and "guards nguardso88 t least least two vehicle drivers drivers f from the 26tb 26th North No;th Xoreaa Korean two of of these these men men were were actlIFOly actually vehicle r o m the Brigade. into the Kaeeong Brigade, Moreover, Moreover, it it appears appear8 probable probable that that they were sent sent Into the Haesong area area from from the the north north to to pick pick up up "oars." ~lccrre.~((SUEDE, (SUEDE, TIK 1016fi 1016/W 297/ 297/ Hl57/SIB-355 H157/SIB-355 2 2 Sep Sep 51). 5 1 ) .
North ir trans..rtation North Korean Korean divisions divisions ordered osdered to t o re remlr transportation facilities faeilitieea A North North Korean Korean message mesaage of of 1 1 SepteMber September reveals reveals that that, a all l l North North Korean dividfvisiom have have been been instructed lnstkcted to t o repair repair the the railways, rallyays, roads that sions roads and bridge8 bridges that
"were damaged damaged by by rain." rain,,"
The Hoommander-inchief" 18eormnander-i-&lefr1 ordered ordered them them to t o coordicoordlThe

TOP TOP SECRET sums
TOP SECIIET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 IDPPROVED
5
5 Sep Sep 51 51
.0) -' Y
n-n
$5
nab the the work work with with the the locil loo& governments governments starting atart nate 31 31 August and and to to report report the the results results daily. daily. (SUEDE, ( S , AFSA 2l44Z, 2 2 Sep Sep 51). OSA 2144Z, significanoe when In conjunction oonjunctia This report has significance when coa6idered considered in Comment; This of Communist C o m d s t capability capability for for launching launohing an an offensive dienaive at at any any with indications of time, time.

PSECRET-SUEDN
TOP SECAET SUEDE

5 Sep 51 5 Sep 51
Approved For Re Wet 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79101146A00Q4,90080001-0
TOP SECRET
5 September 1951
CIA No. 49332 Copy No. 29
DAILY DIGEST
*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews completed*

TOP SECRET
Approved For Relthat4,1002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011494980001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Electricity shortage reported in Central Volga region: A 24 August Red Star article states that the central industrial region comprising seven oblasts, ten percent of the Soviet populationl-and a "considerable" proportion of heayy induatry is short of eleetricity. This shortage, said to be delaying the industrial development of the Volga area as well as of the entire central industrial region, will theoretically end upon completion of the new Volga hydro-electric stations. (S Moscow Weeka, MA-1216, 31 Aug 51)
2.
Commentz The transfer Of skilled technicians between countries of the Soviet Orbit to high priority jobs has been evident for some time. The movement of industrial labor, however, is a possible maw development in the Satellites.
3.
No evidence is available to confirm the.contemplated transfer of 1509000 Germans to neighboring Satellites. This development would reverse a trend of expelling Germans from the Satellites sines the end of the war. While there is some unemployment in East Germany at present, the East German Five Year Plan requirements make the transfer of this number of German workers mnlikely.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Worldwide publicity on Ostia case disturbs Communists: The US &Massy Prague reports that the worldwide interest in the Oatis case may be disturbing the Czechoslovak Communists as is evidenced by the resumption of publicity regarding Oatis for the first time since the trial ended on 4 July. Czechoslovak propaganda is seeking to belittle Western efforts

TOP SECRET
EASTERN EUROPE. GENERAL. Satellites reportedly preparing to shift labor to high priority industries: A recent repOrt from Germany points to a comprehensive program of labor resettlement in the Satellite states aimed at raising the productivity of heavy industry. The whole program is aimed at building an economy under the centralized direction of Soviet economic experts that will counter-balance that of Western EUrope.. Soviet recruiting teams are reportedly visiting Satellite industrial installations on a survey of technicians in order to allocate them to high priority industries, including shipbuilding, mining and heavy automotive manufacture. The program in Eaat Germany contemplates the eventual transfer of about 1509000 workers to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. (U New York Times, 2 Sep .51)
"Shortage" of electricity may possibly be serving a dual purpose in that it excuses lagging industrial production, while at the same time acting to stimulate speedy completion of the postwar Volga hydroelectric program.
-Comments
5 Sep 51
Approved For Re !ilia 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A01490080001-0
TOP SIM=
to free Oatie.and goes tansiderably beyond the'indictment in describing his alleged crime and guilt. (C Prague 165, 31 Aug 51)
Comment: The theMe of current Czechoslovak propaganda regarding the Oatis case is the contrast between legitimate and even critical reporting of Czechoslovak events and espionage which Oatis was allegedly engaged in.

TOP SECRET
2
5 Sep 51
'
Approved For Re !Gape 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0042400080001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
IBAE Cement on Polish and Czech bid for Iranian oil: Iran, according to its official spokesmen, ia considering a bid from Poland and Czechol slovakia for the purchase of 7000000 and 500,000 tons of oil respectively. It was also stated that companies in the US, Italy and Sweden had offered to supply tankers.
Poland owns four tankers with a combined tonnage of 22,044 and charters three totaling 17,378 tons. The Czechs have no ocean-going tankers under their control. Using its entire tanker facilities, Poland could move the 1,200,000 tons of oil under consideration in approximately three years. There is no indication that any sizeable number of tankers will be available for charter anywhere in the free world.
2.
25X1
25X1C
Similar information was furnished in mid-July In view ofthe build-up of the war threat, reports that the Moslem League supports Indian Communists can no longer be categorically rejected.
Comment:
25X1C
.3.
LigaIm.
Chinese aMbassador arriYeAs The first Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Han Nien-Lung, arrived in Karachi On 2 Sentember. Pakistan's first ambassador to China plans to leave for Peiping about 22 September. (R FBID, London, 2 Sep 51)
4: BURMA,
Increasine Communist military capabilities reported* The US Embassy inRangoon reports that insurgents have recently become more active in the vital Irrawaddy Delta, while maintaining a high level of activity farther north. The embassy has noted increasing evidence of Communist ability to concentrate larger forces than heretofore for operations in strategic areas. (C Rangoon 248, 1 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
Sep 51
Approved For Re larea002/05/20 : CIA-R01379101146A0004949$0001-0

TOP SECRET
25X1
'1, I _ A Rangoon informed the US Embassy that neutralism in the loc nese community is giving way to anti-Communism. He pointed to the formation of anti-Communist student and teacher organizations which were primarily responsible for denouncin r cent Communist disparagement of traditional Chinese concepts, ticularly claimed to be por- 25X1 encouraged by the enthusiasm of the s udents who have also organized a new non-Communist school and have launched a campaign to recruit other students attending pro-Communist schools. As further evidence trend, the embassy reports that there of this have been several instances during past few days of local Chinese leaders the bers of the embassy, whereas previouslyinitiating social contacts with memthey had tended to consort exclusively with the Communists. (C Rangoon 20,
7.
..'
f7
C.
"Pc
.9
1 Sep 51)
6.
An officer of the US Embassy in Rangoon, recently returned from Namkhom near the China-Burma border, reports that the area is relatively peaceful but that smuggling continues on a "considerable scale" over the Burma Road. This smuggling, averaging 20 truck loads of contrabands trol of the Burmese Army, which collects a day, is largely under the conover 400 dollars for each truck.
25X1
in Rangoon from Kunming also reported that during a 10 day visit in Wanting on the China side of the border he observed truck convoys, loaded with tires and petroletmleaving for Kunming every few nights. He further confirmed the complete absence of Burmese military authority in the village of Kyukok, which is directly across the border from Wanting, and claimed that it was controlled by Chinese Communist agents. (C Rangoon 248 1 Sep 51)
Comments The smuggling of tires and petroleum Burma Road into China has.been products over the reported by a number of sources. the Burmese Government Although is aware of this problem, it is both unwdlling and unable to take effective action to suppress smuggling, the absence of strong outside especially in pressure.
7. &W.A. atgaajadasinytUage
sunnorts Dato Onn, dean Malay politicians, of opened the annual Malayan Trade Union Council ence with a speech stating that self-government conferwill be attained "before many years." He urged that the trade unions stick to their proper activ-

amaggillagagt&zzas
TOP SECRET
gagasats Growing antagonism among the Chinese in Burma toward the Communists has been noted for some time. Anti-Communism Chinese, however, is still handicapped among the overseas popular leader or cause to rally about, by the absence of organization and a
Approved For Release 2002/051204: CIA-RDP79T01146A000400013001Sep
Approved For Re lda,st 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0080001-0

TOP SECRET
ities, allowing their political interests to be represented by a "national organization." This is apparently a reference to Dato Onn's recently-conceived "Independence of Malaya Party," the non-communal rival of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) whose presidency Dato Onn recently relinquished. The UMNO,lacking Onn's leadership, has already retrogressed toward a narrowly racist, Malaya-for-the-Malays policy. Dato Onn predicts that UMNO will intrigue with the Sultans but that he will get the support of the villages. (C Kuala Lumpur 41, 31 Aug 51)
S.
Comment: Cumulative evidence from several sources has strongly indicated that the Viet Minh is increasingly hard-pressed to meet the material needs of the population within its zone, and that civilian morale has consequently declined. This is the first report, however, that Viet Minh armed forces are suffering a-similar lowering of morale.
-
0.
'
25X1C1
! 1
gfaaellaa_andjasill_dsteziars.tion_injagalinizszag: The Viet Minh-held ricerproducing region of Thanh Hoe in northern Annan is suffering from near famine conditions as a result of bad weather and Viet.Minh requisitioningd Malaria is endemic and there is a total lack of quinine and other, forms of medicine. Textiles are unobtainable. According to an eyewitness, 25X1C there has been a noticeable decline in the morale of the civilian population in the last few months.
1
1
I
1
Viet Minh army moralt reverted declining: Viet Minh forces are reported bi French G-2 in Saigon to be undergoing increasing hardship from lack of food and medicine. Thirty to sixty percent of the troops in large units are unable to fight due to sickness. The result has been a decline in troop morale, increased desertion, and failure to fill recruitment quotas. Because of the condition of Viet Minh troops and the prevailing flood conditions in the Tonkin delta, no major action is expected before October. (S U9ARMA Saigon, MC 2279 2 Sep 51)
INDOCHINA,,
25X1A
Comment: This information is several months old, but there is ample evidence that the trends described above continue to afflict the Viet Minh.
10.
'
French weigh disposition of Chimese intsrnesAl The chief of the Far East division of the French Foreign Office told US Ambassador Bruce in Paris that the French Government is considering the possibility of repatriating, through the agency of some international organization such as the Red Cross, the 309000 Chinese Nationalist troops interned in Indochina. The official indicated that some decision on this question might be taken "before long." (S Paris 1568, 51 Aug 51)
TOP Sig:ET
5 5_ Sep 51 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79101146A000400080001-0
Approved For Relearts/2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A015114116080001-0

TOP SECRET
Nationalist officials Comment; Although constantly pressed by Chinese authorities have postponed making to repatriate these troops, the French any decision for more than a year and a half.
French Surete in Indochina act against "pro-American" VietThe hand of the French Surete was evident in the invalidation of namese: the passport of Tran Van An, semi-official Vietnamese press representative to the San Francisco conference. Although known to be on very poor terms with General De Lattre and regarded by the French as suspiciously pro-US, Tran Van An had been personally invited to attend the conference by Premier Rau, The US Charge comments that this episode, following closely upon other cases of French intolerance of even the "loyal opposition," will have considerable repercussions. (S Saigon 5519 1 Sep 51)
11.
12.
Chinese send aid and dyje_geraat_noLteraost: Chinese Communist material aid to the Viet Minh is increasing, according to French G-2. The number of Chinese advisers in North Vietnam reportedly is unchanged, bui new."propaganda units" are arriving. Reports received by French G-2 from agents in the area of Langson, the traditional "China Gate," indicates no evidence of Chinese troops on the Indochina side of the frontier. 'This is verified by French Air Force reports. (S Saigon OARMA MC 227-51, 2 Sep 51; S Saigon Neeka 35, 1 Sep 51)
13.
INDONESIA. Communist press and labor federation recelve subsidies from lin late February 1951, Chinese Communists; \
SOBS; Communist-controlled Indonesian labor federation, was receiving a monthly subsidy of about 15,000 dollars from Chinese Communists for use in instigating strikes. Chinese Communists were spending approximately the same amount for propaganda purposes, including individual subsidies ranging from 300 to 19500 dollars to leftist nempapers in Indonesia.
Indonesian police have been unable to apprehend 242 Chinese Communists Early who secretly entered Sumatra and southwestern Borneo in late 1950 in February, three pf these Chinese were arrested in Pontianak but escaped three days later. 25X1A
1
Comment: Both infiltration of Chinese Communist agents and Chinese financial support of Indonesian and Chinese Communist activity in Indonesia are frequently reported and undoubtedly exist. The full extent of such activity, however, is impossible to assess.

25X1C
TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Release 2002105120 : CIA-R0P79101146A000400080001-0
5 Sep 51
Approved For Re 854109 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004680080001-0

TOP SECRET
14.
government prepares for forceful action in Celebes; In a radio address on 30 August, Prime Minister Sukiman offered Celebes guerrillas five days to surrender, at the end of which time he said the government will take punitive action. I ltroops are being drawn from South Sumatra, Java and parts of East Indonesia in readiness for a government offensive. The US Army Attache comments that the guerrillas, now numbering 4,000, could swell to 80000 or 10,000, and that the affair could become equal in significance tO the Makassar "rebellion" of 1950. Rumors persist that the Chinese Communists may have bad a hand in fomenting the trouble. C'Djakarta 357, 1 Sep 51; S USARMA Djakarta L 136, 1 Sep 51)
CoMMenta On 17 August, Kahar Muzakar Ordered his 4,000 guerrillas hack into the jungle in the South Celebes and by so doing cancelled the& expected incorporation into the Republican Army. The Makassar "rebellion" of August 1950 occurred when a guerrilla attack on demObilized troops reeulted in the involvement of government forces. Five days of heavy fighting followed, with some 900 casualties reported.
25X1
15
PHILIPPINES. gnposition senatorial candidates seen capable of winning on oualitv basie: Observing that the senatorial candidates ahosen by the opposition party (Nationalista) are much more impressive than those put Up by the Liberal Party, the US Embassy in Manila comments that if Voting were on the basis of quality and if,(as is "unlikely") the November elections were to be free and honest, the Nationalistsswould probably win a substantial majority. (Clianila 867, 31 Aug 51)
Comment: Nine out of 24 senate seats.will be contested in November. The Nationalistas-oppose Philippine acceptance of the Japanese peace treaty and accuse the administration of subservience to the US.
16
25X1C1
(a) the formation of a "Kachin National Congress (China)" inTunnan Province in November 1950;
(b) Chinese Communist orders to the Kachin National Congress to use
Although theie has been considerable public demand that the fraud and coercion which accompanied the 1949 elections not be repeated, the administration has not seen fit to dismiss numerous special and temporary police who have been used to influence past elections.
25X1C
CHINA,
Chinese Communist pagram for Kachina_reflartesl.
TOP SECRET
5 Sep 51
Approved For Reigagp 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0811400080001-0

TOP SECRET
in Kachin schools, Communist texts rather than books imported from Burma; and instructions to the head of the Congress to recruit and train (c) Kachins for use as a "vanguard" in the event of an invasion of Burma.
25X1A
Comment: The Kachins in Communist China are doubtless under the same firm 'control of Peiping as are other ethnic minorities, but the precise form of the minority front organization has not been establiehed; Peiping could be expected to devise an organization and program designed to appeal to Kachins in Burma as well. The use of Communist textbooks in Kachin Irecruitment schools is to be expected. [ of Kachins in Communist China to swell the ranks of Naw Song, the renegade Burmese Kachin, who has been receiving support and indoctrination from the Chinese Communists for more than a year.
25X1
17.
25X1
25X1
Pubmarines sighted in South Ching_aga: TWO submarjnea were sighted on 29 August south of Macao off the South China coast The submarines, on a southerly course, submerged as the p ane passed overhead. After interrogation of flight crew members, (S Astalusna lassesses the report of sighting as probably true. Singapore, 31107Z, 31 Aug 51). Comment& No US submarines were in the area on this date. Since no other Western submarines are believed to have been in these waters at the time, this appears to be the first reliable sighting of a Communist submarine in South China waters. Previous reported sightings of subMarines in these waters have been assessed as possibly true. Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that Russian submarines are smuggling agents and arms into Southeast Asian countries and the Philippines.
g3d
1
18.
25X1
,
mins reported in East Central Ching: Ireport the existence of radar-controlled antiaircrart artillery at :yanking and Shanghai. (S Alusna Taipei, Weeka 3, 31 Aug 51)
BadAtmwatallo
Comment& Radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns have been identified in Manchuria and, North China for some time. Their installation in East Central China is new Information.
19.
25X1C
Poviet streneth in Port Arthur area is reassessed: ,as of 21 August, Soviet forces in the Port Arthur Naval Base Area ( PARBA) were as follows:
25X1C
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : 8IA-RDP79T01146A0004000880W
Approved For Re !auk 2002/05120 : CIA-RIDP79T01146A0042,110080001-0

TOP SECRET
(a) Army -- three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, one artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft brigade, and one paratroop brigade;
'
'
(b) (0)
Air -- 350'naval and airforce aircraft; and
25X1A
25X1A
,
Navy -- a squadron of 10 destroyers of a German type.

11 Sep 51)
.25X1C 25X10.
I
20.
Kao Kane denounces "corruption" and "bureaucracy" in Manchuriag Mukden radio states that the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party met with 2,000 of its top Cadres on 31 August to discuss "bad practices and bureaucracy" in various unspecified Manchurian organizations. Kao Kan& the leading Party and governmental functionary in the Northeast, 41 reported to have "severely criticized corruption and bureaucratic methods in management." Kao is further quoted as citing this "trend" as evidence that the Party has been affected by "reactionary. capitalieth." (1 FBID Flimsy, 1 Sep 51)
Comments Kapos remarks clearly point to a more serious problem than the moral failings of the cadres, but this brief release suggests only the nature and not the magnitude of the problem. If it is true that corruption and incompetence are widespread among the managerial personnel of state
control -- it is reasonable to assume that this problem is much greater throughout China than the Communists have admitted.
enterprisesAnoManchuria -- the area longest and most firmly under Communist
21.
Mao thanks Stalin moderately for "great help" against Japans A ;telegraziAated:2;Septemherilrm Mao Tse-tung to Stalin conveys "profound thanks" for the USSRes "great help" during the war against Japan. Mao states that this help, as well as the Sino-Soviet alliance, has provided "bonndless inspiration" to the Chinese people. In reply, Stalin thanks Mao for his "high evaluation" of the Soviet role, and concedes that China "played an important part" in defeating Japan. (1 FBID Flimsy, 3 Sep 51) TOP SECRET
9
Comments The i Qigest of 13 August reported the unConfirmed assertion Ithat Soviet ground forces in the Port Arthur area were being increased to a total of about 100,000 men; the present report, also unconfirmed, indicates a ground force strength more nearly in accord with.the figure (61,000) accepted by US Army 0-2. The figure of 350 aircraft is also unconfirmed but also credtble, and may even be low. There is Soviet naval activity of various kinds in the PANBA0 but the presence of a destroyer squadron (at least six DDs) cannot be confirmed.
25X1C
5 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-IRDP79T01146A000400080001-0
Approved For Re Awe 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006480080001-0

TOP SECRET
Comments It is worth noting that Mewls "high evaluation" of the Soviet role is confined to appreciation for "help" and "inspiration," and does hot credit the USSR with the leading or even a major part in the fight. Peiping apparentlY feels, with truth, that the Chinese contribution -- both Nationaland Communist -- was considerably greater than the Soviet. Nevertheless, this exchange of messages, on the occasion of Sino-Soviet observance of IT-J Day, draws attention to the unity of Sino -Soviet purpose as expressed in the Sino-,Soviet treaty ofFebruary 1950 -- namely, that of preventing the resurgence of Japanese aggression.
22.
gommenta Following close on a recent interview in which the ROK Minister of Defense stated that-the ROK Army will be a "first class fighting machine"'Rheels speech gives the appearance of another campaign for US arms to equip a large army, The motivation of the campaign-is not clear but may stem from Rhees apprehension that the UN is going to pull its troops out of Korea.
KOREA. Nate claims BOK can muster additional 250.000g In a 2 September speech broadcast over Radio Pusan, President Rhea stated that South Korea can muster 250,000 new troops but that "arms and training are needed" for then. He oautioned against a new Communist offensive or a limited offensive in connection with Communist arguments at the San Francisco conference. His statement closed on the note that the sooner the ROK strengthens ita forces with additional troops, the earlier democratic nations will be able to attain their ultimate aims. (R FBID Ticker, 3 Sep 51)
25X6
23,
TOP SECRET
10 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400080001-0 5 SeP
25X6

Approved For Re laer 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0049,00080001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GENERAL. Smaller NATO countries may check power of military:. US NATO Deputy Spofford warns that it would be a mistake to underes'imate the resentment caused by the threepower Standing Group's refusal to present a report or to be represented at the Ottawa meeting_of NATO Finance and Foreign Ministers. He expects that some of the minor NATO countries mill now press strongly for greater control over the deliberations of the Standing Group. (S London, Depto 298, 30 Aag 51)
The Standing Group argues that the Ottawa Meeting is pritharily Several NATO nations, however, claim that a military progress report is needed, and that a Standing Group representative should be:present to-answer questions. The NATO governments not repregented on the Standing Group are jealous of the power they have delegated, and, unless the Standing Group takes steps to keep them better informed of its deliberations, they will undoubtedly demand a share in decisions now made by the body.
Comment:
nonmilitary.
tripartite
2,
GERMANY. New Soviet move tightens econamic noose in Berlin: On 31 Auguat Soviet and East German authorities further tightened the economic squeeze On West Berlin by imposing a toll on all West German traffic between Berlin. and Western Germany. Exempting Allied and East German traffic, they levied the tax--for "maintenance of the road"--on each oneway trip made by both cars and trucks. West German truckers reacted sharply by blocking the highWay at the Helmstedt border point, in an attempt to prevent compliance and force action by West German authorities to alleviate the situation.
local US officials see no chance for immediate relief to the shippers, the carry most of Meat Berlin's imports of perishable foods. The thirteen freight trains now running daily to Berlin are the limit permitted the Allies and are already'fully utilized, although some unused capacity is available on the Elbe waterway. These officials estimate that the new tax, if absorbed by shippers and consignees, would increase shipping costs at least 20 percent, constitute a "palpable increase" in the cost of food and other imports, and measurably affect the competitive position of West Berlin's industry.
The Allied commandants in Berlin met on 3 September with West Berlin officials to discuss possible countermeasures, including the taxing of all East German barges passing through West Berlin locks, an effective measure in the past. (C Berlin 339, 1 Sep 51)
This latest Soviet move, apparently under consideration June, represents another in a series of measures designed te-harass lest Berlin, and a poSsible further step to force resumption of interzonal German trade. The step, which will greatly increase the general Comment:
since17=st last
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 ?-tlA-RDP79T01146A000400080061.Sep 51
Approved %release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDp79T01t114000400080001-0

TOP SECRET
Berlin may also be the trade impasse uncertainty and alarm in sholld Four Power talks on
additional:bargaining be resumed.
'
USSR in intended to give the
25X6
point
1
i
route to Vienna: Soviet air-corridor of a USSRamended AUSTRIA. USSR proposes pressing for ouadripe;tite approval the SoViet traffic flying over authorities are vigorously British air corridor to a more eirinitiated proposal to redirect 20-kilometer-vide argues mine to Vienna from the present The Soviet deputy commissioner ocpaths of Soviet the northvest. cuitous.route to the flight route crosses ostensibly that the present flights of both poicers. cupation troops, and endangers
-

'TOP SECRET
5 Sep 51
13 Approved For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RD1379T01146A000400080001-0 To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
Approved For Re Weak 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,W0080001-0

TOP SECRET
British and US officials, however, believe that more coneermed that the corridor permits observation the Russians are much of Soviet military airfields at Zadvoeslau and Wiener Neustadt and of Soviet-Hungarian Maneuver and training areas. In bilateral negotiations the British are making counterproposals involving traffic control and Variable-eltitude flights. The US Legation is examining what advantageous concessions can be won from a strong bargaining position. (S Vienna 8).0, 30 Aug 51) Conment: The savlet airfield at Wiener Neustadt is subject I AS of 15 August, reconnaissance indicated ieast eight jet squadrons may be stationed at this that at field. Any safety considerations in the Soviet move seem to be ruled out by the fact that the .corridor now objected to has been in use since 1246.
I
25X1
5.
Margaretha will-try to convince US officials that an additional release of counterpart funds for 1251 is essential, that present exchange rates be maintained if further price advances must in imported raw materials and food items are to be avoided, and that Austria should be granted additional latitude in exports to Czechoslovakia tive/y cheaper coal. As an example of and Poland in return for their relaAustria's efforts to achieve economic Stability, the minister will cite current prices, even though such anti-inflationaryleasures to hold the line on meat controls have resulted in serious shortages of meat. (C Vienna 8410 30 lug 51) Rising costs of essential raw materials, trade withWestern Germany subsequent deterioration of to Germany's awn balance-of-payments difficulties,
Comment:
a continuation of controlled inflation under the system of periodic wage-price increases; and vulnerability to econaMic pressures exerted by Poland and Czechoslovakia have all contributed to the current economic difficulties in which Austria finds itself and to fears that the situation may become acute this fall. While retention of price controls for meat is rib doubt politically essential and has avoided importation expensive animal feeds, imports of animal of products have in consequence further burdened Austria's limited supply of foreign exchange.
6.
ITALY,
Werirriguer,

TOP SECRET
Monetary delegation will press for further US aid: A delegation of Austrian bank and financial officials at Washington meetings of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund will impress upon CS agencies the urgency of Austria's rent econonic problems. cur Finance Minister Margaretha has informed Legation he mill tell the US Government the BS that a cut in ECA allotments below 145 million dollars would be "tragic.!'
Communists claim large delegation at Berlin Youth Festival, Enrico leader of the Italian Communist delegation to the Berlin Youth
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040008vw,
14
51

TOP SEGFtET
Festival, stated that about 1,500 Italian delegates attended the festival, according to the Communist Unita. Berlinguerls passport was confiscated by the authorities at the nalian frontier upon his return. The press reports that his speeches at Berlin were "harmful to.the good name of Italy abroad." (S Rome Joint-Weeka 35, 31 Aug 51; R Rome 966, 29 Aug 51)
Comment:
Berlinguer,s statement may be greatly exaggerated.
On
14 July 1951 the Italian Government suspended the issuance of passports to

individuals wishing to visit iron curtain countries, and ordered the previncial prefects to refer requests for the same to Rome.- However, groups of Italian Communists have been able to circumvent this ban,presumably by securing necessary travel documents from secondary-level government officials who are either inefficient or corrupt.
25X6
7.

TOP SECRET
15 5 Sep 51 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400080001-0
25X1

Approved For Re %Se 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00840080001-0
TOP SECRET
5 September 1951 CIA No. 49332-A

Copy No.
cz 9

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For RelJesk 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000,000130001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
DI42. More delays aver Iraq Petroleum Company agreement foreseen: The Iraqi Prime Minister has proposed that the negotiators begin drafting the final text of the oilAgreement, which then be submitted to Parliament for consideration.' Both the British Charge and Ipc officials foresee that the drafting of the agreement will produce long tough wrangles and probably new Iraqi demands. (C, s/b Baghdad 188, 2 Sep 51). Comment: The Prime Minister is reluctant to come to a final agreement with the oil company because he fears the reaction of the Iraqi opposition parties. Prime Minister Nuri Said has refused to sign the lettere covering the oil agreement unless the company promises a basic minimum.annual royalty" payment. A company official has recommended that the IPC make a private pledge to include a provision on a minimum annual royalty payment in tbe final draft Of the agreement.
.
2.
ima.
Economic situation in Iran: The US Ethbasey in Tehran, in a statement on Iranls economic prospects concludes that economic collapse could be averted for several months and possibly longer by resorting to various extedients, such Eta reducing note-cover reserve or simply printing more money. Moreover,the primargragricultural economy of the country can stand considerable deterioration in non-agricultural sectors before breakdown would occur. (S, S/S Tehran 891, 1 Sep 51),
3.
INDONESIA, Indonesia likely to sign Japanese peace treaty: Despite important political and press opposition in Indonesia to signature of the Japanese peace treaty, the US Ambassador in Djakarta expecte the government to authorize its delegation at San Francisco to sign the treaty and to obtain majority support in Parliament when the question of ratification subsequently arises.
The Indonesian PAM8 Minister is currently demonstrating exceptional firmness in his determination to have Indonesia sign the treaty. .86th President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta support him strongly in this policy, (C, S/S Djakarta 348, 4 Sep 51; Cs, S/S Djakarta 365, 3 Sep 51),
IPomment; The Indonesian delegation at San Francisco was not given advance authority by its government to sign the treaty,
'
CHINA. UK Charge to protest Peipinges treatment of foreign nationals: The UK Charge in Peiping is scheduled to make representations regarding Peipingts treatment of foreign natimaleto the Chinese Communist Ministry in early SepteMber (C,'S/4 London 1177, 31 Aug 51),
.

TOP SECRET
2
5 Sep 51
Approved For Re10002002/05/20:0A-FDP79T01146A00400080001-0

TOP SECRET
Comment:
inter alia, the cases of at least,20 US nationals imprisoned in Comemnist Chinavsome 30 others under house arrest, and a nuMber of others unable to obtain exit permits. The nationals of governments recognizing the Peiping regime have generally fared recognizing governments, particularly the US. much better than those of non, It is conjectural whether taMbos representations or those of the other recognizing governments will significantly improve the status of US nationals.
ing treriping regime to instruct their representatives in Peiping to discuss with the Foreign Ministry,
The Department of State has requested 12 governments recogniz-
25X1
vast Irigh
erequest US assistanoe in militarY Purchases: (Irish EXternal Affairs-Minister Aiken has approached one of General Eisenhowerls American political advisers in Paris with an informal request for assistance in purichasing American military equipment, promising in return a very limited cooperation with NATO in military staff talks on defense plans. Aiken indicated that the new Irish Government was much concerned about the problem of defense; and wanted a sma].l amount of up-to-date military equipment for train, ing purposes now, in order to initiate a modernization and expansion program. Re:mentioned specifically aircraft and heavy infantry antigtank weapons.
Reminded of the tight US military supply situation of the NATO powers' prior claim, and of Irelandfs own refusal to Join NATO in 1949, Aiken urged that a re-armed Ireland would contributj4xidfrectjy to Western EUrope's defense against Ccamunist aggression; butIJe gave his personal vielhat there.
)

SECTIoN 3 (WESTERN)
filinedg F401 4,4,;
TOP SECRET
5 sep
Approved For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00c00080001-0
TOP =RFT
was no possibility of IreladSs joining NATO or other collective defense arrangements at:this time. S, S/S Paris 1377, 31 Aug 51).
Comment! This is the first reported approach to the US for military assistance on the part of the DeValera government which came to power in June. Early in 1950 the previous government had indicated to the US Ambassador that it needed US equipment for defense against a possible airborne invasion, and very indirectly hinted that it might be prepared in return toi forget about the Partition issue which had kept it out of NATO, and to enter instead into a formal alliance with.the US alone on much the same terms as NATO)nembership.
7.
NORWAY. Nation will not lead opposition to Greelo-Turkish NATO admission at Ottawas Foreign Minister Lange stated to US Ambassador Bay that although Norway remains opposed to NATO-membership for Greece and Turkey, his country &See not intend to lead the opposition to such membership at the Ottawa meeting. Norway, he said, will make known its position that Greek-Turkish security needs can be adequately safeguarded by a Mediterranean Pact, and that such a peat is preferable since Greek-Turkish memberphip would dilute NATO's Western European character and lend substance to the view that the treaty is merely a military alliance. Lange added that he expected some support for this positen at Ottawa. .(TS, 5/8 Oslo 235, 3 Sep 51).
Commis Norway will tenaciously oppose the extension of membership tintil it becomes clear that the majority of other NATO members are prepared to endorse Greek-Turkish admission. However, since Norway is not preparing to lead the opposition, se it has in the Lonolon discussions, and the Netherlands Government has indicated its reluctant'acquiescence, concerted opposition at Ottawa is not expected to be strong or protracted.
CHILE. Foreign Minister comments an recent coup attempt to US AMbaseadors Foreign Minister Yrarrazaval Concha told US Ambassador Bowers that the recent Conspiracy (see OCI Daily Digest, 29 Aug 51) "cannot be underestimated in significance since its purpose Was to overthrow the regime." It is positively known, the minister siad, that the conspiracy had its inspiration in Buenos Aires. He admitted that some minor Chilean army officers were involved. The minister also pointed out that he had warted the president that another attemPt would come later.

TOP SECRET
ihough introducing a military budget about 25 percent higher than its predecessor's, the DeValera government had publicly reaffirmed Irish neutrality, and has given no countenance to any suggestions that Ireland might in effect be willing tq trade bases for military assistance. The form of the present approach, whiah easily lends itself to official denials, further suggests that DeValera is not yet ready to challenge Irish neutrality sentiment to obtain US military equipment,
3 5 Sep 51 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400080001-0
Approved For Re !thee 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00940080001-0

TOP SECRET
Sowers comments that "Yrarraaaval is a very high grade man of large means and a, spotless reputation as an able and honest man. He impreased me as worthy of confidence....We know enough of the situation not to find anything he said at all improbable." (S, S/S Santiago 131, 31 AUg 51).
Odmment: There is evidence tending to support the foreign minister's remarks. The inability of the government combination'to modify the inflation,ary spiral, pre-election year conftsion, and growing and demonstrative labor unrest continue to contribute to the present government's unpopularitT, and may.be grounds for another attempted coup. On the other hand, the government has been at. least temporarily strengthened by the recent attempt.

TOP SECRET
5 Sep 51
HR70-14
NR IR
II
NR NR
TOP
6
B
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 22-Mar-2010 DATE: ATE: 22-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
6 sep 51
.1Y1)
sr
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
.
EDNI
18. 18.

TOL' TOP SE S E - JO 3ELSULDE \ %
messages intercepted during t h e l a t t e r p a r t of August and e a r l y September

KOFLU. Communist delegation at a t Kaesong continues c o n t b u e s active: KOREA. Communist active:. North North Korean Korean
messages intercepted during the latter part of August and early September i n d i c a t e the t h e continued continued presence presence of of the t h e entire e n t i r e ComMunist C o m h i s t delegation delegation to t o the the indicate cease-fire cease-fire talks t a l k s ini n tthe h e Kaesong Kaesong area. area.
One 2 2 September,massage September message from from General General Nam Nam II, I1 p r o t e s t s orders to t o return return protests three t o Pyongyang Pyongyang op on the t h e grounds ground8 that t h a t there t h e r e are a r e na total t o t a l of of 629 629 men,n men,lf t h r e e cars c a r s to including of more than thirty including nten tften foreign foreign journalists j o u r n a l i s t s :and and a group of t h i r t y Chinesen Chinese11 t o be be supplied supplied in in the t h e Kaesong Kaesong area. area. Another 2 2 September message from from a a to j u n i o r Communist junior Communist o official'at f f i c i a l a t Kaesong Kaesong s states t a t e s tthat h a t he he will will'hall ' b a l l tthe he c car a r when when t h e conference Evidence of the conference reconvanda.* reconvenes.n Evidence of the Kaesong Kaesong of Communist resupply of group may may be seen in i n messages messages of of 2 2 and.3 and 3 September September requesting requesting that t h a t supplies supplies of medicine, coats, coats, blankets, blankets, and and n120 n120 yards yards of of black-out b l a c k i u t curtains', c u r t a i n s " be be sent. sent. (SUEDE, f i e l d translations t r a n s l a t i o n s of of 1699/1 1699/1 RSM, RSM, 1700/1 1700/1REM, RSM, .1706/1 1706/1 RSM, RSM, (SUEDE, Preliminary field and 1708/1 RSM, E M , Kaesong-Pyongyang, Kaeeong-Pyongyang, 2 2 and and 3 3 Sep Sep 51) 51) While the .the continued continued presence of t h e conference group i n t he Comment: While the in the Kaesong area area cannot cannot be be considered considered aa firm firmindicator i n d i c a t o r_of Df Communist Comunist willingness willingness Kaesong to t o resume negotiations, it it is i s tonsidered considered doubtful doubtful that t h a t the the group group would would be be a t strength s t r e n g t h unless unless some some hope hope for for a a resumption resumption of of talks t a l k s were were maintained at entertained. entertainod.
7
6 s p 5' 1 6 s Sep 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
_TQLSECAET-SUEDE-
,
19. 19
Communist Communist supply supply route route in i n northeastern northeastern Korea Korea cut cut by by floodsr floods: A A prepreliminary field trans/atien t r a n s l a t i a n of a 30 August North Korean Korean message reveals that total freight northt hat a t o t a l of of 196 f r e i g h t cars were enroute onroute between Tumen, in northeastern Korea on on the the Manchurian.border, Manchurian border, and end Namyang, Namyang, northeast northeast of of Hamhung, Hamhung, on an an unspecified unapeciffed date date in in late l a t e August. August. Earlier E a r l i e r in i n the the month, month, flood flood damage damage on a number of of serious serious breaks breaks in i n the the rail r a i l line l i n e and, and, in i n at a t least least had caused caused a-nuAber one case, case, repairs repalre would Hould not not be be completed completed before before 9 9 September. September. (SUEDE, ASAPAC TLW 134, 134, CM IN IN 36931, 36331, 4 . b Sep Sep 51) 51) ASAPAC TIN Comment: Comment: The forces forces of of nature nature have have given given an an assist a s s l e t to t o UN UN aerial a e r i a l and and navarEOMErament-in harassing this n a v a l z d m e n t in harassing t h i sexposed exposedrail rail line. l i n e . Extensive Extensive Comnunist Communist 'Utilization-of now-secondary route route may may indicate indicate t that the primary primary u t i l i z a t i o n of tthis h i s now-secondary h a t the border points poinqa of entry entry at at Sinuiju Sinuiju and and Manpojin Manpojin in in northwestern northwestern and and central central
Korea are a t capacity. capacity. 'Korea are operating operating at

2 0 . 20.
I
TOP SECRET SUEDE
8 8
6 sep Sep 51 51 6
. .,
HR70-14 HR70-14
TitafP SECRET SUEDY-----'

TOP ECRET--egEME TOLS)
NR
1 1 . 11.
New Chinese Chineee Communist C o d a t unit unit mentioned A badly badly garbled garbled KOREA KOREA. New mentioned in in meeea~ei message: A 2 6 t Chinese C0-t niessage mentioned the 29th and 30th &&mente Triiimat Chinese Communist Menage mentioned the 29th and 30th Regiments locatiQn westof ofChorwon Chorwonin inwest west central central Korea. Korea. (SUEDE (SUEDE rd7elation tot o a a location weSt 624, to missed, missed, 26 24 Aug Aug 51) 51) 624, missed missed to
Somnentt Both the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 29th 29th and and 10th 40th Regiments Regiments would would Comment: Both normally be be subordinate subordinate to t o the the 10th 10th Division, Division, 4th 4th Army, A r m y , 2nd 2nd Army b y Group, Group, normally let Field Field Army. Army. While 1st While numerous numerous unconfirmed unconfirmed agent agent rqports reports have have related related the move move of of 1st 1st Field Field Army Army elements elements to t o Korea, Korea, it it wee WBS originally originally believed believed the that these these were were to to be be used used as ag replacements. replacemente. More More recent recent reports, reports, however, however, that have indicated that that complete complete tactical tactical units, units, possibly possibly up up to t o armies, armies, were were have indicated involved in i n this t h i s movement. movement,. involved
i s etill s t i l l too t o o fragmentary fragmentary to t o justify justify acceptance acceptance Evidence available available ia Evidence of these these 4th 4th Army Army units. units. of

Ali
AI
II I
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE 22-Mar-2010 DATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE:
3 53
-
9 9
HR70-14 HR70-14
JECRET-S0
NR
d
/
.IEoresr: Tao T w oMinim, m ineedtremmuniat Qmmunist messages messages o a f 2R S August August reRort r e r t the the attaChment attachment -137a; .ZF'EG regiments. formerly. former- subordinate o the ommuniat 10th loth subordinate tto the Chinese Chineee_Gommunist '471TEregiments ..tivision0A4th.Aritiy, two front-line divisionsof Ofthe theCMneae ChineSe Ccnmnunist Communist Mvidon,'bth.A&y9 , t oto two front-line &visions & l e , the the moatmost llogical ogical lbile 47th 47th ArMY$ A r m y , 4th 4th Field Field ArmY, Army, in i n vest west central o8ntrak Korea. Korea. ?
reason these units units t to combattroops mason for the attachment of these a combat troops in in Korea Korea would would be f for purposes, one ntatively reveals o r replacement replacemant purposes, one intercept-t intercept t ntativaly reveals thethrs attachment attachmmt "for "for combat combat purpoSes." purposes." '(SUEDE, (SUEDE,f7630630 and and 647, M",-4, M-M, 28 28 Aug Aug 51)
KOREA. Cbinese M n e s e Cbmmunist Qmunist lst 1st Field NeZd Amy units attached attached to t o 47th 47th Army in 17. Army umItS Army in 1 7 . .100EA.
647,
a)
e
Comment: to Daily.Digest Comment: The The 7 7 August Special Special Supplement Supplement t o the M l M est advanced elements e emep 8 Of of units were specu3ZZ%at speculated that these theae let 1 s t Field Field Army units were advanced a force a new'major new major Chinese Chinese Communist C-unist force in i n Korea. Korea.
i +
18. 1 8 .
Soviet rocket rocket ammunition amnunition arrives arrive6 in i n Korea: Korea: According Aceorcling to to an an 8, 8 Soviet SepteMber September preliminary preliminary analysis analysis o? of North North Korean Korean messages, messages, a shipment shipment of of over 7,000 7,000 rockets rockets has has arrived arrived in i n Korea b r s a at at a 8 sUpply supply railhead. railhead. It e over It i i4 observed by by the the reporting reporti.ng agency agencythat thatthe thesupplying...of supplying of such observed such a a quantity quantity of m u n i t i o n coUld c o a d indicate indicate the the presonce presence of of multiple multtple rocket rocket 'launchers bunchere of ammunition in i n North North Korean Korean,.bnds hands or or that that the the rodkets rockets are are destined destined for for use use in In existexid1045HH162 162W1 303~ CINCFE o TU 1045 3031, CINGFE t to ing Chinese h l n e e e roci6t rocR&tlaunchers. launchers. (SUEDE Tf.K ASA, A& 8 8 Sep Sep 51) 9.1
'
Fragments from from a ~ussion-laanrrfacfured 132 mm nun rocket rocket were were Cmnmesrb: Fragments Russian-mumfactured 132 'COanent: recently r e c a w discovered o v e r e d in i n the the US US IX I X Corps sector sector in in east central central Korea, Korea, Earlier ttbiayear h f s year opposite oppodte Chinese. Chinese Ganrmuniet ComMunist 9th 9th Army Army Group Group positions. Earlier a number of o f 132 132 mm mm rodkets mekets were captured captured intact intact by by UN UN forces. forces. a number
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FORRELEASE RELEASE DATE: 18-Mar-2010 IDATE. 18-Mar-2010
TOP SECIliT SUEDE
10 Sep 51
ss
To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
.I
Approved For ReNsie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146a110110001-6
TOP SECRET
10 September 1951
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comment represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re leige2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0064110001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1,
25X1C
Alleged plan to attack Hokkaido 18 September 19511 reports an alleged Soviet plen to attack Hokkaido immediately arbor the signing of the Japanese peace treaty, possibly 18 September.,
.
USSR,
25X1C
Comment: There have been reports that the Japanese Communist Party has :Or some months peen using the threat of a Soviet attaok on Hokkaido-. as part of its oaMpaign against the peace treaty*. This repOrt!s;a1leged origin from a member of the Soviet Seonrity police -- renders., it suspect as a plant or a fabrioated report.
24
'Kirk-sees Vishinsky on US citizens detained in Communist China: AMbassador Kirk talkedwith Soviet Foreign Minister 710h/flaky on 6 September about a Department of State eessage urging the governments of the USSR and ten other nations to intercede with Communist China on be.; half of DS citizens imprisoned or forcibly detained in China.
-
Vishinsky remarked that the menage had not been sent to the most important addressee, Conmunist China, stating,that it was not necessary to have diplomatic relations in order to exchange direct Moseages. He believed that the US citizens in question were'beinegiven jUstice aid said that inasmudh as this was a matter of Chinese internal affairs the Soviet Governmesgt"of course, could not intervene," However, the message would be oansidered,
Vishinsky complained about the m failure to recognise the "lawful" government of China and boasted-that, without the presence of the" American Seventh Fleet, the Chiang Kai-ahek regilijwould'be dispOsed of within an hour. (C SD Outgoing 220, 4 Sep; C Moicaw 397, 8 Sep 51)

TOP SECRET
Far East Command comments,that the actual plan of attack Soviet capabilities, although-itqa not considered to be the most expeditious or efficient. However, in one section of the plan a total at.teeking force of five divisions is envisaged, while in other sections it As indicated that 53 divisions will be used, Because .of these contradictory figures and other questionable aspeOts, Far East Command Considered that fnrther intestigation must precede a satisfactory evaluation. SCAF, however, concludes that the report contains enough faotual information, particularly regarding order of battle, to 'warrant careful oonsideretion. (TS Army to SD 07/1442S, 7 Sep 61)
10 Sep 51
Approved For Re lei601001/09/06
CIA-RDP79T01146A00d1Re10001-6
TOP SECRET
;.
25X1C
Soviet 'Union imposes security measures on travel of its diplomatic personnel: In order wto hinder foreign efforts at surve11,1anoo, ton diplomatic And consular missions have been ordered tO protect the itineraries of Soviet di lomatic travelers re-.
25X1C
ported that these measures include makin travel reservations'ancipur .0hasing tickets onlyyfrom the:point of departure te the first staffon any tripi. The Soviet eOnssy, legetiou, Ar..oOnsulate At that point wilt make the necessary arrangements for-the next stage of the journey.. The order, reportedly stressed the.importance of using thenew,method parti-. cularly in.arrangin ourn s'from the trsysler,e'perzanent post to other countries.
.
25X1A

,Comment:
USSR returns power station to Austrian Government: Soviet repre-' sentatives toldAustrian Chancellor Figl last meek that they were prepared to return the DonaueTbbs.Persenbeug poisistation to the Austrian Government and indicated their Willingness to.eonolude a Written agree-7 Menteirigl was told that the.!Auetrians are expected to_teloyaland nndertakfccompletion of the power-project."
"
Suit:action Would provide emimportant preoedent beicaUse.the, Russians .1 have claimed sinoe 1945 that the stationwas a part of_German Aspets.wThe U.S. High Commiseioner believed that the prchable,met*Ve 1:4 to aseure a power supply for, east AUstria ind-to-lesserpielendence. On4hOlveitern Provinoes for elahtrp sower. Figl inforiodlcnnelIy: thect,the. Government has no intention of finiehing construction *14?Pq 40Ukiiens remain in Austria., :::(0 Vienna 914, 6 Sep 51), PYOiclxi 411 The station anctpOwer site is included in' aniaehitions loner-D=4e hydroelectric preject'OOUt0Mplited by the for Figl's private assniances that constrnotiontil none relamed is Sn contrast with published.reports that the fivAyeer'developAentiriWgo forward. Austridust'expanding postwar hydroeleciii6:: induetry_has been largely conoentrated in the Western zones .of occupa-: iieg.'-the Soviet nuthorities may etpect that their conciliatory MVO will lead to allooition of Ea4 counterpart funds for construction in the:Soilet sector.
'
-
6. ..BASTERN:BCROPE,; _ALBANIA.
atioialay
Cabinet'eSt:deee not indicate pUrge of The release of Mehmetihehu as interimMinister ot State

,
Control wee.announced on 7 September. along,with 'the rePlioement of Minister of Agricultnre Ilijas Reka and of acting Minister.of:destiee Manush Myftiu, Radio Tirana statelithit Bysni Kapo vas aseignod to the Ministry of Agriculture,to give further reinforeethe# to the AgriO41474r-. al sector of the Albanian eCionomy. However, RekA Was retained.at
TOP SECRET
2
10 Sep 61
Approved For Re IOW 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040110001-6

TOP SECRET
Deputy Minister.of Agriehlture.
(A FBID, 7 Sep 51)
t: There is no reason to.believe that the shuffle of Albanian CabTast poets is an indication of a purge Lathe government. Mehmet Shehu still retains his mpre inportant Position of:Minister Of Jmterior and Manush Myttiu apparently retains his poit_as Mee Premier, Both Shehu and Myftiu were given their'teMporary a zdnisterial assignments follaSing a Cabinet shake-up in APril 1951. The appointment_of Hysni Repo, a Politburo meaber with long exporlence in-political iemdershiP;'tO therifintstry of.4grioultUre'indioates that2the sooialisation of Aabanian agriculture will adVinci liereaseaytempo.'
. .
6.
Rudolf:Manny has.been relievetof his dutica,I00,*141*:0004+0ed.

eatimia,1 'At the'same tin*, i7Pelitburo and An 0ra4.0Anii0044Apnal The:seven members of-the.1"Olitburo inClude Slaisky end Gottwald, AS well as other leading Communists. The Orgburci-consists of Gottwald and the seoretaries or the Central Committee., -lifeToiiheit duties Will te torned'erle te..044iMon Pf th0-:...Partyllement
CSECHt6t6VAKIA. Reorganization of Czeohoslovak Conmunist-Party increEees: GottWald!s powers8 Secretary General of the CsephoslovAlc..Communietjartv
ireqr$Wiet) were set upp

_
.
(R.,FBID, 7 Sep 51).

_
There is no evidence' that the'transfer Of PoWer from SlansITITTNktwald stems from."nationalist deviation"; in facti; all evidence.indicates that both men have been loyal adherents. of Moscow. The decentralizatien of power in the leadership of the Flirty fellows Soviet expreesions or dissatisfaction with.oenditione in Cachoslovakiae, ..While Gottwald's power has increased at SlanskrFs expense; the establishment of a Politburo may preclude any such centralization of power as that previously held by Slatsky.
:COmmente
Although before the war the Czeohoilovak Communist Part,. was organAsed along traditional lines mith a Politburo and au Orgburq there had been no indications since thewar of the existence of these twWbodietO
7.
TRIESTE.
Hungarians threaten to suspend shipping through Trieste: The Hul= trade forwarding agency Masped has sent a note tO its local agent in Trieste stating that it mill no length- oonsider Trieste a free', port and will be forced to divert future Shipments unless Am offioials porta a shiplent of Hungarian aluminum foil enroute tq Albania to prooeed to its-destitation.
TOP SECRET
3
10 Sep 51
Approved For Relbase 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400110001-6

TOP SECRET
US:Political Adviser Unger interpret:: the note.as a threat to withdraw Hungarian budiness frot Trieste and as i poesible:attempt te charge AlliedMilitary Government offioiala.with a violation of the peace .. treatyts+free port previsions. Unger :Stated that:Hungarian traffic during the firit six months of_1951 vas ofisome, though net Vital, iMpOrtame to the looal eoonoty and that it is imposeible to gauge the serious(0 Trieste 278, 6 Sep 51) nese of the Masped threat.
:Getter:Iv A:10 tot shipment of alumina* foil, which hap nuterons strattiirTggetronic uses, has been held in Trieste Ainoe-eatly July 1951, in aocordence with a US-Wagreement-tO:delaY the shipment thrbugh Trieste of Strategic items originating-bathe SeViet bloc destin-' ed forAlbania.. Interference with a shipmettef Zinchoelovak trucks last January atd a Hungarian meteorologieal tiansmitter,in July eventually resulted in their return to the countries of origin.
.
8.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoelav version:of last week's Rumanian border incidenti A Yugoslav broadcast states that...Rumanianfrontier guards and militaryj.. units on 5 September demmitted anotherarmed protecation ot the-lugoslat-Rumanian border.:./Aodording to the Yngoeliv iece:int, Rumanianfrontier gaards fired on a group of twenty Yugoalavpeasents-PeieefullyterkingL, their field near the border.- When a YUgoilav Commission apPeare&to investigate the-ineident, Ruthenian military Units opened:fire for tWenty minutes with heavy naohine and tommy-zuns (1 FBI% 6 Sep 51)
,
Gemment: The RUM9241346 officially charged Yugoslavia with ai "heinous attack" en Rumanian frontier guards. The.Rutanians alleged_ that Ingoiliv trecips in -"attack formation" were deployed for six hours,
Siring On Ruthenian 'Order guards.;
9.
meat.
Reorganisation of Tugoslav FOreign Office reported:imminent: The US ?Embassy Belgrade bas learned from ...well informed souroe that a re-, organizatiot of the Yugoslav FOreignIOffiCe ie impending. ..TePuty Foreign Minister llahovic and:Aisistant FOreign Miuieter Metesata. deetined te remain in the Foreign Office:with ineteased inflUence, while Assistant Minister Vilfan will be appqinted Ambeseador to Padia, and Aseietant Foreigt Minieter Vejtoda will receive:an unknown assign,
The.Tugoslav Government has also-prepdeed te send Aseistant Foreign Trade Minister Velebit as Ambasiader tO Remo, oaten/Ably te.improie Yugoslat-Italiae relations.. Embasey Belgrade belitires, howeteri.that this requested appoixeialient may have further significanoe elude Velebit is rumored to Oppese tte edonomic: theories of Bbiislidric, YUgpelavia*s
TOP SECRET
10 Sep 51
Approved For RelAISt 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006400110001-6

TOP SECRET
chief economic planner.

Comments
(S Belgrade 509, 7 Sep 51)
The reorganisation of the Foreigo Office as outlined The Yugoslav Government has followed a praotioe of periodically assigning high officials in the Foreign Ministry to important posts in the field. The present Yugoslav Ambassadors to Washington and Paris were former Assistant Foreign Ministers.
appeark rire a normal development.
Assistant Trade Minister Velebit is generally regarded as proWestern sad his appointment as Ambassador to tome . may be designed to promote better relations with Italy.

TOP SECRET
5.
10 Sep 51
Approved For Re I;IIIde 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0640110001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EA8TERN)
1.
GREECE. armikapromisstg_rdiagateb-titap of C-in-Cg The Prime Minister of Greece has told the American Embassy in Athens that the King has promised to give up the title of C-in-C of the Armed Forces shortly ,after the elections. (S Athens 1045, 31 Aug 51)
2. IBA.
IEDA-A2niemulates requeatine Oil experts frok.UN: The Iranian representative to the current UN Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva has queried the US delegate about the American attitude in the event that the UN complied with his request to run Iranos oil industry and eMployed US citizens for the job. Asserting that the Iranian representative in New,York was being instructed to ask the UN to secure experts under the Technical Assistance Program, the Iranian added that if this request were not answered Iran planned to appeal to the General Assembly. (S Geneva 158, 7 Sep 51)
3.
INDONESIA, Kahar Muzakar, leader of 4,000 guerrillas in the south Celebes, failed to respond by 3 September to the governMentls five-day surrender ultimatum, nor did more than 200 of his men take advantage of the governmehts invitation for them to report individually to the nearest military post. Government troop movements for military reinforcement in the Celebes continue. Although several light skirmishes have been repotted, no large and coordinated antiguerrilla operation has yet been launched.
The Information Ministry is conducting a propaganda campaign in larger towns and villages in the south Celebes to reinforce pro-government sentiment and to urge the people not to aid the guerrillas. (S USARMA Djakarta L 138, 5 Sep 51)
gemmen1g Considering the inefficiency of Indonesian troops as displayed in former incidents, the projected Celebes operation could easily become a long and costly one.

TOP SECRET
6
gaga: The Kingls-decision to wait until after the elections before resigning his position as C-in-C of the Armed Forces may put the palace in an extremely difficult position. Marshal Papagos, who is currently considered the leading candidate in.the forthcoming national elections,'is convinced that the palace and the government have been tampering with the army since his resignation as C-in-C. He has indicated that he will attempt to clean up the situation once he has won the elections and become prime minister. Accordingly, Papagos, if elected, may well attempt to use his position to force the King to resign as C-in-C.
gitillagAsezratlannum[in.
10 Sep 51
Approved ForRbeise 2001/8194RDP79T01146AS400110001-6
4.
nartvs Details of the aims and orMALAYA. Data Onn outlines aims of new "Independence of Malaya Party" (IMP) *ere reganization of the proposed the partyla founder. The leased in Kuala Lumpur on 6 September by Dato Onn ;ith a prograth of selfIMP will be formally inaugurated on 16 September of rate, creed or class. determination and union of 411 Malayans irrespective (R FBID Malayan Home Service, 6 Sep 51)
with political (as distinct from Comments Ths formation of a party step in Malaya. pato Onn, this narrowly communal) aims is a revolutionary considered the most energetio and enlightened policy's author, is generally of Malayan politicians. The Thai Government on 6 September announced Martial law liftsis =AM. June during the navy coup that martial law, which had been imposed on 30 effort, was terminated. martial law, the end of press censorship Comments With the lifting of by a flood of prb-Communist, may be anticipiteted. This may also be followed Charges that US equipment was used in suppressing anti-government propaganda. attempting to control Thai the coup and that the US, through ECA and MAAG, is political, economic and military activities might be expected.
5.
6.
Representatives of the Vietnam INDOCHINA. US-Vietnam ECA aereement sieneds signed an agreement Government and of the ECA mission in Indochina today which were made a year ago. covering economic aid, the first deliveries of Laos and Cambodia and the Similar agreements will shortly be signed between US. (R Press Ticker, 7 Sep 51)
'
been reluctant.to see the:conComments The Fiench authorities have US and Vietnam. On 28 June elusion of a purely bilateral pact between the signature of the agreed the French Government unexpectedly prohibited'the not been complied with. text on the ground that French Union protocol hadobjections and with textual Negotiation since that time has dealt with.theee changes subsequently proposed by the French.
(Press ticker, Bangkok, 6 Sep 51)
25X1C
Hainan Island, Three more 19000-ton submarines are Soviet Far East for Hainan soon. Russian staff offischeduled to leave the of eight submarines cers, the informant says, plan to base two flotillas CTP 2069 4 Sep 51) Taipei ( TS AA eaoh in the Hainan area.
have arrived safely
at
25X1C
25X1C no unusual military Comments base on Hainan Island. activity at Tulin, the most likely site for a su.mar ne but presumably Soviet Submarines were sighted on However, two unidentified
TOP SECRET
10 Sep 51
Approved For Re Jease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T011464W6400110001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1C
near Hainan. Because of limited port feeili30 August ties at tulin, it is not considered likely that the Russians intend at this time to base 16 submarines there.
25X1C
25X1C
8.
g
It
*A=
et:
:es
:A.
illivarious
based upon speculation Comment& Much of the above, which appears to be planning, may derive from the prorather than upon access to Peiping's The strategy Peiping in late 1949. nouncements of the WFTU conference at outlined by the conference provided for extensive Chinese aid to the "liberation" movements of East Asia, most of which lie south of China. However, the thesis that Peiping views Korea as a "sideshow" appears emphatically disproved by events; Peiping's desire for.a cease-fire is conjectural; and Soviet air and naval aid has been provided on a continuing basis. Eventual Chinese Communist military aotion against Southeast Asian nations has long been regarded as a probability; the source's extravagant statement regarding Thailand may derive from Peiping's continual denunciation of Thailand's conspicuous cooperation with the US.
9.
25X1C
25X1A
An
from Changsha reports that-Mtb Tse-tung's sappeared"-from indoctrination courses and mos ave theoretical wor of Marx Lenin and Stalin. the writin have been replaoed by translation

..
25X1A
of is allegedly the subsource of the following summary Peiping proposes possible military operations. aggression," leaving northeastern Asian questions to emphasize "southward "side"largely" to the Soviets. Peiping regards the Korean conflict as a has been "warned" that Soviet show," sincerely desires a cease-fire, and sir and naval aid will be provided only after a Korean settlement. PeipingT "would prefer" to take action to gain access tO valuable base's and resources (s utheast Asia and is "es ecially fearful" Of US aid to Thailand.
25X1A
Comment; This report is contrary to information from All other sources Tseand is regarded as'very doubtful. The later theoretical .works of Mao have been given enormous cir-tung -- which are Stalinist in orientation--culation inside and outside Communist China, and are at the topof Peiping's of .,list of required reading. It is also true, however, that translations widely disseminated in China, And the the Communist fathers have also been numbers the appearance of such works in large source may have been led by to overestimate their comparative status.
TOP SECRET
8
10 Sep 51
Approved For Ro 'Wise 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A610400110001-6

TOP SECRET
10,
cdukrehlavg_zumered,Sasve_derseted from Communists. The US Consul General at Hanoi forwards reports that Chu Chia-pi, *ell-knotCommunist guerrilla leader in Yunnan0 defected from the Communists "several months ago."
(S Hanoi 1350.6 Sep 51)
Comments These reports -- or rumors -e are believed false. Chu Chiabecame well-known pi, who defected from the Nationalists after World War as a guerrilla leader in Yunnan and has frequently been reported as playing a major role in Peipines plans for assistance to Burmese Communist forces. Chu's defection at the time stated -- presumably to Li Mi's Nationalist forces -- would almost certainly have become known through the Nationalists.
II,
The major oil companies at Hong Kong have indicated that they will not bunker the Polish vessel, but the US Consul General believes that the ship may call at the colony as an empty ship0 appealing for bunkers to return to Poland. '(C Hong Kong 910, 5 Sep 51; C Hong Kong 942, 6 Sep 51)
12., CHINA/KOREA The Third Division of the Soviet Air Force, equipped with jet aircraft, has been reportedly ordered to complete its transfer from Sakhalin to Dairen by 15 September. This division is to defend Manchuria and aid the "Volunteer Air Force" in the coming offensive in Korea. (TS AA Taipei CTP 2060 4 Sep 51)
Comments A remarkably similar Chinese Nationalist report of late AugPst alleged the transfer of a "Third Air Division" from Sakhalin to Mukden and Dairen to enter the Korean War aa volunteers, "when the cease fire negotiations break down." No Soviet unit of this designation has been identified .on Sakhalin, but movements of air units in this area could occur without detection.
13.
KORZA. Additional indications seen of Communist offensive intentions: The US Far East Command on 7 September observes that "eeveral attacks (one of regimental size supported by tanks) launched 6 September against friendly patrol bases along thp west central front indicate increased sensitivity to UN: patrol action and that the enemy is noving his counterreconnaissance screen forward in this area." (S CINCFE Telecon 5130, 7 Sep 51)

TOP SECRET
9
11.
Insurance underwriters in Hong Kong report that an insurance policy has been issued to dover the shipment of cotton from Karachi to Tsingtao on the Polish vessel Kilinski. Although premiums covering war risk to Tsingtao have been fully paid, the Polish master radioed that the destination has been ohanged to Whampoa in South China, near Hong Kong.
Eauliksgagasuntasighianth2Akijaanistan:
asajossajattiownediznating_tasktajkirsigts
10 Sep 51
Approved For Re 144014 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00%00110001-6

TOP SECREDI
Comments The adoption of strong counter-reconnaissance measures prior to an offensive is standard tactical doctrine in all armies. In additional factor 13 seen in the presence of armor a) far forward. The enemy has committed his armor only once before in his previous 1951 offensives (five tanks in an abortive attempt'on 1 May).
14.
Communists react to UN's charge of "Caucasian troops in Korees A 6 September broadcast from Peiping labels the UN's statement that "' Caucasian volunteers"' are in Korea as a "nightmare creation of Van Fleet's fears. The broadcast concludes with the statement thatthe two Communist correspondents in Kaesong Winnington and Burchett -are the only Caucasians in North Korea other than embassy personnel in Pyongyang. (U FBID, NCNA Peiping, 6 Sep 51)
Comments The CommunistO immediate reaction to this claim Is interesting although no deduction can be made as to Communist motives.' It is, generally accepted that Soviet personnel are present in North.Korean rear areas serving as advisers, technicians, and as anti-aircraft gunners.
15.
25X1C
er eng visited the wes cen a orean town of Ich'on on 15 August. Peng planned to establish an advance command post there because '"a drive ngainst Seoul after the ooase-fire negotiations break down"' was to be launched from this sector. Similarly, the C-in-C of' the Chinese Communist 41r Force on 21 August visited Pyongyang, where an advanced air command post has been established. The soUrce alleges further that 11/411 airfields in North Korea are, to be serviceable by the end of Septembe."'
25X1C 25X1C
25X1A
'
Comments While there is no confirmative evidence concerning these visits, it is highly probable that the Communist command will establiah forward command posts prior to the next offensive. The town of lehl6n is well located for such a post. There are a number of indications that infantry and armored strength is being concentrated in the western sector in preparation for an attack along the approaches to Seoul. No information is available concerning Chinese Communist air activities in Pyongyang. It is considered doubtfral that the Communists could have all airfields in North Korea operational by the end of September.
'
16.
South Korean inflation threat grows, Ambassador receipt of a 5 September letter from the BOK Minister Muccio reports the of Finance drawing Mucciots attention to the serious condition of BOK finances. It is pointed out that currency in circulation increased
by 15 billion Loja
TOP SECRET
10 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400110001=VP
, '7"".
Approved For Relari001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001441410001-6

TOP SECRET
and that the ROE loaned oVer 36 billion wen to the UN forces for Military use during the month of August. This currency increase raised the commodity price index during the month from 2,682 to 3,067. The letter continues that if the "settlement for the loan be delayed, the current inflation.Might get out of the government's control."
Ambassador Muccio comments that the anticipated, seasonal currency circulation rise during the harvest season, coupled with the already abnormal monthly increases, "may bring hyper-inflation unless every possible anti-inflationary factor is exploited to the fullest extent."
Comments The burden of financing UN military purchases of native materials and labor during the Korean war has fallen heavily on the already weak ROK financial structure. UN aid goods are not yet in sufficient quantities to absorb any material amoUnt of the inflated arriving ROE currency.
17.
,
Anti-Communist bill reportedly under preparations The Japanese press that a bill which will virtually outlaw the Japanese,Communist Party .is being prepared secretly in the Attorney-General's office. al MD, 6 SeP 51)
JAPAN.
reports
Comments Sentiment on outlawing the party appears to be divided within thagovernment, opponents pointing out that failure of the police to apprehend the missing Communist leaders indicates that the police are unable to cope With an underground Communist movement. The government, however, is expected to prepare permanent legislation to replace occupation-direoted ordinances upon which the government is currently basing its anti-Communistactivities.
18.
I. 0 h n: The Japanese Government on 7 September announced the depurge of 10,649 more profeesional military of ranks up to army colonel and navy captain. The list includes 865 colonels. This is the fifth list of former servicemen to be depurgedi Still remaining on the list are 40,000 gendarmes and some 10,000 former servicemen, including generals and admirals. Whether.these purges's will be cleared will be decided late next week. (R MID Ticker Kyodo 7 Sep 51)
Crangants The depurges of former officers may be contributing to the increasing discussion of rearmament as recently noted in Japan by CINCFE.

TOP SECRET
Another manifestation of acute ROE concern with the inflation crisis was the overwhelming National Assembly vote on 6 September to send a special economic mission to the US to obtain settlement of the outstanding loan to the UN military command. (S Pusan 235, 7 Sep 51; S Pusan 238, 8 Sep 51)
11
10 Sep 51
Approved For Relate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A044#00110001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION'3
(WESTERN)
Allies map countermeasures in Berlin: Meeting in Berlin on. 6September, the Allied Deputy High Commissioner's and Berlin Commandants discussed means of combatting the latest Soviet squeeze on West Berlin. They decided to dispatch a letter to Soviet authorities Orotesting inter ference with free Allied access to Berlin, and to instruct German officials to submit proposals on the imposition of a tax both on East German barges travelling in Meet Berlin canals and on East German vehicles travelling in Western Germany. The above countermeasures were to be implemented by 17 September at the latest if the USSR failed to remove its restrictions as requested. They further decided the West should provide all possible assistance to alleviate Berlin transport difficulties, particularly with respect to perishable shipments such as milk.. The meeting was marked by French reluctance to adopt firm retaliatory measures. The French even suggested that the Allies permit the signing of an interzonal trade agreement between East and West Germany, but the. US and UK representatives, in rejecting this suggestion, emPhasized that such action would represent "a horrible loss of face for theWest." German officials from the Federal Republic and West Berlin who were called in to discuss the situation with the Allies showed little enthusiasm for firm countermeasures. (S Berlin 364, 7 Sep 51)
GERMANY.

TOP SECRET
12
'
Comment: In applying its recent series of harassing measures in Berlin, the USSR has succeeded in creating a situation where discussiOn of counter measures in each case inevitably produces division and haggling among Allied and German officials, therefore reducing the chances for effective retali ation.
2.
New conetitutional court finally to be established: West Germany's new Federal Constitutional Court will probably be organized in time to com mence sessions sometime next week. '.Establishment of the court has been delayed for several months, largely because of the failure of the major political partiea to agree on the 24 justices And, more recently, on the president of the court. They finally agreed on 4 SepteMber to name Dr. Hermann HoepkerAschoff as president. The new president, reepected in Bonn and regarded by local US officials as a fortunate choice, is a member of the Free Democrats, and is expected to be a strong president. The first case before the court will probably be a complaint that the Iplebiscite scheduled Tor 16September to determine whether a SouthWest State should be formed within West Germany is illegal. (R Bonn 151, 5 SeP 51)
10 Sep 51
Approved For Relot 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A069400110001-6

TOP SECRET
Comment: The prolonged controversy over choosing the court's members has 671137Wconsideration of such important issues as the outlawing of certain extremist parties, including the Socialist Reich Party. The new president was originally opposed by "states' rights" interests on the grounds that he was known to be a centralist.
3.
In a subsequent conversation with Donnelly, Fig]: said that neither the .coalitien nor his position was in danger. Be described the opposition leaders within his party as rprovindial abnighties" who Oriticize but are Unwilling, to accept responsibilities outside their own previnces. (C Vienna 900,
6 sep 51)
Comment: The Chancellor's dismissal of opposition'to hie partY leadership FroTATvincial" is scarcely supported by the facte. Defeated presidential candidate Heinrich Gleissner, governor of Upper Austria has openlY fleuted government policies in the meat crisis. While supporting-the Chancellor, the Socialists themselves have not been averse to encouraging defection of People's Party members to splinter groups on the extreme right.
Rightists move tO form new political party: Negotiations are proceeding among former members of the People's Party-and a Salzburg group connected with the Union of Independents for the organization of a new political party, possibly to be called the "Freedom Party.r Participating in the current negotiations, in addition to the Union of Indekendents group, are members of the Junge Front -- a "reformist" clique redentlY expelled from the Peoplele Party and followers of Karl Aichorn, parliamentary deputy who defected from the People's Party. Component groupe of the new party are comparatively insignificant in number. They believe, however, that by cooperating with the Union of Independents they ban Pim a rightist bloc of sufficient strength to obtain People's Party cooperation and possibly the opportunity to participate in the government. Present.plans allegedly call for a constituent convention in Vienna in September, joint participation in future elections, and a sharing of any electoral victories on an equal basis. (S JointWeeks 35, USFA, 1 Sep 51)
:
AUSTRIA. Federal Chancellor reportedly threatened by party revolt: Socialist Vice-Chancellor Schaerf has informed CoMmissioner Donnelly that rightist elements of the conservative People's Party, led by governors of the Western provinces and by several Cabinet ministers including Foreign Minister Gruber, are seeking to replace Chancellor Figl with someone more sympathetic to their views. Characterizing the maneuvering as the beginning of a "Fascist" movement, Schaerf asserts that Figl may survive until the next general election in.19530 but adds that the opposition is strong. The Sodialiets, Schaerf contends, are apprehensive that the Coalition may break doWn: he asserts.that.the Socialists will never participate in a government that includes both the People's Party and the near-reactionary Union of Independents.
TOP SECRET
13
10 Sep 51
Approved ForRehhersO2001/09/06:=ADP79T01146A0O0480110001-6
TOP SECRET
Comment: The relativelY'negligible Junge Front, long critical of Oor operation with ihe Socialists, wss ousted from the People's Party in JUly after attributing the party's defeat in the Presidential election to weak kneed acquiescence to the Socialists' demands. Since both Junge Front and : Union of Independents leaders strongly espouse sn antiMarxist cense, it was virtually inevitable that the former should graVitate toward the'latter, which demonstrated considerable strength in the presidential elections. If. the Union of Independents should succeed in corralling the factious elements orthe extreme right, it will become a potent movement which con dapitalize upbn increasing dipsension within the otherwise loyal membership of the People's Party,
S.
CoMment.:T The optimistic observation of the Soviet official, probably Deputy Commissioner Tsinev, has the appearances of conversational for bearance rather than Of firm policy commitment. It should be noted, however, that Soviet authorities have recently demonstrated an increased sensitivity to Austrian popular opinion, After years of representations by the Austrian Government, the Soviet headquarters has within the last week released information concerning the fate of a number of Austrians deported to the Soviet Union and has promised that all such persons will now be permitted to communicate with their families in Abstria.
6.
FRANCE. Prethises of another Communist agency damaged: For the third time itiT67171 August, the premises of A Communist agency in France have suffered
bomb damage. Early in the morning of 6 Septetber, a plastic change ma exploded at the entnance of the Banque ComMerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord, which handles FrenchCommunist Party funds and has close connections with the Soviet Embassy. The, interior of the bank was damaged extensively, and all windomm within 150 yards were shattered.
This incident may be the work of irresponsible rightist elements, although it is not improbable that the Communists maybe atteMpting to create false charges of "Fascist provocation." (R Paris 1481, 6 Sep 51)

TOP SECRET
14
Soviet official expresses optimism on treaty prospects: According to Chancellor Figl, an unidentified Soviet official in-Vienna has recently told him that the etate treaty problem is being studied end that chances for agneement may be better after the San Francisco cenferenee, The SoViet of ficial refused, however, to elaboratelurther.on the subject, remarking only that the Mbstern powers and not the USSR have heretofore prevented,agree ment. Chancellor Figl continues to urge the necessity for a meeting 'of the four treaty deputies in the near future, pointing out that the Con:a:Sion of a treaty with Japan and a contractual agreement withWestern Germany mill make the resumption of treaty negotiations a psychological necessity for the Austrians. (S Vienna 912, 6 Sep 51)
10 Sep 51
ApprovedForReque.2001/09/06:,CIAMRDP79T01146A0195440110001-6
10P SECRET
Comment: A similar attack on CGT headquarters on 6 June was labelled by thrnainists es "Gaullist provocation." . Only secondary Communist libraries, reading roome, and the bank -- have been installations
involved so far. No such attacks are likely upon the Communist headquarters at 44 rue le Teletier, Paris, because it is always under heavy party guard.
7.
-Earlier, the US Embassy reported that Communist attempts to.criticite government policies'were less spirited than at last.year's conference and that the-usual Con*hist claqUe in the gallery'wee missing. . al London 1247) 6 Sep 51; U NY Times, 7 Sep 51)
'
Comment: fle close vote on the issue of welfare legislation indicates that tabor Government supporters are still directing formidable pressure againet the government's policy of cutting civilian living standards to pay for accelerated rearmament. The diminution of Communist attacks on government policy is probably attributable to a deliberate Communiet tactic of not embarrassing the anti-Communist critics of these same policies.
8.
DENNARK. Government reluctant to support US on Czech issue in GATT: The US-Mblissy at Copenhagen reports that the Danish Government is reluctant to approve the US proposal to terMinate USipbligations -be CZechoslovakia Undet the General Agreement on Trade And Tariffa. If neceseary, however, it will prebably vote with the US. Foreign Office officials fear that by emphasizing political rather than economic grounds for obtaining inter national approval to termifiate American tariff commitments to the Czechs, the US is setting a dangerous precedent that may be exploited by countries like Egypt-or India, The Denes also indicated their displeasure with the commitments, and US Congress' practice of overriding by cited the recent limitatiOn on Danish cheese exports to the US. (C Copenhagen 201, 5 Sep 51),
US Pargaron Czechoslovakia, also has misgivings about making the case

on epecifically political grounds. The French refuse to support the US

Comment: TOp SECRET
15
toVernuient'Well'are poliey narrewli avoids defeat' it critical trade union conference: After scoring relatively easy victories over left-wing critics of the government's foreign pelicY and.rearmament ptogreM, the Trades Union Congtess leadership ran into difficialtiee at the 6 Septeither Meeting of the annual conference on a resolution attacking ihe healtheervice charges -- the issue over whieh Aneurin Bevan resigned from the cabinet last spring. The resolution was defeated., but only by a comparetiVely small margin under rules compelling delegations to cast their votes in a block; Press reports maintain that the majority of the delegates in the hall favored the resolution.
tillTDD-ktIODDM.,,
fiat international
The British Government, though promising to support the
10 Sep 51
Approved ForRehlisp2001/09/06:CIA7RDP79T01146A0G9140110001-6
Top SECRET
for juridical reasons. The Danes' annoyance over Congressional restrictions on the importation of Danish cheese into the US is heightened by the fact that ECA has sought to stimulate such dollar-earning exports from Denmark.
9.
The-Strike, the fifth by government employees since the of President Arbenz in March, reveals the relatiVe weakness of the executive department and the relative strength of Congress, which is dominated by leftist, pro-labor parties. Although-the government may have to resort to financial juggling, it mill probably grant wage increases despite the "illegal" nature of the strike.
inaugriTIZE
H- Comment:
10.
VENEZUELA. Non-comMissioned officers arrested in plot against miperiors: The US Embassy in Caracas reports that enlisted men and possibly noncommissioned officers at four widely separated army garrisons were involved in a plot "against officers," and that 20 sergeants were arrested in the Maracaibo area in a general:round-up of opposition leaders. indicates that the non-commissioned officers were the primary plotters and that the sergeants were arrested for "turning enlisted men away from the officers." The:plot was supposedly sponsored by the outlawed Accion Democratica party with the aid of some of this year's army recruits. The government believes that the situation is under control, but ie on the alert for possible AD or ComMunist attempts to embarrass it during the petroleum convention now in progress with officials of various foreign governments in attendance. The embassy comments that the armed forces continue to appear united but that "s oradic outbursts are always poSeible." 25X1A (C. Caracas 123, 7 Sep 51; This is the'first report of organized discontent in the of the army. Since the alleged plot got no further than attempts to "turn the men against the officers," and since apparently ne officers were involVed, there is no reason to believe that the government will not continue to keep the situation in hand even though further "sporadic outbursts" might occur.
Comment:
GUATEMALA. Another strike of government employees provisionally settled; Congressional and labor leaders have settled the one-day strike of some 5,000 government customs house workers. Prior to the strikes President Arbenz reportedly told the workers that such a strike would constitute a "catastrophic blow to the country." When the strike was announced, Minister of Labor Charnaud MacDonald promptly declared it illegal and warned that "the instigators of illegal strikes remain pubject to legal responsibilities." Ridiculing this statement, the strikers indicated that they would remain out Until Congress acceded te their demands. They subsequently returned to work after congressional leadera agreed 'be consider their petition demanding 20 to (U --.----NY Tines) 7 Sep 51; La Prensa (NY), 7 Sep 51) 75 percent wage increases.
25X1C
lowererfferons
TOP SECRET
16
10. Sep 51
Approved FOr Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400110001-6
...is...
Ut
TOP SECRET
ASSIFIED when 14topprecle&RHERekeesstt2c611/00/01p:SeqAtigmititoitneMoDor declassi-
fiedpoihen filled in form ts detached from controlled document.

DOCUMENT DESCR IPT ION
SOURCE DOC. NO.
DOC
.
REG I STRY
CIA
271TellEjOii 1
DATE DOCUMENT RECE I VE0
DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
ATTENTION: This form IMO be placed on top o/ and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified TOP Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. TOp Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each Individuat who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
S I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
OFF I CE/D I V.
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect ed from Top Secret mate lal it shall be completed In the appropriate space below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for

DOWNGRADED
TO

DATE
TIME
DATE
record.
DESTROYED
By
D I SPAT CHED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signatore)
TO
BY
(Signature)
W I TRESSED BY
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
,
OFFICE
Mfroved For Abi6Wse .2001/09/06 : CPAIlkDP79T0 MAb00400110001-6

TOP SECRET
FORM 4,0, Se Ude PRIKVIOUS EDITIONS. 8.73
(40)
TOP SECREr
setfit-rwrintoimAtead463611812119 WI -6 UNCLASSIFIED when b afififeria ErtitrIRoioassavetwau from controlled document. fietrwhen filled in form is detached SECRET DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP
DOCUMENT. DESCR I PT ION
d or declossi-
REG I STRY
CIA CONTROL NO.

-DATE DOCUMENT RECE I VED
SOURCE
DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
COPY NO. NUMBER OF PAGES _NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
LOGGED BY
It
received by the Central Intelligence AgencY or attached to each Toy Secret document until such time as it Is downgraded, destroyed. ATTENTION: This form will be placed on toy of and remain attached to the document and those individuals whose official and will Top Secret Control personnel or classified Top Secret within the CIA Secret matter is limited to material will sign this forin transmitted outside of CIA. Access to TOp receive and/or release the attached Top Secret Secret document will sign and duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who Each. individual who sees the TOp provided. and indicate period Of custody in the le) t-hana columns indicate the date Of handling in the right-hand columns.
OFF ICE
shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below When this form is detached from Top Secret material it record. and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for D I SPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) DESTROYED
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT':
DOWNGR ADED
TO
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF I CE

SIGNATURE
DATE
T I ME
REFERRED TO
RECE I VED
RELEASED
DATE
TIME
S I GNATURE
SEEN BY
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
py (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
App sued For Rel eebre1001/09106 : CIA-RthY79T01146 A)F 0F00400110001-6

E
(40)
FORM
ius 1,1
Du's
col'? ioi
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re lei42001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400110001-6
TOP SECRET
10 September 1951
Copy No. 37 rt
CIA No. 49341-A

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECR ET
ApprovedForRekSea2001/09/06:0A4RDP79T01146A0061140110001-6
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
IRAN. Opposition to Iran's prime minister gathers strength: The DS AMbassador in Tehran states that an organized plan to force the resignation of Prime Minister Mossadeq is under way in Parliament's lower house. The ambassador adds that British-supported Seyyid Zia currently is favored as Mossadeqts successor, although Qavam is also being seriously considered. (TS, S/S.Tehran 932, 7 Sep 51). Comment: Anti-Mossadeq forces have increased their activity with the approach of the pre-election adjournment of parliament. Believing that settlement of the oil problem is impossible while Mossadeq reMains prime minister, and aware that the government has been strengthening its electoral position by placing its sympathizers in strategic positions in the provincial governments, members of the opposition are making an increased effort to replace Mossadeq before parliament adjourns...
2.
BURMA. US asks Chinese Nationalists to withdraw their troops from Burma: The US Department of State has instructed its ambassador in Taipei to stress the serious concern of the US over the continued.presence of Nationalist troops in Burma. The ambassador is requested to point out that the situation could develop most unfavorably from the international viewpoint and to express the hope that the Taipei government will make every effort to withdraw their troops from Burma as quickly as possible. (SI S/S to Taipei 209, 5 Sep 51),
Comment: Nationalist forces in Burma constitute a continuing pretext for an invasion of Burma by the Chinese Nationalists.
3.
Burmese views regarding Japan: A high official of the Burmese Foreign Office informed a US EMbassy officer in Rangoon that his government expects to take up again the matter of a Japanese peace treaty with India and Indonesia after the San Francisco conference. He indicated that Burma favored a simple treaty which avoided all controversial issues, called for the termination of war, recognized Japanese sovereignty, and provided for trade. The official pointedly played down the idea of an Asian peace conference. (C, S/S Rangoon 257, 6 Sep 51).
Comment: Burmats position as revealed in this report reflects strong Indian influence and confirms the belief that the reparations issue was exploited as a convenient means to avoid antagonizing the Soviet bloc through attendance at the San Francisco conferenoe.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400110001-6 20 Sep 5 1
H R70-14 HR70-14
7.

TOP SECRET
KOREA. Additional Additional indication indication of of Communist Communist offensive offensive intention intention seen: seen: A A KOREA. -minary f i e l danalysis analysieof'Communistiasssages of' Communist wseages in i n Korea Korea asserts asserts that t h a t an an F;ITminary field urgent 7 7 September September request request for far ammunition ammunition status status reports reports to t o be be submitted submitted urgent t h e following following day day is reminiscent reminiscent of a e n t f from r o m Nor*h the a message message s sent North Korean Korean headhead quarters to to a a front front line l i n e corps corps 5 5 days days before before the the May offensive. offensive. (SUEDE quarters (SUEDE TIK TIK 1049, 1049, 9 9 Sep Sep 51) 51)
Comment: Comment: Communist Communist forces forces in i n Korea Korea are are in in a a high high state s t a t e of of readiness readiness and could c m ulaunch n c ha a powerful pmerful sustained suetained offensive offenaive at a t any any time. time. and
sum
11 Sep 51
'APPROVED FOR ~PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: (DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
I
411k.
/ 5
' 1
HR70-14
*
7. 7.
*-
SUED
a 1.2srcl
CsB
NR
3. Tass Tass denies denies presence presenceof of Soviet Soviet troops troops in in North North Korea: Korea:
~PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 23-Mar-2010 (DATE. 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
To learn about OCR and PDF Compression go to our website

USSR USSR
, 'L,*
ithas hasbeen beenauthorized authorizedto todeny deny Tass states statesthat thatit Tass and the that "Soviet forces forces of of the the white whiterace, race, and arein inNorth NorthKorea, Korea," '' according t oa like, are to broadcast broadcastfrom fromRadio RadioMoscow. Moscow.
-4-
1 TOP SECRET SUEDE I + l B ? SUEDE m
7. 7.
*J
'DieSECRET SUEDIe SUEk

Comment: Comment: On On 6 6September, September, Radio Radio Peiping Peiping also, also' denied Although there has been denied that that "Caucasian "Caucasianvolunteers" volunteers were in Korea. Korea. Although no identification identification of of Soviet Sovietunits unitsin inNorth NorthKorea, Korea, Soviet Sovietmilitary military assistance assistance no does exist in the form form of of air air force, force, anti-aircraft anti-aircraft and and air airwarning warning personnel. personnel.
This authoritative Soviet dental denial may indicate does not notplan planto to expand expandits its participation participation in in the the Korean Korean war in that the USSR USSR does tn the near future or or that that it itwill will not not publicize publicize the use of of "international Ynternational volunvolunteers" as teers'' assuch. such.
FAR EAST
TOP SECRET SUEDE SUEDE

***
.t
Approved For Relbelie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C14140130001-4
TOP SECRET
12 September 1951
DAILY DIGEST
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re bilge 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S00130001-4

IP
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1,
USSR. East Germany sendsaid tO North Korea: The German Democratic BS. public has sent "large quantities of medicine and clothing to North Korea, according to a Telepress report broadcast by Radio Peiping. Included in the consignment are two ambulance cars, 1,893 cases and 30 barrels of medicine, 801 cases of textiles and clothing, 15LI. cases of varied gifte and eight million marks collected during the past year. FBID, 10 Sep 51)'
Comment: Korea.
.
This is the first mention of East German aid to North
2,
FINLAND. TOD Communist leaders reported to have been in Moscow: The US Legation in Helsinki reports that the three top leaders of the Finnish Communist Party departed for Moscow during the end of August, ostensibly on a recreation trip, Another report the three Finnish Communists were in Miyanilthitthtenoscoitturned to Finland during the first week of September.
1.111states that
25X1c
Coincidentally, at the time of the trip the Helsinki press discussed reports of dissatisfaction within the Communist-front Socialist Unity Party,over the question of subservience to the Communist line. Denying reports of a gplit, a party spokesman declared the party plans to publish an organ of its own. In comment, the legation points out that since such a publication has little prospect of being economically rewarding, an inp. creasing sense of individuality on the part of the meMbers of the party 10 (R Helsinki, JW-350 31 Aug 51; is indicated. Sep 51) In June certain members of the Socialist Unity Party were Comment: reliably reported to be endeavoring to break their party away from the Loss of control over Communists, and apparently achieving some success. this party would be a distinct setback to the Communists, and could certainly account for the trip of the Communist leaders to Moscow. Not Only is the Socialist Unity Party the most effective Communist approach to Finnish intellectuals, but dissidence within this party has previously showed signs of spreading into the Communist Party itself. It is also possible that the Finnish Communist leaders received instructions in Moscow concerning.new tactics to be used in a renewed campaign among Finnish labor groups,
25X1C
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIARDP79T01146A000400H088?-451
Approved For Re lbete 2001/09/06 : CIA-R0P79T01146A00400130001-4

TOP SIEMET
3.
POLAND. Pastoral.letter indicates Church not intimidated-by trials of In a strong pastoral letter on 2 September, Polish Catholic priests: Primate Wyszynski affirmed the repolution of the Church to maintain "its right" to provide religious teaching as aa integral part of the education of Polish youth. The letter also contained a stein warning to those parents whO migh4 decide to compromise with their Catholic faith and permit their.children to be brought up without religious education. The US Embassy ia Warsaw comments that the firm tone of the letter and its em.. phasis upon the divine rights'of Polish citizens seems to indicate the recent secret trials of the Catholic clergy have not shaken the deter'mination of the hierarchy to resist further encroachments of.the Polish (C Warsaw 229, Government iato the.religious life of the Polish people.
9 8eP 51)
Comment: The Church is not in a position to enforce the teaching Of religion in the state controlled schools. The.call by the Primate to parents to give their children religious education at home is an effort to circumvent the weak poeition of the Church in regard to religious education in schools.
4.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav actions further jeopardize Yugoslav-Italian relit,Within three days after the postponement of the Trieste elections, tiens: the Yugoslav Government has taken a stand.which will make bilateral negroOn 8 September the Yugoslav Foreign tiations over Trieste more difficult. Office protested the anti-Yugoslav campaign being conducted by Italian Government -spokesmen and propaganda organs., In a 9 September speech celebrating Yugoslav Navy Day, Marshal Tito denounced Italy's anti-Yugoslav campaign and irredentist claims. Be stressed Yugoslavia's desire for peaceful relations with Italy and a settlement of their outstanding issues, but warned that Italy should not forget it is dealing with a new Yugoslavia that "knows what it wants and what it must do to defend its peaceful life." (U Belgrade 326, 10 Sep 51; R FBID, 10 Sep 51)
Comment: These actions are another indication that the Yugoslav Government has no desire to settle the Trieste issue at this time. Prior to the poetponement of the Trieste elections on 6 September, Ytgoslavia had maintained a relatively moderate tone regarding the antiYugoslav
campaign in. Italy.

TOP SECRET
12 Sep. 51 2 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
Approved For Relliadse 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A614400130001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
Israeli Israeli Prime Minister still unable to form government: MAPAI party, of the moderate socialist Prime Minister Ben Gurion, leader government. after sik weeks of negotiations has not yet managed to form a 30 July elections, Ben Gurion$ whose party obtained only a plurality in the the conservahas been trying to reach accord with the next largest parties, tive General Zionist and the extreme leftist MAPAM.
ISRAEL'.
1.
Minister to include the Zionists or MAPAM would force the Prime inability to form to form a coalition with five splinter groups or admit his (C !MAMA Tel Aviv 5731 Weeka 9, 10 SeP 51) a government.
Failure
Unless either,. or both of these partiea considerably modifies its in accora position, Ben Gurion will have to turn to smaller parties more him Only a slim working mat with his position. Such a coalition.would give jority and would leave him a strong opposition.
2.
144 $: INDONESIA. Forty Chinese students left Djakarta in June for Peiping, where' veer noursa: OoMmunist theY will attend a special school' of polities run by the Chinese and will include comGovernment. The course is expeeted to lastj'our years methods. ideology sed propaganda plete indootrination in Comaunist
;

0,a=11
I
strongly, with the General Zioniste Comment: The Prime Minister disagrees strongly with the MAPAM on on many domestic issues. He disagrees even more major foreign policy issues.
.4
ID
to
The trip.was organized by the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta, to which also supplied the students with soeoiaj. letters of introduction prominent Chinese in China. freduently leave.Indonesia Comments Small groups of Ohinese students Communist China... It is' not known whether ar-to, pursue higher education in itHthe. above, report. have been made for rangements similar to those 'mentioned other students.
and coyert The Peiping regime is knoin to be training agents for overt training pro Asia, butthe existence of a operations throughout Southeast gram of the above duration, has not previously been reported.
'
25X1A
3.
The Viet.Minh is definitely preparing INDOCHINA. Viet Minh action expected: It is expected that the a new campaign, according to French intelligence: (S OARMA of the delta. attack will be aimed at areas to the north and west MC 235-51, 9 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
3
12 Sep 51
Approved ForRaliase 2001109/06 : CIA-RDF79101146/S0400130001-4

I.
TOP SECRET
the attack. No time was specified for the beginning:of
Comments
4.
Results-of the Democratic Party wins Cambodian elections: Democratic Party 53 out National Assembly eleotions of 9 September give the went to the The next largest vote of a total 78 seats in the assembly. 51) Pnom Penh 15, 11 Sep Liberal Party, which won 19 seats.
. '
is similar to that in previous CamComments This pattern of voting shown itself slightly more inbodian elections. The Democratic Party has All parties in clined than the Liberal Party to resist French control.as their slogan: All have conservative. Cambodia are however, essentially "For King and country."
actives A high PHILIPPINES. 2unraSino-PhilinnineAomauniet_aroub_Soen other Party organapparently distinct from level Communist liaison group, 25X1C The izations in the Philippines, is now active, but Chinese and Filipino mem ers, group, whioh is reported to include both appears to be primarily concerned with improving to be direeted from China, settling differen the military capabilities of the Huks and with comment5XlA Communists. regard to the policy line and tactics of Philippine important rol The Chinese Communist Party is believed to have an integrating it with directed in part toward 25X1A Philippine Communist movement, Philippine leaders appear the Far East. international Communism throughput Dissension may arise enforcement. to ASpend upon superior Chinese security Filipino fear -of the Chinese. ult of the traditional
5.
25X1A
6.
movement has Ths Chinese role in the Philippine Communist others which indicate increasing ' been obscure. This report supplements logic of the situation, Chinese participation and which are supported by the movement, find their eapa.,-. *herein the Maks, who have virtually embodied the to the Philippine Commabilities at a low ebb. Chinese Communist assistance increased activity by nista in ideological and tactical matters may reflect created under the IFTU Liaison Bureau in Peiping. The Liaison Bureau was for providing apparentlyas an instrument Soviet auspices in late 1949 throughout Asia, but little assiatanco of this nature to Communist movements subsequent operations. has been learned of its

gomanss
TOP SECRET
nw 2 s The US Far .t C. E including 650 jet East Air Force estimates that 1,255 combat aircraft, This represents an increase of 205 fighters, are no* in Communiet China. Over half, or 785, of these aircraft are aircraft over the June estimate. 2,000-2,500 ru believed to be in Manchuria. FEAT estimates that at least in Chinese are qualified combat pilots, 'and an additional 4,000-5,000 are until replace Russians gradually training. FEAF expects Chinese pilote to
CHINA.
12 Sep 51
Approved For Rehop le 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0b000130001-4

TOP SECRET
the CCAF becomes a truly Chinese Communist force. 1 Sep 51)
(S FEAF Tokyo, AX 3273,
Comment: These figures correspond roughly with the current Washington USAF A-2 estimate of 1,260 combat aircraft, of whioh 600 are jets, in Communist China. The large number of Chinese pilots estimated to have completed or to be in training (6,000-7,500) is an indication that the CCAF will continue to expand.
25X1C
'
7.
25X1C
25X1A
'Comment:
parachute
8. Liu Pc-oh'eng
revorteny relieved and transferred:. Generel.Liu Po oh'eng, long-time commander of the Chinese Communist 2nd Field Army.based in the Southwest, is reported. by Nationalist intelligence to have been re lieved of that command and transferred to Nanking 'to head a military school. Mo.Lung is said to be the new-commander of the 2ndlield Army. (S Alusna Taipei, C-3, 100624 Sep 51)
'
Comments Similar reports of Liu's actual'or impending relief'and trans,fer have been received periodically for several. months. Although Liu was the only ocimmander of a Field Army not to'be accorded favorable mention in a recent official history of the Chinese Communist Partyp reports of hie :fall from favor are still regarded 'as doubtful. If Lin has indeed been relieved and transferred, Ho Lung would be a credible replacement..
4ponintmenta to Cominform agenov 511e2041 Nationalist intelligence .reports the appointment of Liu Shao-ch1 as "Chief of the Per Eastern Intelligence Bureau for the Cominform,' and of Chlen Shem-pf as "Chief of the Intelligence Committee.' The alleged area of operations inoludes Japan, much of HSoutheast Asia, and Hong Kong and Macao, agents haing trained in Peiping and shuttled through Hong Kong. (S USARMA Taipei AT 2E1s, 3 -3, 9 Sep 51)
:Comments. Nationalist and other sources persist in citing an "Asian Cominform and/Or Far Eastern bureaus of the Cominform, and identifying Chinese Communist leaders as officials of such organisations. These.reports

TOP SECRET
who obtained his information from a Peiping inmafs.I.or repor s that the Chinese Communists plan to establish a parachute factory at Tsitsihar in northwest Manchuria. The.USSR will su machinery and technicians from a Soviet parachnte-factory, 25X1C believes that this plant ie to be opened by the and of o em oy 250 workers. (S
The Chinese Communists are reported to have reoently opened factories in Hangohow and Canton.
Approved For Release 2001/09/065: CIA-RDP79101146A0004001abbille# 51
Approved For Re lelsoi 2001109106 : CIA-RDP791-01146A049490130001-4

TOP SECRET derive from a widespread conftsion between,the
international) and the new Cominform (Communist old Comintern (Communist Comintern was a Soviet-controlled international Information Bureau). The directorate for the world Communist movement, operating in large part covertly. The Cominform is oCcupied, under Soviet direction, mith ideological questions affecting the world Communist movement, and operates overtly. The covert functions of the Comintern are believed to have been assumed by the Foreign Section of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee when the Comintern was dissolved in 1943. The nearest equivalent to the Cominform in Asia is the WFTU Liaison Bureau
set up in Peiping in late 1949.
25X1C 25X1C 25X1C

25X1A
10.
rest:
25X1A Comments The Communist press has admitted the arrest of a number of puppet party members, reports of the arrest of leaders remain unconfirmed. The waxDigest of 13but July, reporting ruMors of Li's imminent defection, regarded it as doubtfW1 that the Peiping regime would give Li or other disaffected leaders an opportunity to escape. The Communists are doubtless aware of the disillusion of these figures--the result of the collapse of their hopes to play a significant role in the regime-i-and have permitted none of them to move freely inside China or at all outside China.
11.
lignig"Wastat-MREUSL-WitatiLlefloagigLapithraigatjazgas The US Minister and the Servioe Attaches in Taipei hate reported that the recent attempt of the noted educator, Hu Shih to resign from a Taipei newspaper indicate's the active dissatisfaction of the liberal elements in the Nationalist regime. They also oite the cabinet resolution, passed through the efforts of liberal elements, stating that the powers of the police are to be confined to'clearly subversive or military oases, leaving all others to civil courts.
The report explains that these incidents reflect two conflicting in the political scenes trends (1) the necessity and desire to please America, find (?) the conviction that a further tightening of centralized cOntrol is -required at the present critical time. In recent months the advocates of highly centralized control have been in favor, with the ments complaining of increased infringements more liberal eleon freedom of the press and personal liberty, (S Alusna Taipei, Joint Weeka 36, 8 Sep 51) Comments Altheugh Premier Chen reportedly is convinced of the need for curtailing the activities of the military and police, the strong

TOP SECRET
6
that Li -0 en, Chairman uomintang Revolu onary ommittee ENTRC), was placed under house arrest in eaayAugust to prevent his escape and defection. Othe party leaders ar similar treatment,
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040JgOgg-451

TOP SECRET
12. OINAJKOREA. 25X1X
Chinese October Communist offensive in Korea predicted: October, and Korean Communists plan to resume the offensive about 1 ported by nearly 2,000 tactical airoraft, from a Chinese Communist in Peiping. Source claims that all these aircraft, which comprise 16 divisions, are in Manchuria. Chinese have recentl been re lacin: Russians as .ilots of jets and other aircraft.
25X1X
25X1A
13.
KOREA. South Korean anti-Japanese feeling believed irrational: Commenting on recent ROK anti-Japanese public statements and editorials, the US Mission in Korea observes that the "tactlessness and ill considered"' timing of this manifestation is motivated by "pique, jealousy, and frustration" at Japan's acceptance in the international community without ROK sanction. The MisSion observes, however, that the Koreans do have a very real fear of future Japanese economic and military domination. The fact that the adoption of such an anti-Japanese attitude may prejudice future ROK relations with her more powerfUl neighbor seems to have been overlooked in South Korea. (S Pusan 245, 11 Sep 51)
Comment: Korean emotion, engendered bY 40 years of Japanese domination, frequently overbalances common-sense in dealing with the subject of Japan.
14.
JAPAN.
ationgs The Japanese Attorney General's office has issued instructions to local authorities to exercise vigilance over the activities of rightist organizations, which are expected to become more active following the signing of the peace treaty. Officials state that there are now about 550 organizations of rightist complexion which have registered with the government, and that while these organizations are pro-American and anti-Communist on the surface, they are actually pushing nationalism (R FBID under the slogans of "Asianism" and "racial independence." Ticker Tokyo, Jiji, 11 Sep 51)
Comments Since occupation directives prohibit the existence of ultra-nationalist organizations, the post-war extreme right has adopted anti-Communism as its main theme, at the same time avoiding any anti Western activity. The war in Korea, the government's anti-Communist

TOP SECRET
Comment: Communist forces in Korea have long been building up for .a possible new offensive, and many sources have predicted the launching of such an offensive on soma definite date; thus far, all these predictions have been wrong. The source's estimate that 2,000 combat aircraft are in Manchuria is considerably higher than the US Far East Air Force's latest figure of 785.
giusiziacatairjarsimusavsLawagjaaatan_riziatictsrainiz=
12
Sep 51
Approved For Re %se 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00641#0130001-4

TOP SECRET
campaign, the creation of the National Police Reserve and the peace treaty unquestionably have strengthened nationalistic sentiment, but it is unlikely that these rightist organizations will be able,for some time to come, to achieve the influence over Japanese life held by their pre-war counterparts.
15.
Peace treaty sianine ob erved Quietly in Japans The signing of the peace treaty and security pact was observed.quietly in Japan, with the joy of most Japanese tempered by anxiety over the future, according to the US Political Adviser in Tokyo. There were no public demonstrations, and comparatively few shops and homes showed the national flag. (U Tokyo 517, 10 Sep 51)
Comments Several editorials just prior to the conference deplored With the the festive attitude of many Japanese toward the peace treaty. long-sought peace finally attained, there apparently has been a sudden realizati^n of the many probleme facing Japan, foremost of which are future. relations with the USSR and Communist China and the attainment of economic stability.
16.
The Dnslr prinninleR fnr rnArmAmnnt announced by Democratic Party: Democratic Party has announced the following basic principles that should (1) no member of the Japanese armed forces guide Japan's rearmament planss shall be sent Abroad to fight in foreign wars; (2) the prerogative of the supreme command shall not be independent of the government; and (3) the sum to be spent annually shall not exceed yearly occupation costs. (R FBID Ticker Tokyo, Jiji 11 Sep 51)
Comments Occupation costs are now running about 100 billion yen annually -- a SUM which would maintain less than half of the 200,000 man army advocated by the Democratic Party. The Japanese Economic Stabilization Board has estimated the cost of a well-equipped divisioh at 20 billion yen annually. The budget for the 759000-man National Police Reserve currently is 16 billion yen, with a 12 billion yen supplementary appropriation anticipated. The Democrats' enthusiasm for rearmament is not shared by the Liberal government.

TOP SECRET
8
12 Sep 51
Approved For Reim. 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A011614e01300014

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(MESTERN)
1.
Although truck Loqg range adverse effect on-Berlin econemy seen: autobahn appears to have returned-to traffic on -LES Berliaest Germany this normal, the recent Soviet move in imposing a prohibitive road tax on harm:to the West the long run-in further traffic is likely to result-in has apparently been absorbed Berlin economy. At the present time, the tax imported commodities will probably Continue by the German firms and, although The possi.tO be availablel.,there is likely to be an increase in their cost. bilitYekists that some Berlin industries will become less competitive
GERMANY.
through price. increases.
Local US officials, in evaluating the possible Soviet motives, assert that the tax, coming on top of other recent restrictions, is the latest in blockade, or at a series of steps designed to lead progressively to a new effect on the edonamy of Wett Berlin, least a.situation equivalent in its Allied position in the city untenable. with the ultimate goal of making the of the be designed to force the conclusion They feel that the move may also interzonal trade pact, or to divide and confuse the Western camp on the whole Berlin problem, (S Berlin 373, 8 Sep 51)
CoMtent:
The precarious West Berlin economy already requites extensive eupponTREithe Allies and West Germany. Further impairment of this economy would indrease the unemployment, already serious, and require additional West German subsidies from the West German Government, thus adding to ctrrent dissatisfaction with the burden on the Federal budget,
In his report tO the FRANCE. Duelos urges Communist leaders to action: secretaries meeting on rcariiist Party central committee and federal 7:SepteMber, Acting Secretary-General DuOlos met the stage for an intetsistrtggle to obstruct the French economy and 'defense effort. Duclos mentioned la particular the usefuleess-ofthe mass-strike-as the weapon to prevent7dictetorship, adding that 'no good could came from inaction." 2he curreat party line, as outlined tv tuclos, variet from the policy _
2.
establithed tt the last national congress, April 1950, only in its increase& yoke." emphasis upon national independence --from!the "American imperial opposed to almott exclusively, to national, as The Duelos report was devoted International, problems.
In playing up the Communists as a great national party, Duclos was antiattempting to dispel the growing popular awareness of the party's national character and to counter the appeal of Gaullist nationalism. to Nevertheless, he concluded with a pledge of "unalterable" attachment the USSR. (C Paris 15339 9 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
9
12
Sep 51
Approved For Rdi Iste 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79101146A01119400130001-4

TOP SECPET
intended as the opening gun Comment: This convocation may have been The wage increase just by the Communists. for corigatTd strike activity will probably blunt the Communist attack, .granted by the government, however, support and the party may go slow rather than risk the loss of the labor gained last spring. Government opposes seat for Communist China-in International The UK opposed seating Communist China in the International Monetary Fund:: Monetary Fund by supporting the US motion to defer consideration of the favor Czechoplovok resolution to ouet Nationalist Chinats representatives in Western. According to press reports, of those fram the Peiping regime. in British European delegates viewed the stand as a significant departure 11 Sep 51) (U NY Times policy toward Communist China. _ This vete Was in-line With British desurances,to_the US ih Cammlnist early summer that they would supportS poetponenent Of the Chineee Previ inoluding the General Assembly. representatin issue in all UN bodies the UK had Assembly "aggressor!, resolution, Say, even after the General Chinese.CommunistirePreeentation in those supported faverable action upon For the past 'UN bodies it Considered Competent to eot on the queation. recognizing Peiping, has displayed less several menthe Britain, while still Foreign regime in the light Of greying inclination to Conciliate the Mao and in the the US on Far Eastern policy, Office'doneern over divergence with hands of the British casualties in Korea at.the light:Of public reactions to Chinese.
'
UNITED KINGDOM.
4 bwartiN.
The pro British naval visit disturbs neutralityminded Swedes: has indicated concern over the neutrality segment of the Swedish press British to a visit by one of their allegedlY political twist given by the British The declaration by the submarine flotillas to Sweden and Denmark. ties, Admiralty that the naval vieit, in addition to cementing traditiohal and not a Soviet mare nostrum, indicated that the Baltic is an open sea Cohliled with Another recent British Government statement that NATO forces stand ready to aid in the defense of the Baltic, are regarded by this element as jeopardizing Swedish neutrality.
the The Swedish Government remains silent; and newspapers close to entirely for five days, have hinted government, .after ignoring the visits by their comment that the government also fears compromise to Swedish neutrality. (U NY _2222Tin 9 & 11 Sep 51)
Sweden hae been-willing to-receive courtesy visits fram all navienTiFfaaing the-USSR1s, but there has been no exchange with the USSR. The-SWedes enJOy close ties with the British, and recently there have been What a.number of reciprocal visits by,air force as meY1 as naval elements, all belief that Sweden is becoming for is probably feared is a Russian practical purposes a member of NATO.
6OhMeriti

Cichmehi:
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : ClaDP79T01146A000400130001-4 2
Sep 51
Approved For Refloat 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0134110130001-4

TOP SECRET
S.
lannin revelUtion: General Newton SRAZIL. Minister of liraT re ortedl yplanning to over-; , :rak all s r o ar, s repor iatillac throw the government should the opportunity arise. His plans are said to be directed by "Alberto Padua de Araujo and Colonel Emygdie Miranda, both known Communists01 A counter-revolutionary group, headed by former Minister of Mar Canrobert, has been formed.
25X1A
25X1A
It has been only, during the peat month that there hive lieen cleaVate in the army. There is a growing mistrust of War Minister Estillac Leai whose ambiguous statements apnear designed to curry faVor with the radical elements, There is no evidence that he is a Communist, but many of his actions and attitudes play into the-ComMunistsl hands. The Colonel:Miranda mentioned is probably Lieutenant ColonelSmidio da Costa Miranda, a director of the Military Clnb and reportedly a friend and godfather of Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes. Recent reports have indicated increased Communist activities in some sections of the armed forces.
rePortrany
COMmeni:
General Canrobert, as well as General Goes Monteiro, Would be the leaders of the more conservative and the more pro-US grouP of officers in the Brazilian Army.
unkudimn.
President Vargas' attitude toward the reported split in the env is He Mat be giving sufficient rope to Estillac Leal and the radicals to hang themselves; or his failure to take decisive action may be evidence of zeakness and a stall for time.
6.
GUATEMALA, Diplomatic relations with Nicaraguamay be renewed: Foreign Minister Manuel:Galich of Guatemala has indicated that his country may soon renew diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off in 1945. (U NY Times; 11 Sep 51) Comment: The renewal of relations with Nicaragua may be taken as evidence that President Arbenz has abandoned the policy of his predecessor, President Arevalo, which involved nonrecognition of, and overt oppoeition to; governMente established by nondemocratid methods based on military force. The'tirMinetion Of the Guatemalan-Nicaraguan "feud" will constittthe an important contribution to international harmony in:Central America.

TOP SECRET
11
12 Sep 51
....
I Ur ut-wno...
UNCLASSIFIED when
'
ARPrItSectfoRnRakaasetasatuossa0 501,4-ROPPOT-04WASMATIleteida declassi-

REG I STRY
DOCUMENT DESCR IPT ION SOURCE

DOC. NO,
C I A CONTROL NO
DATE DOCUMENT
DOC. DATE
COPY NO. NUMBER OF PAGES
1,5 11
RECE I VED
LOGGED BY
OFF ICE
S I GNATURE

DATE TIME
'
personnel and transmitted outside of CIA. secceis to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control attached Top Secret material will sign this form duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the who sees the Top Secret document will sign and and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual the right-hand columns. in indicate the date ol handling SEEN BY RELEASED RECE I VED REFERRED TO DATE OFFICE/01V.
DATE TIME
S I GNATURE
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on lop of and is downgrade& destroyed, or or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain, attached to the document until such time as itthose individuals whose official
attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
When this form is detacl ed from Top Secret /nate WI it Mall be completed in the appropriate spaces and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:
below
DOWNGRADED
TO
DESTROYED
By
D I SPATCHED
TO
.
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
W I TNESSED BY
(Signature)
'
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
Aproved For Re iiaeW nol /06/cm : a Ailth'TOTN1 MO00400130001 -4

TOP SECRET
4OFF ICE
mm 26 tin rittvious some.
I 40/
7/4
IN:OP SECRET SUEbte

SPECIAL SPECIAL ARTICLE ARTICLE
HR70-14
S-sze 5/
c\ P-e
EVIDENCE EVIDENCE OF OF A A "SOVIET ttSOVIET PUPPET PUPPET FORCE" FORCE FOR FOR KOREA KOREA IS IS INCONCLUSIVE INCONCLUSIVE
Early in i n 1951 1951 the the first f k s t reporte reports were were received received of of Communist Comunist nte nte Early tionar tions to form form an wInternational International Volunteer Volunteer Army Army" --- referred referred t to o ac a e a "Soviet ttSwiet Puppet Puppet Force" Forcett -- for service in i n the t h e Korean Korean War. War. ile no conclusive confirmation has yet been received the Feceived of t h e presence of of such such an Manchuria or Korea, the cumulative an independent tactical t a c t i c a l force force in in Manchuria o r Korea, cumulative , makes makes it it impact of of reports reports on on this t h i s subject, subject the imperative to consider the e evldenct?. un m e basis Dabis of of this this to consider the availab available evidence. On evidence, still inconclusive, the existence of a force eannot cannot be evidence, s t i l l inconclusive, of such a eetablished, established, nor can it, it be entirely e n t i r e l y discounted. discounted.
--
D
:
A of A syhthesis ey~thesia o f reports reports on on the t h e Soviet Soviet Puppet Force points to t o ground, is a allegedly oomposed composed air a i r and and naval naval arms. arme. Infantry and cavalry strength i of fromCommunist o f troops troops from CommunistChina China (separate (separate from from Chinese Chinese "Volunteers" Wolunteersn currently engaged i currently in KoreA, North n Korea), North Koreans, Koreans, Mongols, Mongols, and and unrepatriated unrepatriated Japanese prisoners prisoners of Japanese war..1upporting technical are o f waro .qySuppsrting and and t e c h n h a l components conpanelits a re reportedly drawn from f~om the USSR and and from from the European European Satellite S a t e l l i t e countries. countries. the'USSR
The arm is reported t to m e alleged alleged air drarrn o be predominantly Soviet, Soviet, with with are km1 forces a re personnel included. European Satellite S a t e l l i t e and and Mongolian Mongolian pereonnel included. Naval a t total otal reportedly composed composed almost almost entirely e n t i r e l y of of undersea undersea c r a f t , In all a reportedly craft. of 2 23 Communist and non-Communist, non-Communist, have been claimed, claimed, of 3 countries, countries, both bath Cammudst nationals involved in in the the Puppet Force. Force. at a t one one time or or another another to have nationala
behind-the-lines contribution t to The confirmed Soviet behind-the-lines o the Korean War in i n the form form of of flight flight; control, control, communications, communicatiqns, and supply is is already on whether the Soviet Puppet Puppet Fmce Force on such a scale scale that, that, regardless, regardless, of o f whether now exists force, a highly integrated headheadexj.ets as a bona fide f i d e striking s t r i k i n g force, quarters would would be needed needed to t o coordinate c o o r d b t e it. it. quart,ara
ThiR hiladouarters may exist at Mukden. Manchuria:
which now appesrs to be just over the border on the ooviet siae. It would seem, therefore that, that the the conmind connand structure structure exists exists for for a a puppet puppet would seem, therefom force f o r m of of any any size a i m or or composition. composition. are many reports of the of military military personnel other There a r e marly the presence of than North North Eorean Korean and and Communist Cornmugist Chinese Chineae in i n Korea Korea or or Manchuria. k n c h u r i a . Several thousand Soviet troopn troops already perf perform rFar area area combat support support duties. duties. thouaand o m ryar At air regiments h have in the IbreanKoreanA t least lea&. two Soviet a i r rsgimenta v e been operating i n the hve not Although these these units have not been beendefinitely d e f i n i t e l yiderv, idenManchurian theater. Ihnchurian theat,w. Although tifiedin identified a as tified in battle, b a t t l e , Soviet pilots have been positively Identified s
15 3 . 5
(APPROVED RELEASE APPROVED FOR RELEASE

IDATE: DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar2010

1 I
TOP SECRET SUEDE *
J,.
I
.'
engaging engaging in I n combat combat flights f l i g h t s over over Korea. Korea.
Although lthough there there is i s no no confirmation, it is s probable probable that t oviet remzrea such a8 confirmation, Soviet rear area units such as signal, engineer, engineer, and and quartermaster quartermaster troops troops are are also a l s o in i n Korea. Korea. these ihe extensive Soviet advisadvistheso organized organized unite U t a are are over over and above the ory group identified toot major North Korean ground, ground, air, and'naval i d e n t i f i e d at niost Bir, and naval S a t e l l i t e countries, countries Bulgaria, Bulgaria, Three Eastern European European Satellite headquarters. headqparters. Thsee Rumania and tedical units. Rumania and Hungary, have been represented in I n Korea by Diedical The ovOlunteer" from the arriVed for WXLunteer" medical unit unit from t h e USSR US= has reportedly arrived It is is poscrible, possible, of courm, course, that that tthe h e sole soleimrpose purpose Of of all all duty in i n Korea. Korq. It i s to t o remedy remedy the the deficiencies deficiencies of of the the Communist Conmudst forces theee activities a c t i v i t i e s is these already in i n action. action. already
Balanced against factors are of equally 'balanced again&, these t h e w convincing f actors a r e a number of sound negative negative indicators. Indicators. Primary Primary among these these ie is the lack of even even one sound eye-witness report from of war war or other 80urces sources t to attest to eye-witness roport from prisoners of o a ttest t o the existence existence of of such such a t a c t i c a l force a8 s tactical as the Soviet Puppet Puppet Force Force i is Furthermpre, there have been no reports reports from from anywhere anywhere purported to t o be. be. Furthermore, outside of movement of of "volunteers" "volunteer!" other of China C b l n a or Korea on the outward movement personnel. than medical medical personnel. than
If the Soviet Soviet Puppet Force exists, exists, whether whether as a 8 1 a command command framework' framework with only supporting as a fully integrated atriking striking force, force, With supporting funtions fun&.ons or a8 mechanism for assistance I in it could be the the mechanism .for expanding oxpanding Soviet assistame n Korea to to absorb the any scale scale the the Kremlin ksmlfn considered considored desirable. desirable. It It might well aboorb the any well-equipped C Chinese believed t to have been been b bUilt up new and wall-equipped h i n e m divisions belleved o have u i l t up in i n Manchuria.
North Korean striking force had had Russian Russian equipment; equipment; the the The original NQrth Chinese committed ill-equipped, and and r relied committed last i a s t winter were ill-equipped, e l i e d on surprise reported to have been i in the process process of numbers. ntuHJ3er)Fio Russia Russia is reported n the and weight and weight of reorganizing and of reorganidng, and arming arming 30 30 Chinese Chinese divisions divisions since since early e a r l y last last year, year, which up at up to t o the t h e present, a t least,-have least, have never been committed. committed.

16 16
TOP SECRET SUEDE
* *
int.i) SECRET SUEDir.

Militarily, Militarily, Communist Communist forces forces in i n Korea Korea were were not not capable capable of of a a decisive decisive victory without without substantial aubstantial air, victory air, armored armored and and artillery a r t i l l e r y support. support. It It is is similarly evident evident that it it was not not within within the the immediate capability capability of:the of the similarly COmmunist Communist forces forces in i n Korea, Korea, rich r i c h as as they they are a r e in i ninfantry, infantry, to t osupply supplyeither' either the trained trained personnel pereonnel or o r the the equipMent equipplent for f o r these these decisive decisive arms. arm. These Thee the mechanism deficiencies have have recently recently been bean remedied remedied to t o somo some extent. extent. The mechanism deficiencies of of a Soviet Soviet Puppet Puppet Force Force would w u l d permit permit the the rapid rapid introduction introduction of of the the neceseary necessary numbers numbers of of technical technical or o r other other personnel personnel under the guise guise of "vo1unteere.n "volunteers." It 1% Would would be be a a risk risk for for the the Soviet Soviet Union Union to t o proclaim proclaim that t h a t Russian Russian troops..even troops, even as as "volunteers," "volunteers," were were fighting fighting with vdth the the Chinese %ineee Communists ~~urd.ets The Kremlin, Kremlin, however, however, might might accept accept the the risk r i s k of of a a and North North Koreans. Koreans. The and general general war in.the in t h e hope hope of of continuing continuing limited limited hostilities h o s t i l i t i e s in i n Asia with dth minimum minimum danger & m n g e r of.retaliation of r e t a l i a t i o n against against Russia Ruesia itself. itself.
Both tirerecent Both the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and Communist Comunist China chinahave havereacted reactedto to the recent FECOIL press release release on on tthe presence of of a a Soviet Saviet'Puppet Force i in FECOM pres8 h e presence 'Puppet Force n Korea such a a force force & existe or even even t that "Cau by denying categorically tthat h a t such et6 or h a t "Caucasians," other, other than embassy are casians," embassy personnel and news new8 correspondents, correspondents, a r e on 01p personnel have been identified in increasing t h e scene. scene. Since Soviet personnel the to indicate numbers in i n Korea, Korea, these quick categorical categorical denials would seem seem t o i ndicate either uninvolved, or that the e i t h e r that t h a t Russia Russia is is determined determined to t o remain uninvolved, that t h e time is the i s not not yet y e t ripe r i p e from from the the Communist G d s t point point of of view v i e w to reveal t h e presence presence of any new new force force in i n Korea. Korea.
.
-
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
TbP SECRET SUEDe

-Tor-ssartie-MED13-
jNR /NR
13. 13,
idiEL. KOEEL SOMmunist 6 o d s t dole delegation titian ut at Kaeaopg &tenon believed b e l i e w d to t o have have resuaed resumedtraining.' trainingt 1-1-Teptem er or orean message, message, pro y ffrom e O o ds esong meptembe r Eorth Korean probably r o m %he s t Kaerong delegation, reports that the uuait8 *units have entered d military'training anew, delegation, l l t a r y training a m, starting tomorrow the the battalion battaliawoommanders and e t a d i n g tomorrow Oomandere will w l l l begin.s.olassee," begin,..ohs~es.~ (SUEDE 4515, 1141, 2 8ep Sep 51) (SUEDE[_74515, M-M, 2
OoMMentt Reimption of more thaxa than dolmhenbf Berunption of training trdnlng activities acrtivities among the more 600 dommunist C m a t personnel personnel in i n the the neutral neutral :sone Eone may spo may be he interpreted interpreted as a sign that a renewel of codbat aim a renew61 oambat is contemplated, contemplated.
401"-SBOBBT-78.13110-
a 6
12 12 Sep Sep 51 61
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ,DATE: DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
TOP SECRET SUEDE
t)l)
HR70-14
-TOP-SECRET
NF
9.
rgfre.se tretiniuniSt -80 Boxammist
captured reosntly i n Korea rsporf ort defensiVamleiston: Chinese aaptured dePenei9e plidsjollrx n both both t the prisonere of m r oapure oaptured in he * eioentiil I s 8 ~ 0 0 n ~and a and l east-oentral ieotors eeo+or8 have ham reported reported that that their their units mite mere nrerq aseigned aswlgnedaade.. defeasiramission. fenmiye Geeion, One One prisoner prisonerfrom fromthe the newly-identified newly-identified 67th 67th Army A m y in in enetgeutral s&-geqtral Korea Korea stated atated that that his hi8 battalionos baftalionos mission ndeaion was was to to defend defend for for approximately mhile a approximately one o n ( , month month beginning beginning on on 10 10 September, Septbmbero while a prisoner from from
KOREA.. IDREAS
the met-oentral west-oentral front front stated stated that his h i s army 1v11y -- the @nd land r- wan VOA to to defend defend for for a a month month until until.bridges bridges in in the the rear rear areas areas could oould be be repaired repaired and and tke *e front front line unite units resuppliedo resupplied. The l a t t e r prisoner prirroner otated a t a t e d that t h a t ft/loving following this t h i s an an The latter offensive larmohed to to drive d r i w UN foroes foroes to t o the &e 38th 38th parallel. p a r a l l e l . ~ offensive mas waa to to be be launched
~

-TZIP SECRET
--
Conrmbntr Those Th6rs Unconfirmed meoafinned report6 i n that that this t h i e is i r the the Comments reports Ate unigue uniquein firstof nn & I addittonal addittonal defensive defensive period pbried prier p&brto t h e launching lamohing first-iiiErBn of the of aa u effemeive. o f f d i v e , Of Of equal intereatare arethe theallegations allegationsthat tfrrtadditional. additional of equal interest supplies suppUs8 are needed needgd by by the front front; line Pine units and and that that le @eobjeotiive objeatiw of of the the n coming ooming offensive offensive is is the 38th 38th parallel. parallel.
APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009
6 6
14 Sop Sep 51 51
lk
DB
For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
VOP-SEGRET TBts%GRpx
8
O n the t h e basis basis of of currently olsrrently sec:opted aooepted information, n On information, Cormnollist COmmuniet Pomes forces i in Korea are powerful, sustained iustained ofKerer a r e still s f i l l believed capable oapabla of launching latmohing a powerful, fensive where and Omen when they choose. fensive~ ohoooeo 10.

11. 1 1 .
North N o r t h Koreans Korean6 reportedly reportedly excluded aroluded from from poliay policy role role a at t ltaeson&: Kaesongq
VilFhh.Kbrean Borth .Korea%' Communist CQmnloriSt leaders leader6 have beem h make deoisions been deprived deprived "of authority authority.to decisions
r]
1
Concerning oonosrning the Kaesong reason truce t m e talks" talks" by by the""new tihe ' n e w Sino-Soviet.nission." Siao-Sovie% miesi(bZ1.n ~ v $ o u e l y ,North Koreans Korell~liwere allowed allowed to t o participate partleipate ao while Previously, AO aqua16 equalnivhile theibhinese the bhinere Communist Conmumist Political E b l i t i o a l Mission" (on the Ktosong talks), now reporiadly in in Panohwia, in Korea. reportedly Manchuria, was in
&
oonfinurt;ion has haa been beon reoeived oonoerninag either a L Chineto Chine@e No confirmation received concerning Otmnents Comments NO PQfi-SSiOn or poliirginaesion or aa joint jointSino-Soviet Sino-Sodat mission mission in in Korea.. Korea. It If is i 6 believed beliered tbat with the senior partpart*hat decisions deoisionr on on ComMunist Commmisf policy polioy in Korea originate with North Xorems Koreans and Chincep ner-the USSR--and'are USSR-and are carried QazTPedout ou% jointly j e i n t l y by the Horth C h i m 4 g y
Communiets. C Q m i B t S
12. 12.
Ministry of ROK tests new ROK au suggests new counter-inflation oountsr-inflation measure: masure: The The ROK Ministry ar eettlement oft h their Imp Finanoe. i n exrrsotation of f u l l or o r par Dartial n d ~ ~ n 'settlement i of e i r -go expo(' a on o Finance, *On loan to the UN military commend in Korea, anticipates issuing dollar SOWde .(two years maturity at two percent) to be stbsoribed for and paid in won. These bonds will be secured by US dollars derived from mush a repay.,
..
WR. The bonds will have the dual effect of further attempting to stem inflation and oroteotintthe investor arainst further won devaluation.
Thin suggestion suggestion by the -ROK Ministry Finanoe i 6 motewort This the-ROK Ministry ofof-Finance is notewirthy and sWEREN. The The US US Mission MiSIIiOn in in Korea Korea hal has recently recently emphasized emphatired the the sincere! sinaere effort ruinous inns.. eff6rt being made nmds by by the the ROK ROK Government Government to t o bring the present ruinour hilar tion t i o n under under control. oontrole
C6mman-b: Comment:
\
-T0a-SECRET---
.
7 .
- _ . _ e
4 Oep sep 51 51
k$
'NW

TOP SMRET
13.
14 Sep 51
1 1
HR70-14
E--
~ APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: LDATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0

FAR EAST
- , -
2.
Chinese captured recently in remrt defensive Chinese in _Korea Korea sepph defemive mission:
--4..7-.
Chinese Communistprisoners prisoners of of war war captured Chhese Communist 1 ( 13 Sep Sep 51 51 t h the in b both thewest-central west-central and andeast-central east-central sectors sectors
have reported b a t their units were assigned a have that One prisoner prisoner from fromthe thenewlynewlydefensive mission. defensive mission. One identified 67th 67th Army Armyin ineast-central east-central Korea Eorea stated that his battalion's mission mission was to defend defend for approximately approximately one one month motnth beginning on on 10 10 September, September, while a prisoner from army --- the the 42nd 42nd --- was was from the west-central front front stated stated that that his army to defend for for a month month until until bridges bridges ban in the the rear rear, areas areas could could be be repaired and and the front prisoner stated statedthat thatfollowing following this an front line units units resupplied. resupplied. The latter latter prisoner offensive was to be launched t o drive UN UN forces offensive to forces to to the the 38th 38th parallel. parallel.
-3-
I '
HR70-14
-11013-9E0RET-BUBBB-
9.
Ancording Koreans anticipate KOREA.. North Korean8 IEOBEA. antioipate UN UN amphibious amphibious operation: opera'bioat doeording 1717preliminary North Ho tore= t o p r e h i n a r y field field ans4ysis, analysis, the North r e m Chief Chief of o f Operations et General Headquarters i in Pyongyang has reported t tO Nam 11, Ii, Chief Chief of of a t Cleneral n P yon~aag haa o ltam Staff of Of the. North-Korean Anny, Army, that that UlV UN foroes forges intend intend t to carrY out out new Staff t h e NorCh'Bbrean o oarry aasmption is io mail's made by This assumption bythe the Communists Communists beoause beoause landing Operation:to landing operatione. This activity o of DS ground force u unite, the mewanent movement Qf of of the training aotivley f US ground foroo n i t s , the bomber groups from the US t to ind Korea, Korea, and tthe arrivel of of an bomber from t h e Us o Japan and h e arrival TIK1067, 1067, H H 165, 168, 11507, W 307, (SUM, TIK airoraft oarrier in the "Koreav "Korea" sea. sear (SngDE, 51) 12 Sep 61)
Commeot: North Korean %roes lert f o r amphiforoes have been eapeoially espeoially a alert for amphiConrments bious at Innhon. Swh Sunh fears fears b i o attack u r x since rinoe their disastrous experienoe a t Inohon. forces by oausing causing the C Communist to maintain have generally generally benefited UN foroee o d s t t o maintain a in the rear tear areas, a considerable ooneiderablo coastal ooaslal seourity eeourity foroe in are^^.
NR
--TOP-6BORET-NEDE-
PPROVED FOR APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
TOP SECRET SUEDE
14 Sep Sep 51 51 14
HR70-14
-TOP-NECRET-SUEDE-
125, Chief Comhunist Communist n e g o t i a t o r orders o Kaesongr 13. KORlkb. KOREA. Chief negotiator orders subordinate eUbordinatet to Xaesongs A A
S e p t e m b e r message-N-om from the the Communists/ Coaumunistst oease-fire at Irroltember message cease-fire delegation at ISaosong, signed by by general General Nam Pam Il I1 and and addressed:to addressed t o the Chief of the the Iiieong, signed the Chief Seoretariat of of t h e General General staff, s t d f , states s t a t e s "You "You start start for f o r Kaesong Kaesong on on the the Seoretariat the 26th." (SUEDE, RSM-1792, Kaesong-Pyongyang, 12 12 Sep 8ep 51) 51) MSM-1792, Kaesong-Pyongyang,
14. 14.

-70P-BEGRET-ENTEDE-
Comment: General General Nam N m may-be may be reverting reverting to to his his Primary primaryfunction functionas' a8 Comments C h i e f Staff m f f of o f the t h e North North Korean Korean Army. Amy. The Chief of The message be message may may also be interpreted indioating Nm'a t interpreted as as indioating Nan's continued continued presenoe presenoe at Kaesong until until a at l e a s t that date. date. lezet
Coqmuniste continue oontinue to to use use interdicted interdicted east east coast ooast rail rail. lines linea Communists ReUmiaa4 field field analysie analysis of of enemy enemy messages meeaagea reveals revetala that that over over 3,000 3,000 Preliminary freight oars oars were were utilized utilieed during during August on the the heavily heavily bombarded bombarded east east freight August on ooaet. rail lime line from from Tumen Tumen to Woman. Apparently 58,300 58,300 tons ton8 o f freighk ooastrail Wonsan. Apparently of freight wre moved period. (SUEDE, were. moved during during this this period. (SUEDE, TIK 1072 HH 166 TIK 1072. 188 PI W 309, 309, 15 13 Sep Sep 51) 61)
17 17 Sep Sep 51 51
DATE. 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
TOP SECRET SUEDE
"01) 33
51 SI
-41011-SBORBT-SIMN--
,Commentx The f flow of North North Korean Korean messages messages regarding regarding the the repair repair Compmztt The l o w of and MOvemsnt &anent of of trains on on this t h i s vulnerable lins line displays dieplaya a a ocnsiderable oonsiderable interset in in keeping keeping traffic traf'fio moving. moving. This task has been additionally intermit COmpliciated by serious serious flood8 flodds &iah which apparently apparently severed Severed tthe line in aomplioated by he l ine i n numeroua loa ations numerous locations.
110E-BERBT-SUBDB7 7

17 Sep 51 61
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Releate2001/09/06 CIA-RDP79T01146A00064160001-1
TOP SECRET
17 September 1951
CIA No. 49346
Copy No.
I.
DAILY DIGEST


TOP SECRET
Nor Nee Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDI79T01146A000400160001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR; Moscew's propaganda media marking.time: An FBID survey of Soviet radio outptut of the past week disclosed scattered indications of a possible SoViet dedire to shift away from aggressive propaganda attacks on the West The indications include a low volume of attention to the "Western aggretsion" theme; the continuing absence of militancy in "peace" propaganda; a'Shift from denunciation of US bases abroad to protests over the growing burdens forced on Western workers by the rearmament drive; and the relative absence of atrocity charges in comment on the Korean War. (C FBID Trends and Highlights, 12 Sep 51)
At present, the Kremlin's puppets - especially Peiping -- are purssuing a -vitriolic propaganda line on the sUbject of US-Western "aggressive" intentions.
2.
sjagillaaSsL2Lltstr_ia:12,zpjslobaln: The omission of Soviet Nett Chief Of Staff, A. G. Golotko, from the:signatories of Col. General ShehadenkOls obituary ie the second indication that Golovko was probably released.with Admiral Yumashev, former Navy Minister.
Embassy Mbscow notes that the second-ranking navy figure now appears to be Admiral Zakharov, who in the space of one year rose from Chief of the Political Administration to Deputy Navy Mihister. The Embassy notes the recent appearance in 1.191 Fleet of an article on security questions, and concludes that Bakhames increased prominence may portend a tighten, ing of political control in the Soviet Navy. Mbscow WEEKA, 7 Sep 51)
3.
25X1C
comment: The significance of the dhanges in the Soviet Navy command since July is by no means clear. Admiral Euznetsov, who replaced the politically minded Admiral Yumashev as Navy Minister, is a competent professional but Was convicted three years agO:of divulging military secrets during wartime.
Japanese POWS sent to Manchuria: In early May 51, about 5,000 Japanese POWs were sent from Siberia to northern Manchuria, according to a These POWs were turned

TOP SECRET
Comment; While this slight trend teward a moderate tone in Moscow's attadke on the West is noteworthy, there is insufficient evidence to indicate any major change in the Kremlin's propaganda tactics. This softer key has had short-lived tryouts in recent issues of the Soviet journal, &wit, and in various contributions on the "coexistence" theme. One possible explanation is that Mbscow is marking tine while awaiting Gromyko's personal report on the San Francisco Conference, and a turn of events in Korea, before aetting a more positive line.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : Ck-RDP79T01146A000400160001-117 Sep 51
Approved For ReleaW2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00000160001-1

TOP SECRET
over tO the Northeast Military area to be incorporated into artillery and meChanized units of field armies en route to Kbrea. Over 200 junior and noncommiSsioned officers were sent to China proper as instructors in various officers' training programs
25X1A
25X1A
WaShington Comment: This may confirm similar information re o in greater detail by Chinese Nationalist sources.
-Comments Utilization of Japanese in various capacities, usually teChniCal, by the Chinese Communist forces is generally accepted. To 'date only one Japanese, an artilleryman, is known to have been captured in Korea by UN forces.
4:
ALBANIA. Internal resistance group awaits aid,: It is reliably reported that the National League of the Mountains, a resistance organization in northern Albania, has submitted an appeal for aid to the "free democratic nations." A resistance leader who received this appeal commented that the organization has not yet carried on any activity; He stated that, nevertheless, some of its leaders are eager to act, enjoy considerable freedom Of movement, even though suspected by the Albanian Government, and exercise cOnsiderable influence among antiregimeliments. he concluded that they could However, make a wPrthwhile contribution only if aided "morally, materially and mfllt.rnllvn hr ne of the major democratic powers.
25X1A
This is the first National Leagme of the Mountains. report confirming the existence of the bably countenancing the movements The Albanian security forces are pro of the resistance to identify specific antiHot personnel in order elements.
L'Imgmentr
5
25X6 25X6
25X6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Czechoslovak Prime Minister perturbed During an interview with Prime by Western moves: Minister Gottwald and Foreign Minister Siroky on 13 September, the impreesien that the Czechosnnlritislova..vericonsiderebly the by recent developments" in CzechoslovakWestern disturbed relations. The purpose of the in was to notify the Czech Government formally of the Upon completion of the formalities, owever, Gottwal e su ject to Western that Western Europe relations and stated under US leadership, Slovakia. is trying to blockade Czech. replied that the US would never, in his opinion, abandon its attempts to free Catis.
iligained
25X6
In concluding the interview, fire weather and observed, remarked on the pointing to the open windows, that international
TOP SECBET
25X6
2
Approved For Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004001600R-19P
Si
Approved For Re lege 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009400160001-1

TOP SECRET,
25X6
relations might be less strained if equally ventilated. Gottwald responded by sotay pointing to the US flag flying on the US chancery, believes that Gottwald intended to convey the implication that-his view was spoiled as long as the US flag was vieible. (8 Prague 214, 14 Sep 51)
25X6 Comments The interview with the should serve to imprees the Czechoslovak regime with widespread in the West of the US position on the Oatis case. Czechoslovak propaganda has recently shown sensitivity to the adverse reaction tO the %dila case in the West.
6.
Somas There has been a continuing increase in the number and scale of border incidents since Nay, Early in August the Yugoslays charged the Hungarians with committing thirtyeight provocations between 28 Nhy and 14 July. Yugoslav officials have expressed some concern, but believe the purpose of the attacks is to heighten internal tension in Yugoslavia.

TOP SECRET
3
'
Goverment nroteste increasing Hungarian border incidents: The-Y*411st GoVernMent has protested against fifty-two.provocatiOns cam, mitted by Hungarian frontier guards between 11 July and 19 August. The Yugoslav note does not cite several grave transgressions which had been protested previously. According to the Yugoslays, the violations were committed on an average of two every three days. (It FBID, 13 Sep 51)
YUGOSLAV/A.
17 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001109/06
CIA-RDP79T01146A000400160001-1
Approved For Re raise 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0176400160001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. /um. Political leader states views on amnesty and on US aid to Greece:

General Plastiras, leader of the National Progressive Union (EPEK) has expressed himself as strongly favoring a general amnesty for all political prisoners regardless of the extent of their Communist connections, in a recent post-election conversation with US EMbassy officers. Stressing his determination, once in power, to effect a general and complete amnesty, Plastiras stated that the system of judicial review established for such cases was too time-consuming and involved by red tape to satisfy the "people!s demand for immediate release of prisoners." He added that he favored a liberal-EPEK coalition government headed by himself, even if it meant relying ( C Athens on the support of the extreme left for a majority in parliament. 1241, 13 Sep 51)
Comment: Although Plastiras advocated amnesty for political prisoners in his pre-election campaign, it is doubtful that he would be in a sufficiently powerful position in the event of a liberal-EPEK merger to carry out such,a program. More moderate advisers in his own party, as well as the necessity for cooperating with the liberals, would prevent successful implementation of his program. While the possibility of a liberal-EPEK merger cannot be ruled out, it is considered likely that the two parties would place themselves in a position which would permit the Communist-controlled left to dominate their program.
2.
Communist vote in 9 September elections: The Communist-dominated EDA Party received approximately 11 percent of the total vote in the 9 September Greek elections and will receive 10 seats. Most of the successful EDA candidates are in prison as Communist Party members or sympathizers, or in exile in some Satellite country. (0 Athens 1218, 12 Sep 51)
The 11 percent of the total yote won by the EDA may be lowered Comment: somewhat when the army vote is counted but this prebahly'will not materially affect the number of seats involved. Although this percentage is somewhat higher than the 8.4 P eroent received by the Communists in the 1950 elections, the Communists suffered substantial losses in the urban areas. The increase can be accounted for chiefly by the fact that the leftists had candidates this year in all electoral districts. The election of Communists now in prison or in exile will force the courts to decide on their eligibility. Both Marshal Papagos and General Plastiras, whose parties gained the largest number of votes, expressed their approval of amnesty for political prisoners in their pre-election speeches.

TOP SECRET
17 Sep 51
Approved For Relate 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79101146A006400160001-1
TOP SECRET
ETHIOPIA. Ethiopia and Italv agree to exchange-anbassadOtel After final negotiation by the Italian Undersecretary of State Who Viiited Addis Ababa in early September, Ethiopia and Italy have agreed to resume diplomatic relations. According to the US Ambassador in Addis Ababa, the formal exchange of ambassadors is to occur within a month. He also notes-that there are still anti-Italian elements in Addis Ababa who consider the movement toward closer relations with Italy as being too rapid. (C AddisTAbaba unnumbered, 8 Sep 51; C Addis Ababa 115, 4 Sep 51; U Rome 1161, 10 Sep 51)
Comments The reestablishment of formal relations between the typ countries has been a tedious and trying accomplishment, chiefly because of Ethiopian distrust and bitterness. Italy will make a Strong effort to foster good relations with Ethiopia. If in turn Ethiopia discourages the antiItalian elements inside its own frontiers and in Eritrea, considerable.propress toward stability win have been made.
,
25X1C
SOUTHEAST-ASIA,
25X1C
report of conCludes that in the event of an armistioe in Korea, the Chinese will attempt to step up the tempo of the war in Indochina by sending additional aid to the Viet Minh. The committee also foresees an effort to overthrow the Burmese Government by (1) increasing assistance to the Burmese Comnunists for the establishment of an expansible base in northeast Burma, (2) encouraging separatist nationalism among the Shan and Kachin minorities, and (3) exploiting the above ground pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party. While the report indicates that peace in Korea would have little effect on Chinese intentions regarding Malaya and:: Indonesia, the UK Commissioner General for Southeast Asia believes that the infiltration of agents into Indonesia will Continue on as great a scale as possible. (S Singapore 312, 13 Sep 51)
25X1C
5.
25X6
hatMA. Foreign Office implicated in anti-US Statements -According to e member of the in Rangoon, the BermeSe AtbaSeedot to Peiping's statements linitil.as supporting the Chinese Nationalists in Burma (see Daily Digest, 11 Sep) were contained in a letter from the ambassador to the press. The source implied that the Burmese Foreign Office had prior knowledge of the existence of this letter, but he did not Say whether the letter had been prepared in Rangoon. (C Rangoon 275, 13 Sep 51)
6.
THAILAND. Political assassinations reported imminent: -Attempte on the lives of Premier Phibun and Air Marshall Fuen are imninent
25X1C 25X1C
TOP SECRET
17 Sep 51
Approved For Relate 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q400160001-1

TOP SECRET
Comments Politioal assassinations are common in the Far East and both Phibun and Fuen have many enemies. However, there is no other information to substantiate this report.
7.
INDOCHINA. Chinese advisers to Viet Minh'named: In inforthant of the US Consulate reporta that the Chinese guerrilla leader OW Chia-pi is now :acting,as military adviser to Ho Chi Minh's headquarters, and-that Ch'en Keng, Deputy Commander of the CCA Second Field Army, is now north of Hanoi aetting up a headquarters fox' a potential 'volunteer army." (s Hong Kong 1046, 13 Sep 51) Comments This source's testimony is contradictory, since he has also stated that Chlen Keng is anti-Communist--in which ease it is not likely that he would be with Ho. Ch'en Keng has frequently been mentioned as commander of the actual or prospective "volunteer army."
INDONESIA. Retermined anti-suerrilla campaign id Celebes still delaveds Although the gpvernment's decision to launch a determined campaign against guerrillas in the Celebes is still apparent, to date it has engaged only in a series of minor skirmishes. The Army Attache comments that sufficient reinforcements probably have not yet arrived to riek a major operation. Rigid pressNcensorship continues. (S USARMA Djakarta, 11 Sep 51)
Comment: Lawlessness in other areas of Indonesia does not appear to have decreased appreciably in spite of a.five-months' security campaign and widespread arrests in August. Sudden trooP withdrawals, particularly from Java, to support the Celebee operations coUld have serious consequences.
25X1A
9.
CHINA
25X6
25X1A
Chinese Communist "war sustaining plan" reportede reports that a "war sustaining plan" was a opted by the Chinese Communists at a meeting in Peiping in late July and was implemented by the end of August. The objects of the plan are to (1) maintain the national defense force at three million without weakening the war effort in Korea; (2) continue troop rotatioh in Korea, and (3) give combat e .erience a:ainst US forces to as many troops as possible.
25X6
Comments Although there is no confirmation of this plan, the recent appearance of new Chinese Communist units in Korea lends credibility to the. report. Furthermore, it appears to be a reasonable tactic for the Chinese Communists. The figure of three million troopa is considered low, as the most recent reports estimate 3.7 million men in the CCF.
TOP SECRET
6
17 Sep 51
Approved For Re !date 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000,490160001-1

TOP SECRET
100
25X1C
aalleggeja An 8'September report estimatesthat he Chinese Communistr (1) are emoy Islands (east of Amoy) at may time, (2) will likely to attack the not attempt to invade FormosaUnless US "Covering forces" are withdrawn, (I will not assault Hong Kong until prepared to risk general war, and (4 are not likely to attack Macao, in view of the colony's increasing economic usefUlness to Communist China. (S Singapore 312, 13 Sep 51)
igillinialailateataiSUt
25X1C
11.
VLsaa_iniasztLefutesaflhiP:Stebs_15Ip_ses_ A Chinese Communist prisoner of war captured on 13 September in the west-central sector stated that an offensive would begin on 15 September. The field comment on the PW's statement adds that "although a limited objective attack by the anemy is possible, all other available information does not indicate an all-out attack now." (S CINCFE Telecon 5159, 15 Sep 51)
KOREA.,
Comment! Communist forces in Kdree are capable of launching a powerfhl, sustained offensive where and wheh they choose. There have been, however, some recent unconfirmed indications-that the enemy may continue on the defensive for the near future.
Comments The Peiping regime regards each of the above areas as a.part of China and is cohmitted to'the eventual recovery of all of them. An Ilia operation against the Quemoy Islands has long been eipected. attempted invasion of Formosa is not indicated in the near future, although it is conceivable, as some reports have alleged, that Peiping will obtain Soviet assistance for a Formosa operation in spite of the US commitment to the island's "neutralization." There are no indications of an imminent assault on Hang Kong or Macao--both of which continue to be of more value to China in non-Communist than in Communist hands--although Peiping could launch an attack against either colony with little warning.
12
JAPAN.
25X1C
toward Jatang estimating Communist China's short-term intentions toward Japan, may at first prefer a policy of ingratiation rather than open hostility toward independent Japan. The committee believes that the Chinese will attempt to neutralize Japan, and spread Communist influence by political and economic contacts,
Chinese Communist intentip
25X1C
25X1C
commenting on the above conclusion, stressed the enormous importance to Japan of trade with China, which gives the latter a weapon with which to exert economic and political pressure. (S Singapore 312, 13 Sep 51)
Comments
Japanese officials are fully aware of the' need for
TOP SECRET
7
-
17 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79101146A0013600160001-1

TOP SECRET
continuing rigid economic policies toward Japan is dependent upon the non-Commimist Materials and imported foodstuffs. There controlled trade wfth the Chinese, which, theladvantage of the Western World.
Communist aread during the time ' world for the bulk of its raw will be pressures, however, for the Japanese feel, will work to
Politically, the Chinese can hold little immediate hope for creating an anti-Western attitude among the Japanese, although considerable potential exists for arousing neutrality sentiment. Chinese promanda so :far has pursued simultaneous policies of'conciliation and threat coward the Japanese, citing the advantages of accomodation on the one hand, and the disadvantages of opposition on the other.
13.
25X1A Treaty to be ratified in Octobers, The Japanese peace treaty will be ratified at an extraordinary session ot the Diet to be convened'on 12 to 16 October, according to a press announcement. No commitment has been made relative to the US,Japan security pact. (R FBID , Jiji, 13 Sep 51)
Comments Conservative control of both houses assures apeedy ratification of the peace treaty. The US-Japan security pact, on which the public and opposition parties are demanding further details, may be in for a more difficult time.
14.
Socialists issue joint statement with Indian Socialist Partys The Japanese and Indian Socialist Parties, in a joint statement on 14 September, announced their intention to fight for a Socialist Asia in rejection of both the capitalist and the Communist world. The joint statement also said that the two parties hoped to call a conference for all Asian Socialist parties soon. (ri FBID Ticker, Tokyo Central News, 14 Sep 51)
Comments Failure of the Japanese Socialist delegates at the international Sociilist meeting last summer to support an anti-Communist resolution increased the Japan Socialist Partyfs internal diasension which arose over its unrealistic attitude.toward the peace treaty. Thia new development appears to be a shrewd move to unify the party and at the same time to sane a more positive party platform, centered around pan-Asianism.

TOP SECRET
17 Sep 51
Approved For Releae 2001109/06:C1A-M779t01146A000406160001-1
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
ONESTERN)
!,
1.
GERMANY: Adenauer indicates anxiety over, Allied talke on Germany: West 0717717bhancellor Adenauer has indicated that he is most concerned over the Washington talks on Germany's new status and its 'defense role. He stressed that his whole future and that of his goverment coalition are at stake. The chancellor's emissary, in a talk with the US Deputy High ComL missioner, asserted tbat rifts were appeahng in the coalition and that the chancellor was being criticized for goingptoo far to meet Allied wishes. The -chancellor, therefore, was particularly- anxiona that an agreement ac ceptable to the German public be reached in Washington.
.
25X1C
25X1A
Meanwhile, have!cemented that the GermanS are in substantial agreement on the issue of German rearmament. Reports that tbe SOM-gOVernmeht favera rearthament and:the Social Democrats oppose it are bound to be misleading, they feel, sirice these reports underestimate the determination of the government as well as the opposition to hold out for certain prerequisites, (C Bonn 162, 12 Sep 51;
1
25X1A
Comment: Adenauer has been forced, partly by the intransigent Social Democratic attitude, into a position where, in Order to sell rearmament to the German people and to the parliament, he Must present the rearmament issue in conjunction with some sort of Allied agreement restoring German sovereignty. Although the details of the Poreign Ministers' agreements on Germany are not yet clear, the Washington accord appears to have answered many of the government's conditions.
25X6
TOP SECRET
9 17 Sep 51 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDF79T01146A000400160001-1
Approved For Ramose 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A005400160001-1

TOP SECRET
25X6
3.
Comment: Since France was excluded from the Anglo-American bilateral discussions on Mediterranean defenses in Malta last spring, fears of American, and especially British encroachMent upon Fliench influence in the Middle East have been increasing.
4.
French see no threat ih Soviet note: The French Foreign Office, reports that its government was "not particularly disturbed" by the-Soviet note of 11 September directed against the Schuman Plan and the European Army project. Rather, the note waa regarded merely as a part of Seviet intimidation tactics prior to the Mashington tripartite talks. It is "not improbable" that the note represents a further build-up toward eventual Soviet denunciation of the Franco-Soviet alliance treaty of 1944; it may also be designed largely as propaganda support for the local Communists.
The'foreign office has worked out a draft reply defending the Schuman Plan on its pacific merits and the European Army on its defensive nature. The French-Government, however, feels no need to make haste with an answer. (S Paris 1640, 13 Sep 51)
5.
Comment: French reaction tothe recent friendly overtures made to FrencE-FRigeentatives by Soviet officials will be cooled off by this note. The chances that this is a step toward denunciation of the 1944 Franco Soviet treaty are slight in view of the recent renewal of the Franco-Soviet commercial treaty. The irench Communists can be expected to make full use of the note in their propaganda.
De Gaulle complains about defense_policies: In a speech before the Anglo-American Press Club in Paris, Generar De Gaulle voiced the most
TOP SECRET
10
FRANCE. Anglo-French conference proposed to alleviate disagreements over ErdareiEast; The British Foreign Office confirms that the French Foreign WilinTeirsas proposed a conference with Great Britain to discuss "international questions of common interest" in View of the danger of Anglo-French disagreements, particularly on Middle.East and North African questions. 'The Foreign Office expects a general conference some time after the French Foreign (C London 1380, 14 Sep 51) Minister's return from Ottawa.
17 Sep 51
Approved For Re Ibithe 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOS00160001-1

TOP SECRET
about the vigorous and uncompromising expression' to date of his complaints to the European He repeated his usual objection US and UK defense policies. Army, and stressed.his concern aver infringements on French sovereignty and North resulting from the establishment of military bases in France refusal to accept his concepts Africa. He ended with a hint that Allied (R Paris 1604, 12 Sep 51) would result in a neutralist or Communist France.
reconvenes in November after the prospective fall recess.
Despite the implication in his speech, there is little likelihood that De Gaulle would not vigorously oppose a neutralist or Communist policy in France.
The AUSTRIA. Tito would welcome meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister: Foreign Minister Gruber ITIFgav Minister in Vienna has informed Austrian that Marshal Tito would welcome a meeting in Yugoslavia some time before 15 October. The proposed discussion would cover boundary questiona, trade relations, anti-Soviet tactics, and mutual defense. Gruber refused to commit himself to the meeting before consultation with the Austrian cabinet ministers. The US Legation in Vienna is strongly opposed -to the discussion and has (S considered an attempt to discourage Gruber from undertaking the trip. Vienne 936, 10 Sep 51; S Vienna 987, Belgrade 309, 7 Sep 51; TS/Control
6.
12 Sep 51)
if it is included Comment: An Austro-Yugoslav defensive arrangement, premature in the absence of an Austrian as a subject of'conversation, appears Since the USSR apparently army, and might cause an adverse Soviet reaction. negotiations apart from the Soviet has not connidered the Austrian treaty position vis-a-Vis Yugoslavia, any Austrian move suggestive of friendship for the Titoist cause might jeopardize further the ponsibility of a fourpower settlement in Austria, ln View of well-known Austrian antipathy for Yugoslavia, particularly along the border areas, it is somewhat doubtful that moves toward closer relations between the two countries would be universally popular at this time on the Austrian side.
Communists planning demonstration in Vienna: The Communist Party of Austria is reportedly planning a mass demonstration to take place in
7.

TOP SECRET
Commentv Spokesmen for the Rally of the French People have heretofore strataexcused the anti-US flavor of their leader's extreme nationalism as a primarily to While this speech, directed gem to outmaneuver the Communists. in the an American audience, may actually be a Gaullist bid for support indication that the general will October cantonal elections, it is also an The curevent he comes into power. not be overly tractable in the unlikely rent dissension among the parties of the government coalition has undoubtedly encouraged him to believe that dissolution of the present assembly may be precipitated; but the Pleven government now seems safe until the assembly
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040016000111 SeP
Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146AV0400160001-1

TOP SECRET demonstrations in the It is to be coordinated with against rent and September. Vienna on 18 touching off a Communist Campaign be provincial capitals, Soviet enterprises in Austria dl1 Workers from price increases. the demonstration. ht by truck to Vienna to take part in
,
25X1A
25X1A
Communists have indicated that the Austrian Austrian officials Comment: Previous reports proposed rent law. Soviet would attempt to capitalize on the would encourage tenants in the have reported that the Communists rent increase. These officials have zone to refuse en masse to pay any pointing out that the trade discounted the chances of serious difficulties, that rent, increases will be used for unions support the new measure and claimed that a Communist demonstration property improvements. Previous reports would occur on 20 September.
Soviet interference in 1.3681 administration the US Legation in Vienna that Foreign Minister GrUber has advised ment: and judicial matters EZETinued Soviet interference in local administrative to the Soviet High complain once more Gruber has forced the Austrian Cabinet to meddling as "perhaps growing worse," Describing Soviet Command. measures, his government would stated that, in the absence of corrective parliament and to protest to the Allied be compelled to raise the issue in 51) Council. (S Vienna 989, 12 Sep Soviet unilateral inter Comment: Wide publicity has been givep to The objectionable actions ferenEgrErthe Austrian press in recent weeks. by local commanders, usually consist of an assumption of police powers intervention in court proceedings; directives, and countermanding of Austrian authorities sensitivity to Austrian protests, Soviet objectives -- or to While demonstrating some sacrifice immediate have.not heretofore been willing to sake of good public relations. commanders -for the discipline local
directly affect nation's defense program: ITALY. Amount of US aid will pointed out.at some length that TEE5-77's Minister of the Budget Pella has defense program and the hope of the rate of progress of his country's parliament depends directly securing aey additional appropriations from congressional action on foreign aid. At the on the outcothe of present DS requirements may run that Italian dollar same time, ECA in Rome estimates beyond the 275 million requested for the as much as 70 million dollars fiscal year 1951-1952.
8.
9.
unusually heavy purchases of coal and The Italians will have to make available in Europe because of wheat from dollar sources. Less coal is the Italian wheat crop is 10 pereent below an expanded defense effort, and that price rises, the additional' the 1950-1951 crop. It is anticipated TOP SECRET

12
disturbs Austrian Govern
17 Sep 51
Approved ForRelesse2001/IMU06:=-RDP79T01146A00124p0160001-1
TOP SECRET
costs that they will add to equipment already on order, the cutting off of Iranian oil, and possible retaliation against Italian export controls by the Soviet bloc from which Italy gets 10 percent of its coal and 20 percent of its wheat requirements, will adversely affect the Italian economy, particularly if US aid is reduced below the 275 million dollars recommended by ECA. (C ECA Rome 955, 31 Aug 51; C ECA Rome 994, 10 Sep 51)
10.
Comment: Available evidence indicates that Norway will finally agree to Greek-Turkish admission, regardless of Denmark's wishes, and that Denmark will not ihdividually exercise its veto.
11.
DENMARK.
se=s of the Danish-Polish trade negotiations, the Poles, according to

the head of the Danish delegation, have refused to make any new coal commitment, promising only the approximately Eloo,000 tons still due under the current agreement. The Poles attributed the reduced coal shipments to Denmark's failure to deliver spare parts for automobiles and light trugks. They also indicated their desire for more ships and Diesel engines for fishing craft than they received under the current agreement. (S Copenhagen 211, 10 Sep 51)
Comment: The.Danes have frequently (see OCI Daily Digest, 11 Jul 51) expressed their fear that Poland will restrict coal shipments, upon which Denmark is sorely dependent (see OSI Daily Digest 15 Jun and 8 Aug 51).
12.
CUBA. Communist Party reinforcing cadres of Youth Movement: reports that the Partido Socialista Popular (Cuban Communist y ) is reinforcing its cadres of the Juventud Socialista (Communist Youth Movement) with selected young Communists picked for their knowledge in methods of indoctrination and agitation-propaganda tactics. Flavio Bravo and other leaders of the youth movement are not able to select suitable young men from their own limited ranks and, according to the source, they are using
-
NORWAY-DENMARK. Governments still planning opposition to Greek-Turkish NATO membership. According to a Norwegian Foreign Office source; Foreign Minister Lange now intends to oppose NATO membership for Greece and Turkey at Ottawa, but will finally vote for such membership if all other members do. The Norwegiani, however, reportedly believe that Denmark is prepared to veto such membership if it is supported by one other country, presuMably Norway or the Netherlands. US Ambassador Bay points out that, should the Danes solicit Norwegian support for a veto, Lange would be placed in a difficult position, because the Norwegian public would then consider that by taking a stand with Denmark he might have prevented Greek-Turkish membership. (S Oslo 264, 12 Sep 51)
Poles take difficult attitude in trade negotiations:: In preliminary
25X1C
TOP SECRET
13
17 Sep 51
Approved For Refute 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A086400160001-1

TOP SECRET The aim is t6 form a core other young party members to give it strength. leadership of the Com of militant leaders which later will take over the munist Party.
members. However, At present the Juventud Socialista has about 10,000 youths from ail this number by' recruiting the party intends to increase the social classes of Cuba. (C Habana 210, 7 Aug 51)

TOP SECRET
11+
to be of vital interest Comment: The Juventud Socialista continues importance to the to the Cuban Communist Party which attaches considerable the party's principal memthers, since they execute .work of the youth movement attending propaganda programs by distributing pamphlets, posting signs, and support of the "partisans of The Juventudts activities in all meetings. Recently, the Juventud has peace" movement is its most important function. publication of its been concerned with the UN entrance into Korea and the in labor new youth magazine, Cascabel. It has taken an active interest government disputes with.elements of other questions, and has engaged in sponsored youth groups to protect its propaganda.
17 Sep 51
TOP SECRET
declassi-
bl&RVteSEQt RMAilabeaalfinieSIMISS:30PAIIRDV:49ttitiliffikEltiW4SwIngeoeid-Tr UNCLASSIFIED when document. fied when filled in form is detached from controlled SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER STR Y
REG
I

SOURCE

DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
LOGGED BY
received by the Central Intelligence Agency document or and attached to each Toy Secret document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, ATTENTION: This fOrm win be placed on top of will remain attached to the and those individualywhose Official Secret within the CIA and Top Secret Control personnel TOp or a:ISM/led Secret matter is limited to material will Sign this form transmitted outside of CIA. Access to TOp who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret document will sign and duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers provided. Each individuat who secs the Toy Secret and indicate pertOd of custody in the telt-hand columns indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. SEEN BY
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
SIGNATURE
When this form is detached from TOp Secret NOTICE Of DETACHMENT: Top Secret Control /or record. and transmitted to Central
'

DATE TIME DATE TIME
RECE I VED
RELEASED
SIGNATURE
0 FFICE/01V.
DATE
below material it shalt be completed in the appropriate spaces

D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
DOWNGRADED
By
DESTROYED
TO
BY
(Signature)
WITNESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF ICE
Apptoved For Rel egge`2001/09/06 : CIA -126Th9T01146AOF0F07400160001-1

1401
.
FO
.9A
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re !Me 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A06460160001-1
TOP SECRET'
17 September 1951
CIA No. 49346-A ' Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re leash 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00M160160001-1
TOP SECRET

Copy No.

10 THE DAILY DIGEST
CENIR AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
Approved For RelPite 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W00160001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (PASTERN)
1.
IRAN. Effects of British embargo on Iranian economy: The British embargo on the export of certain scarce commodities to Iran according to the American EMbassy in Tehran, will be felt immediate]; in the case of sugar, already in short supply. The ban will also affect, although less quickly, cotton piece goods which can no longer be.bought from the US because of Iran's inability to convert sterling to dollars. (S, 8/8 Tehran 1017, 14 Sep 51).
2.
MIA/BURMA,.
;ndia advises Burma to delay submission to UN of Chinese troop question: India has advised Burma to delay its projected submission to the UN.of the question of Chinese Nationalistiroop activities along the Sino-Burmese border. India has also expressed the hope that the US can do something toward eliminating this danger to peace in Asia since the US, as the "chief supplier of foreign arms to Southeast Asia," may be accused by Communist powers of assisting the Nationalists, (S, S/8 New Delhi 956, 12 Sep 51).
Comment: Last May, when Burma first.planned to take this case to the UN, it was dissuaded from doing so by US representations, Indian admonitions against hasty action, and the movement of troops in question out of Burma into Yunnan. Now that the defeated Nationalist troops have reentered Burma, any Western advice to delay may be less successful. If the case is hot submitted, it will probably be largely because of Indian influence.
.
3.
4.
BURMA. Burma to make peace with Japan: The Permanent Secretary of the Burmese Foreign Office informed US Ambassador Key that his government expects to establish peace with Japan through the,exohange of notes. Despite the simi/arity to the Indian approach to the matter, the official indicated that Burma was acting independently. (C, S/8 Rangoon 276, 13 Sep 51).
INDOCHINA, De Lattre reportedly seeks command of all Allied forces in Southeast Asia: commenting on De re s trip to the US, told the US Consul in Hanoi that in pressing for an advance US-UK-French commitment to act jointly against any Communist move into Southeast Asia, Bo Lattre will forcefully nominate
Comment: The British action in shutting off these imports will encourage opposition to Prime Minister Mossadeq among moderates. At the same time, it will probably result in an even more intransigent attitude on the part of the present government which will see in this action further confirmation of "British imperialism."
25X6
TOP SECRET
1 Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T.01146A000400160001-1
17 Sep 51
Approved For Re lese 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W400160001-1

TOP SECRET
25X6
ommand of Allied Forces from Hong Kong to Singapore. The US is or would be agreeable but.that the British are unwilling to en rust their area, especially Malaya, to a non(S S/S Hanoi 154, 13 Sep 51). Britisher.
Comment: The minutes of the US-U&French military conference held in Singapore during May strongly suggest that De Lattre has precisely this goal in mind.
5.
The US Charge refers to the original American deciaion to devise a pro'gram whose benefits would be applied directly through the Associated States, in order to strengthen the prestige of the native governments in the eyes This would.prevent the French from diverting the aid to of the populations. their own interest. He concludes that if De Lattrets agenda were Made knbwn (Sp s/8 to informed Vietnamese, it would violently irritate and offend them. Saigon 626, 13 Sep 51),
Comment: Although the French insisted almost two years 'ago on participation in the economic aid program, they subSequentlyappeared to accept administration by the US and the Associated States. De Lattrets reported intent to revive the issue of French participation is not surprising, however, in the light of continuing French criticism of the-ECA program in Indochina.
6.
French-Vietnamese friction over the concept of the French Union foreseen: The US Charge in Saigon believes that the prospective first convocation of the High Council of the French Union may bring to a head the problem of whether the status of the Associated States of Indochina is to be one of genuine association or subordination.
The emphasis which Vietnamese spokesmen have placed on full equality within the French Union, when compared with De Lattrets statement that commonwealth dominion status is hardly in prospect for Vietnam, denotes the potential explosiveness of this issue. The Charge states his balief that implementation of the French Union, along the restricted lines envisaged by France in 1946, will be deeply resented by the Vietnamese public and will embitter FrenchVietnamese relations for years to come. He urges that no American statement be issued which implies approval of the organizational aspects of the French Union, (SI S/S Saigon 627, 14 Sep 51),
TOP SECRET
INDOCHINA, De Lattre plans to revive issue of French participation in Indochinese aid programs General De Lattrets proposed agenda for his meetings with ECA officials in Washington is "highly disappointing," in the opinion of the US Charge at Saigon. The Charge feels that it indicates the French attitude towards the US economic aid program in Indochina has remained the same -- that US economie aid to the Associated States should not be administered bilaterally, but withOfficial French participation.
17
S eP
Approved For Rearse 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0M00160001-1

TOP SECRET
7.
INDONESIA. Ratification of Japanese treaty probable: US Ambassador Cochran states that events at the San Francisco conference have sobered Indonesians generally and weakened the position of those who opposed participation in the treaty. Codhran believes that when Foreign Minister Subardjo and Ambassa dor to the US Ali reveal the progress they made with the Japanese delegation at San Francisco, the government 7 if supported by President Sukarno, Vice President Bette, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta -- can obtain parliamentary ratification of the treaty. (C, S/S Djakarta 4210 13 Sep 51),
Comments The Japanese delegation assured the Indonesians at San Francisco that Japan was prepared to negotiate bilateral treaties regarding the payment of reparations and the regulation of fishing rights in Indonesian waters. The Indonesian delegation is not expected to return to Djakarta until 23 September, and a detailed statement by the government describing their activity at San Francisco will undoubtedly await their arrival.
There is every indication that Sukarno, Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta will support ratification of the treaty.
8.
PHILIPPINES. Filipinos study relations with Japan; With regard to the Philippine attitude on Japanese participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the US Charge in Manila has been informed that the 'Philippine Government is reexamining its position relative to Japan's membership in UN bodies.n The Charge comments that the reexamination is likely to take at least a month and that it would be safe to assume that no commitments would be made before the Japanese peace treaty is ratified. (C, S/S Manila 10501 14 Sep 51".
Comments The Philippine Government, which has been under attack from the opposition for being too lenient on the whole Japanese question, is likely to delay action in this matter until after the forthcoming elections.
9.
JAPAN. Airline negotiations bog down: An investigation by the US Mission in Tokyo reveals that the delay in inaugurating the Japanese internal airline, originally scheduled for 20 August, is due to failure on the part of the several international airlines participating in the venture to form the necessary corporation. Several foreign representativesetill lack authority to commit their companies but continue to indicate their desire to partici pate in the joint venture. Japan Air Lines, whose franchise expires on 20 September, ie now attempting to negotiate with only one foreign 'company. to furniah the necessary planes and pilots. (C, s/8 Tokyo 541, 13 Sep 51).
Comment: The suggestion for a joint international airline was made originally by the US in an effort to avoid criticism that the Occupation was showing favoritism toward US airlines Lack of any restrictions in the peace treaty on Japanese operation of civil aircraft may have been a factor in loss

TOP SECRET
3
17 Sep 51

TOP SECRET of interest on the part of the international carriers, who Japanese will take over realize that the as soon as training is completed and tained, equipment ob-
Newt
SECTION 3 (WESTERO
10.
Comment: French sources have already Arab States are not likely expressed the opinion that the to raise the question of French infringement on Nbroccan sovereignty at the next UN General Assembly.
General Juin's replacement by General Guillaume has relieved Moroccan tension somewhat, even Francothough a softer policy is not likely adopted. Pressure from to be North African Nationalist forces may now diminish. on the Arab States
11.
UNITED KINGDOM. Morrison stresses course of the 12 September US-UK- dan er of' reel: itatin war: In the surVeyed the policy of containing France tripartite talks, which generally the USSR, British Foreign Secretary put considerable Morrison stress on the importance of avoiding action which might inadvertently precipitate a third world war, He warned against Korea, arming Yugoslavia too going too far in extensively, establishing Turkey, rearming a united Germany, western air bases in perMitting West German Anschluss establishing air bases in with Austria, Norway, admitting ese too quickly, and setting Sweden to NATO, rearming the Japanpowerful US wireless transmitters imeter of the USSR. The West up on the pernevertheless tary strength, he concluded. must continue to increase its mili(S, S/S to London 1463, 12 Sep 51). Comment: Objection to many of the projects also be explained by the well mentioned by Morrison might established British persal of US commitments, opposition to extensive diswith a smaller share for the result. Several of UK and France as eihis statements range so far from the realm of issues, however, as to suggest that the foreign current secretary was preoccupied

TOP SECRET
FRANCE. French seek US support to Prevent Moroccan puesti In the 11.September discussions between the French Foreign n reac in UN: US Secretary of State, the Minister and the latter agreed that "no useful served by raising the Moroccan purpose" would be question in ,the UN and promised influence to discourage" to "use hie such a step. The secretary minister that US-Frenbh interests assured the foreign in Morocco "coincided" foreign minister had-expressed, with the views the but he noted that thefl Nationalist served "careful coneideration." (S, S/S to.Ftris 1531, to London forces de12 Sep 51). 1445,
4 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040016000?-igeP 51
Approved For Re lege 2001/09/06 : CIPARDP79T01146A0A400160001-1
TOP SECRET
with the leftwing Labor criticisnis of American foreign policy, criticisms which he anticipates he will have to answer at the partV's annual conference in early October. Just prior to Morrison's departure for the present conferences, the US EMbassy in London estimated .that domestic political considerations would make him particularly anxious to "bring home some bacon" (see OCI Daily Digest, 30 Aug 51) .
.

TOP SECRET
5
la
Sep 51
H R70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST. W.T. .

1.
Areakciqwn of Soviet and Cauc- sian troops in North Korea estimated:
The US Far East Command estimates,

16 Se 51
that a
total of 25, 900 Soviet or Caucasian personnel are in Korea.
personnel in Korea, numbering 400, Soviet personnel numbering 15, 15,400,
isted as asfollows: follows: are listed are

--
Three antiaircraft 000 --6, 6,000 antiaircraft divisions, divisions, unidentified unidentified -One security security o or infantry regiment, regiment, in northeastern Korea -- 1, 500 One r infantry 1,600 Military advisers -- 2, 000 Military 2,000 Engineers - 1, 1,500 Engineers 500 Supply, counterespionage, counterespionage, local local security -500 Supply, --1, 1,500 Coastal Coastal defense, defense,'artillery 'artilleryand andantiaircraft antiaircraft artillery (separate (separate listed above) above) ---1, 1,500 from antiaircraft personnel listed 500 Signal and 1,000 1, 000 Signal and radar radar Civilian advisers -- 400 400 Civilian advisers --
--
--
Caucasian elements, numbering 10, 10,500, Caucasian elements, numbering 500, are are bebe assigned assignedas asfollowS: follows: lieved to be
'
One artillery artillery division, 000 One divisipn, uhidentified upidentvied - 5, 5,000 Other capacities capacities (ground. (ground and --5, 5,000 and air) air) -000 Hospital and medical -- 500 Hospital and BOO
--
The Pucasians c+upasians are believed be advance advance eleeleThe believed to be tothe theF4r Far East East Command, ments of of a "Soviet "Soviei Puppet Forgeb)-iaccording Forq+;'/according to Command, additional the presence presence in in or orimminent imminent movement movement to Korea of of ditional reprts,indicate reports,indicate the troops that that would would fall into the classification of of Caucasian members of a "Soviet puppet army. army. " Information Inforqation concerning conaerning the existence ex\stence of of an organic, "Soviet puppet tactical "Soviet "Sov!et Puppet Puppret Force" Force" continues continues to to be be inconclusive. inconclusive, tactical
o ment: While C;qqment: While this estimate estimate of of the the number number of of Soviet troops in Korea cannot canfiot'lk vel'ified, theirnumber numberundoubtedly undoubtedly has ied, their risen riaen sharply sharplyduring during 1951. 1931. No WoSoviet Soviet or or Caucasian Caucasian combat combat unit has been posipositively identified in Korea. -31.
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 20-Mar-201 'DPPROVED
Approved For Rellklge 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A066160170001-0
TOP SECRET
18 September 1951
4_4
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00041.0170001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR: Purge of Ukrainian textbooks decreed: The Central Committee of TgrUkrainian Communist Party recently decreed that all textbooks should be revised by June 1952. Existing textbooks were criticized for failing to show: (a) the leading role of the great Russian people among the fraternal peoples of the USSR; (b) the help given by the Soviet people, primarily the Russians, to the Ukrainians; (c) the position of the Ukraine as an integral part of the USSR; (d) the importance of Stalin linguistics; and (e) the influenoe of advanced Russian literature on its Ukrainian counterpart. (S Moscow Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51)
"idea-60=r distortions and deviations, all of which culminated in the

reoent condemnation of V. Sosyura's poem, "Love the Ukraine." It is interesting to note that this poem was censured by the party_for the same five reasons enumerated above.
2.
ALBANIA: Premier Hoxha reported in Moscow: A fairly reliable Albanian source in Italy reports that Premier Enver Hoxha is now in Moscow. Italian intelligence considers the visit "highly possible." (S Rome Joint Weeka 36, 7 Sep 51)
Comment: There is no confirmation of this report. A visit to Mose= by Hoxha cannot be considered unusual as he has traveled to Moscow on the average of twice yearly since the Tito-Cominform rift. His last visit was during April and May of 1951.
3.
BULGARIA:
Comment:
There hava been numerous official criticisms of so-called
Exiles re ort plans for entrance of Soviet troo
s:
25X1C 25X1C 25X1C
that on 20 August a conferenoe of Bulgarian and Soviet staff officers was held in northeastern Bulgaria. The conference deoided to evacuate Bulgarian forces from southern Dobruja immediately, and to increase and improve military installations in order to accommodate two unidentified Soviet divisions that were to arrive in October 1951. The decisions were reportedly taken as a security measure againstthe "offensive aims" of Greece and Turkey resulting from their forthcoming inclusion in NATO.
25X1A 25X1A
Comment: There is no evidence to substantiate either this report or a 17e7711s7 report of a high level
Soviet-Bulgarian conference purportedly held in Sofia on 16 July to
TOP SECRET
1
18 Sep 51
Approved For ReleNs, ase 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400170001-0

TOP SECRET
discuss the entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Both reports appear to be from the same refugee Bourne's, whose reliability in unknown.
4.
Comment: The rumors of how Martyk met his death The story is certain, in may be correct. any event, to provide a temporary boost to morale of Warsaw's inhabitants, The method described wadi frequentlythe used by the Polish underground against particularly objectionable and cruel German occupation officials during World War
5.
technicians and s ecialists not to be released: Former army techn clans and specialists who were recal ed to aot period of six months in preparation ve uty fer a for this year,4 maneuvers will be released at the end of their not term of service, as; had been promised.
A000rding to the US Embassy in Warsaw, it appears that all teohniclans are being held in the armed services and mill assist in the olass of 1931 and deferrees training of former Classes, are currently being inducted. both groups of Which (See OCI Daily Digest 7 Sep 51, (S Warsaw 245, 14 Sep 51) p. 1)
ComMent: The retention of technicians-and specialists supports other recent evidence of a planned increase in the size-of the Army, Former army specialists Polish being recalled to active duty indefinite period on the basis are for an of training and experience, not'of :gess, age, or branch, In addition, the class of 1928, soheduled for release this fall, continues on active duty.

TOP SECRET
2
Martyk, the who specialized in diatribes against YOA.BBC and Radio Madrid broadcants, the Polish press to have been was reported bY assassinated on 9 September by "Fascist brigands in the employ of imperialist patrons." The DS Embassy Warsaw states that, in according to local rumors, an armed band way into Martykts flat and shot feroed its him. that this shooting was only the first The band repOrtedly announced in a series which will exterminate the "traitors who have delivered Poland to Soviet domination." embassy comments that this assassination The is the boldest direct action-of anti-Soviet Poles in some time, and provides in indication of the deep resentment felt againat Soviet domination, (S Warsaw 248, 14 Sep 51; R Warsaw 241, 12 Sep 51)
assassinated: IrercirRaawsvituporaveacommentatOr Stefan
POLAND& Zaishradicilopmmentator
18 Sep 51
Approved For Relate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00bd0170001-0

TOP SECRET
6.
TRIESTE: Independent parties reportedly planning to protest election postponenmnt: Independent parties in Trieste are reportedly planning to forward a resolution to the UN and AMG, as well as to the US and UK, protesting the postponement of the Trieste elections as an illegal and undemocratic move. The resolution is expected to demand that a new e/eotion date be set immediately and that the present administrative officials in tone A be replaced by a special commission to handle the affairs of the Zone until after the elections. Trieste, 10 Sep 51)
Comment: Popular reaction in Trieste to the 'postponement of the elections has been strong, but not vehement, among the parties opposed to the return of the Territory to Italy, The independent parties condemn the postponement of the elections because they believe'their present strength mould give them an advantage in the elections, and claim that the population is losing confidence in Allied MilitarY Government. The Slav parties condemn the postponeient as evidence of pro-Italian favoritism, while the Communist Party claims it *OVEIS that the Western powers are preparing to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia.
25X1A
7:
YUGOSLAVIA: Tito criticizes peasants and clergy: On 14 September in a second major speeoh within a week, Marshal Tito pointed out that friendly relations with the Nest did not mean that Yugoslavia iould give free rein .to "reactionaries and individual clergymen." He declared that the government regarded religien as the private concern of individuals but demanded that the Church be free of all political elements. Tito also expressed dissatisfaction with existing agrioultural production, and warned the peasants that the government had "not finished the revolution" and would not abandon its program to socialize agriculture, The speeoh did not refer to Italo-Yugoslav relations.
The US Embassy in Belgrade comments that Communist Party leaders May attempt to blame the Church for the trend among peasants to withdraw from cooperatives. (S Belgrade, Joint Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51; V Belgrade 348, 15 Sep 51; FBIS, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: During the past several months Tito has made an increasing number of public speeches on the government's revised foreign and domestic policies. These speeches have been designed to boleter popular morale by promising a brighter future and to explain to party members the necessity for the government's current policies. Although the govern ment's polioy toward religion has become less rigid, the government's determination'to maintain the cooperative farms may lead to increased pressure on the clergy in an effort to find a scapegoat.
'

TOP SECRET
3
18 Sep 51
Approved For Re leng 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400170001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
GREECE. Post-election problems: Marshal Papagos has categorically refused to collaborate with either of the other two major parties, the US Embassy in Athens reports. Papagos feels that the only solution is a new election under the majority system, which he could win. The embassy sees three disadvantages to immediate new elections: (1) there would be two additional months of neglect of pressing economic problems; (2) a prolenged bitter political campaign would deepen the rift between right and left; (3) there is some doubt that Papagos could-win a significant number of votes. New elections could result in a new realignment divided about equally between the left and the right. (S Athens 12669 15'Sep
51)
Comment: The 107 seats won by Papagos, while greater than either of the other two parties, still does not give him an absolute majority. A Plastiras-Venizelos combination might give such a coalition a bare majority but it is unlikely that these two Tmrties weuld cooperate successfully. Papagos, meanwhile, is demanding Venizelosl immediate resignation and a mandate from the King to form a new government, hoping that he can win over enough of the opposition deputies to make his attempt successful.
2.
AUSTRALIA. Anti-Communist referendum campaign intensified: As the day for voting on the anti-Communist referendum (22 SepteMber) approaches, the government is conducting a studied campaign in support of its proposed constitutiOnal amendment while the Labor Party, particularly its leader Dr. Evatt, is beboming'hysterical if not desperate in attacks on all aspects of government polick. Sectarianism has entered the campaign, with Catholics supporting the.government and some prominent Anglicans supporting Labor. The voters seeM to lack enthusiasm. The weight of opinion still predicts a government victory. (II USARMA Melbourne, C-47, 14 Sep 51).
Comment: The referendum is on a constitutional amendment which would permit the government to legislate on Communists in any way necessary for the national defense, and specifically would grant it power to pass the Communist Party Dissolution Act which was invalidated by the High Court last spring. Virtually all observers concede a government victory.
3.
INDONESIA. Grave insecurity continues throughout Indonesia: With a largescale anti-guerrilla operation in prospect in the Celebes, the government continues to be confronted with serious problems in other areas of Indonesia. On the night of 10 September, 200 terrorists reportedly attacked the town of TjiparaY in West Java, killing 30 to 40 civilians and police, and burning and looting homes and government buildings. In northwestern Java, official

TOP SECRET
4 Approved ForFtelease2001/09/06:0A4RDP79T01146A000400170001 _018 Sep 51
Approved For Re IeTte 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001,160170001-0

TOP SECRET
sources have publicly confirmed previous unofficial reports of serious lawlessness. A new wave of murders and looting is reported in Bali. Government forces, according to'persistent rumors, are meeting strong resistance from remnants of the insurgent South Moluccan Republic, on the island of Ceram. These rumors are somewhat substantiated hy reports of a significant number of casualties entering Makassar hospitals from Ceram. (C Djakarta 424, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: It has been estimated that dissident farces in Indonesia number approximateiy 230,000, of which, however, only a small percentage are active at any one time. A government security campaign, instituted in March and still in progress, has failed to reduce laWlessness.
5.
reports that unless the Burmese Government is able to take more effective steps to settle the Chinese Nationalist problem, U Hla Maung, the Burmese Ambassador to Peiping and "one of the leading troublemakers" with regard to the Nationalist troop issue, "may attempt to make some arrangement with PeiPine'to deal With the Nationalists. (C Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: It is extremely unlikely that the ambassador would take steps independently to promote the development his government fears most--a Chinese Communist incursion of Burma.
BURMA. Possibility of Burmese Ambassador soliciting Chinese Communist aid reported: The US Embassy in Rangoon
6.
Pro-Communists invited to Peipin&: The Chinese Communists have in-. vited seven left-wing, anti-Government Burmese to attend the 1 October celebration of the second anniversary of the Peiping been some speculation that the Burmese Government regime. While there has to some of those invited, the US Embassy believes may not grant passports that political expediency is in their favor and that all will be allowed to attend the ceremonies. (C Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: This development is not connected with the previously reported agreement between Burma and Communist China to exchange goodwill missions.

TOP SECRET
Trade agreement to be signed with Czechoslovakia: The Czech Government expects to send a delegation to Djakarta during the month of September to sign a one-year trade agreement. (C Djakarta 425, 14 Sep 51) Comment: Indonesia's previous annual agreement with Czechoslovakia expirrni August. Terms of the present agreement are not yet available. However, under agreements recently negotiated with Indonesia consented to supply both tin and rubber. Poland and Hungary,
5 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400170001-01 8 Sep 51
Approved For Re Ate 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0M0170001-0

,TOP SECRET
The'presence of these-Burmese in Peiping will offer the Chinese Communists an opportunity to strengthen their control over the aboveground Communists in Burma and to coordinate their program with the insurgent BCP. The Propaganda value to be derived from this trip to Peiping will be negligible to both the Burmese and Chinese Communists.
7.
8.
Japanese peace treaty fading from prominence: Although the signing of the Japanese peace treaty prompted a number of Communist-like attacks upon the US in the Burmese press, comment on the reparations issue, which was cited as the chief reason Burma could not sign, has almost disappeared. Indonesia has been critiCized for its participation, and the US Embassy in Rangoon believes that Burmese-Indonesian relations are likely to suffer. (C Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 31)
Comment: The Burmese press reaction to the Japanese peace proceedings reflects the fact that fear of Communist China far outweighed a desire for reparations as a motivation for Burma's refusal to attend the San Francisco conference.
9.
Comment: The fact that those who surrendered on Panay did not turn in any arms indicates that they were Huk sumpathizers rather than active members. Philippine military compilations indicate a total of over 6600
PHILIPPINES. Huk surrenders continue: The surrender of 840 Huks on the island of Panay brings the total number of these surrendered to almost 1800 during the past month. Philippine military authorities believe the Huk problem on Panay is no longer serious. A former aide of Guillermo Capadocia, Hak leader there, reports that CaPadocia is seriously ill, abandoned by most of his followers and in fear of being killed by his own men.
In addition to the Panay surrenders, a group of 112 Huks, of whom 60 *ere armed, surrendered in Quezon province (East dentral Luzon). (C Manila 1032, 1)4 Sep 51)

TOP SECRET
6
Burmese to tighten controls on tires: The US Embassy in Rangoon has been informed that the Burmese Government intends to.control tire exports by designating 62 firms as the only authorized tire dealers. Other importers will be required to sell their stocks and future receipts to the authorized dealers,whouin turn, may sell tires only on the presentation of permit/6 issued by the Civil Supply Department. The embassy comments that although this probably will cause confusion in marketing circles, it nevertheless indicates that the Burmese Government is making a genuine effort to curtail tire smuggling to China. (C Rangoon 282, 15 Sep 51)
18 Sep 51
Approved For Re lege 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00.400170001-0

TOP SECRET Huks killed, captured, and surrendered, for the period 1 August 1951, Although Huk April 1950 to 23 capabilities have been materialZy this period, their numerical reduced during strength has not declined lieved to remain largely dependent comparably and is beupon the supply of arms.
10.
Conment: The Communist radio confirmed the arrest of of corglle;=7evolutionariesn--estimated a large group by non-Communist least 10,000 persons--in Shanghai sources to be at in late April. have continued, Arrests and executions on a smaller scale, for the past five months. lieved, however, that this source's estimate of 70,000 victims It is bealone should be divided in Shanghai at least by two.
11.
',Advance team,' of LOO Chinese en ineers sent to Sinkian vance team,' of about 00 recently : An ',adgraduate Chinese Sinkiang to engage mainly in industrial and mining engineers arrived in to Radio Moscow in Korean. enterprises, according (R FBIDs 22 Atig 51)
shortage, the sending of In view such a large group of trained personnel to Sinkiang may indicate the importance in that area. attached to enterprises
12.
is a Mertage of engineers, recent Chinese Communist press reports, there technicians and qualified of this admitted workerssu
Comment:
Nationalist re ort pf aircraft factories in China doubted: Ministry of National Defense reports The the establis aircraft factories ent of Chinese Communist at Tihwa, Lanchou, muesu. According to Kaiyuan, Kalgan, Tsitsihar and Chiathis report, aircraft line by March 1952. US officials in Taipei are to come off the assembZy maintenance depots and assembly comment that these points,rather than factories. are probably 150100z Sep

25X1A
According to
51)
25X1A
Large-scale arrests again reported in Shanghais An aTTO official from Shanghai bon'beginning in early September, reports a ',new wave of arrests' in that city and speculates roundup" like that of last that another ularge-scale 25X1X April may be in process. reported to have observed 26 A official is truckloads of victims fare. Another source estimates that about 70,000 on one Shanghai thoroughbeen arrested and killed persons in Shanghai have s ril. (S Hong Kong 1053, 1)4 Sep 51; C/Control
CHINA.
25X1X
(S ALUMNA,
Comment: The recent appointment of a veteran Chinese tary leader to the post of director of the Aviation Communist miliComnunist China indicates the Industry Bureau in growing importance of this industry.
TOP SECRET
7
18 Sep 51
Approved ForReleM2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00(400170001-0

TOP SECRET
13.
Concentration of aircraft in Peiping area: The Chinese Nationalists report that on 10 and 11 September a total of 113 aircraft flew from ChangChun and Ssupingchieh in central Manchuria and from Nanking to the Peiping area. The aircraft were light bombers and conventional fighters. The Ministry of National Defense statestthat the purpose of these flights is (S ALUSNA, Tlaipei; unknown.
1403W Sep 51)
Comment: While the purpose of concentrating hot cIg3F7-The Communists 'may aircraft in North.China is plan to conduct large-scale air cises in North China, prepare training exer(the second anniversary of the for an air parade over Peiping on 1 October Chinese People's Government) Manchuria for more combat units. or make room in
Chinese militar re uisitions frei t cars; The Peiping Railway Bureau on September d sc ose. 't at all rei t cars in that be requisitioned on 7 September for area were to military use, according to Nationa/ist report which the Ministry a Chinese of National Defense (MND) evaluated HC-2." biND stated that no commercial cargo in that area was moving. (S ALUSNA, filealielro 140104, Sep 51)
Comment: There has not from ailligFaial to military been a similar diversion of railroad traffic use since November 1950,
vened in Korea.
15.
Cojjiunists continue September hinese Communist to brand US as "wreckers of Kaeso.e: A 16 broadcast to the US continues to labor the theie of US responsibility for the breakdown of the Kaesong talks. Citing the evidence of Nmore-than 10,000 South Korean war prisoners, and material direct and indirect witnesses,. and photographic evidence at Kaesong," the Communist broadcast accuses "Ridgway and his generals" of committing "everything short of all-out air zone.") In conclusion the broadcast states and land attack on the neutral that "Whether they will succeed in pushing the Kaesong talks over the precipice remains to be seen.th NONA Peiping,16 Sep 51)
Comment: Recent Communist propaganda has striven to document to the world the responsibility of the US for the breakdown of the Kaesong talks. "Mile such a stand would necessarily precede a resumption of Communist hostilities in Korea, no indication of the timing of such a move has been dectected.
16.
JAPAN -Poll indicates overwhelming support for USJapan security pact: A publid opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi, a leading national newspaper, showed that 79 percent of the Japanese people support the US-Japan
TOP SECRET
lb.
when the Chinese inter-
18 Sep 51
Approved For Relent 2001109/06 : CIA-ROP79T01146A000400170001-0

TOP SECRET
security treaty, while only 6.8 percent oppoee.-On-the,questionf rearMee Minc-76.3 percent:, approvetLehile.only 12.1 percent disapproved, although a majority believed rearmament should be postponed until Japan's economy improved. (R FBID Ticker, Tokyo Kyodo, 16 Sep 51)
- Comments This poll shows unexpectedly strong support for both the security pact and rearmament. Polls taken.on therlatter!..question prior to the peace conference showed only slightly over half the people in favor. Soviet tactics at the conference, a realization that Japan is now unequivocally in the Western camp, and a tendency for the Japanese man-inthe-street to support the decisions of higher authority may all have combined to produce additional support for rearmament. These figures may have some significance if and when the government conducts a feferendum to revise the war renunciation clause in the constitution. 17.
SCAP to Permit textile shipments to Communist China: Exports of cotton and yarn to Communist areas will no longer require SOAP approval, according to "Kyodo"' news agency, This step 'is expected t enable Japan to get coking coal from Communist China. Exports of cotton cloth which is vbviously for military use will be prohibited. (R FBID Ticker, 15 Sep 51) Comment: Textile and steel industrialists have been leading a dampaign for a resumption of non-strategic trade with Uommunist China the former being plagued by large inventories and the latter by high costs. Although Japanese importers have reported offers of coking coal from China in exchange for textiles, it is not certain whether the shipments will be approved by the Communist authorities.
18.
New Japanese'Communist thesis draft for nost-treatv activity reporterp The draft of a new Japanese Communist Party thesis for post-treaty aotivity is reported by CIO to have been circulated in a covert publication for the study of regional and prefecharThypattylleddere. ?The new emphasis is on vigorous opposition to the stationing of US troops in Japan, an all-out effort to overthrow the Yoshida government as a US tool, thp establishment of a "racial liberation democratic government" through revolution spearheaded by laborers and farmers, and the overthrow of the emperor system. The draft, still unaccepted, makes coneiderable concession to the theories ofthe radical "internationalist" faction which favors violent revolution. ( S Tokyo Joint Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: The conciliatory gestures towards the internationalist faction indicate that the factionalism which has rent the party for many months although on the mend,still exiets. While the thesis contains many articles designed for farming community consumption, where communism has been relatively unsuccessful, the fact that it calls for the abolition of the emperor system will undermine its appeal.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :90A-RDP79T01146A000400170a114P 51
Approved For Reese 2001109/06 : CIA-Roin9T01146AM400170001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
air corridor agreement: US AUSTRIA. US Minister opposes concession on British Deputy High Commissioner of US Minister Donnelly has advised the AngloSoviet conversations regarding a proposed modiconcern over current Zone Of fication of the air corridor route between Vienna and the Britieh justification for amending Occupation. Donnelly asserted that he could see no would not in any case concur with the the corridor agreement, and that he flights be given prior notide of the suggestion that the Soviet . authorities vieWrs and of military aircraft. The British deputy is in'agreement With theee negotiations. Legation informed on the bilateral has promised te keep the US (S Vienna 1009, 14 Sep 51)
2.
Belgium has extended BELGIUM. Trade agreement with.Czechoslovakia extended: its trade agreement with Czechoslovakia to 31 December 1951. It had already been extended to 31 August. The foreign office states that quotas in the basic agreement have been exhausted, and there is no additional provision for furnishing goods to the Czechs. The reason for the extension is to continue in force other clauses, dealing with such items as tariff reciprocity, not related to the volume of trade. (0 Brussels 357, 14 Sep 51)
The original commercial accord, effective 1 October 1949Comment: 1 October 1950, provides that it can be continued in effect by mutual agreeto obtain the ment. The Belgians undoubtedly wish to keep an avenue open payments due its citizens as a result of the Czechoslovak Government's nationalization of property.
Comment: The Soviet authorities have been pressing vigorously their proposal to shift the British air corridor north and west of its present route, ostensibly for reasons of safetT (see OCT Daily Digest, 5 Sep 51). The British have submitted counterproposals involving controlled and variSoviet Headable-altitude flights, Allied authorities are convinced that quarters is concerned because present flights permit phetographic reconnaissance of the Soviet military airfield at Wiener Neustadt.
. .
'
3.
ITALY.
Communist and non-Communist unions join in supporting general strike =rate employees: A 24-hour nationwide strike of railway, communications, and local administration workers has been called for 18 September by a Saint meeting of Communist and anti-Communist labor unions. The strike is to protest as "inadequate" recent government proposals for.wage increases averaging 3-4 percent for state employees, with the greatest benefits for top-level workers, (U NY Times, 16 Sep 51; S Rome Joint Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51; 5 Rome joint Weeka 36, 7 Sep 5))
TOP SECRET
10
18 Sep 51
Approved ForFNWoose 2001/09/06:0A-FDP79T0114600400170001-0

TOP SECRET
increases for government ComMent: The long-standing issue of wage anti-Communist employees is one of the few which has had.the support of .employees for The last strike of government as well as Communist unions. about 60.percent successful. pay raises, celled by All unions on 22 June, was Italian oil technicians sought by Iran: Iran is reportedly urging to discuss the Italian Government to accept an ranlan economic mission Although the initial proposal was oil problems with Italian technicians. of a is now said to desire inclusion for economic missions only, Iran motives in political mission as well. The Italians are ignorant of Iran's discussion of a political this connection and are attempting to eliminate For critical security reasons mission. this report is not to be further transmittpct within the United States, or beyond the borders of the United States without the-express permission of the releasing office.) The Italians have been evading definite commitments to Iran of on thriajibt of providing technicians to assist in the development help represent These negotiations for technical Iranian oil resources. another Iranian attempt to obtain such assistanee from the small countries in the absence of support from the greet powers. It is not clear what Iran would hope to gain by sending a "political" mission to Italy,
Comment:
1.
25X1A
5.
The Swiss SMITZERLAND. Wage boosts throughout nation appear likely: requesting that federal employPederal Council has sent a bill to parliament their salaries payment amounting to two percent of ees be given a lump-sum to coMpensate for higher living costs. If this measure-is approved, it may touch off a round of wage increases in private industry, which management has been resisting on the grounds that government employees have received (11 Bern Joint Mbeka 37, 12 Sep 51) no pay increases. extreme reserve Comment: The Swiss Parliament has recently shown an The fact that this is an election in increasing budgetary expenditures. indication of of living has risen and shows every year; and that the cost to approve this modest proposal continuing to rise, may cause parliament for wage increases. Because of a scarcity of labor and good profit margins, management will probably follow suit and grant reasohable wage increases. These increases will have little inflationary effect upon the Swiss economy, The rise in domestic price levels stems primarily from external rather than internal factors. The Poles SWEDES. Poles will demand ball bearings in new trade agreement: have intimated to SKF (the Swedish manufacturer of ball bearings in G8teborg) TOP SECRET
11
6.
18 Sep 51
ApprovedForFhOdase2001/09/06:CIA-RDP79T01146X350400170001-0
TOP SECRET
agreement to be negotiated that coal may not be delivered under the new trade type bearings it has place orders for the same in October unless Poland can Since February bearings of strategic sizes. purchased in the past, i.e., which the tripartite Satellite orders for bearings SKF has not been accepting Mar 51). The US EMbassy formula considers strategic (see OCI Daily Digest, 2 Svieden's coal imports in Stockholm states that, since almost 50 percent of great importancer(S.Stockholm come fram Poland, the coming negotiatiens assume Joint Weeka 27, 15 Sep 51) considerable difficulty with Poland Comment: The Swedes are anticipating (See OCI Daily Digest, 12, 28 Jul over coal imports and ball bearing exports 1.'strategic" goods, is using its coal to 51). Poland, in order to obtain European countries mho need the coal. exert pressure on many Western

TOP SECRET
18 Sep 51 12 Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79101146A000400170001-0
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blARPrOntesterwr ReleaerecakOPUOVOCS.eatALIWPirtilf4MMOtr17015711(3. tied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
--
0
N97
REG I STRY

SOURCE DOC. NO.
DOC
.
CI A CONTROL
:1 9 5 i
D TE DOCUMENT RECE I VED
DATE
LOGGED BY
COPY NO. HUMBER OF PAGES
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top ol and attached to each Top Secret document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document Secret Control personnel and these individuals whose official transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form who receive and/Or duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers the Top Secret document Will eon and and Indicate period of Custody in the lelt-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees columns. indicate the date of handling in the right-hand
received by the Central Intelligence Apency
OFFICE
S I GNATUR E

DATE
T ItiE
REFERRED TO
RECE I VED
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATUR E
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
detacl ed from Top Sec et mate tat it shall be NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is for record. to Central Top Secret Contro
and transmitted
TO
completed in the appropriate spaces belotO

D I SPATCHED
DOWNGRADED
By
DESTROYED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
TO
BY
(Signature)
WITNESSED BY
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
.
OFF ICE
red For Reffaird 2001/0170001-0

4OFF ICE
DATE
I
FACY4
26
Lust PRCVIOUS tDItiON.
TOP SECRET
A Approved For Re lel* 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00(00170001-0

TOP SECRET

Copy No.
9

TO ME DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
414
Approved For Rase 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0X00170001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
(C, S/S Tokyo 547, 14 Sep,51).
Comment: Neutrality, pan-Asianism0 and the development of trade with Communist China all have wide popular appeal in Japan. The adoption of these more positive goals by the Socialists should enable them to regain some of the influence lost as a result of their unrealistic, Communistline policies toward the peace treaty. The new line provides a graceful way to drop a lost cause as well as a vehicle for reuniting the nowdiverging right and left wings. The Socialists currently hold 45 (of 466) seats in the Lower House of the Diet, and 61 (of 250) in the Upper House.
2.
Quirino alleges Yoshida promised one billion dollars in cash reparations: During a call on President Truman on 13 SepteMber, President QUirino stated that Prime Minister Yoshida had indicated to the Philippine Foreign Minister that Japan would pay the Philippines one billion:dollars in cash reparations immediately after the treaty comes into force. This would evidence Japan's sincerity and would be in addition to anything else called for in the treaty. The Department of State has requested the US Political Adviser to ascertain Yoshida's version. (a, s/8 to Tokyo 445, 14 Sep 51).
Commenting on the JAPAN. Socialists adopting more positive policy: 14 September joint "third force" statement of the Japanese and Indian Socialist Parties (see OCI Daily Digest, 17 September), the US Political Adviser in Tokyo states that the Japan Socialist Party appears to be seeking a more dynamic policy which will strengthen the partyls present weak political position and overcome its internal dissension. He believes that even the left-wing Socialists are awakening to the negative character of the three peace principles heretofore dominating the party's policies, and this more realistic approach is likely to give the Socialists greater support from labor, the intelligentsia and business. He fears that this pan-Asiatic approach might tend to orient Japan politically with the Asian nations, with possible adverse effect on the future US position in Japan,
'
US aid,.
Comments This sum is approximately equal to Japan's entire exports for 1950, aad even in the form of credits could not be paid by Japan except over a several years' period. Moreover, the terms of the treaty would prevent the payment of cash reparations while Japan was still dependent upon
TOP SECRET
18 Sep 51
FIR70-14
WO-14
-TOP-SSOREI-SSEDE-
/NR

1 1 . 11.
-
KOREA* Soviet Soviet military mieeion confirmed ooafirmed in i n lforea as of of 31 $1 July1 Jul I KOBEL. military mission Korea as -tors ahatter rh&&tirne ~ M i i l i t a r y h ~ t r i d t <? Zge-Faorsr chatter between betweenthe theHeadquarters, Headquarters,cliatiMeAllitary*Distrietirt Voroshi3.d; USSR a d the the Headquariers Headquaderg Of of the:Soviet *he S o v i e t Wseion 8to it'Vereishilo*; USSaand Mission ;beliered ,beliSietto be in North Korea, m 8 interoepted on 3 1 July. Referenaer to bombing be in North.Korea, was intercepted on 31 July. References to.bombing
40P-SEGRET-SUBES-
~APPROVED FORRELEASE RELEASE I AP ROVED FOR IDAYE: 20-Mar-2010 I DA E: 20-Mar-2010

I
20 Sep Sep 51 51 20
Q-D
55
i
TOP SECRET SUEDE-#'

-TOP-SECRET-8UEDE-
and l o o d oonditiom and f flood oonditions In in the the interoepted interoepted ohatter ohatter oonf'irme confirms the the looation looation o f the the mission mission in in North North Korea. Korea. 8ouroe Commentt Flood Flood conditions oondittons and and of Souroe Comment: UN bombing bombing attaoks attaoks oocurred oacurrgd in in so so many many plemes plaoes in i n North North Korea &rea on on the the UN night of of 31 31 July July that that: no no exact sxaot looation looation for night for the the Soviet Soviet military military mission's mission's The heaviest headquarters oan'be oan'be' determined. determined. The heaviest oonoentration concentration of of UN UN headquarters bombing on on this this date, howevers i d ooour h e Chin0-llyomipo area bombing however, d did occur in in t the Chinnampo-Kyomipo near the the Taedong Taedong river. river. (SUEDE, RU-TIE 1478# I . ? (SUEDE, laj-TIB 1478, 18 18 Sop Sep S 51) near
NR
I,

-TOP-BEenT-NEDR8
20 20 Sep Sep 61 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Rel*s 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0GWD200001-6
TOP SECRET
21 September 1951
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence.primarily It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments representCIA the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
*Army and State Dept reviews completed*

TOP SECRET
Approved For ROW,* 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0941490200001-6

Top SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
436811.
Soviet Ambassador to Iran is leaving for talks in Masco*: SadchikOv, Soviet Ambassador in Iran, is leaving Teheran'oncSaturday for talki in Moscow, according to an Iranian Government spokeiman. ' It was also announced that Soviet trade talks with Iran wilI comMence Saturday, at which time the USSR will present plans for a "greatly enlarged" barter agreement. (U, AP, 20 Sep 51; U, UP, 19 Sep 51)
2.
BULGARIA. Soviet aid outstrips weather: In a speech for the opening of the month of Soviet-Bulgarian friendship, Todor Pavlov, Chairman of the Bulgarian Academy of Science, stated, "Thie year the crop has been exceptionally bountiful. This, however, is not due to the rainfall, but to Soviet assistance ..." (R, FBIS, 19 SeP 51)
Comment: This is in striking contrast to Bulgarian propaganda excuses for the delay in the 1950 fall sowing program, which placed full blame for early failures to meet schedtles on lack of rain. The party line abruptly returned to giving full credit to Soviet assistance when timely rainfall permitted successful conclusion of the sowing program.
3.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Czech capabilities to transport Iranian oil may be investigated by Iran Government: Premier Mossadeq has issued a memo directing an investigation of Czech capabilities to provide tankers to transport Iranian oil. Ithe Czechs have offered to purchase 100,000 tons of crude oil on the conditions that the contract be signed prior to the expiration of the two-week ultimatum to Britian, and that the Iranian Government agree to allow Czech technicians to supervise the execution of the agreement.
I

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: The Soviet-Iranian trade agreement was drawn up in November 1951 for a period of one year, and apparently both CoUnttili see advantages in renewing it. The USSR has supplied only 20 percent of the sugar promised Iran under the agreement. Neverthelese, due te Iran's growing economic difficulties, the USSR could gain propaganda' advantages by announcing expanded trade terms this year. Sadchikov's visit to Moscow, meanwhile, may well involve Soviet talks on future. policy regarding the Iranian crisis.
25X1C
25X1C
Comment: Earlier in the month it was announced that Czechoslovakia And Poland had bid for purchase of 1,200,000 tons of Iranian oil.. It is likely that Mossadeq could be considering an investigation
25X1C
21 Sep 51
Approved For Re/ewe 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A01400200001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1C
into the practical aspects of these offers and the possibility of-thus putting pressure on the'UK. At present Czechoslovakia bee-Um Smalltankers under charter. Poland has recently purehasid A third tanker, has two more under charter, and is rumored to be-negotiating:in-London for the charter of several Panamanian tankers. Those-tankera'operate: in the Baltic area, and could presumably be shifted to Abadan: Ithe 6407 GRT Polish tanker Karpa y will soon sail for the Suez area to serve as a fueling ship for Far East traffic.
25X1C
25X1 25X1
4.
IINLAND. Serious fuel shortage developing: The shutdown of the Abadan refinery in Iran will cause a eerious shortage of fuel oil in ?inland, according tol hhe US Legation in Helsinki
1 The effect of the shortage Will be rest in rinnish industries such as pulp, paper, glass, and metal working, and in residential heating.
:The legation reports that almost all furnaces can be converted readily to coal or coke, but that the supply of coal is short and that coke is being rationed as it is in critical supply. Although the.geternment has granted dollar exchange to petroleum importers for the purchase of fuel oil, the importers have not been able to locate any fuel oil available for purchase. As of the date of this report, the legation reported the problem was not yet acute. (C, Helsinki, Des /136, 14 Aug 51) Comment:. Due to a shortage of forest labor, it is estimated that there will be a firewood shortage of six million cubic meters this coming winter.
5.
POLAND. Government announces hog purchasing program: The recently announced government hog purchasing program for the year beginning 1 September 1951 sets for its goal the purchase of 5,100,000 meat and lard hogs.and 1,700,000 bacon hogs. According to the government's announcement, a ugeneral contract system" will be set up and will include all individual hog breeders. In order to gain the peasants, cooperation, the government will
(a)
25X1
pay fixed prices 50 percent higher than the prices . paid for hogs not covered by contracts, grant financial assistance to the peasants participating in the program in the form of interest-free
credit,
(b)
TOP ,SEORET
21 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0/4400200001-6

TOP SECRET
_
(c)
reduce land taxes and the amount of grain reqUired to pe delivered under the government's grain purchasing program, and offer'special coal allotments to peasants participating in the program.
(d)
The US Embassy in Warsaw cotments that the announcement of this program seems to have two objectives: to try to convince the Polish people that the government is doing something about the current meat shortage, and to devise a program which will prevent a recurrence of the current severe shortage of meat. (C, Warsaw Des #63, 22 Aug 51)
Comment: On the basis of 1950 figures, government-purchased hogs, after slaughter, dressed out at 501,040 tons of meat. The government's planned purchases in 1952 will dress out at approximately 504,600 tons of meat -,- a modest increasei The total planned government purchases for 1952 of 6,800,000 hogs will represent approximately two-thirde Of expected production. This will tend to limit the success of the program, since it probably will not leave the peasants enough hogs for their own consumption or for selling on the blackmarket. Unless the peasants are beguiled by the financial concessions offered by the government, which will have to deliver on its promises before gaining any kind of peasant cooperation, there will be no peasant cooperation and the plan will very probably fail to reach its goal.
6.
Coal production not believed in excess of demand: According to the US Embassy in Warsaw, Poland is not suffering from an excess of coal production. As evidence of this, the eMbassy points to the Polish Government's offer of special induCements to recruit coal miners, and to Poland's continued firmness in negotiations regarding coal exports to Western European countries. Finland, Austria, Switzerland, and other countries as well, have found the Poles firm in recent negotiations regarding coal exports. For example, Swiss coal importers are having difficulties negotiating a coal contract under the terms of the recently concluded Swiss-Polish trade agreement and, according to the Swiss Charge in Warsaw, the possibility can not be excluded that the trade agreement may fall through. The Swiss regard the price set on Polish coal as unacceptable.
Comment: It is probably correct that Poland's firmness in regard to the export of its coal to the West indicates no exCeei coal production. However, the Polish Government also realizes that its coal is an excellent trading commodity with which to bargain for strategic items from Western European countries suffering coal shortages. (0, Warsaw
258i, 19 Sep 51)

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re Mast 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0q2230200001-6

.TOP SECRET.
SECTION 2'(EASTERN)
1,
Another cultural delegation allegedlY press reports that an Indian delegationinvited tO visit the ussR: The has been invited to visit the USSR to study Soviet film and theatre arts.. (IT New Delhi 1043, 19 SeP 51) _ _ Comment: A delegation of second-rate Indian urea irwma the USSR this past scientists and literary figsummer; top-flight Indian personnel to take this trip were denied invited permdssion by the goverment to do gation was exploited by the Soviet so. The delepropaganda machine during the period its visit, Its membere of also furnished pro-Soviet material upon their return home. to the Indian preee
INDIA.
TRaRn
2.
Dele ation-to artici ate in Chinese Communist 1 October celebrations: The Indian press s a a en-man n. an e ega Senmuniet China on 20 September to on was o eave or participate.in the 1 October of the se:60nd anniversary of celebration the Chinese People's Republic. 19 Sep 51) ,(11 New Delhi
Comment:

India and Communist
ICU,
olear whether the personnel of the two delegations will be identical, It seems obvious, the tempo of Sino-Indian however, that cultural exohanges ie increasing.
China have also agreed to exchange goodwirrOisions in the near future. cultural It is not yet
25X6
MOP SECRET
4
21 Sep 51
Approved For Reinte 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW00200001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1
5.
US overtures regarding Chinese Nationalist troo s in Burma anno an o c a as orme. irritation at the Anerioan.an r ish suggestion that India intervene with Burna to forestall an-appeal to-"the UN regarding the presence of armed Chinese Nationalist troops on Burmese Zoil. Referring to the apparent involvement of American nationals, the.official stated, emphasis, thit-unless the US aid UK shoWed a more helpful attitude, with could not advise the Burmese against India taking the matter to the Delhi 1050, 19 Sep 51) UN. ($ New
A g n arievernment.'s
India:
25)(1
In the absenoe of restraining Indian may cause the Surmeie to hesitate to influence, the only be a reluctance to admit their take such action wculd inability tc polioe their own territory, and the hope that the demoralized Nationalist force will disintegrate.
facitarZral
Comment:
6*
Bao pat is less critioal of French: During a disbussion of enoch ea s on ECA mission chief Robert Blum, Bao Dat was less critical of the French than in-the past andiseemed oOmmitted, although somewhat uneasily, the Prenoh during these critical times. to a policy of "solidarity" with Bao Dai stated that he is financing personally a campaign to increase his influence in Viet Minh territory, operation whioh he admits would make an the French "very angry" if they should learn of it. (S Saigon 650, lB Sep 51)
INDOCHINA.
Tittrraepeoso
like earlier ones with US officials, oates-reflaa's confused approachto indithe matter of solidarity wAth the Frei:611-d-* confusion which limits his effectiveness as Chief of State.
Conment:
7.
Viet Minh concentration in Western Tonkin: Hanoi reports that some aotion The US Consul in is "in the air" in the vicinity Lo, one of three Preach strOUg Points of Nghia Viet Minh regiment and French airborne in the Thai minority territory. A units appear to be convergieg on this point. ( TS BAnoi_165, 19 Sep 51)
.
haraeliTirgrB.;
Comment:
CHINA. Most Manchurian reported closed -hip Wr5ressure of military railWays traffic in Manchuria has

This interview,
.
Viet Minh action in this area would be for the purpose of diverting French forces from the more critical delta area.
c:ommercial iraffie:
oaueed Peiping authorities
TOP SECRET
5
21 SeP 51
Approved For Ramage 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A012200200001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1
to suspend for an indefinite period all passenger and commercial freight servioe on most of the Menchurian railway net-es well anly rail link with China proper, the Peiping-Mukden as on Manchuria's line. according to
/I if
These reports have not been confirmed, but.are significant if true since the last similar diversion of rail traffic to military use was in the period from September to November 1950, when the Chinese intervened ih Korea._
Interruptions to rail traffic caused by floods in the Muk4en area during late August and September mey be a contributing factor to the necessity for suspending traffio in North China and Manchuria.
9.
last week'reportedly requieitionel-Wricalitery use all freight cars in the Peiping-Tientsin area.
Comments
The Peiping Railway Bureau
25X1 25X1
Soviet activity in Harbin reported: who-left Harbin in late 1950 states that Soviet military personnel in uniform were a "oommon sight" at that time, mid that Soviet tank corps troeps_stationed in the outskirts of Harbin were being allowed to circulate in the city. The personnel of Soviet establishments in Harbin were being replaced gradually (by new officials from the USSR?), and local Chinese no longer re Rarded local Russians with Soviet cassports as genuine Soviet citizens.
25X1
25X1
have reported the resenoe of Soviet mdlitary personnel in or outside of the city, but have disagreed as to the branches of service represented and as to whgthee these forces were edvisorrteahnioal personnel or combat units. have also reported the replacement of local Soviets by genuine Soviet citizens, and widespread discrimination against the former by both the Soviets from the USSR and the Chinese,
1 1
Comments rTharbin
25X1 25X1
10,
25X1C
Two CoMmunist es iona e schools re rted: opera on o an n erztational Espionage Training en er in Peiping and an advanced school with the same name at Kalgan. The Peiping school is said to have 20 Soviet instructors, while most of the staff at Kalgan is reportedly Soviet, The Kalgan-sohool has graduated 400 students, while 300 others are currently in training at the twojohools.. The Peiping school --which acoepts only Chinese Communist Party members - teaohes languages and basio intelligence teaches advanced operational techniques0 operations; the Kalgan school reporting, sabotage and communioa-. tions to graduates of Peiping, I
Comment:
25X1C
25X1
Although unconfirmed, this report is plausible.
The Peiping.
TOP SECRET
6
21 Sep 51
Approved For Rehearse 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09,490200001-6

zap SECRET
regime is known to be training personnel for covert operations, especially in the Far East, and Soviet advisers and instructors are presumably attached to such enterprises. While this report implies that the "advanced" school graduated hundreds of students before the elementary school had graduated any, it is possible simply that figures' were not available for the latter.
25X1C
11.
25X1C
Sino-Soviet joint control of three "a ecia 1 military distriote" al-25X1C under the terms of an un17W6T6176=-Soviet he military paot, three special military districts" were established and are now under Joint Sino-Soviet military control, although civil administration of these areas is still'exolusiiely Chinese. The areas are allegedl the Ash 'flex) and East ChekiangSpecial Military Districts.
leged:
25X1C
25X1
'
Comment: This report a ears do btf \ 1 frequently cite unpublished Sino-Soviet agreements allegedly providing for Soviet control, or joint Sino-Soviet control, of one or another geographical area of China. The Tsingtao area and the Ashen area of Sinkiang, among others, are believed to be of speoial interest to the USSR, and the Soviet position iS presumably becoming stronger wherever an extensive Soviet advisoryttechnical mission is operating. However, except in the port Arthur NiVal Base Areal, evidence is Isoking of the existence'of any Sino-Soliet "special military district" of the type described.
_
12. 0HINA/KOREA,
25X1
Chinede Communist chemical warfare defensive unit reported in Ialleges that some'700 Chinese Communist "ohemdWriarfsre troops" mere about to enter Northigarea on 30 August. The unit is described as "defensive in nature." 125X1
Koreas
I
51)
13.
KOREA.
Comment: The Communists have frequently accused the UN Connand in Korea-ZT-FarTducting chemical warfare, and may either have become the victims of their own propaganda or be contemplating some enbellishnent of that props... genie, The alleged 700 CU troops would obviously be of little value in defending the 7000000 Communist troops in Korea if the UN Commandwere genuinely to employ OW. In any case, this report is wholly unconfirmed.
resume cease-fire talks: A 19 Septeaber 'NW:Mast from Peiping annouaced Communist willingneis to resume cease-fire
Communists willing to
negotiations at Hiesong. While the Conaunists conceded that the Uffis admission of the 10 September aecidental strafing of Raesong sbowed Suffioient good faith upon which to base a renewal or the negotiations, the broadcast proposed that the initial meeting of the resuned negotiation should deal TOP SECRET
7
21 Sep 51
Approved ForeRip lease 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T0114W(600400200001-6

TOP SECRET incidents and with setting up (U FRIO,
unsettled with "the previously mentioned machinerys to guarantee Kaesong'e neutrality.

-"appropriate Peiping, 19 Sep 51)
.
the previous indicates some modification of the resumed This broadcast Comment: if the first order of business of CommtaFT-Fsition. However, Communists incideeti," which the initiative negotiations is to consider "unsettled denied, the Communists will retain the and the UN has have Claimed in propaganda*
rations over North Korea: 014*. Ur ng, y over or ne n enemy e,gh a r ac ie ench actiVity Following a notes a sharp increase the 41 mid-August, the US Far East CoMmand September* While the majority of August to'19 conventional during,the period\25period were of observatiOns and incidents during this recorded unidentified twin-jet aircraft, night attack on OD fighters, a recently unobserved and still ie a 10 September belieted to be a Type-8, reappeared NIG-9 and MIG-15 jet aircraft Additionally, Communist American light bomber. flying WithinManchuria. reportedly have been engaged in night choose to oommit a major part FECOM estimatei that if the Communists swill night operations, a serious aircraft strength in of their conventionsl operations would result. Suoh a restriod (S CINCEE restriction of UN night-intrudsi air jet fightere were also committed. tion would be heightened if enemy Teleoon 5175, 20 Sep 51)
14.
Communists oa able of ex andin
air o
15.
AcCording to US news stand on Kaeson talks: ROK reiterates familiar e cease-fire talks. He ee we come resump on o es Korea and sources, CoMmuniet 'troops must withdraw from that Chieese would giant Korth said, however, p3, return, the ROSS North Korean troops must be disarmed. in the (ROK) National Assembly through Korea "full and equal repreeentation (U AP Ticker, 20 Sep 51) eleotioes..." undoubtedly see a return negotiations will Resumption of the cease=sfire, as indicated Comment: intransigent ROK policy towards the of thrWriThus by Rhea's unrealistic demands.
-

TOP SECRET
21 Sep 51 a
Approved For Re law 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004400200001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(VESTERN)
25X6
1.
2.
Socialists refuse to renew eieetorai alliances with COalition TZFEM: The French Socialist Barty's National Council has just issued a belligerent resolution seemingly ruling out alliances with any other party
FRANCE.
in the October cantonal elections. Furthermore, the keYnote address at the council meeting proclaimed the Socialists' refusal to participate in the government unless the new churchschool laws are repealed. A Socialist spokesman has revealed, however, that the fight against the center parties would be subordinated to the battle against the Communists and the Gaullists, and the Socialists will not actively promote the downfall of the present cabinet. (C Paris 1718, 18 Sep 51)
Cement: The Thrcefulness of the Socialists' campaign against aid for church schools is enhanced by the proximity of the cantonal elections. In the face of sharp Communist competition for the labor vote-and Radical Socialiat competition in some areas for the anticlerical-vote, the Socialists are making a determined fight to retain their strong position in the departmental councils, where they now have 25 percent of the.seats to be filled in October. The current Socialist policy of opposing the goVernment on'oertain vital issues is a continuoue threat to its existence, but can be expected to stop short of precipitating De Gaulle's return to power.
3.
Foreign dffice protests Bourghiba reception in US: French Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann summoned the US Charge in Paris to express TOP SECRET 21 Sep 51 9 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400200001-6
Approved For RLDIerase 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T0114641/4929400200001-6

TOP SECRET
his government's disapproval of the "official reception" of Tunisian nationalist Bourghiba by the US. Schumann fears that Bourghiba's and this "reception" presence would give great encouragement to anti-French elements in Tunisia and throughout North Africa, and would make the task of the North African contribution to developing the common defense more difficult added that some cabinet members He the US that, as a condition for were thinking of demanding a pledge from continuing with current negotiations surveys for North Africantases, and North African nationalists would receive such attention by US officials. not again (S Paris 9040, 20 Sep 51) Comment: Although this is an example of a comparatively which-rairaevelop minor incident into serious friction between France and the US, Bourghiba's presence in Washington has actually either among Tunieian nationalists aroused little interest or in the French Residency in Tunis.
4.
RA-airing of corru tion charges romises artisan dis ute: A anew journal pub is e. former Mihister of Property Control 31- Pe er Krauland, 4 October. The paper, well-financed and Economic Planning, win appear on and boasting a circulation of 200,000 copies, will allegedly hit the newstands "with enough last a year." The first number political scandal to with a docuMented counterattack is expected to re-open the "Krauland affair" against State Secretary of Education Hurdes0 both Graf end Minister of the People's Party. Chief editor of the new -weekly ie Dr. Manfred Jaeser, former editor of a Union of paper recently Independents? published in Graz but suspended by Occupation authorities. (FBIS, Tiroler Tageszeitung2-18 Sep 51)
Tir7617711
AUSTRiA.
Comment: The prospective appearance of a journal reflecting of thnerorner the views Minister of Property Control and the Union of Independents apparently connected with promises a continuation of sharp partisan ,sension in Austria throughout the disfall. Krauland left 'last .spring under chargep,still the Austrian Cabinet "under investigation," his administration of nationalized of having utilized party's treasury. The beneficiary industries for the enrichment of hip of a Krauland counterattack government with implications of widespread against the Independents, which has strongly corruption will be the Union of emphasized this issue.
5.
Sritiah and US CommissiOners rotest Soviet interference Allied oi proper es: with he an i Commissioners have protested o the Soviet Hea quarters against Britis interference of the Soviet Administration in the operation Mineral Oil of Anglo-American Austria, oil companies in eastern The virtual/y identical notes assert that Soviet control officers have been intervening in ihe operational the companies have been forced control of the and that to deliver all crude oil, companies, refined oil, produced t and in some instances o the Soviet organization, and that they have been
,

newspaper repo sta
-
TOP SECRET
10
21 Sep 51
Approved For Reteege 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400200001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1
ITALY. De Gasperi pleads for peace treaty Italian military effortt revision to allow adequate At the North Atlantic 17 September in Oouncil meeting of Ottawa, Italian country's position in a zone of Prime Minister de Gaspori economic ills are overcome, immediate danger and said referred to his "even if Italy's the peace treaty Italian defense effort." limitations would inhibit However, he commitments on time and the outlined plans to meet indicated that present military provided for future force over-all Italian levels in excess of treaty military planning pointed out Italian concern that limits. He again a Western European an acceptable method be found for army, and in such an army. reiterated the financing necessity for German participation De Gasperi called for a "deMocratic West should have a offensive," and urged that dynamic propaganda of Italian idle "the policy." He asked for manpower and industrial the utilization defense effort. facilities in (C Ottawa SECTO 12, the Western European 17 Sep 51) Commentr De Gasperi's policrObTaives with the statements reflect the major Italian exception of first time, foreign however, that the Italians the Trieste issue. This is the are actually have officially planning for forces in indicated that the / excess of treaty /reported limitations. been steadily built up for some months that the Italian beyond peace treaty armed forces have levels.
6.
forced to accept arbitrary price reductions the Austrian below levels Government. The protests established hy these unjustified request an immediate measures. (S Vienna cessation of 1045, 18 Sep 51) Comment: Long-standing disputes in question were aver the recently Anglo-American oil companies aggravated when Brinell objected to the Soviet and American Mineral Oil as a means of negotiators Administration's use of price compromising claims for The companies and the ultimate relief from Soviet contracts Allied compromise of their position, authorities have been anxious supervision. to avoid any since they do not Soviet controls and regard them as far in excess recognize the legality of by an occupation of any power. measures required pay the Nevertheless, Soviet companies 15 to 20 percent authorities have continued the difference is a charge less than the established to for expenses incurred prices, claiming The Soviet in "guarding and control." authorities have never claimed but in Allied Council the companies as German discussions rights asseta, unilaterally to direct oil they have steadfastly Maintained Soviet production within their zone.
25X1
7.
UNITED KINGDOM. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company buys thousand tons of Rumanian oil from Rumania: oil have been purchased Company for slightly Two hundred by the over one million Anglo-Iranian Oil pounds sterling. The oil will be
TOP SECRET
11
21 Sev
Approved For ReseaSe 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79701146A000400200001-6
Approved For Riggpse 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A90400200001-6

TOP SECRET
shipped to bunkering ports in the Mediterranean and Red Sea in tankers controlled by the purchasing company, (U NY TimeS, 22 Sep 51) Comment: Over a month ago an offer along similar linee was made by the USSR, and a representative of the British Ministry of Fuel and Pot stated that it had no objections. This transaction will hot only help the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to provide oil for customere ordinarily served from Iran, but will also be advantageous to the Rumanians who have had difficulty transporting their oil because of the Orbit tanker shortage.
8.
Comment: While any additional dollar drain is iMportant, the obtaining of suThrgalom dellar or sterling sources would not critically impair the Norwegian 'soon*. However, Norway feels that, aside from the economic advantages of such a trade agreement, a break in formal trade relations would be undesirable politically following the failure to consummate an agreement with Poland and preceding renewed negotiations for an agreement with the USSR.
9,
DENMARK. Faroe Islanders oppose establishMent of naval station: The US Embassy at Copenhagen reports that the press in the Faroe Islands vigorously protested against the possibility of a Danish naval station in the islands. All lecal political parties; and espeCially the Independence PartY, 6ppose the military use of the islands even under the North Atlantic Treaty. (1 Copenhagen Joint Weeka 36, 7 Sep 51)
Comment: The location of the Faroe Islands north of Scotland between Norway and Iceland gives them an importance for NATO naval defense plans. Although Denmark in 1948 granted the islandere considerable autonomy in local affairs, nationalist sentiment still remains strong. Many Faroese would regard the establishment of a naval station, even as a NATO unit,as a feeble disguise for a resurgence of Danish influence and interference in local affairs. The Danish Government is reluctant to exert aoy strong influence even in those matterb where it legally may do so.

TOP SECRET
12
NORWAY. Government will attempt to reduce strategic exports to Czechoslovakia: In negotiating a new Czechoslovakian trade agreement Norway will in general try to retain last year's trade pattern; but it will offer no aluminum, ilmenite or ferroalloys, and it will offer a Smaller quantity of pig iron. Norway will also suggesttnat sugar imports be reduced to retain the fourto-one ratio of imports of sugar to exports of hard goods. Norway believes that this ratio would be economically advantageous, since it would otherwise have to use dollars to acquire sugar elsewhere. The foreign office, however, is doubtful that Czechoslovakia will accept an agreement which does not include aluminum or ferroalloys, and has asked US approval for including small quantities of these commodities if necessary in order to reach agree(p Oslo 282, 18 Sep 51) ment.
21 Sep 51
Approved For Rejase 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146AGQ1000200001-6

TOP SECRET
10.
Swedes fear "iron ring" around iron curtain: The US Embassy in gtockholm reports that "some Swedish quarters" view with misgivings the speed with whieh the US is regarded as driving home settlements with its former enemies. Sweden's largest Social Democratic newspaper, Aftontidningen, states that an "iron ring" is thus being wrought around the iron curtain with Sweden the only opening, and that the burning question is What will the Russians do in response, (R Stockholm 349, 17 Sep 51)
SWEDEN'.
Comment: Many Swedes, alarmed by the growing division of the world into two irreconcilable camps, believe that Sweden should cling to its traditional role of maintaining contact with both. The Swedes favorwestern rearmament, cohesion and firmnessland they regard appeasement as fruitless; bUt at the same time they fear that western detertination coupled with Russian intransigence may make war inevitable.
11.
25X1 C
25X1C
ARGENTINA. Communists told to vote for Peron in November elections: Pro Communist students of the University of Buenos Aires Argentine Communists are now being told bY their (S leaders to vote for President Peron in the November 1951 elections,
25X1
Comment: This would be in accord with previous indications that CommUnisTririrgentina feel that they can make greater politioal gains by working to strengthen their position within the labor unions under the guise of Peronismo. This is facilitated by the similarity between the Peronista anti-imperialist, "third line" neutrality propaganda and the Communist antiUS "peace" objectives. While other parties, including the Radicals, have adopted similar'lines, the Peronistas are by far the strongest. On the international front the Peronistas have furthered Communist aims by continuing to trade with the Satellites.
12.
BRAZIL. Uprising in the State of Maranhao: Maranhao's Governor Barre:is is PUFG-it'ed to be a "virtual prisoner'in his palace as armed revolt swept the area." The uprising is headed by Raimundo Bastos, a young lawyer, who said in a manifesto that "12,000 farmers ere in arms. . .we shall surrender our arms only through federal intervention." (U Washington Post, 21 Sep 51)
Comment: The Maranhao state government has been unstable since Barrod was elected last October. Earlier this year he was forced to leave the state in the hands of the president of the state congress, Cesar Aboud, as the result of armed riots, Barros returned:to Maranhao this week after the Supreme Electoral Tribunal adjudged him the winner of the election which had been contested by the opposition candidate, whO lost by only about 700 votes and who charged Barrios' party with fraud.
TOP SECRET
13
21 Sep 51
Approved For Reisase 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A044400200001-6

TOP SECRET
Federal troops, under General Azevedo Pinto, Commander of the Tenth Military Region, are patrolling the capital, and order has been restored, at least temporarily.
Whether President Vargas will resort to intervention, a tactic used by him during his dictatorship to control the state governments,is not yet known. The constitution permits him to intervene "to guarantee the free exercise of arly of the state powers," or "to assure the execution of a judicial order or decision."
13.
Comment: The rumors that President Prio has resigned and that a cabinet "crisisrliexpected momentarily have been current throughout Havana and are being published by the press. Apparently the political opposition has spread these rumors to create general unrest. The president's flat denial :of these rwnors and his statement that "only death will prevent me fram leaving the palace before the time set forth by the constitution" will do much toward restoring tranquillity. The cabinet "crisis" constitutes merely a reorganization of the cabinet as a prelude to the 1952 presidential elections.
14.
PANAMA. Netotiations for US lease of San Jose Island impeded by weak, c75.15Eter ot present Panama administration: US Ambassader Wiley reports that an administrative petition in the National Aseembly for permission to conclude a lease with the US Government for San Jose Island would have a fair prospect of obtaining approval although perhaps not quickly nor eaeily. Difficulties in securing approval are expected to stem from the fact that, with national elections in the offing, a weak government is faced with an equally weak opposition, and both eides lack qualified leaders or issues with popular appeal. (S Panama City 267, 19 Sep 51)
Comment: It is entirely possible that the apposition would attempt to make political capital of the San Jose Island question, althotigh USPanama relations have been greatly improved since the rejection of the 1947 defensesites agreement.
CUBA. President Prio denies rumors of his resignation: In a radio address Erthe Ouban people, President Prio emphatically denied rumors that he mould resign. He accused the Communists of starting rinors designed to create confusion and unrest in order "to strike at US production through the Cuban rear guard." He pointed to his lifelong record in defense of democracy and to his patience in the Xace of opposition insults. In answer to the Charges that he intended to establish a dictatorship, he added that he "mould use the pomr of the gavernment to prevent further, abusive civil liberties in order to save the country from chaos." (1 Havana 210, 19 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
14
21 Sep 51.
Approved For Re loose 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C416190200001-6

TOP SECRET
15.
URUGUAY. Cabinet favors an offer of two destroibr escorts and a regitmental combat team for UN service:. The cabidet on 19 September unanimously approved the offering of two destroyer escorts --. about to be purchased from the US -- for the common defense of the Western Hemisphere and for Unified ComMand service pursuant to the UN "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Further, the cabinet approved the "organizing, equipping, and trainitg of a regimental combat team of ground-troops for UN service." A letter'to this effect is being forwarded to the UN SecretaryGeneral. (S 'Montevideo 115, 19 Sep 51)
Comment:: The Uruguayan Constitution requires that Congress approve the drgaTaVe 'of national forces from the republic. Colombia is thus far the only Latin American country to have suPplied troops to the UN.

TOP SECRET
15
21
Sep 51
25X1

TOP SECRET
21 September 1951
Copy No.
CIA No. 49350-A n
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.represent the

'ID THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For Rause 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A094400200001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR DS proposes new approach to Austrian treaty questions The Department Of. State-plans to make a new attempt to obtain Soviet.agreement on an Austrian state treaty after first,obtaining an agreed Western position, It was proposed, presumably at the recent Washington Foreign Ministers' conference, that the deputy ministers meet to ascertain the terms on which the Soviet representatives would conclude the present draft treaty. In the event of Soviet intransigence, the three Western powers will propose to Moscow, through diplomatic channels, an abbreviated treaty consisting of certain articles already agreed upon from the present draft treaty and one new article changing the agreed position on German assets.
Comment: Austrian officials have been anxious to raise the treaty question at this time. Although Austrian Foreign Minister Grnber has expressed interest in an alternative plan for the state treaty, he has not yet been informed of the plan or content of the abbreviated treaty,
The Soviet Political Adviser in Vienna has recently pointed out that the obstacles to treaty agreement are the questions of Trieste and the remilitarization of Austria. There haa been no evidence that the USSR is prepared to compromise on these questions.
2.
Comment: Trieste heretofore has received financial assistance from the Italian Government and ECA. Piscontinuation of all -EGA aid will increase Trieste's economic dependence upon Italy and encourage fUrther Italian efforts to increase their authority in the Zone at the expense of the Allied Military Government, Furthermore, since the Yugoslav Government might interpret the discontinuance of ECA aid as evidenCe that the Western powers are seeking to strengthen Italy's position in Zone A, the action may cause a further hardening of the Yugoslav position toward a bilateral settlement of the Trieste issue,
.
TRIESTE, Allied Military Government requests continued ECA allocations for Triestes The US Political Adviser in Trieste requested reexamination of a recent ECA decision to discontinue aid to Trieste for the fiscal year 1952. Originally.it had been planned that Trieste would receive some ECA aid in 1952 either directly or through ECAls Italian program. In Order to avoid making Trieste subject to Italian economic control, the Allied Military Government has maintained that at least some aid should continue to be supplied by EGA directly. (CI S/8 Trieste 317, 18 Sep 51).

TOP SECRET
1
If the USSR accepts a new abbreviated treaty text, British and French concurrence will be obtained for the retention of Western .occupation forces until the Austrian security forces are sufficiently equipped and trained to maintain internal security. (TS, S/8 to Vienna 657, 10 Sep 51).
21 Sep 51
Approved For Refuse 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A04Q000200001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
3,
In aninterview with the British IRAN. Iranian Shah gloomy over situations Ambaesador, the Shah was very pessimistic over the future of Iran under Prime Minister Messadeq, and said that the removal of the prime minister would be most difficult. The Shah stated that Mossadeq desires to resume negotiations and inquired what steps the British considered necessary. The British Ambassador replied that his government wOuld require "written assurances that the Iranian Government Was ready to negotiate seriously in a spirit of goodwill, " Oral assurances by the Shah were not considered sufficient. (TS, S/S Tehran 10800 19 Sep 51).
Comments The Shah has played no part in the oil negotiations to date. He has lost considerable prestige and does not exert aay discernible influence on Mossadeq.
While Mossadeq is aware of the increasing economic.and political pressures which are building up against him, and even though he desires to reopen negotiations, there is no Indication that he is ready to make aay significant change in his position. 25X6
4.
5.

TOP SECRET
2
21 Sep 51
25X6

HR70-14 HR70-14
.s
E Z SUEDb TtoP SECRET SUED:be

22.C421-5/
cis
2.
Personnel and equipment equipment status status of of North NorthKorean Koreaneast east coast coast corps corps reported:
CINCFE Tokyo 20 Sep 51 SUEDE 4,ce j.. ar7/
rm.
DATE 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010 ATE: IDPPROVED
Preliminary field analysis of a recently intercepted North Korean message indicates that the four North Korean corps in the eastern sector are k.4 e-sat 70 percent of their authorized personnel strength of 113, 000,and possess almost 100 percent of authorized mortar strength. Shortages in ordnance are seen in artillery, which has only 50 percent of authorized strength, and in a lack of automatic weapons. Almost 25 percent of the individual small arms now in use are "cavalry rifles. "
Comment: The extent of rehabilitation accomplished in these once-decimated North Korean corps has been noted before. Recent UN contact with these units points out in addition a relatively high degree of combat efficiency. The "cavalry rifle" mentioned is probably the Soviet M-1938 carbine.
FOR RELEASE.
For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

--TOPSECRETSUEDE
Ttv-P SECRET SUEDhI
S-er
c
NR
FAR EAST
r
Kaesong conference, would be empowered to mands to the extent of having a neutral zone, to be jointly conthe trolled by the. UN and the Communists. between the oresent hattle line and the I 38th parallel.
y
3. New New Communist Communist thinking thinking on onKorean Koreanbuffer buffer zone zone reported: reported:
. .
The Chinese anxious Chinese Communists Communistsare are reportedly anxious to bring bring about aboutaacease-fire cease-fire in in Korea; Korea; and, and, to to rearealize such an negotiators, at ata arenewed renewed an aim, aim, their negotiators,
Comment: This unconfirmed Comment: :This unconfirmedoffer, offer, while while reprerepreconstderable modification modificwp re v i o u s Communist Communist demands aentlng senting a considerable oi previous demandsfor for a a zone extending an equal distance north and south .of. of the buffer zone the 38th 38th parallel, parallel, would would still still give give the the Communists Communlgts both miEitary military and and propaganda advantages in that organized organized UN UN forces forceswould would be be below. below the that the 38th 38th parallel. parallel.
-4-
TOP SEC
FOR RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009 rPPROVED
'
-TvA)-SECRET-SUEDe
AFRICA
8.
South squadron: SouthAfrican AfricanDefense DefenseMinister Ministerpresse,s presses for for US USjet jetaircraft aircraft for Korea squadron:
. i
meddling.
South African Defense DefenseMinister Minister Erasmus Erasmus informed outh African he US US military attacheson on 10 10 September September the military and air attaches at he that he was was worried worried over over his his failure failure so far to urchase US US jet for the theSouth South African African Air Air purchase jet aircraft aircraft for Force's orce sKorea r e a squadron, squa ron, which w ich has h a s recently recently suffered sufferedmounting mounting casualties. He fears give assurances that fearspolitical political attacks attacksfrom fromthe the opposition opposition unless he can give He has has"money "money in in hand," hand, '' and and hinted that ff jet the aircraft.have aircraft have been bean obtained. obtained. He planes 'are not available, the squadron may be grounded. planes 'are not available, the squadron may be grounded.
Comment: The The South South African fighter Comment: African Aif Air Force fighter squadron sent sent to Korea Korea last last September September had had no no equipment; equipment; it has been been using USUSowned F-51 Mustangs, Mustangs, meanwhile meanwhilepressing pressing its its government governmentfor for jet jet planes planes because owned F-51 of the markedly lower casualty rate among among their pilots. In recent recent months months the the obtaining replacements replacements for for the squadron become increasingly increasingly problem of of obtaining squadron has become acute, owing mainly to to the the bad badeffects effectson onAir AirForce Forcemorale moraleof ofErasmus' Erasmus' political owing mainly
When severely criticized criticized by When severely by the opposition opposition in the last parliamentary session for the the Armed Forces' unpreparedness, unpreparedness, Erasmus Armed Forces' used as was negotiating negotiatingfor for the the purpuras one one argument in his defense the fact that he was of jet aircraft aircraft to to equip equip the squadron The minister thus thus has has chase of squadron in inKorea. Korea. The strong personal reasons reasons for for wishing wishing to arrange this purchase as quickly quickly as
possible.

-7-
LuD70-14
L
0
0
4GP-SEGREPP-StIEDE
a
.I/ NR
14. 1 4 .

aircrafts aircraft8
ZOO training trainlng Over 200 Unusually Unusually heavy air a i r activity a c t i v i t y noted in in Manchuria: Manchuria: Over and operational o p e r a t i o n a l flights f l i g h t e occurred ocourred in i n ganohuria Ahchuria on OR 1s 20 SepteMber. Sept;smber. The 19 and 20 following following partioular p a r t i o u l s r developments developments of of an an unusual unusual nature nature are are emphasized emphaoieed in in a a DS U8 Air hir Force Foroe analysis, anolyeirz
(1) 66 88 MI616 MIG-15 j jets were reported reported by by Bntung Antung a airfield be (1) e t s were i r f i e l d tto o be landing landing at e t an an unidentified airfield, a i r f i e l d , possibly poseibly Tatungkou, Tatungkou, on the flight of on 19 19 September; September1 this this is t h e largest l a r g e & single s i n g l e flight of MIG-151a noted in Antung areas Mf(f-W1a i n the the Ankung area) (2) the movement movement of of t the Chinese hcununist Communist Air Air Division ( 2 ) the h e Fourth Chineas irom Antung to irom iiaoyang Uaoyang to t o Antuug t o participate p a r t i o i p a t e in i n Korean Korean combat combat is i s indicated indioated in in several s e v e r a l reoent recent flight f l i g h t reports r e p o r t s of of jet je.t
(3).a flight penetratiOn fighters from ( S ) R night f l i g h t of of conventional oonventional penetration fighters from Anshan Anahan to t o the t h e Korean Korean border border area, area, possibly possibly on on a a night night intercept interoegt mission, miesion, occurred oocurred On on 19-20 19-20 September; Septembert (4) movement,of training u units within ( 4 ) the t h e movemont o f North Korean Korean air training nite w ithin the t h e Yenohi area a r e a of o f southeast Manchuria is i e indioated by by several aeveral messages; rneeeage~jand and
(6) the flight the Mutanohiang area "to (6) t h e first known f l i g h t from t h e Mutanchiang to Korea" which Korea was noted noted on on 19 19 September September in in a a context context which 'suggested it was was a VIP f flight. suggeeted tthat h a t it Air Force Rouzqlup RounOup l i g h t . (SUEDE, (SUEDE, A i r Force 202, 202, 20 20 Sep 8ep 61) 61)
PPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0
1 I
a
-il&P-SE6LRET-KJEDE-
NR
8 8
24 Sep 8ep 51 61 24
1)\*)
33 ss 55

1 9 .
-Top-sEeitur-StIEDE-
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Sep 51 51 24 Sep
'NA) SECRET SUEDie

-TOP-SBORET-SUEDE-
20.
23..
21.
22. 22.

-T-OP-SECEMP-SUBBE-
Personnel and equipment status of North Korean east coast corps re orteds Preliminary field analysis of a recently intercepted North orean s emessage a s a g s indioates indiohtes that the th;, four f o u r North North Korean K o r e k corps corps in in the the eastern eastern seCtor are at their sector at 70 70 percent peroent of t h e i r authorized authorized personnel personnel strength strength of of 113,000 U3,OOO and poseess percent of of authorizedmrtar authorizedmortar strength. Shortages wad p0SSSSS almost,100 almost 100 peroent strength. Shortages seen: artillery units h have 50 peroent of authorized in O~A; a r t i l l e r y unite a w only 60 i n ordnance ordnance are S 26 percent peraent of of weapons, and there is is a a laok laok of of' automatic automatio weapons. weapons. Almost 25 ana there (SUEDE, TIK TIK the individual individual small small arms arms now now in i n use use are are "cavalry 'cavalry rifles." r i f l a e . " (SUEDE, 1111, 1u1, 20 Sep 8ep 51) 61) Comments Cmentr The extent extent of o f ' rehabilitation rehabilitation accomplished aooornplished in i n these these onceonoewiih dtioimated Korean corpshas has been been noted noted before. before.. Recent Recent UIJ UN oontaot oontact aith d d a i m aIfOrth m h Ko r e a n oorps these units points out additionally additionally a a relatively relatively high degree degree of of combat combat theee unite efficiency. The "oavalry mentioned i is probably the the Soviet Soviet Bd-1938 M-1938 eiX'ioienoy. "oavalry rifle". r i f l e H mentioned s probably carbine. carbine.
1
24 Sep Sep 5. 5;L 24
lb
~.
HR70-14
17. Amu&
a r e p r t "extensive e Wonsan area report "extensive Communist Communist activity activity In south of of Wonsan Wonsan airfield," airfield,m with with beach beach defenses defensee being being strengthened. strengthened. In south addition, ROK marines garrisoning garrisoning an an island idand i n Wonean a large addition, ROK marines in Wonsan bay bay report report a large volume of o f Chinese Chinese traffic t r a f f i c being beinn heard heard on on ROK ROK radio radio sets sets (range (range of o f 33to t o 5L 2 vokume milea) since since 18 28 September. September, miles)
US naval =Its in-

' 4
t l et{
it.
itarv
ao@vltv in W Wonsa r :a P4',1 area -
area has has always always been Oomment: The The Wonsan Wonsan area been considered considered by by the the CommunCommunists as es particularly particularly vulnerable vulnerable to to a a UN UN amphibious amphibioue attack. attaok, -Fear Fear of o f such euch ists
"TOP-SEGRET---
11 11
-1
25 Sep 51 25 Sep 51
99 1).9
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009 1PPROVED
W'
ilar-SECRET-
action has induced induced them them to t o deploy deploy a a sizeable sizeable force force in in a a static s t a t i c coastal coastal action defense defense mission. mission. The r i s e in i n the the volume o f Chinese heard The rise volume of Chinese communications communications heard been ooasioned ocasioned by by a a redeployment redeployment o of Chinese by the t h e ROK marines may have been f Chinese units through Wonsan. Communist 20th Army is known to t o be in in uniSs Wonaan. The Chinese Communist t h e Wonsan Wonsan area. areao the
18.
EfilDr Qhinala Communist unit reported entering northeeetarn Knreal.
a "large unidentified force of Chinese Communist troops" arrived at Chongjin,, A coastal city in northeastern Korea, in early September. there were no Chinese Communists in Ais area during the period 15 to 25 August.
h i l ethere t h e r e iis s no f this.reported Comments W While no confirmation confirmation o of this.reported troop troop movemoveCommunist foroes foroes have have used ueed thc. thc Korean east coast coast route route from from northCommunist Korean east eaetern Manchuria Manchuria for for previous previous moves moves of o f major major units. units. eastern
ment,
______
--
19.
NeW Narth-Eorean diViBi011e reported in nOrtheagtern Koreas 1 an unknom unknown number number "formerly provincia3. raining I of provincial security units," units," completed completed ttraining in n of divisions, d i d sions, "formerly northeaatern Korea departed for t h of o f Wonsan Wonsan before before 31 31 August. August, northeaetern Korea and a&hm&id fnr an an area an th
J
11 I
Commentt Despite frequent reports conoerning concerning the the formation formation of of new new frequent reports North unit been i identified North Korean Korean divisions, divisions, no no new new major major North Korean u n i t has been dentified recently. Sinoe it it is is known known that t h a t replacement replacement training training QCCUTS occurs i in n northeastnortheastrecently. Since ern individual.replacements ern Korea, Korea, these troops &oops were probably destined as individual replaoements for f o r the the four four North North Korean Koreancorps corpson: on: the the eastern eastern front. front.
_.
I
20. 2 0 .
lwhile feuer while fewer the enemy, agents were were taken taken during during the the period period 3 August August t to September, the enemy agents o 10 September, Ix and anb u b c b ef capturedare liecidedly 'tlecidedly improved." improved." Quality methods of meration oneration of of t+om 7ose capturedare
Quality of enemy agents imnroveds as
TOY StCR TcFsmm12 12
25 25 Sep Sep 51 51
-V'
Previously the "saturation" technique technique the enemy has employed tthe h e nsaturetionn Comments. by using a agents with a a limited limited mirsaion mission by ualng a great great many many low low level, 1114trained illAtrained agents improved in t the In h e immediate immediate vicinity of of the the battle b a t t l e line. l i n e . The appearance of imrroved front-line espionage techniques may may be be expected expected tto enhance tthe enemy's front-line o enhance h e enemy'e capability in sector. capability i n this t h i a sector.
- ____

-T-GP-SEGR:ET
13
Sep 51 25 3ep 51
-40E-SEG11ET-BSEDB. .
HR70-14 HR70-14
7. 7.
Fourth Field F i d d Amy western front KOREA. KOREA. Fourth Army units on on,wastern frOnt possibly possibly sharing oommand command A 12 12 September Chinese Communist message n unidentified message from from a an unidentified =turea 1177-tures Waigirpossibly to tthe 47th Army reports of regiment poasibly o the 47th Army reportsthat that "the "the third t h i r d battalion battalion of my regiment regbent has has been been attached attachedLo tot h the e 126th 126th Division...'' Division." ( 1-4 12 12 Sep 51) 61)
Commantt C o m m t t The U 6 t h Ckrlnese Division is subordinate subordinate to to the the 126th Chinese coxnmuniwt Communist Division 42nd m e c Feeently e n t l y returned t o combat combat after rehabilitation in Korea Korea or or 42nd Army, to rehabilitation in Manchuria. Manahuria.
The t r a n s f e r of an integral integral unit (a battalion n this The transfer unit (a battalion i in this (zase) case) of one one army to +he oontrol of of another another suggests suggests a a higher the oontrol higher oomtnand command atruoture struoture (possibly an an army a n y group) group) to to 'Which vhioh both are (possibly both the the 42nd 42nd and and the the 47th 47th Army Army are subordinate, eubordinate.
-TOP-SECRET-STED11-
6 6
a8 28 Ssp Sep 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 20-Mar-201 VPPROVED
1)) Y
<\ 5)
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP791-01146A0004#0250001-1
TOP SECRET
;8 September. 1951
CIA Na 49361 Copy No.
=I
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence.primarily It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments representCIA the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Army and State Department review(s) completed.

TOP SE CR ET

Approved For Re Wee 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000480250001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
POLAND.
25X1
Peasant reastance partially accounts for current food shortages:

!shortages
of food stuffs were becoming pronounced. Meat, sugar,and fresh and canned fish were scarce. No chocolate was available for ciVilians although considerable quantities were being imported. Cocoa and tea disappeared in June,coffee became almost equally scarce, and even pepper was becoming difficult to obtain.
The source attributed the meat shortage primarily sistance to collectivization. He pointed out that such to peasant rea large per' centage of grain was being collected from the independent peasants by the State that not enough was left for raising hogs. This pressure by the goVernment caused many farmers to abandon their farms and move to the cities to work in industry. The peasants' hatred of the regime had also taken the form of frequent individual acts of sabotage such as burning tractor and machlnl stations and grain silos.
25X1
25X1
1
25X1
Comment: In early September, the US Embassy Warsaw reported serious food shortages in Warsaw. On thA haAin nf tha 4.1 OrMation supplied 7-ithe food shortage wag pro ably nationwide.
In late August the Polish Government, taking cognizance of the developing food shortage, announced a program for the purchase of hogs in 1952 to prevent a recurrence of this year's meat shortage. If the numerous reports of peasant resistance are correct, the government may have greater difficulty than anticipated in achieving its hog purchase goals.
stance
rted in Wester
Poland':
25X1
!since May a well organized and adequately armed underground group has been operating in the Vicinity of Gorzow in the 'IrecOvired territoriesu of Western Poland. The underground group ie reported to have conducted raids on local Communist headquarters with skill and efficiency, and engaged in armed fights with well equipped police. There were indications that the group had been able to infiltrate the local party organization, since its raids were en the basis of advance information concerning apparently carried out Party activities. As of July, extensive police investigations had failed to locate the-center of the underground er to centre any of its members.
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
1 28 iSepterahar /951 Approved For Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP7911.11146A0004uonOuuT-1
Approved For Re ler 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00900250001-1

TOP SECRET
Comment: No information has been received previously concerning this group. However there have been a number of reliable reports during recent months indicating growing public unrest and some instances of active resistance in the "unrecovered territories."

TOP SECRET
2
241 September 1931
25X1

Approved For Re lalge 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004460250001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
5. BEL& c
reortedp The US Far East Command, in a discussion of enemy capabilities, noted certain enemy guerrilla operations that may be significant.
25X1
On 26 September, North Korean forces facing the US X Corps in eastern Korea attempted to infiltrate troops in undetermined strength through the UN lines. FECOM had pointed out previously that the enemy might attempt such a southward infiltration down the rugged Taebak mountain range with the intention of strengthening in the UN rear areas. Guerrilla strength continues guerrilla elements to be concentrated in the Chiri-san (southwestern Korea) area. A recent attack by an estimated 1,000 guerrillas in this area indicates that these forces have the capability for "relatively strong action against friendly rear areas." It is observed, however, that major guerrilla action probably is intended to procure supplies for the 'coming winter months. Guerrilla strength in the UN rear areas in nt)11 carried at 7,000. I
25X1
TOP SECRET
4
28 Sep 51
Approved For Ralffise 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A04110400250001-1

TOP SECRET
Comment' In a similar attempt earlier in 1951 to infiltrate large regular troop units with a guerrilla-type mission, the North Korean 10th Infantry Division succeeded in infiltrating to within 50 miles of Pusan before it was turned back.
More recently ROK police, formed into security battalions, have successfully restricted major guerrilla activity to two mountainous areas. The embryonic ROK Air Force, with 20 high-performance conventional aircraft, have performed valuable service by flying strikes against guerrilla positions in support of the police battalions.
25X1
7.
Poll ihdicates Yoshida government more copular: An Asahi public opinion survey conducted during the week following the signing of the peace treaty showed that 58 percent of those polled support the Yoshida government, while 10 percent are (*posed and 32 percent are undecided or have no opinion.
The figure for support of the Yoshida government is 15 percent higher than in a similar poll last March;
I
255(1
gomanta Asahi's opinion surveys are considered reasonably scientific, Japanese public opinion at least temporarily has been favorably impressed in Yoshida's favor by the successful signing of the treaty and by Yoshida's handling of Japan's role at San Francisco.
TOP SECRET
28 Sep 51
25X6

Approved For Fialtase 2004107108 : CIA-RDP791-01146M00400250001-1

TOP SECRET
25X6
L.
25X1
vessel The ship involved, the 8,000-ton cargo-passenger Com restrictions of the Coordinating liscoftWIETaceeds the size and speed condition is not litterIf the ship is sold to Poland, even though its adequate for use in the Fer East. up to tiestern standards, it will still be
Comment:
Poland, France agreed In the recently concluded trade negotiations with Poland in order to receive to send certain specific strategic commodities to to do so in the face urgently needed Polish coal, and maintained the right of strong US representations.
action: The French Communists are drawing free labor into unity of Labor current unity-of-action campaign of the Communist-led General major non Confederation is gaining momentum, despite the 'refusal of two question of coCommunist unions to cooperate. Internal division over the the Christian third pon-Communist union, operation threatens to weaken a left-wing faction is the leader of its dynamic Workerst Confederation, and invitation to Marsaw. The even seriously considering a Polish Trade Union which made a official Communist Party daily, in a series of articles great stress on "tremendous impression" on all labor, has recently laid
S.
workers' legitimate grievances.
to ally All non-Communist locals are showing increasing willingness If current talks result themselves with the General Labor Confederation.
TOP SECRET
7
to Poland is within trade agreement: FRANCE. French insist sale of ship has stated that-the The French delegate to the Coordinating Committee coal is within the current Poland in exchange for proposed sale of a ship to provision that suppleFranco-Polish trade agreement. He referred to the return for an "unspecified mentary amounts of Polish coal may be obtained in Paris reports that such counterpart" from France, although the US Embassy in version of the agreement or in the a provision does not appear in the public "in very insisted that the ship is confidential annex. The delegate also by the US Maritime Attache in London. bad ondition," a fact confirmed
28 Sep 51
Approved For Reese 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400250001-1

TOP SECRET
in a national alliance of the Christian Workerst Confederation with the General Labor Confederation, the other confederations will find it increasingly difficult to abstain. The General Labor Confederation may now be concentrating on long-term objectives and hence not planning general strike action before next spring.
Comment: French Communist leaders were strongly impressed by the success achieved last March when all unions combined to wage the Paris transport strikes. Since then the General Labor Confederation haS avoided overplaying political objectives, and has fostered the unity-of-action theme. This policy increases the likelihood of strong collaboration by the Christian Workers' Confederation, which is the only aggressive non-Communist union, and which has often joined in strike action with the General Labor Confederation. Recent and anticipated wage increases will not rule out local strikes this fall, but it is now unlikely that the General Labor Confederation will jeopardize the gains made toward unity of action until the economic situation insures general cooperation.
25X1
6.
AUSTRIA.
Trade agreement with Hungary signed in Budapest.
Austria's Radio
RWarilnounces the signature in Budapest of an Austro-Hungarian trade

protocol providing for exchange of goods and necessary payment arrangements between the two countries until August 1952. According to the report, Austria will deliver cut timber, pit props, staple fibers, steel, machinery, and other manufactures in return for HUngarian bread grains, oil seeds, sugar, rice, livestock, and various other aRricultural and light industrial products.
Comment: Negotiations between the tzb countries were previously reported at an impasse over the question of a 2,300,000-dollar Hungarian debt to the Austrian Federal Railways Tor transit shipments of Hungarian goods to the West. This issue now appears to have been resolved.
-
25X1
7.
Hungary is a traditional exporter of foodstuffs to Austria and a market for Austrian forest products, iron, steel, and industrial items. Last year, for example, Hungary was the second largest importer of Austrian balI bearings. While details of the new agreement are not available, the essential pattern of trade has apparently not been altered.
Government prepares protest on Soviet shelling of Austrian village: The Austrian Government4s reported to be preparing a note to the Soviet Headquarters protesting the two-day shelling by Soviet troops of a village 25 miles east of Vienna. Newspaper accounts assert that practicing Soviet tanks on 21 and 22 September badly damaged 20 farms, critically injured a village citizen, and left the local population in a state of acute panic.
TOP SECRET
28 Sep 51 8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400250001-1
Approved For Re lage 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0010100250001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
Soviet authorities attributed the incident to "partisans," but Subsequently admitted that Soviet "recruits" in the area had fired the shells. I
25X1
Comment: Exuberance on the part of Soviet troops will further antagonize the A1771757ipopulation against the vastly unpopular Soviet occupation force. Communist papers are reported to have attempted to cover the incident with a new barrage of criticism of US military actions in Upper Austria; and allegations that October maneuvers of US Forces in Germany, Austria, and Trieste will test the strength of the "Alpine fortress."
8.
Immediately after the announcement, the state-controlled General Confederation of Labor called a nationwide general strike and asked all workers to assemble at once in front of the Capitol. The labor confederation said, "Unpatriotic elements have revolted against the country."
ARGENTINA, State of siege declared in Argentina .after reported revolt: On 28 September the Argentine State radio network broadcast without warning the text of a government decree declaring a state of siege throughout the country. The decree added that "all members of the armed forces who rise against the government will be shot."
25X1
25X1
Comment: There is no further information on the extent of disturbances or on the leadership of the alleged army revolt. !Mile developments are in accordance with Peron's.threat that he would call out labor if the anmy should attempt to displace him, the possibility cannot be discounted that Peron has fabricated the reported revolt in order to impose greater restriction over opposition electoral activity and to "prove" his continuing charges of conspiracy.
Senora de Peron's renouncing of her candidacy for vice president considerably reduced.army opposition, and it was reported that the army had decided to defer any further action until after the elections.
TOP SECRET
9
28 Sep 51
25X1

HR70-14
TOP SECRET SUEDh'

TOP T(L33 EaRET-SUEDE4. 4.
4ight bomber regiment regiment moves t to base: Twenty Twenty TU-2 TU-2 U g h t bomber , o Manchurian forward baser light Air 28th A i r Regiment Regiment at a t Nanking Nanld ng will will move move to t o Iiaoyang, Iiiaogana. l i g h t bombers of the 28th a south Manchurian Nenchurian f field,from wtich 55 NIG-15 j jet fighters a i e l d f r o m wGoh 56 MIG15 et f i g h t e r s recently r e c e n t l y left 1ef.t; (SUEDE, AF AF Roumdtlp RoundUp o t h e U8 i r Foroe. for tho,Antun thm,Antung area, area, according t to the US A Air Force. (SUWIE, for 207, 27 Sep 207, Ssp 51) 5f) s oloaer o tthe h e Korean t h e a t e r than than any light Ugh% Iiaoyang i is closer tto theater Comments Iilaoyang he For t the bombeTVEZ-Used heretofore bombe'ra;r'-e;7used heretoforeby bythe t h eChinese Chinese Communist Communist Air Air Foroe. Foroe. For first brought within within range range of of Manohurian-based Nanohurian-based Chinese f i r s t time Pusan Puean -will will bbe e brought Chinese Communist bombers. ~ m u n i e bombers. t
7. 7.
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE
DATE: 18-Mar-2010 DATE. 18-Mar-2010

____TOR-SZCM--SVEDE
This move move o of TU-2's from from Nanking Nanking tto liaoyang follows follows the the tra138fsr transfer iin f TU-2vs o Iiaoyarng n Thie early of e a r l y September o f TU-2 TU-2 light l i g h t bombers from oentral oentral Manohuria to t o the the ,Peiping-Tientsin area. area. The reason o r moving u - 2 ' ~ from and into into reason f for moving T TU-2's ,Peipltlg-Tienteln Manchuria in manner is unoletxr, unclear, and it is is possible possible tthat the two two move8 moves Manohuria i n this xnanner h a t the unrelated. However, h e range of of t h e TU-2 TU-2 based in i n the the are unrelated. However, bombers Nith with t the the Tientsin area by staging through a airfields in Eastern Eastern Shantung Shantung T Zsntein a r e a oould by i r f i e l d s in operate against against Pusan. pUaan.
North North Korean Korean Air A i r Force Forae command oomand shake-u shake-up re reported8 h 27 27 September September orteds A preli nary f i e preliminary e l d ana analysis of recent reoent enemy enbmy~messages reveals t hat a a purge s s o messages reveals that purge of t h eNorth NorthKorean KoreanAir A i rForoe Foroetop t o poommand oommandforldisloyalty" for %ialoyal%y" isapparently, apparentlyt ofthe ia
DET5c TOP SECRET' SUEDE
1 Oot 51
I Oot 51
bs
For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
-Tts1P-SECRET-SUED-h-_20E-SR9RET-SDED-E-in One mesaage massage indioates indicates tthat "Kim T Tal Won" was was under i n progress. progroa8. One h a t Kim a l Won (SUEDE, FEAF FEAF CS CS 838, 838, 27 27 Sep Sep 51) investigation. (SUEDE, investigation. 51)
OomMentg Comments No further further information information is available available on either the goals soals of this command shakeup. Kim Tel was a a major, major, comeor the reasons rewone fot for this ehakaup. Kim Tal 1Non Ton vias oommanding the Attack Regiment, North manding the 2nd 2nd Battalion Battalion of the the Ground Aktaok North Korean Korean Air hir Poroe, Foroe, in in January January 1951. 1951.
_2202-9NCRET-SUENE6 6
1 Oot 51
1 Oot 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Aeprved For fealeasO 2004/09/03 ClA:RDP91T011.72$900200080001-2
sgum
State Dept. review completed
OCI 1960 1 October 1951
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
There was a general lull along the front. Action was limited to patrolling except in the east-central:sector where both sides made local attacks.
Little action took Place in the US I Corps zone except on the extreme right flank where elements of the US 3rd Division repulsed a company sized attack. In the US IX Corps zone the only action beyond patrolling was on the right flank of the zone where ROK 6th Division elements contained an attack by an enemy companY. In the US X Corps zone the ECK 8th Division continued its limited advance. Both ROK 8th and US 2nd Division units repulsed small probing attacks. The ROK I Corps zone remained quiet.
coast.
In the west, carrier aircraft flew 56 sorties. patrolled andfired on shore targets.
On 30 September two small vessels identified as destroyers fired on UN naval patrol aircraft in the vicinity of Tsingtao on the North China coast. No damage was reported.
UN land-based aircraft flew 657 sorties bombers flew 18 missions including an eight-plane attack,
SECRET
-

The enemy order of battle remains unchanged.
Eva
As Task Force 77 replenished there were no air sorties off the east Surface craft successfully conducted interdictory missions. Surface units
Lit
Approved ForRelease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R00

No
THIS
1-2
4 3 JUN 7978
25X1
To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
Apti9vedForgrasse2004/09/03:04441DP91T01172.132p0200080001-2
SECRET
UN Sabres totalling 27 engaged 40 MI0,-151s 25 miles north of Sinanju. One MIG was destroyed and three damaged with no damage to UN aircraft,
II.
General Situation
Kaesong Truce Talks
A 29 Septenber Chinese Communist broadcast accuses the UN of "wrecking Kaesong negotiations" by continuing to pursue aggressive warfare in Korea, The Chinese Communists Claim to have discovered a UN plan for amphibious operations against the east and west coasts.designed to "drive the Korean and Chinese forces back to the Yalu River."

SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
- Approved Fortgease 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172,5290200080001-2
SECRET
OCI 1961
2 October 1951

I.
'
Military Situation
Biahlights
Action was generally limited to patrolling, with heavier local fighting occurring in the west-central and east-central sectors.
In the US I Corps zone the main action was again on the right flank, where one regiment of the US 3rd Division attempted to resume its limited advance against heavy, resistance but was obliged to shift to the defensive. Other corps units continued to patrol. There was little action in the US IX Corps zone where one small enemy probing attack was repulsed by the ROK 2nd Division. Action in the US X Corps zone was heavier. ROK 8th Division units gained ground, lost it, and regained it. ROK 5th Division units advanced to seize a locally important hill. The US 1st Marine Division repulsed a small probing attack With the exception of a small and unsuccessful enemy probing attack against the ROK Capital Division, there was little action in the ROK I Corps zone.
.
Naval air sorties totalled 230. In offensive air operations along the east coast in the vicinity of Songjin, Hamhung and Wonsan, bridges, buildings, factories, locomotives, railroad cars and a gun position were destroyed, while along the west coast similar targets were attacked. Surface vessels fired on rail-highway junction and.a mine depot near Songjin, fired on extensive troop areas at Wonsan, and bombarded 10 troop concentrations on the mainland in the vicinity of Yukto Island along the west coast.
conibat.

AEMIE
ELL.n
Air
Other UN aircraft flew 1,065 effective sorties of which 653 were The US I and X Corps shared almost equall;y in a large majority SECRET
1
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117711i

No.
1-2
JUN 197B
25X1
- Approved For4Wease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172,a(100200080001-2

SECRET
of the 76 close support missions. Medium bombers flew 20 effective sorties, six of these in the Chinnampo dock area, and two others at the Mengjungdong marshalling yards. A preliminary report from Fifth Air Force states that 72 F-84's and F-801s were attacked by about 45 MIG's in the Sinanju area and forced to jettison their bombs. Then 32 F-861s attacked these MIG's and destroyed two of them. No UN aircraft was damaged or lost.
Of a total of 3405 vehicles sighted, 1771 were moving south. UN aircraft attacked a total of 1928 of these vehicles, destroying 299 end damaging 348.
II.
General Situation No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

SECRET
2
Approved Fortime 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172=0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1962
3 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action increased along the front as advancing UN units in the An enemy counterattack western sector met medium to heavy resistance. on the east-central front caused a slight UN withdrawal.
In the US I Corps zone, ROK 1st and Commonwealth let Divisions reported patrol clashes. Both the US 1st Cavalry and the US 3rd Divisions made limited advances against medium to heavy resistance. Two small enemy probing attacks were repulsed.
The US 25th and the US 7th Divisions of the US IX Corps repulsed small probing attacks. ROK 6th Division elements were attacked by an estimated reinforced battalion. In the US X Corps zone, the US 2nd Division reported repulsing a small probing attack, but elements of the ROK 5th Division were forced to withdraw slightly. A UN counterattack made no gaiMS.
There was little action in the ROK I Corps zone.
Naval air sorties totalled 236. In offensive air operations along both coasts various enemy installations were hit, including six troop concentrations Where at least 52 casualties were inflicted. Blockade ships bombarded rail-highway junctions, a railroad area, marshalling yards, bridges, and tunnels near Chongjin and Songjin. Gun positions, Caves, Hits were buildings, and villages were struck at Hungnam and Wonsan. also scored on a North Korean food dump west of Chinnampo.
Other UN aircraft flew 1,049 effective sorties of which 682 were combat. The close support missions, totalling approximately 80, were equally divided between the US I and X Corps. ,Twenty-two effective medium bomber sorties were flown against a variety of targets which in..
SECRET

AEME
ku
Air
THEC.I.A.HASNOOMECTION
TO THEDECLASSIFICATION 07
601-2
Approved ForRelease 2004/09/03 ;31:144-FDP917011W4Obl` 1:i

No.
J UN log
25X1
Approved For Rag pose 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R200200080001-2
eluded the Yangdok marshalling yards, Kyomipo supply center and Sinmak and Sariwon airfields. Enemylosses claimed by Far East Command included six MIG-15's destroyed, one probably destroyed, and one damaged, but no details of air battles are available.
II,
General Situation
Mesons Truce Talks
25X1
25X1
A 2 October North Korean broadcast resumes the line that the "American interventionists" are using Japanese troops in Korea. The broadcast claims that a number of Japanese have been captured in Korea, one as late as 4 September.

Political
SECRET
alleges that the cease-fire talks should be resumed oecause a "further delay" on the part of the Communists would "intolerably provoke" the UN into an all-out offensive,
Approved For Release 2004/09/032: CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved For Rekisse 2004/09103 : CIARDP91T01172RW200080001-2
SECRET
ocI 1963
4 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action was intensified in the west; advancing UN units met heavy resistance, but gains were registered all along the sector. Company strength probing attacks wererepulsed in the west-central sector. Elsewhere, activity was limited to small-scale patrol contacts.
In the US I Corps zone, troops of all four UN dtvisions continued to advance. The ROK 1st Division met only light opposition. The lst Commonwealth Division repulsed one counterattack and forced small enemy units to withdraw. The US 1st Cavalry Division repulsed light enemy counterattacks of company and two company strength but managed to advance and consolidate new positions, Advancing elements of the US 3rd Division contained four counterattacks, but withdrew slightly; other elements established new positions. The US 25th Division of the US IX Corps dispersed various enemy groups, and repulsed a platoon strength counterattack. Enemy probing attacks were also repulaed by the ROK 2nd and US 7th Divisions. The US X Corps zone was relatively quiet; the US 2nd Division dispersed an enemy company, and the ROK 5th Division continued to battle for possession of a hill top. Contact was later broken by the latter division.
The ROK I Corps zone remained quiet.
area remained unchanged,
The mew order of battle along the front and in the immediate rear
UN carrier aircraft flew 127 sorties. In offensive air operations along the east coast, targets from Songjin to Wonsan were successfully attacked, but three Corsairs were lost to antiaircraft fire. Surface craft scored hits on shore batteries at Hungnam and Wonsam. Along the west coast, aircraft and surface vessels attac ed various coastal targets.
SECRET
THE C.I.A. Hai NO OBJECTION

Azaz
an
TO TT DEIMASSTFICATION OF
THIS DcamaT. Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CNA-RDP911101172R000200401303a 11-3
uo.
25X1
Ap *proved ForWase 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117e22,0200080001-2

SECRET
Air
UN landbased aircraft flew 1,006 sorties including 633 combat. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties, including attacks on railroad installa tions at Hamhung and Sinanju; results varied from poor to good.
A total of 3)938 vehicles was sighted, 1,750 of which were moving UN air attacks destroyed 217 and damaged 403. south.
II.
General Situation
Kaesonm Truce Talks
The Communist leaders have rejected the latest UN offer to resume A counter offer to resume negotiations negotiations at a new location. at Kaesong, however, is repeated. The first meeting scheduled would deal with setting up "appropriate machinery" for assuring the future neutrality of the Kaesong zone. Political
Most influential newspapers in South Kbrea and the ROK Government Office of Public Information have chosen to interpret General Bradley's visit to the Far East as forerunning a "more positive course" of action in the Korean war. The concensus of the press is that the UN is now determined to conclude the Korean affair by military means.

SECRET
'
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-R0P91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved ForlBeiease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117Q000200080001-2

SECRET

I.
Military Situation
Highlights Action was heaviest in the west, where advancing UN forces met considerable resistance and were counter-attacked several times hy battalion sized groups. Action increased slightly on the east coast, where enepy attacks were repulsed, Along the central front there were several enemy probing attacks.
Three UN divisions in the US I Corps zone continued their advance, meeting considerable resistance which included several counterattacks by groups in strength of up to a reinforced battalion. These UN divisions made limited gains, although an enemy counterattack forced a local withdrawal in the US 3rd Division sector, The enepy order of battle remains unchanged, with the 65th and 47th and elements of the 42nd and 64th Chinese Communist Arndes on the corps front. US IX Corps units repulsed several small counterattacks, mostly by platoon sized groups. In addition there was considerable patrol action. The 26th and 67th Chinese Armies still face the IX Corps units. Action in the US X Corps zone was limited to patrol clashes and long-range small arms fire duels. Six North Korean divisions face the X Corps.
Action in the east was heavier than usual as ROK I Corps units repulsed several company sized attacks. Two North Korean divisions are on the corps front.

Lea
Enemy troops in Korea
The overall enemy strength estimates are as follows.?
Chinese Communists
North Koreans
409,000 252,000
661751515
Total
(down 23,000 since last week owing to casualties)
SECRET
THE C. I. k, ITAC
5:0
rio oP.27,C2 TON
:!..3.15IFICATION Of
Approved ForRelease2004/09/03:1:144-FDP91701
No.
u
-3
01-2
25X1
JUN.1373
Approved For Eistapse 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP911-011724929200080001-2

SECRET
Enemy troops in the combat zone Enemy troops in Korea and Manchuria
256,000
1,289,000
Navy
Carrier aircraft flew 197 sortiei. Along the east coast, aircraft and surface vessels attacked coastal targets fram Songjin to Wonsan. In the west, troop concentrations and other targets near Haeju were attacked.
'
UN land-based aircraft flew 992 sorties, including 637 combat. A total of 24 medium bombers attacked railroad targets at HWangju and Hamhung. In an engagement over Sinanju, 34 Sabres engaged 30 MIG-1510; one NIG pilot bailed out.
The North Korean radio announced a 500 million won lottery to raise funds for the purchase of "airplanes, tanks and warships" to exterminate the American armed interventionists," All citizens are called upon to purchase "defense lottery tickets." (This money-raising scheme probably . serves the multiple purpose of raising morale, withdrawing currency from circulation and providing the Communist regime with much-needed funds),

Air
General Situation Economic
SECRET
An unidentified destroyer escort was sighted off the North China coast near Tsingtao.
Approved For aglpase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011724900200080001-2
SECRET
OCI 1965
6 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
In the US I Corps zone elements of the let Commonwealth Divisions advancing against opposition from two enemy companies, received a counterattack and withdrew about one mile. The US 1st Cavalry Division repulsed six enemy probing attack's, the largest in battalion strength. The US 3rd Division adjusted positions.
In the US IX Corps zones all omits were adjusting positions. The US 25th Division repulsed two night probing attacks from enemy troops of undetenmined strength.
In the US X Corps zones the ROK 8th Dtvision repulsed twit) probing attacks. US 2nd Division elements attacked toward a Mmited objective against moderate resistance, succeeded in their mission, and consolidated the new positions. Cther elements of this division recaptured Hill 931 (Heartbreak Ridge) and continued the attack northward. Other units of
this corpa patrolled and adjusted positions.
In the ROK I Corps zone the ROK Capital Division reconnaissance troops patrolled as far as the city of Kosongs then withdrew. The only opposition seen was an enemy platoon encountered south of the town on
the way back
Naval air sorties totalled 224, including four elose support (Owing to transmission, Missionfl flown for the US 1st Marine Division. 69 difficulties, no other information is available on naval nativity.)
SECRET

Ammx
UN forcet consolidated their positions, patrolled extensiVely and earfied out a few drives with limited objectives. On the western front action continued moderate with attacking elements engaging and repulsing the enemy in several Iodations.
!jay
THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTION
TO THE DECLIV3SIFICATION OF THIS DO CU/LENT .
1978
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172 Noiremeer 4132JUN
25X1
Approved For liar 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
SECRET
II.
A 30 September Pusan radio broadcast deplores the poor result of the latest provincial draft'call. The bad response is credited to unsatisfactory preparations on the part of the military authorities concerned and to a lack of understanding and a poor sense of duty on the part of the conscriptees.

General Situation Politicel
SECRET
land based UN aircraft flew 1,168 effective sorties of which 614 were combat. The US I and X Corps units were the chief recipients of the 61 close support sorties'. Medium bombers flew 23 effective sorties, boibing the Pyongyang railroad bridge, a highway bridge at Ichon, Chitnetpo marshalling yards and military targets at Haiphong and Ohigyong. The following air enegagements were reporteds (l) approximately 60 MIG-15gs Were observed southeast of Sinanjus 33 of which were engaged by 28 F-84gs; one of each was damaged; (2) 34 F-86gs engaged about 30 MIGgs north of Sinanju and destroyed one MIG; (3) 34 F-86gs engaged 50 MIGgs in this sate area and damaged one MIG; (4) 32 1-861s were attacked by 100 MIGgs in a pincer movement with 50 coming from Pyonuang and the other 50 fXot the area northwest of the North Korean capital. One MIG was probably destroyed and two damaged while two P46gs were lost.
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved Foralpase 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172$090200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1966
8 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Limited UN attacks in the western and eastern sectors met heavy resistance from well-entrenched enemy forces. Elsewhere action was limited to patrol clashes.
UN forces in the US I Corps zone continued their limited advance against stiff resistance. The British lst Commonwealth and US let Cavalry Divisions repulsed enemy counterattacks in several sharp engagements. In the US IX Corps zone, T. 24th Division units repulsed two small counterattacks. Other action in the zone was limited to patrol clashes. Units of the US X Corps continued to attack and were heavily engaged by well-entrenched enemy troops. The ROK 8th Division reported In one local,clash US 2nd Division elements were forced to no gains. withdraw. The ROK 5th Division also reported heavy fighting.
There was little action in the ROK I Corps zone.
UN carrier aircraft flew 201 sorties. Along the east coast communications targets were successfully attacked by aircraft and surface vessels. A US escort vessel was damaged by a mine near Hungnam.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,005 sorties including 641 combat. Of 18 medium bomber sorties flown 11 were in an attack against Pyongyang airfield with fair results.
II.

Itata
Air
General Situation
Kaesong Truce Talks
SECRET
1
After inveighing against UN insincerity and ulterior motives in
TEE C./. A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMEIT.

No.
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01972R0002 )0080,901-gtm
25X1
p"
Approved ForsRelease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011WW0200080001-2

wops
SECRYT
seeking to change the conference site, the Communist leaders in a 7 October broadcast made'a counter proposal which would extend the neutral zone from Kaesong to the UN "Peace Camp" at MUnsan and make the village of Panmunjong the conferenee site& According to US press sources, General Ridgway has accepted the new Communistdesignated conference site but has demurred at enlargement of the neutral zone.

SECRET
2
Approved For,gpLease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01177=00200080001-2
SE=
I.
Military Situation
Highlights
COI 1967
9 October 1951
Advancing UN forces in the west-central and east-central sectors continued to encounter stiff resistance from well-entrenched enemy troops employing mortar and artillery fire. Several probing attacks were repulsed.
In the US I Corps zone, the 1st Commonwealth Division repulsed an attack by an estimated battalion-strength unit. Elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division and the attached Greek Battalion advanced against determined resistance, while other elements contained an enemy attack and maintained previous positions. Outpost troops of the US 3rd Division repulsed a probing attack and other elements of this division repulsed a companystrength thrust. In the US IX Corps zone, the four divisions now on the line (US 25th and 24th, ROK 2nd and 6th) repulsed six probing attacks, patrolled and generally maintained positions. In the US X Corps zone, troops of the ROK 8th Division continued to attack against an enemy battalion and, although they made no gains0 they did not break contact. The US 2nd Division attacked with limited objectives and repulsed several counterattacks The ROK 5th Division continued to attack and secured its objectives, but was forced to withdraw under heavy enemy artillery fire. ROK I Corps units patrolled with limited contacts.
Naval air sorties totalled only 250 of which four were in close Task Force 77 was replenishing support of the US 1st Marine Division, and the only offensive air operations in the east were night heckler missions. There were no air operations along the west coast. Surface vessels bombarded six rail-highway junctions near Chongjin; fired on two rail-highway crossings and hit two railroad bridges near Songjin; and fired on and hit industrial areas, as well as gun positions and ammunition dumps at Wonsan.
SECRET
1
NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCIMENT.2
,

Nan,
THE C.I.A. H
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011.72 2000200 8000fq&UN 1978 No.
25X1
Approved For4p4ease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T0117ag480200080001-2

SECRET
Air Other UN aircraft flew 975 effective sorties, of which 556 were coMbat. The 80 close-support missions were in the sectors of the US I and X Corps. Medium bombers flew 16 effective sorties. Among the targets were Songchon railroad by-pass, Hamhung railroad bridge, Hwangju marshalling yards, and the 'Pyongyang airfield.
General Situation
Propaganda

SECRET
2
On 7 October Radio Pyongyang broadcast in Korean the "deep impression" made "on all the Korean people by Generalissimo Stalin's reply to questions from a Pravda reporter concerning atomic weapons." The comments of a fanner, a factory worker and a woman member of the All three interpreted.Stalin's Pyongyang Peace Committee were quoted. statement as a "decisive blow to the warmongers who have been madly engaged in provoking a new war with their atomic bombs," and as boundlessly boostinethe Korean people's fighting spirit and confidence in ultimate Victory."
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91101172R000200080001-2
Approved Focasjease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T0117.19030200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1968
10 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces in the east-central sector encountered stubborn resistance as they advanced against well-entrenched enemy units. In the west there were several brief fire-fights as both sides probed.
Action in the US I Corps zone consisted of probing attacks by both UN probing attacks were met by enemy groups of up to battalion sides.
size.
In the US IX Corps action was limited to patrol clashes as UN tank-infantry teams conducted reconnaissance missions in force. The US X Corps continued its limited advance with the ROK 8th, US 2nd qnd ROK 6th Divisions meeting stubborn resistance. There were numerous small ehemy counterattacks and in one instance UN troops were forced to withdraw. The ROK I Corps reported no change.
Naval air sorties totalled 225, including six in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. In offensive air operations three bridges, 32 railroad cars and other military targets were destroyed. Surface vessels bombarded five rail and highway areas, two railroad bridges, a truck depot, four gun batteries and troop positions.
Land-based UN aircraft flew 828 effective sorties, of which 523 -were combat. The US I and X Corps benefitted from the 74 close support missions. The 21 effective medium bomber sorties were flown against a variety of targets including Sinanju railroad bridge, Sariwon airfield, Sinanju airfield and the Hamhung marshalling yards.

Army
Air
SECRET
THE C.I.A. HAS NO CB37CTION (FICATIO:1 Off TO THE Div_ THIS BOU',;,.a:,14
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : ClA-RDP91TOIViR000200 8000 'ÌV iLo.
25X1
Approved For,Agease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172$900200080001-2

SECRET
General Situation
Kaesona Truce Talks
In a 9 October Peiping broadcast the Communist leaders offered to reserve discussion of extension of the neutral zone until the first meet ing of the resumed conference.
Political

SECRET
2
A 6 October Pusan broadcast warned North Korean refugees in South Korea not to be confused or mislead by the flsocalled voluntary surrender (This is the first report week allegedly instituted by the Communists. of a Communist effort to win the refugee population back to the North.)
Approved ForljWase 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T011740,1190200080001-2

SECRET
ocI 1969
11 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN ground forces continued to advance in the east-central sector against moderate to heavy resistance from well-entrenched forces up to Elsewhere action was limited to small patrol clashes battalion strength. as units adjusted positions.
The principal action in the US I and IX Corps zones was a small advance by one element of the US 1st Cavalry Division. Otherwise units adjusted positions and patrolled, with fewer contacts than have been evident in the past several weeks.
In the US X Corps zone, the ROK 8th Division continued its attack against an enemy battalion and reached its current objective. The US 2nd Division repulsed a battalion-sized attack. The entire division was on the attack, with some elements reaching the objective immediately while others, forced to withdraw temporarily in the face of an enemy counterattack, secured their objective later. Other units of this Corps maintained positions and patrolled. The ROK I Corps units also maintained positions and patrolled.
There was little action along the west Coast, with air and surface craft engaging in some small-scale missions,
UN carrier aircraft flew 257 missions. In operations on the east coast, naval planes struck at coastal targets. Surface craft successfully shelled targets:from Chongjin to Wonsan.
UN land-based aircraft flew 832 sorties:including 430 combat. Medium bombers flew 22 sorties; nine bombers attacked the two airfields at Pyongyang with unreported results,
SECRET
1
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION

Nyy
Air
TO THE DECA: SIFICATION OY THIS DOCUELNT.2 a JuN
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172p000200080C01-2
25X1
"yr
"
Approved For lase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011724M200080001-2

SECRET
In an encounter between 30 Sabres and 40 MI0-15's, one MIG was probably destroyed and three damaged.
General Situation
Political
In South Korea, the opposition political party -- the Democratic Nationalists -- continued to castigate the government's failure to prosecute persons involved in last summer's scandals (the Kochang Massacre and the National Defense Corps funds misappropriation). Democratic Nationalists pressure, although primarily political in natUre, has succeeded in forcing the Rhee regime into some greatly needed reforms.

SECRET
Approved For.aVase 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP91T0117=10200080001-2

SECRET
()CI 1970
12 October 1951

I.
The most significant action Was again in the west-central and eastcentral sectors, where advancing UN units encountered moderate to heavy resistance from well-entrenched enemy units. Elsewhere light contacts were made and small probing attacks were repulsed.
In the US I Corps zone nearly all elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division continued the attack. Enemy companies furnished strong opposition and several friendly units withdrew and consolidated new positions after engaging the enemy. The US 3rd Division and the attached Belgian Battalion repulsed attacks by email enemy groups. In the US IX Corps zone, patrols engaged small numbers of enemy troops and the four UN divisions adjusted positions. In the US X Corps zone, the entire ROK 8th Division moved to the attack and advanced against heavy resistance from two enemy battalions and eight companies. Elements of the US 2nd Division engaged an enemy battalion and repulsed a small probing attack, while other elements advanced against determined resistance and secured a new area successfully wrested from enemy possession. Combined enemy ground strength is now estimated at 664,000, an increase of 3,000 over the previous week. Of these 664,000 it is estimated that 253,000 are in the combat zone and 374,000 in the rear areas, while the remaining 37,000 are North Korean trainees and guerrillas. (Owing to transmission difficulties, no other information on Army, Navy or Air is available).
II.
The ROK Government announced that local elections -- delayed for over a year -- will be held early in December for the selection of count', town and city officials.throughout Korea south of the Han River. In addition, by-elections for the seats of eight deceased ROK National Assembly meMbers will be held, The seats of 27 assemblymen kidnappfedIbyth17:74/IL nists will,remain vacant. SECRET TO

hr.EZ
General Situation
.
Political
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002013060001a 11"

1
',.IT.21.112.1ION OF
25X1
atik
Approved FocIlslease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01174,51610020008008L2 1971

SECRET
13 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Advancing UN forces in the east-central sector encountered stiff In resistance from a well-entrenched enemy employing heavy mortar fire. attacks were repulsed. the western sector, several small enemy
In the US I Corps zone the 1st Commonwealth and the US ist Cavalry Divisions repulsed several attacks by groups of up to battalion size. in one instance a 1st Cavalry unit's positionwas averrun but the enemy withdrew. During this engagement the enemy jammed UN radio channels.
In the US IX Corps zone, the RCK 2nd, US 24th and ROI( 6th Divisions continued to probe enemy positions against varying resistance.
The RACK 8th Division of the US I Corps was engaged in bitter fighting during its attack, with ground changing hands several times. The US 2nd end RCK 5th Divisions also met heavy resistance in the area of "Heartbreak Ridge" in the east-central sector.
In the RCK I Corps zone, UN units made limited advances.
UN carrier aircraft flew 84 sorties. Air action in the east was limited as Task Force 77 replenished. Surface craft continued interdictory missions along the coast.
In the west air and naval units succeesfUlly attacked coastal targets and continued patrolling.
.

Army
SECRET
1
iiTHB C.I.A. HASNO OF TO Th L.ECLAZSIFICATION TNISDO,J,IALCT,
OBJSCTION
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172610 00200080(
25X1
Approved FocaRsjease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01174;000200080001-2

SECRET
Air
UN land-based aircraft fleW 910 sorties, including 563 combat. Four medium bombers attacked marshalling yards with unreported results. Near Sinanju, 31 Sabres encountered 80 MIG-151s. destroyed and six MIG's and one Sabre were damaged.
One HIG was
II. General Situation
Political
The brief occupation of North Korea by UN forces was a shattering blow to the previously tight, efficient North Korean governmental organization. There is continuing evidence indicating that the North Korean regime is still experiencing considerable difficulties in re-exerting its former controls.

SECRET
2
A 9 October North Korean broadcast provides a significant insight into political conditions in North Korea. The broadcast stated that the "circumstances of war" have forced local governmental organs to replace many of their workers with untrained personnel. Willie praising the "high morale" and "seasoned ideology" of these new workers, the broadcast deplores their failure in many instances to develop "executive ability."
Approved Forepase2004/09/03:0A-FDPS1T0117;52p0200080001-2
OCI 1972
15 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
THE C.I.A. rns NO OBJECTION

TO .171:.
/3
:-.;SSIFICATION OF
0
THIS D0'..:::;;TEAT
3 JON 7928 No. UN forces along the central front continued to mivameagainst light to heavy resistance from well dug-in enemy units. Several probing attacks were repulsed in the western sector.
.
Highlights
25X1
The US I Corps zone was relatively quiet as all units adjusted positions and patrolled against enemy groups of squad to compay strength with no important engagements.
In the US IX Corps zone the ROK 2nd Division attacked against relatively little opposition. The US 24th Division also took the offensive; some elements reached their objective without contact, while others were forced to disperse enemy groups of undetermined strength.
In the US X Corps zone the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions and the US 2nd Division with its attached elements all adjusted their positions forward against moderate resistance. There were no important pitched battlee.
There were only minor small unit contacts in the ROK I Corpe
zone.
Owing to poor weather conditions, only 79 sorties were flown. Although air operations in the settwere limited, surface craft continued their interdictory missions against shore batteries and other installations.
There was also only limited action along the west coast.
TIN land-based aircraft flew 407 sorties inaluding 266 combat. Eaeven medium bombers were despatched, eight on night missions, with unreported results.
destroyed 78.

AEU
lir
Only 318 vehicles
L
sighted, with 108 moving south. UN aircraft
Approved Foceltjease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91 TO117.24100200080001-2
II.
General Situation
Kaesong Truce Talks
AMbassador NUccio reports an encouraging aspect in the previously adamant BOK stand against the cease-fire talks. The new KOK meMber of the UN delegation., General Lee Ryung-gux,recently stated to the press, with considerable moderation, that "our nation need not be pessimistic of the outcome of talks." He further assured the press that he would do "his best" in view of,the national and military points of view.
Economic
Commenting on ROE plans to issue dollar-secured "currency eta:bill:a., zation" bonds, US economic advisors in Korea observe that "the next few months are crucial in determining whether inflation can be held in check".
Approved Focarbase 2004/09/03: Ch442DP91T0117a00200080001-2

SECRET OCI 1973
16 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights .UN forces in the west-central and east-central sectors continued to advance against lessened resistance. Although large gains were not made, enemy counterattacks were less frequent.
In the US I Corps zone the US 1st Cavalry Division continued to advance against resistance from groups of undetermined size. Other corps units were not active.
In the US IX Corps zone, the Turkish Brigade repulsed a probing attack while the ROK 2nd, US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions continued to advance, registering minor gains.
No enemy order of battle changes have occurred in either the I or IX Corps zones. Less enemy resistance was encountered in the US X Corps zone as the ROK 8th and US 2nd Divisions made limited advances. Two small enemy probing attacks were repulsed. US X Corps units now face four North Korean divisions and elements of one CCF army; previously there were six North Korean divisions on the corps front and no elements of a CCF army. In the ROK I Corps zone there was little action; two platoonsized attacks were repulsed.
Naval air sorties totalled 192. In offensive air operations along both coasts two bridges, seven boats, 17 railroad cars, a fuel tank and numerous buildings were destroyed. Blockade ships bombarded a railroad tunnel and junction near Songjin and Tanchon, railway installations at Hungnam and military communications facilities at Wonsan.
SECRET
1

Armv
THEL .A. HASNOODJECTION

TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
THISDOCUMENT.
No.
Approved ForRelease2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172120002010410g01n3,

vu
25X1
Approved For Rejoise 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721399,9200080001-2

SECRET
Air
landbased UN aircraft flew 796 effective sorties including 544 Ninetysix close support missions were flown Along the front'. Only nine effective sorties were flown by medium bombers attacking troop concentrations at night. Two encounters between 1461s and NIG's were reported by Far East Air Forces. One of these involved 32 F-861s and more than 50 MIG,s, while the other involved unreported numbers.Of each. Three MICts were destroyed but there was no damage to UN aircraft.
co.mbat.
II.
General Situation
hours.

SECRET
No significant reports have been received during the past 24
Approved For4dase 2004/09/Qtcgh-RDP91T0117Vap020008002)1j i 1974

17 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
THE C.I.A. RAC NO OBJECTION TO THE DFCT,P3SIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
13-
Highlights
UN forces continued to attack, making limited gains against a well-entrenched and determined enemy. Numerous small scale probing attacks were repulsed.
78
In the US I Corps zone, attacking elements of the US lst Cavalry Division encountered stiff resistance from a well-entrenched enemy regiment, and repulsed several counterattacks. In the US IX Corps zone, the US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions continued to attack enemy groups estimated to be of battalion to regiment size. Light gains were made. On the left flank of the US X Corps zone elements of the ROK 8th Division, while driving north, were forced to:dig in short of their objective after engaging an enemy company in a day-long fight. The US 2nd Infantry and lst Marine and ROK 5th Divisions repulsed small counterattacks and patrolled. In the ROK I Corps zone, elements of the ROK Capital Division captured the strategic peak Walbi-San, held by two enemy battalions, and then repulsed a battalion-strength counterattack. Elsewhere activity was limited to patrol engagements.
UN carrier aircraft flew 278 sorties. On the east coast, air and surface craft continued to attack shore targets. Similar operations on a lesser scale were carried out on the west coast.-
Un land-based aircraft flew 1071 effectiva sorties, including 662 combat. Twenty-six medium bomber missions were flown against railroad targets and troop concentrations.
II.

Navy
Air
Army
Approved For Release 2004/09baatilA-RDP91-101172R000200080001-2
Approved ForNap lease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91101172114100200080001-2

SECRET OCI 1975
18 October
1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The principal action again was in the US IX Corps sector where UN troops made small gains against bitter opposition.
In the US I Corps zone, US lst Cavalry Division elements fought several all-day engagements with groups of up to battalion strength, making only minor gains. In one sector, the enemy retired during the night: The US 24th Division made the main effort in the US IX Corps zone. Resistance was bitter, but appreciable advances were made. One unit of the ROK 2nd Division was forced to withdraw but other enemy attacks in the US 2nd and ROK 6th Division zones were repulsed. In the US X Corps zone, the ROK 8th Division resumed its advance. Other action in this sector was mainly limited to patrol clashes, although the enemy launched a small unsuccessful probing attack in the US 1st Marine Division sector.
An attack by an enemy battalion against the ROK llth Division in the ROK I Corps sector caused a slight UN withdrawal. Other probing attacks in this sector were repulsed.
Naval air sorties totalled 23, and the Marine Air Wing flew 18 close support missions for the US 1st Marine Division. Task Force 77 was replenishing and only night heckler flights were scheduled along the east coast, while no air report was received from carriers off the west coast. Surface vessels bombarded rail and highway installations near Songjin, Chongjin and Tanchon, and troop positions along the west
coast.

Army
Navy
SECRET
.
THr C.I.A. lifts NO OBJECTIOM
TO THE DEC,KBSIIICATION OY
. THIS DOCUMT.
Approved ForRelease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91TW2R000 8S41-92-437A
2 5X1
Approved FocZolease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117Q4,000200080001-2

SECRET
Air Other UN aircraft flew 1,108 effective sorties including 674 coMbat. The 110 close support sorties were divided among the US I Corps (21), IX Corps (52) and X Corps (37). Nine effective miesions were flown by medium bombers, mainly leaflet drops and surveillance although Kang-Nong airfield was bombed.
II.
General Situation

SECRET
Approved Forjarapase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117V090200080001-2
SECRET
OCI 1976
19 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights Action on the battlefront aubsided somewhat. The enemy made two unsuccessful battalion-sized counterattacks in the Kumsong area, but elsewhere activity was limited to patrol clashes and mopping-up operations.
Action in the US I Corps zone consisted of mopping up operations by UN forces. The enemy made one small unsuccessful probing attack in the 1st Commonwealth Division area. Patrolling was heavy.
In the west-central sector several divisions of the US IX Corps were in action. The US 25th Division destroyed many enemy bunkers in cleaning operations. The ROK 2nd and US 24th Divisions were engaged in several small local actions. The enemy launched two battalionsizedcounterattacks against the ROK 6th Division in the Kumsong area; no ground was lost. The ROK 8th Division on the left flank of the US X Corps continued its limited advance. Along the rest of the corps front, enemy attempts to infiltrate were repulsed. On the eastern front, ROK I Corps units repulsed four enemy company-sized attacks. Estimates of enemy ground strength are as follows;
Combat zone Rear areas Guerrillas
The above figures represent a decrease of 26,000 from last week, due to casualties.
Enemy forces in Korea and Manchuria total 1,266,000.

Army
SECRET
253,000 378,000 7,000 638,000 (400,000 Chinese and 2380000 North Koreans)
THE(9 C.I.A.PASNO OBJECTION TO THE DEOLikSSIFICATION OF 1 THIS DOC1"FW. Approved ForFtehmse2004R)9/03:0A-FDP91T01172F030 20o6sp90-2
No.
r,
25X1
Approved Foaipase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117,45990200080001-2

SECRET
Navy
UN carrier aircraft flew 163 sorties. Nothing unusual was reported from either-coast as aircraft and surface craft continued harassing interdictory missions.
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,050 missions including 652 combat'. Medium bombers flew 19 sorties against various targets including Saamcham airfield, where results were excellent. Vehicle sightings totalled 7861, with 236 moving south.
II.

General Situation
SECRET
2 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved For IS/rase 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172011011200080001-2

SECRET OCI 1977
20 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces continued to attack in the west-central sector, engaging several battalions and repulsing several counterattacks. Limited objective attacks and patrol clashes occurred in the other sectors.
In the US I Corps zone, UN units generally patrolled with little or no direct enemy contact. The enemy, however, placed over 700 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in the corps zone. UN units in the US IX Corps zone continued to attack. The US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions attacked several enemy groups of battalion strength, causing enemy withdrawals. Counterattacking enemy forces were repulsed. One regiment of the US 24th Division received 1200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire. Action was light in the US X Corps zone. Limited objective attacks were made by UN forces on the west flank, while other corps units patrolled. No enemy activity was reported from the ROK I Corps zone.
Naval aircraft flew 128 sorties. In offensive operations in the west, buildings, railroad cars, and various vehicles were attacked in the vicinities of Chinnampo, Munggumpo-ri, and Haeju. Aircraft from carriere off the east Coast attacked bridges, gun positions, and other targets in the Kilchu Chosin Reservoir, Yongwon, and Kowon areas.
Surface vessels off both coasts continued to bombard troop concentrations, supply centers, gun positions, and other targets.

Army
Navy
SECRET
1
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DRULAWIFICATION OF 11115 DOCUMENT.
fl
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011142
Approved FocRes lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011745280200080001-2

SECRET
Air Other UN aircraft flew 914 sorties, including 565 cothat. Close support sorties totalled 105. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft flew 367 sorties, attacking targets in numerous areas. Medium bombers: flying 25 sorties, attacked the Pyongyang airfield, marshalling yards at Chinnampo, Samdong-ni, and Hamhung, the Songchon railroad by-pass bridge, and other targets.
II.
General Situation
The Communist liae on the current ROK-Japan negotiations, which deal primarily with the nationality of Korean residents in Japan, is reported by the US Embassy in Moscow from a Peiping Tess despatch. The article claims that AMbassador Muccio is expediting a "pact of military alliance between Japan and Korea." In return for sending troops and military supplies to Korea, Japan facto receive raw materials; apart of the former Japanese-owned railroads and other enterprises in Korea, and the right to organize industrial enterprises in Kbrea. The Americans are credited with the intention of returning Korea to its former status as a Japanese colony.
Reuters reports that at the opening season of the first conference to be held between diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Korea and Japan, the Korean Adbassador to the US who beads the Korean delegation stated his government is willing "to bury the hatchet and promote friendly cooperation with Japan." This statement contrasts strangely with a recent and obviously government-approved demonstration in South Korea which formulated demands to be made against Japan that were tantamount to demanding extraterritoriality.

Propaganda
Political
SECRET
2
Approved FoZrase 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011W7b0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1978
-
22 October 1951
DAILY KOREAN HULLETIN;0 JD!: ..... I)L:i NO OB."XTTON

.
I.
ot173IFICIITION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No.
25X1
2-3-414-1978
UN forces continued to advance in the Kumsong area, attacking enemy groups up to battalion size. Elsewhere activity was limited to patrolling,
In the US I Corps zone, UN units maintained their positions and patrolled vigorously. One small probing attack was repulsed by the US 1st Cavalry Division. In the Kumsong area, the US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions of the US IX Corps drove the enemy back while advancing to within tun miles of the town. A mnall enemy attack in the BOK 2nd Division area was repulsed In the US X and ROK I Corps zones, UN troops repulsed several small local attacks and continued patrolling,
Offensive air operations off both Naval air sorties totalled 212. coasts destroyed a boat, several junka, warehouses, buildings, railroad cars, bridges and a locomotive. Surface vessels bombarded strategic communications targets along the east coast and troop positions in the Han estuary.
Air
Land-based UN aircraft flew 645 effective sorties including 328 combat. Only 12 close support missions were flown, eight in the US I Corps zone and four in that of the US IX Corps. Medium bomber sorties totalled 19; targets included the Hamhung, Kyomipo, and Kunu-ri marshalling yards. There were encounters between 66 F-861s, eight F-80,8 and 110 MIG's in which two MIG's were damaged.
II.
General Situation
Truce Talks
A 21 October Peiping broadcast again accused the UN of negotiating

SECRET
Arm
ApprovedForRelease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2 1
Approved For4prase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117;5980200080001-2

SECRET
In bad faith in the cease-fire talks, and of "manufacturing incidents" to ,delay the resumption of the talks. Alluding to the recent Kirk-Vyshinsky exchange, the broadcast states that this was a "knockout blow" to US dilatory tactics.
Political
?resident Rhee in South Korea is urging passage of a constitutional amendment providing for popular election of the President. Ambassador Maccio observes that this amendment will "help assure Rheets re-election or the election of a Rhee-picked candidate" in the May 1952 elections,

SECRET
Approved For Rs lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91101172QW0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1979
23 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
US I Corps troops patrolledendountering small enemy groups. Several amall probing attacks were repulsed as units either maintained or adjusted. their:positions.
In the US IX Corps zone, a US 24th Division tank patrol advanced to the vicinity of Kumsong and destroyed six buildings, but received 125 rounds of enemy artillery fire. Regiments of this division advanced against light resistance to the east of Kumsong. Elsewhere corps units patrolled. US X Corps units patrolled with very little opposition as the US 7th Division replaced the US 2nd Division on the line with one regiment of the latter division plus the Ethiopian and Netherlands Battalions attached. The rest of the 2nd Division and the French Battalion moved to the US IX Corps zone.
In the ROK I Corps zone units patrolled and repulsed two night probing attacks.
Naval air sorties totalled 1720.including eight in close support of the US let Marine Division. East coast carrier-based planes struck in the areas of Songjin, Hungnam, Yangdok and Wonsan, destroying buildings, gun positions, railroad cars, and bridges. There were no air operations in the west because of replenishing activities. Rail-highway areas and equipment and marshalling yardsaprovided
SECRET
THE C.I.A. HA (/0 OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCIMENT.

Sn
1
Action along the entire front sharply diminished as UN forces either maintained or slightly adjusted their positions and patrolled with scattered enemy contacts. In the central sector patrols destroyed several buildings in the vicinity of Kumsong. Medium bombers were intercepted on a bombing mission in northwest Korea, with a loss of two friendly aircraft.
Approved For Release 2094/09/03 : CIA-RDP91-r01ilZ.
camitidoodvms
25X1
Approved Fortibefease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01112W0200080001-2

SECRET
the chief targets for east coast surface vessels, while in the vest 14 troop and gun positions in the Han estuary were bombarded.
Air Other UN aircraft flew 984 effective sorties including 639 combat. The 89 close support missions were in the US I, IX, and X Corps zones. The Bomber Command flew 20 effective sorties; nine of these attacked the Taechon airfield. Other targets included marshalling yards at Chongjin and Kowon, and the barracks area at Kyomipo. In an attack against Namsi airfield US 8-29's were intercepted by MIG-15's with a loss of one B-29 and one F-84. There was no report of any damage to MIG's.
II,
Radio Peking announced on 22 October that the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers has decided to appoint General Pien Chang-wu as Chief delegate, replacing General Tung Hue. The broadcast added that the Korean People's Army is replacing General Chang pyong-san one of its three delegates, with General Kim Tae-sung.

General 8ituation
Truce Talks
1.
Approved ForRagease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011724S0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1980
24 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
In the Kumsong area, UN forces made limited attacks and returned to their former positions. In the east several small enemy probing at tacks were repulsed. Elsewhere along the front UN and enemy forces patrolled vigorously.
The main action in the US IX Corps zone centered around Kumsong where a US 24th Division tank patrol advanced one and one half miles along the road leading north out of the city and destroyed numerous enepy bunkers and supplies. The patrol later returned to its former position.
In the US X Corps zone, the ROK 8th and US 7th Divisions repulsed small enemy probing attacks. ROK I Corps units also repulsed a small probing attack.
Blockade ships along the east coast fired on communications lines and facilities, and troop areas. One of the ships along the west coast rescued a downed 8-29 airman.
Air Effective air sorties totalled 816 of which 440 were combat. The 94 close support missions were divided among the US I Corps (20). US IX
Naval air sorties totalled 80, including 16 in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. The only offensive air operations along the east coast were night heckler missions as Task Force 77 replenished. In the west, carrier aircraft searched for downed B-29 crews in the north Yellow Sea.

Amy
SECRET
Action in the US I Corps zone was limited to patrol clashes.
/0
TO Till:,
Trisc.i.
DOCUMENT% o lap.
., A . HPSVOOBJECTION ICATION Or DSCTJASIF

4 49749
THIS No
Approved ForRelease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117 2R.000203.0130011172

'
25X1
Approved Forcle lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01171M00200080001-2

SECRET
Corps (40) and US x Corps (34). Medium bombers flew 19 effective sorties, eight of them against the recently constructed Namsi airfield while the others were divided among the Kyomipo barracks area, the Paulo, Kunu-ri and Hamhung marshalling yards and the Yong-ni airfield. Far East Air Force claimed two MIG-15's destroyed, one probably destroyed and eight damaged. A preliminary report indicated that B-29's were again intercepted hy MIG's while on a mission to Sunchon railroad by-pass with a loss of one B-29 and two F-861s. Preliminary claims report one MIG destroyed, one probably destroyed, and one damaged.
II,
General Situation

SECRET
Approved For Reieese 2004/09103 : ClA-RDP91T01172RW200080001-2

SECRET
OCI
1981
25 Ootober 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces continued their limited-objective attacks on the westcentral front. Elsewhere patrols encountered scattered enemy groups of platoon to company strength and other units repulsed several small probing attacks,
US I Corps patrols encountered scattered enemy groups of company strength or less and repulsed several light probes. One unit of the US 1st Cavalry Division advanced slightly, forcing an enemy platoon to withdraw, then received a counterattack by undetermined numbers of enemy troops and withdrew. A tank patrol of the US 24th Division, in the US II Corps zone, advanced to Kumsong Again and destroyed 28 occupied bunkers, then returned to its unit. This division and the ROK 6th Division continued their limited-objective attacks against enemy units of compagy strength in the area below and to the east of Kumsong. Activity in the US X Corps was general1y limited to patrol clashes and to small enemy probes which were repulsed. A minor attack by an element of the ROK 8th Division successfully captured an area west of "Heartbreak Ridge" against an enemy platoon. In the ROK I Corps zone only small patrol clashes were reported.
UN carrier aircraft flew 211 sorties. Air and surface craft successfully carried out interdictory and harassing missions on both coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 796 sorties including 419 combat, Medium bombers attacked Sunchon railroad bridge with Excellent results, and the Hungnam barracks area with good results.
.)A

Army
Air
SECRET
1
THEC.T.A.HASNOODTTCT1
TO THE DECTASSIF
THIS DOCLT:4--T
IOATION
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 T01171200020 g880d6A21978

No.
2 5X1
Approved For !Weise 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91701172wee00080001-2

SECRET
In an encounter between 31 Sabres and over 50 11I0-151s, one MIG was damaged.
A total of 3332 vehicles was Bighted with 2302 moving south.
General Situation
Political
In the RepUblic of Korea the Rhee-dominated political party -the Republican People's Political Association -- recently lost its.: _Majority in the National Assembly when it Was reduced.to 86 seats.
Shortage of food, clothing and shelter are reportedly acute Seoul and the surrounding areas. While the food ration fills only percent of the present minimum needs of this area, the 3.3 million lation is being increased daily by an estimated 1500 refugees from areas.

Sociological
SECRET
in 30 popuother
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RPP911-01172R000200080001-2
Approved Forge, Lease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117306.0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

Ia
Military Situation
Highlights Action along the front varied, with UN troops on the western front repulsing a company strength attack while westcentral sector units Con tinued launching limitedobjective attacks. Elsewhere minor patrol
clashes
rere reported.
In the US I Corps zone, all divisions maintained positions, patrolled and reported contacts with enemy groups up to company strength. The US 1st Cavalry Division patrol base repulsed a probing attack by an enemy company, which was preceded by an artillery preparation of an estimated 150 rounds. The ROK 9th Division also repulsed probing attacks. In the US IX Corps zone, troops of the US 24th and RON 6th Divisions in the area southeast of Kumsong continued their limitedobjective attacks, with minor progress reported.. Tank patrols of the US 25th Division fired on units of undetermined strength 2000 to 3000 yards to the front of their' positions and patrolled. For the fourth consecutive day action in the US X Corps zone was limited to patrol clashes anOsmall enemy probing attacks, all of which were repulsed. The ROK I Corps reported only scattered patrol contacts.
Combined enemy ground strength in North lorea is now estimated at 616,000 (a decrease of 22,000 because of casualties). Of these troops, 234,000 are in the combat zone and 545,000 in the rear areas.
Naval air'sorties totalled 236, including 66 in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. Air and surface craft carried out bombing runs and bombardments of communications targets along both coasts.

Navy
SECRET
fl
7/17
THE C. T.A. RAS RO OB,TSCTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
TEL
25X1 25X1
D07 ISHII.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117/2 'i 0020 Ay' 01-2
Approved Fora lease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T0117110600200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
'
UN land-based aircraft flew 1061 sorties including 694 combat. Fifteen medium bombers were despatched against a variety of small targets including troop concentrations,
II,
General Situation
Cease-fire Talks

SECRET
According to news sources, the Communists have modified their previous rigid stand on the 38th Parallel (as a cease-fire line). The new Communist proposal would include UN withdrawal 15 miles or more from the present battle line in return for the Communist cession of the in,defensible Ongjin peninsula northwest of Seoul.
25X1
2 Approved For Release 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved Forliseease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 T011720600200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 1983
25X1
27 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The US lst Cavalry Division was the most active unit in the US I Corps zone; the division drove back a battalion size counterattack some ten miles west of Chorwon and at the same time continued its advance.
size attack'. US 24th Division tank patrols were active in the Kumsong area. The ROK 6th Division continued its assault.
In the US X Corps zone several small enemy attacks were repulsed. by ROK 8th Division troops. ROK I Corps units maintained positions and reported no change:
UN carrier aircraft flew 258 sorties. Air and surface craft along both coasts successfully carried out intedictory and harassing missions against numerous coastal targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,00 sorties including 651 oombat. Medium bombers flew 11 sorties. Night attacks were made on marshalling yards as well as Namsi and Taechon airfields; results were not reported.
SECRET

&MX
Navy
The principal action again centered in the area just east of Kumsong where UN units continued limited objective attacks. In the western sector, troops of the US I Corps repulsed a battalion size assault while continuing to advance.
In the US IX Corps zone, US 25th Division units repelled a company
Air
"
:
25X1
:EN T
Om
DOC I
Approved For Release 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T0117212R99i 000800C 12
25X1
Approved Focaslease2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117Q060200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Allight of eight 8729's escorted by 80 Sabres was attacked by damaged. 115 MIG-15's near Sinanju. One B-29 and eight enemy jets were
A total of 2,005 Vehicles was sighted with 1,348 moving south.
U.
General Situation

SECRET
25X1
Approved For Reese 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T011721:18.1200080001-2

sEcRET OCI 1984 29 October 1951
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights,
The east-central front was the scene of the heaviest action as US IX Corps tanks destroyed 80 bunkers. UN forces made a successful limited attack in the US X Corps Zone.
In the US IX Corps zone, tanks of the US 24th Division advanced in the Kumsong area and destroyed 80 bombers. East of the city the ROK 6th Division was attacked several times by enemy forces of up to battalion strength. In the mountains east of Kumsong both the KOK 8th and ROK 3rd Divisions of the US X Corps staged successful limited-objective attacks. The enemy made several small probing attacks throughout the corps zone but these were all repulsed. On1y light patrol contacts were reported by HU I Corps units,
A total of 1012 effective sorties was flown by other UN aircraft, of which 682 were combat. Of 111 close support missions, 63 were in the US X Corps zone and the rest in the vs I and IX Corps zones. Aircraft of the Far 'East Bomber Command flew 21 effective sorties, Targets included
SECRET
Naval air sorties totalled 212, including 12 in close support of the,US lat Marine Division. Carrier-based planes on the east coast destroyed 40 percent of the munitions factory center at SOkyon, and also attacked three eneoy troop concentrations. Blockade ships bombarded bridges, rail and highway areas, a barracks, and troop positions.

ALSE
In the US I Corps zone action was limited to light patrol contacts.
T.1
-1:E
A . PA^ r0 Op.TrOrrrl
DGC:iiit11457.
25X1 25X1
SillS
Approved ForRelease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP911011ff
080001-2
0 ta/N yryz.t
Approved ForQp+ease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011710860200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
the Songchon railroad by-pass bridge, the Hungnam industrial area, the Sinmak, Chinnampo and Hukkyo-ri marshalling yards, and the Wariwon number three airfield. Air sightings for the day totalled 5,151 vehicles, a new record high; 3,718 of these were moving south.
II.
General Situation
Political

SECRET
A member of the North Korean "People's Assembly" is reported to :have expressed the view that former South Korean members of the Korean Labor Party (Communist), have "lost enthusiasm to carry on the work." Allegedly this loss of interest is due to a "lack of equality" in positions, no "definite promise of a future," and a disproportionate share of hazardous assignments.
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP911-01172R000200080001-2
Approved Fosigplease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91T0117454680200080001-2

SECRET OCI 1985
30 October 1951
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces generally maintained positions and repulsed several attacks by enemy groups from squad to battalion strength while patrols made scattered enemy contacts. UN troops in the east-central sector continued to make limited-objective attacks.
US I Corps elements maintained positions as patrols made light and scattered enemy contacts. In the US IX Corps zone, the ROK 6th Division repulsed attacks by enemy units of company strength. Elsewhere, patrols encountered scattered groups of platoon to company size. Patrols of the ROK 3rd Division in the US X Corps zone continued their limited-objective attacks against a stubbornly resisting enemy and little progress was reported. Otherwise the recent pattern of small enemy probes and patrol skirmishes continued. Activity in the east coast area was generally characterized by patrol clashes, although a small probing attack was repulsed by ROK Capital Division troops.
UN carrier aircraft flew 131 sorties. Banshee and Panther aircraft from ships off the east coast carried out a sweep across North Korea to Sinanju but encountered no enemy aircraft. Surface vessels attacked communications targets along both coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1147 sorties including 766 combat. Medium bombers flew 11 night sorties, attacking Namsi airfield and marshalling yards with unreported results.
SECRET

Army
Air
23' THEC.I.A. HASNOOBJECTION

TO THEDECLASSIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.
25X1
25X1
4, 3 Approved For Release 2004/09103 : ClA-RDP91T01172141;500 20008000' 2
4V bia
Approved For %lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721Q14200080001-2
25X1
General Situation Sociological South Korean Defense Minister Li Ki Poong announced on 29 October that the new conscription system has been approved by the State Council and the National Assembly. Under the new regulations all males from 19 to 26 years of age will be drafted for military service "regardless of occupation or public status." Heretofore exceptions have been made for public servants, policemen, firemen and science and engineering students. Li said that the ROK must build up forces powerful enough to defend South Korea alone.
According to a 30 October dispatch from Central News, Tokyo, Peking last night revealed that Teng Hwa and Chen Keng are presently in North Korea serving as deputy commanders of the Chinese Communist Volun teer Army under Peng Tehhuai. This is the first time that the deputy commanders' names have been officially mentioned in Communist reports.

Political
25X1
2
Approved Fosjaglease 2004/09/gidatRDP91T01179000200080001.2
-Lica 1986
25X1
31 October 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The principal action took place in the area just east of "Heart break Ridge" where UN units were unsuccessful in an attempt to seize some high ground.
Army
In the US IX Corps zone, ROK 6th DiVision units repulsed a company sized attack in the mountains east of Kumsong. Other corps units were en gaged in patrol clashes. The US 7th Division af the US X Corps repulsed two small probing : attacks. The ROK 3rd Division was unable to make any progress in an at tack four miles east of Heartbreak Ridge. Action in the ROK I Corps zone was limited to patrolling.
Naval air sorties totalled 224. Air strikes along both coasts inflicted damage on troop and Communications facilities. Surface vessels successfully bombarded various targets of military significance.
US I Corps bat. The 118 close support missions were divided as followsg 4. Medium bombers 27; US IX Corps 62; BOK I Corps 25; US X Corps flew 15 sorties against targets which included Saamchan airfield, Kyomipo
barracks and Kunuri and Maengjungdong marshalling yards,
II.

The US I Corps reported only patrol clashes.
Eam
Air
Landbased aircraft flew 1005 effective sorties including 664 com
General Situation
Iruce Talks
According to US news sources, a new Communist proposal for a truce
.
SECRET
HE C. I.A..HAS
TO TH i)2.CLASSIFICATI0N OF
25X1
25X1
THIS DOCUNIECT. 1 Approved For Release 2004/09/01: ClA-RDP91T0117313 002000800fLyz
Approved Fonaease2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91TO 172R,68200080001-2
25X1
line in Korea, described as their "last and best" offer, nearly parallels the UNIs demands. Differences between the UN and the Communist offer are reported to be the Communist desire to keep Kaesong and a two to three mile difference in the location of the battle line. A DiN liaison officer is quoted as saying that the new offer brings the two sides "closer to a solution of the buffer zone issue" than at any time since the talks started. (It may be recalled that the line of demarcation was point two on a five-point agenda.)

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved Fonggjease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172p860200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 2695
25X1
I November 1951

I.
.:Military Situation
Highlights Action along the front was generally limited to patrol clashes in which squad to regiment strength enemy'units ware encountered. UN patrols Enemy probing attacks in all sectors were all returned to their lines. readily repulsed.
'
Units of the US I'Corps generally maintained positions and patrolled with scattered enemy contact.
.
In the US IX Corps zone patrols encountered elements of squad to regiment strength, while units repulsed several small probing attacks and maintained or adjusted positions.
Activity in the US X Corps zone was characterized by patrol clashes In the and enemy attacks of company strength or less Which were repulsed. araa of the US 1st Marine Division 250 to 300 rounds of mortar and artil lery fire fell. On the east coaet, in the ROK I Corps zone, three company strength night-attacks were repulsed.
UN carrier aircraft flew 66 missions. Off the east coast Task Force 77 replenished, and only a few night missions Were flown. Vehicles in the Wonsan area were attacked with unreported results. Aircraft in the west coast area attacked communications targets.
Surface craft off both coasts were active in bombarding coastal targets and patrolling.
UN landbased aircraft flew 577 sorties including 283 coMbat. Medium bombers flew 23 sorties, of which four were directed at Namsi airfield with unreported results.
II.

,Air
General Situation
SECRET

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
on
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117

No
1-2
JUN
we
Approved Fonagloase 2004/09103 : ClATRIDP91T011791Bee0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 2696
1
2 5X1
2 November
1951
DAILY
Military Situation
KOREAN BULLETIN
Highlights UN forces maintained-their positions, repulsed several amall probing attacks, and continued to patrol vigorously as action along the front quieted down.
In the US I Corps zone, the British 1st Commonwealth and US 1st Cavalry Divisions repulsed probing attacks of up to platoon strength. US 24th Division tank patrols were active in the US IX Corps zone. Several small enegy probing attacks of company strength were repulsed by other corps units.
In the US X Corps zone, a UN tank patrol from the US 7th Division carried out a reconnaissance in force.
The ROK I Corps reported only patrol action.
Of these troops, 230,000 are estimated to be in the combat zone,
UN carrier aircraft flew 129 sorties. Aircraft along both coasts successfully attacked communications targets. Surface craft off the east coast near Chongjin bombarded several targets including a rayon factory, causing a large green explosion.

Latest estimates of enemy strength are as follows; Chinese Communist North Korean 385,000 233.000
618,000
Arm"
Navy
SECRET
7)1?
ITHE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
25)(1
2 5X 1
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91TOft
Approved Foci& lease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01174PR/00200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 642 sorties including 295 combat. Medium bombers flew 13 night missions against various targets including North Korean airfields. Of 1742 vehicles sighted, 1486 were moving south.
II.
General Situation Cease-fire
A 2 November Peiping broadcast complains that UN action along the Sachon river near the Panmunjom conference site caused "the din of artillery fire" to be heard. This gives rise to a general charge of military provocation by South Korean troops and a statement that this state of affairs must arouse public attention. UN cease-fire demands for the Kaesong area are characterized by the broadcast as "preposterous."

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved For"2alease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172a000200080001-2

SECRET OCI 2697
25X1
3 November 1961
DAILY KOREAN BULiETIN

I.
Military Situation
Highlights Action was characterized by patrol clashes and numerous soattered enemy attacks. UN units encountered enemy groups of up to battalion strength.
Activity in the US I Corps,zone was highlighted by a series of battalion size enemy attacks against positions occupied by troops of the 1st Commonwealth Division. Elsewhere only patrol contact was reported. A series of enemy attacks from groups of up to battalion strength \ were thrown back in the US IX Corps zone by the ROK 6th Division. The remaining units in the corps made light patrol contacts.
In the US X Corps zone, the pattern of patrol clashes and unsuccessful enemy probing attacks, which has been prevalent recently, continued. Enemy groups of up to battalion size were encountered by patrols end defensive forces from all divisions in this corps. All attacks were repulsed and all patrols returned successfully to friendly lines.
Activity in the ROK I Corps zone was limited to minor patrol skirmishes.
UN naval aircraft flew 121 sorties. Planes from carriers off the east coast attacked bridges, buildings,railroad oars and other targets the west, in the vicinities of Pukchon, Hamhung, Wonsan and Yengdok. near Yonan, aircraft destroyed,or damaged several buildings and attacked troop concentrations. Surface vessels bombarded bridges, railway and highway area, gun positions and other targets from Chongjin to Wonsan. Surface vessels in the vast bombarded troop concentrations.
;
25X1
1

Army
Navy
SECRET
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OTLTECTION
THISD=110W.
Approved ForRelease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0104R000200 80001-2_
Approved Focaskrase 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01111411:1800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
Land-based UN aircraft flew 1028 sorties, including 623 combat. The combat sorties included 45 close support, 404 armed reconnaissance and 66 night intruder missions. Medium bombers, flying 16 sorties, attacked marshalling yards at Sinmak and Hukkyo-ri, airfields at Sarin and Kang-dongi the by-piss bridge at Sinanju and other targets. In seven sightings of MIG-15's, the largest group of enemy aircraft numbered 79. In three minor engsgements following the sightings, three MIG-15's wore damaged.
A 31 Ootober North Korean broadcast gives some indication of the The deterioration of the financial structure of the North Korean regime. broadcast, beginning with praise for the "oonsolidation" of the State's finances, shows its hand later by detailing steps to be.taken in further "bolstering discipline in finanoes." Tax collectors are instructed to "fulfill their duties faithfully," since it will be impossible to "meet ths demands of the fighting front" if taxes are not met. All persons handling,expenditure of money are warned to "show devotion to their duties and to look for any irregular outlay of funds" or overspending. The broadcast concludes with a pessimistic statement that "at a time when the war has made everything difficult and complicated, it is essential to maintain our discipline in finance at a high level."

Economic
SECRET
General Situation
25X1
2
Approved Forigkease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP917011732ile0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
XI 2698
5 November
1951

I.
enemy Imjin seven by an
Units of the 1st Commonwealth Division repulsed an attack by an division supported by 22 tanks and four self-propelled guns on the River front. The attack lasted 10 hours. UN aircraft destroyed enemy armed vehicles. US 1st Cavalry units repulsed a night attack undetermined number of enemy troops.
The US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions of the US IX Corps repulsed several enemy attacks of up to company strength.
US X and ROK I Corps units reported only patrol clashes and small enemy probing attacks. Navy
Naval air sorties totalled 208. In offensive air operations along the east coast, buildings, railroad cars, vehicles and a bulldozer were destroyed. Similar targets were destroyed along the west coast. A serious F9F landing accident occurred on the carrier Antietam when the hook failed to engage and the plane went through the barriers. Two F9F aircraft were jettisoned, one badly damaged, and another suffered minor damage. Four personnel are dead, one critically injured, and nine suffered lesser injuries.
Surface vessels off both coasts fired with success on various coastal targets and conducted normal patrols.
25X1
1

LEM
SECRET
I I
The most important development was the reappearance after many months of enemy armor in considerable strength. UN forces in the western sector repulsed an attack by an estimated enemy division supported by tanks and self-propelled guns.
THE C.I.A.IuSNOOBJECTION TO THEDECLASSIFICATION OV

THIS DOCUMENT.
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91Td11472R000: Manta 478
25X 1
Approved For Rojetse 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011722041200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air In air battles in the Sinanju area, one M1G was destroyed and another probably destroyed when 34 F-85's engaged elements of an observed 50 MIG's. In another engagement, eight of an observed 20 MIG's attacked 31 F-80's with no damage reported. Land-based UN aircraft flew 856 effective sorties of which 541 were combat. Medium bombers flew 11 effective sorties, attacking Namsi airfield, Hungnam wmmunition dump, and the Maengjung-dong and Chongju marshalling yards.
A Peiping broadcast of 4 November states categorically that Communist forces must retain the city of Kaesong in any cease-fire line. The broadcast threatens that "the responsibility for stalling the armistice negotiations" will be on UN shoulders if they "stubbornly persist" in their demands for Kaesong
Political
The text of a meesage released on 4 November from North Korea's Premier Kim Il Sung to the "Chinese People's Political ConsUltative Conference" praises the assistance of the "Volunteers" in having "victoriously achieved the glorious mission assigned them..." Kim's message continues that "with the militant aid of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, the Korean People's Army will assuredly defend the unification and independence of their country..."

General Situation
Truce Talks
SECRET
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91101172R000200080001-2
Approved Forgelagfie 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117240941100080001-2

SECRET
25X1
'4111.4100r.
OCI 2699 6 November 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action flared along the western sector as the enethy in company to battalion strength launched a series of attacks against UN positions and forced a slight withdrawal. In the eastern sector UN elements conducted limited objective attacks and made minor gains.
In the US, I Corps zone, the 1st Commonwealth Division was engaged with undetermined numbers of enemy troop's on the high ground west of the Imjin River, while the US 1st Cavalry and ROK 9th Divisionsreceived a series of attacks by company and battalion size enemy units. These attacks, although repulsed, caused a slight withdrawal.
Infantry and tank patrols of the US 25th Division in the US IX Corps zone encountered scattered enemy groups. Other corps units repulsed several small probing attacks. Activity in the US X Corpe zone consisted of patrol clashes and minor enemy attacks in the central'portion of the zone, but the intensity of the action was light. Limited-objective attacks by troops of the ROK Capital Division in the ROK I Corps zone was only partially successful, as one regiment was compelled to withdraw. Minor patrol clashes occurred along the east
coast.
Incomplete returns show onli 34 naval air sorties. On the east coast surface craft shelled railroad targets near Songjin. On the weat coast surface craft attacked troop concentrations with unobserved results.
UN land-based aircraft flew 798 sorties including 488 combat. Medium bombers flew 12 sorties, attacking targets which included Taechon
SECRET

Ne,v
Air
51
THE C. T 4. F41 NO
eRrterrol
25X1 25X1
TO :vs DECLIECTFICAIrCU 0? THISDfl-
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : ClA-RDP91T0117000200081V0J-UN 197
Approved ForRialene 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP9170117213/49090080001-2

SEERRM
25X1
and Saacham airfields*
General Situation
Truce-talks
According to US press sources, Communist cease-fire negotiators on 6 November proposed that hostilities be ceased before agreement is reached on all points of the cease-fire agenda. UN spokesmen state that this is unacceptable in that it would give the enemy an opportunity to rebuild his forces in Korea without fear of UN action.
25X1
2

Approved For Rajoise 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T011721410000080001-2

SECRET
00I 2700 7 November 1951
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action was highlighted by a clash between tank patrols in the mountains near "Heartbreak Ridge." The action involved only a few tanks, but UN tank losses were greater than those of the enemy.
US I and IX Corps units reported only patrol contacts and minor probing attacks. In actions involving no stronger forces than platoons and companies, several local terrain features changed hands. For the most part, however, UN forces maintained their positions. A US 7th Division tank patrol in the US X Corps zone was involved in two engagements with an undetermined number of enemy tanks in the "Heartbreak Ridge" area. Six UN tanks were damaged by mines, mortar and antitank fire; one enemy tank was reportedly destroyed by UN gun fire. The enemy laid a heavy mortar barrage on the ROK Capital Division Positions in the ROK I Corps zone.
.
Naval air sorties totalled 72, all in the west, where aircraft destroyed buildings, railroad cars, and small vessels. Aircraft also provided air spot for naval gunfire targets for surface vessels, consist ing principally of railroad bridges, crossings, junctions, marshalling yards, and enemy troop poSitions and installations.
Landbased UN aircraft flew only 236 effective sorties, and only two close support sorties, because of bad weather. Medium bombers flew 10 effective sorties against a variety of targets including the Sinanju bypass bridge. In the vicinity of Sinanju 33 F-86's encountered more than 100 MIGIs but no claims of damage were reported.
SECRET
25X1
1

ALM
an
Air
cI
Yoe
A. HAS W.) C2 T7CTION
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002,0080001 -2 .1
v4
494
25X1
Approved For edalaase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172Q110200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
General Situation
Political
Ambassador Muccio reports making a call on President Rhee on 5 NoVember to advise him that the Communists have come far towards meeting UN demands for a demarcation line based on the line of contact and that world opinion could not support a continuing deadlock on this issue. Rhee thought it was stupid to expect the Communists to honor the settlement but he appeared resigned and did not make a scene Muceio warns, however, that he may still be difficult.
25X1
2

SDCRET
Among the points the ROK is likely to raise in the future, if the line becomes an armistice line, is that the Ongjin Peninsula and other ROK areas are being handed over to North Korean administration while those east coast North Korean areas south of the demarcation /ine cannot, under present UN resolutions, be turned over to ROK administration.
Approved Fosapidase 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01179R6e0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Hostile activity flared up in the Kumsong and Otan areas (westcentral and western sectors respectively) Where the enemy in platoon to battalion strength launched a series of attacks; all of which were reElsewhere on the front patrols made light scattered aontacts. pulsed.
In the tE. I Corps zone, the 1st Commonwaalth Division near Otan repulsed a tank-supported attack, while elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division advanced, forcing an enemy company to withdraw, but later received an attack from an enemy battalion and withdrew.
-
The main activity in the US IX Corps zone was a series of attacks, in platoon to company strength, in the Kumsong area, which were repulsed by the US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions. In the US X and ROK I Corps zones, UN divisions patrolled with scattered contacts and repulsed several probing attacks by small enemy groups usually of squad strength.
Poor weather reduced naval air activity as only 75 missions were Surface craft attacked communications targets on both coasts. flown.
UN land-based aircraft flew.767 sorties including 406 combat. Medium bombers flew 12 sorties including night attacks on Taechon and Saamcham. Results were unreported.

AEME
Air Of 1974 vehicles sighted, 1030 were moving south.
SECRET
A total of nearly 100 MIG-15ts were engaged in three separate Claims were one MIG destroyed and two damaged encounters by 42 Sabres. against one Sabre lost.
NASNOOBJECTION
1 Approved For Release 2004109/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172ROCIC 200080C 01-2
25X1 25X1
no.
Approved Forlapthase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117111116t0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Political
On 6 November, ROK observers including foreign office and legialative figures departed from Pusan for the UN General Assembly meeting.
The announced intention of the group, according to Prime Minister and chief observer Chang Myon, is to secure the unification of Korea, ROK admission to the UN, and UN assistance for Korean economic rehabilitation.
President Rhee listed another objective as being the "rapid liquidation of the Korean government's loan to the UN forces." Rhee also instructed the ROK observers to give "strong warning" against Japanese future ambitions in Korea.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : C2IA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved Focaplease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01174P0100200080001-2
25X1

I.
Activity across the front was limited to light scattered probing attacks and patrol clashes.
'In the US'I Corps zone elements of the lst Commonweeath Division repulsed two small probing attacks; elsewhere in the western sector patrols encountered small enemy groups. Elements of the LE 24th and ROK 6th Divisions in the US IX Corps A tankinfantry patrol dis zone also repulsed two probing attacks. persed an enemy platoon and destroyed 21 enemy bunkers. Other patrols made light contacts. Activity in the US X and ROK I Corpazones was again limited to patrol clashes and minor probing attacks, as all UN units maintained their positions. Latest estimates of eneRy strength are as follows:
Naval air sorties totalled 218 of which 11 were in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. Carrier based aircraft destroyed bridges, buildings, and two tunnels: and cut 53 railroad tracks.
Surface vessels bombarded eight railhighway areas near Chongjin and started large fires in the industrial area in the vicinity of Sondin.

Chinese Communist North Korean
378,000 232,000 610,000
Of these troops, 219,000 are in the combat zone.
NE.a
SECRET
/9
THE
TO T THIS DOCIMIERE:8
25)(1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721*10
4 JO 008000,1C)S28
25X1
IN%
Approved Foca* lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011749/8100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
Other UN aircraft flew 1,152 effective sorties of which 737 were combat. The 123 close support missions were divided as follows: US I Corps, 33; US IX Corps, 41; US X Corps 45; ROK I Corps, 4. Medium bombers flew 19 effective sorties against the Millgae-ri, Sariwon and Sungan-dong marshalling yards, as well as the Taechon and Namsi airfields. About 120 MIG's were sighted and in.several encounters at least three were destroyed and four damaged.
II.
General Situation
The ROK delegate, General Yi Ryong-kun, ie reported by the Korean press to have stated that "even if the question of determining a truce ' line is settled; it will net necesearily bring about optimistic prospects" The general reportedly noted that the question of exfor the conference change of prisoners would be a difficult one. The Peiping radio on 8 November announced the Communist plan for "initially fixing" a military demarcation line along the present line of contact that can be adjusted by mutual agreement if further major changes occur.
-Political:
According to Korean press sources, ever 1,000 Chinese CommUnist prisoners in the Pusan area addressed a petition written in "blood" to Generalisamo Chiang Kai-shek asking for enrollMent in the Nationalist Army.
25X1

' Truce Talks
SECRET
2 Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200080001-2
Approved Foci& lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117a/800200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 2703
25X1
10 NeveMber 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
In the western sector, UN patrols of the US I Corps met enethy groups of up to battalion strength, and, after light patrol olashes, returned to friendly lines. US 1st Cavalry Division positions receivedNIP rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire.
In the US IX Corps zone, outpost elements of the ROK 2nd Division in the west-central sector were attacked by enemy forces of company to battalion strength, and withdrew to the Division's MIR. Elements of the ROK 6th Division repulsed attacks by compe.ny strength enemy units, Light scattered patrol contacts occurredin other parts of the Corps
zone.
Pstrol clashes and minor enemy probing attacks occurred in the US X and ROK I Corps zones. (Latest press reports state that the US lst Marine Division celebrated the 176th anniversary of the Corps by laying down a terrific barrage of fire on opposing enemy forces. Planes flew 83 close support missions after dropping leaflets informing the enemy forces that a "birthday oelebration" would be held).
Carrier-based aircraft flew 175 sorties, including eight close support missions for the US let MSrine Division. Other offensive missions attacked targets in the vioinities of Chongjin, Kilchu, Songjin, Hamhung, and Wonsan. No sorties were flown in the west.

Army
Enemy forces met UN patrols in the western sector with battalion strength groupa, and attacked in the west central sector with company to battalion strength units.
Navy
Surface vessels bombarded numerous targets along both west and

SECRET
I I
3C
N
THE C. I . A. 1- AS YO tr 'PT:ITTUN
THE:
DECLASSIFICL
,
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172RL
NUJ
42
N 1ft
Approved For grjease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117241fab200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
east ()oasts.
Air
Land-based aircraft flew 1,082 sorties, including 714 combat missions. Ground troops were provided 128 Close support missions. Armed reconnaissance airoraft flew 397 missions; Medium bombers flew 18 eorties, attacking the Hungnam barracks area, the Kowon and the KWangju marshalling yards, and the Taechon airfield. Leaflets were dropped in 16 North Korean oitiee.
11.
Chinese Communist radio broadcasts continue to stand firm on the retention of Kaesong by the enemy forces. Again the UN is accused of leading "the armistice into a oomplete deadlock...in their preposterous demand for seizing Eaesong."
A 9November Peiping broadcast compares the "dirty summer uniforms" of recently captured CS troops with the "brand new cotton padded uniforms, leather boots, and woolen caps" of the Communist troope. One US PM is quoted as saying this company has been reduced to half strength and that "terrible winter is coming again."

General Situation
Truoe Talks
Propaganda
SECRET
25X1
Approved Fongelease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172W600200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Ground activity was limited to patrolling and small eneRy probing Poor weather severely limited air operations. attacks.
The only noteworthy action in the US I Corps zone occurred when ROK 9th Division troops repulsed a platoon size probing attack five miles west of Chorwon. All units patrolled. US IX and X Corps and ROK I Corps units reported only small enemy probing attacks and patrol clashes,
Naval air sorties totalled 51. In offensive air operations along the east coast, aircraft cut five railroad tracks and damaged ten railroad cars. Poor weather hampered air activity. Surface vessels bombarded bridges, rail-highway areas, warehouses, and troop areas, starting several fires.
Medium bombers flew 13 effective sorties. Among the targets were Saamcham and Namsi airfields, and the Hungnam Chemical plant. A conventional enemy aircraft made a firing pass on a B-26 which evaded by performing a maximum performance climbing turn into the overcast sky. Tlim rapidly firing nose guns were observed by the B-26 crew.
Land-based UN aircraft flew a total of 239 sorties of which 82 were combat. Ten close support missions were flown.

Navy
Air SECRET
Ara
25X1
1
JEC:i 0.N
FICA T ION OF
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000 .611:611
Approved Fosage lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01174864800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Political
Ambassador MUccio comments that the recent news release in Taipei of a petition signed by pro-Nationalist prisoners of war in South Korea may indicate increasing Nationalist efforts to influence foreign opinion relative to the disposition of Chinese prisoners of war. The news has been put out at a time when truce talks possibly are nearing the discussion of prisoner of war exchange. The Nationalist line is that the majority of prisoners are proNationalist because of former service in the Nationalist Army and only forced involuntary service in the Communist army. Actually, according to a State Department interrogation team, only one fourth of the prisoners of war are reluctant to return to Communist hands and possibly 15 percent are genuinely pro-Nationalist.

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved Fosaplease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01174a100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
OCI 2705
14 November 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy activity was limited to scattered patrol contacts and several small probing attacks.
In the US I Corps zone, outpost elements of the ROK 1st and US lst Cavalry Divisions repulsed company-strength probing attacks. The enemy probed in squad strength in the US IX Corps zone against elements of the US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions and was repulsed. A tankinfantry patrol of the US 24th Division destroyed 12 enemy bunkers. Other patrols in this corps engaged scattered groups of platoon to company strength. Units of the US X Corps maintained positions and patrolled, with only light contact reported. The ROK Capital Division of the ROK I Corps repulsed attacks by an undetermined number of enemy troops in the Kosong area.
UN carrier aircraft flew 219 sorties. Air and surface craft on both coasts successfully attacked communications targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 919 sorties, including 601 combat missions. Seventeen medium bombers attacked various targets, including troop concentrations and Taechon and Namsi airfields. Results were unreported. No enemy jets were sighted,

It_tu
Air
SECRET
OBJECTION DECTIASSIFICATION Or TO THE THIS DOCUMENT.

F E C C.I.A. HAStiO
1 No Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R00 200080CLI-.44"1-2
25X1 25X1
Approved For Relate 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721W00080001-2

SECRZE
25X1
IL,
General Situation
Truce Talks
A 14 November radio broadcast from Peiping denies UN assertions that the establishment of a cease-fire line now would result in a de facto ceasefire. The broadcast cites the provision in the previous Communist offers that the designated line be "appropriately amended according to changes" in the battle line at the time the final agenda is agreed upon.
25X1

SECRET
2
Approved FoRaelease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T011710460200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
DAILY KOREAN BUL.LETIN

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The pattern of action has remained unchanged with only small enemy probing attacks and scattered patrol clashes reported.
A corrected version of yesterday's probing attack in company strength against Two enemy the US 1st Cavalry Division of the US .I Corps has been received. companies supported by 7 to 10 tanks attacked a Thai Battalion outpost. The UN unit withdrew to the main line of resistance. Other corps units sighted several tanks or selfpropelled guns, but actual contacts were limited to patrol clashes.
In the US IX Corps zone ROK
The US X and ROK I Corps reported only patrol action.
Naval air sorties totalled 202, including 23 in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. Aircraft destroyed bridges, buildings, gun positions, railroad cars, vehicles, and boats in offensive air operations along both coasts. Surface vessels bombarded various coastal targets of military significance with moderate success. Air
Landbased UN aircraft flew 889 effective sorties of which 499 were combat. There were 137 close support missions flown, of which 23 were for the US I Corps, 48 for the US IX Corps, 55 for the US X Corps, and 11 for the ROK I Corps. Medium bombers flew 12 effective sorties against targets which included Kyotipo steel mill and the Taechon and Namsi airfields. No air operations involving jet aircraft were reported.
II.
SECRET
.7)

AEME
6th
Division units repulsed a platoonsized probe.
Navy
THEC.I.A. HAS NO OB1ECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
Approved ForRelease2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117201:2000200081N1Mg
25X1 25X1
Approved Foaaalease 2004(09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117101/00200080001-i

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
ROE unite of the US X Corps were attacked by an enemy battalion in the area northwest of the sPunchbowl." Other units reported only patrol clashes.
Action in the zones of the US I and IX Corps was limited to scattered patrol contacts and small enemy probing attadks. UN forces regrouped.
In the US X Corpe zone, ROK 3rd Division units' sustained a two-pronged attack by en enemy battalion in the-area northwest of the sPunchbowls (15 miles northeast of Hwachon Reservoir),
The ROK I Corps reported only scattered patrol contacts.
Latest estimates of enemy strength in Korea are as follows; Chinese Communists North Koreans
370,000 237,000
Of these troops, 222,000 are in the cambat zone.
Owing to bad Weather and replenishing, naval aircraft flew only 43 sorties. On night'heckler missions; aircraft attacked vehicles and buildings in the Hamhung and Wonsan areas. Surface vessels off both coasts bombarded rail and highway areas, bridges, warehouses, troop and gun positions, and tither targets along both coasts.

Air
-
'
Un land-based aircraft flew 252 sorties including 78 cothat. Medium bombers flew 15 sorties, attacking Taedhon and Namsi airfields, the Hoeyang highWay bridge, and the Hungnam storage area.
II.
General Situation
No significant reports have been received during the past
SPORES'
24 hours. 9!
Approved.For Re leas 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91TO 1172R90249.11M04

No
ME C.I.A. PAS NO OFJECTION IQ ' 7:1):.,:fI;ASSIFICE..TION OF
25X1
25X1
biliii1
Approved For cieitase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117211000200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy forces of company to battalion strength in the western sector launched a series of attacks which Were repulsed. In the east central sector battalion strength activity continued.
In the US I Corps zone, positions of the 18t Commonwealth Division cane under enemy artillery and mortar fire totalling 565 rounds. Also in the western sector, enemy attacks of company and battalion strength.caused outpost elements of the US lst Cavalry and ROA 9th Divisions to.withdraW to the main line of resistance, but the attacks were then repulsed without loss of main line of resistance positions. Other ICorps units made scattered patrol contacts with enemy groups. In the US IX Corps zone, the US 24th and 25th Divisions and the ROK 2nd Die vision repulsed minor enemy attacks of squad to less than company strength. The ROK 6th Division launched an attack in the eastern part of the zone, and at last report was progressing against enemy groups of undetermined strength. In the ROK 3rd Division area of the US1X Corps zone, battalion strength ace tivity continued. Elsewhere in the zone, action was limited to patrol clashes. No enemy activity was reported in the ROK I Corps zone.
Surface vessels off the east coast bombarded railroad tracks and tunnels, marshalling yards, bridges, troop positions, and other targets along.the coast from Songjin toWonsan. In the west, surface vessels bombarded 15 troop positions and also provided support for a guerrilla raid in the vicinity of Haeju.
SECRET
.
Naval aircraft; flying 162 sorties, attacked numerous military targets at Chongjin, Haps% Songjin, Tanchon and Sinpo in the east, and at Chinnampo, Sariwon, Changyon, Ongjin, and Yonan in the west.

Navy
1.
it))
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP911-01172R0 200080N

*Ps
oy saveii4lemsninxicarioN Wanan.
C
4_
am A.A. MS Mr OltircirrQs
,du,p
wz
25X1
/sin
25X1
Approved FoNiletease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01171/M/60200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air Other UN aircraft flew 873 sorties, including 502 combat, Close support sorMedium bombers ties totalled 45; the majority were flown in the western sector. Namsi airfields, the Hungnam storage area flew 13 Sorties, attacking Taechon and dropping leaflets over 17 North Korean and the Chinnampo marshalling yards, and cities,
II
General Situation
Propaganda
A 17 November Peiping broadcast labels Col. Henley's release on Communist atrocities as "shameless fabrication." Alleging that the release was designed to delay further the cease-fire talks, to arouse ."war hysteria," And to cover up ,"flagrant crimes":committed by the UN, the Communists claim that in fact UN bombers were responsible for the death of 62 UN prisoners.

swan
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R,QA0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy attacks in up to battalion strength.highlighted the activity along the front.
Ar4K
In the.US I Corps zone, the enemy continued his attack on hill 227 in the vicinity of Higong. The hill was regained by a 1st Ccamonwealth Division counterattack, US IX Corps units registered small gaina against decreasing resistance southeast of Kumsong. A battalion strength counterattack was repulsed by ROK 6th Division elements. There were only minor patrol contacts and small enemy probes in the US X Corps zone. In the ROK I Corps zone a reinforced enemy battalion forced outpost elements to withdraw from the area south of Kosong.
Because of transmission difficulties, no information on naval activities is available.
One MIG-15 was destroyed, one probably destroyed and six damaged out of an estimated total of 180 sighted or encountered.
Because of transmission difficulties, there is no additional information on air activities.
Landbased UN aircraft flew 1044 effective sorties of which 689 were combat. There were 106 close support missions of which 60 were in the US IX Corps sector, and 23 each in the US I and X Corps sectors.

Air
SECRET
THE .I.A. HAS 70 OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICMION 07 THIS DOM
25X1
25X1
a,
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172Rdill400080001
441/
.9 9
Approved Forattease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011791.980200089001-2

SECRET
25X1
General Situation
Economic
A recent US-UN field survey of food trops in South Korea reveals that available grains and vegetables will provide a minimum ration for the entire ROK pop:dation through June 1952, There will be a defioit of some 150,000 tons of graine to meet industrial needs of the RCA.
The,ROK Government's eitimate of the same grain crops, however, shows a much lower over-all yield with a deficit of nearly a million tons of grain,

SECRET
25X1
2
job
Approved ForSease2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91T0117261100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
DAILY
I.
KOREAN BULLETIN
Military Situation
Highlights
In the western sector UN forces repulsed several battalion-strength attacks. In the east, UN forces made a slight withdrawal before attacks by battalionStrength enemy groups.
nt
In the US I Corps zone, the ROK 1st and 1st CoMmonwealth Divisions repulsed enepy bettalion-size attacks. Additional contacts with small enemy groups were made by patrols of other divisions.

Air Economic
Tank and infantry patrols of the US 25th Division in the US IX Corps zone made scattered contacts with small enemy groups and all division artillery units fired:on numerous enemy platoon to company strength .groups and artillery positions. Only scattered patrol contacts were reported in the US X Corps zone, Three battalion-strength attacks against outpost elements of the ROK llth Division forced a slight withdrawal in the area south of Kosong in the ROK I Corps zone.
Owing to an incomplete transmission, the only report on naval activity is the nuMber of missions flown, 228.
UN land-based aircraft flew 944 sorties including 600 combat. Medium bombers flew 12 sorties against various rear area targets including Kyomipo steel mill and Hungnam dhemical works. Three Sabre jets strafed eight MI0-151s on the airfield at Uiju. were destroyed, one probably destroyed, and three damaged.
Four HMIs
General Situation
A 17 November North Korean broadcast complains bitterl

SECRET
about the laxity of
25X1
THE .I.A.HASNOOBJECT/ON
THISDOCUMENT1 Approved ForRelease 2004/09/01: CIA-RDP91T01172R0)0200080011112 No.
25X1
Approved Focaplease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011749400200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
labor discipline and the easygoing attitude of executives. The account concludes by.urging that "our labor discipline must be voluntary," but warns that any inimical tendency will be dealt with vigorously.
Political
A Chinese Nationalist news agency reports that South Korean police succeeded in breaking up a planned Communist uprising in Pusan timed to coincide with the 7 NoveMber celebration of the anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. Apparently the revolt was to be aided by Communist guerrillas in the Chirisan area about 100 miles west of Pusan.
25X1
2

StCRET
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91101172R000200080001-2
Approved For Regoalse 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172%,09200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I,
Military Situation
Highlights
The enemy launched company to battalion strength attacks against UN units. All of the attacks were repulsed.
The ROK 1st and 1st Commonwealth Divisions in the US I Corps zone repulsed several attacks by enemy units of battalion strength. Patrols made scattered con tacts with small groups. Elements of the ROK 9th Division in a limited objective attack engaged undetermined numbers of enemy forces.. In the US IX Corps zone, a series of company strength attacks were repulsed by the US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions. Infantry and tank patrols of the DS 25th Division made contact with the enemy in undetermined strength.
In the US X Corps zone, heavy enemy resistance met raids by US 7th Division troops in the area southwest of Tupo; the opposition, estimated at two battalions, prevented any significant advance. Elsewhere there were light patrol clashes and small enemy probing attacks.
In the ROK I Corps zone the major enemy activity was centered in a series of attacks in the area north of Oemyon which were repulsed by ROK llth Division elements.
Owing to transmission difficulties, there is no information available on naval activities.
Landbased UN aircraft flew 910 effective sorties of which 559 were combat. The 128 close support missions were divided as follows: 53 in the US X Corps zone, 41 in the US I Corps zone, 19 in the US IX Corps zone, 15 in the ROK I Corps zdne. Owing to tranmission difficulties no other information on air action is available,

an
Air
$ ECRET
THE C.I.A. f't, t.vd 623Ectroit

TO TIFY DZCT
=Is DOCUit
ftle
25X1
25X1
1
WO*
k8
001-2
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : ClA-RDP91T01172R0
Approved Forego lease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01170/600200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
General Situation
Political
Recent public comment in the Republic of Korea reflects a fear that the country is being slighted and will be left alone in the event of any regional defense pact of Pacific antiCommunist nations. Most of the statements might be interpreted as criticism of the US for not.concluding a mutual defense treaty with the ROK.
Propaganda

SECRET
A 20 November Peiping broadcast states that the UN is using Japanese pilots in the Korean air war and is "actively expanding" Japanese aircraft production. Allegedly, this is a result of the UNts shortage of manpower and "unexpectedly huge" loss of planes.
25X1
2
Approved FosAglease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP917011741440130200080001-2

SECRET
CCI 2712 23 November 1951
25X1

I,
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy activity was again limited to small unit attacks of platoon, compaay or undetermined size. These attacks occurred in the west-central, east-central and eastern sectors. tlsewhere only scattered patrol contactS were made.
In the US I Corps zone, scattered patrol contacts were made and squad to company strength probing thrusts were repulsed.
The US 24th and ROK 6th Divisions dispersed squad to company strength attacks in the US IX Corps zone. Activity in the US X Corps zone was again heaviest near Tupo, where two company and one platoon strength attacks were repulsed by the 45th Division. Enemy groups of up to battalion size clashed with patrols of all divisions in the corps area. Along the east coast, ROK I Corps action centered northeast of Oemjan, where a series of attacks were repulsed by ROK llth Division troops.
Combined energy ground strength in Korea this week remains at 607,000; of these troops 372,000 are Chinese and 2359000 are North Koreans, and 221,000 are in the combat zone.
UN carrier aircraft in the east flew 75 sorties, as bad weather halted naval air operations along the west coast. Surface craft off both coasts successfully bombarded communications targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 493 sorties including 229 combat, Medium bombers flying 19 sorties attacked various targets including Chinnampo marshalling yards.

AMIX
Na
Air
sy, ..77t
, A . 7 kr,
7.;) r3JY,TIOt
5)(1
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002 30080001
/9/b
25X1
Approved Fortaiiease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T011799960200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Economic
A Pyongyang broadcast of 20 November states that the people of the North Korean Provinces are exerting their utmost efforts to extend aid to war refugees. Homes, utensils and food are given to the refugees, who have lost their proper ties because of "American atrocities."
25X1
2
Approved Fosaplease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117.1(00200080001-2

ARNO.
SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
In the US I Corps zone, the enemy mounted several small unsuccessful probing attacks against the ROK 1st Division and the 1st Commonwealth Division. A unit of the US 3rd Division was forced off a hill ten miles west of Yonchon across the lmjin River:by'an attacking enemy battalion; counterattacking UN forces regained the hill. In addition, there were several other enemyattacks of up to battalion strength; but these were all repulsed. In the US IX Corps zone, enemy attacks caused two minor withdrawals by the "ROK 2nd Division; in one case, UN counterattacks regained the lost ground. Other carps units patrolled. In the US X Corps zone, one hill changed hands twice. At the end of the day ROK 7th Division troops held the ground. An enemy regimental attack one mile northmst of the Punchbowl was repulsed by US 7th Division units during the night.
,
ROK I Corps reported only patrol action,
Because of bad weather, UN naval aircraft flew only 29 sorties.
Surface Vesselsoff the west coast bombarded troop positions in the vicinity of the Han River and harassed troops on Kado Island. In the east, durfabe vessels attacked railroad bridges and junctions, warehouses, sJrflfluniti9fl dumps and other -coastal targets from Songjin to Wonsan.
SECRET
THfC. X.A.
Ar4 No OP TronON
Cir

Army
Navy
Enemy forces in the east-central sector were active as UN units repulsed a regiment strength attack. Several ether attacks were lauhched in the western sector; one of these forcedla UN unit off a hill, but this ground was later 'regained and all etherattacks repulsed.
THIS j):?1,7-P v-
No
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0
01-2
Approved Fosapiease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01174M160200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
Land-based UN aircraft flew 510 sorties, including 250 combat.

Armed reconnaissance and night intruder, aircraft, flying 194 sorties, cut and rail lines in 46 places, destroyed 80 vehicles, and attacked marshalling yards other targets.
Medium bombers flew 11 sorties, boMbing the Sinanju by-Pass railroad bridge, attacking targets in enemy front line areas, and dropping leaflets over eight North Korean cities.
II.
General Situation

SECRET
Of 2960 vehicles sighted, 1680 were moving south.
25X1
Approved Forlioltase 2004/09/31d CIA-RDP91T011724/900200080001-2
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Numerous small enemy attacks of up to company strength were repulsed all along the line.
The ROK 1st Division and the Commonwealth 1st Division both repulsed small enemy attacks of up to company strength in the US I Corps zone. US 3rd Division troops took three enemy self-propelled guns under artillery fire. In the US IX Corps zone, the enemy attacked and forced the withdrawal of several outposts of the US 25th Division and the'ROK 2nd Division. In some cases, UN counterattacks regained the lost positions. All these actions involved no more than one company on each side: There was similar action in the ROK 6th Division sector. In the US X Corps zone, ROK 7th Division and US 7th Division units repulsed attacks of up to company strength. There were two platoon-sized engagements in the RON I Corps zone.
Naval air sorties totalled 47. Moat flights were cancelled because of the weather. Surface vessels bombarded rail areas and bridges, troop areas and other coastal targets. Air
Iand-based UN aircraft flew 264 effective sorties of which 77 were coMbat. Only 14 close support missions were flown, nine of these for the US I Corps. There were 11 medium bomber sorties; the targets included Saamcham and Namsi airfields, and several marshalling yards.
II.
General Situation
Truce Talks
After dAy-long negotiations on 26 November at Panmunjom, All

SECRET
THE C
.
d and Communist
NO OBJECTION DfuLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUBENT. 1 Approved For !Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-FDP911101172F1000 000Amo $ JUN 1978
I
TO TH-1':
25X1
25X1
No.
Approved Foraetease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01174151860200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
negotiators reached agreement over the six remaining areas of differenee over a
, cease-fire line.
Political
The ROK Foreign Minister, according to a Chinese Nationalist news agency dispatch, claiMed on 25 N ovember that the Japanese had proposed to send troops to fight.Communism in Korea, The Foreign Minister said the proposal cannot be enter tained until agreement is reached in the current Japanese-South Korean negotiations A Japanese Government spokesman denied the report which, in on mutual problems. any case, appears unlikely in view of Premier Yoshida's recent comments to the Diet.. Economic AMbassador Muccio on 24 November reported that the inflationary trend in South Korea has definitely leveled off in the past two months, "Starvation" budgetary appropriations by the Republic of Korea for this fiscal year is the greatest contributory factor to the leveling off. MUccio added that the greatest inflationary pressure has come from the drawing of ROK currency by UN forces. From October to NoveMber, the price of commodities decreased 8.2% and skilled wages, which had doubled between April and October, decreased 3.3%.
25X1
2
Approved Fong" lease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP911011711800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Activity along the front was generally confined to probing attacks and patrol clashes. The largest enemy attacking groups were of company strength, but patrols encountered some groups up to battalion strength.
In the US I Corps zone, elements of the ROK 1st Division engaged enemy groups in a raiding attack. .Elsewhere minor enemy probing thrusts were repulsed and patrols made light enemy contacts. Patrols engaged scattered platoon to company strength enemy groups in the US IX Corps zone. Several small probing attacks were repulsed, including attacks by.two enemy companies in the ROK 6th Division sector. Company-strength enemy probing attacks occurred in the central portion of the US X Corps zone. In the ROK I Corps zone, platoon-sized attacks were repulsed in the Kosong Elsewhere patrol claahesoccurred.
area.
UN naval aircraft in the west flew 28 sorties against communications tarSurgets. Owing to bad weather, there was no east coast naval air activity. face craft on both coasts successfully attacked coastal targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 878 sorties including 549 combat. Medium bombers flew 11 sorties against various targets, including Namsi airfield and Sinanju marshalling yards. In a nunber of encounters between UN and enemy aircraft total claims were four MIG's destroyed, seven damaged, and two probably One F-80 Shooting Star was missing. damaged. General Situation No signifieant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.
SECRET
THE C.

Ts.n
Air
L.A. t.A. FASY0OBTE,T ON
TO TEE DECLASSIFICATION OF
THISDOCUMENT.
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002000800C1

No.
25X1 25X1
Approved For 'Wiese 2004/091043affitRDP91T01172RQ120200080001-2
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UNplanes,
With the exception of the east coast sector where no activity was reported, the enemy continued to probe the UN lines with scattered'platoon to ',Spay strength attacks. In several encounters with enemy planes, UN aircraft destroyed seven MIG-151s, probably destroyed two, and damaged eight, with the loss of two
In the LB I Corps zone, ROK 1st Division units repulsed a minor enemy probe. The 16 3rd Division received heavy mortar artillery and rocket fire.
Forward elements of the ROK 2nd and 6th Divisions of the US IX Corpe received minor enemy probes and one UN outpost was forced to withdraw. The US 24th and 25th Divisions reported only patrol clashes.
In the US X Corps zone the US lst Marine Division repulsed a small enemy probing attack. The ROK I Corps reported no enemy activity.
Naval air sorties totalled 136. Two MIGis made a firing pass on four UN aircraft with minor damage to one. All aircraft returned to their carrier. Aircraft and surface vessels attacked strategic communications targets.
Land-based UN aircraft flew 956 effective sorties including 593 combat. The majority of the 88 close support missions were floWn in the US IX and X Corps, zones. Armed reconnaissance aircraft inflicted 100 troop casualties and made 46 rail cuts from Sinanju to Pyongyang. Medium bomber sorties totalled 14, as three bombers attacked Namsi and Saamcham airfields again: The Sinanju east and west by-pase railroad bridges were also hit, as well as several marshalling yards. A total of 63 UN. jet aircraft (F-801s, 7-841s and 7-800) observed or encountered 182 MIG-1510. Enemy losses included seven MIG's destroyed, two probably destroyed and eight damaged. UN losses were one 7-80 and one F-86.
-

Army
&YE
Air
SECRET
THE 0.1 A. HAS NO OBJECTION
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : ClA-RDP91T0117211000200080
Approved Forigelhase2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011726000200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Truce Talks
In answer to a UN demand that inspection teams operating under point three of the cease-fire agenda have free access to all Korea, the Communists have broadcast a reply stating that such a proposal should be discussed at a "high level conference after the armistice." The Communists countered with a fivepoint version of what they think agenda point three should be.
SECRET
25X1
2
Approved For Sease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172M006200080001-2
SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The major activity along the front developed in the east-central and eastern sectors where enemy attacks ranging from regimental to platoon strength were reported.
There was only light scattered patrol contact in the US I Corps zone, In the US IX Corps zone the US 24th Division repulsed an attack by an enemy company.
An attack in regimental strength occurred in the central portion of the DS X Corps zone and was repulsed by the US 7th Division. Battalion and compagy size attacks were also.repulsed by this division. Numerous enemy targets were fired on by the US 7th Division artillery. Along the east coast the BOK llth Division of.the ROK I Corps repulsed several platoon and company strength attacks,
UN naval aircraft flew 226 sorties against communications targets along both coasts. Surface craft bombarded similar targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 956 sorties including 568 combat. Medium bombers flew 12 sorties attacking Uiju airfield and a nuMber of marshalling yards.
North of Anju 28 Sabres engaged 40 MIC-151s; three MIG's were destroyed and four damaged, and one Sabre was destroyed and one damaged.

Army Navy
Alt
SECRET
25X1
THEC.I.A.RAggdo8Js0
1
girDECT.AElyi
001-2
-
in
.
OATIONflgi,
Approved ForFtelease2004/09/03:CIA-RDP91T01172A90
25X1
Approved For*Please 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721960200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Political
President Rhea, in a recent exclusive interview, doubted chances for peace in Korea and stated that the Communists will use the "30-day armistice" for a military buildup. He made a special plea for unification of Korea, emphasizing the "monstrous" genocide in North Korea and the occupation of that area by the Chinese.
The EMbassy believes that Wheels latest statement is "for the record" only and that war weariness and a eense of inevitability are mitigating the previous general opposition throughout Korea to cease-fire.

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved For Rekeise 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172%01200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Minor enemy probing attacks and scattered patrol clashes occurred in all sectors.
In the US I Corps zone, ROK 1st Division units observed squad and platoon strength enemy groups at widely scattered points along the division front, and made minor patrol contact, US 3rd Division units dispersed an undetermined number of enemy troopo making a minor probing attack. Other units in the zone maintained positions0
Minor enemy attacks in the US IX Corps zone were made against the US 24th, ROK 2nd, and ROK 6th Divisions. Enemy forces Were dispersed.
Units in the US X Corps zone maintained positions and patrolled.
In the ROK I Corps zone, ROK llth Division units repulsed platoon strength attacks, Other units in the zone maintained or adjusted positions, The latest estimates of enemy streng th i n North K orea are as followss Chinese Communist North Korean
366,000 230,000
Of these troops, 213,000 are in the combat zone.
These figures reflect a decrease of 11,000 in enemy troop strength. ties were only partially offset by replacements,

Total
596,000
Casual
Navy
Naval aircraft flew 263 sorties, attacking various targets from Songjin to Yangdok in the east, and from Hanchon to Kumchon in the west.
Blockade ships along both coasts bombarded a variety of targets, including rail lines, tunnels, and marshalling yards.
SECRET
25X1
1 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172

No
TH C.I.A. HASNO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT,
sew IAN
/978
25X1
Approved Fosaalease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T011741:1800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
Other UN aircraft flew 915 sorties, including 14 medium bomber missions. UN S-29's bombarded Sinanju, Anbyon, and Hanboungju marshalling yards, three ground support targets at the enemy front, and the Sunchon railroad by-pass bridge, and' dropped leaflets over eight Korean cities. Of 7,765 vehicles sighted, 5,377 were moving south. 291 of the vehicles.
UN aircraft deatroyed
General Situation
25X1

SECRET
2
Approved For kolease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91-1011724&00200080001-2

SECRET
OCI 2719 1 December 1951
25X1
DA/LY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Action across the UN front was limited to several minor enemy probing attacks and scattered patrol clashes.
AEME
Very small enemy probing attacks were repulsed by outpost elements of the US 1rd Division in the US I Corps zone. In the US IX Corps zone an enemy platoon probed an outpost position of the US 24th Division end then withdrew, while two enemy platoons forced outpost elements of the ROK 6th Division to withdraw.
Light probing attacks, all of them repulsed, and numerous scattered patrol contacts featured activity in the US X Corps zone. Four light contacts by the ROE llth Division patrols constituted the entire action in the ROK I Corps zone.
Naval air sorties totalled 56. Surface vessels scored hits on a factory and a-transmitting. station, bombed two bridges, blocked a tunnel and started fires at a railroad by-paes in the vicinity of Songjin, and destroyed e marshalling yerd near Hungnam. (Because of transmission difficulties no other naval information s available).
Land-based UN aircraft flew 944 effective sorties of which 571 were combat. The 44 close support missions were divided among the three US corps. Medium .bombere flew 15 effective sorties against targets which included Sariwon airfield, Sinanju by-pase bridge, the Songchon railroad bridge end four marshalling yards. In the Sinanju area, 31 1=861e engaged 12 TU-21s, 16 14-9's and 100 MI0.-l51e. Six TU-219 and one MIG were destroyed and one T1L2 and one MIG were damaged. There was no damage to friendly aircraft. The enemy aircraft were reportedly flying in support of an amphibious landing on Taewha-do island off the northwest
SECRET
1

Navy
Sit
1-
THE C.I..A. IIASI:;L; ;..':'...;.:1;,,.. 1;ECIliksJEFICATI ON Or

DOCIMENT.2,23 17020008000 ME'
No
25X1 25X1
pm lips
Approved For Miefease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011786100200080001-2

ESCRET
25X1
coast, which was supposed to have taken place at the same time. This is indicative of the same type of action used on 6 November when .TU-21s were used in support of invasions of Kado and Tando islands. An estimated total of 228 other enemy aircraft were observed or encountered, with a loss of two MIG:s and the damaging of another.
II.
General Situation
Truce Talks
This latter theme,is echoed in a. Peiping broadcast which accuses the UN of attempting to interfere in the domestic affairs of North Korea through the proposed inspection system.
A recent official statement from the ROK government noted that any armistice would be a tragic mistake unless it met the following three conditions: (1) no Chinese forces to remain on Korean soil: (2) security of South Koreans who are in North Korean handsi and (3) establishment of a free and unified Korean nation..
The ROK Ministry of Defense hae proclaimed martial law in southwestern Korea in en effort "to mop up Communist bandits prowling in rear areas." (This measure, coupled with the establishment of an anti- guerrilla task force of two ROK divisions, represents the strongest effort to date to repress guerrillas In South Korea).

Political
ESORET
A Communist correspondent at the truce talks states that the 'Communist negotiators are now perfectly willing to discuss the question of foreign troop with, The correspondent condrawal under Point 5 of the agenda, rather than Point 3, tinues that the UN-proposed inspection system wotld interfere with "fundamental reconstruction works" in North Korea.
25X1
2
Approved Fonlease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T011710100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action on the UN front was limited to scattered patrol clashes.and a squad strength probing attack by the enemy. Unidentified planes bombed a UN artillery unit 15 miles south cf the front line. A total of 166 enemy planes was observed or encountered.
There was practically no contact in the US I Corps zone as units maintained positions and patrolled. A number of patrol contacts occurred in the US IX Corps zone.
The US lst Marine Division repulsed a probing attack by an enemy squad in the US X Corps zone.
.The ROK llth Division reconnaissance unit engaged an enemy company and patrols engaged a small group of guerrillas in the ROK I Corps zone.
UN naval aircraft flew 219 sorties. Air and surface craft successfully attacked communications targets along both coasts.
Three unidentified aircraft bombed and strafed a field artillery unit some 15 miles behind the lines in the US I.Corps zone, about 15 miles north northeast of Uijongbu. Ah observer said that the aircraft had sweptback wings and red star markings.
Four unidentified aircraft were sighted at 33,000 feet over Seoul. Sabres gave chase, no contact was made. SECRET
UN landbased aircraft flew 1014 sorties including 652 combat. Several marshalling yards were bombed as 12 medium bomber sorties were flown; results were unreported.

Ar_qE
Air
Although
THE Ck.VA.Mss onsscrioi TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT,'

'
25X1 25X1
1 8 Si Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117M000200080001-2
Approved For4s lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117918800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
An estimated total of 166 enemy aircraft was observed or encountered. Claims were five MIG's destroyed, one probably destroyed, and five damaged, with one F-84 Thunderjet heavily damaged.
-
UN pilots observed that during the afternoon, when the majority of the engagements took place, enemy tactics were characterized by an unusual nuMber of nonfiring paeses and feints. Of 3510 vehicles sighted, 2096 were moving south.
I. General Situation
According to US press sources, Communist negotiators have agreed to_rear7 area inspection by "neutral" observers. This offer is conditioned, however, by a Communist limitation that inspection should be allowed only at "designated places."

Truce Talks SECRET
25X1
2
Approved Fortlialease 2004/09/03SOARDP91T011721a900200080001-2
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Ground activity was limited to small probes and patrol clashes. Four aircraft, believed to be MIG-15,s, bombed and strafed UN positions on the western front.
In the US I Corps zone, 1st Commonwealth Division troops repulsed a small probing attack. Four aircraft, believed to be MIG-152s, bombed and strafed two UN positions near the Imjin River ten miles southwest of Chorwon.
US IX Corps units repulsed several small probes.
In the US X Corps zone, US 7th Division units repulsed a company strength attack.
The ROK I Corps reported only patrol clashes.
'
Naval air sorties totalled 227. East and west coast offensive air operations resulted in the destruction of buildings, a factory, a gun position, a locomotive, 20 railroad cars, a supply dump, ten vehicles, and a motor boat. Blockade ships near Chongjin bombarded communications targets and damaged the police station at.Pbchondong. In the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon surface vessels supported two commando raids. Gun positions were the principal target near Hungnam and at Wonsan.
Land-based aircraft flew 986 effective sorties of which 636 were combat. Twelve of the 19 close support missions were in the ROK I Corps zone. Medium bomber sorties totalled 20; the principal targets were four marshalling yards. An estimated 118 enemy aircraft were observed or encountered, and !Our MIG-152s were damaged.
The Fifth Air Force reports that the Fourth Fighter Group sighted what appeared to be a flight of MIG's over Seoul at approximately 280000 feet. Chase
SECRET

Navy
Air
AEMX
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
25X1 25X1
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 07
T.B.1
3
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117axu

No.
ÛPLELIT.
1-2
3
1978

SECRET
25X1
was given as far as Cho-do island, where the enety formation outdistanced the pursuing Sabre jets. About two hours later a flight of three swept-wing jet aircraft, described as marked with a red star, dropped eight antipersonnel bombs and strafed artillery positions in the US I Corps zone. UN air force units are taking maximum precautionary measures, and the US Eighth Army has been alerted to expect repetitions and to remind subordinate units of the enemy's current capability to reach the battle line.
General Situation

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved For Ratite 2004/09/03.: CIA-RDP91T0117211(44200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Activity in all four UN corps zones was limited to clashes between patrols and enemy groups of which none were larger in size than a company; and to small probing attacks, of which five in squad strength were repulsed. There were scattered artillery duels also. Units of Task Force Faik, in South Korea on guerrilla-hunting missions set up blocking positions. An undetermined number of enemy troops attempted a 1Lding on Muda-ri Island about 20 miles south of Haeju; the attack was repulsed and enemy prisoners of war and equipment captured.
Task Force 77 replenished and there were no naval air operations in the-east. Carrier, aircraft based off the west coast flew 54 sorties against targets of opportunity in the Chinnampo area. Surface craft off both coasts successfully attacked communications targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 806.sorties including 511 combat. Nine medium bomber sorties were flown against targets including Uiju airfield and Hungnam. The P-29 making a night attack on Uiju airfield sustained heavy damage from four jet aircraft while caught in searchlight beams. Results of other missions were unreported.
14I0-151s observed or encountered totalled 136 during the period. In encounters between UN jet aircraft and the MIGts, claims were two MICts damaged with no friendly losses.

F13
Action on the UN front was still limited to scattered light patrol clashes and minor squad and platoon size probing attacks. A preliminary report indicates that a B-29 attacking Uiju in northwest Korea was attacked by four enemy jet aircraft, probably MO's, and damaged. The B-29 succeeded in returning to Kimpo airfield. An attempted enemy landing on Mhda-ri Island, approximately 20 miles south of Haeju, was repulsed.
airfield
Air
SECRET
I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
g1
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172146b0 2000800
.94
Approved Forlialease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011724100200080001-2

SiCRET
25X1
General Situation
Truce Talks
.
On Point 3 of the ceasefire agenda, a Nationalist Chinese news agency re ports that the Communists have suggested an "international " body of observers from three to five neutral nations to supervise the armistice. These teams, how ever, under the Communist plan would have access only to "ports of.entry."

SECRET
Approved ForgagOase 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91 TO117351099200080001-2

SECR.ET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action was limited to small enepy probing attacks and patrol clashes. ROK army efforts against guerrillas in.the Chin Mountains in southwestern Korea were intensified.
In the US I Corps zone, there was very little action. Division outpost was forced to withdraw.
A small piece of ground in the ROK 6th Division zone changed hands twice, with friendly forces in possession at the end of the period; only forces of less than company strength were involved. Other US IX Corps units reported only patrol clashes. The ROK 7th Division of the US X Corps repulsed a company strength probe. Other corps units patrolled.
The recently formed Task Force Paik, composed of the ROK 8th and Capital Divisions, maintained and adjusted positions in the Chiri Mountain region, and intensified anti-guerrilla activities.
Naval air sorties totalled 226, including 16 in close support of the US lst Marine Division. Task Force 77 planes, flying from off the.east coast, destroyed Various transportation facilities in offensive operations from the vicinity of Songjin to Wonsan. Surface vessels bombarded targets of strategic military value along both coasts.
Land-based UN aircraft flew 913 effective sorties including 541 combat. Close supPort missions totalled 50, with one-half in the US X Corps zone and the rest divided between the US I and IX Corps. Medium bombers flew 11 effective sorties against various targets, including the Songchon by-pass railroad bridge. Preliminary reports indicate that on 6 DeceMber (Korean time) F-86's engaged 100
MIG's in the Sinanju area with the resulting destruction of onr and the
SECRET

Air
ArmY
A 1st Commonwealth
.THECIA.HASNO0n7nCTION
TO THEDECLASSULCATION 0,
25X1
THISDOCUUNT.
ApproVedForRelease2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91T01172SP44200080001F9
25X1
imm, 1978
Approved Foriastease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011710W1200080001-2

SECRET
damaging of another. A total of 310 MIG's were observed or encountered on 5 DeceMber (Korean time), with the box score showing five MIGIs destroyed and one damaged..
II.
General Situation
Political
According to a 5 December Pusan broadcast, President Rhee has announced that elections to fill certain vacant National Assembly seats will be held late in January -- the guerrilla situation permitting. He added that elections for city, town, and country officials will be held in March.

SECRET
Approved Fonaggease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011726,6180200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Along the central front UN forward elements repulsed several small probing attacks. Elsewhere patrols made scattered contact with small enemy groups. ROK elements continued aggressive action against enemy guerrillas.
In the US I Corps zone, ROK 1st Division units patrolled; 1st Commonwealth Division outposts received an attack from an undetermined number of enemy troops and withdrew; the US 3rd Division repulsed a squad strength probing attack and silenced additional enemy forces by artillery fire; and ROK 9th Division patrols forced withdrawal of an enemy platoon. In the US IX Corps zone, ROK 2nd Division outpost elements received an attack from an enemy platoon and withdrew to the main line of resistance where the engagement continued for two hours longer until the enemy withdrew. Other elements repulsed platoon and squad strength probing attacks. US 24th Division troops engaged enemy platoons and repulsed a squad strength probe. Latest estimates of enemy ground strength by the Far East Command, based on cumulative evidence over a period of several weeks, are as follows;
.Chinese Communist
Of these troops, 292,000 are estimated to be in the combat zone. Owing to transmission difficulties, no further information is available on ground activity, and no information is available on naval or air activities.
General Situation

579,000 226 000
North Korean
805,000
(p
C.I.A. HAS NO 071ECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
T
25X1 25X1
TH1
nOflUMEIjT
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0 020008 01110.2d ON m No.
Approved Forel/lase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172440,0200080001-2

SECRET
OCI
2725
25X1
8 December 1951
DAILY KOREAN
I.
Military Situation
Highlights
BULLETIN
in the west-central sector. Elsewhere action was limited tO scattered patrol

clashes.
The enerny launched several minor probing attacks against forward UN Positions
itay
UN units in the US I Corps zone made minor patrol contacts. The enemy placed 127 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on lst Commonwealth DivigiOn
positions.
In the US IX Corps zone) US 25th, US 24th, ROK 2ndx and ROK 6th Diyision reptased probing attacks of sqUad to platoon strength. The enemy placed 240 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on ROK 2nd Division positions, 400 rounds an 'US WA Divaion, and 611 rounds on ROK 6th Division.
Scattered patrol clashes occurred in the US I Corps zone.
ROK I Corps units maintained positions and patrolled, engaging small enemy patrol groups.
area.
Task Force Paik continued anti-guerrilla operations in the Chiri Mountain

'
UN Naval aircraft flew 246 sorties, attacking bridges, buildings mehiblep, and other targets.
Surface vessels continued to bombard bridges railway and highway 'trees, gun emplacements, and other coastal targets.
Air
*I
Other UN aircraft flew 426 sorties, of which 15 were in close support of ground troops. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties, shoran bombing the Sinanju by-pass
bridge, dropping leaflets over nine North Korean cities, and furnishing five close support missions.
SECRET

Lan
Tra0IIIIiiropc;A:C.4:14TE.
;1(11:nrIgyiN
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01 i%Flt0002000
V 0001t214/
Approved Forcerase 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117211/4200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation., Political
Ambassador MuCcio reports a recent renewal of strong opposition to the . cease-fire in the ROK. This has been manifested by an Assembly resolution condoning any permanent partition of Korea, by additional official ROK'p&ess releases, and by mass meetings held in Pusan on 4 and 6 December.
The Embassy comments that the demonstrations, while ostensibly spontaneoup, were probably officially inspired and seemed to be directed at'non-KoreaneleMents in Pusan..

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved Forlialease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172411100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
D AILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces maintained positions as patrols engaged scattered platoon to company strength enemy groups. ROK elements continued aggressive action against guerrilla forces in the Chiri mountain area.
vs I Corps units dispatched patrols which observed and engaged small enemy groups. In the US IX Corps zone patrols also engaged enemy groups of squad to platoon
size. Mortar and artillery fire totalling 108 rounds fell in the US 24th Division sector.
Patrols engaged small enemy units in the US X Corps zone. Two small-scale probing attacks were repulsed by the US 1st Marine Division. A total of 439 rounds of mortar and artillery fire fell in the three division sectors of this corps. In the ROK I Corps zone, the ROK llth Division maintained positions and patrolled, with scattered enemy contacts. Task Force Paik units continued to adjust their positions in the Chiri mountain area in guerrilla round-up operations.
UN naval aircraft flew 250 sorties. On both coasts air and surface craft successfully attacked communications targets. Two Skyraiders were lost.
UN land-based aircraft flew 882 sorties including 530 combat. Thirteen Medium bombers shoran-bombed marshalling yards with unreported results. No encounters with enemy fighters were reported.
General S ituation

Amix
Nen
Air
No significant reports were received during the past 48 hours

SECRET
Vt
1 ,
THEC.I.A.HASNOOEJECTION
25X1
1
Approved For Release 2U1141U9/U.5 : UIA-HDPV111 01144

No.
1:2 J JUN 1978
25X1
Approved Fos& 'Rase 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01174B131)0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

.1.
Military Situation
Highlights
UN forces continued to maintain positions, and patrol engagements with the enemy were limited to scattered contacts with company and platoon strength groups. Aggressive action against enemy guerrillas in South Korea continued.
Small probing attacks were repulsed in the US X and ROK I Corps zones. Elsewhere activity was limited to minor patrol contacts, as units consolidated their positions in the line.
The ROK 8th and Capital Divisions in Task Force Paik continued to move forward in their mopping up activities against the guerrillas in the Chiri Mbuntain region.
Naval air Sorties totalled 243, including four in close support of the US 1st Marine Division. One tank, buildings, warehouses one highway and five railway by-passes, two railroad cars, five.locomotives, and two turntables were among the targets destroyed by aircraft in offensive operations. Surface vessels laid fire on strategic communications facilities and military targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew 695 effective sorties of which 388 were combat. Only six close support missions were flown. Fifteen medium bomber sorties were flown; the targets included the Sinanju west railroad by-pass, which was shoranbombed by seven aircraft from two separate bomber groups. In two encounters in Two the Sinanju area, 62 F-86 Sabre jets engaged approkimatay 115 MIG-15ys. MIGts were probably destroyed and two damaged, while one F-86 was damaged.

Army
an
Mr
THE?.I.A. HAS NOOBSECTION

TO THE DECLACSIFICATION OF
1 Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R616d 4,111:111
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T0117214100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General Situation
Political
President Rheels opposition in the National Assembly will probably propose an amendment to the ROK Constitution which would make the Cabinet reeponsible to the legislature, according to Ambassador Muccio. The timing of this proposed amendment may be intended to help defeat Rheets recent amendments for a bicameral legislature and a popularly elected President and Vice President,
A public appeal to General Ridgway was released on 8 December by the ROK in the name of the Speaker of the National Assembly. The appeal, based on an Assembly resolution, calls attention to the "tragic sacrifice" of 867,000 people living within the area south of the 38th Parallel which the UN delegation proposes to turn over to the CoMmunists. The appeal asks what provision can be made for the 150,000 Koreans inhabiting the buffer zone who have been ordered to evacuate, and the 600,000 people maved out of the eastern area north of the 38th Parallel. Relief Supplies for only 160,000 of the latter group are provided.
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy action was again characterized by small probes and scattered patrol contadts.
In the US I Corps zone, the ROK 9th Division reported a sharp patrol clash; in another engagement a UN outpost was forced back. US 24th Division and ROK 6th Division units of the US IX Corps repulsed small enemy probes. US X Corps units reported squad size probes which were repulsed. The ROK I Corps reported little action.
Figures for naval air sorties are incomplete, Since no report from Task Force 77 was received. Surface vessels bombarded railhighway areas, gun positions, buildings, and villages.
Air
Other UN aircraft flew 973 effective sorties including 647 combat. TwentY one of the 28 close support missions were flown in the US IX Corps zone. Medium bomber sorties totalled 14; among the targets bombed were the Maengjungdong and theSinanju marshalling yards. In an air engagement, 36 F-861s encountered 24 MIGrs out of a total of 65 observed; one MIG was probably destroyed and two damaged. One F-46 received minor damage.
II.
General Situation
According to the Peiping radio, the UN has again violated the neutral zone. An American aircraft allegedly dropped two bombs and strafed near Kaesong early on 11 December,
(This is the second such Communist claim in the past week).
SECRET
25X1
I

Na_u
Truce Talks
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
(DO THEC.I.A.HASNO OBJECTION

OF
THIS DOCUMEN No
Approved For Release 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172 00020008

.
i7 0 lth
vii 7941
25X1
Approved Fortiagiese 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117911986200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Propaganda
Radio Pyongyang on 8 December initiated a new propaganda theme, namely the "vicious scheme, unpardonable by heaven and man," forcibly to register the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan as ROK nationals and to deport certain elements to South Korea as cannon fodder. Korean sentiments towards Japan remain so violent and nationalistic that this new propaganda line will probably receive heavy emphasis for some time to come, particularly since it lends itself to associating the "Syngman Rhee traitors" and "American imperialists" with the "reactionary Japanese Yoshida government."

SECRET
25X1
2
Approved Forlialease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721a6,200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
DAILY'. KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Eilitary Situation
Highlights
Action on the western front was highlighted by an engagement between an enemy battalion and UN elements. Elsewhere scattered patrol contacts occurred and several small probing attacks were repulsed.
Elements of the ROK let Division in the US I Corps zone engaged an estimated enemy battalion and then withdrew to the main line of resistance. The 1st Commonwealth Division received eeveral small probing attacks and some elements withdrew. There was only minor activity in the US IX and X Corps zones, with small probes repulsed. No enemy activity waa reported in the ROK I Corps zone.
UN naval aircraft on the east coast flew 252 sorties. Targets included two T-34 tanks which were possibly destroyed. Surface craft successfully bombarded coastal targets.- West.coast carriers replenished and no missions were flown.
UN land-Msed aircraft flew 765 sorties including 465 comhat. Fourteen medium bombers shoran-bombed several targets including Samdong-Ni and Sunchon marshalling yard.
In an encounter near Sinanju between 22 Sabres and 50 MIG-15ts, four MIG's were deetroyed, three probably destroyed, and one damaged; one Sabre was lost. Two LA-9 conventional fighters were also observed, but no contact was reported.
II.
General Situation'
No Significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

AE1Z
1
Air
SECRET
0 THE
.I.A.nA7r^n-rlITA
TO THE Ilt;CTL.LT:::'.
THIS Du ell7;
,;.2
25X1 25X1
Approyed For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011f2 s 0002ooctonor -
Approved For Niose 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172RGINE00080001-2

SECRET
25X1
DAILY KOREAN SULLETI N,

I.
Military Situation
Highlights UN forces maintained positions and patrols encountered scattered platoon to company strength enemy groups. ROK forces in the rear continued aggressive action against North Korean guerrillas. Elements of one UN division observed a Yak-9 aircraft flying in a northerly direetion from behind UN positions.
There was very little activity in the US I Corps zone, but elements of the US 3rd Division reported spotting a Yak-9 aircraft with a red star painted on its wing and fuselage flying from behind the division/s main line of resistance in a northerly direction. US IX and X and ROK I Corps units patrolled, engaging several small enemy groups and repulsing some squad size probing attacks in a generally quiet day. The troops of Task Force Paik continued mopping up exercises against guerrillas in the Chiri Mountains. Radio Pusan reports that the ROK Minister of Defense announced on 14 December that "more than 3,000 Communist bandits" had been killed, wounded or captured since the intensive campaign started several weeks ago. ROK authorities reiterated that their army will cohtinue the operations until all bandits have been cleared out of their hiding places in the mountains.
Naval aircraft flew 263 sorties. In the east,:offeasive operations were conducted in the vicinities of Chongjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Yangdok, and included cuts in 62 railroad tracks. Aircraft' in the west attacked various targets from Hanchon to Haeju.
Enemy strength in Korea is estimated at 802,000 this week, a decrease of 3,000 from the previous week. Of this total of 802,000 (573,000 Chinese and 229,000 North Korean) 272,000 are in the combat zone and 492,000 in the rear areas, while the rmnaining 38,000 are North Korean trainees and guerrillas-.
Surface vegsels continued the coasts.

Ara
anti-guerrilla
bombardment of coastal targets along both

SECRET
Trir,
CO V
25X1
A jr;;.7
ITo Zus
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011j2K0002000
1-2
LI/
(;-k
25X1
Approved For %Lease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172190200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 1009 sorties, includi ng 645 combat. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft flew 512 missions, attacking numerous targets in various areas of North Korea. Medium bombers flew 12 sorties, bombing the Sunchon south by-pass railroad bridge, furnishing Close support for ground troops, and dropping leaflets over eight North Korean cities.
II.
General Situation
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours
25X1
2
Approved For 12* lane 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R419200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Owing to technical and transmission difficulties no information on the military situation in Korea is available.
II.
General Situation
25X1

TEl
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117
C. I. A HAS NO OBJECTION 0 THE Mr.0 SCIFICATION OF THIS DOCITE 061.74;:i

1,94;
No
25X1
Approved Fonliapase 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T011726i1.0200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action on the UN front was still limited to small scale probing attacks and scattered patrol clashes.
There was no significant activity in any of the four corps zones; troops of all units patrolled with contacts ranging from one to eight in the varioussectors. Several squad strength probing attacks were repulsed and one of platoon strength was thrown back by the ROK llth Division in the ROK I Corps zone. The US 45th Infantry Division was assigned to the US Eighth Army upon arrival at Inchon. Two regiments of the US lst Cavalry Division which had been attached to the US 3rd Division reverted to control of their parent unit and will depart soon for Hokkaido.
bst_v
Naval air sorties totalled 29, all on the west coast, as Task Force 77 in the east was replenishing and conducted no air operations. Surface vessels in the east fired on Narious communications targets, while in the west they bombarded the mainland near Ung-do and Wolsa-ri, silenced a gun battery on Amgak, and bombarded enemy mortar positions at Ung-do a second time. One UN vessel received a hit above the water line.
Land-based UN aircraft flew 941 effective sorties including 587 combat. Twelve effective missions were flown by medium bombers, which attacked the Sinanju east by-pass railroad bridge and strategic targets at Chinnampo and dropped leaflets over ten North Korean cities. There was no damage to either friendly or enemy aircraft in air operations for the day.
II.

Air
THE CII.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION oF THI
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01117,2
tz3
Approved For Pa lane 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01172R3M00080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action was again limited to minor probes and scattered patrol contacts.
Army
There was very little activity in all of the four corps zones as units en, gaged the enemy on patrol and repulsed squad and platoon strength probes. A total of 330 rounds of mortar and artillery fire fell in the US I Corps zone, 321 rounds in the US IX CorPs zone, and 478 rounds in the 7th Division sector of the US X Corps zone. The US 2nd Division assumed responsibility for the sector previously held by the US 25th Division in the US IX Corps zone.
Naval air sorties totalled 144 and resulted in the destruction of buildings$ bridges, warehouses, and gun positions. Surface vessels along the east coast fired on communications targets. In the west, enemy forces took the islands of Chongyangdo and Ungdo off the coast of North Korea about 20 miles southwest of Chinnampo, but UN vessels bombarded their positions on these islands and on the adjacent mainland.
Air
II.
Other UN aircraft flew 806 effective sorties including 471 combat. There were 16 close support missions in the US I and X Corps zones. Medium bombers flew 14 effective sorties; targets included a Sinanju railroad by-pass bridge and the Kyomipo steel mill. A total of 111 MIG-151s were either observed or encountered; of these, two were damaged, General Situation
Political
Ambassador Muccio in Pusan reports that public demonstrations by South Koreans denouncing the cease-fire negotiations occur almost daily in Pusan or Seoul. The displays generally take the form of mass meetings or parades composed mainly of university students or youth corps meMbers. Tie Ambassador states that the demon, strations, aimed at the Embassy and UN organizations, are proXtbly governmentorganized, as they show little life or spontaneity, 5
'

Eam
-
SECRET
ns No 0B.TECTI01
6-- -2.
)T20 TS:: DECLASSIFICATION OF
Approved For Release 2 114/0911.13 11 : UIA-RUP91 I 011
TRIP r)ocin
No.
25X1 25X1
Approved Forgo Lease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T0117216100200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
oci
2734

I.
DEC 1 9 1951
Military Situation
Highlights
Enemy action flared up in the western sector where UN units repulsed a battalion size attack Elsewhere, the enemy limited himself to minor probing attacks and scattered patrol clashes.
Army
In the US I Corps zone, the enemy launched an estimated battalion strength attack, preceded by 100 rounds of artillery fire, against elements of the ROK The attack was repulsed and the hostile forces withdrew. 9th Division. In the other corps zones, UN units maintained positions and patrolled, repulsing small probes and engaging in scattered patrol Clashes.
Naval air sorties totalled 166. Two antiaircraft positions, bridges, buildCommunications ings, locomotives, railroad cars, and a gun position were destroyed. facilities and installations again provided the principal targets for surface vessel bombardment.
II.
UN land-based aircraft flew 966 effective sorties of which 602 were combat. Twenty-two of the 26 close support missions were flown in the US X Corpe zone. Medium bombers flew 12 effective sorties, including eight against the Sunchon south by-pass railroad bridge and one against the Hungnam chemical plant. The total number of MIG's observed or engaged totalled 208, hut none was destroyed or damaged.
General Situation
Truce Talks
A Chinese Nationalist news agency reporting from Seoul stated that South Koreans held a mass meeting on 19 December protesting a cease-fire without national unity. In addition to displaying the usual anti-cease fire sentiment, the South Koreans said they were ushocked" by the news that only 7,000 of their missing personnel are now in Communist hands out of an estimated 80,000.
SECRET
THE C.I.A. rfca NC Crin:cTtm(

Na_v
Air
TO THE DLELASEIFICATION THIS DECUMENisn
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0 )020008005V-Wi .4 /

No.
Approved Forfjpiease 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172C1000200080001-2
SECRET
25X1
20
DecemIT 171

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
and scattered Action along the front was limited to small enemy probing attacks patrol blashes.
repulsed In the US I Corps zone, outpost elements of the ROK 9th Division two probing attacks by an enemy platoon and one by two squads.
along the In the US IX Corps zone, the US 2nd Division occupied positions dispersed an enemy squad and elements of the division former US 25th Division front positions and patrolled with in patrol action. Otherwise corps units maintained some contacts.
probing attacks The US X and Rok I Corps troops patrolled and repulsed seven by small enemy groups.
targets, while surface UN naval aircraft flew 59 sorties against various targets, concentrating principally on railroad vessels continued to bombard coastal bridges, tunnels, and trains along the east coast.
II.
tan were Other UN aircraft flew 535 sorties. Of the 13 medium bomber sorties, two were close shoran bombing missions against the Chongju marshalling yards, North Korean cities. leaflet drop mission over ten support missions, and one was a
General Situation

.1.EBE
Navy
Air
SECRET
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TIE DECLASSIFICATION OF'

I HIS DOCUMEN
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01 172 0002000 0001-2 d 2919 No.
Approved For %please 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721140200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights The relative quiet continued in all sectors.
UN units in the four corps zones repulsed amall enemy probing attacks and engaged enemy patrols in scattered minor clashes.
UN naval aircraft flew 219 sorties, attacking targets from Tanchon to kowon in the east, and from Chinnampo southward along the West coast.
Land based .UN aircraft flew 614 sorties. Of the 360 coMbat missions, 232 were flown by armed reconnaissance aircraft and 60 by night intruders. Medium bombers, flying 13 sorties, attacked Sinanju airfield, provided close support Tor ground troops, and dropped leaflets over :tan North Korean cities.
Of 2800 vehicles sighted, 1189 were moving south.
II.
General Situation
Strongly questioning the Communistreleased prittoner of war list, an'official ROK spokesman on 19 December stated "we refuse to believe that the Communists hold only 7,000 Korean prisoners of war, since it is known that 88,000 of our troops are missing in action." The statement also criticized the omission of the names of the scores of thousands of ROE civilians "abducted" by the Communists.
25X1

itEMX
Air
Truce Talks
SECRET
THE C.
.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOW TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
Approved For Release 2004/09/0i : CIA-RDP911-01M R00020000001-2 1978
25X1
Approved For Aekrase 2004109103 : CIA-RDP91T01172198600080001-2

SECRET
25X1
Economic
The ROK government is proposing to release the dollars obtained in return for won advances to the UN in order to import food grains immediately, according to The Embassy believes this step is a favorable sign of ROK Ambassedor Muccio. willingness to start an import program which would have the effect of reducing won circulation and curtailing inflation.
25X1

SECRET
I Approved Forgo lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011724illb200080001-2
SMUT
DAILY KOREAN BULLET/ N

I.
Military Situation
Hiahlimhts
UN units in all four corps zones maintained positions and patrolled. 'homy units were engaged in small probing attacks and in scattered patrol clashes.
'
Owing to weather conditionp and replenishing operations UN naval air 'craft flew only 26 sorties. Surface vessels Continued to boMbard gun posi tional railway lines and equipment, warehouses, and other targets.
Of 771 sorties flown by landbased UN aircraft, 461 were combat missions. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties, attacking Namsi airfield and dropping leaflets aver ten North Korean cities.
25X1

Ar
Air
SECRET
THIS DO
Action along the front was limited to small enemy probing attacks and scattered minor patrol clashes.
Approved For Release 20 IMMI9f0-31-61A-RDPJI-TOS .
Approved Forlikalease 2004/09103 : CIA-RDP91T01172414860200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
OCT 2738 26 December 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action flared up in the area north of the Hwachon Reservoir, where a UN unit repulsed an attack by an enemy battalion. Elsewhere activity was limited to scattered patrol clashes.
Outpost elements of the ROK 1st Division and the Commonwealth 1st Division of the US I Corps dispersed enemy patrols. US IX Corpi units also reported light patrol action. The ROK 7th Division of the US X Corps repulsed a battalion sized attack in the area 15 miles north of the Hwachon Reservoir. The US 7th Division reported several squad strength patrols, all of which were dispersed.
UN action against guerrillas in the Chiri Mountains continued.
State Department officials returning from southwestern Korea report that the anti-guerrilla campaign is continuing successfully, with both army-police coopera, tion and the treatment of civilians reported as having been good. The onlY possible basis of criticism for the army and police effort is the high ratio of This ratio is guerrillas'captured in comparison with military arms captured. probably justified, since on previous occasions guerrilla groups have attacked the police with more personnel than arms, the unarmed men picking up the weapons of casualties.
The prisoners captured so far, according to AMbassador MUccio, include several "high-ranking Communist political leaders," some with international experience. All preliminary evidence indicates that the guerrilla movement in South Korea is a genuine Communist manifestation and not the action of criminally-motivated bandit elements.
UN carrier aircraft in the west flew 15 sorties against communications targets. Owing to the weather there were no naval air operations in the east. Surface craft off both coasts successfully attacked communications targets.
el 0

.118122
SECRET
TH E C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DXLASSIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUMEN
25X1 25X1
1
No.
107
Approved For Release 2004/09/03
: 1: hk-FINP91T01172
01-2
Approved Forapgase 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T01178511380200080001-2

SECRET
Air
Poor weather limited air activity as UN landbased aircraft flew 263 sorties including 166 combat. Medium bombers flew 17 missions against various targets, including Hwangju airfield.
II.
General Situation
No significant reports have been receivad during the past 72 hours.

SECRET
Approved For Rease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T0117261410200080001-2
SECRET
25X1
OCI 2739 27 DeceMber 1951

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
The action north of the Rwachon Reservoir continued as outpost elements of the ROK 7th Division remained cut off. Elsewhere only patrol clashes and small probes were reported.
The ROK 1st Division of the US I Corps reported repulsing a company sized probing attack. Other corps units patrolled.
US IX Corps units reported nnly patrol clashes. As a result of a company sized attack, outpost elements of the ROK 7th Division of the US X Corps remained cut off at the end of the period. In the ROK I Corps zone, UN forces adjusted their positions without incident.
Successful antiguerrilla action in the Chili Mountains continued.
west.
There were no east coast carrier air operations and only 23 sorties in the Surface craft on both coasts attacked communications targets.
UN landbased aircraft flew 155 sorties, including 15 combat, as poor weather hampered operations. Medium bombers flying 15 sorties successfully attacked tar gets including Sinanju airfield.
General Situation
North Korean Military Mbrale
A delayed report of a US X Corps study on the reasons for North Korean Army desertions reveals that no dingle factor was a major cau:
SECRET
1

Nary
Air
T
P7 :4C.II H:: ::::::
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
THIS DOCUME T.
25X1 25X1
OF
1 Approveci For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T01SIMR000200 Abil4w2,u,
il
Approved For %lease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP9110117241800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
long-standing vulnerabilities of insufficient food, heavy casualties, and poorly trained replacements, some prisoners indicated that the presence.of a large aumber of ex-ROK troops in North Korean ranks created a feeling of distrust and a lessening of combat efficiency. The use of ex-ROK troops in front-line units has increased. Due, however, to the large nuMber of desertions among them some units are reported to have sent their ex-ROK's to the rear areas for additional indoctrination. Another reason given for desertions was'the failure of political officers' promises to materialize.
A majority of the prisoners covered by this early November study had been inSome reducted between May and July 1951 and ranged from 16 to 34 years of age. placements had arrived at forward units without unifOrms and many without weapons.
25X1
2

SECRET'
Approved Foragease 2004109/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721940200080001-2

SECRET
25X1

I.
Military Situation
Highlights
Action continued in the east-central sector where UN troops forced undetermined number's of enemy forces to withdraw but later in the day received an attack by two enemy companies, Elsewhere light probes were repulsed and scattered groups were contacted by patrols.
US I and IX Corps troops 'engaged several enemy groups while on patrolling missions. In the US X Corps zone outpost elements of the ROK 7th Division cOntinued the previously rePorted action and.forced the anamy to withdraw in the area south of Mhlguji.. Later, hoUever, two enemy companies attacked in the same vicinity, forcing a slight ROK withdrawal. Elsewhere in this and the ROK I Corps VMS, small probing attacks were repuleed.
Combined enemy ground strength in Korea decreased 15,000 this week to a new total of 773,000; casualties and a reassessment of strength caused the reduction. The Chinese number 551,000 of this total, and the North Koreane 222,000; 264,000 troops are in the combat zone.
Owing to bad weather, UN naval airoraft flew only 58 sorties, In the west nUmereus targete were destroyed or damaged in the vicinities of Amgak, Sariwon, and Haeju; no sorties were flown in the east. Surfaoe vessels off both coasts continued to bombard coastal targets, columntrating principally on oommunioations facilities.
Other UN aircraft flew 937 sorties, including 561 combat. A total of 335 armed reconnaissance planes attacked various targets. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties, attacking Sunchon railroad by-pass bridge, Namsi airfield, and other military targets, and dropping leaflets over eleven North Korean cities.
SECRET
25X1
1

&MX
flu
lax
THECA. HAS NO OBJECTION

TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS Dorumwwm
25X1
Approved ForRelease2004/09/03:CIA-RDP91TO4P2FM0200080 n1-2
Approved Fonliaiease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91T011721:1800200080001-2

SECRET
25X1
II.
General.Situation
Political
25X1

SECRET
Ambassador Mhccio reports that President Rheels political support appears definitely split into two groups. Pro-Rhee associations outside the National Assembly and the RPPA AsseMblymen, considered as favoring Rhea, have refused to merge because of aeveral points of contention. Each unit proceeded independently An late December to forth a new political party, each using the name ',Liberal Party." The Liberal Party outside the Assembly elected Lee Bum-suk, former Prime Minister and Ambassador to Nationalist China, as party vice-chairman. Rhee as party chairman sent a congratulatory message to the group outside the legislature but not to the new party in the Assembly. The latter, although considered the pro-Rhee group in the Assembly, can he expected to line up with the opposition against Rhee,on questions involving conflict between the legislative and executive branches of.the government*
2 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91101172R000200080001-2
HR70-14 HR70-14
i c
'
VIP SECRET SUEIA'-TOP-SECRET-SUEDE-
;AR
5. 5.
KOREA. Serious damage damage to t o North Morth Korean Korean east e a s t coast ooast rail r a i l system system revealedi. revealedt. KOREA. Serious TriTaMinary reveale tthat "UN air air atfmks attacks m i n i n a r y field field analysis a n a l y s i e of of enemy ejnemy messages reveale h a t "UN hilii-disrupted the main mein lateral lateral lline from Yangdok Yangdok (east (east c central have disrupted the i n e from e n k r a l Korea) Korea) to to Koren:" (on (on t h the east ooast ooast n north of Wonsan) Wonsan) and and another important line Plomn" e east o r t h of line into the area. Other serious leading i nto t h e Wonsan area. eerioua damage wasreported m e r e p o r t e d in i n the the Songjin observes t h a t "continued "oontinued disruption d i s r u p t i o n of o f the the lines line8 that Bongjin area. area. The field observes to the should materially affect t h e enemy's oapato t h e extent e x t e n t indicated indioated . . should materially affect the enemy's oapa(SUEDE TLK bility .(SUEDE TIK ll78, 1173, b i l i t y to t o stookpile s t o o k p i l e materials m a t e r i a l s for f o r future f u t u r e operations." operations." 29. Sep 61) 51) 2 9 8ep
Comments recent e c e n t serious floods, floodsJ ooupled coupled rith with the cumulative cumulative Comment: The r effeot the interdiction program, have havereoently neutralized , e f f eof o m e heavy UN rail rail i n t e r d i o t l o n program, reoently n eutralized While "oontipted "oontinued many of many segments sep~ente of the the North North Korean Korean east e a a t coast ooaat rail rail line. line. While disruption" will. rill materially mwteridly affeot a f f e o t Communist Communist logistic l o g i s t i c capabilities, c a p a b i l i t i e e the the * enemy hse has previously displayed displayed considerable considerable ingenuity ingenuity in in u utilizing motor' t i l z f n g motor vehidles vehiolee and and indigenous indigenous means means of of transport. transport;.
6.
6 .
-TOFIEVRET-SULPEE-
2 Oct Oct 51 Sl 2
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: k A T E : 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
55
. .. .
VIP SECRET SUEDE4011-8BORBT-51313DE-

-Tep-szeitET-stnus-5 5
2 Oct Oot 51 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
\NO"
41011-BRORETI
:NR NRI
NR
-TOP-SECRET-
6 6
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009 DATE:
2 Oat 51
DD
I
10. 10.
.3 Coabnrolistr May qay e!pand e x p y d jet j e t operations operation8 in i n Yalu Yalu River R i v e r : area; area8 The Caimunists Chinese s reported to e m d l o p i n g mether 0hinese Cownurristkir Coemnadat Air Toroo Force i is to b be -4veloping enother jet jet operr operr ational airfield a%ional airfield (at ( a t Takushan) Tdcushan) in in the the lower lower Yalu Yalu giver River area, area, according rooording to In MP, Whioll field there would would enable enablethe theCbAF OAF %a to exexFEAF, whioh comments o o m n b s that tht; 8 new f i e l d there bepand 100 ita FEAF bo0114 by by:100 its $@% jet f'iBhCek fighter rtrong'bh strength in in the the Xorsv preen borddt bordet areao FEA.I., 1 1 0 thrt'5O ~ ~ j m t fighhters are are no* now based at epoh'of epoh of the the two operational opbrrtional lieves thet50 jet.fighters basedet fields (AntOng Tatungkou) a at tlieborder, and an au &deliMona1 additional 100 100 from from field# ( b n w g and Tatmghu) tt @ bordrr, ~ and the.An--Waoysng-Mukdsn Anshan-LiaoyangAdukden area the area o f ' ofeouthoentralMenchuria,operata aouth-oontral Manahria opercts daily daily Kmea bv t over-Korea by s starine trough rough Antung bntung and-Tatungkeuo and Tatungkooo
,
,
Chinese CoMmunists
!that fthe Chineee Commtmliet
ling to continue vows
deeire 8:negotiated peaoe because of the possibility_that the United Nations
2 obt 51 2 Oat 51
will Nationalists into intothe war on the the mainmaine 1 1 eventually ovontually bring the t h e Chinese Natiorralirh the w a r on the Chinese land of China." China." ,Allegedly, Allegedlyy, the Ohins Communists fear thortwiteh wit+Arpnerevolt." would "stir "stiir the t h o people people into r evoltom
1
.
.
Vhile.frequent been received mile froquent reports roports have h a p baen received indicating indioating ' ChinalrWgrmnist unwillingness Chine-ist umiIlingnsssfor f o r4avariety v a r i e t y or of reasona reaaonn to to continue continuo the the. war, in Korea, Korea, this thii iis among the most most hplauqiblo implaueiblo to da%e. date. 1 w a r in a a m e the
Clomntr Garments
12. 12 v
far f , n m n n l n l a t invomiftm_mt 4 a u s A a t .Jana Tmnngs t Korean war reported as sprinrhoad few nnmempinfl
rollowing explanation explaAktion for for oontinuation oontinuation of o f the t h e war a r in in Korea Korea and and of of Soviet Soviet rollowing plena plans to t o invade invrdoJapan,, Jape
(1) Continuation or war in the "long-range af the the way i n Korea ie is part port of of %he -long-range (1) Soviet for invasion o$ or Japanon Japea."- AA oeaso-fire oease..fire now would Move O the S o v i o t plan f o r hvasion now would roqove h . pretext for launching before Japan Japan oan prepare pretexb lamohing "air "air raids against Japan PePore by rearming." reamingOW
(2) (2) North NorthKorea Korea and and the tihe Soviet Soviet Union Union are are not no% prepared prepared for for all-out all-out war war in in the the Far East, Eaat, and and action aotion against against Japan Japan "is "$a not no% expected expeated until u n t i l the the summer of of 1952.11 1952." auIML4r
(3) Tho Soviet Soviet timetable timetablo for f o r aggression aggroreim ip I s the Far East inoludes: inoludesr Far'East (3) The Xoroa,'Juno 19514 1 9 5 1 8 Japan, Japano August August to t o OctOber, Ootober, 1952; 1952~ T a i w , Indochina, Indoohha, and and Korem,'4un. Taiwan, Burma, to follow Japanl plus "the o other % u m ,t o follow JapaS and the t h e Philippines R U i p p i n s a plum t b r South South Pacific PIaifio Ialmds," to 69 be bo oonquered oonquorod under W o r the the supervision ruperviaion of a a "Japanese-Soviet nJapanese40vieh Islands,"
planning p l a n i a g board.". boardo"
64) The invnsion using Japaneso Japanese (4) The i n a s i o n of of Japan Japan would would be be a000mplished aooomplished Inr by using troopi fro* to tto~ps from "giberia, "Siberia, Sakhalin, Sakhalin, and and Hanohuria" Ma,nehuriaH bo invade invade and and seoure 80oure HouCaidoo rolloming Following the %he establishment ertabllshmant of of a p bas*. basQo Korean, Chinese, Chineate, and and Hokkaido. "other would for-the invasion ofef -wonalid and "o.bherAsiatic AsiaCio troons" tr00~8" m u l dfollow Pollon for th, invu5.m Kyushu. ISyuahUe

Comments
j% a Ithe
_ ___ - - .
s%atemnts, It is probable-that suoh such statements, they were made, were for morale and propaganda purposes. purposea~
if
13.
Communiits Char. * gN :nu lo Kteson no otiations for militar advantagess am er i nese ommun roa oas. e UN fOrces in Korea "sinoe the beginning of the nOK otiations" have'been
Tor EMMET
2 O o t 51 51 2 Oot
' .
OP-SW=
preparing to make maks amphibious landings landings on on b both Korean rrsf east and and west west preparing o w tthe h e Koreau ooasto irZ in order t to Korean and and Chinese Chinese fQroe8 fOrces b book to tthe Yalu ooastr o drive "the Koroan o k to h e Yalu river.". Tb0 The C Communists oharaoterizeijeoentARLas rj,vw.". 0 ~ 1 m u n i O t 6 ffUrther u r t h e r oharaote I c e d reomt flBT * o t i d t v a s :"wreoking of ths the Ifaesong Khesong negotiations." negotiations." "wrroking of __
bi an an o effort oounter Comments Conrmsntc This latest:Communist latesli Communist claim oislm may, may bo f f o r t tto b oountar offs/M.1;M propaganda that propaganda thatthe thoChinese Ohinem an4 an4 North Nor* Koreans Xoreyls have have success8woerrrffeofull,y. utilized the respite the Kee/song talks 4o rebuilheir offenf u l l y uW,liced the res p i t r of of tb6 Kaesong trlk r 40 rebui19 t h e i r offenAdditionally, 10 it is known that that Cmuunist ComMunist Poroes forces i in Korea siv potential. rivo p o t u ~ t i a l . Additionally, n Korea haveaagenuine have genuinefear foar of o f ' UN U?i amphibious Mvphibious capabilities. oopabilltieso
140
Pril.gYa4;."
15.
Communist risoners re ort seein Soviet antiairoraft ersonnel e n erroga an 0 rery in the An oon .y.o p ure ommun s so era reveals that in late May and early June1951 on soldier observed othousands at Euieian antiaircraft troops deployed along,the Yalu river iv the vicinity of Antung and in the, hills surrOunding Antung0" Another prisoner olaiMs to have seen'5,000 Soviet elittairoreft troops, dressed in Chinese Communist uniforms, detraining in Antung LOserly June, kstrwrg iq:esrly June, 19540 1958. _ _
mand,Oommen ng on on Communi& ommpn aui?d, oohnentina
The Far Far Ea8.b East CodCotro ram moves Communist Oomuunist air air interdiotton interdiofion program paves souths south8 Tho oreen'war, .e Korean a r ao a o t l v i ty nn $n tlie war. observes observus a ir that while previously most enooUntersWith enemy jet airoraft took pleoe over the'Yalu river in the vicinity of Sinuiju, during 4!the past two wooks, the majority of enoounters between friendly and enemy jets occurred,in the Sinanju area, with occasional engagements in the immediate.Fyongyang vi4 cinity, end Only a small number in the Sinutju area." FECOM comments that it is "evident" that the Communist have "ekpanded the norial area of counter-sit operations to inolude most of northwest Korea, alOost to
'
Comments Tbe presence of e considerable number of Soviet troops in NOrth"EifW,JE rear reas is aocepted. Although not a firm estimate, it is possiblethat they nuMber im excess of 20,000. Mhile generally performing a toohnioal, advisory, or service function, some organized antifircraft units are believed to be operating in northwestern Korea. These dated incLatill unconfirmed reports although dealing with the Antung area are further evidence pointing to the presence of a relatirely lerge nuMber of Sovietain the Korean-Manohurian theater.
;
TOS_SEGNET
9 9
2 Oet Q a t 51 51 2
10 10
2 Oot 00% 51 51
._
HR70-14 HR70-14
7-TOP-SECRET-
NF
14.
(1) In l late August, a battallon battalion of of non-fkiental non4riental artillery (1) In ate A wst, a a r t i l l e r y troops troops entered the Najin-Vnggi Najin-Unggi area bringing with with'them them #heavy "heavy coast artillery and and anti-aircraft anti-aircraft guns"; gunmu; tillery
Twelve Soviet 1 ! 5 0 mm %cavy W E" were observed 150 ma guns and other "heavy guns" observed (2) ( 2 ) Twelve in in Unggi Unggi harbor; harbor;
On 5 5 $eptember, September, 600 600 non-Oriental non-0riental troops, troops, described described as a1 "not "Rot (3) On (3) JZuropean, but...from but...from the the near near east'areas east area8 of ef the the Soviet %Viet Union," Uniin,"-Zuropeans moved mved by by truik tru k from from Unggi Unggi to to Najin. NajSn, -__
coastal defenare defense inatallatlons installations KOREA. KOREA. Non-Oriental Non-Oriental troops troop8 reported reported maftning msmd,nu, eoast.al I n northeastern northeastern Korea: Korea : in the ionoaring the following about northeasternpnortheastern Korea: Korea :
9.2Mat.:
however, however, haa has previously previously reported reported that that a a Soviet security seourity regiment regiment is ie gargarrisoned risoned there. there*
FMO-W-FaWm=dT
Abile WhUe only cnly speculation, speculation, it it may may be be recalled recalled that that this t h i s reported reported movement movement followed followed by by only only a a few few days days the the UN UN medium bomber raid raid on the the town town of e l ? Najin Najin is entirely the Soviet Union Union might might choose dhoose to (Rsshin) s e n t i r e l y plausible that the (Nashin). It i of a a IM UN anlphibioua amphibious reinforce this strategic strategic area against the possibility of operation. operation,
NR
--TOP-SEeRET-
9 9
3 51 3 Oct 51
.D6 bb
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16~Dec-2009 ,1&Dec-2009
Approved For Reftte 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0911400290001-7
TOP SECRET
4 October 1951
CIA No. 49365
Copy No.
143
DAILY DIGEST
State Dept., USAF reviews completed

TOP SECRET
Approved For Range 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011400290001-7
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Radio Moscow comments on General Bradley's visit to the Far East: The Southeast Asian audience heard that "there is no doubt that Br:idlers trip is linked with American plans to extend aggression in the Far East;" that there is "a connection between US press detands that the atom bombbe used in Kbrea, reports that the Pentagon is planning an offensive in the direction of the Yalu River and the bombing of northeastern China, and Bradley's visit to the Far East." (R, FBID Ticker, 2 Oct 51)
Comment: Current Soviet propaganda has either ignored the armistice talks or has referred to them in the past tenSe. The Communist China anniversary provided an additional opportunity for emphasis on alleged American plans to extend the war "So as to use a conquered Korea as an aggressive base against China."
2.
PAchikov remains in Tehran and sees Mossadeco Sadchikov, Soviet Ambassador to Iran, has not yet left Tehran, contrary to earlier press reports. An Iranian spokesman states that in a visit he paid Premier Mossadeq on 2 October Sadchikov promised a Soviet effort to increase deliveries of sugar and other goods now denied Iran by Britain. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Tehran has not been able to confirm whether Iran has discusSed with the Soviet Union a clearing agreement whereby the USSR would supply certain essential goods on indefinite credit. Recent talks with Iranian members of the trade committee, however, have suggested to embassy officials that Iran would like such a clearing arrangement, but that at the opening meeting,of the talks on 22 September this was not discussed. One Iranian official stated he had no idea whether the Russians would work to encourage trade with Iran for propaganda purposes, or try to hinder trade in order to cause added dislocation to the Iranian economy. No date has yet been set for a second Soviet-Iranian trade talk. (C, Tehran 1234, 2 Oct 51; U, AP, 2 Oct 51)
Dsmmeatg Sadchikov, originally scheduled to leave Tehran on 22 September for Moscow, has apparently postponed his departure pending preliminary Soviet-Iranian trade negotiations, and the British evacuation. Previous reports have also suggested that the Iranians hope to obtain essential goods from the Soviet Union, and that SadchikoV may have made overtures directly to Premier Mossadeq on the subject. (See CCI Daily Digest, 1 Oct 51)
3.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. peace Partisans promote a North European Congresst The Communist press in Sweden and Finland has announced that

TOP SECRET
1 4 Oct 51 Approved ForFWease2002/05/20:0A-F0P79T01146A000400290001-7
Approved For Re Ihte 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0thle00290001-7

TOP SECRET
"prominent public figures" of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland have initiated plans for a Peace Congress of Northern European Countries in Stockholm from 30 November to 2 December under the theme "the North under threat of war". A large number of organizations have been invited to participate "irrespective of political views" but it is believed that Swedish support will be confined to the small Commun ist Party and a few fellow travellers. (R, Joint Meeka Stockholm, 28 Sep 51)
Comment: Although the Communist Wrld Peace.Partisans during the past year have planned or held regional congresses in almost all areas of the world, this is the only recent attempt to hold such a congress in Northern Europe.

TOP SECRET
2
Approved For Re lbmge 2002105120 : ClA-ROP79T01146A0V,0290001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
10
(S*ngoon 332, 2 Oct 51) Comments Thies ia the first report that Li thirma, although'it is entirely Yuan-kai's poeSible thet they too have troops are in. there Pram thevOommuniste, It is probable sought refuge are Operating independently beoause of the that the twn,Nationalist forces both of wham claim 4ealouey between their extensive 'jurisdiction commanders, in:southwest China. The appearance of a substantial force west exesperate the Burmese and of the Salween will farther provide an additional the entire issue before ipoentive for them to place the,United Nations.
2.
American-British Aelassador and the TIS Charge representations to Thais On 1 Ootober the UK delivered a joint aide Government requesting its memoire tO the Thai cooperatien in preventing Chinese Nationalist arum from reaching the troops in Burma, The British representations Pointing out also made oral the potential dangersAmbassador might develop and ifsarms smuggling embarrassmentt whieh When the US Charge through Thailand were allowed to continue. associated himself with Minister replied.that he was in agreement, these statements the Thai Foreign official, and remarked that and then tuarned were involved. (9 Bangkok he tust be aware that American to thISAmerioan 780, 1 Oct 51) personnel and arms
Comments The Thai Government probably will being made to satisfy Burmese demands that steps cooperate in the effort supplies from reaching the Nationalists in Bgrma. be taken to prevent further
30
THAILAND.
INDDCHINA. Viet Minh attack French ost in weistern of the Viet 3111 Tonkins Three regiments Nghia Lc in western Tonkin y e French post of beginning 2 October, maximum aerial The French have mounted counterattack 4 during perfect 2 Oct 51) flying weather, (S Hanoi 197,

thstsonac
TOP SECRET
BURMA4 Chinese Nationalist forces reported a Burma lest Trlishassy in Rangoon of Salmon: The transmits a repqrt 54000 Chinese Nationalist thation 1 Eeptember there were trnops-weit Burma. These troops Of-the'Salween River in arennder the control northeastern of:Li Yuad=kai4 Chief" og Nationalittiorced!in "Commander-inkting independently of General-Li southwest China, They are said to be'operaMi, Nationalist forces, currently "Governor" of Yunnan, whose located to the east of the mese Government eo much Salween. have caused the concern. BurThe embassy oomments that this report, the first indication that a sizeahle.group though probably exaggerated44a rillas is operating west of the Salween, anti-Communist Chinese guer-
3 Approved For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040029040997t 51
Approved For Re leute 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q2S00290001-7

TOP SECRET
Comment: Viet Minh preparations for an attnok on this eliiderrernTe mid-September. post have been The French believe ing rice supplies that the Viet Minh is seekand a morale-boosting victory which, if achieved, alter the "basic situation.* will not
4.
50
friendshi ": A con a ns more e usua ns stenoe There are three references in as many senallianoe." the the "union of our country "Sino -Vietnamese union,* and with China." (7 FBIS, 2 Oot 51)
on Sino -Vietnamese solidarity. tences to the "Sino-trietnamese
Viet Minh
6.
Netherlands officials inquired whether Indonesia.would over West New Guinea if the "make trouble" Netherlands grants acceptable RTC agreements. Supomo replied that Indonesiee revisions to the would remain. (C Djakarta oliim on West New Guinea 508, 1 Oct 51)
Comment:
Netherlands and Indonesi lan to re slace .RTC a reementssretomo, o oia w o recen e urn disouseed revision of rOM er an the 1949 Roend sador Coohran that the twogoverumentsTab/e Conference agreements, told Ambashave decided to draft working as a basis far further negotiation. papers When Suposio asked the Netherlands tiators what criteria they envisaged in replacing negoDutch replied that they felt the present agreement, the that there should'remain between Indonesia and the Netherlands a special relationship . and that theywould simply with most-favored-nation not be satisfied treatment. that Indonesia Supomo told Cbchran, however, could not countenance the continuance Indonesian Union or_any of the Netherlands of its instruments.
INDONESIA.
irriElresian

anda stresses brOractrar228iftWiralir
Possible French use of Chinese Nationalist Blancke in ano repor s internees: US consul ecen a gns in possible employment of e enc are s owing interest Indochina for transborder some of the Chinese Nationalist troops interned in intelligence works:in which V woeful weakness." the French acknowledge Blanoke wonders whether there these signs and reports that is any relation between General Huang Chieh,, ranking internees, is planning officer among the a secret trip to Hanoi. (S Hanoi 199, 2 Oot 51) Comments The French authorities have refused questriErreome 30,000 internees Chinese Nationalist reha be repatriated t6 ForMosa or employed against the Chinese otherwise Communists. The Fienoh have involved in relations with in the past been trip to ForSosa last year) General Huang Chieh.(notably the General'stbecret" which they have strenuously but unsuooessfully attempted to conceal.
Viet Minh
ro
"Sino -Vietnamese
Indonesian desire for
revision
of the RTC agreements princi-
TOP SECRET
It
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP791-01146A0004002900610n 51
would like te discard the Union it as a vestige of colonialisM. They entirely ahd replace the agreements with a standard remaining RTC bilateral treaty. The Dutch have admitted to US officials that the Union is a doornail" and that it will "dead as have to go. pone action until after the June However, the Dutch wish to post1952 elections.
7.
Approved For Re lase 2002105120 : ClA-11131379701146A00g$00290001-7 TOP SECRET pally involves the Netherlands-Indonesian Uhion which, includes the two nations although it as equal partners, exists under the Dutch Crown. Most Indonesians resent
National Communists spread rumors A National against Sultan of Jogjakarta: Communist leader in Jogjakarta is spreading rumors that the Sultan of Jogjakarta intends to restore feudal rule and that when his position central Java, is sufficiently strong he over hopes to succeed Sukarno,) as president. These alleged by the people. ambitions of the Sultan are resented
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: During his actual reign over the Jogjakarta, the Sultan special territory of instituted many progressive and democratic and adopted the policy of reforms keeping directly in contact with He continues to be immensely his people. popular in central Java target for Communist and is an obvious propaganda. The rumors probably have had little mentioned in the above message effect to date; scale they however, if continued on a undoubtedly would weaken the Sultan's large position.
8.
CHINA. China's trade with Soviet Orbits The Chinese with pride to the fact that Communists point the SSA and the bave become China's principal Eastern European Satellites trading partners in place of ,Sp far in 1951, 70 percent the West. of China's imports have Orbit (16 percent from come from the SoViet the USSR and .25 percent Shipments to the Orbit came to from the.Satellites). 78 percent of total to the pssa and 26 percent exports (52 percent to the Satellites). China's ability to find According t6 the Cemmunistv, new markets and sources of supply bloc'"is a serious blow to in the Soviet the imperialist countries against economic blockade and embargo of the us." (U Peiping, NONA to press, 1 Oct 51) Commentg China's foreign trade reflects economic orientation-toward the Soviet Orbit. that country's continuing first in which the Soviet The year 1951 is the outranked the West partner. .This developmentOrbit as China's trading is commerce with the US and other only in part due to a decline-in the reflects an absolute increase Weetern countries- in large part it in trade with the 6rbit. Communist claims that the increased trade with the Orbit Despite the Western trade controls, the continuing efforts to procure effectively counters smuggling indicates that Western goods by the Orbit countries have not satisfactory sources of supply proved altogether for petroleum, and other strategic commodities.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002105//0 :
CIA-RDP79701146M0940000001-7
Approved For Re Ihte 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S60290001-7

TOP SECRET
9.
Polish vessel carrying Ceylonese rubber to China. The Polish vessel Mickiewicz left Colombo fOr CoMmunist China on 2 October, after several days' delay due to commercial difficultiea and bad loading weather. It-is carryihg 5,530 tons of rubber, probably to the South China port of Whampca. (C Colombo 216, 29 Sep; Colombo 226, 3 Oct 51)
known shipment of rubber to CommuMEC-ana since the UN-sponsored embargo of dune 1951. Ceylon is the only rubber-exporting
Comment:
This is the first
country which permits the sale of rubber to Communist China. If the Chinese can overcome certain shipPing and commercial difficulties they will probably attempt to buy Ceylon rubber on a continuing basis.
10.
KOREA. Communist general estimates number of "Caucasians" in North Korea: A North Korean general is reported to have estimated that-the "most accurate figure" 'on the number of "Caucasians" in North Korea during late-August was-7,000 to 10,000. These troops, mostly antiaircraft and field artillery gunners, are not Soviets (although Soviet officers have been observed with them), but "volunteers" from Hungary, Bulgaria, YLEoslavia and Poland. They are in-general located in the PyongyangSinmak region in western Korea. (S FEAF Tokyo 4293, 30 Sep 51) Comment: This coincides very closely with a recent US Far East Command estimate of the nOmber, mission, and location of "Caucasians" ih North Korea'. However, sufficient information does not exist to confirm or deny the presence of a aeparate tacticalforce in North Korea composed of "Caucasian volunteers."
11.
2 5X1 C
North Korean Communist leaders' discussion of the war reported: In a 16 September meeting of the "North Korean Communist Party Executive Committee," the entire subjects of military operations and the Kaesong talks were reviewed
The conferees, feeling that additional delay in resuming the Kaesong talks would goad the UN command into an all-out offensive, talks should begin again. noted that the Concurrent with tha talks, however, a limited Communist offensive designed to force the UN to the 38th parallel should be initiated. If the UN still refused to settle on a ceasefire line at the 38th parallel, an all-out offensive would be launched. It was noted that, in any case, only the Soviet Union could order ah end to the Kaesong talks. On other matters, it was observed that part of the "world-wide resiatance against since the Korean war was ' imperialistic America," the Chinese Communists would continue to support the North Koreans. A serioua rift between Peiping and Moscow, however, could cause Chinese abandonment of their Korean venture. The possibiliii of

TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400290001-74 Oct 51
Approved For RP/Kase 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146a6400290001-7

TOP SECRET
armed Japanese Communist resistance and "increasing trouble in the Balkans" were diacussed. The members concluded their meeting by:resolving to "step up the party line campaign of last July" (presumably peaceful settlement of the Korean war) and to "mobilize South Korean Communists for guerrilla work, sabotage, and political infiltration."
25X1A
Comment: While contradictory in part (Le., expressing fear of a UN offensive, yet discussing a Communist offensive to drive UN forces to the 38th parallel), the reported proceedings of this meeting could very well be true. It is to be noted, however, that this was primarily a discussion rather than a policy meeting at the command level. The only concrete actions recommended (propaganda and guerrilla activity) are probably within the sphere of activity of the North Korean Communist Party. It is believed that the thinking reflected here, although .it will have very little bearing on eventual Communist policy, is reasonably accurate.
12.
Communist charge that UN uses Japanese troops repeated: A 2 October NOrth Korean broadcast states that the "American armed interventionists" are employing "a large number,of Japanese troops" in the Korean war. The broadcast, claiming that Japanese soldiers have been captured as recently as 4 September, states that a 2,000-man Japanese "infantry volunteer" unit has been introduced into Korea and that."about 300 Japanese soldiers" are currently working in the UN cease-fire camp at Munsan. (R FB/D Pyongyang, 2 Oct 51)
13.
US
Comment: This and similar previous charges have probably been inspiredi by confused or intentionally misleading North Korean intelligence reports. US citizens of Japanese ancestry and South Koreans trained earlier in the war in Japan are believed to be the "Japanese" in question. This type of broadcast additionally is a potent propaganda charge, in that a widespread distrust and dislike of the Japanese still exists throughout much of Korea.
ROK government "misinterprets" US repayment of won advance to ersonnel: On 2 October the semi-official South Korean newspaper orea Times1 quoted the US Secretary of State as promising a refund "at the first opportunity of the billion won loan of the Korean Government to the US Army in Korea." The article stated that the payment of 12 million dollars "will-be an advance refund of the entire Korean Government's loan to the UN army amounting to 321 billion won." It is further noted that the US Nairy and Air Force
i

TOP SECRET
4 Oc t 51
Approved For Re Iltrhe 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146/017400290001-7

TOP SECRET
and other UN nations having fighting forces in Korea would sbon follow'suit. (S Pusan 303, 2 Oct 51) Comment: The US is undertaking tn repay the sum of 12 million dollars: in specific settlement for the Rats adtance of 63 billion won "which have been utilized in Korpa through July 31, 1951, for direct sale to US personnel." The US has given no indication as to when negotiations for the settlement of the ROK advance to the UN command will take place. The US 4mb3ssy observes that this newspaper article is "apparentiy a continuation of an attempt to make the advance appear as a loan and to make Acheson appear as guaranteeing repayment of the loan."
14.
JAPAN. Subversive activities control law to be presented to Diet: A draft public safety law, aimed at controlling subversive activities, will be submitted to the Diet during its special session commencing 10 October, according to Japanese press reports. The law reportedly will permit a public safety committee to disband any organization, remove any individual from pUblic office, and suppressany publication which engages in, advocates or otherwise supports actiyities Which (a) deny the Japanese Constitution or imperil the State, (b) support or justify aggressive military operations against the State, or (c) encourage any attempt to unseat the government through violence.
(II MD, 2 Oct 51)
Comment: While this law will provide the basis for outlawing the Communist Party, Government leaders still deny any intention to do so. The need for a permanent law to replace the Occupationdireeteck ordinances which now are utilized to contra subversive activities is generally recognized; however, considerable concern is being ex pressed in Japan over the possible misuse of the proposed law. The press in particular, fearing a retUrn of state control over publications, is presenting organized opposition to the bill in its,present form.

TOP SECRET
S. act 51 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-121:11379T01146A0004002900u1-/
Approved For Re !Me 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S60290001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
(WESTERN)
GERMANY.
discontinue the Berlin freight air-lift, because there is no conclusive evidence that Soviet and East German officials intend to cease their harassing measures. For the time being the been flYing out West Berlin exports, will belimited air-lift, which has continued on a day-to-day basis, and the matter mill be considered further by the High Commission at its next regular meeting on 4 October. (S Frankfurt 2878, 2 Oct 51)
At the time of the signing of the interzonal trade pact on the East Germans agreed oraliy that various harassing measures would be discontinued. So far, they have complied only by reducing the ratee of the road tax on Berlin-West Germany traffic. Soviet and East German officials are still holding up approval of export permits. As of 29 September, parcel post shipments were still being interfered with and the Rothensee canal lock had not been opened.
20
air-lift in view of continued Soviet Warggent: High Commissioner McCloy has abandoned earlier plans to
McCloy to maintain Berlin
Seprbers,
Comment:
2.
FRANCE: Comment on cantonal elections of 7 and 14 October: The major political parties in France are placing unusual emphasis on the forthcaming cantonal elections. They are determined to capitalize on any shift in popular support since the indecisive June elections for the National Assembly. Since, however, many of the local contests, which are for 50 percent of the seats on the councils of the French departments, will be decided on local issues, the results will not give a true picture of national political sentiment. When the deputies reconvene early in November, the parties' gains and losses in these local elections, together in the recent assembly debates, will increase with the ill-feeling engendered present tensions which stem largely from basic econanic issues.
The Gaullists are confident of making an even better showing than they did in the June elections, when they emerged as the largest party in the Assembly. The Socialists, mho currently hold the largest number of the seats being contested, are struggling to minimize their anticipated losses; nevertheless, they have declared their intention not either the Communists or the Gaullists in the present to cooperate with campaign. The Communists have publicly stated that they regard the forthcoming elections as equal in importance to the national poll in June. They probably believe, with considerable justification, that they will be able to hold their lead in the popular vote, especially in view of the growing inflation and the controversial NATO issues.
3.
French 1952 budget faces opposition: French Finance Minister Mayer expects to have serious difficulties with the National Assembly's Finance
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400290160QcS I-1 51
Approved For Raltse 2002/05/20 : CIA-RD1379T01146A0.01100290001-7

TOP SECRET
Committee on the 1952 :budget. Mayer shares a widespread view that Paul Reynaud, the committee's chairman, is working to replace the present cabinet with a Rightist government including the Gaullists, Reynaud has secured a committee resolution inviting the government to submit the budget immediately, although in a recent newspaper article criticizing the results of the Ottawa Conference he pointed out that the government canhot knovrWhat level of military expenditures its prospective resources will permit. (C Paris 1929, 28 Sep 51)
4.
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA. Federation favored by all Victoria Falls conference delegates except Africans: Except for the native African representatives, delegates from the UK and the three Central African territories of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland supported the principle of federation at the recent Victoria Falls conference. According to the joint statement, all agreed to rule out amalgamation of the territories unless a majority of the inhabitants of all three desired it. Whatever agreement is final1y reached, the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland under the British Crown will be preserved. The Northern Rhodesian Africans "declared their willingness to consider federation on the basis suggested if the proposed policy of "partnership" defined, and "as defined first put into progressive action" in Northern were Rhodesia. The delegates hope to reconvene in London in the middle of next year. (IT London Timea 24 Sep 51) Comment: As anticipated, attempts to allay African fears of white supremacy in a future federation including Southern Rhodesia dominated the deliberations. The partial success of the conference in this regard is shown by the Northern Rhodesian Africans' declaration, which iS the first African statement that is not uncompromising' in its opposition to the principle of closer political ties in Central Africa. Nevertheless, the satisfaction of African objections and resolution of controversial constitutional questions will take so much time that federation will probably not be realized for several years,
S.
COLOMBIA, Communists claim success in collecting information on diplomats: Rafael Baquero, who is in charge of the Communist Party's collection of detailed personal information on Colombian diplomats stationed in the US, England, and France, stated that the information had been compiled prior

TOP SECRET
Comment: Reynaud, a specialist on financial matters, is an independent conserfaiNs7 who was one of the first to recognize De Gaulle as an authority on military questions. An anti-inflationist of long standing, he can be expected to insist on reduced budgetary commitments unless adeqUate non inflationary resources for financing defense expenditures are clearly in view,
10 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDID79T01146A00040029001-7
t.
Approved For RelNife 2002105(20 : ClA-RDP79701146A00002900

TOP SECRET
,401
-7
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
August (see CCI Daily the compilation Digest, 21 Aug 51). His to be sent to the inforzn 'on o instructions called for as soon as Co lamb the same type of re Cominform tatives in Spain could be included. 25X1A Comment: There is still no indication been issued to any that similar other Latin American Communist Party. instructions have
to l

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000k0924001-7
TOP SECR
UNCLASSIFIED when lapird94cFreRefeesetuloto6/10:4DiAtiqoppgrroisopoggsvoraeopt or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

DOCU ENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE
REGISTRY
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC
NO.
77Vr
DOC .
DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
It
NUMBER OF PAGES NumDER OF ATTACH E TS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on toy of and attached to each Toy Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside 0/ CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limsted to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose orflcial duties relate to the matter. TOp Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /Orin and Indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
Indicate the date of handling in the right-hand

EFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECE I VED
columns.
RELEASED
DATE
T I
SEEN BY
E
SIONATURE
BATE
T I
S GNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detach ed from Top Sec et material it shall be completed tn tha appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contra for record.
DO NGRADED
70
By
DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY
(Signature)
WITNESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF ICE
4TOroved
For
Ikracise 2002/05/20 : CiAT-hDP79T019(40000400290001-7

TOP SECRET
K" 26 U41 PRIVIOUS OPTIONS. 0-73
(40)
Approved For Re ItIllte 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400290001-7
TOP SECRET
,1r
4 October 1951
CIA No. 49365-A
Copy No. 4 9
WS CABLE SUPPLEMENT
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of not represent a complete coverage Current Intelligence. It does of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re illese 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A66111400290001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
strategic materials to Czechoslovakia may be US Ambassador Cochran spoke to Djuanda, Vice Chairman of the Cabinet's Financial and Economic Council, concerning Indonesia's agreement to provide tin to Czechoslovakia under the annual Czechoslovak trade treaty currently being renegotiated. Cochran appealed to Djuanda for assistance in orienting Indonesia's trade policy away from the export of strateoic materials to the Communist bloc so as to avoid the'possibility or penalties under the Kem Amendment or superseding legislation.
avoided..
INDONESIA0
small:tat
2p
JAPAN. Japanese hope US troops will move out of capital: The Japanese' Government hopes that the administrative terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty will provide for the removal of GHQ and the bulk of US troops from Tokyo, the capital city, according to the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairsc; The official has also informed the US Political Adviser that the Japanese additionally hope for the return of numerous requisitioned houses, piers, warehouses and other properties now utilized by the Occupation. (S, S/S Tokyo 668, 2 Oct 51).
Comments Although the broad principles'of the agreement were worked out and initialed priOr to the peace conference, details relative to faCilities and bases are still awaiting inter-departmental diecussions by US authorities.. The Japanese Government, anticipating considerable political opposition to the US bases, is anxious to avoid any arrangement which would give the appearance of a continued Occupation.
30
South Korea to request negotiations with the Japaneses The Korean Mission in Japan has indicated that a formal request will be submitted to SCAP in the near future requesting negotiations with the Japanese on outstanding problems. The US Political Adviser states that it would be in-

TOP SECRET
1
Djuanda stated that trade agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia had been routine arrangements following old Netherlands East Indies lines and that some provisions had been specificaliy inserted at the'request of the Netherlands Government. He agreed unofficially that commodities obtained by Indonesia under these treaties are not vital and could be obtained in large part from other countries. He said he believed the Czechoslovak agreement had already been signed but was sure it had not been approved by the Cabinet. He promised to look into the matter, since he is particulariy interested in continuing to receive aid fnom the US. (S, S/S Djakarta 513, 2 Oct 51),
4 Oct 51
Approved For Relative 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004400290001-7

4.
TOP SECRET..
appropriate for SCAP personnel to serve in a mediatory role, and he suggests that bilateral negotiations commence initially without US intervention. Re feels that US intervention, unless necessitated by an impasse, would produce more misunderstanding than goodwill. (8, S/S Tokyo 669 , 3 Oct 51),
Comments The two outstanding problems most likely to cause an itpasse are Korea's demand that all Japanese shipping which claimed home ports in Korea during the war be turned over to Korea, and Koreats demand that Japanese fishing operations be restricted to the current limits established by the "MacArthur Line."

TOP SECRET
2
4 Oct 51
-.
'
HR70-14 HR70-14
. 30P___BECEST--SUEDIr TOP -S
13. 13
Bin urgent urgent military m i l i t a r y message mssage Air defense material sent tto Manchuria: An &ir o Mmahuriar from h Shanghai that vitirdefense dainse material" material" ia is being being shipped shipped tto from m g h a i reports reports t h a t "air o Manchuria starting The reoipiente recipients a at Chinohaw are directed t to onoe. The t Chinohow o Uwohuria s t a r t i n g at a t once. make arrangements its arrival. &e arran ements to Co pick picrk up the t h e material immediately upon i t s arrival. (SUEDE y l 7 3 736, Shanghai-Chinchow, 27 Sap Sep 51) (SUEDE 6 , Shanghai-Chinohow,
1
Comment: The The material material tto be s sort is not not speoified, specified, but but a a similar similar Cqnnnenkr o be o & is MessiErfFEE may have been m e s s a mShanghai Shanghai to t o Mukden Mukden indicated indioated that'the that t h e items i t e m 8 may Chinese Communists Communists are are ourrently currently placing placing strong strong training t r a l n i n g aids. aids. The Chinese aMphasis on amphasie on air a i r defense defense in i n the t h e coastal c o a s t a l areas. areas. Air defense exeroises exeroisee have batteries organiwed, air ham been been held, held, anti-aircraft anti-airoraltt and and searohlight b a t t e r i e s organized, raid r a i d drilla dri1I.a (=duetted, oonduoted, and and raconnaissanoe reoonnaissanoe activities a o t i v l t i e s stressed. stressed.
14. XOREA. KOREA. Soviet GCI N I net in i n northwestern Korea Korea reported re orted 1 19 9 September Se tember j e t 14 et ;anti a. y gar. e , very imperfeot per ec Russian ss an language m k r A b adly garbled, of nguage message of 19 eSeptember of combat m m b e r from "Karasee "KBra8ev" to t o "Galkin" "Galkin" reports reports "(...time) "(...time) oombat 1000 *** Chongju-Pakchon 1000 *** (in (in the t h e region) Chongju-Pakohon Anju and i n the period in

-1-(1)-11E;aRE";174313
(13)00 -1(3) urt3 ( i n tthe h e region) urs (in region) Anju-oceKaeohon...Junsen(Sunohon) Anju-..Kaechon...Junsen(Sunchon) (13)OO -1(5) ...." 2239, . e 'I (SUEDE (SIJEDE~Z Z S S , 19 19 Sep Sop 51) 51)
Comentr there WAS was no no UN UN jet jet activity a o t i v i t y during during the t h e period Comment: VVhila Male there 1300-1330 of UN jet fighter 1 3 0 0 - hours ~ w on e on 19 1 9 September, Beptember, a considerable oonsiderable number o f aJ jet f ighter sorties following 1000 1000 hours. hours. s o r t i e s were flown fbm in i n this this northwsstern northwestern Korea area foEollowing As these As many many as as 16 1 6 MIG's MIQ'a were were encountered encountered at a t one one time time during during t h e s e sorties. sorties. possible that aircraft in supply iinterdiction were It is posaibls that UN a i r o r a f t engaged i n supply n t e r d i c t i o n were in time. also i n the area at a t the time,
While the positions positions of "Galkin" "Galkin" and "Karasev" "Karassv" are unidentified, i.t; 'Mile the unidentified; it i e probable t h a t this this r e p o r t emanated f r o m the Soviet CI s tation a t is that report from Soviet G GCI station at Sunchon. Sunohon.
TOP
8 8
'
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Re liade 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q400300001-5
TOP SECRET
5 October 1951
CIA No. 49366
Copy No.
.
4 "i
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, USAF and DOS review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. not represent a complete coverage of all current reports It does in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET
Approved For Re !doge 2005/01126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,00300001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
prospects for Soviet industrial expansion considered poor: From a recently completed survey of current Soviet industrial expansion and its immediate produotion prospects, Embassy Moscow concludes that the rate of industrial expansion in the USSR for 1951-1955 will "taper off" well below the rate of the past five years. Main reasons for this anticipated decline are the strict limitations on Soviet labor reserves and 'plant capacity; and the government's failure to achieve a substantial increase in industrial efficiency and labor productivity. Direct Embassy observations in the past year in Moscow and other areas attest to continuing low productivity of Soviet,workers due to improper use and maintenance of machinery and backward work techniques. The USSR also continues to suffer from a shortage of labor.
gm.
The.abassy believes that an attempt to increase military and civilian output simultaneously would restrict the USSR,to minor progress in each sphere, Any sizable increase in Soviet armaments and armed): forces will therefore
25X1
Comment: There is Other evidence suPporting the Embassy's thesis that a tight economic situation continues in the USSR. The many Orbit attempts to circumvent export controls, increased Soviet demands for Satellite capital goods and appeals for more exploitation of existing plant facilities seem to substantiate efficient this opinion. However, if labor reserves have not yet been completely exhausted, some increase in productivity can be expected in the period 1951-1955. As output increases, some drop in the rate of increase is to be expected.
2.
25X1
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav views regarding the UN Military port partially accepted: The UN Military Subcommittee Subcommittee ReReport has been revised to meet, in part, Yugoslav claims event of future aggression should command that the victim state in the the UN military operations conducted on its soil. As amended, the report states that the "victim state" may be designated as the Executive Military Authority if it is capable of directing the UN military effort without requiring substantial foreign assistance. More often; however, ty would consist of a group of states'of the Executive Military Authoriwhich the victim state would be one.
I
Comment: Although Yugoslav views concerning the role of the victim state are not completely satisfied by the adendments Yugoslavia will probably support the subcommittee report, for in the event of an attack -on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav ambition to direct the Allied effort could be satisfied under the terms of the report,

.
,
show an rbsolute decline in non-military output.
TOP SECRET
1
5 Oct 51
Approved ForRelease 2005/01126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400300001-5
Approved For Re Idea 2005101/26 : CIA-ROP79T01146A00V0300001-5
TOP SUET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
14
25X1
IND/A. Prime Minister eleetioneering for Prime Minister oontinuance of Nehru's first Party in the forthcoming electionepeeoh on behalf of secular states' the Congress munalism which. Nehru nationaleleotions deolared all-out said, was wa India's greatest enemy. I I
.
25X1
One of Nehru's basic contributions to.India hae battle-riflaeoular state. If been.his be retains the Party after the elections, leadershipof the Congress he.ihonld be ableeuooesefully fight against the Hindu -CO continue -his state advooated by many of hie opponents.
INDIA'.
Comments
25X1
lErgiiian Oetober toropen

Comments
2*
rge A
arisn Le ation to be o lied in New. Delhi, a res, The newly appointed ro y Sza a, a Legation in New Delhi. save Hungary in mid-,
Heretofore, Hungary has been represented in India by a
I
trade-Ma-fa-ion.
3.
25X1 usAF
BURMA. War Office complaoent Burma War Office believes regardinkChineee Communist that the-Chinese intentiones Burma because suph Communists will not 'invade The actionwould resentment among the arouse wideepread anti...Chinese Communist Burmese peoples according to a Builmse staff Officer.
Comments
muniarri-Zbmmon among most ignoring the threat of international momelements of the Burmese
Government.
&abase comments on Prime The US N..assy n angoon repos sMinister's forthoemi visit with Nehru: Japanese pease and s es souse ons concern ng Nationalist troops in e forthboming visit with Nehru Could be of Burma"Prims Minister Thakin. Wies (ulnae." The Embassy believes "considerable political who are aware of the that Nu is one signifi!.. --of the few Burmese leaders faoe of foreign and increasing-iipotenoy of the local Communist Burmese in tSe making this trip to pressure, and, that heGovernment may Well be seek.Nehru's guidance and to bolster his domestic moral sunpori in an effort position./
Such thinking,
25X1
Comments
support which Nehru may reverriErourrent trend of provide will growing Burmese Government. Communist strength relative to
No amount of moral
the
TOP SECRET
Q
Approved For Release 2005101/26 : ClA-RDP79701146A000400300001-5
5 Oct 51
Approved For Re laffie 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q2300300001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
60
25X1
US transfers arms to Associated State's, A. ceremony in narked the tranefer to the Saigon Vietnam-- of 55,000 rifles Indootinese states -- mostly to which recently arrived under fense assistance program. ths mutual deThis is the first major which will contribute to delivery of US weapond ure of the French civil the development of the Vietnamese Army. and military chiefs to Faildue, in the opinion of the attend the US Charge, to their uncertainty ceremony was the absenOe of General how to aot in De Lattre and to their the fact that tbe US had disinclination to publicize been called in to give mese, small arms to the Vietnaon I. Cretober
INDOCHINA.
tomments Delivery of these arms end the been riTilltr of some attendant publicity has to permitted the press in embarrassment Saigon to state, the French authorities, who have oment Of the Vietnamese falsely, that delay in the develarmy was due to failure of the fad - equipment. US to deliver prom-
7.
25X1
assault on an attaok on Binh Lu, located headwaters of the Blaok River. on one of the A parachute at Nghia Ic to supplement battalion has been dropped the two battalions there, The oomnwnder of the area Was Quoted of Thai troops stationed was inevitable. as stating that its loss
Viet Minh attack twoFrench costes Viet Minh stepped op tririernIrin forces have western Tenkin (tginning Nghia ID on 29 vrith the September) by
Comment, According to an Assooiated already seized the post of Press report, ths Viet Minh Binh Da. hag

TOP SECRET
3
Approved For ReleaSe 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004003601t651
Approved For Re Wee 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0116400300001-5

TOP SECRET
80
25X1
Representative government in Vietnam reportedly Oostponedi A minor official of the Vietnamese Government states .tlitt the .project.whioh was initiated some months ago to establish a national. asseibly is now ddfunot and is, moreover, strictly taboo even as a topic of conversation lit
government administrative singes.
Comments Deaemphasis of this projeot has been evident for some t1.149: Bap Errecently..told- Charge Gullion that the assembly project was not being pressed because, as any "sensible, average" Vietnamese knew, such an assembly would be worie than useless as a resultof Viet Mink infiltratiop. Bao Bails argumentation is specious, since it must knve applied as muoh tet the project was initiated as it does now. It would appear that this is simply anOther case of Bao Baits disoovering -- to his satisfaction, at least -- that the most patriotic course is happily identicalWiththe line of least resistance.
25X1
TOP SECRET
5 Oct 51
Approved For Re horse 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0QQ400300001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
10.
25X1
China's trade with Poland increases sharply: According to the Warsaw radio, trade between China and Poland for the first seven months of 1951 was three times greater than it was in 1950. For all of 19512 it is estimated that Sino -Polish trade will be six times greater than in 1950. The sharp increase in China's commerce with the Eastern European Satellites in 1951 has significant1y affected the pattern of China's foreign trade. Traditionally, China's foreign trade has been mainly with the West; -trade with Eastern Europe was negligible. So far in 1951, however, according to Peiping's. claims, about one-fourth of China's foreign trade was with the Satellites. Together with the USSR, the Satellites now account for the hulk of China's foreign commerce.
Comnsnt:
25X1

TOP SECRET
5
5 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2005101/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0014,00300001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
12.
25X1
Comment: While possibly of no significance, it should be noted that the Communists have not included in the first order of business ofa discussion "of previous incidents" a resumed conference.
25X1 25X1
South Korean ress sees more aggrepsj6 future UN olic : Most influential South Korean newspapers, as well as the ROK Government's Office of Public Information, have chosen to interpret general visit to Japan and Korea as presaging Bradley's "a more positive course" in the prosecution of the war. It is widely intimated that such a "course" would include breaking off the "endless and fruitless ceasefire talks" and concluding the war by military measures.
I I
14.
Comment: Such interpretations are in line with recogni.zed ROK antipathy to any ceasefire agreement which fails to unify Korea ROK rule. under
ROK Government to set u ecial le al deartment to militar offenses a deal with ROK ainst the civilian o ulat on: he ROK Minister of Defense announced the formation'of a special office in the Ministry of Justice to deal with complaints "againstarmy misdeeds." this step was taken to "eradicate Explaining that unlawful nisdeeds committed...against civilians," the Minister urged the people to make full use of this new
TOP SECRET
KOREA. Communists refuse to move Kaesonn talks: According to'a 3 October release in Tokyo, the Comnunist leaders refuse to accept General Ridgway's proposal to move the ceasefire talks to a new location near Kaesong. The release states that Kaesong was "agreed upon by your side" asthe site of the conferences and tha US has had no cause to complain of Communist violations since the "accidental incident of 4 August" (when a Communist company zarched through the city). The Communist again offer to resume negotiations leaders at Kaesong "immediately" with the con tinued proviso that the first order of business will be the setting of "ap ro riate machiner up ' to ensure the neutralization of the Kaesong zone.
AwovedForFWease2005/01/26:0A4RDP79T01146A000400300001-5
5 Oct 51
Approved For Re Atte 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,090300001-5
TOP SECRET
facility. The US Army if the army is to gain Attache comments that this is "a timely measure the respect and confidence of the Korean people." Comment: Like most Oriental armies, the forces of the unnecessarily requisitioned ROK have housing and materials and civilians. The frequent have mistreated scandals in which the military (the Kochang have been involved massacre and the National Defense have given the military Corps misappropriations) a bad name in South Korea. reflect-vn the Rhee regime, Insofar as these the army has been forced uous campaign to clean to undertake a strenup corruption and evil practices in the military.
15.
25X1
25X1
treaty will not come into by the 1/8, Japan, and effect until ratified a majority of the above ratify the
nations. treatY late this month or early in Novenper. Japan expects to

Comment:
JAPAN. Timetable for of peace treaty: State has advised the ratification US The Department of Political Adviser pakistan and the UK,will in Tokyo that Ceylon, France, ratify the Japanese of the yeas; Canada will ratify after Japan; Peace Treaty before the end Australia and New Zealand the Netherlande after the US; after the US and Japan; February 1952. and the Philippines in Indonesies ratification is uncertain due to local factors. 1
The peace
TOP SECRET
7
Approved For Release 2005101/26
:
C0051-gct
lA-RDP79T01146A000400300
Approved For Re lnte 2005101126
C1A-RDP791-01146A00400300001-5
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
(WESTERN)
25X1
Comamnt: Most Western observers agree that East certain additional small Germany will make concessions to the Weetern to embarrass Bonn, but viewpoint in an effort apparently will as international not accept supervision of German elections such important conditions freedom in East Germany; Meanwhile discussion ofor guarantees of genuine interfering viith the the unity question is solution of such pressind _dealing with West German probleMs contractual relations and as those. European integration.
25X1

TOP SECRET
East German unity proposals intended to erq.ender West The Western belief that German the purpose of East posals is to stir up a Germany's unity prorevolt in West Germany was Germany's leading corroborated by East In a speech to theCommunist theoretician, Fred Oelssner, Berlin on 29 September. Socialist Unity "urge for national unity Party, Oelssner stated that will break through the like especially by the working elemental force, led class, supported by the peasants and bourgeoisie." He denounced small Bonn's conditions elections impossible. for unification He was careful, as negotiations completely, however, not to close the making free door on remarking that "it is amply concessions will have to be clear that made on both sides if far-reaching agreement is to be obtained."
eggrir
GERMANY.
Approved For Release 200510Q126 : CIA-ROP79T0114M0004003))05M-Th.
Approved For Rejease 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146AV400300001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
3,
25X1
On the provieions for financing the European Defense Forces, which they have seriously opposed, the Italians are now willing to join with other powers ih the tranefer of some control over military budgets to the European Assembly. opposition to European Defense ForcerFrEg was intended to strengthen De Gasperi!s bargaining position
Cbmment:
at Ottawa and 'Washington. Premier De Gasperils Christian Democrats will probably be able to win Italian Parliamentary, approval for financing European defense plans.
25X1

As previously believed, Italian
TOP SECRET
Italians end opposition to European Defense Forces: The highlight of the most recent session of the European Defense Forces conference was a report by the Italian delegate to the effect that the Italian Government was prepared to accept the interim report as a basis of discussion on most questions, and to drop a number ef its previous reservations.
ITALY.
Approved For Release 2005/01/26 ?ClA-RD1)79T011460004003000.g19gt El
Approved For Re lace 2005/01126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041400300001-5

TOP SECRET
6.
Foreign
Diplomatic relations between Italy and the Satellites have been i ratred for some times Retaliatory action against them for treatment accorded Italian diplomats and nationals has been under study, and has resulted in the recent closing of the Czechoslovak Consulate in espionage trials of Italian nationals Milan. The in Rumania, where stiff jail sentences were meted out to the Italians, probably prompted the restrictions above. The Italians mentioned are disturbed by these developments, for they do not wish to jeopardize the flow of raw materials which they receive from Soviet bloc . the
TOP SECRET
25X1
to go outside the "free zone" unless they first obtain special permission. around Rome The Bulgarians will be required merely to notify the Italians of their intention to travel outside the permitted area0 while their Minister will not be under any restrictions whatsoever.
Comment:
and Rumanians will not be allowed
diplomats and members of their countries, Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian official families can circulate freely in a zone of approximately sixty only miles radius around Rome.
The Hungarians
Italian diplomats in Satellite
25X1
Ital malces re risals against Satellite di lornats in Rome: The Italian in s ry as announce re a a on or
e res rictions on
Approved For Release 2005/01/250 CIA-R0P79101146A00040030(y)%f
Approved For Relate% 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004600300001-5

TOP SECRET
7.
25X1
Postponement of fall local elections confirmed: Persistent rumors that the south Italian local elections originally scheduled for this fall would probably be postponed until spring have been confirmed by a high official in Premier'De Gasperils Christian Democratic Party. The reason given is that the elections would conflict uith the November census; but it is likely that the government is reluctant to face another test at the polls until there,has been time available for the implementation A member of the democratic Socialist Party had reportedly predicted three months ago that the government, as a result of its poor showing and an increase in leftist and rightist strength in the MayJune elections, would not hold a fall series of local elections in south Ita and that it might use the census as an excuse for postponement It would be particularly government should the local polls reveal continued embarrassing to the Communist gains im mediately prior to or concurrently with the meeting of the NATO deputies, council scheduled for RCM in NoveMber.
Comment:
of reforms..
25X1
9,
ARGENTINA. New attempt to create organization: Four delegates from "third poeition" continental labor the Argentine General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and a delegation form the Uruguayan CGT ere en route to hold a joint meeting with to Asuncion representatives of the Paraguayan CGT. One TOP SECRET
11
25X1
5 Oct 51
Approved For Reltkie 2005101126 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00000300001-5

TOP SECRET
item on the agenda will be the creation of an anti-Communist, antiimperialist continental labor organization.
I
25X1
Comment: Since March 1951 Argentina has been discussing with certain Mexican:Mir leaders the formation of a third inter-American labor
organization to rival the Communist-dominated Confederation of Latin American Workers and the Inter-American regional organization of the TOM, which both countries have denounced as being dominated by "Yankee imperialists."
Mile Argentina has not yet been successful in establishing a "third position" hemisphere labor organization, its propaganda and efforts in this direction are prejudicial to the development of a strong anti-Communist hemisphere labor organization and adverse to the US interest in encouraging Latin American peoples to identify their interests completely with those of

TOP SECRET
the West.
12
5 Oct 51
.....
---..
surAtkinstohtsvoitoxitsabutorsOr declassi-
UNCLASSIFIED when bApkipecw.seReleagetojeggyipap


DOC. NO.
REG I STRY
CIA CONTROL NO.

19-1d
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
PAGES
NUMBER NUMBER
OF OF
ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top Of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified TOp Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as ft is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside 01 CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period 0/ custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand

RECE I VED
S I GNATURE OFF ICE
columns.
REFERRED TO
RELEASED
DATE
T
SEEN BY
SIGNATURE
OFF ICE/0 IV.
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO

ImE
DATE
T I ME
DATE
Top
Sec et mate WI it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below

D I S PAT CHED
TO
DESTROYED
By
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
eY
(Signature)
ITNESSED BY
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF I CE
APtiftved For RgiaVe 2005101/26 : ClIAlkbP79TO1liga00400300001-5

PNEV/OUS EDITIONS.
FORM
8.73
v. u USE
TOP SECRET
(40)
Mit
Approved For Re late 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0013400300001-5
TOP SECRET
5 October 1951
CIA No. 49366-A

Copy No.
49
25X1
This summary of significant reports has been for the internal use of the Office of Current prepared primarily Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.represent the

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re levee 2005101126 : ClA-RDP79T011461b0004003130001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
2.
25X1
Forei n Office re.uests US a oval for visit of The Japanese of its Ja.; ese Foreign Office officials to visit Okinawa officials has requested of the and clearance for three peace treaty with local AmamiOshima to discuss Political Adviser in residents the meaning Tokyo. The Foreign and officials, ments are gaining according to the US Office influence in the local explained that leftist The Foreign ele Office wishes movement against the the delegation Diet session peace treaty. to complete conrenes on 10 October. its trip before the 25X1 Office request. GHQ strongly supports the Foreign Qomment; Diet opposition Jne, if not the major, to the peace treaty objection of the Japanese the status of future is the Governmentts sovereignty over the failure of the document Ryukyus have been to clarify Ryukyus. While leftists in the Foreign Office capitalizing on the desire the to return to Japanese Japanese people the actually may have.designed sovereignty, the trip continuing thereby reducing relationship between the to demonstrate to the Diet opposition to ratification of the Ry-ukyus and Japan, treaty.
Spat:
JAPAN.

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
TOP SECRET
1 Approved For Release 2005101126 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000400300604)6t 51
I.
Approved For Re lse 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0641400300001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
4.
AUSTRIA. Arrests in Czech spy case embarrass US information program: US Legation officials, concerned about the possible loss of US prestige, believe that public announcement of the reasons for the recent arrest of the Linz director of the US-sponsored Red-White-Red Radio Network has quieted widespread speculation that the director was suspected of maladministration. US Army officials in Austria released a statement on 3 October that Director Reischek was taken into custody, together with his wife and family, for interrogation, in connection with the arrest of his sister-in..law as a member of a Czech espionage group. The latter had been a frequent visitor at the director's home and admitted that the mail box at his residence was utilized in the spyring's activities. No connection between Director Reischek and the espionage group, however, has been established, and he and his family have now been re.
leased. I
25X1
Comment! US information in Austria suffered considerable embarrassment recently when the director of Radio Salzburg was dismissed after being charged with defending at a convention in Germany the continuing validity of the soldier's oath to Hitler. The episode was widely discussed in the Austrian pressswhich took vigorous exception to the views expressed by the Salzburg official.
TOP SECRET
2
5 Oct 51
..
..
HR70-14
TzT SECRE'rSUEDNq
3oc-k SI r?oc+
r m i e s on the Korean front appear amear well-supplied: well-sumlied: Communist a armies 3. Communist
I
I
I

r '7" 7 S 3 9.
"the determined def ense, the the expenditure expenditure "the determined defense, o a r t u l e r y and mortar ammunition of artillery and mortar ammunition at a high rate and and the physical .3$6 a ~ f - s a 3 ~ relatively high 3 appearance of of prisoners prisonersof o f war war testify testifyto toadequate, adequate,although althoughnot notabundant, abundant, food (and (and ammunition) ammunition)supply. supply. " Winter Winter clothing clothingi is reported as food '* s reported as having having been issued to been partially issued to Chinese Chinese Communist Communist forces, and and North North K K such issues issuesare a r eexpected expected "in the near future. future. 'I prisoners report such " althoughthe the disease disease rate will rise although risewith with the the coming coming of of supplysituation situationshould shouldkeep keep the the enemy enemy non-battle non-battle w n er, the improved supply casualty rate rate below below that of of last last winter. winter. In i s In a final final comment, comment, it is 'Ithe estimated estimated enemy enemy morale morale and and conibat combat effitiency effikiency along along observed that "the the entire entire front frontranges rangesfrom fromgood good to to excellent. excellent. " I'
6 Oct 51 51
r 1
Comment: These observations Comment: These are in in sharp sharp contrast contrast to to those those are commenting on on the the civilian civilian supply supply situation in North Korea. tends to support the view that combat troops enjoy a I Itends.to priority at atthe theexpense expenseof of the thecivilian civilianpopulation. population. high logistic priority
NR
APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-2010
Approved For Re leas 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0061400310001-4
TOP SECRET
8 October 1951
143
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re !Se 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0061490310001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
um. !lost of production in Soviet Light Industry, The Chief Finance Administration of the Ministry of Light Industry stated in pravda on 25 August that a reduction of 1 percent in production costs would save the government 1 billion 220 million rubles (presumably per year). It was claimed that such a reduction would result in a saving of 300 million
rubles in Moscow Oblast alone. (RI Moscow, Desp 1471 28 Aug 51)
2.
International fur auction held in Leningrad: The 22nd International Fur Auction was held in Leningrad from 23 to 29 July and was attended by buyers from all over the world except the Satellite countries. The furs offered for sale represented about $8,000,000 out of a total USSR annual production of about $40,0000000. Actual sales amounted to some $6,000,000 compared with $7,000,000 in 1950 and $6,000,000 in 1949. CR, Moscow, Desp 115, 16 Aug 51)
Commenta ThP auction is conducted by the organization of the:sale of furs (Soyuzpushnina). Proceedings are in the Russian language and interpreters axe provided for those unfamiliar with the language. Although sales are announced in rubles, payment this year was exclusively in dollars or Swiss francs, while in forther years, pounds or French francs Were also accepted. The annual Leningrad fur auction, formerly conducted in English, has long been an assured source of "hard currency" for the Soviet Union.
3.
25X1C
Rumors that USSR Will sell out East German regime are a plant: has confirmed that the rumors of Soviet willingness to sell out the East German regime in return for German neutrality were a deliberate Communist plant.
Also, contrary to rumors, the Communist Party leaders in East Germany are in a confident mood after having deliberately deceived conservative party leaders into thinking that free elections might really be held. (5, Berlin Desp 5350 4 Oct 51)
Comment: This information reinforces the view that the intent of East German leaders is to stir up discontent in West Germany, not to

TOP SECRET
1
Comments This data indicates that production costs in light industry amount to about 122 billion rubles, of which production Moscow Oblast accounts for 30 billion. Althougft presently unable to evaluate this information, the embassy observes that Moscow Oblast thus appears to account for about one-fourth of the total output of light industry.
8 Oct 51
Approved For Releir 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000490310001-4

TOP SECRET
achieve unity. While some concessions may be made regarding elections in an attempt to embarrass Bonn, it ie unlikely that the USSR will permit free political activity in the Soviet Zone of Germany or international supervision of any elections.
4. 25X1C
.ivilian nersonnel of Soviet Occupation Army in Germany dismissed: General Chuikov has ordered the immediate dismissal.of the entire German auxiliary staff of the Soviet Occupation Army in Germany. For security reasons, shoemakers, tailors, technicians, and kitchen help will be replaced with women from the USSR who have recently arrived in the Soviet Zone.
25X1A
5.
iNTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. Peace Conference to be held in India: The Indian News Chronicle reports that an All India Cultural Conference and Peace Festival will be held in November to which the All India Peace Council has invited "men of literature and music from China." (S, "Joint Weeka, Karachi, 20 Sep 51, U, New Delhi 1098, 24 Sep 51) CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Possibility of a deal to release Oatis discussed by Czechoslovak press: In reporting Ambassador Prochazka's 25 September press conference in the US, the leading Czechoslovak daily Rude Pravo pointed out that (1) "it is not the Ambassador's business to seek terms for Ceti& release, but the business of another party," (2) "it was not proper.to speak about terms because this was the subject for negotiations".but that (3) "no negotiations are possible in the atmosphere intentionally created in the US against Czechoslovakia."
6.
The article also quoted the Ambassador's comment that "reduction in economic pressure might assist in clearing the atmosphere." The 'article concluded that "Czechoslovakia would not give in to any pressure, be it in the Oatis affair or any other case." The US Embassy in Prague considers it significant that the possibility of a deal was discussed in the Czechoslovak press. (R, Prague 273, 2 Oct 51; C, Prague 274, 2 Oct 51)
Comments The Czechoslovak press and official spokesmen have continually emphasized that Czechoslovakia will not yield to US pressure to release Oatis. The US Embassy in Prague, the Belgian Minister in

TOP SECRET
2
The dismissal of some German personnel has been reported previously (see OCI Daily Digest, 14 Sep 51), but never to the extent indicated here. Although it is possible that the recent tightening of security measures could have culminated in a mass dismissal, it is more likely that the above report is exaggerated.
cpmmenta
8 Oct 51
Approved For Releast 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000460310001-4
TOP SECRET
Prague and Ambassador Prochazka have all expressed the opinion that a calmer atmosphere is necessary before negotiations for Oatis' release can be profitably discussed.
7.
HUNGARY. Rumanian and Chinese messages on Hungary's Army Day omit references tb Soviet Unions Congratulatory telegrams received by Defense Minister Farkas from military leaders in the Satellites on the occasion of the Hungarian Army Day 29 September, were unanimous in their praise of the USSR, the Soviet Army and Stalin, except those received from Rumania and China. The messages from Rumanian General Bodnaras and Chinese General Chu Teh omitted all references to the Soviet Army. (R, Budapest 207, 4 Oct 51)
Comments General Bodnaras made up for his negligence by extolling Stalin and the Soviet Union in a speech on Rumanian Army Day 2 October. General Chu Teh, on the other hand, in the only speech on China's National Day, 1 October, failed to refer to the USSR or to Stalin. However, such omissions have been frequent on similar occasions without discernibly affecting Sino-Soviet relations.
,
8.
YUGOSLAVIA. Soviet officials accused of directing Spy rings Twelve Yugoslays and two White Russians accused of espionage and sabotage on behalf of the Soviet Union are currently on trial in Belgrade. "The defendantstwho are engineers, technicians and laborers, include the former President of the Serbian Branch of the Metal Workers' Union. The group is accused of sabotaging, under the direction of Soviet MVD and Embassy officials in Yugoslavia, various Yugoslav works projects. (U, Belgrade 420, 4 Oct 51)
Comments A similar trial of twelve White Russians was held in Belgrade in early August. All of those accused in that case had been under arrest since 1949, and it appears that the present defendants have been under arrest at least a year. These and other recent trials of alleged Cominform agents are apparently part of a widespread campaign to end "administrative,' imprisonments and to grant trials to all accused. Public trials of the Assistant Ministers of Finance and Agriculture and others recently arrested on charges of Cominformism have not been held.
9.
US urges Yugoslav Government to hasten signature of arms aid agreements Ambassador Allen in Belgrade has been instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government that delay in concluding the bilateral military aid agreement will impede deliveries of US military equipment since certain steps cannot be taken until agreement is signed.or until a

TOP SECRET
8 Oct 51 3 Approved ForFWease2001/09/06:CIA4REM379101146A000400310001.4
Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00/11400310001-4

TOP SECRET
Military Aid Advisory Group is functioning at Belgrade. The US has already initiated certain activities to provide Yugoslav military aid which will be thrown off balance seriously if the bilateral agreement and arrangements thereunder are not resolved promptly. If the Yugoslav Government requests that final action be delayed until General Collins arrives in mid-October, it is to be informed that the US does not consider that the treaty requires Collins' personal attention and that he regards it as a subject for political negotiations. (R, Outgoing to Belgrade 361, 5 Oct 51)
Comment: The two aspects of the agreement to which the Yugoslav Government has objected are the proposed size of the US military group to supervise the arms aid program and the manner in which the supervision might be carried out. The US insists that the military staff must initially total at least 30 but has assured the Yugoslav Government that the supervision will be coordinated with Yugoslav military
staffs.
10.
;MD loan negotiations nearing completion: A Yugoslav foreign trade official has informed a French official in Belgrade that Yugoslav negotiations for a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are now being finalized in Washington. The first installment will be made available immediately subject to several, conditions, including an overall debt ceiling during the next twenty years of $3,700,000. US economic officials in Belgrade point out this wauld appear to indicate that the IBRD loan to Yugoslavia will be considerably less than the $200,000,000 contemplated and may adversely affect the planned approaches to fourth countries to postpone their collection of Yugoslav debts. CS, Belgrade TOECA 160, 1 Oct 51)
Comments In accordance with tthe US-UK-France economic aid program for Yugoslavia, the three powers have agreed (1) to meet Yugoslavia's economic needs through January 1952 which they estimate will approximate $125,000,000, (2) to share this burden among themselves and to obtain the assistance if possible, of fourth countries, and (3) to mesh the short-term aid program with a long term program under consideration by the IBRD. If Yugoslavia fails to obtain at least a substantial portion of $200,000,000 contemplated, the Western problem of shoring up the Yugoslav economy will be greatly increased and fourth countries may not be willing to participate.
U.
25X1C
Deportations to Bulgaria continue: Refugees from Yugoslavia arriving in Trieste report that 30 White Russian families in Belgrade were arrested recently by the secret police and then expelled over the Bulgarian border, indicate that as a result of

TOP SECRET
4
8 Oct 51

TOP SECRET
this incident a certain degree of panic is evident among the White Russian population there. The US political advisor, in Trieste reports that of the 598 refugees arriving in Trieste during Septenter only twelve were White Russians, as compared with 25 in August and 48 in July. (S, Trieste 370, 5 Oct 51)
Comments The expulsion of undesirable persons from Yugoslavia into Cominform countries was stopped a year ago after which an in creased flow of refugees into Trieste was noted. Apparently recent US representations to decrease the number of improperly licensed refugees sent to Trieste have prompted the Yugoslav authorities to resume de portations to the Cominform countries.

TOP SECRET
5
8 Oct 51
Approved For ReleA.e2001/09/Cleth Cgdpf79T01146A000448310001-4
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
IRAN. New Governor General appointed for Azerbaijan: The Iranian ernment announced on 4 October the appointment govof General Zakhrai Shahbakti as Governor General of the northwestern province of Azerbaijan. (U Tehran 1279, 4 Oct 51)
2 INDONESIA.
be
Re resentative to To o sa a coo eration with Ja an wotild rofitable to Indonesiaz Ambassador Sudjono, chief of the Indonesian delegation to Tokyo but currently in Djakarta, stated in a press interview that he believes Japan to be almost countries for raw materials and incapable completely dependent upon other of becoming a military threat. He said that for these reasons it is possible to place credence Japan's good faith in establishing in Sudjono feels that trade relations friendly relations with Indonesia. with Japan would be most profitable to Indonesia. (U Djakarta 525, 4 Oct 51)
Comment: Sudjono was a delegate to the and, with other members of the delegation, San Francisco conference is now in Indonesia to help the government awing political and popular sentiment in favor of ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. His remarks to the press, although including no mention of the treaty, were undoubtedly directed toward its favorable consideration.
3.
LE_RMA/Ialsil No a ends ado ted for Nu-Nehru meet : high official of the Indian According to a oreign Binistry, no agenda has been deloted for consideration a-during the forthcoming visit to India ourmese Frime Minister. of the The Indian official assumed, however, there would be an exchange of ideas that regarding the Japanese peace treaty and ChineSe Nationalist troops in northern Burma. When queried whether security might be discussed, he replied that it was unlikely India had neither men nor materiel to since risk in Burma, which was "so woefully weak." (S New Delhi 1252, 5 Oct 51)
Comment: India's inability and/or unwillingness the Burmese Government to aid materia4y in its struggle tainly known to the Chinese Communists, against Communism is almost cerand consequently tends to make Burma an increasingly attractive area for Communist machinations.

TN' SECRET
Comment: The removal on 19 September of General Shahbakti's predecessor, the anit-Communist Dr. Iqbal, led to fears that a newappointee might be less capable and less efficient in governing this chronically troublescme area bordering on the Soviet Union. Shahbakti however, held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forcellin Azerbaijan in 1949 and was acting civil governor of the province in 1950. appears to be respected by the people He of Azerbaijan and during his term of office had strong popular support. He is considered to the US. not unfriendly

8 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A01304003100014

TOP SECRET
4.
25X1C
INDONESIA. Oil industry is one of SOBSI's main targetst One of the main organizational targets of SOBSI, Communist-dominated labor federation is the Indonesian oil industry. Communist elemen s plan to cut down oil production through strikes and other disturbances, gain complete domination over the oil workers and strenuously advocate nationalization of the oil industry.
25X1C
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: A congress of Indonesian oil workers held in Djakarta from 20 to 27 July resulted in the formation of a federation of Oil workers--PERBUM--which voted immediately to affiliate with SODSI. Although non-Communist elements withdrew from the new organization, it is estimated that SOBS/ has gained control of at least half of the oil workers in Indonesia.
There have been no strikes or unusual disturbances, however, in the oil industry since the formation of the SOBS/ federation.
5.
INDOCHINA US Legation sees long French struggle against Viet Minh: The US Charge in Saigon notes that most French officers and foreign attaches in Indochina do not agree with General de Lattre's recent estimate that he might be able to defeat the Viet Minh within two years. HA quotes the British Army Attache as estimating that a Viet Minh defeat is not possible in the foreseeable future. The US Charge further asserts that a deterioration of Viet Minh morale cannot be assumed and that, in any case, there is no present indication that their military strength is declining. (S Saigon 763) 4 Oct 51)
Commentl: During the past ten months Viet Minh military strength in relation to that of the French has decreased. There are clear indications of deteriorating morale among the civilian population in Viet Minh areas. Military morale has probably been similarly affected. France's. present military commitment in Indochina is straining its resources severely, and any conspicuous decline in Viet Minh strength probably would result in political pressure.in France for the reduction of this commitment. Such a reduction would again shift the balance in favor of the Viet Minh.
6.
Viet Minh leadership alleged to be half Chinese: A Chinese source in Saigon has informed US Charge Gullion that approximately half of the higher Viet Minh staff leadership is now composed of Chinese Communist officers with heavy admixture in the quartermaster, medical, and other service corps. On the other hand, the source believes that Chinese seldom provide field leadership.

TOP SECRET
7
8 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : ClA-RDP79T01146406400310001-4

TOP SECRET
The same informant states that the assignment of some 50 Chinese political advisers has aroused the emotions of the "hypernationalistic" active Viet Minh, and that the tendency of these advisers to avoid the at "headquarters" in Caobang has coca - fronts and spend all their time (C Saigon 777, 5 Oct 51) dAmed Sine -Viet Minh friction; Chinese Communist perConnent: Reports of the participation of received with increasing frequency sonnel in the Viet Minh have been for more than a year-and a half. Chinese advisers numbering, according Minh to the French,lietween 5,000 and 10,000 have been assigned to Viet Chinese soldier or adviser has ever units down to company level, but no been identified, dead or alive. French Air Force aids in beating off Viet Minh: Enemy attacks on the outer defenses of the post of Nghla Lo in western Tonkin have been beaten off. The airstrip at Nghia Le, which the French are have been now confident of holding, is still in use and French aircraft 1,000 killed, 2,000 Viet Minh losses are estimated at very active. (S Hanoi 216, 5 Oct 51) wounded.
.
7.
Comment: The French appeei to have put up a better defense of Nghia Le than they themselves anticipated in view df the fact that they Were apparently willing two weeks ago to write off this and other posts in western Tonkin whose loss "would not affect the basic situation." It is believed that the capture of Nghia Lo was attempted by the Viet Minh as a morale-booster, as well as a source of rice and opium.
8.
25X1C
CHINA. Military transport in South China increases: Chinese Communist military trans ortation in Fukien province has increased since last The army recently requisitioned 50 August, civilian motor vehicles and 3W teats for moving military supplies in south Fukien. More supplies of food, medical goods, arse and ammunition are arriving in south Fukien than the quantitie s normally used by the garrisons there.
Comment: The Fukien coast is a babe for projected operations against Formosa and Nationalist-held off-shore islands. Howeveri no significant increase in Communist troop strength in the area has been noted recently, and there are no confirmed reports of a recent logistic build-up.
.

TOP SECRET
25X1A
9.
Peiping denounces "abuse of workers by cadres": The Peiping dePeople's Daily (the Chinese equivalent of ?ravda) has editorially The ednounced the "abuse of workers by cadres" in Chahar Province. itorial points out that some cadres --i.e., Communist Party and government
Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CILRDP79T01146A000400310001-4 Oct 51
Approved For Re larte 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000060310001-4

TOP SECRET
functionaries - -still "harbor reactionary thinking...and (an) erroneous attitude toward the working people." (R FBID flimsy, 4 Oct 51) Comment: This recurrent problem illustrates the dilemma of the "workers" - -regarded in theory as the backbone of the "revolution," in
practice Although expected Party as
to be broken to the purposes of the regime as rapidly as possible. the theory reasserts itself periodically, Chinese workers can be to become as completely vulnerable to the arbitrary will of the have the Soviet workers.
10.
COmment: The Korean war has added to the economic problems of the Communists. Since June 1950 the Chinese Communists have found it increasingly difficult to import necessary industrial supplies such as cotton and petroleum from the West, have had to order the temporary closing of factories and have severely strained the government budget by the sharp increase in military expenses. Nevertheless, the picture presented by the Nationalist press is overdrawn. Localized famines, floods and other disasters are a traditional feature of the Chinese scene and are not more serious today than they were in 1949 and 1950. Shortages of industrial supplies formerly imported from the West continue, but the Communists point to their increased trade with the Orbit countries as a "serious blow" to the Western export controls. Insofar as government finances are concerned, Peiping has so far been fairly successful in containing the inflationary pressures resulting from deficit financing. The weight of evidence is that, despite the current stresses to the Chinese economy, financial insolvency and collapse of the country's economic structure do not constitute imediate threats to the authority of the Peiping regime.
11.
Communists may try to sell Liberty ship: The Hai Hsuan, a Liberty ship claimed by both the Nationalists and Communists and detained in Singapore since 1950 by the British when its crew defected from the Nationalists to the Communists, May be offered by the Communists for sale. Inquiries regarding the purchase of the vessel reportedly have been made by an Italian firm, London shipbrokers, and the Hong Kong shipping firm of Wallem and Company. (S Singapore 392, 1 Oct 51)
Comment: The US holds a mortgage interest on this vessel, and has requested the Britiskto detain it at Singapore.

TOP SECRET
Peiping regime reported on verge of bankruptcy: Nationalist news dispatches allege that natural disasters are playing havoc With the Chineee Red economy and that the Communist government is on the verge of bankruptcy. Floods, famines, lodusts and epidemics are reported. Because of the decline in overseas remittances, the regime is in urgent need of foreign exchange. The Korean military adventure has brought a government deficit totaling more than half of the total budget. (U Reuters Taipei, 4 Oct 51)
Approved For Release 2001/09/069. CIA-RDP79T01146A000400310001t1Oet
Approved For Relcpse 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009400310001-4

TOP SECRET
The projected sale of the vessel to a third party may have been suggested as a method for facilitating clearanee of the vessel from Singapore. Such a sale could be merely a paper transaction which would not affect Communist possession of the vessel. Wallem and Company, for example, would act as registered owner of the vessel, but the Chinese Communists would retain beneficial ownership.
12.
25X1C
25X1C
escribed as "extremely cooperative, sincere ... a vast store of information. ..." He is considered by his interro ator as "a re iable source of information,"
wxn
25X1A
KOREA. Chinese Communist deserter reports observing Soviets in North KoreaManchUria this summer and fall: A Chinese ComMunist deserter, with the rank of Lt. Col., reports observing in Manchuria 3,000 troops "believed Soviets and dresied in CCF uniforms mounting trains destined for Korea" in June, 1951. In late August, 1951, he claims to have observed in Pyongyang"one Russian AA regiment moving south" with more than "200 pieces of AAA (=idiom caliber) drawn by trucks .." The prisoner further reported that a Chinese Commu-' nist company-grade political officer had informed him that an "unknown number of Polish troops had arrived in Korea."
25X1A
This is the first high-grade source who has reported the presence of organized Soviet units in Korea, It is currently accepted that a "considerable" number of Soviets are performing a variety of functions in North Korea, probabZy including the serving of anti-aircraft guns. The prisoneros information concerning "Polish troops" is hearsay and cannot be confirmed.
Comment:
13 .
Communis s pursue accusations of Japanese troops in UN forces: A 5 October Peiping broadeast in English relates the details 'of the 'capture and interrogation of "Yasui Tatsubumi", an alleged Japanese "volunteer" fighting with the ROK 1st Division on the western front. The Communists claim that their captive, an unemployed tailor from the Osaka area, was recruited by US authorities in September 1950, together with over 1,000 other Japanese. It ie further alleged that the prisoner was from the "third batch" and that two previous groups of 1,000 each had proceeded him into Korea. (R FBID Ticker Peiping, 5 Oct 51)
Comment:
South-Z:0;Z who was trained in Japan with either the US 3rd or the 7th
Division during the summer and fall of 1950. While this office has no direct knowledge of this, an additional possibility exists that Koreans
TOP SECRET
10
It appears very likely that the Communists have captured a
8 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00QA00310001-4

TOP SECRET
residing in Japan (who would possess a Japanese name) were also recruited for this force.
14.
15.
South Korea to receive Japanese ships: The recent amouncement by SOAP that all ships registered in Korea on 9 August 1945 were to be returned by Japan to Korean ownership was greeted with considerable satisfaction in ROK government circles. (ROK estimates place the amount of shipping in this category at 33,000 tons.) In view of the fact that the ROK will continue to press for the return of all Japanese ships, regardless of registry, in Korean waters on that day, Ambassador Muccio feels that quick action on the part of SCA') and the Japanese in returning ships so as to present tangible evidence might "placate Korean sensitivity." (a Pusan 316, 5 Oct 51)
Comment: The return of shipping cLsimed by the Koreans has been a bone of contention in the ROK since the end of World War II. A complication may arise in relation to the agreed-upon return from the provision that ships will be turned over as and where they are. The Koreans feel that the Japanese will claim most ships in this classification have been sunk and are therefore unreturnable.
16.
JAPAN. Socialists may support peace treaty: The Socialist paxt's Central Executive Committee has voted to reverse the Party's former policy by deciding to support the Japanese peace treaty in the coming Diet session. The Committee voted, however, to continue its opposition to the USJapan Security Treaty. The decisions are still subject to approval by a party convention slated for 23 October. (R FBID Ticker, 5 Oct 51)
Comment: This is obviously an effort at a compromise which will avoid a split between the left and right wings of the party. The right wing, which has recently been strengthened by the addition of several important depurgeee, for several months has favored a change in the partyls peace treaty policy, but until now it has been unable to force such a change. Socialist opposition to the peace treaty is out of step with current public opinion.

TOP SECRET
Communist armies on the Korean front appear well-supplied: The US Far East Command observes that "the determined defense, the expenditure of artillerY and mortar ammunition at a relatively high rate and the physical appearance of prisoners of war testify to adequate, although not abundant, food (and ammunition) supply." Winter clothing is reported as having been partially issued to Chinese Communist forces, and North Korean prisoners report such issues are expected "in the near future." FECOM also notes that although the disease rate will rise with the coming of winter, the improved supply situation should keep the enemy non-battle casualty rate below that of last winter. In a final comment, it is observed that "the estimated enemy morale and combat efficiency along the entire front ranges from good to excel lent." (S CINCFE Telecon 5232, 6 Oct 51)
Approved For Release 2001/09/0a CIA-RDP79T01146A0004003100014 Oct 51
Approved For Re Ise 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q600310001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
Comment: It seems unlikely that Friessner, who has been described by Germans as politically stupid," will last long as head of his veterans' association. There is growing sentiment among veterans that they are not well represented by former generals.

TOP SECRET
12
GERMANY. Veterans' chief is criticized for impolitic statements: Ex-General Johannes Friessner, chairman of the Association of German Soldiers, a new veterans' organization, is now under fire for his remarks concerning war criminals, the 1944 plot against Hitler, and the German invasion of Poland. In regard to the attack on Hitler, he stated that he was opposed to political murder; on war crimes, he did not believe that members of the German armed forces had ever committed any; and he felt that the attack on Poland was justified since there was no other way to solve the problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. These remarks were not carried by the major newspapers, although secondary organs reported them along with strong criticism. Ths remarks also caused some agitation in labor and church circles, and at its 2 October session the Bonn Cabinet issued a statement criticizing Friessnerls organization, defending participants in the plot against Hitler, and promising aid to their dependents; The Government again stressed its view that political activities are not the task of veterans' organizations, (0 Bonn unnumbered, 29 Sep 51)
25X1C
2.
25X1C
25X1A
Official distribution of East German budget plans limited: East German budget plans for this year are not being printed and disseminated generally to the various government ministries. The alleged reason is that information concerning expenditures might leak out and be interpreted, presumably in anti-Communist propaganda, as funds earmarked for rearmament. Each ministry will receive only the section of the budget apolicable to its function and must kee. this section under lock and key. Comment: This restriction is probably part of a general effort to tighten security.
3.
FRANCE, France may review German policy in light of East derman unity proposals: uS officials in Berlin are seriously concerned lest the tast German "unity" campaign lead the French to reconsider their German policy. According to reports from the office of the US High Commissioner in Berlin, French officials in Berlin believe that the USSR is now ready to accept free elections under four-power control in order to achieve demilitarization of the whole of Germany. The East German press "is making a persistently strong play for French support of a demilitarized united Germany," and "most
8 Oct 51
Approved For Rease 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146M0400310001-4

TOP SECRET strongly attracted observers" in Berlin believe that the Germans would be the price of" demilitarization. truly free elections "at by an opportunity for
reports that the French The concern of the US officials is heightened by issued by the Foreign Office possesses "secret instructions," purportedly, in the Saar directing that Germans living West German Chancellor's office, reunion of these encouraged to look forzsrd to a and Alsace-Lorraine be that these "instructions" areas viith the Reich. The US officials suggest efforts atned at the French. may be another form of Communist deceptive 544, 5 oct 51) (S Berlin 543, 5 oct 51; R Berlin reconsidering Comment: While the French Government is not known to be proposals, French of the East German "unity" its German policy as a result possibility of a political circles have shown widespread interest in the toward ft new Soviet diplomatic initiative" which might be particularly directed political reported opinions of "certain
France. The pro-Government press has personalities" that such an initiative is "plausible." The mounting defense foreign burden is already forcing the French to reconsider many of their instability of the present regime policy commitments, and the increasing still strong Foreign Office for ignoring the weakens the capabilities of the misgivings in France concerning German remilitarization.
U.
France wants to increase tnports from the Soviet bloc: Although the French Foreign Office denies that it is seeking another Econanic Commission past two weeks for Europe meeting on East-West trade, French officials in the for more imports have been putting increasing emphasis on their country's need from the Soviet bloc. A general France-USSR commercial treaty was signed in.early September, The Soviet and the two countries are now negotiating for its implementation. and large quantities of copper wire. Union particularly desires textiles (S Paris 1985, 3 Oct 51)
Comment: At the August Economic Commission for Europe meeting onEasttrade West trade, the French were arridolls to explore all possibilities of They wanted to prevent the Soviets with the USSR in non-critical items. from charging France with the failure of the talks but they also had legitimate commercial motives. At the same meeting, the USSR showed an interest in obtaining from France steam boilers, lead and other metals, reinforcing rods, ships, and machinery. The French themselves are faced
with a copper shortage. When the US made inquiries about the French agreement in June to give the the Poles ball bearings, French officials replied that they reserved right to export limited quantities of critical items to the Orbit when necessary to obtain vital imports such as coal.

TOP SECRET 13
8 Oct 51
Approved For Rehearse 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00111400310001-4

TOP SECRET
S.
AUSTRIA. US prepared to grant entry to Soviet correspondents: After some 67517-eration of the possibility ot extracting equal concessions from the Soviet Headquarters) US officials in Vienna decided to issue entry permits to three Soviet correspondents desiring to cover a meeting of the Austrian Peace Council in Salzburg. This decision followed an offtherecord Meeting of the American press corps in Vienna where it was unanimously agreed that the Soviet visit to the US Zone should be authorized. American correspondents argued that even if no admittance of American press men to the Soviet Zone was granted in exchange, favorable,action on Soviet applications would deprive Soviet propagandists of an issue, and would provide.useful contrast to anticipated Soviet policy. (S Vienna 1216, 3 Oct 51)
Comment: US admission of Soviet correspondents to the US Zone is not believed likely to achieve a more liberal Policy on the part of the Soviet authorities. US officials in Vienna, however, have been searching for some leverage which might encourage the Soviet Headquarters to improve its attitude toward US applications to transit the Soviet Zone to the British sector. Soviet refusals of such applications appear to be entirely whimsical-1 sug gesting that Soviet actions may reflect bargaining or retaliatory motives, or both.
6.
ITALY. Italian Communists strike new note in attack on Church: Italian naThist chief Togliatti, in recent speeches at Bologna and Milan, charged that the Church is largely responsible for the present situation in which the Government "dared to develop its reactionary policies in favor of the privileged classes." Prior to these speeches, . Togliatti had tended rather to softpedal the Church issue, and he gave the impression that he did not wish to collide headon with thn Church. .He has Always pretended, however, to distinguish between the Church "hierarchy" and the mass of Roman Catholic believers who are "victims" of the "class" policy pursued by the Vatican.
(C Rothe 1508, 1 Oct 51; C Rome 1450, 25 Sep 51)
Comment: Togliattils remarks are presumably in answer to the recent encyclical of Pope Pius branding Communism as "the infernal enemy." The Vatican has increasingly attempted to counter Communist charges of "class" policy by issuance of papal encyclicals stressing the need for social reform.
7.
Although about 99 percent of the Italians are Roman Catholic, some 50 percent do not consistently practice their religion. Experts believe that anticlericalism is increasing in Italy.
UNITED KINGDOM. Latest poll shows Conservative margin reduced: According o the latest published Gallup survey, the Conservatives' margin of popular support over the Labor Party has declined from eleven to_seven percent during a week.: Of those who have decided how they will vote, the survey shows that

TOP SECRET
14
8 Oct 51
Approved For Re la 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400310001-4

TOP SECRET
50,5 percent will vote Conservative, 43.5 percent will vote Labor, 5.5 percent ) Will vote Liberal, and 0.5 percent will support other parties. Further questioning of the 11.5 percent who were undecided did not materially affect these figures. Answers to subsidiary questions suggest that two factors currently working to Labor's advantage are a popular belief continue to rise regardless of the outcome of the elections that prices will and a greater confidence in Labor's ability to avoid war, (R London 1677, 5 oct 51)
Comment: This trend, if continued, would soon upset the Conservatives? long-standing advantage reported by the Gallup poll, which proved very accurate in the last two general elections. Just the previous week, however, there had been a slight trend favoring the Conservatives, and this latest survey was taken before the publicity attendant upon the British evacuation of Abadan and before the beginning of the regular campaigning.
8.
DENMARK.
order, and that orders issued in the name of the King, the Government, or senior military authorities telling the men not to mobilize or not 'to offer resistance or to desist in mobilizing or fighting "must be regarded as false." The instruction commands the troops to continue fighting, however hopeless the situation appears, in: order to permit other forces either in Denmark or elsewhere to organize; threats of reprisals are to be ignored. The Minister of Defense, in his radio broadcast announcing the issuance of the orders, stated, however, that the publication of the orders does not imply that the Government has adopted a more pessimistic view concerning the international situation. (FBIS, Copenhagen, Danish Home Service, 4 Oct 51)
.
arriFued instructions to the armed forces that The Ministry of Defense an enemy attack is to be regarded as a mobilization
Comment: This vigorous statement is long overdue and should have a salutary effect on Danish morale and will to resist. The Norwe.gian Government issued a similar directive in June 1949, The Defense Minister's emphasis that orders do not reflect any new anxiety 6n the part of the Danish Government indicates the sensitivity of Danish public opinion to alarmist statements.

Government issues no-surrender orders: TOP SECRET
15
25X1C
9.
.25X1C
ARGENTINA. Army may ask Peron to resign: Minister of the Army Lucero, representing a committee of high-ranking military leaders, asked Peron to resign on 24 September, but the issue was postponed because of the 28 September revolt. The committee was considering reopening the issue with Peron on 5 October, because they want to announce the candidacy of Colonel (retired) Domingo Mercante and ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia on 11 October. lucero wants the o e effected constitutionally and 25X1A without violence, none of the a be counted on to defen ron,
8 Oct 51
Approved For Re Ate 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00490310001-4

TOP SECRET
Comment:
The extent to which'the armed forcesond especially the army, arbiter, are prepared to press the ouster of Peron at this time is not known.
which-Ii-rEFfinal
This report, if true, mould indicate an advancement in timing of army plans which originally called for support for Peron through postponing a decision on the future the elections, course of action regarding him. are reports that Mercante There and the army will attempt a coup in but in the past the army has attempted the future, to avoid bloodshed. Considerable maneuvering and political tension can be expected to continue until well after the elections. In the meantime Peron has increased his security measures.
la.
EL SAIWADOR. Defense Minister rumored stalling on US air mission while negotiating wi C e: he Am assa or o E Sa va or reports from two important rumors sources that the Salvadoran Minister of Defense is stalling on the renewal of the US military aviation mission and is at the same time negotiating with Chile for a similar mission. The Ambassador requests authorization to press for an immediate commitment from the Defense Minister. (C San Salvador l04, 4 Oct 51) Comment: Defense Minister Bolanos has never been especially toward the US, and last year he friendly arranged for a Chilean mission to take wicet of the instruction over at the US-run Salvadoran War School. While the VIP tzeatment accorded Bolanos on his recent and only trip to the Canal Zone was reported as having "improved the US," it is likely that the Minister Salvadoran military attitude toward the is still displeased mission whioh he has long blamed with the US air for the continued inefficiency of Salvadoran air force. the
In view of the fact that the US Embassy in Chile reports of Chilean-Salvadoran no knowledge negotiations and expresses doubt furnish such assistance, it that Chile could is possible that Bolanos manufactured to provide himself the rumors with a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the W. In early September he told the US Ambassador that he wanted sorhe in the text of the agreement changes in order to avoid "certain difficulties arose during the which commands of the last two chiefs of air mission and to obtain other technical military advantages." On the other hand, and in view of Salvador's increasing that the US may have to accept sense of "national dignity," it is possible the presence of a competing mission of some kind, even though Chilean air it might be technically the US mission. far inferior to

TOP SECRET
16
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00040031619PA
ET
- UNCLASSIFIED when itisjii-OratliE6RERekieseti9044063/09021kAiRDRZWF9I446A0G014110340204a4 dr declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

SOURCE DOC. NO.
REG I STRY
CIA CONTROL NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RE ..E I VED
ql 3(e
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
Or classified Tap Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside o/ CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Toy Secret Control personnel and those individuals Whose Official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /Ortn and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECE I VED
5 I GNATURE
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATUR E OFF ICE /D I V.

DATE
T I ME
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detacl ed from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Toy Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
DESTROYED
D 1 SPATCHED
TO
By (Signature)
(OUTSIDE CIA )
BY
(Signature)
W I TNESSED BY
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
(40)
OFF ICE
AN:froved For 416Wse 2001/09/06 : Cr/VhDP79TO 9:(6:(0004003100014

wig imusViewo lllll pas.
"bit
13.73
26
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0M00310001-4
TOP SECRET
6 October 1951 CIA No. 49367-A

Copy No.
49

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
IRAN, British Government split on naval blockade of Iran: There are divergent views within the British Government over the wisdom and legality of a naval blockade of future Iranian oil shipments, according to the US Ambassador in London. (S, S/S London 1599, 2 Oct 51).
Comment: A blockade of Abadan would be an effective way of denying to Iran the benefits of oil nationalization. Lack of unanimity among the British on this subject, however, suggests that they will make no immediate attempt to use military force against Iran in connection with the oil issue.
40
INDIA/CHINA. Panikkar makes representations on behalf of US nationals in China: Indian Ambassador Panikkar on 2 October made representations on behalf of US nationals in Communist China to Chen Chia-kang, Director of the Asian Section of Peiping's Foreign Office. Chen in turn alleged that thousands of overseas Chinese were being detained in foreign countries, especially in Southeast Asia, but finally promised to investigate the cases on the Ambassador's list. The Indian Foreign Office, relaying the above conversation to the US Embassy in NeW Delhi, noted that Panikkar was the only mission chief in Peiping who had personalli made representations for US nationals. (S, S/8 New Delhi 1221, 3 Oct 51).
Comment: Chen Chia -kang is one of several Chinese Communist figures, assigned during and after World War II to liaison duties with American and other Western personnel, who acquired a reputation for being amiably disposed toward the US. There is no evidence, however, that he, a second level functionary, is genuinely pro-Western. It is therefore doubtful that he either would or could do anything to improve the status of US nationals in Communist China.
3.
BURMA/CHINA, Chinese UN delegate discusses withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma: During a conversation with the US representative in the UN, the Chinese Nationalist delegate indicated surpriee at a report that the Burmese Government might allow Nationalist troops to withdraw from Burma rather than insist upon their disarmament and internment. The Nationalist official believed that, if this report is true, his government might be willing to undertake the removal of the troops in question from Burma. (S, S/S New York 417, 4 Oct 51). the Burmese are of surrender and of internal the Chinese
Comment: All previous information has indicated that adamant in their refusal to agree to any settlement short internment. It is possible, however, that in the interest secUtity, the Burmese are now willing to risk antagonizing Communists by permitting the Nationalists to leave Burma,

TOP SECRET
8 Oct 51
Approved For Re Itee 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0(1900310001-4

TOP SECRET
JAPAN/CHINA. British diplomat suggests postponement of Japanese recognition of China: Sir Esler Bening, who has been designated as Britain's first post-war Ambassador to Japan, believes that it would be to Japan's best interests to refuse to establish diplomatic relations with either the Taipei or Peiping regimes "until the situation clarifies." In an informal conversation with the US Political Adviser in Tokyo, the British diplomat expressed the opinion that a Japanese "nommitment" to Taipei undoubtedly would cause later embarrassment, "especially since the Chinese Nationalists are incapable of reestablishing their ho/d on the Chinese mainland."
4.
The US Political Adviser adds that Bening ie proposing to call on Prime Minister Yoshida within the next few-days, and that it is safe to assume he will advance this idea in an endeavor to influence the Japanese course of action on Chinese recognition. (S, S/S Tokyo 684, 4 Oct 51).
Comment: While the Japanese Government has given assurance that it will not deal diplomatically with the Communist regime, there are indications that it would be amenable to any suggestion that Japan's recognition of the Nationalists likewise be postponed. This attitude is based both on a desire to maintain a limited, non-strategic trade with Communist China, and on a desire to avoid this controversial issue. Japan will undoubtedly continue, as it has in the past, to support the Nationalists in various international organizations,
5.
JAPAN. End-use checks to be Japanese responsibility: The Departments of State and Army are proposing to transfer responsibility to the Japanese Government for end-use checks on certain less strategic List II and List II -B commodities, which on the basis of past experiance have not presented probleths of diversion. These end-use checks would be conducted by the Japanese overseas agencies whenever feasible; otherwise, a request would be submitted via US diplomatic channds. The purpose of the change is to enable SCAP to instruct the Japanese and supervise their initial operations in preparation for the termination of the Occupation. (C, S/S Tokyo 544, 4 Oct 51).
Comments Japan's foreign trade officials are well aware of the necessity to maintain strict compliance with Western export controls, especially in view of Japan's great dependence upon the West for vital imports. Some, though not extensive, leakage can be expected through smuggling and bribery of customs officials.
6,
Press leaks on security treaty attributed to Liberal Partys Several recent Japanese press reporta concerning the alleged administrative details of the US-Japan security treaty may well be a calculated attempt of the Japanese Government to make known its views on the provisions in the hope of influencing discussions in Washington, according to the US Political TOP SECRET
2
8 Oct 51
Approved For RelEse 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0441400310001 -4

TOP SECRET
Adviser in Tokyo. These leaks, although may be emanating attributed to the Foreign from Liberal Party Office, Japan's role, the American sources. Since the repOrts play up official believes that the tempting to foster the Liberals may be atminimize apprehension impression that Japan is an equal partner, that Japan is giving Tokyo 764, 4 Oct 51), the US a blank check. and thus (C, S/S
Comment: The Government's of the security pact inability to release is causing officially the details pressions of conern lest Japan considerable criticism, together with exhas agreed to extend to the US. Although many of the extra-territorial general principles have Japan and the.US, final rights been agreed on by cussions in Washington. details are now undergoing inter-departmental dis-
:7.
AUSTRIA. Government official says Austrian arrest casess public blames US in SovietA high-ranking of the Austrian Austrian official, speaking in the presence Cabinet, has informed spread public Minister Donnelly that there dissatisfaction on the subject is widewhose anti-Soviet of. Soviet activities are popularly arreste of Austrians US operations in Austria. believed to be State Secretary Graf of the associated with referred in particular to the arrest Ministry of Interior of Austrians anti-Soviet.propaganda, and to a charged with recent case distributing protective custody to in which US authorities granted to Graf, the Austrian persons suspected of anti-Soviet activities. According pUblic believes US operations these peop/e. are unnecessarily exposing Einister Donnelly denied any knowledge of these the Austrian complainants that these activities and assured US agency in Austria. operations did not originate with any anti-Soviet activities The US Legation, however, expresses concern that, when go wrong, US for such activities officials in Vienna, whether pUblic discredit andor not, are forced to responsible to minimize serious take protective measures to 4 Oct 51), avoid difficulties. (TS,S/S Vienna 1239, Comments The Communist "revelations" that Austrians press hae recently given wide play to alleged arrested for anti-Soviet tions from US/OIC (see OCI Daily actions received instrucprotest is an apparent Digest, 4 Sep 51). The official reply to US Justice, under Austrian pressure from Soviet complaints that the Austrian Austrian prisoner from authorities, agreed to the Ministry of transfer of an prison. The Austrian a jail in the US sector of Vienna to a Soviet Zone Government, alleging that arena for international its country has become an disassociate themeelves espionage, has frequently urged Austrian from such activities. citizens to

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004003100014
8 Oct 51
Approved For Re Mate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000310001-4

TOP SECRET
8.
UNITED KINGDOM. British name Gaitskell to NATO Temporary Council Committees Chancellor of the Exchequer Gaitskell will be the official UK member of the NATO Temporary Council Committee; but activities in connection with the im pending election will require him to leave a great deal of the work to Sir. Edwin Plowden, chief planning officer of the Treasury. These two will be supported by three experts, one economic, one military, and one political, and will be ftrther supported by an interministerial group under Treasury chairmanship. W. Averell Harriman, the US member of the Committee, con siders the British personnel arrangements excellent. (8, S/8 London DEPTO 397, 3 Oct; S, 8/8 TODEP 212 to London, 4 Oct 51).
Comments The Temporary Council Committee was establiehed by the North . Atlantic Council at Ottawa to.prepare a coordinated analysis of NATO defense plans with the special aim of reconciling the requirements of external security with the politicoeconomic capabilities of the member countries. The Committee will report by 1 December to the next Council meeting to be held in Rome. Commonly referred to as the "apostles," its members are individuals appointed by the 12 member governments, of which three;Harriman Gaitskell, and Monnet for France -- the "wise men") form an Executive Bureau to spearhead the work.

TOP SECRET
8 Oct 51
HR70-14 HR70-14
IMPACT OF WAR WAR ON NORTH KOREAN CMUANS CIVILIANS THE IWACT
The North Korean civilian o i v i l i m population PO u l a t i o n is suffering suffering from a serious serious d deterioration e t e r i o r a t i o n in in living l i v i n g standards, standards
The situation, s i t u a t i o n , which whioh has has been been described desoribed ati,"oatastrophic" RS ,"I)atastrophio't bye. by a Czeohoslovakian diplomat arises the Ceeohoelovakian diplomat in i n Pyongyang, Pyongyang, apparently a r i s e s from t h e cumu, o m lative bombing, t the necessity of' of p partially l a t i v e effect e f f e a t Of of ceaseless oeaseless UN bombing, h e neoeesity artially sUpporting half a million, million, and t the supporting an e n armY army in i n excess of half h e severe reduotion in i n the t h e agrioultural agrioul-bural population. population.

The impaot i m p a o t of o f tthe h e war war has probabl pro ablv the t h e Urban urbaa. add and industrial i n d u s t r i a l workers. wrkers.
i
available, that will available, it is believed t h a t the tihe coming ooming fall f a l l harvest W i l l be smaller than t h a n the t h e adMittedlY admittedly poor crop of 1950. 1960. Major factors f a o t o r s contributing to to suoh i l l be the l aok o f any appreoiable amount of eueh a a shortage ehortage w Will lack of of chemical chemioal fertilizers; f e r t i l i z e r s , eerious serious fleod flood conditions conditione throughout muoh of o f North Korea, Korea, a a l liCk-of:adequite a c k of:adequate 'seed, eeed, and and t h the e ocritical r i t i o a l shortage shortage of of farm farm labor labor and and farm farm aniMils. 'Deapite the that will be anhals. Despite t h e statement t h a t there there ~511 "enough tO eat,"-other evidence points tto the oontrary! cOntrary. A "enough t o eat," other evidenoe'points o the A recent reaent interinternal propaganda oampaign has been oontinuously oontinnously'urging farmers nal urging North Korean f armere "tax payments in i n kind" promptly. promptly. t o make their t h e i r "tax to
fd.2~1 inordiu%el&yilv ~
Major shortages shortages have have developed developed as a8 a a result r e s u l t of of the t h e near-total neaP-Cotal destruc.. deatruot tiOn i o n of the t h e eibryonic embr onio North North Korean consumer consumer goods goode industry, industry, particularly particularly t e x t i l e mills. mills. textile
on
'Some reports allege allege tthat h a t aoute acute iinflation n f l a t i o n ha8 has rraised a i s e d Che the ooae cost o of f food food 8ome reports and remaining oonsumer goods as muoh much as 700 peroent percent over June, June, 1950 1950 levels. levels. TaXation is to tines as beTaxation i 8 reported t o be three t h r e e tiraes a0 burdensome as in the period bsteri-the $ore.'the war,'and WELF, and the t h e forced foroed purchase purohase of of defense defense bonds end.lottery and'lo-ktery tickets tiakets to raise military r a i s e funds finds for for m i l i t a r y materials is i s reportedly common. common.
5 5
RELEASE APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: ATE: 22-Mar--2010 22-Mar-2010 IrPROVED
Disease is ie -
threat. believed to t o pose a serious serious t hreat.
r 1
Ourrent "anti-epldemio oampaign' oampaign" being b 6 ing waged waged by by the t h e Nbrth Nor431 Korean Korean govern,governOUrrent "anti-epidemio Ment and available for meZit and by 6y refugee refugee reports r e p o r t s that t h a t no hospital hoepital spaoe.is 8paoe.i~ for o lvllians civilians.

i n t h e roar r e a r areas, areas, in the
A major major cause oauee of of the %he serious serioua oondition oondition of of non-oombatants nOn-OOmbatant6 in i n North No*h A inthe t h e devastation devastation of of the t h e transportation t r a n a p o r t a t i o n system. Byatem. 'Largely Korea 'lh Ibrealies in Iargely inadequate t o begin wikh due t o its i t s north-south r i e n t a t i o n and its inade4Uate to begin'With to north-south o orientation limited number of border points of entrY, entry, t the he r rail a i l system has been immobilized over large l a r g e segments s e g e n t a by UN bombing attaoke a t u r a l deterideteriiMMobiiized'oier attaoke, n natural oratiOn;.and bulk of the the oargo transported ora%f'bn, and 011matio olimatio ConditiOns.' obnditiona: The vast bulk on availtible fadilitios, f a o i l i t i e a , moreovero moreover, consiate consists o Of f e essentially s s e n t i a l l y military supplies. Ammunition, illinmunition, ordnance ordnanoe and and rations r a t i o n s for for t h e combat oombat troops troope demand demand auPplies. the far'highen-priority than relief relief goods. goods. A a far h i g h e r ' p r i o r i t y than A signifioant-emount signifioant-amount of of the the remaining i s believed to t o be 000upied, oaoupied, furthermore, furthekmore, in in reMaining available manpower manpoWer is a a-hUmen human supply SUPply oapaoity 'capacityo or r in ine effortato f f o r t s 40 maintain maintain tthe h e ttransportation ransportation semblanoe of of working working order. order. eystem i n a semblanoe system in
s i t u a t i o n believed t o exist exiat In Striking Contrast to the desperate situation to s t a t e d on 6 h a t all. stated 8 Ookober Ootober t that all indications pointed to an "adequate" food, ammunition, ammunition, and clothing supply anong anong front f r o n t line l i n e unite.1 unite. khia Tmproved sUPply this "improved supply eituation" situation" w i l l reduce t h e inoidenoe o f disease among tthe h e troope will the of troops below below last last winterts winter's high high levels. levels
A critical will be facing K o r i t i c a l internal i n t e r m l problmn problem will facing Communist Communist authorities authoritiee during t h e ooming l l e v i a t i n g the during. the ooming wider winter months months unless unlesi some some means means of of a alleviating the ilmraediate needs needs of of t h e urban urban and and refugee refugee North population can can be iMmediate the Nbrth Korean population found. found. With Withthe t h e oontinued oontinued heavy heavy logistical l o g i s t i a d demands demands of o f the t h e Communist Communist field field armies under either e i t h e r offensive ankles under offensiveor o rdefensive defenaive . oonditlona, oonditions, it i is s difficult d i f f i o u l t to to see how-the how'the Communist Communist authorities a u t h o r i t i e s will mill be able to solve this %hie presking problem. problem.
Approved For Re lesee 2002108121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2
TOP SECRET
10 October 1951
143
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS AND USAF SF44WAidefgr44egaTia002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79101146A000400330001-2

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re !diode 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001430330001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Austrian personnel in Soviet Occupation Forces dismissed: The dismissal of indigenous personnel employed'as lations in Austria continues. The vacancies servants at Soviet instal are being filled by an un known number of Russian women who recently arrived from the USSR. Sev eral local rumors predict that the Soviet Occupation Force will dismiss all nonCommunists employed in military installations, but there has been no indication that large=scale dismissals are intended.
A field comment netes that a smallscale arrival of Russian char women has been in progress for several months in Austria,.primarily for use in officer clubs and messes. Indigenous personnel continue working in Soviet Ordnance camps and wsrehouses
Comments Apparently, as a security measure, the same type of re placement has taken place in the Soviet Occupation Forces of East Germany. The German dismissals have been on a larger scale and have included a broader category of personnel at military installations. It may be as -Burned that a similar development is in progress in Austria.
2.
125X1
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. Communists again advocate modified neutralism? Pratda, on 3 October published ap article by World Peace Council magazine In the Defense Pierre Cot, editor of the EMbassy feels is one of the most important of Peace which the US Moscow of such statements in some time. After painting a dark picture of the worsening conditions between the two camps into which the world Ilas become divided, Cot called at tention to the many differences existing among nations in the "war camp" West:
He alleged Western governments faced adverse public opinion in their own countries due touneasiness about Korea and fear of US domin ation of world trade. He urged the World Peace Council and national peace committees to use these conflicts by whatever method suited their particular country in order to impede agreement in the West. He stated that, while the WPC cannot recommend the passive forms of neutralism or religious pacificism which the fight against war takes on in some coun tries, it can.still act jointly with the local peace committees if a foreign policy based on neutialism could rupture the war coalition and "return the UN to its origina/ role."
25X1
Comments The Communists alternate between condemning neutral ism and advocating it as a disruptive device under certain conditions.
TOP SECRET
10 Oot
Approved For Re !Age 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00811160330001-2

TOP SECRET
3.
World Federation of Trade Unions Conference: The East Berlin conference of the Communist World Federation of Trade Uhions, 13 - 21 November, is expected to present an important decision which will strengthen the unity and action of the group according to the East German labor federation's newspaper, Tribulene. Main subjects to be discussed concern results of capitalist war preparations. deterioration of workers' living standards, and colonial problems.
l 1
25X1
25X1
5.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. New propaganda angle on Oatis: The Prague radio is now alleging that the US is exploiting the Oatis case "for an even sharper campaign against Czechoslovakia." A recent broadcast stated that Secretary Acheson had told both American and West European press correspondents to "blow up the Ostia case in every possible way until the General Assembly opens in Paris on 6 November." This reportedly is part of the US propaganda campaign against the possible candidacy of Czechoslovakia as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
1
25X1
25X1
Two-policemen murdered: The US Army Attache in Prague has received information about the murder of two uniformed police (SNB) in a city near Prague on 1 October The attache's I also quoted a Czech on stating that the commander of the troops in that city knew nothing of what was going on in the present day army, that organization, training and future planning is "in chaos at all levels," and that Mirdster of Nattonrl Defense Cepicka is despised at all levels. 1
1
Comment: This will be the first general meeting of the WFTU since its Second World Congress in 1949 at Milan. During this interval WFTU strength in the West has been weakened by the withdrawal of many unions. The East German labor union announced that representatives from 64 countries will "make vital decisions upon the preservation and consolidation of peace" - an indication that Germany's participation in Western defense will receive special attention.
25X1
Comment:
6.
reporr.--R;;eover other evidence would indicate that this situation

is not general throughout the Czech army,
No confirmatory information is availab/e for the above
25X1
Intelligence interest in Belgium shown: According tcl la representative of the Czech Government in Belgium has exFressea ah interest in detailed surveillance of the port of Antwerp, deliveries of war materials to Belgium, France, Germany and Yugoslavia, the construction of a new oil storage tank, the construction status of a new General Motors factory, and a map of navigable riverq and canals of the Benelux area.
1
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1A
10 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDR79T01146A000400330001-2
Approved For Re !See 2002108121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041480330001-2

TOP SECRET
25X1C
7.
25)6
RUNGARY. Slays utilized in anti-Tito 'propaganda: At the recent celebration of International Peace Day in Budapest, one of the principal events was a speech by a South Slav'peasant comparing garian Slav minority with.deplorable conditions the happy life of the Hunin Yugoslavia. In the name of the South Slays he sent a message to the Yugoslav "brothers" to "fight against Tito." The US legation in Budapest reported that increaei use is berm, made of the Runrarian South Slave to carry (in anti-Tito propagangnda.
Comment: South Slave have not been used in recent months to carry on the verbal battle against Tito.
8.
9.
25X1
Hog surrender period extended till Spring; A $ October decree of the Ministry of Food extends till spring the period for ku/aks to surrender their hogs. The US Legation in Budapest points out that, besides revealing that governmental bog collections deadline were insufficient, the decree indicates by the 30 September that the government is not yet ready to liquidate the kulake. It could havp confiscated puch proDerty 1,netead of extending the surrender period.
'
Comment: There have been numerous indications since the end of the harvest that an intensive campaign is underway to increase the number of cooperatives. It does not appear, however, that the government is prepared to undertake full scale collectivization this fall.
YUGOSLAVIA; Tito describes Cominform espionage activity. Speaking at Zagreb before a Congress of Yugoslav trade union workers, Marshal Tito
Comment: Since 1949 reports from Brussels have indicated the Czech legation's interest in procuring military and economic Belgium through questionnaires distributed to selected information on Czech nationals resident in the country. In August reported that between 1948 and 1951 there had been uncovered certain continuing manifestations of Czech interest in the Rhine Valley, including detailed cluestionnaires on upecific information and maps of bridges, banks, industry, communications, US bridge exercises, etc, A 1951 questionnaire was particularly noteworthy for its clearly offensive nature since it sought information on which sectors of the Rhine could be inundated, easily defen, dable bridges, possibilities of bivouac, docking facilities, etc. The 'Pointed out that among the Satellites, the Czechs alone had shown curiosity of this sort. No indications of Soviet offensive intentions have been uncovered through their questionnaire in which political and economic matters predominate.
TOP SECRET
3 10 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2
Approved For Relate 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006400330001-2

TOP SECRET
charged that the Cominforthas employed 1,932 Yegoslav citizens and 7,930 "White Guards" for espionage purposes. The Premier alleged iets had founded a network of 98 that the Sov:. spy eenters in the Cominform countries (including 35 in the USSR and 12 in Czechoslovakia) whose function send "diversionists was to hourly across the borders into Yugoslavia," he claimed that Bulgaria has employed Although more agents than any of the other satellites, Tito stressed the point that Dimitrov had refused to en Yugoslave as agents prior to the Cominform resolution.
I
125 X1
10,
Recent Y oslav de ortees to Bul aria have been Cominformists: Ambassador Allen believes that a large number of the portees to Bulgaria, among whom were recent Yugoslav deseveral dentists, engineers, and professors, may have had Cominform connections. One of the deportees was a former MVD officer in Germany and Poland who had elavia following the Cominform remained in Yegobreak by playing doWn his Cominform nections. con, Another was his wife who formerly was the secretary of Major General Pero Popivoda, a former Yugoslav Communist Party member and now the leader of the Yugoslav Cominformists in Rumania. The Ambassador cites as additional evidence the manner in which the group was received in Bulgaria and the lack of subsequent Bulgarian publicity. ador hopes to verify a rumor circulating among White Russians The Ambass.that the UDB chief in in Belgrade ad has been Belgre arrested for his resoontibility in deporting the group to Bulgaria.
1
Comment: Minister of Interior the Cominform break in 1948, 8,403 Rankovic stated in June that since Cominformists had been arrested. Titols figure of 98 epy centers ie the Cominform countries represents considerably larger number than previously a estimated. Early this year the Yugoslav radio stated that over 20 "centers for sabotage" were in the Satellite located countries on Yugoslavia's periphery, inform subversive camps have been While over 90 COMreported to exist in the neighboring satellites, fairly reliable information is held on less than 20 of them.
25X1
Comment: Although there is little doubt that some_of were not Cominformists, the-deportees the circumstances surrounding the incident, in, eluding the apparent fore-knowledge and cooperation of Bulgarian auth, orities, suggest that the group may have been deported to Bulgaria in exchange for Yugoslav citizens.
:
TOP SECRET
10 Oct 51
Approved For Re !Ste 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041490330001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
25X1
IRAN. Iranian Prime Milister desires to avoid Security Council coniiliration of oil disputes Prime Minister Mossadeq prefers to settle the Eirtish-Iranian oil dispute by prior negotiations and to atoid Security 0i...toil action. Mossadeq expressed this sentiment in an interviewwith Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and US United Nations delegates, and added that the strong statement which he must make in the Security Council Would-preclude successful negotiations. Therefore he'summested a delay of 'd s duringwhich an agreement oould be sought. 1
'
2.
Government's second annivorsary, although he was strongly urged-to do So as a "calking influence" to prevent possible "disturbances." He attended i reception at the Chinese EMbaspy hith other high Government dfficiale, but they all significantly left bhfore the showing of a Communist movie.
Meanwhile, the new Burmese Ambassador to Peiping is reliably reported to have refused to present his credentials to the Chinese Vice Minister of-Foreign Affairs, and to have threatened to return to Burma unless. granted an audience with Mho Tse-tung. Despite the interVention of the SOViet-AMbassadorthe Burtmise diplomat 'remained adamant with the complete sunoert Of his Government, and the Chinese finally acceded to his desire.
with Chinese Communistsa Fare Master Thakin Nu refused to attend a mass-rally celebrating the Chinese COmmunist
BURMA. Burnie-Se offioials Cool in diplethatio dealings
25X1
to China, stated that if Bunha were to be itiaded it Weuld'fight the aggressor alongwith the "many countries which hate injustide."' -Nevertheless,' the Burinese, bY and squirelY-tRe-threat of Chinese Communist large, Still refuse to face intervention in their affairs. Thii report else tends strongly to refute information that the Burmese AmbaisadOr intends to invite Chinese Communist troops to enter Burma to eliminate Chinese Nationalist foroes.
3.
BWPP spokesman outlines party program: In a press conference a leader of the Burma WiFkers and Peasants Party stated that his party stood for the prevention of Burma becoming a Second Korea, the TOP SECRET
5
to these indications of a stiffening Burmese attittralWards the Chinese, Thakin NU in a reoent parliamentary speech, obViously referring
'COMMenti In addition
more favorable to the British than those previously Offered. Resumption of negotiations, xdght avoid the dilampa of-an Iranian refusal to comply with ahowever, UN recommendation. The USSR weuld iimilarily'not be given the opportunity of posing in the UN as the champion of Iran.
negotraniterms
''COmmenth There is no reason to assume that Mossadeq is willing to
10 Oot 51
25X1

Approved For Relate 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004400330001-2

TOP SECRET expulsion of Chinese Nationalist troops, and the insurance of "full democratic rights" for the Burmese people. He added that the BWET was prepared to cooperate with any other political organization, including the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League which controls the Government. The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that this statement provides the framework for the formation of an above round united front dominated by the BWFP.
Comment: This relatively mild statement regarding BWFP aims trasts sharply with the greetings conby the former's labor organization sent to Communist China on 1 October warlike reactionary Americans who which denounced the "bloodthirsty and are aiding the reactionary rulers Burma in constructing military of bases in Burma."
25X1
4.
25X1
Karens threaten to join Communists: The US Embassy in Rangoon has received a letter from an unspecified Karen "delegation" the Karens would join the Communists which stated that unless the US and UK supplied them with arms. The Embassy believes that this incident coupled with inrreased Communist influence" reflects "des eration among the Karens.
Comment: There is ng doubt that the Karen gressively more desperate. position has become proThe failure soever in their behalf has no doubt beenof the West to do anything whata keen disappointment which probably has gradually turned to resentment. Since the Karens do not expect the Burmese Government to offer a satisfactory struggle they probably have solution to the become increasingly propaganda. Wholehearted Karen-Communist receptive to Communist collaboration would be disastrous for the relatively pro-Western Government now in power.
The BWFP has long been suspected of having an intention to develop an anti-Government coaliticn which would parallel the Burma Communist Party's strategy of establishing an underground "Peoples Democratic Front," made up of the various insurgents.
25X1
5:
25X1
Burmeae to ti hten controls on tire shi ments to China: officials have stated that the High Burmese Government will discontinue the of import-transit issuance licenses for tires. They indicated, however, thwtout standing licenses would be honored. After reiterating the Burmese contention that the US should control the transit trade through Burma shipments at their source, these Officials by stopping indicated that the cabinet was about to consider the entire problem of the shipment of tires to China. The US Embassy in Rangoon comments that the current interest in controlling the traffic in tires stems from a desire to insure exports against rptJy issued the approval of US licenses or the import of goods from the dollar area.
TOP SECRET
10/ Oct 51
Approved Forlielease 2002/08121 :Ch4-RDP79T01146Ar60400330001-2

TOP SECRET
6.
The Burmese Ambassador to BURMA/CHINA. Burmese intercede for Amoricans: other chiefs of mission in calling the Peiping recently joined several harsh treatment being accorded attention of the Soviet Ambassador to the the The Russian claimed to have raised American citizens in China. Minister who stated he "would give question with the Chinese Foreign that the the matter consideration." The Burmese Ambassador also reported various embassies had agreed to approach the Chinese Foreign Minister indtviduallv on the matter as opportunities presented themselves. of these representaComment: There is no evidence to date that any tions, including those of the Soviet Ambassador, have altered Peiping's policy toward US nationals..
25X1
25X1
7.
The US Consul MALAYA. Reaction to murder of Malaya's High Commissioner: murder of High Commissioner Gurney General in Singapore concludes that the notoriously noncommittal Chinese October will probably convince the on 6 population of Malaya that cooperationwith the British is dangerous policy.
The US representative also transmits the unofficial views of the office of the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia that the incident will arouse the British Government to a greater awareness of the serious Malayan situationlbe a strong boost to bandit morale, increase dissatisfaction with security operations, and possibly call for substitution of stiffer measures.
25X1C
8.
The Thai criminal court, THAILAND. Verdict given in regicide case: acquitted two of the three persons charged after more than two years, with complicity in the death of the late King and sentenced the third to death. The prisoner is reported to be preparing an appealiin which case the matter "can drag on another few years." The US Embassy in Bangkok observes that the verdict is politically useful to the Phibun it can be used to discredit Pridii with whom the prosecution regime: associated the defendents, and it can be held up as fulfillment of Phibun,a promise to solve the case.
I
25X1
9.
Police grant Nationalist Chinese special favors: No overt celebration was permitted in Bangkok on 1 October in honor of the second anniversary of the Chinese Communist Government. On the other hand, Thai police officials have stated that celebrations will not be prohibited on 10 October, the Chinese Nationalist holiday. \ TOP SECRET
7
25X1
10 Oct 51
Approved For Rarase 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A46400330001-2

TOP SECRET
25X1
Comments The strong and open anti-Communist position of the Phibun raging-WEI:ally precludes any compromise with Communism and requires that the regime be replaoed should Thailand become oriented towards Communism
10.
INEOCHINA. Frenoh confident in western Tonkins The French consider that the critical phase of the battle for Reda /p is now over and that Viet Minh ability to mount further attacks in this area is deoreasine owin, to their lack of supplies,/
25X1
25X1
11.
25X1
'reports competition among Party, government, 1/44 Chinese Communist Party, who has provided a great deal of useful information on Party organizations and personalities, states that there is a "bureaucratic struggle" for funds and privileges among the Party, the government, and the armed forces, with the Party ap'states that the governparently in the "meekest position." ment "has the advantage of oontrolling funds," while the army has the "historio advantage of having been onoe virtually identical with the Party and the government," The military leaders regard the government as "essentially their awn.creature" and have adoped a "rather independent"_line with the political oadres, observes that, although directives flow from the Politburo, Party officials hew been told to act on government direotives, Army directives and editorials of the Party press witheut waiting for explioit Party directive's,
CHINA,/
ENT
25X1
25X1
25X1,
12.
Comments It is believed that this account is out of date. The Party controls the government absolutely, and appears to have effeotive oontrol over the armed forces. All important leaders of both the government and the armed,forces are members of the Partrs Central Commattee, Directives on major matters! originate solely with the Politburo; government and army directives, and the editorials of the Party press, of course transmit the will of the Politburo and have not been observed at any time to take an independent line.
25X1
Chinese Communist anted forces join Sino -Soviet Friendship AssooiaPeiping radio states that the Chinese Communist armed forces, ple" with th. e numbering five million," have becoic neeeilietAd AA A Sino -Soviet Friendship Association.
tion en 'blocs
25X1
dontents Chinese Communist field forces, military distriot troops', and nravand air foroes are believed to total about 3,625,000 mon; Pei.ping's figure of five million is obscure, In any case, this new member-
TOP SECRET
8
10 Oat 51
Approved For Retsefse 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2

TOP SECRET
ehip was obviously acquired by fiat, possibly in order to claim achieve ment,of Peiping's 1951 goal of 20-million SSFA members. Peiping radio last month, while citing 16 million SSFA members, admitted that the Chinese people remain apathetic to the Association and its program. Peiping may next turn its attention to goVernment employees, and so on to other groups, until the USSR has more official friends in China than it has citizens of its own,
13.
25X1
oyd
Commenti One aspect.of the special status of China's border areas as spherre-Eaviet influence has been the speoial currency systems of thoee areas. In the paet year, however, the Chinese-Conmunists,have sought to promote the economic integratiodof the border areas with the rest of China by ourrency Unification. In the summer of 1950, the special Port ArthurDairen currency was abolished. The Manchurian and Inner Mongolian currencies were recalled in the spring of 1951. With the redemption of the Sinkiang notes, the circulation of Chinese currency will extend to all the
areas bordering on the USSR.
It.
KOREA.
25X1
25X6
15
ME, SECRET
9
South Korean reaction to latest Communist offer to resume negotia Reacting to the latest Communist offer to resume negotiations at Panmunjon with an extension of the neutral zone to Munsan, ROK Foreign Minister Pyun stated that extension of the neutral zone is "fraught with dangers lethal to the UN strategic position in Korea." He argued that extending the neutral zone across the Imjin River into Munson would give the Communists a foothold across that strategic river. Pyun asserted that "it is high time" for the Communists to be resented with an ultimatum on the conferences./
MEE:
Comm:Intl It is generally believed that the Communist proposal to extend 717-Zraral zone is equally unpalatable to the OR command. This official ROK statement is merely another attempt to discourage further obese-
fire 'efferts on the part of the UN.
Special Sinkiang currency abolisheds The Chinese Communists have announcedthat beginning on 1 October 1951, Sinkiang notes will be redeemed and the.regular Chinese currency will be circulated throughout the province. .Uighurian language characters will be printed on the currency for Sinkiang circulation, but currency without Uighurian characters may also be circulated. The Chinese currency is to be the standard legal tender in the province, and all business transactions.are to be in terms of that ourren-
10 Oct 51
5X6

Approved For Re lage 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Thr00330001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(lPESTERS)
1.
GERMANY. Retail stores in East Germany cut prices: Effective 8 October, the East German Government cut prices on certain foods, textiles, and industrial wares, and removed marmalade, soap, and textiles made from
cellulose from the ration list. US officials in Berlin estimate that these reductior will cause West Berliners to increase their purchases in East
Commentr West Berliners find that they can buy more with their West
25X1
Berlin.
marksintrt Berlin. Although the West Berlin Government realizes that this
2.
25X6
3.
FRANCE.
Popular support of European Defense Forces cooled by East German lurErtrr" proposalsa The US Embassy in Paris reports that the East German
Tivnity'l proposals have confused the current of French opinion favorable to the European Defense Forces plan, but have not reversed it. The virtual absence of nonConnnunist opposition to any German military contribution
TOP SECRET

11
practice is injurious to West Berlin's economy, efforts to control it have met with little success.
10 Oct
51
Approved For Re leabe 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00UP0330001-2

TOP SECRET
whatever is considered by the EMbassy as "perhaps the most outstanding feature of public opinion development." Should the USSR demonstrate, however, that it is prepared to make real concessions in its campaign for Germ! "unity," French public opinion "would be very profoundly affected."
US officials in Berlin recently warned that the East German "unitiffrpaign might lead France to reconsider its German policy. It is unlikely, however, that the defense plan mill be abandoned by the'French Government under any foreseeable international circumstances, inasmuch as this plan is an essential phase of the integration of Europe... The French are increasingly inclined to view such integration as attainable.
'Comment:
I
25X1
4.
Communist pamphlet attributes atrocities to US soldiers in Korea: /Tars Communist bookstores now offer for public consumption a lurid story of American "atrocities" in the Korean conflict. The pamphlet, prepared by the Austrian member of a 17-woman delegation sent to North Korea last May by the World Federation of Democratic Women, is entitled "An Eyewitness Account of the Modern War of Destruction," Four pages of the report are devoted to reproduction of "original" documents, reputedly convicting South Korean and American "politicians" of initiating a war of aggression against the North Koreans. The remainder of the pamphlet is devoted to an imaginative account of crimes attributed to Americans or to South Koreans acting under US orders, such as bacteriological warfare, the use of various instruments of torture, and the usual acts associated with brutal and illdisciplined soldiery, The author is supplementing her written report on Korea with a series of lectures, \
Comment: US officials in Vienna discount the effectiveness of the pamphlet's illustrations, but indicate that the text is clever. The circulation appears to be very limited at present. The non-Communist press has ignored the publication.
AUSTRIA,
25X1
Similar reports have been submitted in other countries represented by the delegation, and have been recognized as the end results for which the World Federation of Democratic Women engineered the trip to Korea,
Austrian press surveys consequences of prospective ERP cuts: Vienna's leading newspapers continue their gloomy analysis of the conse7 quences of the anticipated reduction of about 70,000,000 dollars in external Assistance to Austria for the coming year. Attributing Austria's economic plight to the rise in world prices following the Korean crisis, there is general agreement that further gains in living standards and the achievement of economic independence by 1952 are now precluded. Surveying the prospects
TOP SECRET
12
10 Oct 51
Approved For Re lace 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011260330001-2

TOP SECRET
of an Austrian solution within the framework of declining foreign aid, most editorials emphasize the necessity of increased productivity, an expanded export program, and strict austerity in the matter of imports. A People's Party paper calls for all-out mobilization of the country as a prerequisite to meeting the Crisis. A right-wing, independent newspaper vigorously criticizes the coalition government for creating an economic climate unfavorable to the obtaining of external credits to cliensate for the diminution in foreign aid. I
Comment: The proposed reduction in ECA allocations has caused considerable dismay among the Austrian public. The semi-official press has suggested that US authorities were unaware of Austria's special position, and the recent invitation for a delegation from Congress to visit Austria suggests a new plea for an "understanding" of Austria's peculiar problems. Though the Austrian press is taking an uncommonly realistic view of the alternatives to foreign aid, its suggested remedies are those which ECA has been urging upon the Austrian Government for same time.
6,
25X1
NETHERLANDS, Government's proposed economic controls may still labor criticisms In view of international economic developments stemming from rearmament, the Dutch Government haS introduced a bill to enable it to control trade in a number of metal and chemical products, in effect a reintroduction of some of the clauses of the 1939 vital materials distribution act. The Government also plans to introduce a bill to ban hoarding and profiteering. These proposed laws would enable the Governhent "to keep an effective eye on prices in general," and on trade in critical raw materials in particular.
I
25X1
Comment: Passage and enforcement of these measures May serve to quiet the criticism of labor that it is shouldering a disproportionate share of the defense burden.
7,
25X6
TOP SECRET
13 10 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDI379101146A000400330001-2

TOP SECRET
25X6
8.
Communists plan strikes and land seizures this fall: Recent intense activity in the Communist Party stimulated rumors of nation -wd.de and in Communist-dominated labor unions has agitation and strikes to be carried out fall. The opening of parliamentary debate this on the controversial labor law will be the signal for this agitation. The Communist Youth Federation has given its support to a plan for land occupation in the Rome area to be carried out at the same time,
I
25X1
Comment: The Communists obviously hope to use the issue of restrictive labor legislation, scheduled for parliamentary discussion in the near future and vigorously opposed by all labor organizations, to win the support the anti-Communist of trade unions for their strike prograni, Prospects for success are fairly good in regard to All unions supported the 19 September strikes on purely economic issues. strike of state employees for higher wages, However, illegal land seizures, in which the Communist Federation has actively participated Youth in Central Italy, anti-Conmunist unions. are opposed by the
9.
25X1 25X1
ernment acts to limit flow of military goods to China: Hong Kong reports that in late September Lisbon government instructed the the Macao authorities that an embargo shipment of military supplies to Communist on the areas was to go into 1 October . / on /on 26 September the avowedly effect anti Communist Macao chief of police prevented the transfer of eight aircraft engines from a Macao warehouse for possible sale to the Chinese Communists,
PORTUGAL.
Lisbon
25X1
Meanwhile, the headof Macao's Economic Services, P.J. Lobo, reportedly refused to announce the embargo. He maintained that ould continue inasmuch as export trade with China no ex ort licenses are required in Macao.
Comment: Lobo, reputedly political boss of the colony financial interest in Macao's smuggling td.th a sizeable activities, has opposed any attempt to regulate the China trade,
Although Portugal has not recognized the Peiping Government, it is anxious not to antagonize the Chinese Communist regime, because of possible
TOP SECRET
14
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000401)33M14
Approved For Relalge 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011480330001-2

TOP SECRET
loss of the colony. While in general agreement with the need for an embargo, the Lisbon government has hitherto maintained that Macao, which depends on Communist China for much of its food and even its water, is an exceptional case,

TOP SECRET
15
t .51
i-t
Approved ForRelease 2002/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T01146A00040030v8
Approved For Re leinie 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP79701146A00300330001-2

TOP SECRET
25X6
12.
CENTRAL AMERICA, Comment on the Conference of Central American Foreign Ministers: At the "First Central American Conference of Foreign Ministers" which opened Monday in El Salvador, the five Central American republics will attempt to revive some of the aspects of the single state of which they were all once members. The conference was called at the initiative of El Salvador which has long coveted the role of prime mover in a Central American bloc. Announced on the joint Central American Independence pay, 15 September, which fbllowed by a few days a conference of Central Atherican chambers Of commerce, the conference is described by the Foreign Minister of the host country as a "preliminary exchange of impressions on the best means of achieving joint action by the five republics." The agenda includes the establishment of special commissions for. dealing with common problems and discussion of a charter of a Central American organization to promote group action.
The conference comes on the crest of an unprecedented wave of confraternity among the widely divergent countries. In recent years there has even been considerable hostility among certain of the republics over the issue of the Caribbean Legion and its plots. Although the current spirit of goodwill seems genuine enough at the moment, and has been given some substance by the recent exchange of ambassadors between the ideologically opposed governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, it is likely that the more grandiose of the conference's atns will eventually meet the fate of other previous attempts at unification -- namely: falling afoul of shifting governments and underlying mistrusts.
13,
25X1
TOP SECRET
16
Peron asks leave of absence until after the elections: President of Congress to meet on 11 October to consider his request for a leave of absence until after the 11 November elections, according to an official broadcast. It was stated that Peron did not want it to be said that his presence had influenced the elections. The broadcast was Peron's first official acceptance of the Peronista nomination for re-election.
ARGENTINA.
PeroThrecarferTSFcialaon
No possible successor was mentioned, although Vice-President Hortensio Quijano, who is ill, and Rear Admiral Teisaire, President pro tempore of the Senate; are next in line. However, they, too, are candidates for re-election, and therefore could decline with the same explanation.
lo
Oct 51
Approved For Re Rode 2002108121 : CIA-RDP791111146A004}400330001-2

TOP SECRET
Comment: Peronts request for leave may represent a compromise with the alingarnrces, who reportedly had demanded Peronfs resignation and had planned to replace the Peron -Quijano slate -with Colonel (retired) Domingo Mercante and ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 Oct 51). It is not clear whether Peron, in officially announcing his candidacy, was also speaking for Quijano. If he was not, there is the possibility of a further compromise in that Mercante may yet replace the ailing Dr. Quijano.

TOP SECRET 10 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP79701146A000400330001-2
17
25X1

Approved For Re Iwbee 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006,00330001-2
TOP SECRET
10 October 1951
CIA No. 49385-A

Copy No.
49
25X1

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Relapse 2002108121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q9400330001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
INDONESIA. Foreign Minister will recommend against triangular arrangements with India and Burma: Foreign Minister Subardjo told US Ambassador Cochran that Indonesia had received no invitation to participate in scheduled India-Burma talks in New Delhi. He further stated that the time has come for Indonesia to determine friendships on a political rather than a sentimental basis. Subardjo told Cochran that he would recommend to his government that it not enter into triangular conferences with India and 'Burma. but instead strive toward good relations with all of Asia.
25X1
25X1
The Indonesian Government has received considerable criticism, particularly from Socialist Party members, for not pursuing closer relations with Burma and India.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Italy seeks semblance of equality for small powers on temporary ITALY. NATO committee: The US Embassy in Rome "trusts that the Department of State will firmly oppose the French demand that the US, UK and France openly dominate the temporary NATO committee," and points out that "neither the French nor the British are inclined to spare the susceptibilities of Italy and other smaller countries on vital issues." The EMbassy adds that Communists in Italy would take full advantage of the opportunity to point out the lack'of equality in NATO and charge that Italy is being exploited in the interests of the larger powers. It believes that the benefits resulting from Do Gasperi's trip to the US could quickly be lost through such a development.
I
Prior to the San Francisco conference, there was some disComment: cussion of India-Burma-Indonesia consultation in Djakarta. These talks, however, did not materialize. Recent press reports in both India and Indonesia have mentioned Indonesia's inclusion in India...Burma talks scheduled for 21 October.
25X1
Comment: Although the Italians have long been resentful of what seemed to them an inadequate participation in the policy decisions of the NATO councils, it is doubtful that any predominance of the Big Three in the temporary NATO committee would arouse Italian public opinion to a serious degree.
TOP SECRET
10 Oct 51
Approved,Epr Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000500010001-6
TOP SECRET
11 October 1951
143
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approvedfo-Release2001109/06:=42DP79T01406A000500010001-6
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
25X1X
25X1X
- 25X1X
The Stiviet Union's rke Soviet military intentions concer USSR. lans-for eventual occupation of Turkey, do not involve plans, for full_scaleuhilital7 a including invasion and annexasimultaneous moves would be made, however, Bospbrus and Istanbul, invasion tion of the Western coastal region of the The Dardanelles mould then near Samsun, and a paranhute drop near Ankara. vessela. These revelations of be closed to all tregfii. excepting Soviet
:
25X1X
25X1X 25X1X
25X1X 25X1X
ra
r
s at intelligence requ r so revea e Turkish Black Sea fortifica for such information as lations, troop concentrations and communications.
ons,
25X1A
25X1A
25X1X
25X1X
received concerning intelligence Comment: Other reports have been involving detailed questions not requirements evelopment, but requiring similar only on Turkisri m1i1ary The Czechs have also shown information on the Arab area, Greece and Iran. valley and Belgium.(See intelligence interest in such areas as the Rhine 0/CI Daily Digest, 10 Oct 51)
25X1X
25X1X
25X1X
2.
ALBANIA.
25X1X
25X1X 25X1X
has informed craft in Tirana e m ere are that Stormoviks. He fighters and ground attack conve.onal engined YAK-9 in the number of antimaintained, however, that there had been no increaee 23 Aug 51) aircraft batteries. (S AirAtt Belgrade IR-71-51, first reported two YAK-9 airAC .1 4 May, US Air Force intellicraft flying over Tirana in MarcH 19L. the only operational military gence estimated that these two aircraft were other unassembled planes planes in Albania, altbnush it was'noted that report may be correct as the USSR has sent probably had arrived, Soviet-manufactured ircrart to all the other Satellites.
Comment:
Yugoslays re ort
Albaniaiiirarceatanes,
25X1X
25X1X
3.
A Bulgarian Home Service Committee: BULGARIA. Pirinski elected to Peace "noted fighter for 5 October Georgi PirinskY, broadcast reports that on the United States," was returned to Bulgaria from peace who recently for the Defense of elected first Vice-Chairman of the National Committee Peace. (R FBID Ticker, 9 Oct 51)
25X1X
TOP SECRET
1
11 Oct 51
Approved fix Release 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79T01446A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
Comment: Pirinsky, former Secretary of the Congress of American Slays, was deported from the United States in August. He was well received in Warsaw and Prague before his arrival in Sofia on 3'September.
4.
25X1C
25X1A
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. One of the best hospitals taken over by the army: The 2000 bed hospital at Hradec Kralove has been taken.over by the army, acSeveral of thhospital's elleading cording to have been granted commissions politically up to and including the rank of general. The hospital, affiliated with Charles University, is reported tocbe one of the best in Czechoslovakia.
reliablinsurgeons
5.
.
HUNGARY:I More industrial plants to be grown: An ambitious program for producing certain industrial plants heretofore not grown in Hungary is now underway in that country. By the end of 1954, the Five Year Plan calls for growing cotton on 200,000 acres of land, rubber on 5,000 acres, kenaf fiber plant on 5,000 acres and oil seed plants on a large scale. (11 FBID, 29 Aug 51)
Comment: Such plans are still in the experimental stage'. The production of cotton is nevertheless being increased. A drawback to growing kenaf, a fibrous plant of Indian origin used in making cloth, is the large number of people needed to harvest it; the development of a mechanical harvesting process would revolutionize the kenaf ihdustry.
6.
POLAND. Antiaircraft guns noted around Warsaw: The US Military Attache in Warsaw reports that 85 mm gun emplacements complete with fire control installations are now being developed in a circle around Warsaw. (S MA Warsaw 192-51, 9 Oct 51).
Comment: The tactical emplacement of antiaircraft guns around Warsaw was first reported in mid-September 1951. The number of 85 mm antiaircraft guns reported in the vicinity of Warsaw has grown from 4 to 60 between April and July of 1951.

TOP SECRET
This move may be an effort to increase the army's facilities Comment: as a result of armed force strength increases last spring.
Approved For Release 2001/09%6 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00A0881.011-1-6
Approved ,pr Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T019146A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
BURKA. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma requires Thai or French cooperation: The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that, although the'Burmeso Crovernment would be "delighted" to have all Chinese Nationalist troops withdrawn from its territory, the withdrawal must be accomplished without antagonizing the Chinese Communists. Thus, the treops would have to be conducted to the Thai or Indochinese border ostensibly as a retreat before the Burmese Army. The Embassy points out, However, that both the Thai and the French have been reluctant in the past to allow the entry of Nationalist forces into their territory. (S. Rangoon 356, 9 Oct 51)
Comment: The Thai might be persuaded to alter their position. The Frencn7 77The other hand, may be expected to insist on internment if the Chinese enter Indochina.
It may be inferred, however, froth an apparently lessened Burmese concern over the presence of the Nationalist troops that they are not now presenting the problem they did before their rout from Yunnan.
25X1C
2.
25X1C
INDONESIA.: Overseas Chinese activity in Southeast Asia al1eedly to be directed from Djakarta:, have reported the appointment of Fei Uhen-tung to the s a Chinese ComMunist Embassy in Djakarta. The he has been named head of tverseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. iirincipal planner he has been designated the or LThinese iomntunist. suvveraive.aotivitiesinSouthea8t Aida. Fei was formerly a lending member of the Chinese Communist in Medan, Sumatra, but was e,elled from Indonesia by the Dutch in 1948.
There Comment: These reports are unconfirmed are no reliable indications that the Chinese .mbassy in sljaaana has become or is intended to become the hub of activity among overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,
25X1C
25X1A
25X1A
3.
25X1C
25X1C
Ssn
sts build_gun positions near Hong Kong:, the Chinese are constructing gun positions a e rl River estuary near Hong Kong. Each position e three s es n has emplacements for four guns. -When completed, these gun positions will enable thevCommunists effectively to close the mouth of the Pearl River to any vesssl not capable of Shooting its way through. ze convinced that the planning and supervision of co CHINA.
25X1C
Commu
25X1C
25X1C
"
TOP SECRET
3
11 Oct 51
ApprovecZorReleaseel/ffm TCIA-RDP791-01146A000500010001-6
51) Hong Kong 06001a, Oct (S USARMLO by Soviets. these have beendone merchant vessels in to Western-flag shellings of of foreigners Comment: Recent interest in a sensitivity to the approach waters indicate Communist other sources indicate continued Kong. Repqrts from these sites. in the area opposZt:ong defensive measures variety of 25X1X 25X1X Parties are outlined: 25X1X the relationand ,Ohlawl_Conmaigist characterizes 4. -CP as that of a "benevolent, instructions ar y Common the CPSU never issuesPolitburo res ship o 25X1X .ajor issues, the CCP the CPSU experienced advisor." "suggestions.makes acting; on more routine matters, to the CCP, but CPSU before quests advice from the already made by the CCP. decisions upon merely comments the CCP by "suggesof controlling the system infiltrated by pro-Soviet elieves that 25X1X tionligicillikincipally because the CCP has been regime have been parties of the Peiping facilitated over the CCP is further Soviet adelements much as the non-Communist Soviet control the various infiltrated by the CCP. involving the Soviet Embassy, Chinese intelligence system in the by an espionage missions, and Soviet agents visory-technical apparatus. advisers play a "key role" the Soviet the believes that 25X1X In addition to acting as Peiping. controlling "euggestions" and as a Soviet.intelligence in Soviet tecun.ts of CPSU,s for the liaison channel attached to almo apparently apparatus. arm, these advisers are 25X1X Peipin Is military-economical-political 25X1X 25X1A
25X1A
25X1X
25X1X
25X1X
he C ip o e re Comments correct. It is appears to wo ....nera_y master to elave. this account complex than that of important certainly more the CCP has been less The voluntary to the CCP is "infiltration" of CCP leadership. however, that impelled by probable, orientation of the present Stalinist world-viewadditionally than the of the Soviet affairs- -remains the acceptance by CCP leaders both domestic and foreign "suggestions." inexperience in receptivity to Soviet Peiping's for the CCP's high principal reason system of controls USSR is developing a the Soviet that the It is of course true Peiping regime from leavihg militaryprevent the in this China to Minr elements in Communist the desire to do so. orbit if it should ever ce orcontrols are, system of CCP and in the rag economic-political the more in the operations of presence of Soviet agents Soviet Embassy, and ihe activity of the in China. gans, the and technicians Soviet advisers than 15,000
25X1X
25X1X
5.
expenditures" have farm taxes; "Stupendous China, according to Peiping increases in Communist to raise land taxes made it necessary TOP SECRET
ApprovectForftease2001/0/06:CDP79T01146A0005000100, 51
Approved -6,9r Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79TOPM6A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
a Peiping publication cited by out that these tales will have inoome. The increased revenue war, bolster national defenses (U New Iork Times, 10 Oat 51)
the New York Times. The publication points to remain the chief source of government is said to be needed to fight the Korean and carry out necessary key construction.
agricultural taxes after the Comments Peiping began collecting higher the past used-effective methods June harvest. The Chinese Communists have in It is probable, although no evito collect the full tax quota from farmers. rural opposition there will be considerable dence has yet been reported, that to the new tax rates. Communista_gageribe defects in land reform: A description of land reform problems in an average hsiang, an administrative unit composed of several villages, appears in a recent Central China newspaper.
The newspaper reports that landlords in this hsiang have not been "basically eliminated" nor have the poor peasants been "basically mobilized." For example, only three of the ten landlord-despots in the hsiang were captured and "struck down," the rest managing to escape. A number of landlords "rich have escaped liquidation by buying protection or being misclassified as peasants" or"middla peasants." The Peasants' Association, which under the guidance of the Communist cadres is supposed to effect the reform law, has only a small, unenthusiastic membership in this balsa, according to the report. As a whole peasants are indifferent'toward "political questions," and many sympathize with and protect the landlords.
The cadres, described as corrupt, "impure and incompetent," have unfairly distributed land, usually reserving fertile fields for themselves most of the ferand their relatives. In the process, the cadres have taken comprise 33 per cent of the hoiang poptile land of the middle peasants, who 28 Aug 51) ( U Hankow, Plang_Sagag_Jih Pao, ulation.
of the land reform effected Comments These problems are probably typical throughout South and Central China in the past year. This reform was.too hastily carried out, and its implementation suffered from the fact that its . earlier objective of stabilizing rural society was changed in late 1950 to one of eradicating actual and potential anti-Communist elements. Eresence of heavier Soviet-type italiessapjad_ilaSsis On the basis of UN pilot sightings in the Pyongyang area since 1 October, the US Far East Command has incepted the presence in Korea of enemy armor heavier than the now-familiar T-34. Observing that these tanks are probably organic to the Chinese Communist forces, FECOM states that they are probably
KOREA.
7.

TOP SECRET
5
6.
11 Oct 51
Approved Fr Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01/4A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
Joseph Stalin Its and IIIs rather than the new Joseph Stalin III. The possibility that the Joseph Stalin III may be employed for testing is not to be discounted entirely. (S CINFE Telecon 5243, 10 Oct 51)
Comment: Although the Joseph Stalin I and II tanks -- now superaeded in the Soviet Army by the Joseph Stalin III -- mount a larger gun than their UN counterparts (122 mm9 compared with 90 mm) their underpowered engines and the difficulties of the Korean terrain will do much to counter their effectiveness. In sufficient number, however, these tanks will form an important addition to the lightly-armored Communist forces in Korea.
learned from inhabitants of North Korea thaPIIII ps (believed Russians) with 80 to 100 T-34 tanks were at Hamhung in late Septembero During the same period "109000 Caucasian mechanized troops equipped with tanks and heavy artillery were beOn tween Yangdok and Songehon" across the peninsula in northern Korea. 2a September "600 European troops in Chinese Communist uniforms were moving from Pyongyang" southward.
Commentt While the figures in this report are probably exagger ated, it is further evidence of the.considerable number of Soviet military personnel currently believed to be performing rear area functions in North Korea. These troops may total as many as 20,000.

TOP SECRET
agagAg25X1O
an_treaeggreported inNorth Koreas
25X1C
25X1A
The "Caucasianereferredto as operati4gtanks are probably Soviet military personnel delivering armor to the Chinese Communists and
.
North Koreans..
9.
25X1C
This decision was made at a 13 September high-level Chinese Communist-North Korean conference in Pyongyang. The North Koreans .stated that since the entry of the Chinese Communist Army into the Korean War, the North Korean political line had been ignored by Chinese Communist,political officers in the front-line units, and that pro-Chinese Comminist officers had:infiltrated the North Korean Army political ranks. The Chineae Communists argued that since "North Korea was near collapse and unable to meet Communist requirements,"'
North Korean_nelitical officers to be subordinate to Chinese ite numbers due to ba4 rear area conditions: claims to have learned from North Korean army officers and government officials in Pyongyang that North Korean political officers in tactical units are to be subordinate in the future to Chinese Communist political officers.
25X1C
11 Oct 51
Approved Ziow Release 2001109106 : ClA-RDP79T0,46A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
should occupy a role-Superior Chinese Communist political officers to North Korean political officers. forced to accede to the Chinese The North Koreans allegedly were desertions in the North (1) decision for the following reasonst "equipment" for the North Koreans (2) Korean Army are at a high level; Communists are obviously preparing to the is unavailable; (3) the Chinese peace; and (4) the "morale of of the terminate the war with a negotiated with the coming the lowest ebb North Korean civilians is at amplified with the statement that ciwinter." The last reason was defeat and that six "riots" had vilians would welcome a Communist to 15 August. nacurred in thet Pyongyang area prior
'
25X1A
25X1A
that such a conference Although it is entirely possible remains that the decision, the fact probably betook place with the resulting from the Soviet Union itself and "political line" comes at the lower level. comes a matter of interpretation in of desertion" and the riots The references tothe "high rate reports of discontent and want North Korea lend weight to previous among the North Korean population.
.Commentt
; cpn applihas deferred decision on an 021 The Japanese Foreign Office Japan, to acquire Allied Council for cation of the Soviet Member, The Foreign Office has
10,
JAPAN.
purposes. property in Japan for diplomatic future of USSR diplomatic relations taken the position that since the status of the Office of the Soviet with Japan is undecided, and the the acquisition of property Member is clear.onlY under the Occupation, (C Tokyo 330, 30 Aug 51) must likewise be'deferred. be for Japan will theoretically clatuntd, The Allied Council the Soviets Occupation, thus.leaving of dissolved with the end of the continued operation of the Office basis for the without any legal the Soviet Member. during the peace treaty negotitheir Thia application, made last summer the Soviets intend to maintain by one ations, may be an indication that in Japan after the.Occupation ends diplomatic representation indicative of a stiff attitude on means or another. It may also be diplomatic relations with the the part of the Japanese in future Soviets.

Si
111
0:!
71M-Sollet
Nether of
,
demanded at the itbe Allied Council for Japan
0_
:=
0I114,0_
0_
*:
'
'APiira4edForRelease2001/09/06.:,CIA.RDP79T01146A0005000=
,
v 01 ri
Approved Fa, Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01106A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
Council's It/October meeting that the Japanese Government reinstate four Communist members of the Diet who were recently arrested and purged. 'The Soviet representative's charges that the purge.violated basic human rights was unanimously rejected by the other Council members, who agreed that they had no authority to review action'taken (a FBID Tokyo Central News, 10 Oct 51) under a SCAP-directed ordinance. The ease with which the Japanese Government purged Comments eighteen top-echelon Communist leaders, including four Diet members, despite lack of sufficient evidence to follow through with court action, aroused some misgivings even in the conservative press. The Government is currently contemplating the enactment of a permanent law to replace the SCAT purge directive.

TOP SECRET
11 Oct 51 8 Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-R0P79101146A000500010001-6
Approved Rai Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
25X1C
1.
SECTION 3
(NESMRN)
25X1A
GERMANY. sees Communist confusion in unity debater enauer exchan e of proposals for all German elections, remarked that the Grotewohl propos crea e uneas ness n es rmany and mould delay rearmament there, thus achieving one of the USSR's major goals. He added, however, that Adenauer's counterproposal had caused great confusion among leaders in the Socialist Unity Party who had not been provided with an appropriate reply by Moscow, and he said that "the comrades are very agitated because the are so- oorly informed concerning Moscow's intentions."
25X1C
25X1C
25X1C
Comment: frequent garrulous commentaries on East-West relati on-ye d to be more than his personal opinions. His remarks concerning the Socialist Unity Party's ignorance of Moscow's intentions robabl reflects his own in that he

TOP SECRET
9
25X1C
2.
Comments on economic situation and expected cash crisis: Despite a seasonal lull, 'West Germany's economic situation continued, by and large, to be favorable in midsummer.. In August, West:German exports hit a new postwar record of 315 million dollars, and imports increased, running to 284 million dollars. Bonn hnproved its position in the European Payments Union, compiling a surplus of 51 million dollars and reducing its cumulative deficit. Consumer prices were no longer rising, employment rose somewhat, and the end-of-August unemployment figures mere the lowest for that time in the past three years. The industrial production index, although it fell off three points in July due to eoal and raw material shortages, was not markedly different from previous high levels attained this year. Hard coal and steel production both sagged moderately.
It is noteworthy that as Germany has improved its EPU position, that of the UK has declined, giving rise to the presumption that German exports are beginning to obtain an edge over British exports in the EPU area. The competition is apparently stronger in overseas markets, for example, in Latin America, than in Western Europe. On the financial side, Germany is probably headed for a cash crisis around the end of the year. This stems'fram the fact that Finance Minister Schaeffer has not provided in his budget for about 400 million dollars now being disbursed as occupation expenses. He is considering asking the Occupation Powers for permission to tap three US and UK mark accounts.
3.3_ Oct 5].
Approved Forittelease 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T011464000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
3.
FRANCE. Communists and Gaullists can profit from cantonal elections: The US Embassy in Paris cautions against ally inference from press reports that the French cantonal elections held on 7 October clearly indicated important losses of popular support for the Communists or the Gaullists. Elections were held in only half the cantons of France; none were held in the Paris region where both extremes are strong; and the Gaullists ran candidates in only about ho percent of all the contests.
Nevertheless, the marked shift to the right in these elections can be expected to stiffen the government's reluctance to make concessions to induce the Socialists to re-enter the coalition. (R Paris 2070, 8 Oct 51) Although the Communists populaflaW, compared to their 26.5 received only about 24 percent Of the percent in the June national elections, they can still boast Comment:
of being the largest French party. Furthermore, the apparent sharp drop in the Gaullists' share of the popular vote as well as the strong showing of the right-wing make it expedient for the Gaullists parties in the present government, may to join later in a coalition government. The Ehbassy has recently estimated that the long-term prospect is for a more rightist government, but believes the Pleven government to remain in power through 1951 and that is likely the Majority of its members prefers to strive for the re -inclueion of the Socialists.
Non-Communist journalists' unions sponsor new international organizations: The three journalists' unions affiliated with the major non-Communist French labor confederations have just invited all European and North American journalists' unions to a conference in Paris from 12 to 14 October. The unions will discuss a new confederation in opposition to the Communist-dominated International Organization of Journalists (ICJ). Such collaboration has hitherto been considered so difficult to attain that previous journalists admitted to membership only one such union from each country.
Success in this venture would do much to encourage co non-Communist labor organizations in France, where national labor leaders have actively discouraged grass-roots unity-of-action developments. The Communists have had a monopoly of the international representation of journalists, particularly in the UN, since 1947 when they captured the IOJ largely as a result of indifference and lack of preparation on the part of the non-Communist affiliates. The latter have since withdrawn from IOJ membership.
operatmnr'mong
Comment:
The October meeting is expected to lead to a world congress early in 1952 when the new international will actuallybe formed. (C Paris REPTO
5017, 14 oct 51)

TOP SECRET
10
11 4W( Approved ForRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500u1vvv1-
AprwovedFurRelease2001/09/06:CIA4RDP79T01111104000500010001-6
TOP SECRET
S.
AUSTRIA. US correspondents admitted to Soviet Zone: Soviet authorities in Vienna have approved the applications of two US'newspapermen of the United Press to visit towns within the Soviet Zone for the period 8 to 11 October. The important cities of Miener Neustadt, Baden, and Eisenstadt are included in the approved itinerary. This approval, the first such permission granted in recent years, follows US action in granting Soviet newspapermen access to the city of Salzburg in the US Zone. (S Vienna 1282, 9 Oct 51)
6.
NETHERLANDS, The Dutch are sensitive to Big Power action on Middle East Command structure: The Dutch NATO deputy has submitted two working papers representing the Dutch Cabinet's thinking on the Middle East Command (MEC) and its relationship to NATO. The same official had previously indicated his personal belief that the Dutch Foreign Minister "had backed down too quickly" on his inpistence for pre-consultation with the smaller nations prior to any contact with Turkey.
One of the working papers gives the "background thinking" of the Cabinet, and poses the important question of Turkey's and the MEC structure's political relationship to NATO, Pointing out that the standing GRoup had considered only the military relationship. The Dutch suggest as indispensable a workinglevel operation between the top political organs of NATO and the MEC, pointing out that it is "difficult to see" how the Standing Group can "receive harmonized political guidance" otherwise.
Comment: The Netherlands' sensitivity on the growing loss of a voice in ma3377771sions directly affecting its interests has been increasingly apparent. The Dutch position may be supported by Norway and Denmark, which likewise resent being by-passed in important matters.
The Dutch member of the recently formed Temporary Council Committee has complained that, since his appointment, he has not been officially
The US NATO deputy comments that, although Dutch insistence on preconsultation may not be so strong as it wee it the Ottawa Conference, the Netherlands and "probably other smaller countries" expect a voice on the MEC arrangements and "will be very sensitive" on a seeming "too fast and firm action" is a result of the forthcoming talks with Turkey. (S London 425, 6 Oct 51; TS London 424, 6 Oct 51)

TOP SECRET
11
Comment: This favorable treatment of the applications was not anticipated by US officials and correspondents in Vienna (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 Oct 51). It would be pre:nature to conclude that the Soviet move indicates a generally liberalized attitude in the matter of-access to its zone. It does, however, suggest that the Soviet authorities regard travel restrictions Amposed on US citizens who desire to transit the'Soviet Zone.to the British Zone as a question for bargaining.
11 Oct 51
Approved gar Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T011146A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
informed on the proposed "operation-wise men," whose intense preparations have been leaked to- the press. Furthermore, he has expressed his concern over the rumored domination of the Committee by the "Big Three."
7.
Communists caught off guard by US announcement of Soviet atomic arolicsion: President Truman's recent announcement of the USSR's second atomic bomb explosion caught the Communist press completely off guard. Unita referred to the announcement as a "stinking provocation." The same paper subsequently gave front page coverage to Stalin's interview on the explosion and to Vishinsky's plan for atomic control under the headline: "SupporOhese Peace Proposals." (C Rome 1618, 8 Oct 51)
ITALY.
8.
Italian-Social Movement seeks closer cooPeration among European Fascists: 'The leaders of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) have been intensively developing relations with similar organizations and isolated neo-Fascist personalities outside of Italy, Special attention is being given to organizing rightist elements in collaboration with groups in Austria, Germany, and Spain. In the South Tyrol region of Italy strong nuclei of former Austrian, Germans Italian and French Nazi-Fascists are prepared to form a Fascist International. The movement's center, located in Rome, is a contact point for Nazis It also living in Mediterranean countries and for SS elements in Germany. offers safe haven to individuals who are not safe in Austria or who are The group destined for Spain or South America and are transiting Rome. controlling the center is opposed to any alliance between the MST and other Italian rightist parties. It seeks to promote an nnderstanding between the MSI, the Catholic clergy and isolated Fascist elements, and military and ntacts with similar movements in other countries.

TOP SECRET
Comment: This is not the first time that the Communist press has apparently failed to receive advance notice of important Soviet developments or at least instructions from Moscow as to the line to follow in propagandizing them, Absence of comment by Communist leaders on Malik's peace proposal of last June suggested at the time that the party leadership was uncertain as to the best method for exploiting the proposal and was awaiting instructions from the USSR (see OCI Daily Digest, 30 Jun 51),
25X1A
Comment: A conference of representatives of European neo-Fascist organizations, including the German and Swedish neo-Nazi leaders, reportedly took place the middle of July 1951 in the Milan offide of the MST newepaper. They declared themselves in favor of closer cooperation between the various groups. Toward the end of September a similar group of representatives, including MST and former Nazi $S elements, allegedly attended a meeting of the European Social Movement in Spain for the purpose of organizing a PanEuropean Movement,
25X1A
11 Oct 51
Approved car Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
9.
has resigned fram the Comment: This is the second time Dossetti with party policies. The directorate as the result of dissatisfaction the resignation undoubtedly does reflect fear of a rightist trend in that its long-awaited socioChristian Democratic party and apprehension Disintegration of to be carried out. economic reform program is not going add to social reformist movement would Dossettils devoutly Roman Catholic Party, which the strength of rightist currents in the Christian Democratic in its program. The of land and other goals embodied oppose redistribution present Minister of Agriculture, Fanfani, is a member of the Dossetti group Tempots but has shown little proclivity for achieving agricultural reform. 1.:mandate" end" to the Christian Democrats: remarks regarding the "approaching popular support for the party_indicated undoubtedly refers to the decline in by the spring series of local elections, Italians present 1951-1952 balance of payments forecast: The Italian presented trade forecast for fiscal yoar 1951-1952 is the most realistic 215 million balance of payments deficit of to date and indicates an over-all of payments with the non-dollar dollars. A continued surplus in balance of payments deficit is area seems probable, However, the dollar balance (S Rome Joint Weeka No, 40, 5 Oct 51) projected at 332 million dollars.
10.
foredast scales down considerably Comment: This new balanceS of payments Nevertheless, the Italian balance of payments previous Italian estimates. is indicated by the figures presented. The position is still not so poor as dollars considerable dollar deficit will likely be overcome by 163 million equipment in direct economic assistance, US off-shore purchases for military effort. in Italy, and US funds provided to support the Italian military for Furthermore, although the terms of trade were developing unfavorably inflationary 1951, a slackening of world-wide Italy during the beginning of trends has improved the Italian trade position*

TOP SECRET
Leader of "left-wing" Christian Democrats resigne from party directoChristian Democratic National Council in rate: The recent meeting of the TOE; was marked by the resignation cif Giuseppe Dossetti from the party (conservative) press reacted in divers ways. directorate. The independent a Tempo declared it is too early to believe Dossettils resignation means Democratic growing supremaby of right-wing elements within the Christian end".to the possible that the "approaching Party, but added that it is party Christian Democrats: "mandate" is driving some elements within the right to promises which the country has a to demand the "fulfillment of surprise, in view expect." Italia commented that the resignation was no "trend" has "disintegrated and lost its of tbe fact that the Dossetti announced that to think Corriere della Sera, on the other hand, influence." because Dossettils resignation means the death of his movement is a mistake, up-to-date to be "it has put forward methods and ideas too progressive and Oct 51) (1 Rome Radio, Italian Home Service, 9 ignored."
13
11 Oct 51
Approved hareRelease 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T0110A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
11.
Negotiations NORWAY. Comment on Norwegian provision of base-rights to US: with Norway for US operating rights at Norwegian air and naval facilities are gradually nearing conclusion. A blanket agreement providing for joint US-Norway maintenance and expandion of certain air and naval bases, as an implementation of NATO obligations, to which wilt be appended secret annexes specifying the exact degree of US participation is presently envisaged. The Norwegian authorities are anxious to prepare the facilities for effective immediate use by NATO forces in the event of war and are therefore willing to arrange for US operations at the airfields and naval facilities for "training purposes" now. However, at the same time, the Government insists that the agreement, which will require the ratification of the Storting (Parliament), must not violate Norway's often reiterated policy against foreign peacetime bases.
In reply to a note questioning Norwegian adherence to NATO, Norway Assured the Soviet Government in February 1949 that Norway would "never join in any agreement....that contains obligations...to open bases for the military forces of foreign powers as long as Norway is not attacked or subjected to threats of attack." In line with the standard Soviet practice of intimidation and official protests for the record, the SoVlat Government can be expected to protest the conclusion of an agreement as a violation of Norway's commitments and an unfriendly act toward the USSR. Presentation of the agreement to the Storting will occasion 'considerable debate over whether it contravenes government policy; but Soviet protests will have little influence, since the Norwegian Government has consistently refbsed to be deterred by Soviet maneuvers.
12.
Comment: The substantial gain in popular vote for the Labor Party in this election is a continuation of its increased popularity as reflected in the 1949 general elections. The increase in its representation on municipal councils insures Labor even greater influence in local government affairs. Although no,major domestic or foreign policies were at issue in this election, the returns show continued confidence in the Labor government which has been in office since 1945.
Labor Party gains in municipal elections: Returns from the election of municipal council representatives in Norway on:8 October show substantial gains for the Labor Party. This party received 46.4 percent of the vote, as opposed to the 38.8 percept and the 45.8 percent they received in 1947 and 1949 respectively. The Communist PartY lost heavily in terms of council seats, and its popular vote was reduced from 100,000 in 1949 to 89,000 in this election. However, although polling 6.6 percent of the vote as,compared to 10.1 percent in the 1947 municipal elections, the Communist Party per(U Paris, French News centage was nearly 1 percent greater than in 1949. Agency, 10 Oct 51)

TOP SECRET
11 Oct 52.
Approvedar Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01406A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
The Communist loss of seats will reduce Communist Party influence in local affairs appreciably. However, discounting the nearly 1 percent increase in popular vote as a reflection of radical dissatisfaction in local matters, the percentage of vote polled indicates that there has been no loss in Communist popularity since 1949. Communist influence decreased sharply between 1945 and 1949, but retention of voting strength during the past two years, despite world developmentS, and anti-Communist efforts of the Labor Party and trade union leadership, indicates that the Communist Party's electoral strength has reached its nadir.
13.
Comment': 111.11.11.11.1.11.1111 one of the principal ' matters discusse y ouis ai an an aur ce arrauei 19FTU officials, while they were in Cuba on their Latin American trip (29 April to 16 May), was the attendance in Italy of a large delegation of workers' leaders of the "second-class,fl as part of a program for their later elevation to "firstclassu labor leaders. A subsequent report indicated that 21,Cubans departed from Havana on 25 July on a ELM flight to Amsterdam. It was believed that the majorilty of them -- and perhaps all of them -- were Communists and, in all probability, were members of the group of usecond-classff labor leaders*

TOP SECRET
15
CUBA. Communist program to train future leaders: In reply to an inquiry uS Embassy official regarding the extent to which Communists mere infiltrating labor unionsj Vincente Rubiera, prathinent Cuban labor leader, xeplied that they were making many attempts but not achieving much progress at the present time, He stated, however, that he was very Much concerned about their plans for the future, Indicating that a group of 22 ',secondclass" Communist leaders recently went to Europe for training, he added that approximately 30 more young Cuban Communists, most of whom had gone there during the past six weeks, Were there noW. Rubiera said that apparently these leaders are being scattered throughout Europe since, during a recent trip, he ran into young Cuban Communists in Milan, Rome, and Paris. According to him, the Communists have set up a long-range program for training promising young leaders in Europe. They plan to continue the training program, lasting from a few months to a year or two, by having a continual flaw of prospective leaders moving in and out of Cuba at the rate of ten or twelve monthly. -(C Havana 357, 29 Aug 51)
25X1C
11 Oct 51
UNCLASSIFIED when
bApprosectEntRelease,2001/Ostoo
SOISROPTOTOONAGOSGITOIVCREOseor declassi-

REG I STRY
C I A CONTROL NO.
0
I VED
C 7.90Cr
DOC DOC
.
.
NO.
DATE DOCUMENT REC LOGGED BY
DATE
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified TOP Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as It is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside ol CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose offiC141 duties relate to the matter. TOp Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material wIll sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document Will sign and Indicate the date o/ handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
5 I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I mE
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
OFF ICE/1) I V.

DATE
T IME
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached. from Top Sec et material it shall be completed in the appropriate space and transmitt d to Central Top Secret Contra for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
ay
below
DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
To
(OUTSIDE CIA)
DATE
BY (Signature)
OFF I CE
WITNESSED BY
liT
(Signature)
DATE
Aa etved For Reiaese 2001109106

E F ICE
OFF ICE
ClIA-RDP79T01' 46A000500010001-6
(40)
FORM
8-73
2.
PPPPP 0111 EDITIONS.
TOP SECRET
Approved gar Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01406A000500010001-6
TOP SECRET
11 October 1951
CIA No. 49386-A

Copy No.
49

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved fa Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T014166A000500010001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
'1.
Security Council may further postpone meeting on Anglo-Iranian disBritish UN delegate Jebb is seeking delay of the next UN Security Council meeting in order to ascertain whether Turkey, India and Yugoslavia would co-sponsor the draft resolution on the British-Iranian oil dispute recommended by the United States and Great Britain. After he was informed that Brazil, India and the US would prefer to postpone the meeting, Jebb agreed that if the necessary seven votes were obtained by 12 October he would inform London that he proposed to request a meeting for 15 October, (S, New York AV, 9 Oct 51),
IRAN.
arks
2,
INDIA/IRAN. India's attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian disputes A high Indian official has informed the US Charge in New Delhi that India approved Britain's step in taking the Iranian oil question to the UN Security Council. He also asserted that India had previously assured Britain of its support for any Security Council move calling upon Iran to cancel the order expelling British nationals from Abadan. Indis could not, however, support a proposal upholding the International Court of Justice interim decision in'detail, since India considers the latter to have been superseded by certain agreements reached during the course of Harriman's mediation efforts. (S, New Delhi 12340 4 Oct 51),
Comment: The International Court ruled that no measure should be taken to hinder the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and that the management of that company should continue to direct operations under a five-man Board of Supervision including members chosen by both Britain and Iran.
India's desire to insure regular delivery of its oil supplies, 95 per cent of which are imported, may outweigh its natural inclination to defend Iran's assertion of national sovereignty. India might therefore be persuaded to vote for a resolution calling for negotiations leading toward the resumption of oil operations under some type of temporary management.
3.
INDOCHINA. Chinese internees deemed of little Value to Taipei governments A Chinese source has transmitted to the US Legation an eyewitness account

TOP SECRET
1
Comments The draft resolution calls for early resumption of BritishIranian negotiations in accord with the principles of the International Court provisional measures, or alternatively for a mutually acceptable settlement consistent with the principles of the UN charter. Since India and Yugoslavia apparentIY desire to see negotiations resumed, they may cosponsor the resolution. Postponement of the Security Council meeting, however, may offer some hope for reaching a negotiated settlement,
11 Oct 51
ApprovedNOlelease2001/09/06:CUVRIDP79T01104000500010001-6
TOP SECRET
of the restlessness among the Chinese Nationalist troops interned in South Vietnam. The source states that some 200 of the internees have joined the Viet Minh during the past six months. With regard to possible disposition of the 30,000 internees, the Legation comments that most of them left China almost two years ago.and would have little combat or espionage value with out considerable further training, (C, S/S Saigon 790, 8 Oct 51),
Comment: The French have continued to resist Chinese Nationalist pressure to repatriate these troops to Formosa,

TOP SECRET
2
11 Oct 51
HR70-14
--1v)
IMPSBORETSUEDE-
6.
CHINA. MIG-15 lets fly to Antun gfrmn fromairfield a i r f i e l d in i n Port P o r t Arthur Arthur naval n a v a l base om Chinohou term f ew Prom ino ou near Dairen airen to t e r a flew to EtTing on-7 Ootober, mad there was was o a'similar flightthe sindlar flight the previous previous day day from from possibly.the same' slam& a airfield toAntwng, Antung,aooordiag' a000rdineto Chinese Conimunlst CoMmunist possi\ify'the irfield to e o Chineae meitiages. I apparently related r e l a t e d measage f 8 Ootober t a t e s khat he An message o of October s states that tthe messages. & (SUEDE "Boviet'e Chinhou Chinohcu tO'Antung'forecast t6 h t w g f o r e c a s t is is the the saMe aame as as yesterday." yesterday." "86viet's (SUEDE Shenyang4mtung 8 Air Foroe Force Roundup 'Roundup 2 1 2148 4 , 8 Oct! Oot8/3666,3665, Shenyang4ntung 8 Oct Oct 51) 61)
Zier; Pifteen-RIG4S-jet f
'Cements flights that Comment8 These f l i g h t s are unusual unusual in in t h a t they t h e y are-the a r e - t h e first first detected jet flights-from-the Arthur n naval base area, area, whioh -Whichis is pre d e t ' e o w flights from'the Port Arthur a v a l base pre-' sUmibly'SOvietcontrolled, MIG-15's sumably S o v i e t w o n t r o l l e d , to Co AntUag, h t m i g , the t h e base base for f o r many of the MInG-151s mhioh operate whioh operate over northwest Korea. Korea.
'
The term-"SOViet"'has The tern ' % O d e t n hasAppeared appearedin inother otherChinese Chinese Communist Communist messages messages aboUtlorean is it o olear about Korean combat oombat flights, fllghts, but but in in none none of of these t h e m messages message8 i e 1% lear Whether "SoViet" whether "8oviet" refers-to'elements refere t o elements of of a B Soviet S o v i e t air air unit u n i t or o r to t o Soviet-. 60vietp i l o t e d aircraft airoraft; under actual a o t u a l or or nominal Chineee piloted Chinese Communist Commumist subordination. subordinstion.
/NIR
-TOPSEGSPITHERYBDr
5
11 Oot 51
APPROVED FOR RELEASE I CAPPROVED
\h
IDATE: (DATE: 18-Mar-2010
To learn about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
IvA) SECRET SUEDE

TOP-8VORIT-8-15EDR
10. Nbith Conventional 1 0 . =Eke ItOEZA, No* Korean Korean oonventionalaircraft a i r o r a f t move move from f r o m trainingarea t r a i n i n g 'area to to OFrational baies of o eratim'b a s e oAccording hooording to to prellminaty preUmhary ffeld f i e l d translations, tr'knalationa, a move of at least 14 14 gorth North Korean LA-9 IA-9 oonventional oonventional fighter fi&hlber aircraft aircraPt from from a a training-field at t r a f d n g f i e l d afFengoheng a t Fengoheng in i n Manchuria Mmohuria to t o an & operational o p e r a t i o n g l field a t Air Forae Force Roundup Roundup 218, (SUEDE Air 216, 8inuijU took place SinUiju plaoe on on 8 and 10 10 Ootober. Ootober. -(SUEDS OotZ1) 10 Oct 61)
-
Thie forward movement of Korean This o f North G r e e n operational o p e r a t i o n a l aircraft airoraft OamMerits Comienti May coMpletion of of E an training may indkoate i m e i t'either h e r tthe h e completion I I advanced t r d n i n g oyole oyole and and the the prepaiatiOn'fr p r e p a r a t i o n ' f o r Combat oombrnt of of a a group group of of North North Korean Korean pilots p i l o t s or or a a shortage a h o r t a p of of sabh airoraft airoraft'dUe to the suoh' due t o combat combat losses among t h e limited l i m i t e d number of of North Nor-t;h Korean airoraft Korean a i r o r a f t at a t Sinuiju. Sinuiju,

-Ter-GBORET-EF3EDB-
11.00t 51
HR70-14 HR70-14
lx)P SECRET SUEDz

USSR USSR
1
1/ Oc+
NR NR
-1
APPROVED APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 \ DATE:

FAR F A R EAST
2.
Presence of heavier Soviet-type tanks accepted in Korea:

On the basis of UN pilot sightings in the Pyongyang area since 1 October, the US Far East Command has accepted the presence in Korea of enemy armor heavier than the nowfamiliar. T-34. Observing that these tanks are probably organic to the Chinese Communist forces, FECOM states
10 Oct 51
-3-
TOP TO LSE.CKETSU-EDE
that they are are .probably probably Joseph Joseph Stalin Stalin r rs s and and Ills II' s rather than than the the new new Stalin III. The possibility that the Joseph Joseph Stalin StaLin III III may may be Joseph Stalin employed employ.ed.for for testlng testing i is s not to be tu3 discounted entirely.
Comment: Although the Joseph Stalin I I and and Comment: Although I1 --now superseded in i the n w e t Army by II tanks --now Soviet by the the Joseph Joseph Stalin III-HI-mount mount a a larger larger gun gun than than their their 13 Ukf~counterparts--122..mm, li'nounterparts--122..mm, compared with 90 underpowered engines and, the the difficulties difficulties of of the the Korean Korean 90 mm mm --their --their underpowered engines and_ terrain, willdo domuch much to to counter counter their their effectiveness. effectiveness. In In sufficient number, terrain, will however, these tanks however, tanks will will form an important addition addition to to the the lightly-armored lightly-armored Communist forces in in Korea. Korea.
3.
---T
.
-~

C,aucasian in North North Korea: Korea: Caucasian troops again reported in
L 9 Oct 51
000 Caucasian 1 that 5, 5,000 troops (believed (believed Russians) Russians) with 80 to 100 T-34 T-34 at Hamhung Hamhung in tanks were at in late September. During the same period 000 Caucasian ' period "10, "10,000 i t h tanks between mechanized equipped w mechanized troops equipped with tanks and and heavy heavyartillery artillery were between On 28 28 Yangdok across Yangdokand andSongchon" Songchon" acrossthe thepeninsula peninsulain innorthern northern Korea. Korea. On Qeptember "600 European troops in Chinese Communist Communist uniforms were September "600 moving from Pyongyangffsouthward. from Pyongyang"
Comment: While the Comment: While thefigures figures in in this this report report a r e probably probably exaggerated, exaggerated, itis it is further evidence are ThriTlher evidence of of the the considerable considerable nqmnumber of of Soviet Soviet military military personnel personnel currently believed believed to to be beperforming performingrear rear a r e a functions functions in in North North Korea. These These troops may may total as many as area
20, 000. 20,000.
The "Caucasitins" "Caucasians?' referred referred to to as a soperating operating tanks are a r e probably probably Soviet Soviet military personnel personnel delivering armor to to the the Chinese Communists Communists and and North North Koreans. Koreans. Chinese
-4-
HR70-14
Nort
-TOP-SECRET-
13. 13. MAA.

enemy air activity 141U river AUring the past two weeits nes comirmea au earger estimate that the he Conrmunist8 would expand expand their their counter-air counter-air Operations operation8 southward. southward. ConCommunists would current with with thia thii expansion, expanalon, enemy enemy jet j e t aircraft aircraft are are appearing appearing in in Current greater greater strength. rtrength. In several seVeral recent lnoidents inbidents UN UN pllotr oilote have been been ontoutnutbered two and.three while not y yet numbered and three to t o one, one. bhile e t in in SuffioienO strength strength to to challenge challenge UH aerial superiority, superiority, the the enemy's enemy I suffioient UN aerial aounter-air effort effort in i n the the area area north north of of Pyongyang Pyongyang has ha8 "poaed posed a a definite definite counter-air challenge to t o our o u r fighter-bomber fighter-bomber and and reconnaissance reconnaiseanoe missions." missions. challenge It is Is ooncluded that that while while the the enemy enemy is ie unable unable to t o employ employ ouch auch'booties %acticr over concluded all of of Communist-cOntrolled Communist-oontrolled North North Korea, Korea, "hie is ability...to ability...to continue continue all operatione at a t the the current current level level (utilization (utilization of of at at least l e a s t 200 200 jet e t fighters) f i hters operations ahd even for for alight alight expansion, expansion, should ahould not not be and be minimized." 11 11 oot Oct 51) 51)
r I

4 Tor G FCECRETs B e e
10 10
e
I
12 Oct 51 51
-WA.)
APPROVED PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 18-Mar-2010
HR70-14
NR
10. 10.
-New 'New a airfield i r f i e l d in i n use near Antun a. e A A flight flight on 10 10 October of LL-11 U.U. Venetration f Agri-Wsto T % sd an, me 'penetration l g = s ? a rnear'Antung, &tung, m . 8 reported reported in in a a recent recent message. This is:the acecirding tto the Air Air Foroe, Force, that meeeage. 'Phis 1 8 he first f i r s t indioaticin, indisation, aocording o the that the operational. ha8 been been under w d e r oonstruotion, oonatruotion, is is nols now operational, t h e TekUshan Takushan field,.whiOh f i e l d , whioh has (SUEDE Air (SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundup 216, ZL6, 10 10 Oct 00% 51) 61)
-
i
~ PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: IDATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010

--T-OP-8EGRBT-SUBES-
Commentt The Communists reportedly reportedly have have been bben eonstruoting oonatruoting Takushan Takushan Comments The ai third Set fighter AntUng area, area, but but tthe use of of tthis'new air a a-jet f i g h t e r fieldHin f i e l d i n tthe h e Antung h e use his*new fie34-14 by.jet fightere, which f i e u ' b y IkA1te'des I#Ollte does net not bean kean that'it'iS that it' i a yet.usable y e t i u s a b l e by Jet f i g h t e r s , whioh Howeier, antadditicinaI an,addif;Sonal j jet e t ffighter i g h t e r base eqUire a.MuOh-longer base require a muoh Longer ruheay. runway; :HOweirei, there'eculd greatly t to expand ttheir jet f fighter t h e r e ' m u l d enable enable the t h e Commiliitsti Communists greatly o expand h e i r jet ighter strength in i n the Korean Korean border area, areae atrengbh
5 5
12 Oot 51
-01)
TOP SECRET SUEDE I&
55
116P SECRET SUEDY

-TOP-SECRET-SVEDE-
1 2 .
Ooprmunist8 establish ,eetablish west w e s t coast ooas% defense d6fep.e oommandt aomrnandt Sinoe 8lnbe late l a t e in in OoMmunists SepCember t1er there have in&oatione-i?a t r a i f l o anstlysiso SepteMber iav been' been-irialcations-w4n.trafflo analysis, direotion direotion findfng and meseage i n t e r q e p t d ~ u g g e a t i n g %hat foroee f inding bearings beiringi-,-and-Missage-interOeptlfiuggesting that aommwiet Communist forces la North Korea have established west o & s t defenee defense oOmMand oommand iimilar similar to to ilzHithlorea ha*e eetablished a a west.,Ookst on the t h e east east coast. ooast. It It may be ' .the w'teneive organisation .the'eitenette organilatiOn long long operatiOal on may be that;the t h e now new organization, organization, epboulated'on the a s i s o ofewidenoelOw4ailable f dpeoUlated-On the bbasis that Path heidgdarters headquar.t;eratentatii.elY loOat d i4'ChinnampO, s subordinate eubordinah to to with lava1 in Pyongyang Pyongyang a8 its east 10 Natal Headquarters Headquarters in Lie is is.its east aoaB% coast oountsrpart. oounterpart. A A 10 Ootober field'analysie f i e l d analyeia of of' North North Kerean'traffic Ilorpan'traffio Oonfirms oonfirma that that the t h e 23rd 23rd and and October B t h North Borth 'Korean gorean Infantty o be 26th Infantry Brigades Brigades are are tto be under under operational Operational control control o f th ohis newheadquarters, although remaining o the Of is. neeleadiluirtere-; although remainingsubordimlie subordinate t to the I I and and IV IV Corps, theif parent organizations, or lanizations* (SUEDE CM IN IN'43026, o t 3 TIE 1256 Corps, their Parent (SUEDE CM '43025, 6 6O Oct; TIE 1236 H 176 178 VP 326, 10 10 Oot Oot 61) 617 H i 326,
'

--TOP-SEORNT-fifiEDE-
UommenttEstabliehment of o f this this headquartere ComMentt Establishment headquarters oonfirme confirms the the Colmauniet Comunist foraesr very real-fear r e a l Pear of of UN UN amphibious amphibious capabilities. oapabilitiea. The The detailing detailing of of forogirlgi5 B 0 d h KOrean Korean ciombit oombat units orps has units from from operational operational ooorps has a a preosdent preoedent in in the the east; ()Oast o o a e t syetem. east syetem.
TOP SECRET SUEDE
I 2 Oot Oot 51 51 12
.. ,
-TOP-SECRET-BUEDE-
HR70-14
11.
KOREA. Enemy activity in Korea continues to suggest defensive aptiost cr:Toirding *Preliminary field anilysie, there are indications that the enemy in Korea will continue his defensive operations into November.
The aontinued i l l boxes a d trenohea and *The OOntinned oonstruotion ciOnstrUotionof ofpPill bOkes'ind.trenohes and the the laylay-i n k ol-mEPee 'tiy an 'Unidentified unidentified North oorpe are are aftong d o n g tthe h e evidence evidenoe bY in North Korean Korean corps (SUEDE TIK 326 H H 179, 179, 1 12 Oct 51) supporbing this this oonolusion. oonolueion. (SUEDE TIK 1236 1256 IF W 326 2 Oot 51) supporting
C.
12. 12
'
1% further t h a t the overstrengt;h I1 It may be noted fUrther that overstrength North Korean V VII .COrps.(fiVe Aivisions aad and one one brigade) is i e in in a a better b e t t e r position position to to Oorpe ( f i v e divieioas furniih'reinforoements t o the t h e newly newly formed formed Neat West-Coast Coast Defense Defense Command Command f u r n i s h reinforoements to than may any other other major major Communist CrmPnuniet command oommand in i n Korea. Korea.
Previous Ooxnntlniet messages detailing Pre4ioui ComMUnist d e t a i l i n g UN'preparations '!preparations for f o r an an aoousing the the UN UN of of amphibSou6 landing, Landing, reoent reoent prOpaganda propaganda broadoaats broadoaats aoousing aMphibioue svoh an intention,'and intention, and t h e reoent reoent formation formation of a a Wee% sUOh-an the West Coast Defense ComMand of t the seriousness with with &dah which-the Communists regard regard are eVidfinCe evid6noe of h e eeriousqqse t h e Communists Oonnnand ire this t h i s UV U'H dapability. oapability.
13.
Oomentr A trans-penihsula h i s combat --OOmmenti .A. trans-peninsula move MOW, of of t this combat oorps oorps would would offer f u r t h e r evidenoe Oommuriiat operationeto t o repulse repulee an an anticipated antioipated UN UN furtareiTgende Ofof COmmunist operations landing west ooasto lknding on the t h e weet ooaet.
.~
--Ter-sieem-sulDE5
Moie of-Mi o f major~~C6mmuniat ooast u nit t o met ooast su suaveetedr Alb*. Or-COmmuniit east ooast unit to west ooast ested: 'week, have oons ooneistently W i n g the During e past pas wee , direotion nding bearing6 earings have stent y rep On finding looated(L NOrth IYor$h Korean Ptorean VII VI1 Corps Corps radio radio transmitter transmitter on on the t h e west west coast. coast. lOCated-i o f enemy enemy messages, meeaages, .There hhs'been noindieation indioationWithin w i t h i n the t h e context context of There has-beentO how6vbr, nOnfirMing ironfirming the the westward westward displacement displaoement of of any any elements elements of of this thir hoWiVer; borps, ourrently Carried oarried lavthe i n t h e Itonsan,Hungamm Wonsan-Hungnam area the e a s t aoaet. corps, currently area on on-the east doast. (SUEDE TIK 1236 1236 IF PP 326 2 kt (SUEDE CRJCFE CINCFE TIk 326 H H 179, 179, 1 12 Oct 51)
1 ; 6 Oot 6 1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE . ' P ,DATE: DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
TOP SECRET SUEDE
INIS
-TOP-SECIZT-SUEDE-
14. 1 4
Chinese ComMuniste OonukmlaCs disouss dhoues Japanese Japanese troops troops with with the the UN UN in i n Korea* gbreai Chineie A by Chinese Chinese Cornmiat Communist personnel personnel iin Korea A 6:totober 6 Zjbtober voice ooloe transmilision transmisalon by n Korea oontained Contained the the following oommentst aoImaentai
'
'
"From what "From. what I I bard, heard, the the Japanese Japanese Army Army are are coming, coming, but but is is it true?" "I "I don't don't; know. know. The Japanese are are no good." good.'' "That's right." right." "That's
15. 1 6 ..
16.

' I
COMMents 4 widespread wideepread b belief among the the enemy enemy %n in Korea Korea e l i e f among Commenta There is a favorite that the VD in. employing eMplOying Japanele that.BheVElin Japanese troops.. troops. The'subjeot has been a fa-borite enemy propaganda propaganda broadcasts. broadoaats. recurring theme theme of of enemy recurring
bormm\nidt Military mili u n i t s foroed foraed to to 'subscribe eubeoribb to - COMmuniet Units to 'bonds's "bonds", Aooording A000rding t o i a preliminary preliminary fieId fi te translation.. Railroad Seourity Seourity ranslation,. the the gOrth North 'Korean KOre? Railroad Didoion in Pyongyang Pyongyang addressed addressed the f %he o l i t i c a l Department Division'in the ,"Chief "Chief o of the P poiitical Department Of illregtmenti" h~l'reg~n~ents'' on99 Ootober Ootober instruoting instruating them them to t o "subtraot "subtraot the the cost GOSO of On (41,000 m n for for a a defense defense bond) Prom the the service servioe man's meno# pay pay of o f October October (41,000 won bond) from . ." (SUEDE CM IN 45932, 51) 43932, Fyongyang-U, Pyongyang-U, 10 10 Oot 51)
."
'COmmenti Continuous emphaeia emphasis is plaoed placed on suuh such "volUntary" Cdmnentx Continuouo "voluntiary" contritontributions b u t i o m o r b h Korean Ptorean to Lo defray defray the the Cost oosti of of the the war. war.
-
---T-GP-SEORBT-SbEIDE-
6 6
(SUEDE (SUEDE 0
79 1 , U-U, U-U, 6 6 Oot Oot 51) 51) 791,
61 16 Oct. Oat 61
TOP SECRET SUEDE

40/1-8BGEBTWEDE-
15 Oat 16, O o t 51 01
wo,
HR70-14 HR70-14
TOP SECRET
23, 25
t o observe obaetve . anniverssry n Korean onfliott Pei 1 of internention intervention iin Koreanc con:Mots Peipi to anniversar of The Ai ng a kio esignated Z6 Z6 October &to er as anniversary oof he a6 the annivetsary f th e partici. partioiF ep lp ing o d esignated patiOn o orChineie and direoted directed patiFn f Chinese "Volunteers" "voludteere" in i n the the Korean confliot, oonfliot, and Chineie grOUPs holdr a rallies proMote t the "plane and gun Chhese groups to t o .hold l l i e e t to o promote h e 'plane gun drive drive for for PeiPing sPecified that the 000asion should stress h r e a O w Peiping speoified t h a t propaganda on t h e oooasion stress opposition t o US polioy p o l i o y toward'Jagan "'obatraotion" of of! t h e Kaesong Kaesong talks, DaUrs, Oppositien'tO tOward.Japan, US "Obstruction" the and of Formosa. and US VS flocioupation" "oooupation" o f Formosa, ~ ' ~ 13 Oot 1 51) 61) 3 (
% '
Current Chinese Communist propaganda does not oonrmit the the COMmenti not commit @ommento. Current Peipinrregrie to to the t h e expulsion expulsion of of UN UN foroes foroes from from Korea gorea or o r event even t o aa renewed rsnmd Peipin-e offeneive, aontinum to t o warn the Chinese people that t h a t further offensive, although it continues Ohineee operations in i n Korea may Chinese operations may prove necessary. neoes8ary.
24.
KOREA:. Ca tured Xorth Werth Korean o officer re orts seeing ieein NIG arts in f f i o e r reports MIG airoraft airorafe parte . n .4 an s o A aaptured Korean colonel cave' no cap ure. North or korean lieutenant eutenant co One efated s a ed
ref'uge r o m UN bombing attaoks-in attaoke i n a-oaVe a oave about abou2; refuge f fran i nthe the Cave, oavei Which:was whbh m e gnarded.bY guarded by a 20 miles north nerth of Of Pyongyaflg. Pyongyang. While Whilein 2D miles ChineieComMUniat One Chinese commuiistSoldier, soldier, he heobserved observed approximately approximately 15 1 5 large large Orates. crates; One B open Was ObserVed contain "a "a wing, wing, o or wings" of of an an a aircraft. orten orate wae observed tto o oontain r wings" iroraft. A North Korean Korean interpreter i n t e r p r e t e r informed informed the t h e oolonel'in oolonel i n "utmost 'utniost secrecy" secreoy" that t h a t there there area was was ggnardedbY y were boMe some "200 "200 caves, oaves, containing oontafning MIG MIG aircraft." airorifto" The arm & y b & u of of Chinese Chinese CoMmunint Co&t. banns. I two battalions troons.
ihs:1 On11-111gus. he too
I
/while received while reports have been received indicating an e n acoumulation aoowrdation of o f airoraft a i r o r a f t supplies and and preparation of of' airfields airfields indikatihg f o r a-mavement a movement Of of aircraft a i r o r a f t into into Korea, Korea, it it does not not seem 6eem "plausible" "plausible' that thaf for sition t o laoed suoh thern *enemy is in a seoure enough position tohave have placed such a a large large supply supply is-in a taeoure enou h o t h e enemy 12 Oct 51) o f a i r o r a f t parts parte in in Korea. Korea. ( ofairoraft
'
~~
In mid-Junea aChinese ChineseCommunist Communist lieutenant lieutenant oolonel, coloneel, mho who COmmenti Cmen$o Inmid-june defeafi-ntly to the UN, ObserVed observedfive'jet five' jet aircraft airoraf-b operating operating from from a defeeterMwentlY to the UN,
well-oamouflaged a i r f i e l d about h i s reported iroraft Well.i.oimbutlaged airfield abouttea tenmiles miles north north of of tthis reported a aircraft parte The existence exietenoe of of this this parts stOokpile. stbakpile,/ The airfield, a i r f i e l d , however, however, has never been been confirmed, aonfirmed.
Ootober a UI? UN naval COMMUniats antiaircraft On trainat trainss On 9 October Commkiete thOunt mout a n t i a i r o r a f t on planaaperating agaiiiiTINETTIEWV-WEGMacations aouth of plB3" operating again& e n m y l i n e s of oomunicatione south o fWonsan Woman oh on
'
as. ilS.
..
the-east t h e e a s t Ooist ooast redeived reoeived intense,-accurate intense, accurate fire f i r e frem'aiti-airoraft from anti-airoraft weapons weapons MOUnted a-train.- The The Far Far East East A Air i r Foroe Force oommen%s ooMments t that h a t such such defensive defensive rno'ixnted on" on a'train.. measuree inin WOrld 14.k. uaed eitensivelY extensively bYoombatants by oombatante World War II I1 and and are a r e considoaasiclmeasures were were used ered cred ta t o be an an extreMely extremely effeotite effeofiVe method of defending defending trains t r a i n s against against air dr methed Of attacks." 12 Oot 51) atLaokss* ( 112 51)
(1
-TOP-SECRET12 12
16 Oot 51
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar2010 [1PPROVED
1-
-TOP-SEME-This measure, new in Korea, indicates indioates the the determination determination of of measumnew in Korea, 06MMents ThiS Comentt the t h e Communiatstomaintain G o t o maintain their t h e i r forward forward movement movemen.t of of supplies. suppliee.
26. 26 b
North Korean o belong o new Korban prisoner prisoner olaima olaims tto belonE t to new armored armoreduaitt unitt A A North North of Kassong Kaesong on on 14 October, 00tober, stated Korean prliener, pri-ionfir, *ho who deseited deserted ndi-theast m f i e a s t of stated ed te'the to' the North North K0rean.131st &rears l3ht Mechanized Meohanized Division, Division. [ that he belot ed Oot 51) 15 00% 61)
Comment* This is is t h e first fi.rst identification identifioa%ion of of a a 131st 1 3 b t North North Korean Korean Commentr This the armare-. su& numbered unit is organicto t o either either the the 105th 105th Tank Tarik armOrdrlaW. No No suoh numbered unit is organic Division in i n the the Bari:Ion Barimn area r tthe h e 17th ( 4 ) Division carried carried Division area o Or 17th Meohanized Meohanized (4) in this probably a a mieidentifioatioa, this prisonerls priaoner'a i nC h i 8 dector. sector. AlthBugh Although probably misidentification, this statement etatement may indicate indicate that t h a t a now new North rJorth Korean Korean armored'unit armored unit has has been been formed. formed.
27. w.

.
-T-OP-C-BOREIT-
New RQK ,moderation in a ROK oease-fire oease-fire delegate dale ate shows shows'moderation in public ublic statement statements AbbaSiador Alnbasgador k ccoio c i o obeerved observed t a t South Korean General General h e th at Outh.Korean e Hyun~gun Eyuaggun "seems seems t o have handled handled the f h e presto press s k i l l f u I l y upon rrival a t MUnsan" N & s ~ " (the (the UN UN to-have skillfully upon his hie a arrival at cease-fire camp). cease-fire camp). MUocio Muooio notes notes that i n contrast contrast tto o "past-provocative "paat provocative that in at&bhemen.t;s by by high high ROK ROK offieials" officials" on on the t h e subject aubjeot of o f the t h e oease,4ire, owae-fire, General General statements Lee oonoluded h a t "our *our tation nation need not be pessimistic of of the the concluded by atating stating t that
outcoMe of. talks." Lee outaome of tthe h e kalke." l e e did did say, say, however, however, that that"our (but not) a t %he sacrifice eaorifice of our unifioation (but-hot) at-the unification . L ." 15 16 Oct oat 51) 51)
Comen-kr 'General 'General Lee h e replaoes rephoee ROK BOK General General Paik Paik YUn Yun Sup, Sup, an an excelient exoellent OomMentt field-rasigaer, as delegate. YIhile Mile General field e r , as the the ROK dease-fire cease-fire delegate. General Lee's be's moderate stateMent statement does doe8 not-necessarily not neoeasarily indicate indioate any any badic basic change change in i n the the moderate ROK-attitide BOK attitr;lde towards towards the t h e cease-fire, oeaee-fire, it it will w i l l make make for f o r improved improved ROK ROH public publlo relations, relations
13
."i""--",
-people eo l e want want -peace... eacebe.
16 Oot 51
'
HR70-14 HR70-I 4
16P-SECRET-SUEE
jN R NR
15.
Nam I1 Il v Visits i s i t a &tung AutUng for for an ea hourt hourt According Booording to to a a US Us Air Air Foroe Foroe KOREA. KOREA. Nom a n a l j i s i sof o fChinese Chineseuommuniat 6ommunis.t;flight f l i ght traffic, t r a f f i c , North North Korean Korean General General Nam Nam XL, a, MilTsis chief of Stiff Army to ohief a t a f f of of the North'KOrean North' Korean A m y and senior Comhunist Communist delegate t o the t h e Kae50ngeeeie.4ire. Kaesongcsase-fire talks, taika, flew flew on on'15 16 Ootober Ootober from fram tthe h e Korean border
oity t o the t h e Chinese 0,hineeeolty o'ity of of Antung Antung across aoro88 the t h e Yalu Yalu river. river. The city of or Sinulju Sinaju to elapsed tiMe that time between meeiages messages indicates indioatee t h a t he spent roughly roughly an an hour hour and and twenty minutes in i n Antung. h t u n g . The Air h a t i.t; a "noteworkhy" tWentY'hinutes Ali Foroe Foice obeemea observes tthat it i is "noteworthy" fha-k the t h e "Peiping "Peiping Chief.of Chief of Staff l t a f f mad and advisors" advisors" and and a a "Commander "Oommander Ltu," UU,~ that poaslbly diVision division OomMander oomander of t h e Chinese CoIlonuniat the Communist 10th 10th Air Division, Division, also d a i t e d Antung reoently. (SUEDE Air Air Foroe Foroe Roundup Roundup 220, 220, 16 Oot Oot 61) 51) visited Antung recently.
a signifioant,however, however,that that one one of o f the the highest higheeL ' ' 1 4. o n is nerEgFE. It It is i significant,

ComMenti Commene8
-TGP-8E6REiL-8BEDE-
The The reason reason for for General General Nam's Nan's visit v i s i t to to h Antung h n g at this t h i e time time
'
offioere in in the'North the'blorth Korean &rean armed foroes foroes should leave his hie country country for for a a officers vieit to t o Antung, Antung, the t h e hub hub of of Communist Oommuniat air a i r aotivity a c t i v i t y in in the t h e Korean Korean war. war. visit
0 8
1 7 0et 61 17 Oct 51
Si
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE PPROVED FOR

IDATE: 20-Mar-201 0 20-Mar-2010
3 I
,
II
. . . .,
'INOP SECRET SUED

-TOP-sEeRiriEWEDB-
14. 14
Chinese Communiet Communist meesaEe meesage r refers "International!'t An An exoerpt excerpt Chinese e f e r s tto o "International": frOm the the ureliminarv preliminary f field of a 10 166otober from i e l d ttranslation ranslation o f a 0otober Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message states that Wan-Kuo (literally translated "Inter"Inter. Wan-KUO ( l i t e r a l l y translated measage eiatee t h a t l the the " The ield natiOnal") i ie to the The f field s today returning t o t h e front imMediately." immediately." national") OomMenti that oommentb t h a t "it "it is i e not not known known here here whether whether the t h e expression(VVan-Kuo) expreseion@an-Kuo) iis e a cover name, name, Chtneae Chinese army unit'de.ai unit-designation or oover nation o r some other unknown entity." entityr" CMIN (SUEDE CM I N 46209, 46209, U-U, U-U, 13 13 Oot Oot 51) 515
"
Comments Despite frequently reoeived received field conoerning a f i e l d reports oonoerning Oommentr "Soviet PUppet Force" Pores" or "International Volunteer A Army" "Sovi-et m y " there is still still inauffidient to the i n s u f f i c i e n t evidenoe t o confirm or deny t h e existence existenoe of suoh suah a separate unit. ttaotioal a o t i o a l unit.
unknown. unlcnown.
15. 16
North Koremn Korean'Tranapertatiot redesignated Bailwa.. Railway Mlnistry_t Ministrp TransportaiJion Ministry reUesignated A000rding Pooording t to o a preliminarY prelimihary f fielltranslation, i e l d translation, a a 1$ 19'October Oatober measage message from thellOrth t h e North Korean Korean Railroad Railroad Security Security Division Diviaion Headquarters Headquarters in in Pyongyang Pyongyana; informed informed "each "eaoh regiMental regimental commander".that commander" t h a t the t h e "Standing "Standing Committee Committee of of the the SupraniePbople Peogle Supreme I s Council" Counoil" had:redesignated had redeeignated "thetpreeent "thk .present Transportation Transportation (SUEDE CM CM IN IN 44701, 44701, Mlniatry-. ..:.the'Railway the.Railway Ministry Ministry as as of of 1 1Ootober." Ootober." MiniitrY-. (SUEDE Pyongyang-Chongjin, 13 13 Oot 00%61) 61) yongyang-Chongjin,
Oolionents moire seemt o toformalize formalize t the existing situation. situation. This move mWould u l d seem h e existing Oomentc Thies North"117M7 sea vehioular North= aeatransport.has Oranaport has become become almost almost nonexistent, nonexistent, and and vehioular transport ia.believed be almost alkOat e entirely is believed -be t o be n t i r e l y under tthe h e operational operational control control of o f the t h e Chinese-CommUnist Chinese Communist military. military. It It would appear appear tO t o be a a logioal l o g i o a l step step for f o r North North Korean Eorean tranaportation transportation offioials o f f i o i a l s to t o oonoentrate oonoentrate their t h e i r energies energies
on but v vital rail lines. on maintaining maintaining the t h e much...bombed muoh-bombed but ital r ail l ines

Comments Oohnsnts
The reasons for this f o r and the extent of of t h i s purge are ere still still
-TOP-SEORET-BVEDB9 9
15. 1 0 .
NorthIerean i e l d analysis analysia field "purge": Preliminary f North KoreanAirforoe:continues Airforce continues"purge".1 Airforoe mesaage message reveals of an an 11 1 1 Oototer 0otober AOrth North Korean Kor e h Airforce reveals that the the previously previously repotCted reported shike-uP'in ehake-up'in the airforce airforce top t o p oommand oommand Continues. continues. The Pyongyang Pyongyang Headquartere Maiiige, by Air School Headquarterr' measage, liSting l i s t i n g individuals individuals b y name, name, advised tthe he A i r School at Yenohi-to the ab Yenahi'fo "olear t h e party par%yof o f bad members." members." (SUEDE Air Air Foroe Porde Roundup Roundup 15 Oot 51) 219, 16 61)
17 Oct Oat 51 51 17
..
. ,
w
T0P-SECRET
HR70-14
NR
___
15. 1 5 .
2Op0O0 S o v i e t troops troops allegedly allegedly arrive arrive in In soUtheasternlitanohuriasL aouheastern Xqohuriarr Lx-1 20 000 Soviet
--
20,000 S 20,000 Soviet o v i e t troop8 troops arrived arrived.in in mid-September mid-Septenber a tatToutaokou Toutaokgu-f just Uust These hwia near near the the Korean Korean horder). border).. These southwest sout;bvrest of o f 'Yenki, Ymki in southeastern ManchOria troops, whioh which owes area troops oame from Stbiria br rail. were were stationed etationad in i n the the Toutitokou To as 8s of 15 15 Ootober. Oofobero
*-
-1
Commntrr For For the the past past year yea bave ave periodically periodioally reported Comments the inIgiella of Soviet ootbat forces into Manchuria. U 'US Army Army G-2 0-2 aooepts aooepta the We churia. S presence of Soviet anti-airoraf't anti-aircraft artillery artillery unite units whioh whioh presumhly presumably prerenoe in Korea of' passed Manchuria. However, Howevero it does not aooepk the presence in a nchuria aooept-the Manchuria passed through through l&umhuria.
of any S Soviet (want oviet o o h a t units. uniteo
_TOP-SECRET-
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE )ATE: 09-Dec-2009 DATE: 09-Dec-2009 VPPROVED
9 9
17 51 17 00% Oct 51
b b
BO
To learn about OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
. .
TOP
17.
believes. Peiping desires oease-fire in the7"111-oonoealed METrie" Communist pres8 press In in Ehanghai Shanghai P for a resumption resumption o of ceasem e " ot 0 1 - the Chinese chme se l5ommunlet or a f oeasefire negotiations n Kore,a, "ImpGed oonoernn negOtiations i in Korea, and noted an "implied concern" ow& over the breakdown of tbe down the talks. talk80 as a "possible indioation" indioathn'' of. of miping s e x p e ofo an t agreement a t i indthe.talks a l Peipingos expectation a reported "worsurge"of eoonomio "efforts" in Shanghai Shanghai and in i n Tienteln, economic "efforts" Tientsin.
Koreas. Xoreao
~~ ~
Comments It that press would would take Comments I t ' is i s questionable t h a t ' the Shanghai press I A c e en e m inind epenm x e on a a nhjor Pelping dependent line Major matter; matter; the Peiping press, press, as preeented presented by Peiping radio, "desire" exoept o r suoh syoh radio, ha6 has not indioated indicated auoh suoh a "desire" except on Communist terms or a "concern" noomern" exoept o r a possible i g i l e n o e ~ The unexcept f for possible relaxation of of Chinese v vigilence. eaonamio a o t i v i t y oould LB indioaOion of of s p e d f l e d "upsurge" of specified."upsurge" of economic activity as well well be be an an.indication an expeotation oontinued hortilities expectation of Of oontinued hostilities as of of a peaceful aettlemeato settlement.
KDREA. i l o t s ' observations ObBOrVatiO i r e r a f t i During the the of ene UN flglhyr ri hter pilots, et a airorafti KOREA. ON 18. ---, 18 course c 8 6a ~s i n t h e Sinuijusinuijuv. 0 1 80 MIG oaur8e an enoomter enoonn er between e en ;1 8 an Sinanju Slnanju area area on on the t h e afternoon afternoon of of 12 12 Ootober, Ootober, UN UN pilots.observed p i l o t s .observedthe t h e folloW-, Pollow,
ing: ing a
(1) n a f l i g h t was (1) One One eneqy enemy aircraft aircraft i in flight was "a "a shoulder shoulder uing wing type type and was was believed to t o be be a a Type-15." Type-15." The UN a i r o r a f t passed within 100 100 feet feet aircraft of t h e enemy enenry plane plane and observed the f i g u r e "1T of the figure "11 but no other marklnge. markings.
(2) A MI0 MIG p pilot was Uwearing "wearing a dark oolored, oolored, oloae close f fitting helmet. The (2) A i l o t was i t t i n g helmst. The enemy pilot p i l o t also a l s o wore oxygen mask but appeared were an oxygen but no goggles, goggles, and appeared
..Tc1PsEeRET7
10 10
17 Oot 51 17 51
. .
to t o be light l i g h t oomplexioned." oomplexioned."
m .
,
is entirely Comments While Commsnto While still s t i l l not n o t confirmed, wonfirmod, it it i s e n t i r e l y possible that the enemiTraFloying for testing e n e ~ ~ l a y theType-15 i tn h eg Type-15 f ooombat r oombat t e s t i n g purposes purposes and and is i s Attempting attempting to t o conoeal oonoeal itepresence i t s presenoe among among the the more more familiar familiar MIC-15'4. MIO-15s~
yeuldeppear difficUlt of an e enemy pilot It would-appear d i f f i a u l t to t o deteot deteot the t h e coloration coloration of n e w p ilot It is probable, probable, howevor, however, t that hat oonditioas of of high-epeed high-sgeed jet j e t wombat. oopbatb 1% under conditions personnel aare pilotings o someoftheeneMyjet Soviet personnel r e piloting m o f t h e e n e n ) y j e t aircraft a i r o r a f t encountered in in Korea. Koreas
19. 1 90
h e limited limited material It the material available available whether whether I t cannot oannot be established from t field or o r aatiairoraft' antiairoraft artillery artillery f i r e was field fire was being being direoted directed and oorreoted corrected by by this %hi6 voiob transmission. transadasiono The The word "height" "height" oould ither t oa ltitude could apply e either to altitude in : artillery a r t i l l e r y or or t o elevation n t h e oase in the the case oaee of ofantiaircraft antiairoraft. to elevation i in the case of fisld field artillery. a r t i l l e r y o Similarly, ridsen Similarly, aPea area designators, designators, suoh as as wzon68, "zones, aeotors, sectors, or or g grids," are common oonrmon to to both f ield a rtillery f i r e dirSQtiOn-and o an n t e g r a t e d earlyare field artillery fire direotion_and tto an iintegrated earlywarning nnrning antiaircraft a n t i a i r o r a f t defense def enae system. systemo
20. 20 0
and soorreot ons given in /4:00tober,.ra-dioed ery Ootober, radioed enemy art artille r y f re c directions - g o n the Russian' language were reoeived on OQ a a UN UN divisional d i v i s i o n a l radio r a d i o set. seto Although Russian language were reoeived t h e reception reoeption of the the was poor, poor, a a oompetent competent UN UN Russian Russian the enemy's enemy's transmission transmission was *AA +11 to t - out ratinrwri raParanaea '"Fr, +n f.hn W-& -I- ',Ina linguist mina he 34th 34th sone tone l i n g u i s t was was ahleto +he and and height." height,"
14
Enemy fire direotion given Russian lan languagy Ensmy artillery artillery f i r e diraotion iven iin n Russian ua e:
On 13 13 and
This is i8 t he f i r s t known inshnoe ioe Commentr This Comment: the first instanoe of of Russian Russian language w voioe military trans= being PeoelYadon on UN UN ground ground radio radio s e t s o While SoViot traniirEEMbeing received sets. Sovit military personnel have been frequently freqUently reported reported previouuly previously as as serving serving a antiairoraft perronnel ntiairoraft artillery this transmission Yeuld seem to t kw-41.7 i n North NorthKorean Koreanrear r e a rareas, arease this trsnsmisslon would 6eem o WJLa r t i l l e r y in firm the the presence presenoe of of Soviet Soviet military military personnel personnel in i n some some ground ground combat oombat role. rolee firm
ROK houein :short 0 in ROK takes action aotion to t o relieve r e l i e v e houqing.shortage $n South South Korea: Korea: On On 14 October oo a Welfare e are announoed announoe that, a , in v i e ew er o OQtober%he Rs ROK Minis nister of Sooial w of o f ' exoesses refugees would would now now be be allowed allowed free free lodging oeoaes committed oolnmitted by landlords, landlords, refugees in in Any my living livlng space spaoe they they can o m locate. looaten
~
l 4
The acute aoute houaing shortage i n both u r a l aad housing shortage in both r rural and urban areas of of Comment: The soutliT5Rrhas further wersened S o u t h m a s f'urther mrsenedthe thelot l o tof of the t h e estimated.four estimated four million million refurefuLandlord gees gees in i n the the southern southern provinces provinoes (the (the Chollas Chollas and and the the Kyongsangs). Kpg6angfi). Landlord excessee, rents and turning turning refugees refugees out for for nonnonexaosses, suoh suoh as ae charging oharging exorbitant r e n t s and payment, have forced forced the the ROK ROK Government Gommment into into this this corrective oorraotive motion. aotiono payment, have
1.0P Stumml
.11.
17 Oct 51
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
TOP SECRET SUEDE'

NR
13, 1 5 .
KOREA. North North Korean Korean seourity s e o u r i t y brigade brigade queried queried as as to t o public publio reaction r e a c t i o n to to 1 4 . KOREA. 14. o a a preliminary ield m n stitement ' s sthtement atomlobombs: bombs: According FM08 on on atomic, According t tO preliminary f field
?ranslation, h e -Brigade' s o ohief seourity eeourity offioer offioer translation, t the Northlorean 23rd Brigade's ohief

j e t fTters which whiohoperate operate in i n Korea. Korea. jet
-7013-SEGRET-84313DE--
from Yalu Yalu River a v e r bases bases noted& noted, The The US Reoord ;et j e t flights f CHINVKOREA. Record from US S's,thb largest Sargest'single 'single flight f l i g h t to t o date, date, Air oroe reports that 90 NIM15181the In addition, addition,-306 MIG15 were noted leaving Tatungkou Tatungkou on on 15 1S-Ootober; were nOted.led4ing Ootober. In 306 MIG-15 Jet fighters departed for."Oombat" for'"oombat" from from Antung Antung and and Tatungkou Tatungkou on jet figters deParted on 18 i s a reoord reoord tor f o r jet-activity j e t a o t i v i t y at a t those t h o s e two t w o bases. bases. 16 Ootober, Ootober, which which ia:a (SUEDE i r Foroe 220 and and 221, 221, 16 16 and and 17 1 7 Oot Oot 51) 61) (SUEDE A Air Foroe Roundup6 Roundups 220
Comment; Antung and Tatungkou are the p r i n o i p a l bases for t h e Inoreased a o t i v i t y a t those fm*z bases r e f l a o t s the enemy's'willlngness t o commit h i s growlag j e t
OoMmentt Antung and Tatungkou ire the principal bases for the Increased activity at these baees refleota the enemyIs.willingness to commit his growing jet t o oombat. oombat. f i g h t e r strength s t r e n g t h to fighter
TOP SEC7RET SUEDE

PPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE.20-Mar-2010 20-Mar2010 ATE: IDPPROVED
1 6 Oot Oot 51 51 18
ms
-Tep-SEeRET-SUEDE-
was w8s qderied queried by by the the newly newly established established West West Coast Coast Defense Defense Command Command as aa to to b publio public oriiiiien o p i i o n fo for r the theconversation conversation uhioh which was was made made between between the . . . Generalissimo Stalin Qener&lissimo S t a l i n and tuid '(the) ( t h e ) oorrespondent correspondent o of f the the Pratwda Pravuda (Pravda) (Fravda) preae." press." (SUEDE (8UEDE CM I IN N 45658, 45658, West lest Coast Defense Command, Command, ChimmpoChinnampo23rd B 25rd Brigade, r i gads, undated) undated)
".
Comment: s looated n t h e Haeju HaeJu area, area, northwest Comment: The ZBrd 23rd Brigade Brigade iis located i inthe northwest Relatively high-level o of f Sc;c7r7s-ird S e z d has hasaa ooastal ooaitil security security mission. mission. BelatiVely high-level
North North Kerean Korean intereOt i n t e r e s tin i ngathering gathering . publio publics opinion opinion on on any any subjeot subjeot is i8 unusual. unusud. While lhile it it is is hot n o t knOwn,what knownlwhat Significance s l g n i f ' i o a n o e may may be be attaohod attaohod to to euoh such queries, queries, it it may Maybe be ipeOUlated speoulated thatthe-North that the NolcthEbrean Koreanoolinand oonunand desirea desires to-know to know the'reiotiOne the reaotions Of d f the %he'isiviliaa:pOpulation oivilian.population regarding regarding the the reoent US and and USSR statements statement8 On on atomic atomio Weapons. weapons.
-TOP-SMET-131TEDE-
15. 15
a
8
18 18 Oat Oot 61 61
Approve lor Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79Tb1446A000500060001-1
TOP SECRET 18 October 1951

143
DAILY DIGEST
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept review completed

NAVY review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET
Approvallor Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Soviet Union leads world in international broadcasting: A survey covering the past four years revealed that the USSR, its Satellites, and Communist China have notably and consistently increased their international broadcasting. The USSR now leads the world in this field. In the process of increasing its international beams 30 percent during the past year, Moscow began in March :to appropriate time on Satellite transmitters for the purpose of relaying its programs. This appropriated time now totals 48 hours a day.
Another new trend developed during the past year -Men the Satellites cut to a minimum their heretofore appreciable amount of broadcasting both among themselves and to Russia in-order to increase their output in English, French, Italian, Spanish, Greek, the Yugoslav languages, and to North America. The International Service of the Peiping Radio increased its broadcasts by 76 percent during the past year. There were increases in practically all Far Eastern languages and in English. Peiping does not broadcast in other Western languages.
I
25X1
25X1
Comments These statistics give evidence of.the importance which the Kremlin attaches to propaganda as a medium of its cold war policy toward the West, and of Soviet concern over stepped-up psychological warfare and the effectiveness and proximity of the BBC.
Currently, Moscow is accusing VOA of setting up the Free Europe broadcasting station and of usurping BCC's best wavelength and broadcasting time "to serve the aggressive plans of American foreign policy."
2*
Poviet-Iranian trade talks continue: financial talks interrupted: The Iranian delegation negotiating a trade agreement with the Soviet Union has not met with the Soviet trade delegation since the original meeting on 22 September. The interruption is due to the Soviet request for Iranian draft proposals. An Iranian spokesman indicated that the extent of trade with the USSR would be determined by political considerations. The talks are taking place in Tehran. Soviet-Iranian financial talks, irnmlving Iran's claims to 11 tons of gold were also interrupted, in this case because of Soviet unwillingness to agree to Iranian claims. The possibility exists that such
TOP SECRET
18 Oct 51
Approval' lor Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP7031146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
discussions will be resumed, according to an Iranian spokesman.
25X1
25X1
Comments Unsatisfactory implementation of last yearb trade agree ment by both sides has probably complicated the current negotiations. However, the present AngloIranian dispute tends to give these talki a political as well as economic value and it is unlikely that either the USSR or Iran wishes to rush into an agreement at this time.
3.
25X1 25X1
25X1
Comments This report is probably.correct for Skoda technicians have been supervising Skoda equipment in the Iranian sugar beet industry.
I
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Eight Czechoslovak "oil engineers" in Iran are slated for sugar refineries: The eight Czechslovaks who recently arriVed in Tran nnainn4 nil pnoinppro AR previously reported.I They were sent' to Iran in connection with Skoda installations at two sugar refineries.
I
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
2
18 Oct 51
Approvector Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T911/46A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
INDIA.
Leader of Scheduled Castes Federation advocates partition of Kashmir: The Scheduled Castes Federation, led by Dr. Ambedkar, ex-Law Minister of India, has issued an election manifesto stating that Kashmir should be partitioned -- the Muslim area to Pakistan, subject to the wishes of the Kashniiris in the Vale, and the non-Muslim provinces of Jammu and Ladkh to
25X1
25X1
ke Stheduled Castes Federation represents only a small number of the 60 million Harijans (backward classes), most of whom consider Gandhi and the Congress Party their benefactors, and that any political party with which the Federation might join in contrati ng the elertiene weilla Ile unlikely to Eccept the partition of Kashmir. [the present policy of the Indian Government regarding Kashmir is not likely to be changed by the votes of Dr. Ambedkar's followers. I
Commentt The Scheduled Castes Federation is the first political party to advocate the partition of Kashmir; Dr. Ambedkar's recent resignation as Law Minister was caused partially by his dissatisfaction over India's foreign.policy.
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
3
18 Oct 51
Approvetifor Release 2007103/07 : CIA-RDP7911146A000500060001-1

2eX1
TOP SECRET
4.
25X1
allegedly part of Peiping plan to INDOCHINA. Recent Viet Minh operations Minh military circles that the reinvade Indochina: It is rumored in Viet to clear up western cent operations were a result of pressure from Peiping foroes into nearby Tonkinerd thus permit the movenmnt of Chinese Communist the way for an inIthis is intended to nave /Aos . I vasion of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. Asia by way of Laos would provide the Comment: An attack on Southeast disruption Pith a relaChinertireFgeTunists.with an opportunity for maximum as well as General de tively small force. American and British observers, of such a flanking movement, Lattre, have shown conoern over the possibility avoid jurisdictional friction which would enable the Chinese Communists to problem which a direot assault with the Viet Minh army and would obviate the on French positions in the delta would pose.
25X1
5..
celebration on 1 As elsewhere in Indonesia, the Chinese Communiet previous occasions. October was more subdued than on
I
Double Ten openly in Sumatra: INDONESIA. Chinese Nationalists celebrate October with greater enthusiChinese Nationalists in Sumatra celebrated 1G asm than was apparent in recent years.
25X1
pro-Nationalist celebrations were more reComments In Djakarta, Java, pro-Nationalist end anti-Comstrained than last year. However, in Sumatra muoh encouraged by the severe seourity sweeps munist Chinese were undoubtedly and subversive teleoonduoted by the Indonesian Government against Commmnists
TOP SECRET
18 Oot 51
ApprovedFor Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP709146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
Sumatra were monts in August and September* The sweeps in North and Central Indonesia and included more Chinese much more thorough than elsewhere in Communists*
6.
A release to the press CHINA. Communists report on forced labor program: 77877korthwest China reports on the program of "reform through labor" recently instituted by the Communists for "oounter-revolutionaries" sentenced to prison terms. Such prisoners have been organized in the Northwest to repair rail lines, irrigate farm fields, cultivate barren land, and sew "ideological education," but clothing* Foroed labor is being combined with the amounts of time given to labor and indoctrination are not stated*
25X1
elements has Comments China's campaign against politically unreliable provided the Communists with a pool of prisoners-numbering hundreds of thousands--to be assigned to forced labor projects througheut the country* The US Consul.General in Hong Kong has observed that the institution of forced. labor projects.will provide the Chinese additionalMotivation for an unending series of campaigns to arrest counter-revolutionaries.
7.
Relationship between Chinese Nationalist Government and Formosan local governments reported: As a result of an interview with severalloopularly elected officials of the provincial governments of Formosa, now in litTaipei for governmental training, the US Embassy reports that there is legisfar with the mechanics of the tle central government interference so lative process at the local level* However, administration is allegedly made difficult by the lack of experience on the part of the elected representatives, the inability of the elected officials to employ or dismiss their ownstafb--which are controlled by the provincial civil affairs commission-and.bYthe oontinued presence in the office of each representative of "an This man assistant" who is "a man of complete loyalty to the Kuomintang*" allegedly reports directly to the security police on the persona activities
of the representatives.
Comments
25X1
25X1
Although the recent provincial elections were reportedly.con-
sentation on both the local and provincial levels appears to be the Kuomintang-appointed "assistant" who is ever-present and in whom rests the real power of.office.
8.
nalial alliance treatus
KOREA* .Communists see f:orthclIng ROK-Japaner-conference as resulting in !broadcast of C nese Communis is "now priming Syngman 1.6.9ctober reports tharthe US'Ambassador to Korea between_Japan.and South Rhee to conclude a treaty of military alliance
I
ductarrdemecratic manner, the most serious block to effective hepre-
25X1
TOP SECRET
5
.
18 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2007/03107 : CIA-RDP79T*I46A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
Tlwe
Korea...." The treaty, it alleges, will provide Japanese troops and war material for the Korean war in return for which the Koreans will ensure raw material and food to Japan, comply with Japan's request for a return of former Japanese properties in Korea, and give Japan the right to establish industries and enterprises in.South Korea. The broadoast goes on to quote (out of context) a number of Amerioan articles and speeches in order to preve its point.
25X1
Comment: This propaganda is designed to coincide with the opening of SCAP-77Wire-ROK talks on the question of the nationality of Koreans in Japan. Propaganda alleging US-supported Japanese colonial aiMs in Korea would probably have some effect if beamed to Korean receivere.
South Korean rally demands rights for Koreans in Japan: On li; October, various ROK Government-sponsored organizations (The National Society for Korean Independence, the Taihan YouthAssociation, and others) held a rally to adopt resolutions in oonneotion with the forthcoming Korean-Japanese talks. The organizations resolved that: (1) Koreans now living in Japan should be given the right to live there permanently; (2) the Japanese Government should meet the reparations demands of the BOK Government; (3) Japanese immigration laws should not be applied to Korean residents in Japan; (4) Property of Korean residents in Japan which was auctioned by the Japanese Government should be restored; and
25X1
(5) Korean children in Japan should be educated in accordance with ROK educational policy.
Comments These "unofficial" Korean resolutions, if granted, would virtually amount to ROK extraterritoriality in Japan. It may be noted that the forthcoming conference may not meet Korean expectations inasmuch as SCAP and the Japanese Government do not contemplate the conference treating in detail anything more than the question of the nationality of Koreans residing in Japan.
The Japanese are not likely to be impressed by these tactics. It is probable that the Japanese Government will recognize its Korean residents as ROK nationalsi which will facilitate the deportation of Undesirable elements among them.

TOP SECRET
9.
18 Oot 51
ApproveWor Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP791W146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
10.
JAPAN. Trade.with Communist China remains inaotives The US Political Adtiser in Tokyo reports.that there is little activity in the development of barter between Japan end Communist China, due to strict export control pOlicsies in both oountries. Since the textile embargo was lifted on 20 September, only two transactione have been approved by the Japanese Government, both involving the export of gray cotton sheeting to China in exohange for salt and coking: Pooh Japanese exporters are discouraged aver prospects of trade because-the important industrial materials which.Japan wants are understood to be reserved by the Chinese to exchange for elsential raw materials, equipment and machinery which Japan cannot ship under present regulations.
25X1

TOP SECRET
Comments Current regulations in Japan permit exports of cotton and rayon textiles of certain grades plus non-strategio consumer goods to Communist China in exchange for raw materials of oritipal importance to the Japanese economy, Such as iron ore and coking coal. During the first seven months of this year, Japan's exports to CoMmunist China averaged 770,000 dollars monthly,
18 Oct 51 7 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
(WESTERN)
25X1
GERMANY. USSR again violates agreement by rejecting Berlin trade permita: Soviet authorities in Berlin on ]3 October once again rejected a block of over 2000 trade permits submitted to them by West Berlin-firms. The head of the West German interzonal trade office views this action as a.violation of the conditions agreed to by the East Germans at the time of the signing of the interzonal trade pact on 20 September. in the Federal Ministry of Economics that his He has informed his superiors office can no longer cope with the situation. rnd has requested further instructions from them.
I
25X1
2.
Comment: Last summer's serious meat shortage, needless partisan obstruction of the expansion of exports, and the recent rent-increase measure have aggravated strong inflationary pressures which were inherent in the July wage-price agreement. Austrian officials have warned that prices have about reached their limit under present dollar -schilling exchange rates
25X1
AUSTRIA. Austria moves to meet inflation crisis: Within the past week, ge177FEr significant moves have been made by overnment and semi-official agencies to check alarming inflationary pressures within the Austrian economy. Chancellor Figl has coupled pleas for an expanded agricultural production and export program with warnings that unless more produce is delivered to the free markets, compulsory surrender of farm staples will be initiated. On the financial side, banking and finance officials have reached a tentative agreement to restrict credit expansion to the growth of deposits. Most important, negotiations are now under way between industrial and labor officials to freeze wages and prices until the end of the year. Industry spokesmen, fearful of the consequences of a further rise in Austrian prices, have offered to withhold price increases provided the line is held elsewhere. The trade unions! position is complicated by Communist demands for another round of wage increases and by the general awareness that secondary price-rises since the fifth wage-price agreement last summer have 'resulted in a detsrioratiOn of workersl livinv standar

TOP SECRET
8
COmMent: Since the signing of the trade pact, the USSR had created a huge backlog ,of.uncleared permits by failing to act on them. It had not, however, gone so far as to reject any permits outright, as it had been doing before the pact was signed. Although this block of permits appears to be the most obvious new rejection of a large of the oral agreement to cease harassing measures in Berlin, Westviolation German authorities are unlikely to take any strong counteraction prodded by Allied authorities. French and British officials have recently unless indicated a reluctance to adopt strong countermeasures at the present time.
18 Oct 53.
ApprovAugor Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79TW146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
and are incompatible with expanding Austrian exports. 'While any intention to devalue the schilling has been denied by the government, it would apPear that legitimate demands for wage increases and the unlikelihood of a major gain in labor productivity would make attractive a temporary solution through the further reduction in the value of the'schilling.
3.
BELGIUM. Serious strike threat is posed: The Belgian Socialist Trade Union Federation has set 22 October as the date on which a strike will be called among mine, metallurgical and chemical workers, and possibly dockers, unless the Federation's demands for a 40-million-dollar bonus to labor and a lowcost housing fund are met. The Christian Trade Union has been "embarrassed" into taking similar action.
High industrial profits for this year, and the increase in the price of bread touched off the Federation's dissatisfaction. Meetings between employers, the government and trade union officials are now taking place to stave off a crisis. The government may be forced into a compromise favorable to the Federation's demands.
Comment: Any curtailment at this time of Belgium's economic effort, especially of its coal production, could have a serious effect on defense production. Coal is in short supply, and the stockpiles, usually large at this time of the year because of summer production, are negligible.
25X1
25X1
This strike threat, supported by most of organized labor, may serve as a new tactic in the Sodialist Party's campaign to force the fall of the present one-party Belgian Government and the calling of parliamentary elections.
TOP SECRET
9
18 pet
51
Approve*for Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T111146A000500060001-1

25X1
TOP SECRET
6.
25X1
The Italian Government controls only 19 percent of the cargo vessels and 3 percent of the tankers under the Italian flag, all the others being controlled by private enterprise. Nevertheless, the Italians are unwilling to deny the use of the vesselsthsy control to the Soviet bloc unless other countries in the Coordinating Committee on Eastast Trade n Paris take similar steps "with their vessels having state interests." )
I
Italians unwilling unilaterally to deny shipping charters to Soviet bloc: The Italians have agreed in principle that controls should be exercised on Western shipping chartered by the Soviet bloc; however, they envisage such complex problems in the application of such controls that no solution is foreseen at the present time.
25X1
Comment: The Italian position in this matter is consistent with Italy's usual reluctance to act unilaterally in applying controls against the Soviet bloc. By this stand Italy protects the economic interests of its nationals and guards against economic reprisals which the Italian Government is in a poor position to withstand.
7.
The US Embassy in Rome recommends against formal establishment of solely US military headquarters in Italz: The US Navy is anxious to establish in Italy an organization known as "Headquarters Support Naval Activities Naples," under the command of the.Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), an entirely US command. The mission of this organization would be to support logistically the proposed CINCNELM headquarters in Naples as well as US elements under the command of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, The US Embassy in Rome believes that the establishment of organizations in Italy will not cause much difficulty provided of its being a purely US base is not spelled out in any, formal The Embassy further points out that the essence of the problem
CINCIELM the fact agreement. is that the
TOP SECRET
10
18 Oct 51
Approved*r Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T97146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
Italians must be able to state in Parliament that they have not agreed to the establishment of an American headquarters in Italy. Such headquarters must be related to NATO activities in Italy.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comment: The establishment, without approval of the Italian Parliament, of installations in Italy that are solely for the use of US military forces, would make the government politically vulnerable to Communist charges that NATO bases in Italy are merely for the benefitof "US imperialists." The Italians will cooperate in the establishment of US installations in Italy if these are at least nominally related to NATO activities.
9.
UNITED KINGDOM. Latest assessment of general election prospects: In a further assessment of general election prospects, the US Embassy in.London estimates that if there is an.approximate two percent shift away from the Labor Party, 31 of the Labor seats considered "doubtful" will go to the Conservatives and one will go to the Liberals.. The following breakdown of constituencies into "safe", "probable", and "doubtful" is based on the February 1950 general election and the by-elections held since then: Safe
115 81
0
Labor Conservative Liberal Other
..
Probable
90 107
3
.Doubtful
1950 Elections 315

298
9
'
110 110 6
mr
The reduction of Liberal nominees from 478 in the last election to 108, and of Communist candidates from 100 to 10 *ill present mast constituencies with straight Labor-Conservative contests. It is generally
' 3
TOP SECRET
11
18 Oct 51
Approveror Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T/M46A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
believed the Conservative Party will benefit by the absence of Liberal Candidates,
1
25X1
Comment: A two percent shift away from Labor is a cautious estimate, The latest public opinion poll gives the Conservatives a 6,5 percent margin over the Labor Party, and in tho last five by -elections, the Conservative popular vote has risen 7 percent. In 1950 an increase of only 3.3 percent in the Conservative popular vote netted the Conservatives a gain of 85 parliamentary seats'
1
Since the Communist vote in 1950 was so small, the absence of Communist candidates is unlikely to affect the election results materially.
25X1
The Embassy speculates that, while the Soviet reference to deterioration of Norwegian-Soviet relations may be merely the usual Soviet threat, the note might presage a severance of relation's and, conceivably, a simultaneous Soviet move into Spitsbergen. I

TOP SECRET
12
10.
NORWAY* Soviet note believed an attempt to block NATO bases in Norwayt The US Embassy in Oslo believes that the purpose of the Soviet note or 15 October was to discourage Norway from making any change in its policy on military bases and in particular from negotiating for NATO bases on Spitsbergen along the lines of the recently concluded US agreements for rights in Iceland and Greenland.
25X1
Comment: Although the notels reference to Spitsbergen may indicate 4 ren;WeriEterest in that areal_there are no recent indications of increased Soviet activities in the vicinity. The shipping season for the islands) where there are about 2,500 Russians and about 1,200 Norwegians at mining claims, ends by mid-November because of ice conditions.
11,
SWEDEN.
Poles demand more ball bearings and iron ore: The Polish trade MEITsion negotiating a new trade agreement in Stockholm has demanded that Sweden increase its ball bearing exports to Poland by approximately 50 percent and double Polandls present iron ore quota of 700,000 tons, The value of the ball bearings demanded is approximately 2,9 million dollars, The Swedish Foreign Office expects the Poles to insist on actual contracts,
It is believed that the note was primarily designed to preclude Norwegian negotiation of further aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly in regard to NATO use of Norwegian bases.
18 Oct 51
Approve Kor Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79Tb1446A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
25)(1
not just quotas, for both bearings and ore before granting contracts to the Nodes for coal: The Syedish negotiating Position is rendered difficult because.Sweden requires deliveries of Polish coal during five winter months beginning in mid-November and averaging 275,000 tons Monthly, whereas ore shipments occur in the summer. Censequently, the Swedes require an.early agreement whereas the Poles can afford to delay. The Embassy recommends that the State Department investigate the possibilities Of increasing US coal exports to Sweden in mid-NoVember, in US ships if necessary.
I
12.
UNION.OF SOUTH AFRICA. Prime Minister expresses concern over AngloEgyptian xelations: Expanding upon a statement by the DepartMent of External Affairs expressing concern-over "the recent grave deterioration Of AngloEgyptian relations," Premier Malan told the US Charge clf Affaires oh 16 October that he hoped the present situation would not lead to a clash of:arms, but he felt that protection of the Middle East and particularly Suez was vital to Africa and the western world.
COmMent: 'The Swedes hope to reduce their dependence upon Polish coal by obtaining supplies from the West. Because of the dollar problem, the Swedes prefer dealing with,the British. In return for Swedish iron'ore, which Britain needs, they hope to obtain one million tqns of coal. The Swedes have obtained fiam the British a promise of a firm commitment.by mid-October.
25X1
:
25X1
Comment: These statements, and South Africa's active leadership in the Nairobi defenee conference two months ago.(where plans were made to facilitate the northWard movement of South African troops in case Of war), demonstrate that the Nationalist government is fully aware Of the importance of S113z to the security of the African continent. However, the Unionfs .defense forcee.are so -short of trained manpower. and Of equipMent that: Sonth Africals-commitment to supply one arthored division te help defend the Middle East in case of war could not be carried out with.any premptness.
13.
BOLIVIA. Studenta form junta to take over,universitY: La Paz university students, who have been Striking for equal voice in administration Of the university, have formed a junta to take over the university. The Bolivian Government., which has remained aloof from the controversy on the grounds that the university is autonomous, shoym no sign of intervening. The strikers are led by members of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (1INR) end are reportedly supported by the Communists. The US Embassy in La Paz comments that the "student junta may fizzle; on the other hand, it may develop awkwardly."
TOP SECRET
13
18 Oct 51
Approve*For Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP791*146A000500060001-1

25X1
TOP SECRET
Comment: The university student organization is dominated by members of the MNR, and it is possible that they may have arranged a working agreement with the Communist students, since the latter would also like to see the governing military junta ousted,
It University students play an important role in domestic politics. is probable that the prolonged strike is part of the MNR campaign to embarrass and then overthrow the military junta. The junta's actions have reflected control over the country, but at the same time a desire not to antagonize the MNR -- this arising from a feeling of self-interest in the event the MNR should succeed in any of its constant attempte to subvert key army and police elements and to incite popular revolution through such incidents as the university strike,
14.
GUATEMALA. Anti-US sropaganda wildly applauded by labor unity congress: At the opening session of the Communist-sponsored Congress for the Unification of the Guatemalan Labor Movement, Vicente LaMbardo Toledano was . wildly applauded as he declared that "the high chiefs of the anti-Communist campaign were born in Washington...the chiefs of tho great Yankee monopolies speak of Russian imporialism, but ignore the fact that imperialism is the econamic domination of a small nation for the benefit of a stronger one." He was further applauded as he asked, "Can one find RuSsian rubles controlling Guatemala's banana industry? Are Russian rubles controlling the Guatemalan railroads?...Guatemala's Caribbean seaports?"'
-
ComMent: Ridicule of the US anti-Communist policy through comparison of historical and current US interests in Latin America with the virtual absence of Russian interests in the area has proved to be a very effective Communist propaganda approach. It is possible that the support obtained by the labor unity congress, which will further solidify Communist control of Guatemalan labor, mill prevent the United Fruit Company from achieving
25X1
Communists are reported to have "set the tone" for the Congress and will unquestionably control the new over-all labor.federation, which will include all major federations. Official governmental approval of the Congress was indicated by a letter from President Arbenz and by the presence on the speaker's platform of Public Works Minister Paz Tejada (representing Arbenz) and President of Congress Alvarado Fuentes.

TOP SECRET
14
18 Oct 51
Approve*or Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP791*446A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
a satisfactory settlement of the current labor contract controversy, which has caused the company to threaten complete withdrawal from Guatemala.
.
.
15.
Mass meeting in support of the administration planned: According to the official Guatemalan radio, "the democratic forces of the nation continue with preparations for holding a huge mass meeting on 19 October to demonstrate their support for President Arbenzl progressive and democratic government. Thousands of workers are expected to-arriVe in Guatemala City from many parts of the nation, and plans include a big parade of workers which will file through downtown Guatemala City."
,
25X1
25X1

TOP SECRET
15
CoMment: The demonstration is part of the celebration 6f the anniversary of the revolution of 20 October 1944, which symbolizes the beginning of leftist influence over the government of Guatemala. The march of "thousands of workers" will provide a display of leftist strength designed to intimidate conservative and anti-Communist opposition, and to remind President Arbenz of the source of his support, Although street disturbances are possible during the celebrations, it is unlikely that leftiet groups will meet any organized oPposition. Should disturbances occur, they may serve to indicate the degree to which "anti-Communist"' organizations have gained in strength since the spontaneous riots of last JulY.
18 Oct 51
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when bla rAp
fied when filled in form is ue ac e
KO Rid rvikrchW12110WINinef reiRsttlisftAtiVidiAtkratttiotitlil declossirom conironeu documen .

REG I STRY

DOCUMENT DESCR I PT I ON SOURCE
CIA CONTROL NO .
117,7 7
DOC DOC
.
.
NO.
DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER DF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
Or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Toy Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose ogictal duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Toy Secret material will sign this form and Indicate period o/ custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECE I VED
5 I GNATURE
ATTENTION: This form torn be placed on sop of and attached to each Toy Secret document received by the Central intelligence Agency
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret mate Sal it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contra for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
By

DESTROYED
D I 5 PATCHED
TO
DATE
T I ME
OFF ICE/DI V.
DATE
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
W I TRESSED BY
(Signature)
DATE
BY
(Signature)
DATE
.
I 401
OFF I CE
Approved For RelCease 2007103/07 CIA-RDP79701146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
OF_E IE
OFF ICE
"I" 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 8-73
Approalgor Release 2007/03107 : ClA-RDP794(146A000500060001-1

CIA No. 49391-A Copy No. 49
25X1
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA

or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
N100
Approveor Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2
(EASTERN)
1.
.
ISRAEL Israeli attitude on Middle East Command: Israeli Prime Minister Ben.Gurion.told thetS.Ambassador.in.Tel.Aviv.that Egyptian,refusal to participate in the Middle East Command "may have saved the allies from making a serious mistake." He went on to point out that the Egyptian record in both world wars was bad, and characterized the Egyptians as "corrupt, venal and completely unreliable."
.
,
Ben Gurion also expressed concern lest Egypt and its bases become a threat to Israel despite the ood intentions of Western powers,
25X1
i
25X1
2.
ARAB STATESO Arab states not likely at present to accept membership in Middle East Command:..The.Saudi.Arabiah Minister, in Baghdad.told.the US Ambassadorthat.he believed that because of Egypt's refusal to join the Middle East Command no other Arab states would accept the plan. It would -be highly dangerous, according to the Saudi Arabian spokesman, for any Arab leader to attempt to force his country into such an organization without prier general agreement.
2.5X1
The Iraqi Prime Minister, although showing interest in the Camnand proposal, expressed similar'opinions-to the US and UK Ambassadors in Baghdad,
I 1
3.
IRAN Swedish fire chief hired for Abadan refinery: The Swedish press has reported that the National Iranian Oil Company.has signed a sixmonths0 contract with a Swedish fire control expert to become Chief of Fire Protection at the Abadan refinery. The first Swedish fire chief who was offered the job refused, stating'that it was "like running around with a stirrup pump in a burning powderc.poom.! US Embassy
Comment: As Arab reactions continue to be reported, it is becaming clear.that.Arab participation in the Middle East Command cannot be anticipated while the Anglo-Egyptian dispute remains unresolved, British Foreign Office spokesmen also believe that the Iranians Would refuse an associate membership in the:Command were it offered them at the present time.

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: I Israel, in a guarded.manner, nas inalcatea aerinite interest in members ip in such an organization. There is also, however, fear and uneasiness in Israel over the possibility that Egypt and the Arabs may expleit Western desires for Arab bases.and cooperation to the disadvantage of Israel.
18 Oct 51
Approv:thr Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500060001-1

as
I
Noe
TOP SECRET
Stockholm reports that no other Swedish experta are knoWn to have been hired by the NIOC, although the Iranian Legation in Stockholm has declared that 25 Swedes have offered their services.
25X1
25X1
Comment: This is the first reliable report that NIOC advertisements for foreign technicians to work in the oil induatry hate been successful. If the SWedish Government, which has followed an official policy of "staying out of Persia," allows the Swedish expert to go to Iran, he will be the first foreign technician to be hired by the NIOC to work in the Abadan refinery.
4.
25X1
Comment- New Delhils report of all earlier conversation between Panikkar.and Chen indicated that the name-list had been presented; evidently that was not the case. Prospects remain poor for an improvement in the treatment of foreign nationals.in Communist China.
5.
British fly reinforcementa tb Suez Canal &me: The 16th UNITED-KINGDOM Parachute Brigade.and.the 2nd.lhfantry.Brigade.have been flowh.from Cyprus to the Suez Canal Zone. In addition the British forces have been authorized to remove any road blocks erected by the Egyptians in the Canal Zone, to organize troops and volunteers into a labor force to replace the Egyptians, to screen persons entering the zone, and to nrohibit aircraft from flyin gver the zone without prior permission.
I

1
1
CHINA-INDIA. Peining's ForeignOffice refuses to accent list of detained US.nationals: .Peipingl.s.Foreign.Offiee has.refused.to accept.from the. Counselor.of.the Indian Embassy in Peiping a name-list gf US nationals detained in Communist China) about whom information is being requested from Peiping. Chen Chia-kang of the Foreign Office, referring to Peiping's resentment over.the detention of "thousands" of.Chinese abroad, stated that he would not receive the list until he talked with Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. The Government of India is taking no further action prior to consulting with Ambassador Panikkar, who was due to arrive from Peiping on 16 October.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
25X1
Comment: The British are determined to remain in Egypt despite the situation resulting from the Egyptian Government's interference with telephone service and railroad traffic and from the riots of 16 October in Ismaila.
As of 1 October there were 35,500 British and colonial troops in the Suez Canal Zone. In addition to the two brigades, nuMbering slightly more
TOP SECRET
2
18 Oct 51
ApproveWor Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP791Wi46A000500060001-1

TOP SECRET
than 6,000 men, 1,000 men were landed at Port Said on 13 October,
6.
The and The the

25X1
British acceptinR further amendments to draft resolution: British Foreign.Cffice has.authorized the acceptance of the Yugoslav Indian amendments to the British draft resolution on the Iranian crisis. Foreign Office is discouraged at the prospect of thus further weakening resolution but could see no other way to obtain seven affirmative votes.
Comment: The amendments would omit any reference to the 5 July decision of the International Court of Justice which the Iranians had previously refused to recognize.
7.
British not yet willing-to abandon'hope of running Iranian oil industry: A Britishioreign.Office_official.has.stated.that the UK cannot.yet commit itself to the substitution of a non-British interest for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company because this possibility has not been considered by the Cabinet. He stressed that any saIes contract with Iran could not be limited to refined products but must include crude also.
.
The US Embassy in London feels that the UK Government generally recognizes that some organization other than a British agencf to manage the oil industry is inevitable.
I
The British, in order to obtain Security Council action of some sort on Iran have retreated from their position of a week ago, when they decided to intrOduce the resolution whether or not seven votes were forthcoming. Although the resolution may receive seven affirmative votes, Iran and the USSR continue to assert that this question is not within the jurisdiction of the Security Council.
25X1
Iranian Prime Minister Mossedeq has stated that he will discuss compensation for the seized British aseets and the sale of oil. HO has said that he is willing to hire British technicians under individual contracts. There is some possibility that the British might be included in any international company formed to manage the industry.
Comment:
TOP SECRET
18 Oct 51
E -
HR70-14 HR70-14
-TteP7--SECRET---SUEDt'--Tep-S1 leRET-SUE1Yr
NR
_J J
13. 1 3 .
'OoMMentt in northeastern with a speoifio specific Comment t This increase i n o r e a s e of o f units i n n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea with antiairoraft mission entiamission of OS p protecting r o t e c t i n g vulnerable vulnerable l line ine o of f oommunication oommunication ttargets argets f urther i l l u s t r a t e s Communist determination o maintain he f low o f further illustrates determination tto maintain tthe flow of s supplies u p p l i e a along the t h e east e a a t ooest ooast rail r a i l route. route.
14. 1 4 .
& 77 Ootober Russians InK o r e a searoh s e a r c h for f o r dawned downed US US jets j e t 8 A. October message msssage on Russians in Korea t h e Sala-04 the Soviei; ground-controlled ground-controlled iintercept ntercept n net e t in in Korea reports reports that t h a t "the "the detao eparted to search f o rthe(P-84)4 the(F-8?)4 at a t 1700 1700on on 66 October." Ootober." detaolcnt4epatted to search for (SUED ( s m r _ & 446, M-M, M-M, 7 Oct Oot 51) 61)
Oommenti would appear for Soviet a air Korea Comment* It would appear normal f o r doviet i r personnel in %re@ t o a t m to o recover reoover late-codel l a t e a o d e 1 US u6 jet j e t airoraf-b f o r ttechnical echnical i ntelligence to attemPl aircraft for intelligence purposes. purposes
-T016-81EtitET-StlE13B-
KOREL. North Korean r railroad seourity regiments ordered ordered t tO form speoial special ailroad s e o u r i t y regiments o form KO=. 717171;aroraft u units: -iroKf% n i t s t According Acoording to toa a preliminary preliminary field f i e l d translation t r a n s l a t i o nof of a a1.6 % Ootob-er O o t o I i eNorth r~nh Korean Korean messap, message, t the h e North North Korean Korean Railroad Railroad S Security.Division e c u r i t y Division in Pyongyang has'ordered h a s ' o r d e r e d its i t s 7th 7 t h and 8th 8 t h Railroad e c u r i t y Regiments n Railroad S Security Regiments i in n o r t h e a s t e r n KOrea northeastern Korea to t o organiie organiee an "antiairoraft " a n t i a i r o r a f t group in in.each eaoh b battalion" attalion" of Of 23 men men and o officers f f i o e r s equipped with with "heavy "heavy maohine maohine guns, guns, llight i g h t machine machine guns, and r rifles.* ifles." The'units The*units a are r e to to b be e "mobile* "mobile" and and are a r e to'protect t o protect "bypasses and and b bridges which a are attacked by by numerous numerous planes." planes." A r report "bypaasos r i d g e s wfiioh r e attacked eport of tthis projecils the Railroad on tthe h e execution of his p r o j e o i ' i s to t o be b e submitted submitted to t o -the Division commander DiviSion commander by by 26 October. Ootober. (SUBDE (SUEDE CM I IN 45779, Fyongyang-Hamhung, Pyongyang-Hamhung, N 46779, 1 6 Oot 51) 51)
19 Oct 51 51 19 APPROVED FOR ~ PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE IDATE: 0 _DATE: 20-Mar-201 20-Mar-2010
bD
53 55
U
-1011-8F4RET---
HR70-14
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. 1 .
The Soviet USSR. gonunen ramont_aajcIrgeLag_t_g_Aing_chaneearr: Soviet t on Kirk-Vvshin e b exchanne reflardinn KOrea:The m. reply reply on on 15 15 October October to to Ambassador Ambassador Kirk's Kirk's 5 5 October October statement statement adheredd &epadtl to the Communist Communist attitude attitude on on the the Korean Korean armistice armistice line. line. Vyshinelcy Vyshinsky elaborated the question queation of of the the "line "line at at which which armed armed forces forces of of both both elaborated that that the sides will will be located military activity sides located after after termination termination of of military activity ... is is organically organically connected connected with with the the question of of termination termination of of military military action action and and consequently consequently cannot cannot be be passed passed over over in in armistice armistice negotianegotiations." tione. ' 1
...
The only only observable observable shift The s h i f t in in the the Communist Communist attitude attitude since since Kirk's Kirk's Subsequent to to approach pertains f o r the the Korean Korean talks. talks. Subsequent approach pertains to to the the site site for Kirk's Kirk' s explanation explanationregarding regardingthe the unsuitability unsuitabilityof ofKee:song, Kaoaong, the the CommunCommunists agreed agreed to ists to discuss discuss a a more more neutral neutral zone. aone.
~
2. 2.
3. 3.
of the note and Soviet publication of x the contents contents of Both. Both, the of the the e exchange suggest as change suggest that, that, 86 in the case case of the Smith-Molotov statements Smith-Molotov statements in M a y 194, 1946,the theUSSR USSRis ia attempting attempting to to obtain obtain maximum maximum propaganda propaganda exBXin May ploitation. of Soviet Soviet willingness willingness ended with a a protestation protestation of plaitation, Vyshinsky Vyshinsky ended to to examine examine "with "with the the participation participation of of the_US the US Government Government all all important important and unsettled questions" including includingmeasures measures for f o r the theimprovement improvementof of US USunsettled questions" Soviet Soviet relations. relatione.
1 1
19 19 Oct Oct 51 51
iSb
bb
PPROVED FOR FOR kELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 6-Dec-2009 r'PPROVED
11. KOREA, 1 1 . KOREA
S u s s eau i m e d with mu1t i d e rocket launchers reported in r or "Russian tanks Wonaan W Y i areas arear [ 105 type equipped equip ed with Katusha rocket launchers are located e a i d to t o be 105 said Katusha.rocket located o f Wonsan)." Wonsany.fl The The US US Navy Navy notes notes that t h a t ROK marines marines on on the the ( j u s t southeast souSheast of (just island Hwangt'o o have have received "mortar fire" firell from t the h e reported p position osition i s l a n d of of Hnangt' of these tanks. tanks.
Comments No Eommentt No Soviet Soviet tank tank is i s known known to t o be equipped equipped with either e i t h e r a 105 nun mm or gun o r rocket launchers. It is possible, possible, however, however, t that h a t the viewer might have have mistaken a a Soviet SU-100 SU-100 self-propelled self-propelled gun f for or t the h e armor desoribed. described. guns have have been been identified i d e n t i f i e d in in Korea, Korea, the t h e USSR supplied Although no no such euch guns Although with a a nuMber number of of SU-76 self-propelled gum, s t h e North North Koreans the Koreans with SU-76 self-propelled guns, and it it I is e n t i r e l y possible that t h a t the t h e heavier heavier caliber c a l i b e r piece piece has has also also been been supplied. supplied. entirely.possible
12.
galivaata_say_kt,ragalLx221121Ls.millatzanau_fint9AL On the night of 12 October a UN light bomber above Sunchon, northwest of Pyongyang, observed an unidentified aircraft proceeding west at an estimated 300 MPE. As the UN aircraft came over Anju, farther to the northwest, red rockets The fired from the ground burst three to four miles from the UN airoraft. enemy airoraft came no closer than 3,000 feet and made no passes.
The US Fifth Air Force comments that the rockets observed were "possibly utilized as a signal flare to warn of UN intruders in the area" and qould also have been "one step further in an attempt to vector a night i n t e r o e p t o r into i n t o the the UN UN aircraft." aircraft." [ interceptor
Comment: The effort io QoPrPPent: The Communists Communists have have been making an increasing e ffort t o p r o t e o t their t h e i r vital v i t a l main main supply supply route which runs through this t h i s area. protect area. During During j e t fighters f t g h t e r s liave have made h e UN n t e r d i o t i o n program t h e day, day, Communist Communist Set the made tthe UN supply supply iinterdiction program d i f f i c u l t , and and it it may may be be anticipated anticipated that t h a t the the level of o f night night i ntermore difficult, Interceptions may also increase increase to t o some some extent. extent. oeptions

T-T T1ECZET
13. 13.
tests; AA17 festsr 17October October North North Korean Korean propaganda propajanda broadcast broadcast
Comment: T h i s is la a a further f u r t h e r step s t e p in i n the t h e Communist Ilatrocity This "atrocity campalp" campaign" agiinst a g i i n s t the t h e US, which which has previously included charges o of f b biological i o l o g i c a l and chemical chemical warfare. Such a campaign campaign can can be expeoted o enjoy considerable expected t to auocesa t h e Korean Korean people people and and military m i l i t a r y personnel. personnel. success among the
PWsin i ntactical w a a lA.-bomb A bomb will use Communist PWs directed directed to t o the the Korean kidKorean people people indignantly indignantly protests p r o t e s t s the t h e "unpardonable *unpardonable criminal aot a c t of kldnapping 500 prisoners of o f war war from from the t h e Korean front front i n order t o use them as in to human guinea human guinea pigs pigs in i n atomic atonic tests." tests." [ -
w u s claim - tUS Communists
7 7
19 1 9 Oct 51 51
ari
TOP SECRET SUEDE
*
1 (SOVIET) SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. nrt Fnrther USSR. her evidence evidence of of
Comment: This message message indicates that current Comment; This indicates either either that current priority priority is being being given given to to shipments shipment8 for for Korean Korean operations, operations, or or to to a a buildup buildup of of jet fuel fuel supplies Minchuria for months. Jet supplies in in China China and Nanchuria for the winter months.
TOP SECRET SUEDE
1. 1.
Jet S e t units units in in oviet Soviet Far Far Bests Easts The m ilitary military representative at at the the Dzemgi (Ebmsomolsk) (Komsomolsk) refinery refinery notified notifled the the Chief Chief representative Supplies and Lubricants Lubricants of of the the Soviet Soviet Air Air Forces in In Moscow Moscow of Fuel FUel Supplies.and on 28 28 August August that that the t h e refinery refinery was not not shipping shipping jet Jet fuel he1 for f o r the the milimilion tary. The reason reason given given was was that that jet j e t fuel fuel shipments ehipments to to Grodekovo Grodekovo and and t a r y . The Otgor, trans-ahipment points points on on the the USSR-Manchurian USSR-Manchurian border border are are given given Otpor, trans-shipment first p r i o r i t y , (SUEDE (SUEDE USAF 222, 19 19 Oct Oct 51) 51) first priority. USAF Roundup Roundup 222,
22 Oct o c t 51 51 22
DI)
5
D>
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
MOP SECRET SUED&

40P-SIBOREe-BUEDt-
14. 1 4
~-
dement: Comment*No No major major Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit unit has has previously previously been garri=his far up o a s t . In I n early e a r l y October, Ootober, garriaohed this'far uP the northeastern northeaetern Korean Korean o coast. however, a a source s o u r o e rePerted reported geeing seeing a a large large nnmber number of of both both Chinese Chinese ComComheWever, munist and North Korean Korean troops troops nearTthe near-&he coast coast in in the the Chongjin Chongjin &roe. a r m . It muniet and'North It is posaibli t h a t fear f e a r of a B. UN amphibious amphibious operation in i n this t h i s area area has is'pOssible that neoeseitated the t h e northward northward redeployment redeployment of o f elements elements of o f the the Chinese Chinese nedeiditated Army Group Wonsan area. Communist 9th 9th Army Group from from the t h e Woman area.

-T4P-NORBT-GUBDE-
Chineae perform c coastal security duties in Chinese, COMmincist Conimmist \Units u n i t s perform oastal s eourity d uties i n northeaslern Korea: Aooording to to a a preliminary prehiminary fiefd f i e l d translation t r a n s l a t i o n of of a a northeastern Korea3 According I/ October meesage, the Division 'I7 Ootober Forth F o r t Korean h orean r message, .the Division Commander Commander of o f the t h e Railroad Railroad SeOuritY Seourity Di*ieion DiHeion in i n Pyongyang Pyongyang inforMad informed hid h i s 7th 7 t h Regtnent Regiment commander oommander in in the the Chongjin Ohongjin &rim area that."the t h a t "the guard guard station s t a t i o n which whioh is i e nay now perform(ing) perfonn(ing) the the gUard task, task, with the Army, will will be able to guard t h e Volunteer Voltmteer Army, t o evacuate evaouate after a f t e r they they (SUEDE CM CM IN IN 46225, 46225, have had'full had full disoussion, disoussion, with with the t h e Volunteer Volunteer Army." Amy." (SUEDE Pyongyang-Chongjin, 19 Pyongyang-Chongjia, . . 19 Oct O o t 51) 51)
1
8 8
22 Oot Oot 51 51 22
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
TOP SECRET
23. 23 0
If to with his present preeent deploydeployIf the enemy enemy chooses ohooses t o initiate i n i t i a t e in a n offensive with his major f f o r t would mnt of forces, f oraeap ment of major e effort would be be concentrated the in witn i n the west w i t seoui ssoui am as an a n objective. oojeora-!e. Available for such suoh action in in t he west central oentral sector seotor ire are eight e i g h t or or nine nine Chinese Chineee Communist Cornmist armies, amiss, supported supported west by a North Korean and a Chinese Communist armored division and and by by four four weuld be Communis% artillery a r t i l l e r y divisions Chinese Communist Additionally the enemy would divisions. Additionally ospabls capable of of launching launching ssaondary secondary e efforts southeast towards towards Seoul Seoulf r fromthe east f f o r t s routheaat omthe e ast with ttwo w o and and possibly three Chinese Chinese Communist Communist armies, armies, and and oentral sector with with one Chinese Communist army army and and four four Nor* Nor* Korean Chineae Communiat Korean oorps oorpr in i n the the eastern sector. Q 20 o o t 51) 51) sector. Oot (
.
24 24.
Major North Korean Korean airrield airfield under construction oonetruckfon 60 miles south south of of l the Yalu-Rivers - __ - - - a major e f f o r t aEgRiSr. underway'to d c e in an airfield a i r f i e l d soUth south of of the the northwestern n o r W e s t e r n Korean" Kore& 171S7t to mike c i t y of city Of Taeohon TieChOn opekationalr operational. Thou ends of laborers employing employing truake, truCks, bulldoiers bulldozers and ind s stem t e w rollers rollers working working on 011 ,some eome 30 30 aircraft re+ea.t;ments i t h conorete reiretmenta and and on On resurfaoing -- apparent y w with oonOrete -- the the 6600 6500 x x 200 f Mot o o t rUnway. runway. The area around the a airfield i r f i e l d waa was "8atur&ed" "saturated" with with persOnnel slit s U t trenChes treaahas and the field f i e l d was protected by three b batteries atteries personnel of eight heavy antiaircraft an.tiaSroraft guns and and several antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t machine gun Of positions. polritionso More More antiaircraft a n t i a i r o r a f t positions poeitions were under construction. construction.

I
12 12
KOREA. Ensmy Enemy troops in retain for powerful offensive offensive iin west troopr i n Korea r e t a i n potential f o r powerful n m at KOREAO while h i l e the enemy's enemy/6 ourourTairialiMes to t indicate rent a a t i v i t oontinue i (18 oontlnus o indi an "active and tenacious" defense, his potential for action, developed developed over over a a considerable considerable period period "strong p otential f o r offensive action, atof is still s t i l l largely largely available, available, and and he he remains remains capable papable c f launohing a tof time, time, is l o o a l or or more more extensive, exkenaive, at a t the t h e time tins of of his hie choosing. ohoosingo taoka, tacks, local
T Z G a l Xorerrj "reaFal Koreas
--
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 18-Mar-201 0 ATE: 18-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
2 2 Oot 22 Oct 61 51
'Is&
r'
b i l e Taechon is is only only 60 60 *ile,Tasehon mlfes f the major major enemy enemy jet j e t base at'Antung, a t Antung, this t h i s distanoe distanoe reproreprexs&I south sOuth oorthe s i y t s "over one-fourth f NIGlS*e elants."Over one-fourth of of the the oombat ooMbai range range o of MIG-15's without without external external A1thoug;hthe the field, f i e l d , "due "due to 'to its i t s leek laok of o f facilities," f a o i l i t i e s , " ie is not not f a e l tanks." tanka." Although fUel euited o r staging e t a g i n g ground ground attack a t t a c k or'bomber or'bomber airoraft a i r o r a f t sorties sorties,"" it it is i e well well suited f for suiOed o r 'interception interoeption operations." operations." ( 119 Oot Oot 51) 61) suited f for k-119 (
Coinmentr These These intensive intensive efforts efforts to CO prepare prepare a a major major field field oapable oapable COMmenti o f OutAaining 8 u g j e t operations operatione are are further f u r t h e r evidenCe evldenoe of o f the t h e importanoe importande of jet a-btaohed tto o gaining t lleast eaet p a r t i a l oontrol i r over over northwestern northweetern attibfied gaining a at partial Control in the the a air Korea. Korea.
26
p i l b t s , oolhmanded bYa. by a Colonel Colonel "0tli-lang-4o," "Otu-yang-ko," were r o m Soviet, Soviet Piioti,"OoMMinded were drawn drawn f from a i r foroe -Unita units in a s t e r n Germany were eoheduled o return there iii'foroe in e eastern Germany and and-Were soheduled t to return there after a two oombat tour tour in in Korea. Korea. after a two months months combat
TOP SECRET
13 13
,
Soviet p i l o t s from from east e a e t Germany hermany arrive wrive in in Manchuria M n o l i u r i a for for combat combat SoVietspilots operatcons tmer Korea4 Ereat operaRonti over timed learned that e that a group f 0 3 'about.I00'3oviet about m0 'Soviet j e t pilots,,ranging p i l o t s , ranging in i n rank rank from from oaptain o&tain to to group jet lieu-keatuit Oelonol& ool&eL, hid had arriVed arrived in i n MUkden Mukden in in late l a t e September. September. Theee These lieutenant
The elaborate elaborate antiaircraft a n t l a i r o r a f t defense defense system system reported reporked around around the the field, field, ooupled t h e inereised-Communist inoreaded Communiet jet j.et fighter f i g h t e r interceptor interoeptor operations operations OCUpled with With the over this t h i s area,iignifies. area, 'Signifiee a w determination determination not heretOfore heretofore noted noted to t o put pu% ne a operational etatus. .this this field field i iosa operational status.
I
22 51 22 Oot 0Ot 51
Thia r e p o r t tallies t a l l i e s very very closely oloeely with with unconfirmed inforreport Comments This Connnentt matio-ved 1 in i n early e a r l y SeptsMber. September. T I MatiarFAVVed [ a Sovief letpilot,.mith 8oviet j e t p i l o t -withthe t h e rank ranlc Of rnajOk, majat, W Wee transferred early in to Mukden area qf R ~ in September Sagtakber t o the the Mukdea area Where &ere he he Was Soviet Air Foroe Force Commend." Command." waa to t o aot a o t as as "Operations "operations officer offioer to t o the 26th 26kh S o v i e t Air
-
It is i a believed probable that t h a t Soviet Soviet pilots, pilots, acting eating as as tiombat comba't p i l a t h believed probable instructors hnstruotors or o r in in Operational operational unite, u n i t s , are are ourrently ourrently piloting p i l o t i n g some some of of the the MIG M I 0 aircraft airoraft that t h a t are are encountered encountered almost almost daily d a i l y over over Korea. Korea.
27, 27.

. Period 10 Jun = 9,JU1 10 JUXI 9J u ~ 10 Aug 10 Jul JUI 9 A u ~ 10 Auk 9 Sep SeP 10 Aug B 10 10 Sep Sep - 9 9 Oot oot
XOREA. Peroentag;e o f Chinese Chineaa Communist Comunist desertions desertions decreases; deareaseso The DS L E 3 Far KOREA. Pereentage of m lrel7ommand o m a n dobserves observesthat that fhe t h e percentage perceneage of of danetie Chine& Communist ComunisC prisoners priebners WIO dederted deserted to t o the the UN UN has has deoreeeed deoreased since e i n o e 10 10 August. August. Additionally, iho Additionally, prisoners who deserted during during this t h i s period period were were in i n groups groups of o f six s i x or o r less less Prisoners WhO delerted and-were MotiVited more and were motivated more by by being being isolatedfroM iaolatedf'rom their their parent parent unit unit than than:by by morale reasons, reasons e morale
Chinese Communist Oommuniet desertions desertions since sinae early early June June are arb as as follows: follows:
--
Total Prisoners 639 639

91 91 221 221 883 663
1 r
Per Per (sent cent Deserted Deserted 31 48 24
8 8
The DS US Eighth Bighth Army A m y attributes a t t r i b u t e s this t h i s deoline deoline to t o "close "0;21)se surveillanoe surveillanos and and The i a t e n s i f i e d propaganda" propaganda" on on the Che part of of the t h e enemy. enemy. intensified 1 9 00% 19 Oot 51) 61)
Commntr This lowering lowering of the.Chinese t h e Uhinese Communist desertion desertion rate r a t e tends ComMent; t o Ocafrirni-E'eai.lier 0 e a r l i e r lW0M to FECOMestimate estimate that'the that-the OIIW'E enany's morale Morale along along the ths b battle a t t l e line:ranged line ranged fran from good good to to excellent. exosllent.
-~
1.
22 Oot 51
29. 29.
ZOMmunista use inland waterway as sU 1 y routet The UN naval task ast report8 t h a t as 8 8 of of 17 reanicest boast rePortsthat Pymgyang ind iPnd Sarivon lariwon formed Oetober weneiy Uae of-the Water waY 134een Pyongyang formed
fokcielFeralTETTITISTIFiTh
1' ,
inoreasing." LaenandOhaeryong rivers appears increasing."
I /
Go
o it
Communist u t i l i z a t i o n of all a l l means of of t r a m p o r t a t i o n in in OoMmunist.utilization traneportation
diction program. program. diotion

Tor OEORET
15 -
.Kirea Korea as resulted in in a a generally,"adequate" generaSly,"adequate" level Level of o f supplies supplies for for the the fraiit'linciiiniti, even i in the face o of front l i n e uhiti, even n th e faoe f tthe h e intensive UN DN air air and and sea sea inter-, inter-
Oot 61)
22 Oot 51 61 22
HR70-14
1.1 6901-5
FAR FAR EAST
Communists trying trying to expand air operations in 1. 1. Communists expand air in Korea: Korea:
" : " I
1 -Ithe
~.
'
1 intensive intensive construction efforts at two new Communist airat two new Communist airfield locations in northwestern Korea may be in Locations preparation for large-scale large-scale air operations preparation for operations from Korean fields.
During During the the past past week, week, 7 the construction of revetments revetments and and the the r resurfacing, construction of !surfacing, possibly possibly with with concrete, of airfields, at of runways runways at at two two new new airfields, atTaechon Taechon and and Namsi, north north of of Sinanju. Sinanju. Each field, capable capable of of supporting supporting jets jets when when completed, completed, will will be be about about under construction 6, 6,500 500feet feet long longwith withrevetments revetments for for 45 45 aircraft. aircraft. The field under at Taechon Taechon is is protected protected by by an anunusual unusual concentration concentration of of both both heavy heavy and light antiaircraft weapons. antiaircraft weapons.
In the light of of the recent recent expansion expansion of of Communist Communist jet interception activities activities to to the the Sinanju Sinanju area,/ area, a "continuation of the the high high level level of of enemy enemy air air activity activity in this this region region would would "continuation of undoubtedlyrender renderUN UN airefforts effortsnorth northof ofPyongyang Pyongyang extremely hazardous...." undoubtedly air extremely hazardous.. Under Under these these circumstances circumstances "it "itwould would be possible for the the Communists Communists to base base .. safety. aircraft on these these facilities facilities with withrelative relative safety...."
.'I
.I'
Comment: UN Comment: UN air air supremacy supremacy over over North North Korea Korea and the the ability ability to to destroy destroy e eneTniiiiTacilities n e m a c i l i t i e sbefore beforethey theybecame became operational operational have been been predominant predominant factors factors preventing preventing extensive extensive enemy enemyair air operations from from have construction, well well within within the the defensive defensive Korean bases. This intensive airfield construction, range of Communist jet interceptors interceptors from Communist jet fromAntung, Antung, suggests suggests a a Communist Communist units to to airfields airfields farther south strategy of of "leapfrogging" "leapfrogging" units south in order ord.er to to challenge challenge UN UN air air supremacy supremacy closer to the battle line. line.
22 October, October, nine UN medium bombers bombers UN medium On 22 attacked the the airfield at Taechon and, according according to to press press accounts, "knocked Taechon and, "knocked attacked it out. " '+
3-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 22-Mar-201 IDPPROVED
ApprovisdrFor Release 2002110/21 : CIA-RDF79*(146A000500090001-8
TOP SECRET
23-October 1951
143
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS, OSD and USAF review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDF79T01146A000500090001-8
Approvbefor Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79*1146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
I.
25X1
The USSR. Moscow,comments on the assassination of Liaauat Ali Khan& first Soviet press comment-on the assassination of PakistanIs'Prime Minister, LiaqUat Ali Khan, obliquely hinted at US complicity. Stres ing that "disputes among the imperialists are daily becoming more acute," the article explained this comment by saying "it is sufficient to recall that in recent years the following persons have been killed in the Near East'," and listing them all. The Russian's clandestine Azerbaijan radio, meanwhile; etated that "it is now abundantly clear that the US-UK imperialists arp responsible for these murders," including that of the Liaquat.
1
25X1
Comment& Following the assassination of Iran's Prime Minister Razmara in March, Soviet commentary issued strong and scurrilous hints that the US was the inStigator of the murder and was, moreover, motivated by rivalry with the UK, Propaganda will possibly develop the same line on the Liaquat's assassination., as part of Moscow's current effort to highlight Western "aggression" and arouse Moslem nationalism against
it.
2.
25X1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA/HUNGARY, Specialists replacing incompetent party-re liables in industry: There have been recent indications that Czech and Hungarian officials hale recognized that uneducated Communist Party members in managerial positio e are partially responsible for the Present production failures. 1President Gottwald has ordered a Large-scale reinscatemeac of professional personnel and specialists, including non-Party members heretofore frequently barred from government posts. In a speech at the Foundry Conference in mid-October, Erno Gero economic boss of Hungary, emphasized the necessity for competent managers who were qualified specialists. Managers must be industrial commanders, Gero said; they meet direct the workshop instead of indulging in political agitation.
25X1
Comment& Since the Communists gained control of the Eastern European countries they have alternated between emphasizing political reliability and technical proficiency in their industrial managers. The current economic difficulties in Czechoslovakia and Hungary have forced the Communist leaders to seek out all possible ways to improve production.
25X1
TOP SECRET
1
23 Oct 51
ApprovNliFor Release 2002/10121 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
3,
25X1
I
Soviet economist Varga in Budapest's. Ithat Eugene Varga, the Soviet economist, is in Budapest. He s repor ed to be directir Hungarian foreign-trade and Perhaps other branches of the economy.
HUNGARY.
25X1 25X1
Comments Varga, who was born in Hungary, spent several months His visit coincided with increased there during the slimmer of 1950. Soviet demands on the Hungarian economy and the beginning of a period of austerity for the people.
4.
The Yugoslav Government therefore proposes that the agreement be signed as soon as possible and that the chief of the US military group, General Harmony, and an initial staff of six or seven officers, come to Yugoslavia at his earliest convenience to work out details. Mates explained that the Yugoslav Government now appreciates that the VS Government needs to furnish satisfactory reports to Congress on use of the military equipment. He added that the discussions with General Collins had also brought out the Yugoslav reasons for avoiding any re currence of the interference and domination which it experienced with the Soviet military mission.
I 1
,
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia ready to sign bilateral arms agreements Assistant Foreign Minister Mates has assured Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Government now has a clear conception of the cooperative character of US military assistance and that he is certain that the bi lateral arms aid agreement can be carried out in this spirit.
-
25X1
Gomments Signature of the agreement as the Yugoslays propose will not settle the USrYugoslav differences over the size and functions of the Unirms aid grouN This problem will remain to be negotiated after the agreement is signed, and the Yugoslav Government will prebably continue to insist that the groupos size and functions be limited.
5.
Implementation of the new economic program postponeds Yugoslav Minister of Finance Popovic announced yesterday that the threat of in flation had forced the government to delay the introduction of the new economic policy from 1 November to 1 January 1952, andY to freeze wages at their present level.
A shortage of consumer goods and heavy defense expenditures were given as the principal reasons for this postponement.
As a deflationary device, the Finance Minister announced the in troduction of increased electricity, transportation, amusements, and
TOP SECRET
2
23 Oct 51
Approviik For Release 2002110/21 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
25X1

TOP SECRET
that these increases would be postal rates. He insisted, however, foOdstuffs and consamer compensated for through stabilized prices of purchasing power. goods brought about by reduced etate shops and prices of induetrial Prices of food products in the fall in the pricee products are to be lowered in proportion to However, the regime has already Of farm 'produce on the free market. flour and tobacco prices in announced the 4owArjflt of sugar, lard, state stores. of the wage increases indicates that Comments The postponement unpopular deflationary devices-and the regime is willing to institute liberalize the economy in order partially abandon its econoMic planto to save its ambitious investment program. etaples in the state stores, 14owever, by forcing down the prices of reduced prices on forced de through the employment of subsidies or able to preserve the relative liveries of grains, the regime May be economic position of the worker,
1
23 Oct 51
Approve*For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79fte146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
BOXPT. Possible futurearatian_action in its dispute with Britain: A leftist Parliamentary deputy in Cairo states that the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent a draft of a non-agression pact with the USSR to the Council of state for final review.
25X1
Comment: There is no confirmation that an Egyptian-Soviet non-aggression pact is being considered. Some Egyptian and other Arab leaders have on occasion suggested that Soviet aid might be snught if the West refused to yield to Mao demands.
25X1
It is more likely that Arab extremists, rather than the Egyptian ArmY, will become involved in incidents in:the Canal Zone.'

4 23
Oot 51
Approv4dProrFWlease 2002/10121 :CIA-F013.79teli146/UD00500090001-8
TOP SECRET
3.
BURMA. Increased insurgent activity reporteds Increasing activity is WirOted in northeastern Burma adjaoent to China, A customs official in Shame has been attacked, and others have requested transfer on the grounds of insecurity in the area. A sundown curfew has been imposed upon Sagatng, across the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay, as a result of the concentration of insurgents in the hinterland.
I
25X1
50
25X1
fisheries, I
The Indonesian Government does not plan to submit the Comments generia-Nlinese Peace Treaty to Parliament ter ratification until after negotiation of the bilateral treaties. /t hOpes that terms of the bilateral treaties will satisfy the current objections of various political groups to the general agreement. Japan plans soon to engage in negotiations on fisheries with the United States and Canada and will prefer to complete them before beginning TOP SECRET 5
Indonesia vitt initiate bilateral negotiations with.Japans Sudjono chief of the Indonesian mission to Japan, told a press conference in Tokyo that an Indonesian delegation would visit Tokyo within the coning menth to negotiate bilateral treaties on reparations and
25X1
Comments A large-scale Coimmunist offensive scheduled for November to gen133176o1 of northern Burma, including Mandalay, has been pre1Communist actiVity in central and northern dioted Burma Las been mounting ror the past several months..
23 oot 31
ApprovStor Release 2002110/21
ClA-RDF179-*146A000500090001-8
TOP SECRET
25X1
discussions with Indonesia, Indonesia therefore may have to postpone the dispatch of its mission,
B.
ihanghai authorities jail 374 but announce Wm death sentences: The Shanghai press reports that 374 more Shanghai residents have been sentenoed to slave-labor oamps as "counter-revolutionaries" but gives no figures for persons sentenced to death, I
Comments At least 25,000 alleged "counter-revolutionaries" are believed to have been arrested in Shanghai since April, The Communist press has thus far admitted the execution of about 600 and-the impriiOnment of about 10000 Of those arrested, the number admittedly executed has deolined from a, peak of 70 peroent in June,
25X1
TOP SECRET
6
'
23 oot 51
Approved. For Release 2002/10/21 : COARDP79T01146A000500090001-8
ApproJed For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
9.
25X1
25X1
gommunists order manufacture of unif2=0.3 The Chinese Communists have ordered the manufacture by the end of November of 150,000 army urdforms at a factory in South Chinaj Purchasing agents of the factory have gone to Hong Kontio purchase the cloth.
1
I
I I
25X1
25X1
lemmas The Chinese Communists have been buying heavily in cotton It is probable that these items are and wool items, as well as shoes being bought for the armed forces.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Ithe 8th Soviet Air Division was transferred from Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East to the Manphurian cities of Mukden and Dairen in late September. In early October,I the Soviet 12th Air Division moved from Komsomolsh to Harbin and (Mangthe Chinese Changchun chun. The mission of both divisions is to protect US-UN bombing. Railway and other installations against possible
I 1
10.
Soviet ala_IMareported2Y-MOSA-la_Manchurill
25X1
1
25X1
25X1
25X1 25X1
There are no Soviet air fore Manchuria outside of the Port Arthur area.
gomagni
units known to be in
25X1
11.
President pf Nationalist Legislative Yuan reeigno. The resignation on 19 October of Liu Chien-chun, President of the Nationalist Legislative
Yuan,
25X1
2cmmenta Charges of corruption and the while in office, were brought against Liu by meeting in early September. Subsequently, a Yuan members investigated the charges, which Liu's resignation.
use of dictatorial methods the Yuan in its opening fifteen-man committee of resulted in the call for
Chiang Kai-shek reportedly has been quite disturbed over the Legislative Yuanos unprecedented freedom of action, which he considers an obstacle to his personal attempts to establish certain reforms recently
TOP SECRET
7
23 Oct 51
N1001
Approvigi. For Release 2002110/21 : COARDP79T01146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
requested by the US. In a 16 October converAhee continuee pre-election meneuverag Muccio, as he had done sation President Rhee "hinted" io Ambassador in May 1952. Complaining before, that he would not run for re-election heavy burdens," Rhea stated that "it *as time someone else shouldered the again. Muccio got the impression that he would feel no obligation to serve The Ambassador comments that Rhee hoped Muccio would urge him to run. that he has minvariably remained noncommittal."
12.
=LA.
State Council (his Muccio also states that Rhee has urged the amendments providing cabinet) to "take action" on the constitutional election and for a bi-cameral assembly. for a popular Presidential Rhee's opportunities for Passage of the former would greatly enhance candidate. re-election or for the election of a Rhee-picked
25X1
25X1
I
the President is elected by the gemmenis Under the constitution, between the President and National Assembly, and in view of the friction be given another term. On the Assembly it is doubtfUl whether he would Assembly action on conthe other hand, it is equally doubtful whether two-thirds vote, could be obtained, stitutional amendments, which requires a
13.
recall_LUOK Minister to $outh Korean National Assembly recommends it was recommended National Assembly session, laDans In the 17 October present Ambassador to Japan, that Sihn Sung Mo, ex-Minister of War and Although Sihn's recall ostensibly be recalled from his diplomatic post, in the Kochang massacre courtwas reCuested so that he might testify party--the Democratio martial, the chairman of the opposition political the ROK mission "unfit" to be chief of Nationalist--stated that Sihn was to the Korean-Japanese talks in Japan and a member of the ROK delegation criticized by the ROK that began on 22 October, Ambassador Sihn was session for ailing Foreign Minister during the course of the Assembly return to Korea. ( to comply with ROK Defense Ministry orders to
military personnel charged with gemmtuts The court-martial trying await a considerable period to the Kochang massacre has been recessed for his is involvement in the case Sihn's testimony. Although the degree of of the National Assembly by not believed great, he has aroused the ire refusing to obey "requests" to return to Korea. Japanese-Korean talks off to bad 'starts JAPAN. statement at the opening session in Tokyo reports that the formal Korean to the Japanese that the of the Korea-Japan conference was so offensive
25X1
I
25X1
The US Political Adviser
14
TOP SECRET
Approved For
23 Oct 51 8 Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-FUDP79T01146.4000500090001-8
Approva For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP7.9T01146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
The statement withdrawing from the conference. latter are considering to the Japanese occupation nill-advised" references for a contained several such that the japanese might ask of which was and to prevent of Korea, the tone reconsider the purpose of the conference debates on the lengthy recess to Government during the current Adviser urged.the serious attacks against the ratification in the Diet. The Political to serious charges peace treaty since to do so would open Japan Japaneie not to withdraw, Asiatic nations who antici?rom Korea and other of breach of good faith negotiations in the near future. pate bilateral in Japan to demand The tendency of the Korean minority inferior status, Qammando their previous retaliation for position, in the Japanese Government a privileged of friction between grant has been a continuing source Since Japan does not intend to in postwar Japan. any and the Koreans nation in the present negotiations, in the Korea the status of a victor concessions beyond those granted attempt of the Koreans to gain between the two nations. will lead to further peace treaty arranged primarily for the purpose resident in The current negotiations were nationality of Koreans of aettling the question of the hope to enlarge the scope of the confer-. Japan, but the Koreans evidently settlement of other outbtanding problems. once to include the
25X1
TOP SECRET
23 Oct 51
9
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-FUDP79T01146A000500090001-8
ApprovetPror Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79M146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
25X6
3.
25X1
ITALY. ;talian surplus in European Payments Union inhibits industrial I as' al result exports:1 yls nheavyll European Payments Union aurplusothe Italian Governmentls
of I

TOP SECRET
10
23 Oct
51
ApproveWFor Release 2002110/21 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
25X1
present licensing policy is to restrict the export of items not in the normal trade pattern with the country in question. RIV, the Italian manufacturer of ball bearings, reported, for instance, that it foresaw a possibility of further large increases in sales to the United KingdoM and France) but that it was encountering difficulties in getting government licenses for exports to these countries.
25X1
Cotment: Italy finds itself in an anomalous position, complaining of insufficient raw materials and orders to keep its large industrial establishment going) while at the same time enjoying a surplus in the European Payments Union.
25X1
Government examines its defense potential against possible Communist u rising: Recent threats of insurrection made in Parliament by Camnunist ea er Togliatti io the effect that OAP arms in Italy may one day be used against the US have caused the Italian Government to examine its internal defense forces. According to competent Observers, a Communist revolt could succeed only if it were accompanied by the appearance:of a hostile army at the border. Even in such an event it is believed that government forces could hold'central_and southern Italy until NATO aid arrived. These opinions are based on the size and efficiency of the police, the loyalty of the armed forces, and the unwillingness of most Italians to support an uprising,
bailment: US observers have long agreed that a Communiet-inspired revolt could-EUE-gaceed unless actively aided by outside intervention. They have also agreed that Jtalian defense against an invading force would consist mainly of delaying action. No official estimates are available to indicate to what extent Italyr.s defensive capabilities have Improved during the patt
year.
5.
Details of European fascist meeting reportedd Ithe members of the fascist European Sociai Loyement reel tnat tne movement is making unsatisfactory progress. At the recent meeting inSpain they explored the ground for future action but arrived at no decisions, Among the twenty-tWo delegates present were two Spaniards, one a Falangist journalist, allegedly pro-Nazi during World War II,
SPAIN.
ECA in Paris has requested a study of this situation to ascertain whether the Italian Government will take advantage of its creditor position to increase imports of raw materials and capital toods from the EPU monetary area or will continue to maintain that it cannot expand investments and defense programs because the "so-called raw materials shortage" would lead to an inflationary threat,
25X1 25X1
TOP SECRET
11
23 Oct 51
ApprovtefFor Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500090001-8

TOP SECRET
and the other an unidentified military Meer. The next meeting, scheduled
for spring
1952, may 25X1
be held in Paris.
25X1
Comment: This is the first report on the European Social Movement since the September meeting in Spain. According to earlier reports, leaders of the movement had hoped to secure at that meeting a pledge of Falange cooperation from Franco. General Moscardo, hero of the Alcazar and a Falange National Delegate, was to have addressed the meeting.
6.
Observers agree that the election campaign has been relatively quiet, and attribute this to "a serious British electorate thinking hard about the issues,ft If the total vote is not high, the Embassy estimates that the Conservatives will benefit. The cost of living and foreign affairs continue to be the main campaign issues. The adverse effect upon the Labor Party of the Iranian evacuation appears to have been partly offset by the goverment's firm stand on the Egyptian problem. Neither party has made the rearmament program or USUK relations a vital campaign issue. I
Comment: The figures of the generally reliable British Gallup poll at least show that, with the margin between the two major parties narrowing and with a substantial proportion of the electorate still claiming indecision,the outcome is far from certain.
UNITED KINGDOM. Conservative victory foreseen in general elections The US Embassy in London reports that ',opinion still strongly favors a Conservative victory with a working majority', in the 25 October general election. Nevertheless, the latest Gallup poll shows that the Conservative margin over labor has fallen from 11 percent in late September to 4.5 percent in midOctober, with 10 percent of the people still undecided.
25X1
25X6
TOP SECRET
12
23 Oct
51
25X1

TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when from controlled docurnen. form 4detached fied when filled in
blankAROPSEtilifrothRelettiefe e210192/Milf
TarhmeAtitroi;tirzyodoosworiogzoe:07.:eciassi.
FOR TOP SECRET r)ounvmyr REG I STRY CONTROL AND COVER SHEET
CIA C ON Tb01.7N,
0
$
DOCUMENT D E SCR I PT I ON
SOURCE
DOC
NO.

LOGGED SY
7/
re
DOC, DATE
COPY NO. NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
Intelligence Agency document received by the Central it is downgraded, destrOyed, Or tO each Top Secret until such time as top 0/ and attached Whose official to the document on those individualssign ATTENTION: This /OM will be placed will remain attached id Tod Secret Control personnel and this form the CIA and Secret material will within attached Top will sign and to Tap Secret Matter is limited or classified Top Secret receive and/or release the Secret document of CIA. Access who sees the Top transmitted outside matter. Top Secret Control Officers who Each individual duties relate to the in the left-hand columns provided. period of custody right-hand columns. and indicate SEEN BY indicate the date of handling in the DATE RELEASED
RECE I VED
SI
ors ICE
GNATURE
in the appropriate spaces below Secret material it shall be completed //Mewl ed front Top this form is When (OUTSIDE CIA) Contro for record. NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: Central TOP Secret D I SP ATCHED and transmitted to DESTROYED TO DOWNGRADED $Y (Signature)
TO
DV (Signature)
OFFICE

DATE
T
REFERRED TO
SPE
DATE
T I ME
S I GNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
WITNESSED BY
(Signature)
DATE
CY (S.ignature)
4Rikor r ICE
DATE
ApprlindForReleanncnnnnema
e0ITIONS.
t
140)
TOP SECRET
HR70-14
-'10E-SEORET-STIE
NR
i
I
1I
I I
has in Manchuria. hoe apparently apparexbly moved moved to t o forward forward bases bases near near AntUng Antung and and MUkden Mukden-in Manohuh.a.Thi4 This division divisLon is i e equipped equipped with with MIG-151a, MIhfEISgs, conventional oonventionel fighters f i g h t e r s and and light light bodbers. (SUEDE Air Air Foroe Force Roundup Roundup 224, 224, 22 Oot Oot 61) 51) bombers. (SUEDE CoMments Since Cannnents Sinae late September Beptember the Chinese Chinese Communists Connnuuists have shifted shifted sever;r7g-regiments from China northward aeverzrereg;imente Prom China northwardto t oadvanced advanoed bases bases in i n Manohuria. Manohuria. With Wi%hthe tho transfer t r a n s f e r of of the t h e 2nd 2nd Air A i r Division, Mviaion, the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Air A i r Force Fora6 im lett i f fL f b with little littla known h o w fighter f i g h t e r strength strength south south of of Tsingtao. Tsingtao. Air Division Consists oonsiets of two t w regimental regiments8 one one of of them them contains oontains The 2nd Alr prebably 37 conventional fighters probably 37 MIG-15's, MIG-lS's, and and the the other other at a t least l e a s t 28 28 11.-11 U 1 1 oonventional fighters and three TU-2 T U 4 light light bombers. bombers.
6. 6.
-One 18 Octoberi A A oivil oiviZ a air One or or more more Soviet Bovlet VIP's VIP's fly f l y to t o Mukden on 1 8 Ootobera ir transport wae WAS saheduled schedulea to to oarry carry one one o or more "high-r&n "hig&ranking ahief(s)" of r more ohief(a)" of the USSR USSR from'Eailar from H a i l a r (in ( i n Manohuria Manohuria near near the the Soviet Soviet berder) border to t o Mukden Mukden on on 18 Ootobar, Ootobbr, according aooording'to B Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message. message (SkED3997, 18 to a (SUEDEr---1.3997, Mukden-U, Mukden-U, 17 17 Oct Oat 51) 51)
I
I
I
I
7. 7 .
Cormnento This This phraseologyovhich phraseology,sd.lieh is i r unusual unusual in i n Chinese Chinese Communist Communist ComMentt messages, n e s e a ' maybe m y be an a nindication indieation Of of the t h e high high rank rank of o f the the unidentified official(s) o f f i o i a l ( s ) traveling traveling to t o Mukden. &&den.
KOREA. has OOa8tal coastal security seourit mission KOREA. North North Korean Koroan division has miaeion in in northnorthwesrn reag ' Preliminary re nary ana ysis of orth Karean rean message WesKrn Korea8 analysis of a a recent reoent North message reveals revveala that that the t h e North North Korean Korean 10th-Infantry 10th'Infantrv Division Divirsion is is still still in i n the the Chongju ElemeLte of o f the t h e diviaion division are a r e on on outoutChungjlr area area in^northwestern i n northweetern:Korea. Korea. Eaements lying l y t n g Sinmi S5.mi island i s l a n d and end were were reported reported "engaging" "engaging" the t h e enemy. enemy. (RON (ROK naval naval
I I
I
I I I
I
(~PPROVED FOR RELEASE

.
f
-7e1' -GBORDP-1911B9E-
6. b.
EastOhina East, Chinaair air division division Moves moves to t o Manchurial hknohuriaa The The Cbinese Chineae Communist Communist Air Division, which two months ago w was 2nd A Gm i k r m B whioh a s looated-at b o a t e d at Nanking and Shanghai, Shanhai.
6 6
24 Oot O o t 51 51 24
7OP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR RELEASE

I
m 75
ATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDATE: 20-Mar-201 0
I
I
. ..
-TOP-SECRET-MIND'S-
uaits a d t s and friendly f r i e n d l y guerrillas guerrillas are are active a c t i v e in i n this t h i s area.) area.) The 10th DiVision was erroneously reported Division reported by by collateral c o l l a t e r a l sources aourcea as a8 being being in i n the the 332, 23 O Oot (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE TIK T I K 1263 1265 H H 18317 183W 332, o t 51) 51) Kaesong area. Kuesong meam (SUEDE COMftents'There no indications indications t h that the NorthKorean Cementa There aare r e no a t th e North Korean 10th 10th Divisra7-Talloh D i v i s m i o h has has been been in i n this t h i s area a r e a for f o r many many months, months, is i s subordinate suhordinate to to the newly lest Coast newly established West Coast Defense Defense Command. Command. Chinese Communist Eeaurity security units are ere also a l s o believed to t o be in i n this t h i s area. area.
U. 8.
Cementa of troops f o r agricultural a g r i c u l t u r a l purposes, purposes, widewideComments !!%e The utilization utilization of for n p r e a mChina i n a and notieed notioed before in i n Korea, Xorea, is probably neoessitated spread in hy thaticute the a w t s shortage shortage of of agricultural agrioultural labor labor and and farm farm animals enhnals and and by by the the known food food shortages shortage8 in i n the t h e rear rear areas. area@. kmown
;
r e a r area area troo troops help inith wlth harvest8 ield North Korean rear s hel harvest: A A preliminary preliminary f field transXFi7on of a o ctober the "Commander Commander trans a on o ic o er North orta Kxean ,orean message reveals khat that.the of t h e 8th 8 t h (Railroad (Railroad Seourity) BsouriCy) regiment" regiment in'the i n t h e Chongjin Chongjin area area of OS north, northof the eabtern Korea reported o the Division headquarters in in Pyongyang: Pyongyang that eaetern.Kores. reported tto Division headquarters during a tl five f i v e day dap period period "we we mobilized mobil3.zed 14 14 times times utilizing u t i l i z i n g 270 270 members members during and harvested. harvested 21, 150pyong pyong ('pyongl ( pyong equals equals36 36 square feet ) in the harvesiiand 21,750 square feet)" in. the 'harvest (SUEDE CM IN 46663, 46863, Chongjin-Pyongyang, 21 Oot Oat 51) 61) helping" campaign. helping campaign. (SUEDE Chongjin-Pyongyang, 21
a-m
NR
Tor OBCRET SUEDE

7
,
2 24 4O Oct c t 51
a
MEI
HR70-14 HR70-14
-'rdP-SECRE-T- SUEDz'
2-z- Ck-k
C.18
EAST FAR EAST
pilots from 1. Soviet Soviet pilots 1.
East East Germany Germany arrive arrivein in Manchuria Manchuria for for combat: combat: II
L
group of of 100 100 Soviet Sovietjet jetpilots, pilots, ranging r a n m iin n rank to lieutenant lieutenant colonel, colonel, arrived arrived in from captain captain to drawn from from Soviet Soviet allegedly were were.drawn en n a e ep m er. These pilots allegedly were scheduled scheduledto toreturn return there there after a Air Force Force units units in in East East Germany Germany and and were a two-month two-month combat tour in Korea.
The USFar Far East East A Air that "it The US i r Force comments that had been been assumed on on the the basis basis of fluctuating fluctuatingtactics tactics and and markings markings of of aircraft aircraft . . ." '' that units units were were being beingrotated. rotated....
Comment: The Air Force Comment: The movement movement of of Soviet Soviet, Air Force personnel from East East Germany Germany was reported previously previouslyl stated that a Soviet Air F Force ]stated Soviet Air o r Fmajor, -Gjc stationed in a jet jet pilot, pilot,' was was transferred transferredto tothe theMukden Mukden a r e a to t o stationed in the the area as a area charged with air operserve as "operations officer" to a Soviet air command with air command serve as "operations officer" to a Soviet ations over North North Korea. Korea.

- 3 -
In view view of of the the general lack of In of information on the identity and unit subordination subordination of of the Soviet known to Soviet pilots pilots known tobe be operating operating over Korea, it itis isentirely entirelypossible possiblethat thatthe theSoviet SovietUnion Union is i s rotating rotating pilot pilot personnel personnel into into the the theater theater in order to to provide provide combat training trainingto toas as large large a a number number as as possible.
2. East China China air air division division moves moves to to Manchuria: Manchuria:
2nd Air Air Division, The Chinese Communist 2nd Division, which which two months months ago ago was was located at two a t Nanking Nanking and Shanghai, has apparently apparently moved moved to to forward forward bases bases Shanghai, SUEDE in Manchuria. This near Antung Antung and Mukden Mukden in with MIG-l5's, MIG-15's, conventional fighters and light bombers. conventional fighters divisi is equiged with
US i r Force USA Air 51 22 Oct 51
-TOP-SECRET SUEDE
PPROVED FOR RELEASE IDATE: 0 If)ATE: 23-Mar-201 23-Mar-2010
1,*
-TteP-SECRET-SUEDkr
Comment: Since late late September September the the Chinese Chinese Comment: Since Communists have China northward Communists have shifted shiftedseveral several air air regiments from China northward to to adadvanced bases bases in in Manchuria. Manchuria. With 2nd A i r Division, Withthe the transfer transfer of the 2nd Air Division, the Chinese Communist i r Force known fighter Communist A Air Force is left with little known fighter strength strength south of Tsingtao. of
The 2nd 2nd Air Air Division Division consists consists of of two two regiments; regiments; The least28 28 LA-11 LA-11 one of them contains probably probably 37 37 MIG-15's, MIG-15's, and and the the other other at least conventional TU-2light bombers. bombers. conventional fighters fighters and three TIJ-2
: I
NR iNR
NR ;NR
--TOP-SECRET-SUEDe
-sief-aBenT-suffe-
HR70-14 HR70-14
/NR
9. Q .
Communists Communists may may take t a k e more more positive p o s i t i v e measures measures against againet floating f l o a t i n g mines mines off off North North China China coast: ooaetr A A Chinese Chinese Communist Communist coastal ooastalv e s e e l complained oomplained to t o Shanghai Shanghai vessel that %hat floating f l o a t i n g mines mines were were making making navigation navigation unsafe unsafe and and that that it it was was annoying annoying to t o maintain maintain a a mine mine watch. watoh. This This message message stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e proper proper authorities authorities 'should sweep up up thedmines the,mines immediately. immediately. In should sweep In reply, reply, the North North Sea District Dietriot it would would ask a s k the t h e "proper "proper parties" parties" shipping bureau bureau at a t Dairen D a r e n indicated indioated that t h a t it shipping t o decide deoide upon u on suitable a u i t a b l e measures measures to t o remove remove the t h e hazard hazard of of mines mines to to ooastal ooastal to shipping. shipping. (SUEDE p8UEDE CCS-71, GCS-?l, SS 88 Chung 128-ahanghai, 128-8hanghai, 5 5 Oct Oat 51; 613 008-70, CCS-70, DairenDairenSS 58 Chung Chung 128, 128, 7 7 Oot Oot 51) 51)
-TOP-SEeRET-SUEDE-
26 Oct Oat 61 61 25
TOP SECRET SUEDE APPROVED FOR ~APPROVED FORRELEASE RELEASE 1 DATE: (DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar2010 I
33 tb
SS cs
-TOPElEORET-9BEDB
Comment: Connnent I Several Several Chinese Cormmist Communist shipping shipping)messages 'messages have have reported reported the t h e appearance appearanoe of of mines mines off off the the Shantung Shantung coast. ooast. Apparently Apparentlythe only the only action 80 so f far a r taken Ey by the the Chinese Communist Main Main Sea Sea Transport Tranmport Bureau Bureau has has been t o alert a l e r t vessels vessels under under its i t a jurisdiotion j u r i s d i c t i o n to t o watch out f o r mines. to for mines.
The primary responsibility f o r t h e considerable number loating for.the.considerable number of of f floating mines in i n the Yellow Yellow Sea 8ea must be borne by the yorth North Koreans, Koreans, W who ~ D have devoted a oonsiderable f f o r t during considerable e effort during the the oourae courde of of'the thewar wart o to laying layingminemine fields of tthe peninsula.. Since f i e l d s on on both both the the emit e a s t and and west west 'coasts cosets of h e peninsula. Sinoe it it has has never never been been definitely proved proved that t h a t the the Koreans resorted t to o "floating" *floating" mine8 Vines without noorings, moorings, UN UN mine sweeping sweeping activity a o t i v i t y and faulty f a u l t y 'North North Korean Korean laying techniques probably a000unt aaoount for for t h e madority the majority of of these these mines. nines.
1 11. 1 . .CHINOOREA. CHINA/$COREAr Chinese Communists Communist6 rotate rotate j e t combat oombat unites units: The replacement replaoement Chinese et onmu st 4th of the Chinese chineae Communist 4 t h Air r D i ds sion on a a t Antung n ung by y &ee 9rd id3rd Air Air DDivi sion sion is is indicated indioated by by reoent recent messages. measages. On October MIG-16 MIG-15 elements of of O n 21 21 Ootober
the 4th Mvision e f t Antung o r Mukden. Division l left Antung f for MUkden. On jet O n the the same same day day 50 50 MI0-15 m6IQ-I.6 jet f i g h t e r s flew flew from from Mukden, Mukden, where the 3rd 3rd A i r Division fighters where the Air Division has been been stationed, stationed, t o Antxng, and on on 22 22 Ootober Ootober 24 24 MIG161a of t h e 3rd 3rd A i r Division deparCed to Antung, and MIG-16,8 of the Air departed from Amtung h t u n g "for. "for Korea f o r oombat.r oomba-t;." from Korea for (SUEDE (SUEDE Air Air Foroe Roundup 225, 225, 23 Oot 51) 61) 23
Comment: This is tthe he f i r s t evidenbe h a t t h e 3rd i r Mviqion t first evidence tthat'the 3rd A Air Division is is a at A n t u n .Rotation a t i o n of o f jet Jet units units in in Korean Korean combat combat has has seldom seldom been detected detected Ahtung. probably 000ura oocure periodically. periodioally. but probably

--TOPSESBETSIMMB--
5 5
1 25 Oot 5 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE k
in possibly t h r e e divisions, divisions, at at the MIG-15,s, in three the There are about 140 140 MIO-15'8, 0nits of these fighters oouldst MUkden s airfields. Mukden i r f i e l d s . Units oouldat any time relieve relieve elements of the four combat t h e four oombat divisions, divieione, with with a a oombinsd oombined strength skrength of of at a% whioh are believed based in. the Antung-Tituntkou NIG-15's least 228 MIC)-lSte,whioh are believed baaed i n the htung-ll&tu!Cglmu 4 oombat area. are^.

-S9P-8134.11N-6413E,EF
6 6
25 Oot Oot 51 61 25
-TOP SECRET SUEDE-
HR70-14
UEW TOP SECRET SUED

JR
rotate jet 2. Chinese Communists rotate iet combat combat units: units:
US Air Force US Air 23 Oct 51 51
SUEDE
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010

FAR EAST FAR
The replacement replacement of the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 4th Air Division by the the 3rd 3rd Air Air Division is Division at at Antung Antung by is On 21 21 October October indicated by byrecent recent messages. messages. On
-3-
-1s0P-SECRETSUEEte
MIG-'15 elements of the 4th Division Division left Antung MIG45 elements Antungfor forMukden. Mukden. On On the the same day 50 MIG-15jet jetfighters fighters flew flewfrom from Mukden, Mukden,where wherethe the3rd 3rd Air Air Division Division has 50 MIG-15 been stationed, to of the 3rd Air beon to Antung, Antung, and and on on 22 22 October 24 MIG-15's of Division departed from Antung "for Korea for combat. Division Antung "for combat. " ''
Comment: This is Comment: is the the first first evidence evidence that the Rotation of 3rd Air Division of jet units in Korean combat combat has Division is at Antung. Antung. Rotation seldom been been detected but but probably probably occurs occurs periodically. periodically. seldom
about 140 140 MIG-l5's, There are are about MIG-15's, Ln hi possibly possibly three Units o divisions, at of f these these fighters fighters could could at any any time Makden airfields. Units atthe theMukden relieve elements of the the four four combat combat divisions, divisions, with w i t ha a combined combined strength strength of of at at elementsof least least 228 228 MIG-15's MIG-15'swhich which are are believed believed based based in in the the Antung-Tatungkou Antung-Tatungkou combat area.
NR

-.
"
D
ApprovWFor Release 2002105120 : ClA-RDP70t11146A000500110001-5

143
DAILY DIGEST
*Army and State Dept reviews completed*

TOP SECRET
ApprohoeFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
25X1X
ascertain US policy: TASS correspondents again used in attempt to Istanbul,N In a conversation with TABS correspondente in about the meaning of American air ryas questioned rms again 25X1X1 and naval activity in the Near East. [ with TABS corquestioned on thie subject in a subsequent conversation respondent Yuri Zhukov in Paris.
2.
25X1 25X1
25X1
On both occasions the TASS men reacted USSR's talk about peace was only propaganda might appear before the UN General Assembly sincerity of Soviet proposals for peace and
to suggestions that the by replying that Stalin in Paris to prove the disarmament.
25X1
conversations With Zhukov indicated Comments Reports of earlier regarding US policies of that he was probing for well-informed opinion Soviet Government, such as US rearmament and particular interest to the for American policy in the Far the significance of the MacArthur affair East.
Stalin-Truman meetings Zhukov has recurrently made references to could occur at the time of multior some form of bilateral talks that period the Soviet Government lateral conferences. However, during this confidential approaches made has disregarded opportunities to acplore by the United States.
TOP SECRET
1
25 Oct 51
Approarlrfor
Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
Stalin has consistently declined to meet Western representatives outside the USSR or Eastern &rope, the most recent example being his refusal in February 1949 to meet President Truman in Washington.
3.
Comment: Embassy officials suggest that the comment regarding the "regional" nature of the Atlantic Pact may be an advance indication of the Soviet line at the UN General Assembly on this subject. Output of this type for domestic audiences furthers the Soviet "hate America" campaign and is offered as "proof" that only the Kremlin strives for world peace. Lest the peoples of the Orbit become lethargic as a result of daily Soviet assurances that their "peace campaign" will win world peace, Moscow periodically reminds them that they must be prepared to fight for peace.
4.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. Preparations for Moscow Economic Conference under strong leadership: An AP dispatch from Moscow reported on 24 October 1951 that Denmark had granted visas to a Soviet-delegation which is soon leaving for Copenhagen to discuss plans, with various international groups, for the Moscow International Economic Conference, now scheduled for December. The delegation is headed by Vasili Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Soviet Central Trade Unions Council and a Vice President of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Communist leaders have hinted that important announcements on foreign trade and economic relations would emerge from the Moscow Conference.

TOP SECRET
2
Moscow press asserts Kirk's statements contradicted by reality: On 20 October, Literary Gazette published a lengthy article aimed at "disproving" Ambassador Kirk's recent statement to Vyshinsky regarding the absence of US aggressive aims against the USSR and others. The article included reproduction of a map published in the 30 July iesue of Newsweek, entitled "European Defenses; Missing Links in Mediterranean," and it quoted a Newsweek statement that "US naval and air forces operating from land and air bases in Greece and Turkey . . . could inflict powerful blows on the solar plexus of Russia." The American "strategists", according to the Literary Gazette, considered "such 'Atlantic' governments as Greece and Turkey" as important links in their "system of military bases encircling the whole world." The article asserted that this disproved "the alleged regional character of the Atlantic pact." (R Moscow 685, 22 Oct 51)
(U AP'MOscow, 24 Oct 51)
5.
French industrialists reportedly planning to attend Moscow Economic Conference: The following French industrialists reportedly have
25 Oct 51
ApprovStor
Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79S146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
consented to attend the International Economic Conference in Moscow:. Charles Schneider of Schneider-Creusot, the largest steel and munitions works in France; Rene Fould, President of Chantiers et Ateliers de -Snint Nazaire, shipbuilding and repair yards; Albert Metrall President of Ateliers GSP, a machine tool company; Edouard Rastoin, President-OfUthe Marseilles Chamber of Commerce. I
Comments French industrialists of this calibre have shown no previous sympathy for Communist aims, although Metral is known to have attended a meeting in Paris on 9 July called by the World Peace Council for the purpose of designating a French delegation to the Economic Conference. Though invited, it is not known whether they will actually attend this conference the true purpose of which must be clear to them. Western governments have considered the desirability of sending indi-. viduals who would make a public defense of Western policies, but apparently no action along these lines has been taken.
25X1
6.
ALBANIA. Spy trial implicatei Western powerss The trial of Albanian spies and diversionists, which began October 10 in Tirana, involves the alleged activities of the "American espionage service" accused of carrying out the hostile aims of Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain. The prosecutor claimes that some of the accused were agents who had been trained in Munich and parachuted into Albania by US planes flown by American or "satellite pilots" under the instructions of the Committee for Free Albania and Anglo-American intelligence in Italy.
More than forty agents allegedly were parachuted into Albania in this manner, equipped with weapons, radio sets, identity cards, maps They were supposed to engage in military and inand gold coins. dustrial sabotage, Oontact exiled war criminals and other agents, Murder members of the Albanian Government and Communist Party, and (U FBID ticker, collect military information for transmittal by radio. 16 oct 51)
7.
BULGARIA.
P
25X1
Comments Previous Albanian trials, while aimed against the Western powers, have failed to be as specific regarding details surrounding the accusations.

TOP SECRET
3
Arrests of military and political personalities reported:

I
(1) former Minister of Agriculture Titko Chernokolev has been arrested, and will soon face trial; (2) General Slavche Trunski, former commander of the Third Army, has been imprisoned; (3) rumors to the effect that
25X1
25 Oct 51
ApproarFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
Tremier Chervenkov and Vice Premier Poptomov have fallen into disfavor are continuing; (4) a purge is quietly underway within the Bulgarian Army, and several ranking officers 11 be removed; (5) a new Minister of Interior will soon take office.
25X1
25X1
Comments Titko Chernokolev was replaced as Minister of Agriculture on 23 June. Nothing has since been heard concerning him, and it is possible that he may be under arrest. Since early June persistent rumors have reported the arrest of General Trunski and the impending purge of Chervenkov, while some reports have also implicated Poptomov.
'
8.
HUNGARY, Third Quarter plan results reveal shortcomingss The implementation of the Five Year Plan for the third quarter of 1951 was reported by Hungarian officials to have been successful for the most part but heavy industry, and the with some significant failures. Specifically, building materials, construction, coal mining, food, rubber and timber industries failed to meet their quotas. (R FBI, 23 Oct 51)
Comments These industries also failed to meet their quotas for the second quarter of this year. The workers continue to be blamed for the production failures. According to Sandor Czottner Minister'of Mines and Power, there is need for "a new Socialist work discipline, a new Socialist relationship between the miners and the managing officials, responsible individual leadership, and the adaptation of Soviet methods both in work and management."
9.
25X1
I
YUGOSLAVIA. politburo member mav be dromeds A Yugoslav Politburo member, Frank Iaskovsek,may soon be removed from his post according to 'the US Embassy in Belgrade. Two close collaborators of Leskovsek nave been arrested, one for criticizing Yugoslavia's econemic policies and the other on charges of Cominformism. These arrests suggest that Leskovsek's recent removal from his governmental post was partly inspired by security considerations. The Ebbassy believes that he and his collaborators are guilty of violating discipline by refusing to accept party decisions. .(C Belgrade 529, 22 Oct 51)
Comments

TOP SECRET
Although the rumors concerning General Trunaki may be correct', it would appear that the wide-spread reports concerning Chervenkov and Poptomov have no basis in fact. There is no reliable evidence to support rumors concerning an impending purge in the Bulgarian Army or the replacement of Georgi Tsankov as Minister of Interior.
This report adds credence to previous hints of differences
25 Oct 51
ApprovelrFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
1.04
within the Politburo over the government's policies on internal reforms and aid from the West. The removal of Leskovsek from the Politburo would mark the'first break in the top party leadership since the Tito Cominform rift. A veteran party member and Politburo member since July 1948, Leskovsek is a labor leader and closely identified with the Yugo slav industrialization program. There is no evidence, however, that Leskovsek's removal would seriously disrupt the unity of the party.
10.
Although this thesis will probably be stoutly contested by Ameri cans and others at the Conference, Ambassador Allen states that oZilliacus is being most active and may attract considerable support), The Yugoslav delegate in the keynote address apparently rejected neutralism and asserted that localized wars were no longer possible. He itplied that a policy of neutrality was a snare and a delusion. Nevertheless, he deplored the tendency of the great powers to oppose the right of equality of the small nations. (C Belgrade 539, 23 Oct 51; U NY Times, 23 Oct 51)
11.
Orbit diplomatic representation in Belgrade totals eighteent Ac cording to an official publication of the Yugoslav Foreign Office, the USSR and its Satellites have a total of 18 diplomatic representatives in Belgrade. The USSR has 8 representatives, Bulgaria 5, Rumania 3, Czechoslovakia 1, Poland 10 Hungary and Albania none. Except for the US, Great Britain and France, none of the Western countries represented in Belgrade has more than 8 diplomatic representatives and the majority have less than 5 each. The US has 31, Great Britain 20 and France 10. (R Belgrade Despatch 259, 13 Sep 51)
Commentt Total Orbit representation in Belgrade has decreased by 4 since November 1950. Orbit representation has gradually been reduced as part of the Cominform drive against Yugoslavia, but in no case have diplomatic relations been broken. Hungary and Albania withdrew their representatives in 1949, but diplomatic relations were not formally severed. Hungary will probably reassign a Charge to Belgrade soon.

TOP SECRET
5
Neutralism dizonma et Zagreb Peace Congress: The leftwing British delegate to the Zagreb Peace Congress Zilliacus, who was expelled from the British Labor Party for his extremist views, has drafted a resolu tion which he hopes the Conference will adopt, stating in effect that national Communism, as exemplified by Yugoslavia, provides a basis on which to build peace in a world torn between warlike factions.
25 Oct 51
ApproarFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79101146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
10
limiting movement of foreign INDONESIA. Government allegedly considering reported last week that the govdiplomates A fairly reliable newspaper reciprocal limitation of the freedom of move-. ernment is considering the circles" rent of foreign diplomats in Indonesia. The paper gave "cabinet Subsequent investigation by_the US Embassy as the source of the story. that indicated that the matter had not been discussed by the cabinet, but China, currently in Djakarta for a the Indonesian Charge in Communist about oonference, had oomplained strongly to persons in government circles (C Djakarta 609, in Peiping; restrictions imposed upon his moverents 20 Oct 51)
2,
STAT
Government coaxes Celebes villagers to pay taxes: A broad io the Celebes stated oast of the Indonesian Information Ministry beamed (in the Celebes) have, gone beyond the limits, in part, "00.01awless bands to reThey have reportedly circulated pamphlets, exhorting the people realize that in fuse to pay taxes to the government...Dear listeners, we must be a State consciousour efforts to rehabilitate the country there This means,,,the duty to pay ness and a desire to have a government.. that the rehabilitation of the country can be taxes to the government so 23 Oct 51) (oompleted)." (11 FBID
.
in rebellion against Comments The Muzakkar guerrillas, currently trying to collect Celebes tax money for the central government, may be without the exhortation of lawless their own use, Hmever, with or Indonesia have resisted the payment of bands, villagers throughout East government continues to be one taxes, Their resentment of the Djakarta of the chief problems confronting the Ministry of Information,
is indicated: In an INDOCHINA. Shift in French-Vietnamese relationship interview with Minister Heath, Bao Dai stressed the importance for intelligent Vietnamese patriots of cooperating with the French. He was mildly critical of Premier Tran Van Huu and Dai Viet Party leader Nguyen Huu Tri, while praising General De Lattre to the point of calling him "moralrethe "Joan of Arc" of Vietnam, Bao Dai stated that he looked for ermament".-as the' longtrunrreans of defeating theiNlet:Minh.:Hehadihoped, bUt in vaini,that thie moral aiakening would be secomplishei_through theo Dal lilet party; now, he hinted, he was more inclined to place TOP SECRET
6
3.
The Indonesian Government strongly resents the restrictions impoceTUFE its Charge's activities in Peiping, but has indicated no inlimitatention either to protest those restrictions or to apply similar personnel in tions upon the movements of Chinese diplomatic and consular Indonesia.
Comments
25 Oct 51
Approvtlael/For Release 2002/05120 : ClA-RDP79W1146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET the his hopes in the Catholics. Meanwhile, other important evynts on Colonel Nguyen the emergence of Lieutenant Vietnamese political scene were contender Van Hinh, son of Security ldinister Nguyen Van Tam, as leading Govthe Vietnam Army and the Vietnam for the post of Chief of Staff of election which had been scheduled eminent's interdiction of a provincial (S Saigon 892, 22 Oct 51; by a local administrator and military chief. 896, 22 Oct 51) C Saigon 895, 22 Oct 51; C Saigon indicate a rapprocheComment: Recent statements by General De lattre of Huu, reversing the pat-. ment between himself and Bao Dai at the expense De Lattre's visit to the Vatican tern which obtained several months ago. strengthVietnam and the Joan of Arc comparison on his reoent return trip to make a French and Vietnamese authorities will en the suggestion that the stronger bid for the support of Vietnam's 1.5 million native Catholics. (Bao Dai has not in .41e past made the most of the fact that his wife is a of staff will serve to check Catholic.) The appointment of Hinh as Chief and its army, any decline of French influence over the Vietnam Government naturalized Frenoh citizen and is, moresince Hinh is, like his Father, a This appointment cerin the French Air Force. over, a lieutenant colonel The Vietnam tainly does not reflect the will of the Vietnamese people. Government's awareness of its unpopularity is indicated by its cancellation of election plans in one of the most secure areas of Vietnam.
L.
Mao Tse-tung claims "great success" for Peiping and "greatly inChinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung on 23 CT'i7si..ed" Soviet strengths October told the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferencea supposedly representative bodywhich is a rubber stamp for the Peiping regime--that the regime's three-point domestic program for 1951.had achieved "great success," end that Soviet strength
CHINA.
had "greatly increased."
He derided the West for failing to perceive that the era of "imper.ialist humiliation" of China has ended, and that the existence of.the Soviet bloc, particularly.the Sine-Soviet alliance, ensures the "doom" of "imperialist domination" of the world as a whole. Mao asserted that the strength of China's "most trustworthyand loyal ally," the USSR,
has "greatly increased."
Mao olaimed that the Chinese people had "united unprecedentedly" behind the regime in its Korean venture, that land-reform would be completed "by 1952," and that "counter-revolutionary remnants" would soon be comcommitment in Korea 'pletely eliminated. Mao reaffirmed that the Chinese "must continue" until the "NS" agrees to a "peaceful settlement," and specified support for Chineie forces in Korea as the current "principal dutym of the Chinese people.

OR MD flimsy, 23 Oct 51)
TOP SECRET
25 Oct 51
Approwd For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
N4.0
5.
Coordinated antiaircraft in Canton by units exero ses were g and /Mite Cloud, accordfiring an searc airfields, Tienho Canton's tze major reported to stationed at Canton authorities are reliably for dereports. ing to confirmed support and antiaircraft guns additional fighter have requested (S Hong Kong 1474, 19 oct 51) fense of the city. the flight of several usThe Communist press has alleged Comunent: past few weeks. These flights are Canton in the has been "eneM57TalEgs" over occurred during the night and no damage after the alually claimed to have air drills were held in Canton Several practice reported. leged violations, reoently _ant-222-1mtielf---nrIfearairreSouthChinaautk.ids: e Communists have slave-labor cam s: The Chinese able to accomm Conmunists set which will be been cons ruo ing e r as coun r-revodate 0,000 persons, sentenced o orce house prisoners Security BuThe camps will commissioner of the Canton Pdblic studied the. labor The deputy lutionaries. visit to the USSR where he in July from a labor cam a reau returned to or anize the Chinese camps of the USSR. It is proposed USSR. along the lines employed in the
25X1
6.

TOP SECRET
statement since is Maols first major polioy This speech outbreak of the Korean conComments prior to the irThe 1950 address, June China's long-range prospects. flict, dealt primarily with Mao success" of Peiping's domestic program, inthe "great has been largely In reviewing the Korean venture cadres has made the landdid not admit that support for of the Communist voluntary, that the behavior that liquidation of alleged "oounter -revolu unpopular, and reform program of the regime. tionaries" will be a continuing feature commitment in Korea follows the line suggest any Mao's reaffirmation of Peiping2s comment an Korea, and does not Peiping's or indicate of all other reoent Communist for a settlement previous terms alteration in Peiping's future course of action. rejoiced in the decline of 'Western Communist spokesmen have frequently have often cited the Sino -Soviet the past year bloc. The influence in China, and in balance in favor of the Soviet tipping the world has been emphasized alliance as Soviet strength contention of greatly increased" reoent olaim of Soviet atomic world sinne Stalin's throughout the.SoNiet achievements.
.
25 Oct 51
8
ApproNti For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET have themselves admitted that Comments The Chinese Communists subjected to foroed labor, justifywere being The cur"oounter -revolutionaries" re-education and "reform through labor," ing the practice as eleumnts should provide rent campaign against politically undesirable thousand', prisoners for the Comnunists with a pool of several hundred
their forced labor camps.
25X1
25X17.
(S Landon. 1982, 23 Oct 51)
25X1
of asserting The Communist argument is the familiar oneand (b) anyhow, simulreorily that (a) people are net being persecuted, right in believing that they deserve to be persecuted. T-Tilprobably detained US nationals. Peiping will not provide accurate n ormation on foreign nationals may result in The various representations on behalf of prospects remain bleak, sone small improvement, but their
Comments
8.
the Korean conflict by organs Conments All current statements on China's conmitment to of the Peiping regime emphasize that Connunist lione of these Korea will continue until a settlement is achieved, settlement or the terms for such a statements', however, speoifies Peiping's future course of action.
The National Conmittee of Peiping reaffirms commitment to Koreas Conference (a rubber stamp the Chinese People's Political Consultative "full satisfaction" aith the for the Peiping regime) has announced its in Korea in the past year, The "victorious record" of the Chinese forces struggle in Korea until a Committee, pledging itself to a continued the regime to (a) conjust and reasonable" settlement is achieved, urges the Korean conTlict, tinue mobilization of men, material and money for regarding the Korean conflict, (c),mipe out (b) intensify propaganda espionage n elements in China, (d) inevery trade" of US "underground and (e) expand the drive for aircraft crease production and austerity, and 31) and other heavy equipment,' (R FBID flimsy, 24 Oct

TOP SECRET
9
toward foreign nationals: Peip ng persists in "shamelese" attitude Pei ng F negations made b 'hoe learned f regarding QffioerunctiOnary, in a'conversation with the Indian Anbassador are well nationals, that "all foreigners Peiping's treatment of foreign ths "majority" of foreign treated" in Communist China and that in,any case deserved punishment." The crimes for whioh they nationals have "committed shameless" attitude is not enCharge oomments.that this "persistently information requested couraging and that Peiping probably will not supply The Charge has leatd, however, that on US nationals now under detention. less rigorously some" Catholic priests in custody have recently been representations. treated, possibly as a result of recent diplomatic
25 Oct 51
Approvbetor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79V1146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
9.
KOREA. Chinese Communist unit in east-central 'sector may be relieveds On 21 October a Chinese Communist prisoner from the 203rd Division, 68th Army was taken in the Kumeong area. The prisoner reported that he had heard earlier in October that the Chinese Communist 20th Army (long in the Wbnsan area) would replaoe elements of hie division and the entire 67th Army.
The Far East Command comments that the 67th Army -has "established a poor combat record"'and has suffered staggering losses as evidenced by the recent commitment of a division of the 68th Army to "bolster the sagging defense of the 67th." (S CINCFE Telecon 5292, 24.0ct 51)
Comments While it is possible that the 20th Army may relieve 'the badly battered 67th9 its southward displacement has not yet been accepted by FECOM.
100
North Koreans attack "inhuman" UN treatment of Communist POW's: A 22 October Pyongyang broadcast in Korean related the experiences of a North Korean soldier who reportedly escaped from a UN prisoner of war oamp at Inchon. Describing the camp as a "living heIli," the soldier ores, shootinge, and negleot" of Communist priltoners. detailed "
(11 TaID
STAT
Comments Propaganda of this nature serves a dual purpose in that it provides additional "charges" of UN atrocities and serves to counter UN propaganda of the good treatment received by Communist prisoners. Recently taken prisoners have reported an intensified propaganda campaign among the front line units to discourage desertions.
11.

22 clet 51)
25X6
TOP SECRET
10
25 oot 51
5X6

ApproveYFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1
5-.17CTION 3
("WESTERN)
2.
Communists inspire strikes in German ports and plan Dutch Communistinstigated wildcat strikes have 'broken out dock n the key Morth German ports of Bremen and Hamburg. In Bremen, city and union officials agree that 80 percent of the dockworkers are out only because they fear Communist strongann tactics. Although the strikes are still confined to these two ports, they are rumored to be part of a longrange Communist program supported by a large fund from East Germany.
.
25X1
Meanwhile, other reports indicate that the Dutch Communist controlled dockers' union is planning to stage a 24hour strike in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The vralkout is to be based on demands for a ten percent wage increase and a Christmas bonus; its success will allegedly determine the advisability of attempting a general strike. 1 23 oct 53.; R Hamburg, 23 Oct 51; C Bremen 79, 23 Oct 51)
STAT
TOP SECRET
12
25 Oct 53.
ApprovItgeFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79t61146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
Comment: During the past several months there have been unconfirmed report's of a possible wave of strikes throughout Western EuroPe this fall.
Communist strength in the German dock areas traditiOnally'has been greet. Communist influence in the Dutch dock areas has declined since the failure of the 1950 appeal not to unload OAF shipments._ A 24hour strike now would serve to test present Communist strength in the area. No date for the Dutch strike has been given.
3.
STAT
During the conversations, the Soviet representatives gave the impression that they wished to extricate themselVes from the whole affair by shifting the blame to the East Germans. In a later press statement, however, they stressed that the future status of the area would be studied by Soviet and US specialists. (S Berlin 611, 617, 22 and 23 Oct 51; R FBIS AFP, 24 Oct 51)
_ _
Comment: At the time the East Germans withdrew from Stein's-M(7En, the Allies were considering retaliatory action in the form of denying the Russians access to the important radio buildihg which they how occupy in the British sector. Despite indications that the USSR was backing down completely, an unconfirmed press disPatch now reports that a group of Soviet soldiers and PeoPle's Police returned to the area on 24 October.
4,
FRANCE. German defense contribution may be delayed by French stand: The US delegation to Allied discussions in London on a German financial contribution to Western defense warns that the French position on this subject threatens to "move back the entire timetable" for the conclusion of contractual-relations with the Germans, the establiShMent of the European Defense Forces, and the raising of German units. The up delegation recommends that some_interim solution be worked'out, which it considers "entirely possible" despite French opposition.

TOP SECRET
13
Soviet attitude still unclear on seized Berlin district: Soviet authorities in Berlin on 22 October ordered the East German People's Police to withdraw from Steinstuecken, the small district in the-US sector of Berlin seized by People's Police units four days earlier. Although the acting chief of-the new Soviet Control Commission in Berlin explained to the US Commandant that the community would revert to its former Etatus, he requested further documentation of the US claim to the sector.
,
25 Oct 51
ApprobW6 For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
ft.10
France is insisting that a common defense:budget be applied by the European Defehse organization from its inception and hence seems to contemplate a "much fuller working out and implementation" of financial arrangement's than was envisaged by the US. Although the French question the need to have an agreed Allied position on a German financial contribution before the November NATO Council meeting in Rome, they will attempt to prepare estimates Within ten days of the total European Defense Forces budget and an appropriate London, 1995-1996, 23 Oct 51) German contribution. (5
Comment: France had previously approved postponement by the Defense Conference of consideration of a budget, pending at_least-the initial results of the current NATO study of its members' potential defense contributions.
--
The French estimate tentatively that the Federal Republic might contribute a.total of 2.5 to 3 billion dollars to Western defense in This would 'order to match the efforts of the other European nations. more than match the contribution of some nations, such as France, to tbs. European Defense Forces, but would take into account the additional burden borne by France in Indochina and in maintaining a navy.
5.
AUSTRIA. Russians still hold 781 Austrian citizens arrested since 1945: /S-310trian Federal Chancellor has informed the US Legation in Vienna that 781 Austrians who have been arrested by Soviet authorities during the. past six years have not yet been released. The list of arrestees, which the Chancellor requested not be made public at the present tiMe, includes 120 persons whom the Soviets have acknowledged were apprehended and sentenced, and 661 persons whose arrest by the Seviet,authorities is reasonably established but has not been acknowledged. In those instances in which a reason for the Soviet detention has been ascertained, the alleged crimes include auto accidents, brawls with Soviet soldiers, Nazi ( S Vienna Desp. activities, and distant family relationships to Hitler.
1481, 17 Sop 51)
.
.
Comment: The report does not cover the unknown number of non Austrians, primarily refugees, who have been arrested, detained, kidnapped, or otherwise apprehended by the Soviet authorities in Vienna. No other action by the Soviet occupation forces has contributed more to their unpopularity than their frequent disregard of aceepted procedures of arrest, prosecution, and fair trail. The Austrian GovernMent has repeatedly sought remedial action only to receive evasive replies... Aside from the continuation of such kidnapping episodes,the Soviet authorities

TOP SECRET
14
25 Oct 51
Approverfor Release 2002105120 : C1A-RDP79T01146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
400
have recently exacerbated this annoyance by releasing information regarding the fate of a small number of prisoners and promising a greater leniency in permitting communication with those who are still alive.
6.
Compromise averts general strike. The Conseil Paritaire Manle, a tripartite group of labor, government and industry leaders, has reached a settlement on the demands of the Socialist Trade Union Federation, thus averting the generalstrike scheduled for this week. The settlement, which is generous to labor, provides for a slight
increase in the hourly wage, an extension of rent control,- a decrease in the price of margarine and vegetables, and other benefits. The federation hasalso gaihedasignificant victory, by "embarrassing" the Catholic Trade Union Federation into parallel action, and by using the Belgian Government to serve demands on employers. The US Embassy in Brussels reports that employers are "bitter" at the government for making them foot the bill for the wage increases. The government, which during the negotiations "showed fear of affronting labor.,!' may be led to strengthen the Cabinet by some changes. (R Brussels 560, 21 Oct 51)
BELGIUM.
Comment: A Socialist party leader has stated that the one-party Belgian Government will be greatly strengthened by achieving a successful compromise on labor's demands. Other reports also indicate that the Belgian Government will now make some Cabinet changes which will be favorable to labor,
7.
Comment: This supports earlier ranors that the Italian 1 Government wculd move ahead the time scheduled for the elections, which, according to the Constitution, are to be held every five years. The last Italian national elections took place in April 1948, but local elections held in the spring of 1951 showed a decline
ITALY. National elections may be held in 1952 instead of 1953: ReCealy, a Christian Democratic Cabinet Minister confidentially told US representatives in Rome that he thought the next national elections in Italy'would be held in the fall of 1952 rather than the spring of 1953. He said there would be a "more favorable public psYchological atmosphere after the long summer months than after the bitter winter.P Furthermore, he believed the government was anxious to hold the elections before expiration of the five-year law prohibiting important former Fascist officials from running for public office. (C Rome 1825, 23 Oct 51)

TOP SECRET 15
25 Oct 51
ApprovbtFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500110001-5

TOP sisc Ter
in..the strength of Premier de Gasperi's Christian Democrats and a rite in votes for the Communists. Pr@sumably the government is anxious to hold the national elections before this trend becomes too strong.
8.
25X6
9.

TOP SECRET
16
2.5 Oct 51
Approve" For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79101146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
\IS
10.
25X6
11.
Council. Satellite for Yugoslav seat on Securit a oc can DENMARK. Danes favor as pro a y suppo e ega ion The Thniariish vacated by Yugoslavia. for the Security Council seat being conviction that the gentelmen's a Danish position stems in part from distribution of Security councilthe regional agreement concerning belief that the in part from a general seats should be honored, and UN and it is underrepresented in the 324, Soviet bloc states are now into a corner. (C Copenhagen undesirable to push them farther 23 Oct 51) the under no illusions with respect to Comment: The Danes labor They fear that a conversion of the UN powerar Sfluence of the UN. would rupture that organization East-West into an instrument for Western policies dim, for a reconciliation of and reduce the prospect, however
12. NORWAY.
to .olicy on bases: Government will assert strict adherence ore rep y ng par amen cons TEFFirweg an overnmen w The reply will deny October later this week. to the Soviet note of 15 of Norway's treaty or any breach any violation of the Spitsbergen military bases. However, Foreign policy against peacetime foreign to the note will make strict Minister Lange remarked that reaction
differences.

TOP SECRET
17
25 Oct 51
ApprovieFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79t91146A000500110001-5

TOP SECRET
,adherence to the base policy necessary, and that any inclination of the government to soften this policy is now out of the questien. (S Oslo 380, 22 Oct 51; S London DEPTO 492, 22 Oct 51) Comment: This last remark of the Foreign Minister apparently refers to the current negotiations with the US regarding operating rights at Norwegian air and naval facilities and points to increased difficulties in concluding an agreement. Although the Norwegian Government has insisted throughout the negotiations that it will not make arrangements contrary to its policy on bases, officials un doubtedly entertain reservations that various provisions could be interpreted as breaching that policy. Since the timely arrival of the Soviet note will tend to aggravate these doubts, it may cause the government to proceed more cautiously in conmitting itself to further implementations of the North Atlantic Treaty, thus at least partially achieving the Soviet purpose.

TOP SECRET
18
25 Oct 51
25X1

HR70-14
SUEDkd TeP SECRET _sep-anamie-suitm

11, KOREA. Communist oombat combat troops favored over rear mer r e a r area troops in i n rations: rational 1 1 . KOREA.
On .23 Oohober, October, aooording a000rding t to preliminary ffield a supply tupply o aa preliminary i e l d ttranslation, ranslation, a offioer of Regiment in f the North Korean 7th Railroad Security Seeurity Rbgiment i n HaMhung Hamhung o ffioer o to reported t o Pyongyang Pyongyang the t h e movement of or provisions (possibly (possibly for f o r civilians oiviliaxm as well i l i t a r y ) to t o towns towns further further north north on on t h e east e a s t ooast. ooast. HS He noted well as m military) the "about t h e 41 freight car0 meat, only Only the front f r o n t line l i n e and Chinese "abOut the 41 fieight Cars of meat, (BUEDE CM IIN N 47791, 47791, Hemhung-F'yongyang, Hamhung-Pyongyang, oan get g e t it." it." (SUEDE Volunteer troop(s) troop(s ) oan 24 O Oct 24 o t 61) 61)
Comments This provides further Comment: f u r t h e r confirmation confirmation of o f the t h e priority p r i o r i t y logis l o g i s -burden of supporting supporting tio of The.burden t i o FirErori p of Communist.combat Communist combat troops in i n Korea. Korea. The the 600,000 600,000 troops troope in in Korei Korea has worked great g r e a t hardshipt hardships on on the t h e mass maas of the the Korean oivilian o i v i l i a n population. population.
.
-_____
12. 12

-TOP--SECRET-SUEDE-
7 7
26 Oct 51
17>c
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 20-Mar-201 IDPPROVED
To learn about PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
HR70-14 HR70-14
11101"-BBORET--.5SEDE-
, . : '
NR /NR
Analyzing Anrlyziag this this move, m o m , the t h e field field speoulates speoulates that t h a t "the "the 5th 5 t h Corps Corps will will assume aesumo a coastal c o a s t a l defense defense mission mission while reorganizing reorganizing and and recuperating." recuparating." I N 48443, 48443, 117IrUIH, H7L-UIH8 26 (SUEDE CM IN 25 Oot; Oct; TIK TIK 1268 1268 I? W 333 333 H H 184, 184, 26 26 Oct Oct 61) 51)
Comments Ths The North North Korean Korean V V Corps Corps was badly badly hurt h u r t in i n the t h e battle battle Comment: for considerably f o r "Heartbreak Ridge." Ridge." Its withdrawal from the oombat zone coneidernbly strength i n t h e eastern While the t h e field's field's diminishes Communiet Communist strength in the eastern seotor. sector. Ihile speculation on the t h e Corps' Corps! eventual eventual coastal ooastal defense defense mission mieeion may may prove prove speoulation on oOrrect, at tim to oorreot, there t h e r e is i s insufficient ineuffioient evidence a t tthis h i s time t o accept acoept this. this.
8. 8.
North Korean p! moves moves northvkrd northiard throu through Wonsan: Acoording A000rding t to Korean V V Cor Corps h Woasant o elements of of t h e North the a preliminary field f i e l d translation, tranelation, elementa o r t h Korean V Corps -- r recently moved e o e n t l y relieved fr.= f r o m combat oombat in i n the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector seotor -- have movei northward'through norChward through the t h e Wonsan Wonsan area. area. The chief chief of he C o r S I security seourity of t the Corps' department reported *that "the headquarters headquarters of 0 . f the t h e Corps Corps (has $has arrived a r r i v e d ?) 1) reportedthat "the at a t Yongtongni (near (near Yonghung) Yonghung) . . t h e 32nd 'Division (will ( w i l l stay s t a y therel), there?), the 32ndZivision d i v i e i o n (will ( w i l l arrive) a r r i v e ) 25th 25th and and the'12th t h e 12th division d i v l s i o n by by 26th." 26th." t h e 6th 6 t h division the
-+ --
--TOP-SEeRET-BUEDE5
29 Oct 00%61 61 29
TOP SECRET SUEDE

VI)
'
c . /
Tt-5-13-SE'CRET
4
T ~ T
H R70-14 HR70-14
'
NR NR
17. 17
IQUAL_Utigua_friatisaja
friction on between Chinese Communist and North Korean troops has neceasitated the setting of a a committee committee headed headed by by a'high-ranking a .high-ranking North North Korean Korean cabinet cabinet s e t t i n g up of officer o f f i c e r to t o settle s e t t l e "differences" "differences" between between the the two two armies. armies.
During the During September, 20 20 .minor minor iincidents n c i d e n t s among t h e enemy troops resulted resulted in the nine North North Koreans Koreans and and eighteen eighteen Chinese Chinese Communists. Communists, The i n t h e death of nine situation was so that October t the Chinese Communist Communist "38th "38th 80 serious serious t h a t on 20 October h e Chinese s i t u a t i o n waa Armies moved and 39th 39th Armies moved from from the the west n e e t froht f r o n t to t o the t h e west-central" west-central1I to t o avoid avoid contact with II Corps commander commander was allies, and and the t h e North North Korean. Korean I1 888 with their t h e i r allies, ordered between hie his troops ordered to t o "put )(putforth f o r t h more moreeffort" e f f o r t " to t o'pa-event prevent cconflict o n f l i c t between and the t h e CCF. CCF. . . and
1 October, "Joint Operations Board" Board" discussed discussed tthe On 1 October, the t h e Communist !'Joint he the and the t h e causes causes of o f irritation. i r r i t a t i o n , CCF charges that t h e Koreans had s u b j e o t and subject failed by Korean charges. .handling. f a i l e d to t o provide provide food foodwere werecountered countered by Korean charge8of o f"poor "poor handling o f t h e war" a c t i c s " on he p a r t of h e Fhinese. of the. war" and and Ithumiliating "humiliating ttactics" on tthe part of t the Chinese. When the Chinese threatened to report the facts t to "Moscow and and Peiping," Peiping," tthe t h e ChLneae to r e p o r t thhi o "Moscow he North Koreans stated that they %u&d,'rather "woulUrather fight Finally north stated t h a t they f i g h t the t h e war w a r alone." alone." F inally Pak Il-u Il-u a "euboommitteefl headed by by the the North North Korean Korean Minister Minister of of Interior I n t e r i o r Pak *subcommittee" headed was formed to "iron out the differences." was formed t o " i r o n o u t the differences," __ __

--T13r-SECB,F4T
11
7
~
-~
29 Oct .51
T) t>
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 * 16-Dec-2009 IPPROVED
HR70-14
TOP SECRET SUEDW

--T+31"-n9E0E2T-SVEYr-
r
11. l l .
NR
"S~ACI-SOV-LO~ n h*ung res.~ Three a t e Ootober !In/le-Soviet airoraft" aircraft" i in Antung_ aareas Three llate Ootober Chinese Cbinese Conununist messages messages referred referred to t o "Sine-Soviet "Sino-Sodet aircraft," airoraft," involving involving over over Communist 100 presumably presumably NIG-15 MLG-15 jet jet fighters f i g h t e r s based based in in the the Antung area. (SUEDE 100 Antung area. (SUEDE A Air i r Foroe Foros Roundup 229 229 and and 230, 230, 29 29 mad and 30 30 Oct Oct 51) 51)
12. 1 2 .
KOREA. Chinese Chinese Communists Comupists join Koreans for f o r joint in =REA. oin North Koreans oint operations o orations in ftenghae Provinoar rovinoet ,Chinem -as Volunteer anese VO unteer Amy Army units units have moved into the western portion portion of of' Hwanghae Hwanghae Province Provinoe to t o aid aid North North Korean Korean units, unite, accordaccordwestern ing t o *he preliminary field f i e l d translation t r a n s l a t i o n of o f a 28 28 October October North North Korean Korean ing to ihe preliminary The measage t o an an unidentified unidentified brigade brigade states s t a t e s tthat h a t "joint "joint message. message to message. The are to t o be organized organized "with "with the t h e annihilition annihilation of of the t h e reactionaries reaationaries operations" are as aa t their h e i r main main aim." aim." (SUEDE CM IN IN 48999, U-U, 29 29 oot Oct 51) 51) (SUEDE 48999, U-U,
Comments Comments Hwinghae Hwanghaa Provinoe, ProvInoe, which lies across the 38th 38th Parallel P a r a l l e l on on t h e viar-C7Tist, w m s t $ oontains o c a l anti-Comunist ~coetathe contains llocal anti-Communist elements elements and and has been been acoessible s i b h to t o UN U N raiding parties. parties.
Chinese previously active in t h i s area, area, may Chinese Communist Communist units, units, not not previously active in this may d r a m from from CCF CCF reserves. reserves. have been drawn
~PPROVED FOR RELEASEM RELEASE& ATE: 20-Mar-2010 (DATE: 20-Mar-201 0 VPPROVED

--TOP-Re-RET-Strar
Comment: The subordination subordination of of most moat of o f the t h e MIG-15 MIG-16 jets j e t s operating operating over over Comment: KOrea-TTaTases Koreamases ini n the the Antung Antung area area of ofManchuria Manohuriahas has never never been been established. established. Other than jets j e t s of of two tw~ Chinese Communist Communis% Air Divisions, Diviaions, these NIG-15's M I G I S 1 s have have Other Chinese i r l regular regular units units of of either e i t h e r the the Soviet, soviet, Chinese Chinese Communist Comuniat been identified identified in never been or o r North Korean Korean air air forces. foroaa. These measages, h e first f i r s t oomunimessages, whioh which provide provide t the communioations irrbelligenoe reference referenoo to t o MIG-15 MIG-15 fighters based in the Antung wea eations intelligence Amtung area is as "Sine-Soviet "Sino-8ovlet airoraft," a i r o r a f t , suggest suggest t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of a joint j o i n t Sino-Soviet Sim-Soviet the jet unit jet u n i t it at Antung. Antung.
6 6
P SECRET SUEDE-
ApproveApor Release 2004101/15 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500150001-1
TOP sEasET
sRMIRITY INFORMATION
31 October 1951
CIA No. 49413

Copy No.
14 3
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant 'reports has been prepared primarily It does for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. reports in CIA current not represent a complete coverage of allComments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence.. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approvebror Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP794(146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR.UzbekcottOn-harv.srSedt . Embassy Moscow reports article-Ahat contained an appeal from the
on a tecefititaida.Vostoka 'Uzbek Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee to all agricultural losses; organs and workers for cooperation in averting serious gotten crop offered, work norms estahlidhed, Monetary and inkind incentives are to be delivery'repuirements enunciated and non-rural labor forces are to be
utilized.
I
2.5X1
2. =MOM= gindinth orescane train leaflets reoultds
25X1
The US EMbensfial-Pragde hae.tedeivedreportsAhat:balloon leaflets telling the story of the Czechoslovak-escape train were found near Beroun and Ker. lovy VarY, in Western Czechoslovakia. The eahassy has evidence that the leaflets are being clandestinely circulated in Prague. No press, radio or government comment on the balloon release has been noted, but the general response of Czechoslovak people is to believe the story carried by the leaflets.
I
25X1
ggmmants Balloons carrying leaflets describing the runaway train incident were released from the American Zone of Germany in late Sep tember. This is the first report fram Czechoslovakia on the effects of this operation.
25X1 4.

TOP SECRET
climaxes a month Swatents According to the Embassy, this appeal pointed out the growing leng Spate of critioal articles whioh have The Soviet in Uzbekistan. seriausness of the cotton harvest situation cotton that Uzbekistan produced an expellent press had previously etated and crop, bPt that the Infleet was delayed by faulty work organization Finally, wet weather non,psvment of earnings due the harvest workers. caught the agricultural organization unprepared for mass drying.
31Oct 51 1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150601-1
Approvisa.forRelease2004/01/15 : ClA-RDP79*146A000500150001-1
TOP SECRET
being.fitted out-for black,and Hungarian Danube barges and tankers were Between March out has led to a complete discounting of the information. Rumanians and Hunmariners -Czechs, and July a dozen Danube river officers in Austria. garians -- were interrogated on this subject by US Navy of the ships None of them had seen any blackout work being done on'any The sources atated that if such .norisad any heard of plans for such work. (C USFA known, actiVities were being carried out it would be widely Repriit #325 Vienna, 12 Jul 51)
.er-Be
5.
,
of Peacew.and't
Soviet Society.
20212,als
25X1
The standard way to celebrate a holiday in presentday the'feW Hubgery iiito hate the workers increase their Production during production is then weeks preceding the holiday. The increased rate of of the work norms. used as a basis for a revision
-
6.
25X1
Within-a recent Lbw Maior airfield improvement sites Youngs four.airfields .eight.day:petiod-US.Embatisyoffidiala.inPoland.identified improvenents andoonstructiOn were in north-east Poland at which major eleven the total of known being undertaken. These four fields bring to Three of the eleven air.=-: projects. major improvement and construction not fields are-presently occupiedand eight are former German airfields now in use. / \
-
Da.
airfield construction and Comments This first reportof major suggests that steps are being taken to impretementin north-east Poland, this arena part of the overall air defense improve the air defenses of known to be underway plan for Poland. Major airfield improvements are _in soUth-west Poland.
7

TOP SECRET
2
ratiOnsin.Hungary:forthei341nanniversary 'Other features of inelude increased work offers by factory anployees. at the DUAapenthe celebration will be the inauguration of operations of Soviet "Works tele Steel Works and the Inota.PowerPlant arexhibition nt of 15 000 new m bars for the Hungarian-
of.the Octoberrevolution
31 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2004/01115 : CIA-RDP79-101146A000500150001-1
ApprovigjeFor Release 2004101115 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2;
25X1 25X1
Calor
Slat The id i C EGYPT. Soviet Mini Minister the Egyptian Foreign of Egyptian Soviet Minister in Cairo stnted to would be willing to consider the exchange that the USSR be broken off, Soviet o il should Anglo-Egyptian relations
The Soviet Minister also promised would hel Epvnt foment trouble with Sudan.
25X1
tun euez
that the USSR anal and the
25X1
25X1
during the past two Comenp There has been.considerable evidence Communists, in addition weeks that the Soviet to Moscow Radio, have It is not possible at the rumors concerning
Legation in Cairo and the local tension in Egypt. attempted to exploit the current however, to confirm or deny many of the present time, relations. recent developments in Soviet-Egyptian
25X1d
25X1A
governmentl government,I hafd Party colleagues with a Palace Independent. wjuld .Former Premier Hussein Sirry Pala an lixely candidate for the premiership. be the most
ElagiarsagiaosIsassasingtarsaUs.a-Wvamtan Prime Minister and his King Farouk will replace the preserit
25X1C
25X1
TOP SECRET
3
31. Oct 51
Approveldfor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP764f146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
4.
Committee_forme4 to promote_the International Economic Conference The Indian press on 11 September ',reported a statement issued in Bombay the day previously by Professor D. D. Kosambi, "Member of the Bureau of the World Peace Council," and by Professor P. A. Wadia, retired member of the faculty of Wilson College, Bombay, and "Convenor of the AllIndia Preparatory Committee for the forthcoming International Economic 'Conference" to be held in Moscow. The statement, which described the purpose of the Moscow' conference, listed the following members of the Indian Preparatory Committees Ratilal Nanavati Vice-President of the Indian Merchants, Chamber; D. L. Shah, an obscure exporter, President of the All-India Export Association; N. M. Joshi, antiquated labor leader of Bombay; Shibbanlal Saxena, outspokenly anti-government member of Parliament; S. A. Dange leading member If the Communist Party of India; and S. S. Mirajkar, Bombay Communist,
INDIA.
Moscom
25X1
Comments As has been anticipated, the committee is comprised mainIy of educators and Communists or Communist sympathizers rather than of bona fide economists or industrialists.' It is doubtful that any Indian industrialists of note can be persuaded to attend.
5.
Shipments of manganese org_to Japan get favored treatments According to the'US Minerals Attache in India, official records at the port of Visakhapatnam (from which most of India's manganese ore is shipped) show that, during the first eight months of 1951,.new clients in Japan received 105,000 tons of Indian manganese ore while old customers in the United States got only 60,000 tons. This suggests that Indian ore shippers supplying Japan have been unduly favored over those exporting to the
United States'.
I 1
25X1
Comments India may be expected occasionally to favor Asian purchasers over American ones. Indian favoritism in the above instance is not entirely unfavorable to the United States, however, since a significant portion of Japan's steel output is used in the Korean war. The quantity of manganese ore imported by Japan in 1951 is far in excess of normal requirements and was probably purchased during a raw materials buying spree in which Japan indulged early in 1951.
64
1
BURMA.
25X1A
Ba Swe ambitious to become Prime Minisler: According to an the Secretary General of the Burma Socialist Party, U Ba Swe, is planning to run for Parliament with a view to replacing Thakin Nu as the Prime Minister. The source comments that Ba Swe believes that he can,retain the support of the BWPP and prevent it from going underground and joining the Burmese Communists.
1
25X1

Ba Sreos extreme leftist view* Are well known.
TOP SECRET
Comments
He has
Approved For Release 2004/161/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0005(41Reao.ai
Approverftor Release 2004/01115 : CIA-RDP791*146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
recently been inacessible except to a few trusted Socialist intimates, and it is impossible accurately to access his intentions. If he stands for election there is no doubt that he will be returned, and he would then be in a position seriously to challenge-Thakin Nu,for the Premiership. A Burmese Government headed by Ba Swe would reverse the current trend towards increasing.,cooperation with the Western powers and greatly increase Burma's vulnerability to Communist subversion.
7.
MALAYA Police official urges clopgr Amprigan-British_teamworki Police Commissioner Gray of the Federation of Malaya believes that eloper USLBK cooperation in Malaya is essential to successful operations against Malayan Communists, and he cites several measures by which the US might demonstrate its solidarity. These measures inCluded the despatch of a battalion of US Marines as "observers" and the assignment of a.highranking FBI officer to the Malayan police force. The US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur was informed that these or similar proposals might b fnrwara nefirbiAllv hv th Malayan government in the hear future.
25X1
8
25X1
25X1 25X1
INDONESIA. Spkarno's speech mav cause delay in Netherlands-Indonesian discussions: lone resul l ot ?resident oukarno's United Nations Day speech will be a further delay in annulment discussions of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.
1
1
25X1
25X1
CoMmentg Sukarno's hour-long UN Day speedflonsisted principally of an elaboration of the theme that colonial imperialism is one of the pr4me causes of international unrest. Reviling the Dutch record in Indonesia, he characterized the-Indonesians, during their struggle for independence, as having been consistently conciliatory and the Dutch as having been, coercive, uncooperative, obdurate and intransigent. The speechwas delivered in English before a large audience0including the diplomatic corps.
The Indonesian Government is currently seeking the bilateral abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union within which the two nations exist as equal partners under the Dutch Crown, The Indonesians regard the Union as a vestige of colonialism.
9..
OommunistAblnese neampappr urgea eaution against deceptive tactics Sin Po, Chinese. Communist daily in Djakarta, duly noted a 1 October broadcast from Peiping which included the stateof "reactionary." Chineseg
TOP SECRET
5
31 Oct 51
Approvettior Release 2004/01115 : CIA-RDP79T*146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
ment, "the present urgent work for the Overseas Chinese is to unmask the Chiang group's crimes of selling out our country and undermining the Overseas Chinese...."' Ain Po stated, "seeing our new mother country become more progressive and stronger day by day, and themselves appraching eclipse, the reactionaries can only attempt to undermine and intimidate our cow! patriots. They fear closer diplomatic ties between New China and Indonesia. Therefore, ma Overseas Chinese must unmask their nefarious face and hot be deceived by them."
I
25X1
10.
25X1
25X1A
THAILAND. Recent predicIions ef coups dgete_t_discountedt The possibility that Thai political elements will stage scalp cretat in the near future is considered remote points out that there are insufficient armed forces available to "woulibe plotters" to ensure success of such a venture, believes that it is unlikely that local Chinese Communists will attempt overt action unless assured that Communist China is prepared to invade Thailand.
I
Comments It is estimated that 'one-third of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia are strong adherents of the Chinese Communist regime, one-third are uncommitted but easily swayed by the course of events, and one-third aro pro-Nationalist or anti-Communist. The increasingly vigilant attitude Of the Indonesian Government in recent months toward Communism and the ChineSe Communists has undoubtedly inspired optimism among anti-Communist' Chinese and given them some edge over the Communists in approaching the politically uncommitted group in the Chinese community.
25X1
25X1
Comments The conclusions contained in this repdrt are well-founded and are generally supported by an evaluation of the situation in Thailand recently submitted
'
The possibility remains, however, that violence will occur as a result of the constant rivalry for power among the various factions within the Thai Government which control the police and military forces.
11. :INDOCHINA. Antiganiam eeen between Chinese aemmunists and Viet Minht The US Legation in Saigon estimates that the Chineee Communist relationship with the Viet Minh is not the perfect association which has often been pictured. Evidence is available that the overwhelming majority of Viet Minh adherents dislike and fear the Chinese Communists and that the Viet Minh leaders have resented the interference of political advisers and "administrators" through whom the Chinese have attempted to guide Viet Minh policy. The Legation warns against the conclusion: that a'serious rupture has already-takenplace, but comments that current friction may
TOP SECRET
31 Oct 51
ApproveWor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP791Wi46A000500150001-1

TOp SECRET
25)(1
assume serious 'proportions more rapidly than hasheretofore been thought possible.
I 1
Comments Reports have been reoeived periodicallY of antagonisth between Chinese Communist advisers and Viet Minh officials, and of rank and file resentment of Chinese instructors. SuCh hoetility, Which has deep historical roots, probably limits the numbers and influence of the Chinese commUnists in the Viet Minh movement.
12.
25X1
An authoritative Soviet journal recently stressed that There is no doubt, however.- that Peiping's political-economic-military program is designed to prepare for the possibility of global war, It may be speculated that Moscow and Peiping have deoided thatltls Unprofitable to diasipate Peiping's hUman and material resouroes, And to risk the crippling ot the Chinese military establishment, in peripheral ventures in Korea or in Southeast Asia, However, Peiping's true intentions are not known, and large-scale Chinese operations in both Korea and Southeast Asia remain possible at ,any time.
Comments
war frrEecessarily inevitable,
13.
25X1
Pei n o oses exohan e of Euro Sans in China for Chinese in Malayas e n an Am assa or Pan r as repor ed y orme authorities in Hong Kong of a Chinese Communist proposal to exchange all "Europeal e" nnw detained in Communist China for Chinese imprisoned in Malaya.
1
Comments Apart from UN POW's taken in Korea, about 20 US nationali are fr175=Ted in Communist China, Another 30 are under houae arrest, and pessibly 150 are unable to obtain exit permits; as many as 100 Otherforr eign nationals of all kinds may be in similar situations. Several hundred' Chinese, apprehended in terrorist activities in Malaya, have been jailed by the British authorities, It is conceivable that Peiping has propoaed or will propose an exchange of all or some Europeans held in China for

TOP SECRET
7
CHINA. /ndioations of Peiping's preparations for world war cited, The W-USSsul -General in Hong Kong believes that recent Chinese Communist Statements, as well as reporti from the mainland, indieate that the Peiping regime is increasingly taking a long view'and preparing for a possibleworld Wier. He feels-that Peiping's efforts.to build.defense installations, to train and equip the CCF, to organize militia, to wipeL out opposition, to push land-reform, and to extract money for armaments are "not primarily" for operations in Korea or against Formosa, The Condul -General speculates that Peiping's willingness to negotiate in Korea may indicate a desire for respite in order to build up the regime's overall strength,
31 Oat 51
Approval! Kor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP791W146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
Chinese held in Malaya and other Southeast Asian proposal has not been.confirmed I
areas0
but this alleged

I
25X1
114::
Peiping. launches movement to "reform ideology" of universitr teachers: The 'Peiping regime has .launohed a study program aimed at l'renicirirthe ideology" of Chinese university teachers. The four month, course is to inVolve a study of basic doinmunist works and a thorough "critioiem and self-oritioism" of each participaritls theory and practice. Peiping. radio has commented, that, while most teaohers have accepted the "general political principles of new .demooracy," they retain "some European and American 'capitalist ideology" whioh must be eradicated.
25X1
Comments Sone 3,000 of China's estimated 10,000 teachers at the university level have begun to reform their ideology in the neW program, which will doubtless extend to the remainder. University teachers have been Tepoited as -generally antagonistie -0 the regime'. The systematic imposition of the Communist world-view, regarded by moet,of these teachers as barbarous and farcical, will oomplete their process of disaffedtion, but.it is not likely that the teachers, unqualified for other werk, will actively resist the Communist program!
25X1

TOP SECRET
'
31 Oct 51
'Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1
Approvd For Release 2004/01115 : CIA-RDP7M1146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(MESTERN)
1.
plan show decline in rate of fUlfillment: EAST GERMANY.. Results of economic of 1951 under East Germany's Five Economic results for the third quarter Although the government dlsims Year Plan were announced on 26 October. over-fulfilled, there is a marked that several targets mere fulfilled and and electro-engineering industries. deficiency in the machine construction The harvest, quotas of pit coal were not achieved. The planned Production report shows a lower rate of plan by and large, was good. In general, the The failure in the machine fulfillment than in the previous two quarters. nartiallv explained by the important, but -VI industry is particularly emphasis on the metallurgical industry. to sketch federation scheme at Strasbourg: FRANCE. Schuman plans only recent announcement that France would Despite Foreign Minister Sehuman's November Council of Europe session, propose a European federation at-the that the French Government is still the US Adbassador in Paris believes such a plan. The Foreign undecided as to the time and method of launching at Strasbourg would be a personal Minister has indicated that his initiative and the problem only in 'rsummary fashion" one, by which be would introduce discussion. "laboratory" for a in order to use the Council of Europe as a fits principally into longNevertheless, while the, federation scheme may now be accelerated by French term French policy trends, its advancement that a united Europe which tbe leaders in order to persuade Parliament being created. 1 prospective European Army can defend is
25X1
2.
25X1
25X1
retarded French British coolness toward European federation tomsrd economic plans9OrEhievement of this objective. The progress made benevolent however, together with the UK's more and military integration, encouraging return to power, is attitude in recent months and Churchill's ties. the proponents,of closer political
Comment:
Testae of employee dismissals threatens organizations are engaged in a
anti-Cammunist labor unity:
TErnmmunist and anti-Communist labor
scheduled for employees of Breda's bitter dispute over the mass dismissals worked out with the Labor electrical plant near Milan. The company has Would dismisS with bonus payments Ministry a reorganization plan whereby it dismissed would be placed in Half of those 3,000 of its 120000 workers. training schools. and the General Labor Confederation (CGIL) The Communist-dominated plan, and have (UIL) have rejected the democratic Socialist Union of Labor
,
3.
iTALY.
TOP SECRET
9
31 Oot 51
Approve4For Release 2004/01115 : CIA-RDP701151146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
(CISL) for CGILTh 'denOUnOed the Christian Democratic workeraltorganization with the government. The accepting it and for alleged collusion strike in all Milan metallurgical plants. called a 24-hour protest
-
25X1
26X1
strike consistently fought, frequently with of North Comment: The CGIL has the heavy industries actioH7-Illie -scale layoffs of employees in By its the workers is greatest. Communist strength among CGII Italy where invelved in_the Breda case, the by'securing thelUILIs Stand on the purely economic issue prestige among labor. Moreover, will enhancerits own will make the formation of a strong support in denouncing the CISL, it anti-Communist labor front more difficult.
4.
25X1
year./
25X1
elections originally scheduled Rumors that the south Italian had recently been would probably be postponed until spring Christian Democratic, for de Gasperila confirmed by a high official in Premier Communist.strength, a guage,of The spring elections will serve as Party. elections in north and cehtral in the May-June elections would which showed an increase by the government in the spring who Wish the next Italy. A favorable showing Christian Democrats strengthen the position of those 1952 rather than in the spring plprtAnnq 1-.n he held in the fall of ,nations of 1953
tEinati
Comment:
5,
25X1
chat-4 6: for National Council show little Swiss elections e shift s ow SWITZERLAND. muss er iamen e e lower ouse o seats still The elections o 49 of the 196 sentiments of the voters. With Peasant Party in ihe political have gained three seats, the the Conservatives to be decided, tiro, while the Independents, the and Social Democrats have.each gained have each lost one. Radicals, the Liberals, and the Democrats of its seven seats. It won only The Swiss Camnunist Party lost two Two of the three it won four years ago. one seat in LauSanne instead Basel and Zurich. and one each in Communists were elected in Geneva, traditional Communist, were agreed on a against Swiss All parties, including the however; campaigned policy of ne tralitv. The Communists, rearmament. occurred little political shift has actuallyout of Comment: As anticipated retention of five The Communists' as a result of the elections.

TOP SECRET
10
Interior to be held next s rin elections for Local eleetions for south Ital an provinci e munic p as s a the This will complete Minister ce of 1952. of this south Italy will be hald in thespring and central Italy in May-June begun In north series of elections
:
31 Oct 51
Approved ForRelease 2004101/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1
ApprovbelrFor Release 2004101115 : CIA-RDP79M146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1
the seven seats they held is surprising in view of the drastic decline in party strength which has been reported for some time.
8.
COLOMBIA. Urdaneta may succeed Gemez as President: President Gomez suffered a heart attack on 29 October; his present condition is unknown. Congress was convoked .at 2200 hpurs on 30 October to elect a Vice-President, who will probably be Minister of Government Urdaneta, already Vice-President under a 1950 decree. Departmental goVernors have been alerted, and the army in Bogeta has been confined to garrisons.
-
25 '1
25X1
Comment: Gomezts health has been known to be precarious sine& September 1950, and Minister of Government Roberto Urdaneta hae consequently had an important voice in governmental decisions for some time. Urdanta is a strong Hispanophilel but he would be unlikely to.change the present pro-US orientation of the Colombian Government.
-
Although the replacement of Gomez would increase prevailing unrest to some extent, and although sporadic outbreaks of violence, frequent in recent years, may be expected to recur, the opposition Liberal Party has lost
TOP SECRET
11
31 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2004/01115 : CIA-R0P79T01146A000500150001-1
ApprolAmilf or Release 2004101/15 : CIA-RDP791,4146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
probably not noW capable power and influence to such a degree that it is to overthrow the government. of even a determined attempt
political unrest:. According to ECUADOR. Tmenty-four-hour strike adds to strike throughout press reports, 70,000 Ecuadoran workers went on a 214thour The Confederation against Congress on 29 October. the country In a protest failed to adopt of Ecuadoran Workers called the strike because Congress changes in The union program called for a program demanded by the union. strengthening road conscription laws, additional social security legislation, and revisions of civil service, a general increase in wages, price controls, in the income tax law's./
9.
25X1
The total membership of the Cotmunist-controlled ConfederationniThdoran Workers is approximately 70,000, and it is likely that only about 200000 were out on strike. Neverthelees, the strike reportedly The presently affected many stores and all transportation facilities. Repercussions of an tense atmosphere will continue so for several days:. 25 Octoberhave added to the attempt to assassinate Guevara Moreno on /general unrest, particularly in the key port city of Guayaquil Comment:
25X1
25X1
10.
25X1C
e weekl A CommunistNICARAGUA. New Commenist weekly. being_publishedi has begun publication in Managua. newspaper called Orientacion reports that the paper is the new mouthpiece of the Communist Par y.an intended as a successor to iToz Sindicai the defunct organ of Nicaragua's contents .General Confederation of Labor. The US Etbassy comments that the Communist and number of copiet printed appear to confirm the view that the line-in Party has embarked on a new campaign to propagate the Kremlin's Communist propaganda.in other Nicaragua. The close similarity between Orientacien further suggests that the Oeuntries and that now appearing in Communist pommunist Party with similar coordination and contacts of,the organizations outside Nicaragua have recently been improved.
I
25X1
25X1
I.
weekly following, as it does, Comment: The peblication of this new Communist-line handbill at the Fourth closely behind the circulation of the Latin American Regional Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations of:the of United Nations confirms the Etbassy's conClusion and presages a period renewed activity on the part of Nicaraguan Communists.
TOP SECRET
12
31 Oct 51
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : ClA-RDP79T0114-6A000500150001-1
25X1

Approvbecor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP791W11146A000500150001-1
TOP SECRET
31 October 1951
CIA No. 49413-A

Copy No.
49
This summary of significant rePorts has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1
ApproVad For Release 2004101115 : CIA-RDP7M1146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Minister of Court Ala Moderates in Irah campaign to remove Mossadeq: planning a campaign to replace reports that Iranian political moderates are the Shah has privately given to whom Prime Minister.Mossadeq by Ahmed Qavam, persuading accomplish their aim by The moderates hope to his support. by using normal parliamentary Mossadeq to retire upon his return to Iran, or
IRAN.
methods to unseat him. the latter were to rid The Shah would hesitate to remove Mossadeq ifnationalist sentiment into himself of unsavory advisers and transfer Iranian compelled to Temove Mossadea constructive channels. However, he would feel policy. / to insist on his present should the latter continue
25X1
25X1
will face opposition from elements Comment: When Mossadeq returns, he and the left. Previous within his own party as well as from the moderates Unless the opposition has quickly evaporated, opposition to Mossadeq, however, highly unlikely nationalist support, it seems can manage to enlist whole-hearted that the Prime Minister can be easily removed.
the oil dispute Iranian Foreign Minister asserts that Iran's stand on informed the US Ambassador in remains unchanged: The Iranian Foreign Minister in his government's attitude Iran on 29 October that there had been no change which The Minister reiterated that the only points on on the oil dispute. concerning the future allo Iran would negotiate with the British were those AIOC for the nationalized cation of oil to Britain and compensation due the and processing of Iranian oil propertier. The development, extraction Britain. internal matters and not subject to negotiation with to indicate thnt Viere has benn Comment: There is no reliable evidence the oil dispute. any weakening of the Iranian attitude in The Vicein US: De Lattre blamed fOr lack of Vietnamese mission INDOCHINA. that Premier Huu had Premier of the Vietnamese Government told Minister Heath deference to the thus far refused to appoint a minister to the US out of wishes of General De Lattre.
2.
25X1
25X1
3.
25X1
displayed with The strong suspicion which General De Lattre has report. Rivalries respect to US policy in Indochina lends plausibility to this contributing factor. among Vietnamese politicians may have been a
Comment:
cards: Soviet diplomatic personnel to get special identification .TOP SECRET
The
4.
JAPAN
31 Oct 51
ApprovgleFor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP791131146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1favors . 3nvi.c.1.,
Department of State has informed the US Political Adviser in Tokyo that it SCAP's plan to issue distinctively colored identification cards to
diplomatic personnel as a measure to emphasize that their presence in janan is only by virtue of the USSR's membership in the Allied Council.
25X1
5.
25X1
Parliament reported hostile to German NATO membership: If the French National Assembly suspects that German accession to NATO is implied in French ratification of the European Defense Forces, the government will suffer a severe defeat when this question is debated in the near future, according to the US Embassy in Paris.
FRANCE.
Comment: While the attitude of the French Foreign Office on this 'issue has changed completely in the past two years, popular opinion is still violently opposed to German participation in NATO.
The government hopes to sidestep the question during the forthcoming foreign policy debates in Parliament and thereby to gain time for a gradual conversion of public opinion.
6.
Swedish official hopefUl regarding_Polish trade negotiations: The American Embassy in Stockholm reports that the Swedish Assistant Foreign Minister gives the impression that he hopes to reach an agreement with Poland .on terms somewhat better than the present agreement, but including a substantial amount of List I bearings.
Comment: During the trade year ending on 31 October Sweden obtained aproximately 3,200,000 tons of coal and 200,000 tons of coke from Poland; Swedish exports included 700,000 tons of iron ore (worth six million dollars) and bearings valued at one million dollars, including 600,000 dollars worth of Liet I bearings. It is doubtful whether Sweden could, even if it so desired, completely replace Polish coal with supplies from other sources. However, Sweden "regards a trade agreement as necessary for political and strategic
SWEDEN.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Comment: All diplomatic personnel in Japan except the Soviets are accredited to SCAP. With the coming into force of the peace treaty the raison dletre of the Allied Council will be ended, and the continued presence of Soviet diplomatic personnel in japan presumably will be subject to negotiation between Japan and the USSR. As a first step toward independent contact with the Japanese Government, the Soviet Member of the ACJ has extended an invitation to high Japanese officials to attend a social event at the Soviet Embassy on 7 November, thus assuming the privileges recently granted by SCAP to the accredited foreign missions.
25X1
TOP SECRET
2
31 Oct 51
Approsilat For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP7911311146A000500150001-1

TOP SECRET certain quantity reasons"; and therefore it is evidently prepared to export a agreement. Poland in order to obtain an of bearings and iron ore to

TOP SECRET
3
31 Oct 51
w
-1m-tomolopt--
w
SECTION SECTION 1 1 (SOVIET) (SOVTET)
HR70-14
1. 1 .
USSR. for Kbrea U s . Moscow )loscow broadcast broadcast mentions mentions an American campaign campainn f o r a Korea fltruce by Armiartice Armistice Dayan Day:" Soviet broadcasts on 31 31 October made no "truce by mention of the t h e Korean truce t r u c e talks t a l k s except f o r report8 for reports of of an alleged alleged campaign by the t h e North California California Peace Peace Council Council for for a a truce t r u c e by by Armistice Armistice (11FBID, FBID, 31 31 Oct Oct Da and Day and for f o r great great power power negotiations negotiations on on a a peace peace pact. pact. (R
51) 51s
While no immediate immediate significance significance can can be attached attached to t o this thie Comment: .While Gonrmentt i s o l a t e d report, report, it it should should be recalled r e c a l l e d that that t h e Soviet pres8 isolated the press gave concons i d e r a b l e play t o US Senator Johnaon'cr o end h e Korean ar siderable to Johnson's proposal proposal tto end tthe Kbrean w war by 25 June, June, and and that t h a t this t h i s was wa8 followed by Mdlik'e Malik's ceaee-fire cease-fire proposal proposal on 27 June. June.
NR

-TOP-SEGRET___
1 1
2 Nov 51 51
bb
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: DATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009
NR NR
KOREA.
Specialized Communist units
in Korea:
three North Korean itdependent Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments--the 19th, 20th and 23rd with a'strength of 1,200 each--as being located in the general area of Pyongyang. the Chinese Communist 32nd Anti-Tank Division with a s rength of 3,000 as being in Korea in an unlocated area. Although Communist prisoners have mentioned a 31st and a 33rd CCP A2 Division in Korea0 these units are not accepted.
Conrmentr oonsiderable build-up in i n Communist Communist units units of o f the t h e more more Comment: A considerable In t e o h m m n addition to t o the the hasbeen beennoted noted since sinoe last l a s t spring. spring. I techn=1-7.76 has a Chinese Chinese Communist Communist antiairoraft a n t i a i r o r a f t division, d i v i s i o n , two tW0 above-mntioned units, units, a above-mentioned Chinese Communist C o r n m i s t armored armored divisions, divisions, additional a d d i t i o n a l artillery a r t i l l e r y troops and and a a r e h a b i l i t a t e d North Korean armored a r m r e d division d i d s i o n are are naw now accepted acoepted in i n Korea. Korea. rehabilitated North Korean
10 10.
aeo on airfields in i n ths the am an reconna sance o Ootober b aerial of Sammo Sarmnoham and Taeohon a r October i aer a reconnaisance
ftrk continues on Communist Communist a airfields Sinan u oomplex: Work i r f i e l d s iin n Sinanju oom lexr
&
Late Late
.Sinanju area of of northwestern northwesternKorea Korea reveals that both fieldssuspected Sinanju area reveals that both fields-suspected of being readied as of as advance advanoe enemy enemy jet j e t bases--are bases-are inoperable inoperable due due to t o bomb bomb On fields, however, the repair n both f i e l d s , howemr, damage and inoomplote oonstruction. O incomplete construction. of bomb damage of damage , the t h e building of of revetments, revetments, and and the t h e extension extension of of runways runways continue, with mdth "numerous personnel and some oontinue, some heavy equipment" equipment' engaged in in
'TM'S-EGRET
2 Nov 51
. .
'
*
i .
Sae
this task. t his t asko
I#
1.7-01-3 SECRET-I
i r ffields i e l d s and nrsi' f or Preparation of of these these a air andneighboring neighboringN a &mei for Comment: Preparation Commtg I t has been apeoulated operational speculated o p e r a m uuse s e apparently apparently enjoys enjoys a a high high priority. p r i o r i t y . It these that t h e s e fields f i e l d s are a r e being being readied readied to t o receive reoeive Communist Comunist jet j e t interceptors interoeptors fromManohuria in challenge i n order order to to extend'further extend f u r t h e r southward southmrd ths the enemy's enemy's ohallenge fromManohuria of the UNSs i r superiority. superiority. UN's a air
12. 12.
rilla weeks. r i l l a activity a o t i v i ty in i n ihe the ROX ROK has has increased inoreased during during the t h e past past few fewweeks.
guerCommunist guerOn 17 October, October, g guerrillas 17 u e r r i l l a s narrowly narrowly missed mieeed two.Pusan-Seoul t w o Pusan-Seoul passenger trains trains a statiOn s t a t i o n near near Taejon. Taejon. On On 13 13 Ootober, other Communist Communist during an an attack a t t a o k on on a October, other during elements raided a f r e i g h t train t r a i n carrying oarrying ammunitian m u n i t i o n in i n the t h e Chiri-san Chiri-ean area, area, r a i d e d a'freight and 80,000 to t o 120,000 120,000 rounds rounds of of ammunition ammunition were were captured. oaptured.
Communist Comrmuni.aC Guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s inorease inorease activities a o t i v i t i e s in I n ROK: ROK:
The National Assembly, worried The worried by by the t h e worsening situation, s i t u a t i o n , has has requesrsquested both t ed b o t h the Minister of of National National Defense Defense and and the t h e ROK ROX Chief Chief of o f Staff Staff' to to explain explain past p a s t failures f a i l u r e s and and to t o submit submit future f u t u r e plans plans for f o r anti-guerrilla a n t i - g u e r r i l l a operaoperations. The tion& The ohief ohief complaints oomplaints from from guerrilla-affected guerrilla-edfeoted areas a r e a s are a r e that that adequate adequate ROK army aviilable and and'"foroed oontributiont" t to the Polic army forces foroes are not av&ilable "foroed oontributions" o th e Polio. are a r e not used used "to ''to maintain maintain adequate adequate anti-guerrilla a n t i - g u e r r i l l a foroes." foross
Countermeasures against against the the guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s have have recently rtloently been been increased. inoreased. UN medium bomber strikes s t r i k e s against a g a i n s t guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s on on 26 26 and and 27 27 October October in i n the the medium bomber Boutb of of Taejon Taejon were were described deeoribed by by captured oaptured partisans partisans as as having having "eom"oomarea south p l e t e l y demoralized g u e r r i l l a s as e l l as pletely guerrillas as w well as being being extremely extreMely effeotive.? effective." A A large soale anti-guerrilla l a r g e aoale a n t i - g u e r r i l l a campaign oampaign in i n this t h i s area--mith area--wlth air support SUDDo r t and and armored armored half-track half-traok vehicles-vehicles- s 8 in i n the the planning planning stage. stage.
7,000 Communist Communist guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s still &ill operating operating estimated 7,000 Coxumntt The estimated Connent: in i n soUthern aouthern Xoreaere korearp-e generally generally compartmentalized oompartmsntalized in i n the the eastern eastern Taebak Taebak mountains and and in in the the southwestern southwestern Taejon-ChiriSsim Taejon-Chirima r e a Although Although these these area. forces foroee are a r e not n o t considered a n s i d e r e d an an aotivm aotive threat t h r e a t to to UN UN military m i l i t a r y operations operations at at present, presentp their %heir harassing harassing effect e f f e o t and and their their disruption'of disruption of locale l o c a l e conomies conomies

."
I
11
9 9
2 Nov
b1
3.
'
. '
have caused -rich sOUthWeat6r4 southwestern oaueed a a significant eignifi oant decline deoline in in food food production production in.rioe in .ri&rich Korea. Korea.
Well-coordinated anti-guerrilla.operations, utilizing air and and ground ground Well-coordinated anti-guerri lla operations, u t i l i z i n g air units',will will do do much much to to minimize minimize the the effsotiveness effeotiveness of %see these residual groups. units, groupe. An An important.faotor, lmportant.faotor, however, however, ip is that that the .tfie cooperation of the local popuPolice Oorruption can do much to oorruption oan lace i is s involved in in the the operations, operations, Polioe alienate this this vital'support. d t a l support. alienate

10 10
2 Nov 51 2 51
. '
8. 8.
..
isoOP SECRET SUE151:

ME-SECA13f-SITEDE
HR70-14
NR
9. 9a
10. 10
KOREA. Soviet antiaircraft a n t i a i r o r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y seen linked o GCI ett A A 26 26 October October KOREA. linked tto GGI n net: message from meaeage from one one station s t a t i o n on on the the Russian-operated Russian-operated GO! GCI net net in i n Korea Korea to to another demands an explanation another explanation as'to a s ' t o "why "why there there w from the the reply from artillery (SUEDE ." U-U, 26 Oct 51) a r t i l l e r y men in in radio (network?). (network?). ( S v e O E m 2620, 2620, U-U, 51)
Comment: Although tends Cord:lents Althoughfragementary fragementary and and inconolusive, inconclusive, this this message tends to belief thet some t o confirm c o r a nb e l i e f that some relationship relRtionship eiists e x i s t s between Russian-served Russian-served a n t i a i r o r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y in i n northwestern Korea Korea and and the t h e early e a r l y werning-ground warning-ground antiairoraft control interceptor interaeptor net operating operating in in the area area between Pyongyang Pyongyang and and the the River. Yalu River.
A All l l evidence evidence points points to t o the the operation operation of o f en an efficient e f f i o i e n t air a i r defense defense system in i n northwestern Korea, inoluding including early e a r l y warning, warning, fighter f i g h t e r interceptors, interceptors, and 000rdinated ooordinated radar-controlled radar-controlled antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t fire. firs.
11. 1 1 a
P r i v i l e ed Soviet Soviet _position p o s i t i o n iirritates r r i t a t e s North Privileged North Koreans3 Koreans: A A 1 1 November Novadber clear d e a r text e message message from from one one unidentified unidentified Northliforean North Korean unit t to o another mother "don't you you provide pmvide the t h e special s p e o i a l food food on on 7 7 November? November? There queries, "don't Thare are are many Russian Russian friends friends who who are are going going to t o have have pleasant pleasant time t i m e on onthat t h a t day. day many
_LID.P_SECRE-T--SBEDE7 TOP S v -

."
6 6
5 Nov Nov 51 51 5
7D)) 'PP
7 4
' I
'
ri-OP SECRET SUENd

TOP_SSCRET-SVEDE---
their playing. I urge that t h a t you would while we must only watch t h e i r glorious playlng. o have ( r i c e ? ) on that to have ( rice?) provide something t o eat. eat. It would be good tto CM IIN 50217, M-M, M-M, 2 2 Nov 51) 51) (SUEDE CM N 50217, day. . .I' ." day.
..
Comment: This surprising message, i if authentic, indioates a heretwhereteComeat: f authentic, fore unexpreosed unexpressed resentment o of Soviet position position iin North Korea. Korea. fore f tthe h e favored Soviet n North November. The anniversary of of the Soviet Revolution is oerebrated celbbrated on 7 7 November.
12. 12.
unit suffers supply d difficulties: Chinese Communist Communist front line l i n e unit i f f i o u l t i e s a On Oa 21 October an unidentified unidentified Chinese Chinese Communist u unit complained i in a plainplain2 1 October n i t oomplained n a language voice transmission tranamission that t h a t "right "right now now we have no food to t o eat. eat; The The minter uniforms haven't hare ye 1 aannot winter haven't been transported here 1 combat men men cannot " (SUEDE move due . 149, U-Us U-U, 21 Oct Oot 51) move due to t o lack h o k of of these these stuffs. stuffs. 149,
...
13. 13.

_LNE_SEGRET--stEDE--TOP
Comment1 Comment: This message probably reflects refhats t the h e U"s UN's degree of of success in isolating certain front units from t their bases. It i n iaoertain f r o n t line l i n e units h e i r supply basesI It is is believed, however, that be/ieved, however, that th the volume of of Communist supply aupply movement into f fororward area8 fis a "adequate" "adequate" and and that t h n t such such conditions conditions do do not prevail along along Ward areas the t h e entire e n t i r e front. front.
7 7
6 Nov Nov 51 51 6
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14
-10-P-SEORST
NR
,,,'
NR NR
17.
Organization of Field reported: 0rgani.eation of the the Chinese Chheee Communist Communist Fifth Fifth F i e l-d.Army Army reported: ____ __ 1 the Chinese Fifth F Field Chinese Communists Csnsrmnistrc in in August August 1951 1951 organised organ+zedtbs. t h o Fifth ield
~
--40:12-SEOREur
8 8
5 5 Nov NOV 51 51
PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE. RELEASEDATE:

16-Dec-2009 [c1/4PPROVED
I
1
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
1. -7.
' 8
. .
ArmY. It oomprises four infantry armies and four mechanized corps of the same size as a Soviet mechanized corps. It is equipped -with Soviet arms0 I arms.
Comment: There Comments many previous .unoonfirmed unoonfirmed reports Thors have been many r e p o r t s of the the formaChinese Communist F i f t hField F i e l dArmy, Army, organized organized with with Soviet Soviet form:MR-3f a a Chinese Communist Fifth a a s i s t a n c o and and advice. advioo. assistanoe olaima Fifth Iaims that the the F ifth F i e l d Army Army was was formed formed under u!uIer Soviet Soviet guidanoe guidanoe in inthe t he spring ekring of o f ' 1951, 1951. its ita Field troops being being drawn drawn from f r o m the the North North China Ohina Military M i l i t a r y Area Area Special Spsoial Army Army Group, Group, troops h e I15th subsequent reports r e p o r t s have alleged alloged long known known as as tthe "5th Field Field Army. While Mile subsequent t h e presence preeenoe of of units units of of the t h e Fifth_Field FifthJ'ield Army Army in i n Korea Korea under under Nish Nieh Jung-ohen, Jung-ohen, the was the NCMASAG, Soviet-equipped u units have been been who w a s and and is C,O.of C , Q of t he N C M A S A G , no such suoh Soviet-equipped n i t s have enoountered in in oombat. oombat enoountered
18. 18.
I
òodshJKORFA.4.taeinNorthCorea not Been seen as 'aouter emutes
while indithan oations point p o i n t to to a a less lests'th an normal normal yield y i e l d in i n the the current ourrent orop orop harvest harrrst oations in is ourrently ourrently no no acute aoute food food shortage shortage in in the t h e area. area. I n North Korea, Korea, there t h e r e is x erience I t is i e probable, probablo, however, however, that t h a t the t h e civilian o i v i l i a n population pop It mill experience this this a h o r h g e s during during tthe h e coming ooming winter and and spring.I spring. shortages .antioipated on athe have "no.signifioant "no s i g n i effect f i o n stability t r k y ot of a n t i o i p a t e d shortage shortage wilt have the t h e North Korean regime" regime1' inasmuch inasmuoh as as that that government government exeroides exeroidea "good "good an effective e f f e o t i v e "produotion "produotion program.".. program." oontrol" and and has has an control"
there here have been no reoent7----reosnt reports indicating.that the CCF logistioal.Trogram was being utilized for anything except the complete support of Communist military foroes
~
Comment; generally indicated indicated that t h a t the t h e coming coming winter Comments It has been generally luiil -severe hardship on t h eNorth NorthKorean Korean civilian o i v l l i a n population. population. FacPaowillJETrirsevere hardship on the tors, in a addition this tom, d d i t i o n to food, food, oontributing to to t h i s suffering suffering will be the t h e acute aoute of houring housing and a probable shOrtage laok of ahdrtag'e of oonsumer oonamer goods, goods, particularly partioularly t e x t i 10se textiles.
No , N o firm firm conclusions oonczluaiona regarding regarding the t h e stability a t a b i l i t yor o r instability i n s t a b i l i t yof of the' the indievidence. There are indioan be drawn from from current c u r r e n t elriderme. North Korean Korean regime regime can cations, however, however, pointing to cations, t o increasing inoreasing administratibe adminis$ratibe problems problema being disorganization in n the t h e lower lower levels lexmls of of government. government. The disorganization encountered i ocoupation last winter, following UN oooupation last d n t e r , the the considerable'loss considerable' loss of of effective effeotim administrative personnel b by administrative y death, death, defeotion defeotion or or oonsoription, oonsoription, and and the the previously observed iharp l i v i n g standards standards must all all be conoonprevloualy eharg lowering lowering of living sidered in assessing s idered i n a s s e s s i n g the t h e degree of success sucoesi achieved aohiemsd by the t h e North Korean Korean regime in reimposing its previously regime previously tight t i g h t control o o n t r o l gystam. dystem.

wilt
-7LJ
. I
9 9
Nov 51 51 5 Nov
w
TOP S'ECRET-
U "
19. 19
S:telas taken toallev-A& alleviaterefugee refugee problem problem in in ROKC ROKf The ROK Min-ster Minister taken to of SoOial.iffairs f a i r s issued lseued a a statement statement Noveiber November 1 1 conoerning.the oonoerning the dispersion dieperelon of 15,000 15,000 refugees refugees from f r o m North North Korea Korea concentrated oonoentrated in i n the tha Seoul S k u 1 region' regi-m of " "into i n t o warm warm southern areas." areas." This aotion IS is part of of a *winter "winter.preparapreparations" plan which includes.the tione" plap which inoludes.the designation deeignation of of November_as November-aa the t h e "month "month for for "the publio publio tto make prerefugees entry e n t r y arrangements" arrangements" and an appeal for 'Ithe o w ke p rs(R FBIP FBID Tioker, Ticker, 1 f o r the the approaching approaohiug winter season." aeaaon." [R 1 Nov 51) 51) parations for _ ,l*5OO other other refugees refugees arriving arriving in i n Seoul Seoul and and its i t s environs environs With 1,500 Connrentr Comment: With all million reoaoh-iiiiIITom eaoh o m all Korea Korea and and a a conservatively oonesrvativoly estimated estimated 'four f o u r million fugees throughout South Korea, the innnenaity innensity of of the the ttask oonfronting ROK ROK 6outh gorea, a s k oonfronting Nevertheless, ii o f f i o l a l s is manifest. it is is encoUraging encouraging to t o note that t h a t definite, definite, offioials manifest. Neverthelass, even though though inadequate, evon inadequate, steps stope are are being being taken taken to t o dope oope with w i t h 'this t h i a oritioal oritioal problem. problem.
NR

10 10
5 Nov 5 51 5 NOT 1
ApprovbeFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RD13791194146A000500190001-7
TOP SECRET
6 November 1951
CIA No. 49417
Copy No.
1s3
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approve', For Release 2002105120
CIA-RDP791*146A000500190001-7
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Soviet note warns Turkey against Atlantic Pacts The Soviet Union has warned Turkey that it "cannot remain indifferent" to Turkey's plans to join the Atlantic Pact, and "awaits an explanation from the Turkish Government." The note, announced by TASS in the Moscow press, was delivered in Ankara by the Soviet AMbassador, who flew from the USSR. The note, according to TASS, drew Turkey's attention "to the responsi-
bility it has assumed by joining the aggressive Atlantic bloc and allowing Turkish territory to be used for the establishment of foreign military bases on Soviet frontiers." Major stress was laid on the air and naval bases allegedly being established by the US near the Soviet frontier. (U NY Times Reuters, 4 Nov 51)
Comments The Soviet Union's current campaign against the Atlantic Pact and Western defense measures has included the delivery of notes to such NATO countries as France, Italy and Norway. The Soviet demarche to Turkey fits into this pattern and is similar to Moscow's protests to Norway at the time of its entrance into the North Atlantic Pact in 1949. It may well be followed by a similar note to Greece or a Soviet offer to renew the Soviet-Turkish non-aggression treaty, denounced by the USSR in March 1945. Such an offer was made to Norway following the Soviet note in 1949.
2,
AUSTRIA. Austrian employees discharged at Soviet military installations: On 1 September 1951 all Soviet military installations in Vienna were directed to discharge all Austrian employees. The process of dismissal, which is expected to take about two months, is determined by the trade union representative of each installation, with non-communists and " uestionable" communists leaving first.
I
25X1
I.
25X1
25X1
Comment: The report is in accordance with earlier reports of dismissals at Soviet installations in Austria. (See OCI Daily 10 Oct 51) While the move is probably a security measure similar to that taken in East Germany, it aleo may be an indication of the permanent nature of Soviet occupation, as contrasted with the alleged Soviet interest in concluding an Austrian peace treaty.
TOP SECRET

6 Nov
Approtot For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP7*1146A000500190001-7
25X1
25X1X4.
25X1X 25X1A
25X1
purchases: According to poles approach France and Finland re ship poland concluded a recent report \tee. of the French merchant ship negotiations in August for the purchase Wisconsin of approximately 8,000 gross tons. lalso that Poland has been negotiating with dead-weight tons merchant Finland for the construction of six 10,000 signed yet between Poland and Finland ships. No contracts have been long delivery terms. ecause the Poles ob ect to Finland's
I

TOP SECRET
2
25X1A
25X1A
that Poland is These reports are consistent with others the cost. merchant marine whatever making every effort to enlarge its that France had agreed to an In early September it was learned providing for the sale of annex to the French-Polish trade agreement has been received as the Wisconsin to Poland. No further information to France's final action on this sale. construction of six merchant Poland's approach to Finland for the However, Finland does have vessels has not been reported previously. of this size. shipyards capable of constructing vessels
g_j_n_tlenot
6 Nov 51
Approator Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP707646A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. SEAR EAAI. Exatuai of Jerusalem urges Arab attacks against Westerners. The a-Mufti of Jerusalem has reportedly sent word to his followers in all the Arab countries urging them to attack all British, American and French ndtionals and to sabotage their property. 1 Ina 25X1A -evidence of an understanding between'the ex-Mufti and the Moslem Brotherhood, 1the Mufti has conferred with Moslem Brotherhbod lenders 25X1 as' well as with members of other dissident groups.
25X1
25X1A
aumsnii The followers of the ex-Mufti are not as numerous as :those of the fanatic Moslem Brotherhood, but they have sufficient suprort as a result of the Palestine issue to promote disturbances in the area and to increase Arab bitterness toward the Western powers.
2. Lall
Military training nrogram in the US for Eivptiens tn he suspended: The Department of State has informed the Embassy in Cairo that "present conditions" make it advisable to suspend the training program in the US for Egyptian army and air force personnel. Egyptian personnel now attending US service schools, however, will be permitted tO complete their training. The Department states its further belief that it "does not consider this action punitive," and it voices the hope that "conditions will soon permit a resumption of the training program."
The Department suggests that, since formal notification to Egypt concerning this decision to suspend the training program "would probably cause considerabl- resentment, particularly in the Egyptian Army and the Ai: *orce," the Embassy should merely delay acting on Egyptian applications ftf military training and explain, when asked, that the delay is "only administrative." (S to Cairo 683, 2 Nov 51)
3.
Comment: Relatively little is know of Communist activity in Afghanistan. It was reported in July that Aussian language propaganda materials were being disseminated by the Soviet Trade Agency in Kabul (see Dailv Digest,'23 Jul 51), but the Czechs have not previously been reported as involved in propaganda activities. Following Dr. KratochvWs defection as Czech Ambassador to India, in early 1951, it was rumored that the Cominform had shifted its South Asian base of activtties from India
AFGHANISTAN. Caech Legation in Kabul a possible source of Communist propagandas.,-The -Ctech-Legation9in Kaburis-thoUght;to be disZemiflating Communist propaganda written in English. Several pieces of this material, of the fellow-traveller variety clearly designed to appeal to Afghan intelligentsia, have recently come into the possession of the US Embassy in Kabul. (C Kabul, Joint Weeka 18, 1 Nov 51)

TOP SECRET
8;
,
6 Nov 51
Approved! ForRelease 2002/05120: CIA-REND79T01146A000500190001-7
Approval' For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
tO:Afghanistan in order to make use of the well-developed net of Czech economic representatives in the area.
Trade apreement with Ceylon: On 14 September, Pakistan signed 4. 'PAKISTAN. en agreement with Ceylon designed to facilitate trade between the two countries. Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan will encourage exports including 150,000 tons of Moe, some wheat flour, and gram to Ceylon, while Ceylon will export natural rubber, graphite, cocoanut oil, tea and spices. (U Karachi Deep. 349, 20 Sep 51)
Comment: West Pakistan's normal rice surplus is from 200,000 to 300,000 tons, most of which ordinarily is sent to the deficit area of East Pakistan. The dispatch of 150,000 tons of rice to Ceylon would force East Pakistanis, who prefer rice, to consume more wheat, of which there is a greater surplus in West Pakistan. India, which has imported Pakistani rice, may also suffer as.a result of the new agreement. Pakistan utilizes very little natural rubber and graphite and may intend to re-export these commodities.
5. gam. Durmese Communists and Karen insurgents reportedly sign agreement:

The US Charge in Rangoon was told by the British Ambassador that the Karen insurgents in the Irrawaddy Delta have just signed an agreement to cooperate (S Rangoon 441, 3 Nov 51) with the Burmese Communist Party.
Comment: If this report is correct, Communist capabilities in Burma will have been greatly increased at a critical moment. Coordinated action by the numerous Karen rebels in the rice-rich delta area of southern Burma would facilitate the achievement of the Burmese Communists' current objective -- control of northern Burma, including territory adjacent toCommunist China.
6.
INDOCHINA. Renewed Viet Minh terrorism foreseen: The French authorities fear that the assassination of Commissioner de Raymond in Cambodia is the signal for a renewed and increased effort on the part of the Viet Minh to establish a reign of terror. 'After being Spared any grenade throwings for four or five months, Saigon has recently suffered three such incidents. (C Saigon 965, 3 Nov. 51)
TOP SECRET
The British Foreign Office regards the situation in Burma with considerable Concern and has recently suggested a joint American-British effort to assist the Burmese Government in reaching a settlement with the Karens. The American and British Embaasies in Rangoon, however, believe such an approach unwise, citing extreme Burmese sensitivity to the Karen insurgency as reflected in Premier Thakin Nu's 29 October statement that Burma would not accept mediation.
6 Nov 51
ApprovAlitor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP7911P1446A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1X
7.
25X1
25X1A
25X1
Communists Penetrate Indonesian Army: the Communist Party has penetrated the Indonesian Army in Sumatra to such an extent that a number of troops 1 Ihad to be moved to Java because of their subversive behavior.
1
INDONESIA.
25X1X
25X1
If Comment: true, Col. Simbolon, military commander of North and Central Sumatra and one of the most competent officers in the Indonesian army, was probably responsiiile for shifting unreliable troops to another part of Indonesia.
It has been estimated that five percent of Indonesian Army troops are Communist and 40 percent are "unreliable."
8.
Re-entry permits denied to Overseas Chinese now in Chine: A reports that after the departure for Communist China in August of an overseas Chinese observation party, it was discovered that the Indonesian Immigration Department had not included re-entry permits in the passports and travel documents. Members of the party born in Indonesia will be permitted to return. However, those born outside Indonesia probably will not be permitted to re-enter the country on completion of the tour.
25X1A
A prominent Chinese in Sumatra has made several visits to the Immigration Office in Medan in an effort to secure re-entry permits for the entire Sumatra contingent of the party. To date he has been unsuccessful.
1

1 1
25X1C
25X1A
Comment: During the weeks preceding the departure of the group, the Indonesian Government had become increasingly irritated by policies of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta and increasingly aware of Chinese Communist subversive activity. Additionally influenced by the discovery of an "underground movement which had foreign support," Indonesian officials may persist in denying re-entry to those Chinese not Indonesian-born.
9.
25X1
25X1
1SOBSI, the Communist-led labor federation, has probably passed instructions down to local unions not to create disturbances in order either to.giVe the impression that the government's security sweep was not necessary or to Suit. tne government and the public into thinking the security measures have been effective. Ithis is only a tactic, and that the left-wing labor movement is preparing to renew agitation and to carry out increased subver1
25X1A sive activities.
1,abor front is Quiet: The labor front in Indonesia is generally quiet. Left-wing labor unions are not making excessive demands or threatening crippling strikes.
TOP SECRET
5
6 Nov 51
Approvartor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP791*146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
Comments The government's security arrests included a number of SOBSI and leftwing labor officials and several suspected Communists in the Labor Ministry.
25X1
correct in estimating the current lack of labor

an disturbces as a 1probably actic. However, an additional and more immediate reason
25X1
for such quiescence is the fact that renewed activity at the moment would undoubtedly bring renewed arrests.
11.
25X1X
Communist resolution outlines plans for Provisional Revolutionarv Governments A has obtained a copy of a Philippine Politbureau resolution, dated March 1951, which sets forth the aim ofmstablishing a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" which would be in-. tended to serve as a "rallying center" for the allegiance of the masses and give them a "permanent revolutionary outlook." In areas of strong Huk influence, town councils would be elected by a "show of hands." The councils would designate and supervise peasant committees for partitioning and apportioning the land, and where factories exist, workers, committees would prepare for the seizure of industries.' 'While it is recognized that there is a big difference between outlining and actually implementing this plan, in areas friendly to the Huks "town councils" might be used to gain further mass support, although it is doubtful they could accomplish actual government functions since the Philippine Communists lack a "liberated area." (C Manila 1611, 2 Nov 51)
25X1
TOP SECRET
6
6 Nov 51
Approvals,. For Release 2002105/20 : ciA-RDP791V1146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
12.
Chou En-lal reports on state of the nation: Chinese Communist Frillier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lei's long political report to the People's Consultative Conference on 23 October has been released by Peiping radio. Chou made the following principal points:
CHINA.
(1) an "unprecedented unity" of the Chinese people has resulted from the three-point program of aiding Korea, advancing land reform, and suppressing counter-revolutionaries; (2) although Chinese Communist forces in Korea have inflioted on the US "coloesel" fosses; US intransigence in negotiations has shown that the Chinese must be prepared if necessary for a "long-term struggle"; (3) land reform now extends to 310 million people, with 90 million to go, and will be largely completed by the end of 1952; (4) although "great nation-wide successes" have been achieved in suppressing counter-revolutionaries, the movement has been "uneven," and the struggle "must continue on a nation-wide scale"; (5),government organs at all levels are working well but need to be.streamlined, to improve their cadres, and to learn to distinguish between Peiping's area of responsibility and their
own;
(6) the national minorities are being brought under Communist control while concessions are being made to local customs; and (7) united front activities are effectively lining up the populaoe to support Peiping's policies, with even the intelligentsia, businessmen and religionists learning to admire the Communists and despise the West. (11 FEID flimsy, 3 Nov 51)
Comments Most of these points were made in the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders before the Conference, which discharged its function of endorsing the regime's program in toto. The "unprecedented unity" and nide popular "support" are clearly the products of compulsion; almost all sources agree that the regime is unpopular with All elements except its own functionaries.
13.
25X1
Over 100 nuns ani Priests _said to be imprisoned in Communist China: in Hong Kong states that 19 nuns and 300 priests Are known to be in jail in Communist China, that 1,000 Catholic missionaries have been forced out of China during 1951, and that the remaining 1,500 are
TOP SECRET
7
6 Nov 51
ApprovIssleFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79t1A146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
expected to be jailed or expelled within the next year. 1621, 2 Nov 51)
(S Hong Kong
25X1
25X1
Imay be correct, his figures are 1 Even higher in all categories than those suppliedI including those under house arrest the figure of 319 cannot be confirmed by available evidence. Some hundreds of Catholic missionaries are known to have been expelled; it is estimated that about 1,000 others Icertainly right in expecting have remained. In any eventlI the imprisonment or (in most cases) expulsion of those remaining, as well as continued coercive action against the estimated 10,000 Chinese priests and 3,000,000 Chinese Catholics.
Comment: Although'
25X1
14.
Comment: US Foreign Assets Control Regulations forbid payments for merchandise in which Chinese Communist nationals have had any interest since 17 December 1950, unless permission is obtained from the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the regulations, US dealers cannot pay for wool now owned by Tibetans (who are presumably nationals of Communist China).
Tibetan wool sales hampered by US contrclal According to an important Indian trader in Tibetan wool, US oontrols may force the Tibetans to sell their wool to the Chinese, who urgently need it'for making blankets. Because of US Treasury restrictions, dealers do not know whether the us will buy Tibetan wool. The Consul General in Calcutta advises a relaxation-of these restrictions in order to encourage Tibetans to bring their wool to the Kalimpong market. Otherwise, they will sell to the Chinese Communists. (C Calcutta 221, 27 Oct 51)
15.
Chinese Communists are still relatively unaffected by Western economic =anctions: Western economic sanctions have had no especially adverse effect on China's economy, according to the US Consul General in Hong Kong. Although the Communists have had to defer some of their plans for industrial expansion, reports from travelers indicate that the efficiency of many utilities--some of which depend on imported machinery-has actually increased. The Consul General believes that stockpiles of strategic items already acoumulated may have acted thus far as a buffer against the effect of Western sanctions, but shortages are beginning to develop in certain items, e.g., trucks and electronic supplies. He is of the opinion that the next six months will demonstrate the full effects of Western economic sanctions. (S Hong Kong 1612, 1 Nov 51)
Sanctions have been in effect for too short a time to Comment: permit firm conclusions regarding their effect on China's economy. The Chinese claim that increased shipments from the USSR and Eastern Europe TOP SECRET
6 Nov 51
ApproviiFor Release 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP791irS146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
are countering the effectiveness of Western export controls. Nevertheless, unconfirmed reports that the Chinese Rre dissatisfied with the qUality of Soviet deliveries and costly efforts to develop sources of supply in the non-Orbit areas (e.g., Macao and India) indicate that Western sanctions are beginning to handicap China's economy.
16.
KOREA. "Aerial no-mnn's land" reported over northwestern Korea: The inability of UN medium bombers to venture north of the Chongchon River
in northwestern Korea in daylight hours is cited by the Far East Command as demonstrating the loss of UN air superiority in this area. The Far East Command states, however, that the "relative freedom of action" enjoyed by high-performance UN jet aircraft over northwestern Korea has in turn prevented the Communists from achieving effective air (S CINCFE superiority, in effect establishing an "aerial no-man's land." Telecon 5331, 5 NOV 51)
Comment: Loss of air superiority north of the Chongchon River has caused the UN to resort to night medium bomber and fighter-bomber missions in an attempt to continue the neutralization of the airfields at Taechon, Namsi and Saamchan. The Communists are continuing to augment their antiaircraft defenses at these fields, and considerable construction work continues in the repair and extension of runways.
17.
Communists adamant on possession of Kaesongl A Peiping broadcast, reporting the A November sub-committe meeting of the cease-fire talks, .states that no progress was made. The broadcast adds that the Communists are "determined in their opposition to the absurd American demand that they yield Kaesong" and that they will equally. oppose "the fantastic demand that Kaesong be placed under American control and moved into a so-called demilitarized area." The broadcast concludes with the warning that if "the American side stubbornly persists in their demands .. then the responsibility for ptalling the armistice negotiations will rest entirely with the American side." (R FBA Ticker Peiping, A Nov 51)
Comment: Reasons for the Communists' currently intransigent stand on the disposition of Kaesong are obscure. It may be speculated, how, ever, that the prestige value of holding this ancient Korean capital city, located in South Korean territory, is of equal weight with its military value.

TOP SECRET
9
6 Nov 51
ApprovalFor Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T1,1146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
18.
Chinese Conmunists make cootdinated tank-infantry attack in western sector: In the late afternnon of 4 November, an unidentified Chinese Communist unit, estimated at division strength, launched an attack supported by anestimated reinforoai battalion of tanks and selfpropelled guns. The attack, directed against elements of the lst Commonwealth Division west of Yonchon in the western sector, was sustained for nine hours but made,pnly slight gains. UN air action knocked out Six of the twenty-two attacking tanks and one of the three selfpropelled guns. (S CINCFE Telecon 5331, 5 Nov 51)
Comment: This engagement, the heaviest reported during the past two months, is significant in that it is the second occasion that Chinese elements have received armored support in the attack. The armor utilized during this action were probably elements of the Chinese Communist lst.Armored Division located in this general area.
19.
North' Korean Premier thanks Chinese "Volunteers" for haying "achieved" their mission: In a 4 November Peiping broadcast, the text of a message from Morth Korea's premier Kim Il Sung to the "Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" was released. Kim tendered his "warmest thanks" for the encouragement received from China, and in speaking of the feats of the Chinese "Volunteers" in the Korean war he noted that "they have victoriously achieNed the glorious miseion assigned by the Chinese people."
He added, however, that "with the militant aid of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the Korean People's Army mill assuredly defend the unification and independence of their own country...r (R FBID Ticker Peiping, 4 Nov 51) While this broadcast is of particular interest in that Kim uses the past tense in referring to the mission of the Chinese "Volunteers" in Korea, the obscure statement that they would continue to "defend the unification" sheds no further light on ultimate Chinese intentions in Korea. Chou En-lai has recently stated that.the Chinese must be prepared if necessary for a "long-term struggle" in Korea.
Comment:

TOP SECRET
20.
Russian-born Korean named Vice Premier: Ho Ka-i was appointed Vice Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 November by the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, according to Radio Pyongyang. (R FBID Ticker, 4 Nov 51) Commenti Ho Ka-i takes the rlace of Vice Premier Kim Cheek, who was a war casualty some months ago. He is believed to have been born in the USSR and to have dual citIzenship. His highest official post to date
10
6 Nov 51
Approvearbr Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79Tati46A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
has been that Of Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the North Korean Labor Party. One of the few KoreanS rumored to have free access to the'Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, Ho's political star appears to be in the ascendancy.
21. JAPAN Korean-Japanese talks reach iMvasse: The US Political Adviser reports that the Korean-Japanese talks have reached an impasse over the Korean request that special privileges be accorded to Korean residents in Japan aftet they attain alien status. The Japanese Foreign Cffice has indicateditbstitwill be difficult to continue the *elks if the KorEans insist on a status which the Japanese consider eAra-territoriality. (C Tokyo 932, 3 Nov 51) In a letter to Ambassador Dulles on 26 October, the head Comment; 6f the Korean delegation complained that Japan was deliberately delaying consideration of outstanding problems until Japan achieves full sovereignty. The Koreans, mistrustful of Japanese intentions and mindful of their former status as "second-class" citizens, apparently are seeking guarantees of special treatment which the Japanese are determined not to give. The Koreans probably also fear a wholesale deportation Of indigents and other undesirables, despite Japanese assurances that deportation would be applied only to "leftist troublemakers." A breakdown of the current talks will be an'unfortunate beginning for Korean-Japanese'independent relations, which are certain to be tenuous for several years.
25X1

TOP SECRET
6 Nov 51
ApprovellFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP791191146A000500190001-7
25)0
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
12
6 Nov 51
Approve*For Release 2002105120 : ClA-RDP7911P(146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GERMANY. USSR apparently seeking four-power discussion of Berlin trade problems: East German trade officials have told their West German counterparts that they are now forbidden by the Soviet authorities to discuss restrictions on list Berlin trade. The East Germans admit that this marks
A definite change in the Soviet position from the time thainterzonal trade agreement was signed on 20 September. They declare that the restrictions_can_naw be discussed only on a four-power level.
The Western Allies are prepared to open trade discussion with the SOviet authorities., but only after suspension of the interzenal trade agreement, a step on Which Chancellor Adenauerts views are awaited. list Berlin officials, claiming that economic difficulties are beginning to be evident in Berlin,..believe that immediate steps should be taken to increase the airlift_of exports. Meanwhile,: confirmation has been receiVed that the Rothensee canal lock in East Germany has been opened, removing One Of the ebatacles to barge traffic from Berlin. (S Bonn 3081 2 Nov 51; R'Berlin 6721 3 Nov 51)
Comments At the signing of the interzonal trade agreement, the East Germans made an oral pledge that certain devices to harass Berlin trade would be abandoned. Prior to this time, they honored thia promise only to the extent of reducing the tax on truck traffic to Berlin. If the Soviet authorities have now denied the East Germans ay.jurisdiction over trade restrictionl, the purpose might be to give the USSR a free hand to use the restrictions as one of several levers to impede progress toward the integration of Germany into the West, and particularly to force four-power negotiations on this issue.
The Rothensee canal lock, now open for the first time since last January, mill not be of much immediate use to the list, as the canal is normally closed because of ice by mid-December.
.2.
FRANCE.. French.succeed in having German EDF contribution reduced: At the instigation of the French arid with German_apprOval,_the.European. Defense Fordes Conference has agreed'to reduce from 18 to 12 the nunberof German units (groupements) to be contributed to the EDF by 1954. The French argued that the total cost of 18 groupements with appropriate supporting forces amounting, according to HATO estimates, to about 16 billion dollars, would be so great as to create fears that the EDF would not be built at all. The SHAPE observer at the conference stated that his organization could not modify its estimate of military requirements, but that it
TOP SECRET
13
6 Nov 51
Approved*.dr Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01/46A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
would have to accept the conference's decision on national financial capabilities. The French are influenced in part by the serious balance Of payments crisis, which they are convinced will compel them to curtail their own defense program even more than they had thought a short time ago. (TS Paris 2585, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: The European Dofense Forces plan was intended by the FrencE-arl-means of preventing a-return of German military ascendancy in Enrope. The French are looking for ways to insure that, aside from contributing.a nuMber of units equal to their own, the Germans make an additional financial contribution to Western defense which woUld compensate for France's naval and overseas commitments benefiting this
cause.
3.
FRENCH MOROCCO. Public disorders attend 1 November election: Disorders accompanied strenuous French efforts to get out the few Moroccans eligible to vote in the 1 November election. Eight persons were reported killed by police and 500 arrested. Further disorders are said to beplanned for 6 November, the date of the opening session of the UN General Assembly. (C Casablanca 26, 2 Nov 51)
CoMmentt The nationalists had asked the few enfranchised natives to boycott this election of 21 delegates to the advisory, 154-member Council of Government; but probably did not propose any demonstrations dr dieorders. Although disturbances May occur on 6 November, or the national holiday on 18 November, the nationalists probably would not jeopardize their case before the UN by inciting disorders.
4.
Cement.: Although theoretically an internatiohal administration, the International Zone of Morocco --Tangier-- is doMinated bflrance, which in fact centrols the police. The Moroccan nationaliSts have received further grist for their propaganda mill, and the Arab League nations will probably use the expulsion in presenting the Moroccan case to the UN General Assembly.
Expulsion of Bourghiba froth Tangier may increase nationalist agitation: On 2 November the international police in Tangier expelled Habib Bourghiba, Tunisian nationalist leader, who had arrived the day before on a private visit. The US Legation in tangier considers the expulsion a hasty and ill-advised action because it may furnish grounds for renewed political agitation. (C Tangier 168 and 169, 2, 3 Nbv 51)

TOP SECRET
14
6 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-R6P79T01146A000500190001-7
ApprovE*ForRelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP7914146A000500190001-7
25k1
TOP SECRET
6.
25X1
French use occu ation receiptLte support French banking intereatst Austria's nationalized bank, the Creditanstalt, verifies that the French Government is using schillings received from the Austrian Govern ment as oCcupation costs to indemnify French banks for losses incurred in Austria's 1947 monetary converdion. The French are also reported to have utilized 25 million schillings of occupation receipts as a deposit (S Vienna to purChase an equity interest in the Austrian Laenderbank.
1592, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: US authorities,in Vienna have strongly resisted French and British demands that the Austrian Government should increase its allocations of funds to covor the costs of Allied occupation in Austria.

TOP SECRET
15
6 Nov 51
ApprovbeFor Release 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP79W1146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
made a serious mistake in the ecent grant of wage conceasions to labor. As a result, he expects further strike threats from labor in January. (C Brussels 619, 2 Nov 51)
CoMment: An influential Belgian Cabinet member has stated that the recent turmoil" over the Present government has died down,.although criticism of dt.ledst one of the ministers continues to be severe. He also stated that the present plan ls to go before Parliament with the government unchanged, even though the Chamber of Deputies has not specifically assured this particular government its support.
Ever sinee the conclusion of laborls successful campaign for wage concessions, it has been rumored that some changes would be made in the composition of the Belgian Government.
NETHERLANDS-BELGIUM. Schuman Plan is ratified by Dutch ParliaMent: Dutch participation in the Schuman Plan was approved on 31 October by an Overwhelming majority in the Lower Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, with only the Communists in opposition. Thus the Netherlands becomes the first European country to obtain parliamentary approval for the plan. The Dutch Economic Minister attributes this early adoption to "good coordination between the government, parliament, and industry." Moreover, a great shipping center, the Netherlands stands to profit from the consolidation of industrial commodities like steel and coal.
9.
25X1
The Belgian Foreign Minister is not optimistic that the plan will be accepted by the Belgian Parliament and charges the opposition with "hiding (ll ehind the conetitution"'as a pretext'to defeat the plan. S Brussels 614,,31.0ct 51)
J
25X1
CoMment: The Dutch have consistently endorsed the Schuman Plan as a valtigre-M-ontribution toward a federated Western Europe. The French Aesembly, which reconvenes 6 November, is expected to give early and favorable consideration to the plan.
25X1C
25X1-10.1
25X1C
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
17
6 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000500190001-7
ApproViwrFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1A
25X1
Comment: Certain Western observers have suggested that Italy's chances for obtaining UN membership at the present time are slight.
11.
GOVernment refuses to permit neo-fascist national congress: The ItalianInterior Ministry has refused the request of the neo..fascist Italian Social Movement for reVocation of a year-old ban against the party's holding a national congress.
'
US representatives in Rome comment that the refusal of the Christian DemoCratic government to weaken its stand against this group is motivated by oppoSition on principle to neo-fascism and perhaps by fear that the vote for the Italian Social movement may grow, particularly in southern Italy. (S Acme Joint Weeka 44, 2 Nov 51)
domment: The Sicilian elections in the spring of 1951 gave the neo fascists the balance of power between the Christian Democrats and the Com, muniets. Partly because of the gaine by the two political extremes, the Italian Government recently postponed elections in southern Italy from the fall of 1951 to an uncei-tain date, now planned for the Spring of 1952.
12.
Communists try new tactic to force coqperation from anti-Communist labor unions: The leadership of the Communist-dominated General labor Confederation (cpIL) has stated that if the government leviers prices,15 percent within one Month, the Confederation will forego its recently announced de7 mand for a general 15 percent wage increase to offset the'riSe in the cost Of living.' The US EMbassy in Ram comments that the COIL's change of policy is a clever tactical Move in an effort to force the anti-Communist unions to join the drive for higher wages. (S Rome Joint Weeka 44, 2 Nov 51)
Comment:' The-anti-Communist unions had opposed the CGIL's previous deMand for higher wages and advocated instead a reduction in the cost of living through lewered prices: In addition to this switch in the CGIt's position, a development that will exert even greater inflUence in promoting unity of action among all the unions is the stringent anti-strike bill recently apProved by the Cabinot and due for parliamentary consideration during November.
COLOMBIA. Abella leaves Communist Party in protest: Pedro J. Abella, meMber of the National Directorate of the Colombian Communist Party, has
13,

TOE SECRET
18
6 Nov 51
7*
ApproV4*For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
Secretary-General Vieirals policy of not left the party in protest against. ad. supporting the Liberal guerrillas. Abella is reportedly recruiting leftist Liberals. made up of party members and herents for a separatist group (C Bogota 328, 2 Nov 51)
Comment: The Colombian Communist Party has been numerically insi-gnificant-Eflxtraordinarily unattractive to Colombians for years. Abelles Communism's . policy, if carried out intelligently, would greatly increase well result in severe repressive measures appeal in Colombia, although it may administration: against party members by the Conservative

TOP SECRET
19
6 Nov 51
25X1

Approval ?or Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T*46A000500190001-7
TOP SECRET
6 November 1951 CIA No. 49417-A

Copy No.
49
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coves age of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFCRMATION
Approve *For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79tri46A000500190001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1,
CHINA. Communist China's vulnerability to stricter economic controls estimated: The US Consul General in Hong Kong declares that the Chinese
Communists would be squeezed much harder than they are today if US-type controls were adopted and strictly enforced by all UN member nations outside the Soviet bloc. .Such controls, he states, would not have an early effect on the ability of the Chinese to wage war in Korea on the present scale, since the USSR would undoubtedly make a strong effort to make up for the loss of non-Orbit supplies. Nevertheless, the Chinese urban economy would be strained, and there would be increased dissatisfaction with the Korean war and with Peiping's "lean-to-one-side" policy. (TS S/S Hong Kong 1634, 3 Nov
Comment: The Consul General has previously estimated that current Western controls have as yet had no especially adverse effect on the Chinese economy as a whole. The US-type controls he envisages would meaL a cessation of all shipments to Communist China -- not merely a UN-type embargo limited to strategic items. In addition, they would include a ban on merchant ship innings to Chinese Communist ports. Britain and other Western European countries have indicated their unwillingness to bar their merchant ships from the China trade; nor are they willing to ban the export to China of so-celled non-strategic items.
2.
Comment: Itnly has also stalled on the matter of reparations to certain UN members. It has taken no steps to initiate payments to Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, or Albania.
Government delays compliance with certain provisions of peace treaty: The US Ambassador in Rome has stressed to the State Department that the Italians by delays and inaction are failing to comply with Articles 78 and 83 of the peace treaty, relating respectively to UN property in Italy and to the settlement of disputes between a UN member and It*ly by a Conciliation Commission. The Ambassador believes that as soon as agreement is reached on the Italian note requesting revision of the peace treaty, the Italian Government should be told "in the strongest terms" to expedite the processing of claims and to agree on the appointment of a third member to the Conciliation Commission. (S S/S Rome 1977, 2 Nov 51)
ITALY.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
,
51)
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00050019)OBT51 -7
HR70-14
(0, toost-SI
W-s\
q
FAR FAR EAST

"Aerial no-maxi's land" remrted reported over northwestern Korea: 1. "Aerial no-man's land"
u 5 Nov 51 51
5
The inability inability of of UN mediumbombers bombers to to venture The UN medium north of the Chongchon Chongchon River River in in northwestern northwestern Korea in in daylight daylight hours hours is is cited Korea 1- i r b s demonstrating demonstrating the loss loss of of UN UN air as superiority in in this area. superiority
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 19-Feb-2010 DATE: 19-Feb-2010 1DPPROVED
land. land, "
lt
Comment: Loss Loss of of air superiority superiority north north of Comment: River has has c caused toresort resort to night medium bomber and a u the g UN m to medium bomber the Chongchon Chongchon River fighter-bomber missions the neutralization of fighter-bomber missions in in qn gn attempt attempt to to continue continue the of the airfields airfieldsat a tTaechon, Taechon, Namsi Namsiand andSaamehan. Saamchan. The The Communists Communists a are r e continuing continuing to augment their antiaircraft defenses augment their defenses at these these fields, and and considerable considerable conconstruction work work continues continues in the repair repair and andextension extension of of runways. runways,
-TOP-SECRET-SUEDE-
I I however, however, that the "relative freedom by high-performance high-performance UN UNjet jetaircraft aircraft of action" action" enjoyed enjoyed by freedom of over northwestern Korea has in turn prevented the Communists Communists from achieving effective effectiveair air superiority, superiority, in effect establishing establishing an an "aerial "aerial no-man's no-man's achieving
8. B.
KOREA Desertion Desertion rate r a t e worries worries North North Korean Korean security s e c u r i t y division: division8 According According KOREA. W a , r e ' l i m i n a r y f field i e l d Tr-ion, th e North 771-7a7preliminary ti701757cion, the NorthKorean Korean Railroad Railroad Seourity Security Division in i n Pyongyang PyongyRng notified n o t i f i e d the tho "security " s e c u r i t y department" department" of of its i t s 7th 7 t h Regiment Regiment Division i n northeastern n o r t h e a e t s r n Korea Korea that t h a t "the "the troops troopn under undor the t h e 7th 7 t h Regiment Regiment have have been in been d e s e r t i n g frequently. frequently. Therefore you V deserting v i l l inspect inspect t h e prevention method of will the of t h e regiment..." regiment.. .I' (SUEDE the (SUEDE CM CM IN I N 50657, 50657, Pyongyang-Hemhung, Pyongyang-Hamhung, 4 4 Nov Nov 61) 61)
Coxmenti A Comment: A high high desertion d e s e r t i o n rate r a t e appears appears to t o prevail p r e v a i l in i n many North North Korean rear rear area a r e a unite. unite. The 7th 7 t h Railroad S e c u r i t y Regiment, h i o h bas Korean Security Regiment, w which has a t r a i n i n g as as well w e l l as as a a security s e c u r i t y function, function, has has been beon particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y hard hard hit. hit. training
:1012LBECREZ-SUBEE--6

6 Nov 51
1)1)
5 S
'APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE 22-Mar-201 0 ,DATE: 22-Mar-2010
* -
W
1. 1.
E SUEDe D F
HR70-14
-I
121.Joy- st
FAR EAST FAR EAST
cig C IS
Communist light light bomber bomber divisions may may enter combat: Chinese Communist combat:
Eighth and and Tenth Tenth The commanders of the Eighth Chinese which a re Chinese Communist Communist Air Air Divisions, Divisions, which are equipped with withTU-2 TU-2light lightbombers, bombers, flew to equipped ,2j,s0/307- Antung at.B-1Antungon onthe theKorean-Manchurian Korean-Manchurianborder border on 29 Oct er. The A Mr these visits suggest 29 er, 2Js The i r Force Force comments comments that these suggest a high-level high-level conference s into into the Korean Korean war war may conference at Antung, Antung, at at which which the entry of of TU-2' TU-2's have been considered. have been considered.
AF-v
US Air Air Force US 5 Nov 51 51 SUEDE SUEDE
A significant bomber strength and and A significant increase in bomber intensity of of training was noted in Manchuria intensity Manchuria during October, when when the Chinese concentrated all their bomber strength, about Chinese their known known light bomber about 100 100 TU-2's, TU=2's,in inManchuria Manchuria by by moving moving several several bomber-equipped bomber-equipped divisions from from at Liaoyang Liaoyang appear to tobe be employing employing China. The Tenth Division Division bombers at withone one or ormore morebombers bombersequipped equipped with with specialized tactics, tactics, with particularly specialized radar., radar NR
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-201 0

-3 3 -
Comment: Since October October the the Eighth Eighth Air A i r Division Division Comment: Since and a regiment reregiment of othe the Tenth Tenth have have been been based based at atMukden Mukden and Liaoyang Liaoyang r espectively. The The Korean Korean battlefront battlefront is is well well within within the the operational operational radius radius of of TU-2's from these fields. TU-2's
-'-%SUEDE TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14
L
TOP bbili
.. .
12. 12
i n Hong Hong h n g reports reports on troop movements: US Military Military Attaohe Attache in Kong movements: The U8 US Military Milihry Attache Attaohe in l a Hong Hong Kong Kong comments oomments that the t h e trend of of all a l l reports received since of Communist sinoe mid-October indicates indioates the movement o f Chinese Communiet F o u r t h Field Field Army Army units d t s away away fram from Kwangtung, Kwangtung, either in i n the direction Fourth of The bulk bulk of o f the t h e reports reports indioate indicate a a move move of' Kwangsi Kwangsl or or northward. northward. The toward toward Kwangsi, Kwangsi, but but to t o date date no no reliable reliable information information from Prom Kwangsi Kwmgsi has reached reaohed the the reporting reporting officer o f f i c e r confirming oonfirming the the arrival arrival of these units. unite.
The Attache believes believes that that the t h e movement movement of of these these troops troops to to Kwangsi, Rwangsi, The Attache if If true, true, indioates indicates that: that:
(1) to pressure (1) the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communiats intend intend t o put put psychological preseure
(2) (2)

on on the the Frenoh Frenoh in i n Tonkin; Tonkin3
the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists intend intend to t o participate partloipate in i n Tonkinjor Tonkia3or
KGB
7 Nay Nov 52 61 7
bb
PPROVED FOR APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 24-Mar-2010 DATE: 24-Mar-2010
Y
. A
(3)
the Second Field Army units are being withdrawn from South China probably for employment in Korea and Mhnohuria, and the Fourth Field Army 3s extending to.00ver the gap. The reporting officer feels that, in view of the presence in Korea of Chen Keng, field thid it the:Most likely.: Commander of the Second Field Army
Comments movement Comment t There have been been several several recent reports indioating a movement of troops o of the Army from to Kwangsi provinoe. province. o f troop8 f t h e Fourth Field Amy froni Kwangtung Kwangtuig t o ~imngsi lbw-ever, all remain remain unconfirmed unconfirmed and are, are, therefore, therefore, not aooepted h e y all However, tthey pending further f u r t h e r information. information.
.
13.
whether h e volume o f war Whether t the of whr materiel delivered by rail has changed, but a change in the cOmposition of freight. Mamas previously the emphasis had been on tanks,' orated planes and cannon, there whs more recently a greater variety of materie/, inoluding Czech and Russian six-wheeled truoks and a number of rooket-launohers.
Comments Comment: The heavy heavy demand demand for f o r military m i l i t a r y transport on on Manchuria's Manchuria'e rail-s raiiWTYT-EtTs on on several several occasions ocoasions resulted resulted iin n temporary temporary suspensions suspensions o of f passenger and ordinary oommeroial commeroial f freight service. reight s edae. A A continuing oontinuing strain strain on net by the the shortage shortage of' of Soviet Soviet shipping and by on the t h e rail rail . ne t i sihindioated indioRted by difficulties d i f f i o u l t i e s encountered enoountered in i n chartering ohartering Western,flag Western-flag vessels. veesels.
14. 14
Rail congestion in Mhnohuria reported; the rumor, now current current i in Hhrbin, t that rail t h e rumor, n Harbin, h a t the r ail line from the USSR is Lnoreasingly oongested. Shipments of consumer goods have been banned during some periods. that by January 1952 it will be impossible to ship oonsumer goods from the USSR to Harbin.
1
7 Nov 51
.. ..
SECRET SUELZ
TOE-SEGRET-StEDE-
HR70-14 HR70-14
,."R
5.
6.
IR NR
7, 7 .
Chinese Communist light Ugh* bomber divisions may enter enter oombati oombatr The The oonmuvldere of oommandera of the the Eighth Eighth and and Tenth Tenth Chinese Chinese Communist Commmist Air Division, Division, whioh which are equipped Ught bolebere, bombers, fflew l e w tto o BRtung a're equipped with vith TU-2 TU4 light Antung on on the KoreanKoreanManohurian border border on on 29 29 October. Ootober. The Air Foroe ooment8 Manohurian oomments that these visits suggest a a high-level high-level oonferenoe-at oonferenoe'at Antung, Antung, at at rhioh whioh the the entry entry of of TU-21s TU-2's into in*o the the Korean Korean war war may may have have been been considered. aonaidered. I ~ ) 5 '511ov N o 51) 51) v
TO1_2_11ECTISP-817EDE-
TOP
_TOP_SECItET-SITEDEAPPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-2010
7 Nov 51
TY)
)5
SZEBECEETetTEDE---
Comment 1 Since Sinoe Ootober Ootober the the Eighth Eigh-bhAir Air Division D i v t s i o n and md a a regiment regiment of of the the OommentA Tenth have been based and Idaoyang liaoyang respectively, respectively. The Korean Tath=een based at a t liukden Mukden and Korean battlefront is well w e l l within within the theoperational operationalradius radiusof o f711.-21s TU-2fe from battlefront is from these these fields. fields.
8.

TOP _19-2--ISECRETItHIEDE5 5
7 Nov 51 51
wl
---WAD SECRET SUEDL.,

12),LIEciaz_suEDE--TOP, -S
HR70-14 HR70-14
,:"R /NR
1 0 .
11,
CRINA/KONNA. Nelvjet field border inoreases enemy a air Jet f i e l d near Korean border ir KOREA. New capability: The naw the Manchuria-Korea border new Takushan shan airfield a i r f i e l d near t h e Manahuria-Korea M t i destination n a t i o n on o??luovember o f a flight f l i g h t of wase the 4 November Of of twelve twelve MIG-lS's MIG-15's from fram iiaoyang,'south Mukden. AAMessage, Liaoyang, south of Mukden. message on 6 6,November November suggests tbe t h e possipossibility b i l i t y of o f the t h e transfer t r a n s f e r of of a a MIG-15 MIG16 division d i v i s i o n froi from North North China China to t o this *is same airfield. i r Force Roundup 235, 236, 21252, 51) (SUEDE A Air 2125Z, 6 Nov 51) airfield.
. report i s the first first r e p o r t of a a flight f l i g h t of o f jet j e t aircraft a i r c r a f t to t o the Comment: This is r e o e m m p l e t e Takitsshan d T&lct@han airfields a i r f i e l d , which which is i s the the third.field.near t h i r d field near the the recert773ipleted Manohuria.-Korea border border-oapable of acoommodating a000mModating.jet aircraft. Mariohuria-Korea oapable of Jet a i r o r a r t . At A t Antung Antung f i e l d s in i n the t h e area, area, there t h e r e are a r e about about 200 200 and Tatungkaw, Tatungkow, the t h e other other two two fields M10-15's, Them fields f i e l d s have been b!IG-1its, probably probably in i n four four divisions divisions of of 50 50 each. eaoh. These %he principal p r i n o i p a l bases for for M1G-15's MIG-15's encountered enoountered by by UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t in in Korea. Korea. the
.
12. 1 2 .
ICS)REA. Communist air a i r message message mentions mentione nevi new Korean border air a i r fields field: KOREA. Communist la77ding to -ding t oan a nAir AirForoe Foroeanalysis analysis of o f Communist Communist air a i r messages, messagea, a a new new air nlr field at Uiju ( (ten milee east o of field a t Uiju t e n miles f Sinuiju Sinuiju on on the North North Korean Korean side s i d e of o f the the border) border) Was was mentioned.as mentioned as a a possible possible landing f a d i n g point point for f o r two two flights f l i g h t s of of eight e;tgXt MI0-15's MIG-16's on on 30 30 October Ootober and and for for a a flight f l i g h t of o f 25 26 Mlq-15's MIG-1St8 on on 6 6 November. These are a r e the t h e tirst f i r s t references referenoos to t o this airfield's a i r f i e l d ' s utilization. utilization. Novembet.. These (8UEDE Air (SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundup 235, 236, 2125Z, 212S2, 6 6 Nov Nov 51). 51)
'
-.
UX's loss l o s s of of air a i r superiority s u p e r i o r i t y in i n northwestern northwestern Withthe t h e UN's Comments With Comrnentc --Korera; Communists presumably presumably ~ mill be able t to begin combat operations Korea, t the h e Communists I lbe l able o begin
TOLBCRET--SUBDE---
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-201 0 DATE: IDPPROVED
8 Nov 51
'h w
53
:*
I *
TOP SECRET SUEDe

____TOP-SECRET--613EDEI
from .the the border airfields a i r f i e l d s of Sinuiju Sinuiju and Uiju. Uiju. No reports have been reoeiyed o date of o f enemy enemy air a i r operations being initiated i n i t i a t e d from the threereoeived t to threea i r f i e l d complex oomplex in i n the the Sinanju Sinflnju area, area, farther f a r t h i r south. south* airfield
13. 13
North Korean Korean:Message message of, of', CommunistMattack plan reyorged: plan r~ ek ortedr A North Chinese C omm~ist6~~~ a~tR Visions of 6 November reports tthe presence oortmt Novomber reports h e presenoe f t w o visions o f the t h e Chineae Chinese reporting ~iie reporting Communist 64th 64th Army i n the .the immediate immediate vicinity v i o i n i t y of o f Kaedong. Kaesong. lite Communist Army in that:the that mill deoidedly attaok attack officer adds t h a t t h e Chinese Chinose "stated "stated t h a t they will The message t o north north of of the t h e Imjin Imjin river r i v e r despite despite anir ani enemy enemy intentions." intentions." to .additionally a d d i t i o n a l l y reflects a Communist Communist fear fear that t h a t UN UN forces forces are a r e preparing preparing to to attack a t t a c k Kaesong. Kaesong.
Eay
The message message also the.attachment of officer's. a b o brings to t o light l i g h t the attachment o f the $he officer's North Korean Korean unit u n i t (probably (probably the t h e 82nd 82nd Regiment, Regiment, 8th 8th Division) to to the the (SUEDE -25),' 15362, 15352, 7 7 Uov Nov 51) (SUEDE AFSA AmA-251, 51) 64th 64th Army. Army.
'
Comment,* This T h i s .report report may may rreflect eflect a a Chinese Chinese Communist Communist:intention intention to' to Commen-tr laut35-KrEttack l a u n m t t a c keast e a s t towards towards the t h e Imjin Imjin river r i v e r to t o frustrate frustrate at ali anticipated anticipated mith. UN UN attempt attempt to.take t o take Kassong. Kaeeong. These Chinese elements may have been withto northeast, drawn from their t h e i r lait l a s t point of contact, contact, considerably considerably t o the northeast, to t o take advantage advantage of of the t h e relative r e l a t i v e security s e c u r i t y of o f the t h e Kaesong-area Kaesong area for for staging Such such an an attack. attaok.
_T-CP-SZORET-EBEDE-
8 8
8 Uov Nov 61 51 0
c -
HR70-14 HR70-14
. . .
1101)-SEeRET SUEDE' SUED&

s--L
FAR FAR EAST
Communist light light bomber bomber divisions may may enter combat: 1. Chinese Communist 1. combat:
of the Eighth and Tenth The commanders of Chinese Communist A i r Divisions, which are Chinese Communist Air Divisions, which are 5 Nov 51 6 51 equipped with TU-2 light bombers, flew to equipped with TU-2 light bombers, SUEDE BUEDE a/.D== .74,0 z- Antung Antungon onthe theKorean-Manchurian Korean-Manchurian border border on Oct er. The The A Air that these these visits suggest 29 Oc i r Force comments comments that suggest a high-level high-level conference at Antung, s into into the the Korean Korean war war may may conference Antung, at at which which the entry of of TU-2' TU-2's have been considered. have been considered.
US Air Air Force US
AF-R..u;Lb-bc
A bomber strength and A significant significant increase increase in bomber intensity of of training was noted in Manchuria during October, when when the Chinese concentrated concentrated all their known light bomber bomber strength, strength, about Chinese known light about 100 100 TU-2's, TU=2's,in inManchuria Manchuria by by moving moving several several bomber-equipped bomber-equipped divisions dfvlsions from from Division bombers bombers at Liaoyang China. The Tenth Dlvision Liaoyang appear to be employing employing particularly particularly specialized specialized tactics, tactics,with withone oneor ormore morebombers bombersequipped equipped with with radar, radar ,
NR
PPROVED FORRELEASE RELEASE PPROVED FOR ATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
Comment: Comment: Since Since October October the the Eighth Eighth Air A i r Division Division and a regiment been based at and Liaoyang Liaoyangrereregiment of of the the Tenth Tenth have havebeen at Mukden Mukden and spectively. The Korean Korean battlefront battlefront i is s well within within the the operational operational radius of TU-2's from these fields. TU-2's
SUEDE
Approvtrfor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500210001-4
TOP SECRET
8 November 1951
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
Approve**For Release 2002105120 : ClA-RDP7911,1446A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
In USSR. Soviet representative offers proposal for armament census: an approach to a member of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin suggested a US-Soviet meeting on outstanding issues. Specifically, he maintained that the Soviet Union was prepared for,an international armament census and inspection of arms production. Alleging that real international inspection was meant, Tsarapkin said it must be "based on abolition of the use of atomic weapons in warfare and on a limitation of conventional armaments." (S Paris US DELGA,70,
-
7 Nov 51)
The USSR in 1948 rejected a Western proposal for an arms census. Soviet acceptance of inspection appears conditioned on prior agreement to abolition of the use of atomic weapons and to arms limitation. The USSR's attitude toward inspection in the atomic energy negotiations has been that it should be periodic and limited to announced facilities. Tsarapkin's proposal does not appear to provide for atomic energy control.
Comment on Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech: Politburo member L. P. Beriya's keynote address on the occasion of the 34th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution appears designed to emphasize to the world the USSR's increased economic and military strength in comparison with the rearming West while claiming the continued existence of a "basis for agreement" with the West. -However, Beriya warned Western leaders not to construe the USSR's desires for peace as a sign of weakness, repeatedly recalled the Nazi invaders' defeat by the Soviet Union at a time when it was much less prepared than at present, and stated that another world war would result in the destruction of capitalism.
To emphasize Soviet strength in basic war industries, Beriya gave absolute figures rather than percentages for the 1951 increases in steel, coal and oil production, and total steel production was hailed as roughly equal to that of Great Britain, France, Belgium and Sweden combined. ill

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: Tsarapkin's remarks probably foreshadow a new Soviet proposal regarding armaments and atomic weapons in this session of the General Assembly.
8 Nov 51
ApprovNifor Release 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP791Ve1 46A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
:did not
Beriya who reputedly heads the Soviet atomic energy program, mention the recent atomic explosions in the. USSR, but he drew particularlk marked applause when he stated that the army and navy upossesa all modern types of weapons."
25X1
Treatment of the Korean war, which received significantly little attention in comparieon to Bulganin's address on this occasion last year, seemed to indicate the Kremlin's desire to disassociate itself from this conflict if not to achieve an actual ceasefire. While Bulganin had drawn a parallel between the situation at that time and the early reverses of the Bolsheviks IP the civil war period, Beriya, withoUt mentioning Chinese assistance, was simply "convinced that the brave Korean people will find a worthy way out Of the bloody conflict."
25X1
4.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Organization formed to implement new defense training programs In order to facilitate implementation of the new defense act,
the Union for Cooperation with the Army has been established. The Union consists of a central committee and regional committees. The Red Cross, amateur flyers, Sokols and the People's Militia have already affiliated with the Union for the purpose of activating a new program for defense

TOP SECRET
2
8 Nov 51
AppromileFor Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79V146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
education and training of the populace. Training units will be formed the in these organizations. According to Defense Minister Cepicka, Cepicka army will furnish instructors, training cadre, and materials. stated that the new Union must have the widest possible popular partici(R FBID, 5, 6 Nov 51) pation.
Commenti The nature of the defense training is not yet known. However, the Union is similar to DOSAAF,the USSR All-Union Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The latter organization has concentrated on building up a reserve of skills which would be militarily useful, such as swimming, shooting, driving, and communiArmy thus represents another cations. The Union for Cooperation with the to a Soviet model. social organization generally conforming

TOP SECRET
3
8 Nov 51
Approvaceor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP7941446A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Iranian Parliament concerned over increased Tudeh activities; The US Embassy in Tehran reports that the Parlianentary session of 4 November was taken up,almost entirely with a discussion of increaded. Tudeh adtivities: The dePuties 'stated that the Tudeh was much stronger now than it had been at any time since it was outlawed following the' attempted assaasination of the Shah. Opposition deputy Emami accused the government of "establishing a rule by demonstration which itwas unable to control." (R Tehran 1691, 5 Nov 51)
Comments Both the Communists and the opposition have benefited by Mossadees policy of permitting free speech and assemblage as long as there is no breach of peace. Opposition criticism of the government's policy came to a head recently with the closing Of the.university after Comnunist-led students had held the president prisoner for eight and a half hours. If Mossadeq, who has reportedly ordered the reopening of the university, continues his present policy, he may be faced with increased opposition from all sides upon his return from Washington.
'
IRAN.
25X1
.
2.
AFGHANISTAN. Lakaattemsaazjase_fIlms frultaaR: Mohammad Hashim Karini, director of the cinema operated by the Kabul municipality, has reported to the US Embassy in Kabul that Pakistan's deliberate delay in allowing the transit Of Indian films to Afghanistan may fo^ce Kabul's two cinemas to import films,from the USSR. The Embassy feels this is a definite possibility. The Russians are quite willing to supply the films, which they have been prevented from showing until recently. On 5 November, a US Embassy officer saw a Soviet diplomat in the office of the main Kabul cinema where a Soviet propaganda film was being shown. (C Kabul 224, 5 Nov 51)
fisimpiguati The regular showing of Soviet films would afford a good new opening for Communist propaganda activities in Afghanistan.
3.
25X1
PAKISTAN. Sinkiang border patrol penetrates Pakistan; On 24 July a reconnaissance patrol of Sinkiang troops penetrated 2000 yards into the Gilgit area of northermmmt Pakistan at 36-37 N, 75-25 E, according 1 Shots were exchanged with a Pakistani patrol but no casualties were seported on either side.
Pakistani military sources stated that this was just one of several patrols which had entered Pakistan recently and that the event
cular importance. 1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
4
8 Nov 51
Approte For Release 2002105120 : ClA-RDP791146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET defined borComment: 'Little is known'of activities along the poorly activelY patrolThe Chinese have been der tetweda'Sinkiang and Pakistan. ComMunistKashiir since-the ling-and oroSsing the borders'of Gilgit and position it oannot afford to beizUre of Sinkiang. Pakistan has taken the antagonize China in such matters On 1 November Ghulam Saddiq INDIA. -Political developments in Kashmir: newly-convened Kashmir Constituent was eledted perthanent President of the New Delhi 1563, 2 Nov 51) Assembly. (U New Delhi 1552, 1 Nov; U of the leading Communists Comment: Ghulam Saddiq is reputedly one in Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah's in Kashmir. Long an important adviser to increase his power government, Siddiq is now in a favorable position and influence. be expected to Under Saddiq's guidance, the Constituent Assembly may except in foreign affairs, uphold Sheikh Abdullah's recent statement that, draft a Constitution according have full freedom to the people of Kashmir the Sheikh's suggestion that to their own desires. The Assembly may act on state. Kashmir cooperate with India but retain its sovereignty as a the Assembly and India has publicly advocated the establishment of their own fate which has championed the right of the Kashmiris to decide Pending a fin:11 soIndia confidently expects to be accession to India. India might experience some lution of the problem by the United Nations, the Kashmiris from assuming a considerable embarrassment if it prevented degree of autonomy. policies If the Abdullah government continues its Communist-tinged Communist capabilities semi-autonomous state, and if Kashmir becomes a adjacent to India and for obtaining control of the Himalayan borderlands Pakistan will be materially improved.
4.

TOP SECRET
5
5.
A recent announcement by the MALAYA. Egoder Powers for military_hinted: to thepowers of the government of the Federation of Malaya with regard implies, in the opinion of (against the "bandits") Director of Operations the granting of still more sweeping powers to the US Consulate General, this month. The Consulate General Lockhart, the new Director who arrives (S Singapore Wecka 44, declared. does not believe that martial law will be 3 Nov 51)
net reported: The efforts of INDOCHINA. Signs ofirench-Kuomintang spv Nationalist troops General Huang Chieh, ranking officer among Chinese
6.
8 Nov 51
Approvefror Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T011#46A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
interned in Indochina, to set up "French language study groups" among his men suggests that recent reports that he has been collaborating with the French authorities in organizing a trans-border intelligence network (S Saigon Weeka ), 4 Nov 51) may have some basis.
Comment: The Chinese Nationalist authorities have been attempting for some time to foist their services on the French. The French, fearful of antagonizing the Chinese Communists, have reacted cautiously to these overtures.
7.
gomentr The CCF's enrollment by fiat in the SSFA was announced a month ago. At the time, Peiping gave the figure of 5,000,000 for the CCF, almost 1,400,000 in excess of the accepted figure for field forces, military district troops and naval and air forces; the 6 November broadcast gives no figures. Indoctrination on Stalinist lines has been conducted throughout the COF for some years, and the activity of the political apparatus in the CCF has been directed toward Stalinist goals. The planned intensification of such indoctrination and activity in the CCF will tighten the Soviet grip on the armed forces of the Peiping regime and will further reduce Peiping's capabilities for pursuing an independent line if the desire should ever arise.
Mao felicitates Stalin on the anniversary of the October Revolution: Mao Tse-tung's message to Stalin on 7 November, the 34th anniversary of the October Revolution, extends "heartfelt greetings," offers congratulations on various alleged Soviet achievements and salutes the "unshakeable and great friendship" between the USSR and Communist China. Sino-Soviet friendship,"which grows ever closer," is said to be the "most reliable guarantee" of victory for the Soviet cause. (R FBID flimsy, 6 Nov 51)
Comment:
8.

TOP SECRET
6
Chinese Communist tosses exhorted to emulate Soviet Army: The Peiping radio, commenting on the recent en bloc enrollment of Chinese Communist forces in the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, has informed the troops that their participation in the SSFA will instruct them in "patriotism and internationalism". and in the "advanced military science" of the USSR, and will further strengthen the Sino-Soviet alliance. The troops have been told that their work in the SSFA will consist of studying Communist theory and practice, learning Soviet military science, and spreading propaganda to the "masses."' The broadcast also advised the troops that "the Soviet Union of today is the China of tomorrow,w that the Soviet Army is the "long-range" model for Chinese Communist forces, (R FBID and that the USSR is the "best friend of the Chinese people." Peiping, 6 Nov 51)
CHINA.
Mao's message corresponds roughly to Stalin's "friendly
8 Nov 51
Approvecnigr Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01/211946A0005002100014

TOP SECRET
greetin&" to Mho on 1 October, the second anniversary of the founding of the Peiping regime, which expressed a wish for further Chinese Connunist successes and for consolidation of the Sino-;Soviet alliance. As usual, Mao's tone in this message to Stalin is deferential but not obsequious.
9.
Kao Kang and Lin Piao move up in Revolutionary Military Council: Peiping radio has announced the appointment of Kao Kang and Lin Piao as Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. (R FBID Peiping, 6 Nov 51)
Comment:
Kao is Chairman of the Northeast (Manchuria) People's
east Military District, and Secretary of the Party's regional bureau. Lin is Chairman of the Central-South China Military and.Political Committee, commanding officer of the Fourth'Field Army, and Secretary of the regional bureau. The.Chairnan of the Revolutionary Military Council, which controls the.armed forces of the Peiping regime, is Mao Tse-tung, and four of the five present Vice-Chairmen are also members of the Party's Central Committee. The elevation of Kao and.lin will add two more Stalinists to the leadership of the Military Council.
.
10..
Peiping comments on significance of October Revolution: People's China, a publication of the Peiping regime, observes the 7 Novemberarversary of the October Revolution by infOrming its readers that current events have exposed with unprecedented clarity the contrast between the . Soviet bloc and.the Wept. The former represents "peace, democracy and progress," the latter "retrogression, war and terror." The USSR is II politically and economically stronger than ever before" and counts as its "great ally" the People's Republic of China. The people of Asia can see the "path to the future of all mankind" charted by the October Revolution of 1917, and can see also the Chinese revolution is the "prototype" for eolonial and seni-colonial countries. (R FBID, 6 Nov 51). Chinese Communist spokesmen have made all of these points, International Communist propaganda characterizes the October Revolution as the greatest event in history, and the ascendancy of the Chinese Communists as next in.importance.
Comment:
11.
Communist currency depreciates sharply in Hong Kongi The value of Communist China's currency has declined sharply in the Hong.Kong market. On 6 November a Hong Kong dollar exchanged for 5,882.Chinese notes. The ratio a week earlier had been 5,150 to one. These figures compare with Peiping's official rate of 3,880 to one. (U.Far East Trader, 31 Oct;
-
usual1371=somewhat less gaudy rhetorib,'on other occasions.

TOP SECRET
7
Governrgaraommanding officer and political commissioner of the North-
6Nov51
Approved FoWtelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01116SA000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
AP Morseoast Hong Kong, 7 Nov 51)

Connants The wide difference between the official and open merket rates 1177-Ti;oent development and reflects the declining confidence in the Communist currenoy. Large military expenditures are forcing the regire to increase the amount of money in ciroulation and are oreating strong inflationary pressures. Although the Communists have thus far managed fairly well in keeping these pressures under control, prices are beginning to move upward,
12.
Comment: The amount which the Chinese people have been foroed to oontrfbute in the donation campaign already exceeds the amount which the Communists were able to exact in last year's Victory Bond Campaign. Both drives were effective in withdrawing money from circulation and countering inflationary pressures. These pressures, nevertheless, continue strong and prices are beginning to rise,
13.
Comnmnists report on economic progreses Chinese Communist VicePremier Chen 'Nu, in a long statement to the People's Political Consultative Conference, reported on agriculture, industry and commerce, and finance. His main points were:
(1)
(2)
(3)

TOP SECRET
8
Communist donation.campaign passes 100 million dollar mark: Hong Kong press accounts report that Peiping has received donations from the people and from business concerns amounting to about 100 million dollars. These donations, which are made for the declared purpose of enabling the Comm:lists to buy airplanes and heavy equipment, come to about 59 percent of the total amount pledged for the period from July through December 1951. (S Hong Kong 1550, 26 Oot 51)
Harvests have been generally good, and agricultural output will definitely surpass last year's levels.
Industrial output also is higher than it was last year. Pig iron production in 1951 will be 131 percent of the 1950 figure. Cemparable percentages'for other items are 142 for steel ingots, 178 for finished steel, 118 for coal, and 122 for electricity.
Government expenditures have risen, but the people's patriotism in paying taxes promptly has "facilitated the oountry's finanr cial adjustments," Although the rekire has issued more paper money, finanoial stability has not been disturbed. The oountry's (R finanoes are adequate for the needs of national defense. FBID, Peiping, 6 Nov 51)
8 Nov 51
ApprovberFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0005002100014

TOP SECRET
output in China industrial and agricultural Comments The level of but output has been diverted oompaigi-TriUrably with last year's figures, standards have probably suffered. to military ends, so that popular,living The Ceylonese press Communists offer rice for Ceylonese rubberl offered to send in Naoao.have reports that Chinese Communist rubber buyers rice, coal and grain for discuss the barter of high prioe for the rubber a delegation to Ceylon tomillirt to fix a very within the next rubber. The Chinese are prepared to supply 100,000 tons of rice and are reportedly Nov 51) three months. (U Colombo 304, 5 efforts to procure Ceylonese rubber Comment: Persistent Communist and have already succeeded in efshipping space have b=Itnearer way since last summer tons. Inability to find to China. fecting the acquisition of 5,530 from Ceylon, rubber shipments has so far prevented further
dro s 25 eroentt The China PetrolPrice of asoline in Shanghai :.g ai in mid-October, price o gaso ne a eum Corpora on re uce In terms of US ourrenoy, half months. One Communist the third decrease in two and a Shanghai. a gallon in gasoline now costs about two dollars ample dupply of reduction to a more are conpress article ascribes the price that the authorities gasoline .imported from Russia, and claims which now use charcoal for fuel sidering whether to permit some vehicles 27 (0 NCR& Peking 16 Oct; U Shanghai News, to reconvert to gaboline. Sep 51) probably lowering the price on certain Comment: The Communists are gesture than as a reflection of imported commodities more as a propaganda products in Shanghai has been closely improved supply. The sale of oil 1950, end on 15 August (after the controlled since the UN embargo of July private automobiles was cut from first prioe out) the gasoline ration for about 25 to 15 gallons a month.
14.
15.
16.
On lines foresees ROK agitation on cease.-fire US Nission in Korea to explain KOREA. MIMOi0 called on ROK President Rhee rilciTieriber US Ambassador negotiations at reasoning on the current cease-fire Muccio feels the UN Command's appeared "resigned to the situation," The ROK attack on the Kaesong. Although Rhee it quietly. he will aocept take that this doet not mean points of contact will probably Kaesong, and cease-fire line along the military retention of the Ongjin peninsula, demands for the is the form of will be raised, Muccio speculates, the mai( the Yonan area. Another point that administer former ROK territories, terthat while the Communists mill to administer UN-held North Korean is now forbidden by UN directives 51) ritory. (S Pusan 410, 6 Nov

TOP SECRET
9
8 Nov 51
ApproIXIY For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
of the Cement: The ROK will continue to advocate a continuation the ROK is that Afllternative hope expressed by war forwErrication," the US might be concluded, if and when &ceasea "security pact" with fire is negotiated.
17.
A tripartite fishJAPAN. Tripartite fishin conference opens in Tokyo: the US.and Canada opened on 5 November in eries conference between Japan, aimed at conclusion Tokyo. This is the firstftf a aeries of negotiations of bilateral or mnitilateral fishing agreements which Japan mill undertake in compliance with Article 9 of the peace treaty. (U FSID Tokyo Jiji, 6
Nov 51)
Comments Since this is the first important postwar international conference at which Japan will sit as an equal negotiator, the conference has created unusual interest in Japan. In the current negotiations, Japan the high hopes le establish a precedent by which freedom of fisheries on attempts of other thus weakening the expected seas will be recognized, oertain high nations in future negotiations to exclude the Japanese from seas fishing areas.

TOP SECRET
10
8 Nov 51
1/24.1.1
ApproatFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(MESTERE
1.
Party, which likewise The congress of the Austrian Communist emphasized the unity theme. week, also strongly convened in Vienna last to go slow at the European Defense Forces BELGIUM. Belg ans reportedly talks- According to France has again warned conference at Paris, the Belgian Ambassador government might not permit the the chiefs of the delegations that his basis of the proposed suprawork at the conference to continue on the other things, to a The Belgians object, among national institutions. voluntary contribution from each common budget and prefer instead a As a result, the member nation to meet certain common expenses. passive role in the talks expected to play a more Belgian delegation is decisions. reservation" on past and future conference and "take a general (S Paris 2602, 2 Nov 31)
At its call for unity with-Communists: AUSTRIA. Schismatic Socialists Austrian 4 November, the in Vienna on 3 and first national congress calling Party of Erwin Scharf passed a resolution Socialist fforker's union" of leftist of the "combat for a continuation and strengthening Member of Parliament Scharf was socialists and the Communists. Socialist Pietro Nenni redesignated party chairman. Left-wing Italian attending the World Peace visited the congress while he was in Vienna proffered felicitations Council meeting, and Austrian Communists Oesterreichische Zeitung, 6 Nov 51) to the Socialists. (R FBIS from the Austrian Socialist Party Comment: Erwin Scharf defected of all-out cooperation with in 1948 and was expelled for his advocacy subsequently formed has attracted The party which he the Communists. "socialist" front for various Communist very little support, and, as a schemes, has been of limited effectiveness.
2.
25X1
Shortly after the Benelux Ministers' conference of Comment: informed US Embassy officials 25 October, the Belgian Foreign Minister the technical committees in Brussels that Belgian representatives onviews until ministers of had been instructed to withhold additional could arrange "to exchange the member countries at the Paris conference technical committees had gone too far views." He added that the which might prove embarrassing without specific directives, a situation accompli. governments by presenting them with a fait to the participating opposition to the trend In view of the recent expression of Dutch withdraw from the of the conference talks, the Benelux countries may conference unless their demands are met.
TOP SECRET
11
8 Nov 51
ApproveYPor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79Te146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
3.
ITALY. Liberal Party enlarges its following: Unification with the Liberal Party of progressive-minded individuals and groups who have remained out of or seceded from the party is practically complete. The unified party will oppose alliances with the neo-fascists and monarchists and support government policy in general,
The US Embassy in Rome comments that the party, though small, will have a healthy influence since it offers a democratic alternative in the next national elections for conservative voters disappointed in the policy of the Christian Democrat-dominated government. The Embassy adds that it is not yet known whether the Liberals will return to the government or remain out until after the next national elections. (R FBIS, Rome Radio, 6 Nov 51; S Rome Joint Weeka 43, 26 Oct 51)
Comment: The conservative Liberal Party, which has consistently rejected Premier de Gasperi's offer to return to the Cabinet, showed an increase in strength in the May-June local elections. With this new addition of "progressive" groups, it should offer an even greater appeal in the next national elections to conservatives who, while favoring democratic processes, oppose many of the government's domestic policies and might otherwise give their support to the neo-fascists. The party could draw from the Christian Democratic right wing, although the Liberals' anti-clerical position would reduce their appeal to this group. An increase in the Liberals' parliamentary representation would enable groups with vested interests to block the government's program of socio-economic reform even more effectively than they have done heretofore.
'
4.
SPAIN. First step taken to simplify foreign trade controle: In what he has informed the US Embassy is designed as the first move toward simplification of Spain's complicated multiple exchange rate system, Minister of Commerce Arburua has reduced the number of export exchange rates. (Under the multiple rate system, which has long been a major handicap to Spanish foreign trade expansion, each import and export commodity is assigned a special exchange rate.) At the same time he abolished compensation and combined accounts. (These barter trade "accounts" have been utilized by SPanish industry, especially the textile industry, as its principal means of importing essential goods for which the government would not grant foreign exchange.)
Arburua believes that these measures will appreciably reduce black market foreign exchange transactions and will soon be followed by simplification of import exchange rates. He pointed out that, because of the complexity of Spain's exchange and economic controls,

TOP SECRET
12
8 Nov 51
ApprovWFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
he must proceed cautiously toward a less rigid system. 2 Nov 51; C Madrid 448, 2 Nov 51)
(U Madrid 447,
Comment: The Minister of Commerce evidently feels that US dollar aid and Spain's recently improved export trade will make it possible for him to remove these restraints on foreign trade, to attack currency His recent action, although it speculation, and to stabilize prices. does indicate an intention to normalize trade, does not represent any drastic step toward removal of rigid governmental trade controls. Furthermore, recent reports indicate that his decision to abolish compensation and combined accounts was influenced by a desire to prevent a scandal over cotton speculations and the possible bankruptcy of a number of important textile firms.
5.
PORTUGAL.
I
25X1
25X1
22 October Premier Salazar approved the Fortuguese Defense Minister's plan for the unification of the Army and Navy air arms. According to lunification would give the Air Force an equal status with the Army and Navy and place it under direct control of the (S Lisbon Joint Neeka 43, 24 Oct 51) Minister of Defense.
Comment: Unification would appear to conform with the Portuguese Government's intention of strengthening the Air Force's capabilities to fulfill its obligations under NATO. There have been several indications that the Defense Minister is grooming Brigadier Anselmo Vilardebo, a protege of President Craveiro Lopes, for the post of chief of thd new combined air arms. Vilardebo is more internationally minded and reputedly more capable than the present Commanding General of the Portuguese Army Air Force.
6.
MOROCCO. French press in- Morocco campaigns to discredit US representatives: The French-language press in Morocco is continuing its campaign to make scapegoats of American representatives there. The Resident General's remarks that US diplomatic representatives should be instructed to be "neutral" have been widely featured. US diplomats in North Africa are openly accused of cooperating with extremists and the Resident (C Casablanca General is requested to exact guarantees of non-assistance. 29, 6 Nov 51)
French interests in Morocco bitterly resent the Comment: continuance of US extraterritorial privileges. Much of the French press in the area has also been frequently critical of the US. The current campaign, howeter, has concentrated its attack upon American representatives rather than upon the more generalized aspects of American " imperialism." TOP SECRET
13
Unification of Army and Navy air arms reportedly approved:

[that on
8 Nov 51
site ApprovWFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
25X1C
7.
25X1A
movement reported. ARGENTINA. New revolutionary including Socialists, eports that a new revolutionary movement, workers, and members of the armed a Ica s, Conservatives, railway if this movement is this week. forces, may act against the government established to govern until successful, a civil-military junta will be eneral elections can be held
1 1
25X1C
25X1A 25X1A
8.
On 6 November Senora de Peron undergoes major operation: including a of surgeons, Senora de Peron was operated on by a team 51) (U NY Times, 7 Nov US cancer specialist. that Senora de Peron may have been Comment: Information indicates although government bulletins have suffering from cancer for some time, If she is seriously avoided mentioning the nature of her illness. which has been one incapacitated, her extensive political influence, administration, will be to Peron's of the army's strongest objections sharply curtailed.

TOP SECRET
14
of the Opposition elements, including some members is unlikely Comment: against Peron, but it armed forces, may attempt an uprising to stage a successful that they can attract sufficient army support might turn against that key army generals revolt. While the possibility that they it is more likely Peron cannot be completely discounted, and watchful waiting through next will continue their policy of support that the army would prefer Sunday's elections. There are indications to its terms. to have Peron remain in power subject
8 Nov 51
25X1

Approved For Release 2002/05120 CIA-RDP79T01146A000500210001-4
Approviipifor Release 2002105/20 : ClA-RDP791 146A000500210001-4
TOP SECRET
SECURITY DWORMATION
8 November 1951

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approwisli For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79)11146A000500210001-4

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN) received as vet: No Russian protest over Greek NATO membership from the Turkish in response to a query A Greek Foreign Office spokesman, has yet been received from the Ambassador in Athens, said that no note The Government contemplated accession to NATO. USSR protesting Greecels protest is received it will be has decided, however, that if such a turned back against the Soviets." "firmly rejected and the accusations in Athens that while Greece did The spokesman also informed the US Embassy it was thought advisable to indicate not expect a Soviet note at this timetoward the Soviets "remained firm and to the Turks that the Greek attitude (S S/S Athens 2112, 6 Nov 51) unyielding." On 31 Greece may be anticipated. Comment: A Soviet protest to against warning the latter October the USSR delivered a note to Turkey Rumania and reports state that membership in NATO, and unconfirmed press Bulgaria sent notes to Turkey on 6 November.
1.
GREECE.
2.
likely to be increased: Troop commitments for Korea not BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS. their inability to expressed regret at Belgium and the Netherlands have mentioned the A Belgian official furnish additional troops for Korea. problem of ordering conscripts abroad. stated that the volunteer system and the A Dutch Foreign Office spokesman replacements for the original contingent lack of incentives has even made added that about 2,000 Amboinese difficult to obtain. The Dutch spokesman and now in the Netherlands, soldiers, well-trained in guerrilla warfare contingent to Korea, but the Indoprobably would be willing to be used as a (S S/S stand against such employment. nesian Government has taken a strong Nov 51) Brussels 621, 2 Nov 51; S The Hague 433, 3 the support of the UN resolution condemning Comment: To affirm their Netherlands each sent a token force North Korean aggression, Belgium and-the early part of the Korean affair. of about battalion strength to Korea in the

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
TOP SECRET,
8 Nov 51
Approve( *or Release 2002105120 : ClA-RDP79th1011146A000500220001-3
TOP SECRET
9 November 1951
CIA No. 49420
Copy No.
14 3
DAILY DIGEST
State Dept review completed

TOP SECRET
Approveor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T*146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
BULGARIA. Power and fertilizer plants completed: Ceremonies marking the completion of the Stalin nitrate-fertilizers plant and the Chervenkov (Maritsa III) thermoelectric plant were held in Dimitrevgrad on 5 November. Premier Chervenkov, Soviet Ambassador Budrov, and Minister ot Heavy Industry Yugov were among those who spoke at the inauguration. Great stress was laid upon the role played by "thousands" of Soviet specialists in making possible the successful completion of the plants fully.twoyears ahead of schedule. (R Sofia FBID, 6 Nov. 51)
'
Although Bulgaria greatly needs power and fertilizers-, it would appear that the sudden rush to complete the Chervenkov and Stalin projects in 1951 was based as much upon propaganda considerations aa upon actual economic need. Publicity given to the "labor heroism and unheard of speed" manifested at Dimitrovgrad has served effectively to overshadow the failures of Bulgarian industry in other sectors of the economy.
2.
POLAND. Poles believed to have COPY of International EXport Controls Lin: During the current Polish-Swedish trade negotiations, the Polish negotiators have made constant references to "list I" and "prohibited items." A high Swedish official told a member of the US EMbassy in Stockholm he understood the Poles had been given or shown a copy of the International Export Control Lists by West German export control authorities. (S Stockholm 603, 6 Nov 51; 616, 7 Nov 51)
Comment: Considering the terminology used by the Polish negotiators, there can be little doubt that they are familiar with the International Export Control Lists. This familiarity enables the Poles to know exactly upon which strategic items to apply pressure when negotiating with the West.
25X1 3.

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: The Chervenkov thermoelectric plant is expected to supply power to a considerable area of southeastern and central Bulgaria as well as to various industrial activities located at Dimitrovgrad. The Stalin plant will provide nitric acid for the production of ammoniuM and calcium nitrate fertilizers. Nitric acid and annonium nitrate are' used in the manufacture of amatol and TNT explosives.
9 Nov 51
Approverfor Release
2002105120 : CIA-RDP79TV146A000500220001-3
25X1
TOP SECRET
4.
The Rumanian GovernRUMANIA. Boonomic plan fulfilled in third Quarter: goals for over-all industrial production ment has announced that the Only three fulfilled by 101.5 percent. the third quarter of 1951 were timber, (building construction, food, and major production categories All others overpaper, and cellulose) failed to reach their targets. ' percent), exceeded their goals, including coal and petroleum (102.9 Press electric power (105.1 percent), and transport (118.7 percent). for joint Soviet-Rumanian companies comment particularly lauded the Oct, 7 Nov 51) (R Bucharest 201, 3 Nov 51; MID 31 major triumphs.
Satellite to claim Comment: Rumania is the only Eastern European over-all industrial fulfillment of its economic plan.
In light YUGOSLAVIA. US agrees to sign arms agreement with Yugoslavia: the US of recent Yugoslav concessions regarding the size and duties of have agreed to conarms aid group, the Departments of State and Defense EMbassy Belelude the bilateral arms aid agreement with Yugoslavia. grade has been authorized to prepare the final text for signature (S to following Ambassador Allen's return from Paris on November 12. Belgrade 499, 7 Nov 51) accept an initial US arma Comment: The Yugoslays have agreed to that the supervision of the aid staff of thirty and pledged assurance will be carried out in a cooperative manner. use of the material General Harmony, who will head the US military group, Will work out the detailed implementation of the agreement upon his arrival in Belgrade near the end of the month.
5,

TOP SECRET
2
9 Nov 51
ApproveYFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
INDIA. Indian Foreign Secretairs statement on Communist Chinas In a reZ;ET-addtess before the new American, Trench, and Belgian AMbassadors to India, Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon mide the statement that "India has gained nothing in a material sense and perhaps has lost something by reoognizing (Communist) China. Similarly, the United States has gained little in a material sense and perhaps has lost little by refusing to recognize China," (U New Delhi 1626, 6 Nov51)
2.
Three oil refineries to be established: Three oil refineries maY be operating in India within the next two or three years, aocording to Indian press reports. Negotiations are said to be in On advanced state between the Indian Government and the Standard Vacuum, Caltex, and Burmah Oil Companies, the first two-Of which are prepared to inVest 30 million dollars each and the last 10 to 20 million pounds sterling. The closure of the Abadan refinery and the uncertainty as to ita future are said to have stimulated these negotiations. (U New Delhi 1624, 6 Nov 51) India, though sympathetic to Iranian aims, is nevertheless The degree of its concern is evident in i report that the foreign oil companies will be allowed to oontrol, manage and operate the refineries, an arrangement contrary to India's basic policy of eventual control or nationalization of all key industries.
Comment:
oonceri-rver the safety of its oil supplies.
3.
BURMA. De Lattre and MacDonald alarmed over Burmese situation: General 771e7ttre told the US Consul in Hanoi that he is seriously worried over the menace to Burma. He believed that Burma is threatened more by internal pressures than by a Chinese Communist invasion. He partially blamed Nehru's "antics" toward the West for Burmata weakness and critioized Britaints.negative attitude toward both Nehru and Hamm.
Meanwhile, the British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, in reviewing the politioo-military situation in the Far East for a group of US Congressmen visiting Singapore, stated that

TOP SECRET
This is a most unusual statement for a prominent Indian ofComfient: ficial to make befote diplomats almost certain to report it to their respective governments. Though it probably does not refleot any, ohange of attitude on the part Of Prime Minister Nehru, who is also Minister of External Affairs, it may indicate that oertain segments:of Indian officialdom now have some doubts as to the wisdom of India's precipitate recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.
9 Nov 51
ApprovitierFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
'god
Southeast Asia and that the government Burma is the weakest spot in of undermining tactics needs outside aid-to prevent collapse-as a result 537, 6 Nov 51) 307, 7 Nov; C Singapore by the Communists. (S Hanoi MacDonald are now meeting in Indochina to Comment: De Lattre and discuss the problem posed by Burma.
Poliee Director win royal support: THAILAND. Phao attempting to Ito be reported] General Phao lriyanrc, is against his political making a determined effort to min royal support Chief of the Army. rival General Sarit, Assistant Commander in
I
4.
25X1A
25X1C 25X1A
''''
5.
of French effnrt in Indochina is INDOCHINAL De Lattre save price General di. Lattre tnld US Consul greater contribution bv Vietnamese: retaihed as Premier for the Blancke in Hanoi that Tran Van Huu would be produce a proper budget time being at least, but that urless Vietnam can might be disposed to that the French Government it was not impossible objection. The pull French troops out of Indochina over De Lattre's own remain a critical spectator general declared that Vietnam could no longer both financially and in manbut must measure uP to its responsibilities (S Hanoi 307, 7 Nov 51) power for self-defense. to devote between 40 and 55 perComment: Vietnam is now committed receipts to defense costs. Any further cent of its meager budgetary of the Vietnam paring down of the Minimum social and economic programs it now enjoys. As Government would detract from what little popularity the anti-Commufor manpower, there are now some 200,000 Vietnamese among Frenchmen. nist forces in Indochina as compared with some 60,000
6.
meddlim". Vietnamese Premier rraised for resisting "French the major VietnameseAn editorial in the 3 November issue of one of of Premier Tran Van Huu . language newspapers of Saigon urges the presence in Paris on the ground that at the forthcoming French Union conference from meddling in our Huu "has many times prevented backward Frenchmen (C Saigon 974,,4 Nov 51) ihternal affairs." followed This newspaper, which is subsidized by Huu has Comment: The shift in amity line during all of 1951.
the, French-ViAtnamese

TOP SECRET
4
Premier Phibun A number of recent reports indicate that Comment: political and military is backing Sarit in an effort to reduce Phao's has for his coronation, influence. ,The King, except for a short visit continuously for several years and is unlikely been away from Thailand the immediate future. to wield any great influence in Thai politics in
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00050022: 0 :3
7 51
Approvareor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T*146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
editorial policy reflects Huu's effort to strengthen his now very feeble popular following in order to arm himself politically against the growing enmity of General de Lattre. Huu has generally been considered pro-French, although he is capable of opportunistic criticism of the French authorities.
7.
SOUTHEAST ASIA/GHINA, US Congressmen briefed on the Far East: The British-Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, in reviewing the politico-military situation in the Far East for a group. of US Representatives visiting Singapore, stated that although Indochina was tbf, "easiest highway" by which the Chinese could conquer Southeast Asia, DeLattre had effectively barred this road. MacDonald believed, therefore, that Burma was the weakest spot in the area. Touching on Malaya, he said the "emergency" would probably endure for "a very,very long time," but that even if Burma, Indochina and Thailand fell to the Communists, Malaya would definitely hold out.
With respect to Communist China, MacDonald stated that the Peiping regime is "obviously" in firm control of the country and is less corrupt and more efficient than its Nationalist predecessorlbut that Peiping's program of terrbrism has resulted in a "great swing away" from popular support of the regime. Speaking off the record, MacDonald stated that
25X1
Speaking generally, Macpcnald said that political freedom in Southeast Asia inevitably Eeant administrative inefficiency and corruption which provided fertile ground for Communist exploitation. He felt that the West should take this fact into consideration in formulating policy toward the peoples of the area. (C SingaPore 537, 6 Nov 51)
Comment: MacDonald is widely rekarded as a brilliant analyst-of Southeast Asian problems. Most observers are in general agreement with his major points on Southeast Asia and Communist and Nationalist China.
8,
CHINa. "Counter-revolutionaries" ars_lredominantiv males over 30: Tabulation of a list of 741 "counter-revolutionaries" sentenced to death or imprisonment in a Chinese city last July reVeals the names of only two women and discloses that the great majority of the men were over 30. (C FDD U-1521, 24 Oct 51)
Pommenti This general breakdown for all areas has been assumed but not previously proved. Men under 30 and women of all ages have had

TOP SECRET
5
9 Nov 51
'ApproveralPor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79M146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
relatively little opportunity to sin, as defined by the Communists, and Peiping is far more concerned with gaining the support of youth than of the comparatively unrnalleable adult population. Dalai Lama pave tribute to Chinese forces occuoving Tibet: On 5 November a representative of the Dalai Lama of Tibet formally greeted General Chang Ching-wu, top Chinese Communist official in Lhasa, and two officers commanding the Chinese occupation forces, and presented to them on behalf of the Dalai Lama 100 sacks of rice and 10,000 taels of Tibetan silver as a groceries fund for the Chinese troops. The presentation message from the Dalai Lama acclaimed the arrival of the Chinese troops and stated "I am happy because they have come here to consolidate national defense and create happiness and prosperity for the Buddhist people of Tibet." (U FBID Peiping, 8 Nov 51)
Comment: Now that Lhasa is securely occupied by Chinese Communist troops and the Tibetan regime has publicly endorsed the Sino-Tibetan agreement of May 1951, the Dalai Lama will be exploited for his propaganda value.
9.
10.
25X1A
1,Lleua2alsn_attemata_revival of his tbird force movement: Li Tsungjen, a leader of one of the third force movements and Vice President of the Chinese Nationalist Government, now living in New York, is attempting to launch a comeback into Nationalist politics. One source reports that Li has been attempting to rally support among former Chinese leaders now living as political refugees in the US, while another reveals that he has been in contact with a Japanese Liberal Party Leader.

TOP SECRET
6
25X1A
Other sources have reported that after the entry of the US Comment: into the Korean war, anti-Chiang and anti-Communist elements were convinced that the time was propitious for a revival of the third force. These elements allegedly felt that the US was now committed to military action against the Communists while at the same time being anti-Chiang.
11.
South Korean delegation to seeklOK admission to the UN: Ambassador Muccio reports the departure from Pusan on 6 November of a ROK delegation of observers to the General Assembly in Paris. The delegation'is headed by Prime Minister Chang, who announced that at the Assembly session the group will seek to seotre the unification of Korea, UN assistance for Korea's economic rehabilitation and ROK admission to the UN.
KOREA.
Li Tsung-jen's.retiring to the US after the collapse of the Nationalist Government on the mainland has reportedly lost him the respect of a great number of anti-Communist Chinese who do not support Chiang Kai-shek.
9 Nov 51
Approved Wr Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79TOS6A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
President Rhee said that another objective is the "rapid liquidation Of the Korean Government's loan to the UN Forces." Rhee further inetructed the observers to give "Strontwarning" against any future Japanese ambitions towards Korea. (u Pusan 409, 6 Nov 51)
Comment: ROK motives in sending such ranking figures to the General Assembly in the capacity of mere observers are n6t clear in view of Korea's internal situation, Soviet objections to.ROK admission to the UN and the lukewarm attitude of several western nations towards the inclusion of the South Koreans. The ROK Government has always displayed great respect for the UN, and the:make-up of the delegation tey be designed to make an preesion.
12.
Possible indtoator of deteriorating co3loe svetem noted in North Amiss Radio Pyongyang ot 7 November broadcast an ordinance of the PraesidiuM of the Supreme People's Assembly which makes the assignment, sale or wearing of the regime's decorations and medals by unqualified persons a
criminal offense, punishable by two or three years-at hard labor. Ticker, 8 Nov 51)
(R FBID
Ighonts The necessity for Radio Pyongyang tO broadcast instructions of so' picayune a nature and the rash of "unlawful" dealings in medals are possible indioators of the breakdosim of police communications and controls.
13.
Qmments Pak is the second North Korean Government official of oabinet or vioe-oabinet rank who hal reportedly died in aotion during the course of the war.
14. IMAN.
ShabithahajahajauterSeinjauations Radio Pyongyang on 7 November broadcast the speech of Vioe Premier Pak Hun-yung at a memorial serviCe for Pak Tong-oho. Pak Tong-cho became vice minister of Foreign Affairs when the Government of the Demooratio Peoplete Republic of Korea was formed on 9 SepteMber 1948. No details were given of the death of Pak, 4 man of about 38, other than the.statement that he "died in aotion." (R IBID Ticker, 8 Nov 51),
:4;41; S.
Reserve Force.

00:1
The announced Objectives of Rhea and the Premier are largely for domestio consumption. However, the inclusion of a "warning" on Japanese intentione,at a time when rather delicate negotiations are in progress between the Japanese and South Koreans, is a typical.display of the ROK's lack of diplomatic savoir-faire.
-OA I
IL:
On 8 November the chief of the National Polioe Reserve told

TOP SECRET
7
9 Nov 51

TOP SECRET
NW'
NNW
the press that his government is working on a plan whereby the strength of this force will be doubled--to approximately 150,000 men--"after the peace treaty comes into force." He stated further that training of this 'force will "then be according to the traditional Japanese training methods, although Berne American officers will be retained as advisers." (R FBID Ticker, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Although the Japanese Government has indicated its intention to strengthen its internal security force, this is the-first time that the contemplated size has been disclosed. It is presumed that many of the recently depurged former Japanese military officers will assume staff and command functions. There has been some criticism among former military officers of the current American-style training and the lack of military background of the present Police Force leadere.
15.
Japanese Government gives up plan to decontrol ;ices The Japanese Government's plan to decontrol rice on 1 April 1952 has been abolished, according to a Japanese "official statement" of 6 November. This announcement followed a series of conferences between Japanese cabinet officials and Joseph M. Dodge, SOAP financial adviser. (U FBID, 7 Nov 51)
.
Comment: Despite the social consequences whioh would result from removal of rioe from ration and price control while it is still in short supply, the government has been determined to decontrol rice in keeping with the Liberal Party's philosophy of a free economy. Minister Dodge, upon his arrival in Japan last month, sharply criticized this planned action, as well as the government's plan to reduce taxes, because of inflationary effects.

TOP SECRET
8
9 Nov 51
Approverror ReleastSpOge : CIA-RDP79T11046A000500220001-3

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Smi
1.
GERMANY-AUSTRIA. Control regulations hamper Austro-German,trade relations: A German businessman having'close contact with German trade officials has recently reported that the German Government is rapidly losing interest in the development of trade relations with Austria. This decline in interest is allegedly attributable in part .to the fact that German export quotas envisaged under the current trade agreement are in some cases already exhausted by old orders which have 'not yet been filled.
A far more serious complication arises out of German fears that a large proportion of goods exported to Austria are disappearing into undesirable channels. In an effort to conttol this diversion, the German Export Committee issued a circular last August providing that future applications for exports to Austria would be accepted and processed only after Austrian authorities had allotted an import license number confirming that the goods involved would remain in Austria. Since receipt of the Austrian license is frequently delayed for periods up to three months,. German exporters are unwilling to hold their goods for Austrian shipments that are not puarantepd n ultimate authorization.
1
25X1A
Comment: Inasmuch as West Germanyis Austria's best customer, obstacles to the development of Austro-German trade are a serious matter for the Ahstrian Republic. Austrian exports to Germany were severely curtailed earlier this year by German import restrictions, and did nut recover until mid-year.
It is well-known that Austria has a special problem in controlling the diversion of imports to Satellite or Soviet users. complicated system of Austrian and Allied controls in Vienna is believed to have been of some effectiveness in restricting illegal diversion of Austrian imports into East-West trade channels.
The Austrian Government is endeavoring to devise a simplification of its present highly political import-expert licensing system.
2.
FRANCE. French attempt to stop attacks on US in Morocco: The US Embassy in Paris has found. the French ForeigeOfrice "highly embarrassed" by recent anti-American outbursts of theResident General in Morocco. He has been inatructed to cease making exaggerated Statements unfriendly to United States representatives and to keep the Moroccan press in line. (C Paris 2698, 7 Nov 51)
TOP SECRET.
9 Nov 51
Approvetrfor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP791W146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
Comment: The French-language press in Morocco has been conducting an intensive campaign to discredit American diplomatic representatives there. Remarks critical of their conduct, made by the Resident General at a private gathering, have received wide circulation, as have his threats to ask for the recall of the American Consul at Rabat. In line with the Foreign Office's directive, the attacks against the US can be expected to decrease.
3.
A drastic curtailment of French dollar imports would ,undoubtedly lead to a large increase in imports from other areas, including EPU countries, and hence to a worsening French position within the.Union. A steady deterioration in that position since last spring, a widening dollar import-export gap, and the increasing threat to the stability of the franc are now leading the French Government to question the practicability of the import program it has been promoting in an effort to halt inflation.
1
Comment:
4.
NETHERLANDS. Dutch lack of equipment may delay fulfillment of armed forces commitment: The Dutch GOvernment has expressed concern that it may nut be able to deliver the two divisions and corps troops promised fur the.SHAPE maneuvers in September 1952. Because of the delays in the receipt O.f US military equipment, the Dutch Defense Ministry will apparently have to either get higher-delivery rates or else slow down the conscription program. The government, feeling. that the September deadline is the "moment of greatest. danger," is adamant, in demanding that any.Dutch force which participates in the maneuvers be fully equipped for combat. ( S The Hague 437, 3 Nov 51)

TOP SECREI.
French import policy chanRe may weaken the European Payments Union: The French representative on the managing board of the European Payments Union fears "regrettable effects" on the Payments Union as a result of the uncertainty over the French dollar position, which may force drastic cuts in France's dollar import program. While the French Payments Union position is difficult, the representative believesthat recent unusually large monthly deficits are'due not only to the increased import program, but also t- speculation which has exaggerated inflationary tendencies. (S Paris REPTO 5545, 5 Nov 51)
.
10
9 Nov 51
'ApprOalrForFtelease 2002/05/20
ClAARDP79I1146A000500220001-3
TOP SECRET
Since spring, Dutch military leaders have stated that Comment: failure to receive U$ military equipment on schedule could lead to a temporary set-back in the Dutch defense effort.
Insistence on fully equipped troops,actually under arms represents a departure in Dutch policy from military preparedness'on a readily mobilizable basis. Such a change in policy was recommended by SHAPE and was probably taken to improve the serious morale problem of the armed forces.
25X1A
The Italian objections to the French general are based on the fact that he is to be promoted shortly te a rank superior to that of anv Italian offider now on Carney's ataff.1

. .
Italians want to retain comman0 of Sputhern European Land ITALY. Forces: General Marras, Italian Chief ef Staff for Defense; is concerned with the "command implications" of the admission of Greece into.the Atlantic Pact and the nomination of 4 French general as assistant to Admiral Carney, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern'Europe. Marras and Defense Minister Pacciardi are in agreement.that the present Italian command of the Southern Land Forces must be 'maintained regardless of the possible geographical expansion of this command.
To data no decision has.been made as to which. Comment: territorial command Greece or Turkey will Come under when they are admitted to NATO. Both Greece and Turkey want to come under SHAPE, tut neither of them Would relish an Italian gennral as Commander in Chief of the Southern Land Forces.
6.
25X1A
25X1
Eden's statement, following closely upon a similar statement of the British Ambassador to a high Foreign Office official in Rome, has had a great effect on the Italian Foreign Office. It is believed
Italians discouraged by British reaction to their Egyptian mediation offer. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden has told the Italian Ambassador in London that the UK cannot tolerate acceptance of the principle of unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and that it is up to the Egyptians to indicate whether they will accept US proposals for a new treaty.
(For critical security reasons this report is not
TOF SECREI
NOY 51
Approved Ftr Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01'14000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
to be further transmitted Within the United States, nor beyond the borders of the United States, without the express permission of the teleasing office.)
Comment: Eden's statement represents established in the Egyptian dispute. UK policy
Since this dispute may be considered at the current session of the General Assembly, it seems probable that the Italians desist from further mediation offers will for the time being.
7.
The Embassy comments that there has been and may still be some entirely unofficial communication between the two general staffs, in which the question of Spanish admission It doubts, however, that any invitation to'NATO may have arisen. for staff talks was issued as such action would be tantamount to open defiance of officcal French Government policy and would scarcely be risked by the French General Staff which has shied away from politics scandal. since the Revers (S Paris 2588, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: Despite recent signs which Spanish interpreted as evidence of officials have a softening attitude, the French Government is not likely to alter drastically its policy toward Spain, While Franco aesires a rapprochement between Spain and France and Britain for reasons of prestige, he is believed to prefer bilateral military a arrangement with the US to membership in NATO.
8,
Franco replies to Don Juan's letter: The Spanish Pretender has told an official of the US Embassy in Lisbon that, about 3 October, he received a long reply to his letter of 10 July to Franco. opposition Comite de Coordinacion The has also informed the US Embassy in Madrid of Franco's reply. (S Madrid Joint'Weeka No. 42, 26 Oct 51)
Conment: Available information on the contents of Franco's letter is scanty and inconclusive. Apparently Franco is still interested in reaching an understanding with Don Juan.

TOP SECREI
12
SPAIN. French deny alleoed approach to S anish General Staff: A French Army General Staff officer has denied, to the US Embassy in Paris, a Madrid report that the French General Staff had invited the Spanish High General Staff to discuss the possibility of Spain's entrance into NATO. The Spanish Military Attache in Paris has expressed disbelief of the report.
Presumably,
9 Nov 51
Approved ForRMease 2002/05/20 : CIA4RDP79101146A000500220001-3
Approvettor Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79W146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
he still hopes that he can induce Don Juan to renounce his rights to the throne, and that he will then be able to establish himself as regent for the Pretender's minor son, Juan Carlos. There is no indication that Don Juan would accept these terms.
25X1C
96
25X1A
UNITED KINGDOM. Churchill reportedly sends messaRe to Shvernik: Winston Churchill has sent a special message to Nikolai Shvernik, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to a 1 When Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the new British Ambassador to Moscow, presented his credentials on 2 November he insisted on a personal conversation with Shvernik so that he could deliver the message. (For critical security reasons this report is not to be further transmitted within the United States or beyond the borders of the United States without the express permission of the releasing office.)
1 1
25X1A
Comment: Although the subject of the reportedmessage is not known, Churchill has repeatedly advocated talks "on the highest level" in an endeavor to lessen East-West tensions. There is no other available information suggesting that the has directly proposed such talks to the Soviet Union.
10.
Spy trial discredits Communists: The disclosure that a 'fanatic "ultra-Red" SWedish noncommissioned naval officer has transmitted vital security information (see OCI Daily Digest, 1 Nov 51) to Soviet Embassy personnel has aroused bitter indignation against the Swedish Communist Party. This indignation is especially marked in labor circles, whose earlier objections to "discrimination" against Communists employed in sensitive jobs now appears to be rapidly dwindling in the realization of the need for drastic action against bad security risks. (R Stockholm 611, 7 Nov 51)
.SWEDEN.
domment: Labor has previously reo4iized the general need for security measures but has held that to consider membership in the Communist party as an indication of unreliability ia pushing one's zeal for security too far. In July, for example, the Swedish trade union of .defense wOrkers protested against the Defense Minister's ordering the dismissal of a Communist sympathizer tram his position in a torpedo plant (see OCI Daily Digest, 10 July 51). The sensational espionage trial may well dispel labor's excessive coneern for civil rights and will hasten the adoption of stringent securitY regulations.
TOP SECRET
13
9 Nov 51
25X1

ApprolietFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79*1146A000500220001-3
TOP SECRET
9 November 1951
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET
Approwf For Release 2002(05120 : CIA-RDP791111146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
Deputy USSR protest border violation by US plane in Far East: the US Charge in 7 Novel-I:ter proteated to Foreign Minister Gremyke-on border by a US Moscow concerning an alleged air violation of the-USSRIs The US Charge plane in the area of Cape Ostrovnaya east of Vladivostok. under the United US planes in the area were maintained that inasmuch as all but only as a accept the note as a protest Nations Command, he could not (C S/S Moscow 801, of the US Government. statement of fact for information 7 Nov 51)
USSR.
2.
non-interference in impendingitalo TRIESTE. US Department of Statefavors The Department of State believes that at Yugoslav negotiations on Trieste: in any Italo the present time the US and Britain should avoid involvement It considers that the US should Yugoslav negotiations concerning Trieste: negotiations allow time for the Italians and Yugoslays to begin direct before undertaking any further action, assuming that the two governments party assistance should the need arise.
will not hesitate to invite third
In addition, the British Foreign Office has been informed by the in Rome Italians that the Italian Foreign Office told the Yugoslav Minister (S S/S to London that'Italy was prepared to enter into direct negotiations. 2390, 5 Nov 51; to Paris 2737, 6 Nov 51)
3.
this agency, to be concerned Comment: Plans for the establishment of primarily with matters of trade, were under way prior to the peace treaty opening, conference; the Japanese Government, however, deliberately delayed for fear of jeopardizing acceptance the agency until the treaty was signed of the treaty by countries recognizing Communist China. Premier Yoshida has repeatedly stated that the establishment of the agenoy has. no'political implications. In an attempt to emphasize this, such an Yoshida asserted that Japan would be eqUally willing to establish TOP SECRET
The Japanese in Formosa: CHINA/JAPAN. Japanese Overseas Agency to open to open with the arrival, in late Overseas.Agency in Taipei is expected (C s/p Taipei 594, 7 Nov 51) Noverber, of the chief, Kimura Shiroshichi.

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
generally the same Comment: The'Soviet note gate the violation plane inaident, particularly in stating treatment as the APril 1950 Baltie forced to open return fire, after which the that "the Soviet airplanee Were the direction of the sea and disappeared." American airplane went off in
9 Nov 51
APproalleFor Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79S4146A000500220001-3

TOP SECRET
agency in Shanphat: he intimated, however, that he would reject a reciprocal opening of any similar agency in Japan by the Chinese Communists:
4.
Comment: Unofficial reparations claims advanced by the Philippines during the peace treaty negotiations amounted to 8 billion dollars, a sum approximately five times Japan's annual national budget. Elizalde's objective view of the problem gives some hope that satisfactory arranL.., ments can be worked out when the subject can, to a degree, be removeL Qfll Philippine politics after the elections this month.

TOP SECRET
2
Philippine official takes realistic stand on Japanese reparations problem: Ambassador Elizalde, Philippine diplomat who has been in Tokyo investigating Japan's capacity to pay reparations to the Philippines, has concluded that his country's demands for reparations are fantastio, and that Japan can hardly stand one-tenth of what the Filipinos expect. In a conversation with the US'Political Adviser in Tokyo, Elizalde also indicated that he would advise Prsident Quirino to send a mission to Japan in January to conclude's. reparations agreement covering only 3 to 4 years, after which the problem sheUld be 'considered closed. He intends to propose, as a first-step to demonstrate geed faith, that Japan undertake to salvage ships sunk in Manila Bay. Elizalde also expressed the opinion that trade promoted by a commercial treaty would he of more mutmel .benefit than reparations over a long period. (C S/S Tokyo 943, 7 Nov 51)
JAPAVPHILIPPINES:
9 Nov 51
HR70-14 HR70-14
--TtIP-SECRET-SUEDe49P-SEGREIT-euEDE-
NR
7. 7.
Chinese island: Chinese Communist Communist bombers b o m ~ e r sattack _ a _ t l t aUN-held ok.~-hel island8 d Nine TU-2 ight TU-2 l light bomber,h e Chine-se-Mix-Fulist Chinese Communist g t x Air-Division A i r T i v i s i o n were acheduled o f ly bomberr, of of t the 8TE scheduled t to fly from Muicden &kcden t to o Antung Antung at at noon noon on 6 November. F r i e n d l y sources report report Friendly t h a t four f o u r hours that hours later l a t e r UN-held UN-held Tando Island I s l a n d (50 m miles i l e s southeast s o u t h e a s t of' of Antung) Antung) was w&s bomind bombcd by by eleven eleven twin-engine twin-engine aircraft. airoraft. (SUEDE Air Air Force Roundup 236, Roundup 236, 2130Z 21302 7 7 Nov; Nov; US A Air i r Force Japan CM IN I N 51692, 51692, 8 Nov 51)
Comment: Tando and and other o t h e r UN-held UN-held islands i s l a n d s have have been been previously previously Comments bombed conventional b o m b eby mn v e n t i o n a l ground-attack ground-attack aircraft. aircraft
r e p o r t s strongly s t r o n g l y suggest suggest that t h a t the the Chinese Chinese Communists CommFists These two reports have begun begun operational o p e r a t i o n a l use use of of TU-2 TU-2 light l i g h t bombers bombers in i nKr,rea. Knrea. During t h e Communists considerably c o n s i d e r a b l y increased increased t h e i r TU-2 trength i n October the their TU-2 s strength in Manchuria, a recent r e c e n t conferenoe oonforence at a t Antung Antung attended a t t e n d e d by t the h e oommanders commanders and a Manchuria, and of o f two two Chinese Chinese Communist Communist light l i g h t bomber bomber divisions d i v i s i o n s suggested suggested that t h a t plans p l a n s for for the t h e operational o p e r a t i o n a l use of of bombers in in t the h e Korean war wtr were wsre being being considered. considered.
/NR
-TO.P-SECRET-SUEDE-
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
&
top SECIIET SUEDE
l 3 Nov 51 61 13
-bb
55
HR70-14
a
W
ItA4-1%/51 caz.
COIWUKCST N KOREA COMMUNIST INTENTIONS INTENTIONS I IN

. I
no f firm indications of In0 i r m indications of ultimate Communist i n t e n t i o n s regarding a a oease-fire n Korea. he the intentions oease-fire i in Korea. Although t enemyfa conduct of o f cease-fire cease-fire negotiations i s propaganda have enemy's negotiations and h his recently that the h e cessation cessation r e o e n t l y suggested an expectation t h a t an agreement on t of o s t i l i t i e s Kill eventually be reached, i s pronounoements continue of h hostilities will eVentually reached, h his pronouncements continue t o sttike s t r i k e a balanoe between conciliatory oonoiliatory and b e l l i g e r e n t themes. to balanoe.between belligerent themes. MewMeanwhile, a military position while, a oontinuing continuing improvement improvement of o f the t h e enemy's enemy's milikary p o s i t i o n in in observed. Korea and contiguous areas has been observed. the the spring 8pring of 1951 1961 t h e stated s t a t e d objective of Communist Comunist forces was wa8 the the forcible f o r o i b l e expulsion expulsion of o f UN UN troops from all all. of o f Korea. Korea. This Thie p o s i t i o n had position ceased to be made explitit e x p l i o i t some some weeks weeks prior p r i o r to t o Malik's MaLikls tease-fire oease-fire proproceased bemade posal of late l a t e June June 1951, 1951, and and has not n o t been stated a t a t e d categorically oategorioally since, sinoe, remains t the h e Cornmist Communist long-range long-range ob objective. jeotive. although it presumably remains
ROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE i 1APP ~PPR OVED FOR
I DATE: 19-Feb-2010 1 IDATE: 19-Feb-2010
most nearly reliable r e l i a b l e gauge gauge of o f Communist Comuniat intentions i n t e n t i o n s in in Korea Korea has h a The moot been the t h e prevailing p r e v a i l i n g tenor tenor of of their t h e i r propaganda propaganda which has attempted attempted alteraltarn a t e l y to t o prepare prepare for f o r either e i t h e r successful suocessful negotiations negotiations and and a a cessation oessation of of nately military m i l i t a r y operations operations or o r failure f a i l u r e of of negotiations negotiations and and a a prolonged prolonged conflict. confliot, mont; of-the of t h e past p a s t month, enemy enemy propaganda propaganda has has emphasized.the emphasized t h e first first For most p o s s i b i l i t y , attempting attempting to t o prove prove that t h a t Communist Communist forces foroes haive ha,vs a ttained possibility, attained t h e i r objectives objeotives in i n Korea, Korea, that t h a t the their the US U S has ha6 suffered suPferad an a n unprecedented unprecedented defeat, t h a t the t h e battle-lines b a t t l e - l i n e s are in i n the the vicinity d . c i n i t y of o f the t h e 38th 38th Parallel, Parallel, defeat, that t h a t there t h e r e are a r e no no insuperable insuperable obstacles to t o successful successful negotiations. negotiations. and that
A t the the same 8 m e time, t i m e , Mao Ma0 Tse-tung Tee-tung and and Chou Chou En-lai En-lai have have asserted asserted that that At Peiping's Peiping'a offer o f f e r to t o settle s e t t l e the t h e Korean question question b by y peaceful means "still "stil1 holds good," good,'' but have cautioned cautioned that t h a t support support for f o r the t h e "long-term mlong-Cerm struggle" struggle" holda oomplex problem of of 4 a Thua, even w e n if +she is the the complex i s still still t h e "tentral " c e n t r a l task." Thus, tease-fire oeasa-fire is is iesolved, resolved, subsequent subsequent negotiations may may see see the t h e reaffirmareaffirmat i o n of of the t h e enemy's enemy's original o r i g i n a l objectives. objeotives. tion
r e c e n t l y stated lrtated that that Chinese Chinese Ranking Rankin Chinese Communist leaders have recently "volunteerR pi would would not not have have been been dispatohed diepatohed to t o Korea Korea if i f the t h e US U S had had not not "volunteers" and "oooupied" ft 000upied" Formosa,"invaded" "invaded"Korea, Korea, and and pushed pushed toward toward Manchuria, Manchuria, and Formosa, objeotlve in. in Korea he t errit h a t Peiping's Peiping'a objective that Korea remains remains thak that of of defending t the terriMore ominously, ominously, Soviet soviet Foreign Minister torial o f China. China, More t o r i a l integrity i n t e g r i t y of Foreign Minister Vyshinsky at at the t h e Paris Paris UN UN mseting meeting has ha0 again again put put forth f o r t h unacceptable unaoceptable proproposals regarding regarding the %he38th 38th Parallel P a r a l l e l and and withdrawal withdrawal of of foreign foreign ttoops troops as 88 posals .part of B a Korean peate statemonts clearly d e a r l y permit renewal renewal p a r t of peaoe plan. plan. These statements of of t the h e earlier e a r l i e r explicit e x p l i c i t demand for f o r abandonment by the US of its i t s policy policy o f "neutralization' of of Formosa Formosa and for f o r withdrawal of of all all foreign troops troops of."neutralization" from from Korea. Korea.
TOP I
SECRET SUEDE
F From r o mthe t h e date of of Chinese Communist Communist intervention i n t e r v e n t i o n in i n Korea until until
Amblguous bnb3 posts politioal p o l i t i c a l indications indications of of a a desire deoire for f o r an an armistice armistice have have military not been refleoted r e f l a o t e d in i n Communist m i l i t a r y aotivity, a c t i d t y , with their t h e i r air a i r and ground forces continuing to their t o improve t h e i r capabilities. capabilities. The major--and major--and possibly t the h e most decisive--improvement decisive--improvement in i n the Communist strength has been in in t h e i r air a i r potential. potential. Enemy b s m y air air a ctivhy Communist their activity over North Korea expanded during where during 1951 1961 and has now now reached a point where e f f e c t i v e UN UN superiority s u p e r i o r i t y over oyer northwestern northwestern Korea Korea has has been denied. denied. Thspe effective There has also also been been a a decided deoided improvement improvement in in pilot p i l o t ability. a b i l i t y . Chinese pilots pilots has have been previously carried been noticed supplementing supplementing Soviet personnel personnel who previously oarried t h e main burden o the of f enemy air combat. combat. An An effective e f f e o t i v e air a i r defense defense system system now exists e x i s t s in i n northwestern Korea including inoluding daylight jet jet interceptors, interceptors, naw interoeptors, probably probably utilizing u t i l i z i n g radar, radar, radar radar directed direotod antiaircraft antiaircraft night interceptors, artillery, warning ground-controlled a r t i l l e r y , and an integrated early e a r l y warning ground-controlled intercept interoept t an all-time radar net. net. Communist air atrength strength in Manchuria Manchuria is a at all-time high with with about about 500 600 MIG-15 MIG-15 jet j e t aircraft, a i r c r a f t , and and enemy enemy jets j e t e have havs recently r e c e n t l y begun begun Active preparations to t o base baae operations from a Korean operatione Korean border border a airfield. i r f i e l d . Activepreparations aircraft aircraft, at a t other o t h e r operational operational Korean airfields a i r f i e l d s continue. oontinuo.
Communist troop strength s t r e n g t h has been maintained at a t about t h e maximum maximum Communist the which which pan can be be logistically l o g i s t i c a l l y supported, supported, and and new new units u n i t s have have Appeared appeared since since the t h e cease-fire oease-fire talks t a l k s began, began, The e n q y ha8 o o'vercome enegy has attempted tto overcome his deoided n f e r i o r i t y in i n weapons and firepower by introduoing decided i inferiority introducing heavier equipment. At A t the t h e time time of of the t h e Chinese Chinese intervention, intervention, he had no no effeotive effeotive equipment. annored fdree,but fdroe, but three t h r e e armored armored divisiens divieiBns--partially i t h ttanks anks arnored - -partially equipped equipped w with -34- -are now now docepted iocepted i in Korea. Firepower n Korea, Firepower heavier than t h a n the t h e familiar f e n d l i a r TT-54-are has also abo'b e e n increased by the the a d d i t i o n of of a Chinese Communist Communiet anti-tank anti-tank been addition diviaioil, and by a divisioh, a considerable inorease in i n organic North Korean divis i o n a l artillery. a r t i l l e r y . Four, o r possible five, five, Chinese Cammunist artillery Four, or Communist artillery sional divisions, possessing some conventional conven%ional rooket rocket weapons Weapons, a are re p presently r e s e n t l y in in divisions, aupport o f front f r o n t line l i n e troops. troopsm Antiaircraft o excreed Antiaircraf't strength, strength, eatimttted support of estimated t to exceed i s disposed disposed at at strategic a t r a t e g i a points points s i x Soviet-style antiairorafti divisions, divisions, is six Sovietstyle antiairoraft throughout CoMiunist Cornniunist held territory. territory.
All evidence evidence points points to to a a continuing aonbinuing adequate adequate supply supply situation s i t u a t i o n to to support current military operations. operation8 e Morale among ourrent 'military among the t h e enemy enemy forces f or088 varies v a r i e s from good good to t o excellent; excellent, with certain o e r t a i n exceptions among units that thati been heavily heavily engaged engaged during during the have been t h e past p a s t month. month.
m i l ethe t h oproblem problemof oflogistical l o g i s t i c a lsupport supportprobably probablyprevents prevent8the t h eintro i n t r oMile of additional a d d i t i o n a l Chinese Communist Comnunist elements, elementry, individual replacements replacements duotion of duotion oontinue t o maintain existing existing u n i t s at at o r near strength. strength. Major units unit6 to units or t h a t have have lost l o s t their their combat combat effectiveness effectiveness have have been been replaoed replaoed by by fresh fresh that u n i t e from from China China and and Manchuria. Manohuria. Chinese Comunist units etrength in i n Manchuria Manohuria Communist strength has been maintained at a t a fairly f a i r l y constant level and presumably is i s available availabb for f o r 'commitment commihent in in Korea Korea iin n tthe h e event event of of need. need. I bhe r a i n i n g by the the the re-equ pping-and pping and t training USSR Of of large l a r g e numbers of Chinese troops in i n Manchuria. Manchuria.
"Ita) SECRET-SUED
Although Although the t h e Soviet Boviet Union Union has has avoided avoided publicly publicly associating assooiating itself itself mith the cause iin Koreanwar--other warother than wlth t h e Communist cause n t the h e Korean than by by giving giving limited limited diplomatic and propaganda propaganda ssupportSoviet covert diplomatio and upport--so~et covert participation participation has inindreased oreased considerably oonsiderablrr during during the fhe summer s m e r and fall f a l l of o f 1951. 1961. It has included the t h e continuous oontinuous supplying supplying of of war war material material and and of o f large large numbers nmhbers of of Soviet soviet military FECOM at a t 20,000, 20,000, serving serving in in m i l i t a r y personnel, peraonnel, tentatively t e n t a t i v e l y estimated estimated by by FECOM i n rear r e a r areas. areas. The effect e f f e c t has been both technical t e c h n i c a l and and oombat oombat capaoities capaoities in both t o bolster bo l a t e r Communist Communist technical teohnia a1 oapabilities. o apabilit i e s * to There continues t o be no evidence, evidence, however, however, that t h a t the Soviet Soviet Union Union continues to plans to t o employ employ its i t s considerable considerable Far Far Eastern Eastern military m i l i t a r y forces foroes 'openly openly in in I n the t h e event event of of such such intervention, intervention, the Russians Ruasians could could commit commit up up Korea. In Korea. to t o ensure ensure Communist Communlet t o 15 15 infantrY i n f a n t r y divisions divieions and and sufficient s u f f i c i e n t air a i r power power to offensive o oapability in i s increasing its offensive apability i n the the a i r supremacy. supremaoy. The USSR is air Far F a r East East by by the t h e conversion conversion of o f conventional conventional fighter f i g h t e r air a i r regiments regiments to t o high high performance jet Jet fighters. fighters. performance All A l l current current; indications indications point point to to a a oontinued continued strong strong enemy enemy defense defense to be Communists are a r e believed t o b e preparing a a series s e r i e s of o f defendefeni n depth. depth. The Communists in In sive the Wonsan-Pyongyang line. fax north as a8 t h e WonsawPyongyang line. s i v e positions positdons extending extending as as far western western Korea, Korea, they,retain they,retain a a considerable oonsiderable offensive offensive potential, p o t e n t i a l , supported supported hoWever, recent UN UN iinterdiotion of supply l lines by armor armor and and artiller3i4 artilleryj h o b v e r , recant n t e r d i c t i o n of ines has resulted r e s u l t e d in i n some some deterioration d e t e r i o r a t i o n of o f this t h i s potential. potential. There are are no no indiindioations, however, aations, however, that t h a t offensive aotion, action, other than limited limitod defensive counter and the in t h e near future, future, and spoiling attaoks, attaoks, will be launched in
.
D
143PSESEETSUEDB-
HR70-14
. " RNR
11. JCOREA, 1 1 , KOREA.
Arta i identified on western wsstern s seourity dutv Chinese Communist Comnunist 40th.-E A d e n t i f i e d on e o u r i t y dutxt 137eliminary tranilation an 8 lifovemTer November -~rYan w i m i n a r y field field t r a n s l & i o n oofen North Korean messam message reveals revealcr that t h a t the the Chinese Ohinese Communist Communist foroes foroes sent sent into i n t o western western HWanghae Hwanghae provinoe provinoe to t o engage engage UN UN guerillas g u e r i l l a s and and for f o r ooastal ooaatal seourity s e o u r i t y purposes purposes were were Xorth Korean Korean elemsnts message, from an an unidentified unidentified North elements of o f the the 40th 40th Army. Army. The message, battalion that left defense defense m sector b a t 6 a l i o n oommander, oomander, reports reports t h a t "information "Information on the lef't otor of the of t h e reoonnaissance reoonnaiesanoe group group has has been been Verbally verbally turned turned over over to t o the t h e 40th 40th Army 51) (SUEDE CM IN 56469, 58469, 11 11 Nov 51) Army of of the t h e Volunteer Volunteer forces." foroes."
Comments , Comment8 The southward douthward deployment deployment of of this t h i s Chinese Communist Communiet Army, Army, f o r m e m s a r i w o n coupled , qoupled with the eastwardmovement movementof o f major major elements e1ement.a formeT5riSariwon, vith the eastward of o f the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 3rd 3rd Composite Composite Army Army Group Group into i n t o the t h e central c e n t r a l eector, seotor, materially m a t e r i a l l y redUoes reduoes known known Communist Communist reserves reaerve8 for for offensive offensive action a o t i o n in i n the the western western sector. seo13or.
.

-TOPSECRETSUEDE6 6
14 NOT 51
FOR RELEASE
TE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010 AVPPROVED
OP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
,111*IR NR
U. 1 1 .
.More MIG -15'sfl fly from from P Port Arthur naval naval baso base aren area to AntunL: NineNineMore MIG-E's o r t Arthur t o Antun&: t e e n Soviet Boviet 1IG-15's MIG-~ 5's left %ft %brt Arthur for f o r Antung Antung on 1 2 N o v e z (SUEDE teen /4'ort Arthur on-12 NoveiST--.n (SUEDE Air A i r Force Force Roundup Roundup 239, 239, 2115Z, 21162, 13 13 Nov Nov 51) 61)
. I
In e a r l y October Ootober there were flights f l i g h t 8 of of 30 30 to fo 45 45 MIG-15's MSG-X10 Comment: early Cornenti In from u a i r f i e l d , i n the t h e Port Port Arthur Arthur naval naval base baso 'area 'h.rea t o the tho combat comba-b Chinohou airfield.in to f ield a t Antung, h e r e was l i g h t of en 1 l I b l S ' s from field at Antung, and t there was a sohoduled scheduled f flight of tten MIG-15's from the the USSR USSR to t o Port Port Arthur, Arthur, possibly possibly to t o replace replace or o r supplement supplement the the ones ones which previously left loft Chinchou. Ohinchou. whioh
to or Arthur area area were were of Soviet 8oviot jet j e t fighters fighters t o o r from tthe h e Port Arthur Flights of These meesagos appear to t o oonfirm oonfirm that t h a t Soviet S o v i e t MIG-15's MTG-15's messages appear r a r e before before October. October. These rare been based at a t Port P o r t Arthur and are being committed o combat n have been committed tto combat iin Korea. Korea.
12. 1 2 .
KOREA. KOREA. Commurdst Ground-air liaison l i a i s o n signal signal Communist ground-air ground-air lialsonSOP.setas ---.lia&son8OP .- ... s e t up8 Ground-air operations proCedure procedure (SOP, (8OP) was was the the SubjeCt eubject of of three during operations three Communist CoMmunist messages messages - during e a r l y November, aocordio6 aococuug to early t o preliminary prelirmntiry field field translations. translations
of 33 and and99November-one Novemberone of Two Two Nortl, N o r t h Rn-ean messaees, measaeea of of whioh whioh probably probablv waa originated by by a.brigade a brigade on on west w e e t coast ooaat seourity seourity duty--designated duty-deeignated two was originated
different d i f f e r e n t SOP's SOP'S for f o r ground-air ground-air liaison U a f s o n activity. activity.

--
--
A A5 5 November November Chinese Chinese
RET SUEDE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE. ,DATE. 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
TOP SECRgT SUEDE

L
15 Nov 51
n7) 5s
'
Toz:R SECRET SUED&

-TOP-ElEe RET-euEDE-
Communist message message e i g n a l ' is needed needed signal' 10 Nbv; 10 Novj 52234, 52234, 10 10
Comments Comenta coincides with o o i n o m t h iSland i s l a n d off o f f the the
stated that "one oopy oopy o of 'Korean air-ground air-ground li liaison stated t h a t "one f 'Korean aisoa by t h e oommunications o'omunioations section." section." (SUEDE CM I N 52299, 62299, IN by the Nov; Novs 52951, 62951, 13 13 Nov NOV 51) 51)
interesting the period of of theae these SOP'S SOP's It is i n t e r e s t i n g tto o note tthat hat f h e period the bomber attack t he 8 6 November Communist TU-2 tu-2 bombor a t t a o k on on a a UN-held Urn-held northwestern northweatern Korean Korean coast. coast.
Of significance, however, haWever, i is fact air-ground U liaison Of greater g r e a t e r signiMcenoe, s tthe he f a o t tthat h a t air-ground aison maY be for for signals may f o r operational operational. use in i n Korea, Korea, rather r a t h e r than f o r training t r a i n i n g or or morale-raising surposes of morale-raising .purposes as as previously previously noted. noted. The preponderance o f enemy activity may have enoouraged jet a Q t i V i t y in ia northwestern Korea Korea nay enoouraged the t h e Communiststo Conrnunisteto attempt a t t q n p t the t h e use of o f ground ground attack a t t a o k and and bomber bomber aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n oombat combat against against VNheld positions UN-held p o s i t i o n s in In this t h i s area. area.
13. la
possibly from from tthe same North Another 13 13 'November'message, November message, possibly he e rne N o r t h Korean unit in i n the t h e Kaesong ICaesong area, a r e a , includes inaludes instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s fram from the t h e division d i v i s i o n commander oommander t o the t h e regimental commander commander that t h a t "the "the troop troop Should Bhould prepare prepare for f o r combat oombat and and to await t the (SUEDE US A Air Japan, CM I IN i r Force Japan, N 53009 and 53047, 63047, 14 14 h e order." order." Nov 51) 51) Comments It has become increasingly inoreasingly apparent, apparent, both in i n oommunications oomunicatiorus Commen-bt It intaland Communistpropaganda, propaganda, that that the the enemy enemy antioipates antioipates a EL UN UN inteiTEFEW and ini n Communist attack a t t a o k on on Katisong. Kaesongr The f ear t h a t "their " t h e i r (presUmably (presumably t h e ROK lst 1st Division's) Division's) fear that the duty is'to is * t o captUre c a p t u r e Kaesong Kaesong and and Yonbaek" Yonbaek" (the (the area a r e a west of o f Kaesong) Kaesong) proprobably has has been been caused oaused by by official o f f i o i a l ROK pronounceMents pronouncements on the importance bably importance %o to t h e Korean Korean people people of of these these "historio" " h i s t o r i c " locations. looatione. the

-T6P-eBefirk-SUEDE--
Communist units Qommuniet u n i t s in i n Kaesong b e s o n g area a r e a continue continue to t o fear f e a r UN UM capture aapture of o f that that cityra 13 govember mewage, apparently apparently repor1ing r e p o r t i n g the interinter3 %-mo ve m b e r Nbrth NorthKorean Koreanmbssage, rogation rogation of of a a captured oaptured South South Korean, Korean, states s t a t e s that t h a t "the "the 3rd 3rd battalion b a t t a l i o n perperMRn at ell they were were strong and w well sonnel are all.evil a11 e v i l men a t Kaesong Kaesong and and * . ; indoctrinated troops. Their duty is i a to t o oapture Kaesong Kaesong and Yonbaek Yonbaek area...." areaiann." i n d o c t r i n a t e d troops.
7 7
16 Nov 61 15 Nbv 51
Approve "tor Release 2002/05120 : ClA-RDP79*146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
15 November 1951
143
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFCEMATION
Approved For Release 2002(05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
Approv**or Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79111146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. M A. Menshikov replaced as Minister of Foreign Trades The 10 November issue of rravda announced the appointment of P. N. Kumykin as Minister of Foreign Trade. The position had been held since 1949 by M. A. Menshikov who at that time replaced Politburo member A. I. Mikoyan. According to the announcement Menshikov was simply tranaferred to other work. However, the US Embassy in Moscow believes that he may have been given new duties in connection with the organization of the International Economic Conference, now schdduled for Moscow in April.
Viewed in connection with the recent three way shuffle of function-. al organs within the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Menshikov's removal may have added significance, and at least reinforces the indications of changes in this Ministry. (R Moscow 817, 10 Nov 51)
Comments Evidence that thie Ministry has been undergoing readjustments for some time was noted inl 'that shakeups and arrests had occurred in.the Ministry of Foreign Trade involving personnel most frequently in contact with foreigners. However, until knowledge of Menshikov's new duties is obtained, it is impossible to determine whether his displacement represents a promotion or demotion.
2 5X1 C
From 1943 to 1956, Menshikov held various important posts in UNRRA, which gave him valuable experience and contacts for work connected with international economic organizations. While a temporary position in charge of the proposed April conference appears below Menshikov's stature, it is, of course, possible that the USSR hopes to use this conference to increase world resentment against US sponsored trade restrictions, and as the first step towards creating a permanent international trade organization to back up the Soviet claims of wish-. ing to promote increased East-West trade.
2.
Pravda asserts West's "act of sabotage" at UN General Assembly has Paris TASS correspondent, Yuri Zhukov, asserted in a Pravda article that after the "failure" of the West's "act of sabotage" to prevent the Soviet Union's armament proposal from being placed on the agenda, the USSR's concrete program for peace had compelled Western delegates "to send an SOS to Washington for further instructions."
failed:
Zhukov in summarizing the developments in the sessions to date attacked US "San Francisco tactics," and implied that "pressure tactics" will continue to fail because "Paris is not San Francisco" and because of the "aggravated internal contradictions in the camp of capitalism." He added that the "crazy aspirations for the establishment of a
TOP SECRET
15 Nov 51
ApproveWor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP791-1711146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
world-wide American empire spell no good," and warned that the Soviet Union's "broad program for the struggle against the threat of another world war forms the basis on which all proceedings of the session will have to develop." (R FHB:), 13 Nov 51)
Comment: The Soviet Union has already suffered a number of defeats in attempting to prevent UN General Assembly consideration of various Western proposals. The tone of propaganda comment on the Paris sessions and of Vyshinsky's attack on the Western disarmament plan reveals the sensitivity of the Kremlin to current Western diplomatic initiatives and the USSR's inability to prevent General Assembly consideration of proposals which the USSR opposes.
3.
Soviet occupation authorities in Austria tighten security: The Austrian Chancellor has confirmed reports that Soviet military authorities are in the process of discharging all Austrian civilian employees and replacing them with Soviet personnel.
Further indication of tightened security measures is reflected in the pending Soviet request that the three western powers vacate offices they now occupy in Hofburg Palace. The request will not be honored. The US High Commissioner in Vienna interprets these Soviet activities as (1) tightening security control, (2) further preventing fraternization of Soviet military with civilians, (3) possibly designed to conceal new moves, and (4) revealing the absence of any Soviet intention to leave Austria. (S to Vienna 1679, 9 Nov 51)
4.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Transfer of administrative employees is still incomplete: Prague radio has reported that as of October 20, 74,000 out of a planned total of 77,500 clerical workers had been transferred from administration into production. A minority of this group were said to have not"acquired a positive attitude toward production". (R FBID 8 Nov 51)
Comment: A government mission for the transfer of administrative employees was set up in June for the specific purpose of effecting the planned transfer. The transfer is an attempt to alleviate the shortage of productive manpower caused by increased production targets.

TOP SECRET
2 15 Nov 51 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-R0P79101146A000500250001-0
Approve*or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79Tt146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
PAKISTAN. Atomic researeh laboratorv to be established: According to an Associated Press item datelined Karachi, the Pakistani dovernment announced on 14 November that an atomic research laboratory is being set up in Lahore, Punjab.Province. The announcement states further orders have been placed with a Dutch firm for part of the equipment that for the laboratory which is expected to be completed late next year. (R News Ticker, Karachi, 14 Nov 51)
2.
Comment: By issuing such a statement, the BWPP clearly demonstrates its adherence to the Communist timetable for control of.Burma as expressed by Thakin Than Tun, leader of the BCP.
3.
Delegates to Peiping return: The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that four of the seven Burmese delegates to the 1 October celebrations in Peiping have returned. They have been unreserved in their praise of the Chinese Communist regime. The Embassy comments that the press has reacted favorably to these, Burmese, particularly totheir claims of religiOus freedom in China. (C Rangoon 457, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Since all the delegates to Peiping were pro-Communists, such statements were to be etpected. It is interesting to note that no concern hal yet been expressed regarding the whereabouts of the other three delegates. Two have been reported en route to Vienna via the Soviet Union.
4.
Violence might ArrpAA +11Qt ne +ha 1,11. "y coup attempt of'last June.
I
25X1C
Comment: This report is the latest of a series detailing tenSion between the army and police resulting from the rivalry for power between the Director'Oenetal of Police and the Assistant Commander in Chief of the Army. -Premier Phibun, whose position has been insecure since June, has been I Iplaying the two.against each,other in order to strengthen his authority. In this strained situation, an ihter7service clash is a continuing possibility.
25X1C 25X1A
THAILAND. Clash between Thai army and police predicted: An armed clash between' the Thai army and police force in the near future iii Predicled b

TOP SECRET
3
BURMA. BWPP hopea for "Treedom" within veer: During its 7 November rally, the pre-CoMMunist BWPP'expressed the hope that "'next year" Martha Would be "Tree from'exploitation by Fascist capitalists."' (C Rangoon 457, 9 Nov 51)
15 Nov 51
Approv4tFor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79S146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
25X1C
5
25X1C
25X1A
Preparations for Vjat_anbIttatek._regarteg: The Viet Minh is ito have begun recruitment of able-bodied men in several provinces of the Tonkin delta, an activity which is usually a prelude to an attack. Ithe chiefs of Viet Minh "sections" in Hanoi have been instructed to move into Hanoi from their present suburban locations, and that this order May indicate plans to coordinate a wave of violence within the city with attacks by regular Viet Minh forces throughout the delta.
I
INDOCHINA.
Comment: Recruiting of able-bodied men is a continuing Viet Minh_aotivity. .Any accelerated recruiting.at this time is probably more a measure of the heavy losses sustained by the Viet Minh during their unsuccesefnl October-operations than of their intention to launch an offensive through'out the delta.
The Viet Minh will probably attack some point or points on the French perimeter during the latter part of. November, but not in sufficient strength to threaten Hanoi seriously; The Viet Minh would hardly stage an UPrising in Hanoi unless it were strong enough to attempt an all-out attack on the French in Tonkin with a fair prospect of success.
6.
Pe Lattre sees end of Viet Minh by 1951: De Lattre told minister Heath that current French military operations in North Vietnam had proved very successful and would be followed promptly by other local offensives. He could not launch a large offensivo until mid-February 1952, when he will have completed his defense works in the Tonkin delta. De Lattre claimed to have 'received reliable reports that Viet Minh morale was declining, and he felt "utterly confident" that by the spring of 1953 the Viet Minh revolt will haie been stamped out. (S Saigon 1016, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: Viet Minh morale, is declining but it will not be stamped out until a popular and viable non-Communist government is established. It is very unlikely that this will have been accomplished by 1953. DeLattregs optimistic presentation may be an attempt to justify his return to France on the ground that his mission to destroy the Viet Minh is well on the way to being achieved.
INDONESIA, gayaznmaaauggests early Dutch-Indonesian discussion of New Guinea: The Indonesian Government has handed the Netherlands High Com-. missioner a memorandum proposing that the West New Guinea issue be included in discussions already scheduled by the two governments for the end of November. "In the interests of good relations" Indonesia suggested that the New Guinea dispute be solved within the next several months--before the Dutch Parliament considers any changes in the Netherlands constitution.

TOP SECRET
4
15 Nov 51
Approvtetor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79V1146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
Pending a reply from the Netherlands, the departure of an Indonesian mission for the previously scheduled discussions has been indefinitely postponed. (C Djakarta 707, 12 Nov; U Djakarta 708, 12 Nov 51)
Commentt The Indonesian Government has reacted with some hostility to a proposed change in the Dutch constitution whereby West New Guinea would be listed as part of the territory of the Netherlands Kingdom. Indonesians claim that West New Guinea is rightfully theirs and is only under interim Dutch administration pending disposition of the issue. Pending a reply from the Netherlands Government, Indonesia has virtually cancelled discussions on the abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Should the Union and revision of the 1949 Round Table Conference agreements. Netherlands prove reluctant to resume negotiations over New Guinea, Indonesia may serionsly consider a unilateral abrogation of the Union.
25X1C 25X
CHINA.
pommunists hk q adequate rubber suooliess
25X1C
25X1
25X1C cording tol 25X1A Hong Kong.
exclu-sively for the Chinese Communist army. Ac'experienced no difficulties in T--obtaining rubber; tne local Communist authorities arrange an adequate auantitv. He states that the rubber is shipped to China from
25X1
Comments The ban on shipments of rubber from Malaya and Hong Kong to China has cut sharply into Chinese Communist purchases of this commodity. liowever, the Communists probably have a large stockpile as a result of heavy put-theses in late 1950 and early 1951. This steckpile together with small amounts constantly obtained by smuggling, puts the Chinese in a fairly comfortable position with regard to rubber supply.
9.
Nationalists propope banged budget fpr 1952s The 1952 budget, covering operations of both central and provincial governments on Formosa, estimates revenues at 1,991 million Taiwan dollars (one US dollar equals about 16 Taiwan dollars). Estimated exTenditures will be 2,100 million Taiwan dollars, of Alleh 1,229 million is to be spent for military purposes. New taxes are being proposed to bring estimated revenues up to expenditures. (C Taipei TOECA 1189, 11 Nov 51)
Comments Nationalist success in achieving at least an approximate balanee in the budget is essential to reMove the threat of inflation. The Nationalists are genuinely concerned with the problem and have accepted US 'guidance in the preparation of the budget. The Economic Stabilization Board,. which approved the 1952 tudget has several American officials represented on it as observers.
TOP SECRET
15 Nov 51 5 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
ApprovbeFor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1t)
1
25X1C
China transfers rail employees to North Korea: I Ithe Chinese mainland report no obvious economic strains resulting trom %he Korean War,I Istates that the railroads are suffering from a shortage of personnel because of the assignment thus far of 38,000 railway personnel to 'adds that.the Chinese Communist Ministry of North Korea. Railways anticipates that more personnel will have to be sent and coneludes that there will therefore be many difficulties in m aintaining (S Hong Kong 1395, China's railways during the next three months. 12 Oct 51)
I
25X1
25X1C
11.
KOREA. Continued evidence of North Korean azricultural troubles seen: A.10 November North Korean.domestic broadcast complained that "since Ihe. making of sttaw bags is not being carried through by systematic Methods, (11 FBID Pyongyang, we must extend our working hours into the night." 10 Nov 51) Comment: Straw bags are the primary agricultural containers utilized in Korea. Normally manufactured from rice straw during the non-growing seasons, a shortage of straw bags could prove an additional severe handicap for the already beleagured North Korean internal supply system. Such shortages are probably directly attributable to the acute lack of agricultural manpower.
12.
At KOREA/JAPAN. Korean-Japanese Conference nears recriminative end: the seventh meeting of the Korean-Japanese talks on 12 November, the Japanese admitted that the forthcoming "February meeting" for fUll-fledged treatment of outstanding problems between the two countries would not include finalizing the questions of fisheries, marine cables, and claims, and that the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation could not be negotiated until "next summer."
In a tense atmosphere, ROK Ambassador Yang accused the Japanese of stalling, but failed to sway the Japanese position that "they have no obligations directly to Korea under the Peace Treaty." The ROK Ambassador privately expressed later that he would "raise TOP SECRET
6
15 Nov 51-
-Coments The number of railway workers reportedly assigned to North Korea is probably correct and comes to about a tenth of the total number of railway workers in China. Despite the reportedly tight labor supply, the Chinese so far have proved fairly proficient in maintaining rail operations. Civilian traffic has suffered because of the priority given to military shipments, but the railroads are continuing to support effectively the Chinese war effort.
ApproVuieFor Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79W1146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
he:1" in Washington if the Koreans were "brushed off." The US Political Advisor to SOAP believes the Japanese will "partly recede" from their position. (C Tokyo 1015, 13 Nov 51)
-
Comment: The history of relations between the two nations will make almost every problem on the agenda the subject of protracted negotiations. The question of timing is essential to both parties in the negotiation of outstanding questions between the two countries. Korea desires to reach an agreement prior to the return of full sovereignty to Japan so that the leverage of "the occupation" may be used, while Japan, for similar reasons, desires a postponement of any major agreement.

TOP SECRET
7
15 Nov 51
Approval Icor Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79ttlf146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
.BECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GERMANY. West Germans wary of retaliation against Soviet interference in Berlin, ask foUr-power talks dn matter: West Gerean meeting on 12 November with'HICOM representatives, displayed extreme reluctance to implement the specific trade countermeasures recommended by.the Allies against Soviet harassing in Berlin. They stressed that too strong a move would provoke more serious Soviet interference, and could only be aecompanied by Allied action expanding the current airlift. The West Germans agreed, however, to instruct,firmsflot to deliver certain scheduled key shipments to East Germany, and to issue nomcre trade permits on such shipments. French and British officials were reluctant to force drastic action.
The West Germans also asked that four-power talks be initiated on the Berlin problem,'but were informed of the tentative HICOM decision not to take the initiative on this matter, but to be prepared to discuss the problem on the invitation of the USSR. (S Frankfurt 3816, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: The HICOM had previously agreed that if the Soviet obstruction of West Berlin export permits was still continuing on 12 November, the 'West Ggrmans would be instructed to revoke a temporary East-West German trade agreement covering key'goods. The action finally agreed to by the West Germans does not go that far.
Further indications have been received froml of Soviet feelers for' four-power discussions of Berlin trade difficulties. The French High Commissioner expressed the view on 8 November that theAllies should make some response to this desire, 'but the HICOM deferred discussion of the issue,

TOP SECRET
8
25X1C
2.
FRANCE. Communists uneasy under government repression: French Communists are seriously concerned lest the recently tightened antiCommunist bloc in the National Assembly pass broader repressive measures against them. Party leaders have obviously been struck by the overwhelthing vote for the recent bill designed to weaken the Communist press and have publicly accused all the non-Communist parties of "envisaging serious attacks on civil liberties." Other anti-Communiet measures under attack have been "de facto'elimination" of Communist deputies from the Foreign Affairs Committee and a proposed procedural reform providing for discussion and adoption of laws in secret committee rather than in public assembly sessions. (C Paris 2801, 10 Nov 51)
15 Nov 51
Approve*For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP7031146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
Comment: Although the Communists have retained their influence over labor, the party has been inbreasingly on the defensiye since its last participation in the government in 1947. Repreesive measures during the past year . have caused it considerable uneaSineSs, and have served effectively to isolate it politically.
3.
France presents import needs to USSR: Trade negotiations between France and the USSR began 8 November. French"requirements include grain, non-ferrous metals, coal, asbestos; fuel oil, woodpulp and newsprint. Soviet representatives did not comment on the availability of these items, and stated that they would submit their own requirements in the near future. (C Paris 2812, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Although the French profess strict adherence to COCOM restrictions, the search for non-dollar imports may tempt them to stretch their interpretation of "critical" exports. They have reserved the right to export limited quantities of critical items to the Orbit in eXchange for "vital" imports, and French officials haVe reCently stressed France's need for more imports from the Soviet blob.
'
4.
Socialist leader Rives verbal support to Plevel government: The Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party, Guy.Mollet, has has stated he will "do his utmost" to keep the Pleven government alive. With the backing of a majority in the party's executive committee, however, he ie determinedly opposed to participation by the Socialists in the government; where they would be "prisoners of a rightist majority," thus leaving the Left entirely open to Communist 'exploitation. Regarding the possibility of a coalition including the Gaullists, Mollet comments that he has no desire to bring about a crisis which might "install a Salazar" in France. (C Paris 2796, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Despite an increasing number of friendly overtures from the Communists, the Socialists seem determined to play thn role of "buffer" between the extreme left and Pleven's middle-of-the-road regime, which they consider too rightist to warrant Socialist participation. Mollet's stand buttresses other recent indications that the current coalition will not crumble this year.

TOP SECRET
9
15 Nov 51
Approved' For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
5.
AUSTRIA. Government moves to terminate four-power censorship: Chancellor Figl has advised Ambassador Donnelly that the Coalition parties will introduce a joint resolution in Parliament instructing the government to bease salary payments to Austrian employees of the Quadripartite Censorship Bureau. Overwhelming approval of the resolution is anticipated, whereupon the Austrian Government will inform the four occupying powers that Allied censorship activities will no longer be maintained at Austrian expense. Ambassador Donnelly (S Vienna 1665, 9 Nov 51) assured Figl of US support in this move.
6.
Communist Party conference demands Austrian association with At the conclusion of its 15th Congress last week, the Austrian Communist Party (KP0e) adopted a resolution demanding that Austria dissociate itself froM the Atlantic Pact, that the Union of Independents (Vd1J) be prohibited, that Austria withdraw from ERP and intensify trade relations with her Eastern neighbOrs, and that wages and salaries be raised to offset price increases since last (R FBIS, Vienna Volkstimme, 6 Nov 51) summer.
Eastern Orbit.:
Comment: The KPOe line does nut vary materially from previous statements of party attitude, and was considerably influenced by the simultaneous convention of the World Peace Council, by Soviet propaganda with respect to Austrian remilitarization and by current government efforts to negotiate a new economic program. The party conference, however, was notable for an unusual candor with respect to KPOe capabilities and for the fixity of its attention'on Western defense preparations. Chairman Koplenig, acknowledging the impossibility of organizing strikes and public demonstrations on every issue, asserted that the KOPe does nut immediately aspire to the formatiOn of an Austrian People's Democracy, but will freely support any Austrian government opposed to cooperation with the West.

TOP SECRET
10
Comment: Western efforta to terminate quadripartite genporship of Austrian international communications have been blocked by Soviet opposition and by Western reluctance to give the Soviet authorities The' a free hand in censorship through Western nonparticipation. Austrian move is by nu means assured of success. If the Soviet Hea:Aquarters continues to insist upon censorship, the West may be compelled to contihue its association with the objectionable activity and to pay the Austrian salaries out of occupatiOn-costs funds.
15 Nov 51
Approvb*For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79S4146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
7,
BELGIUM, Belgo-Polish trade agreement reportedly to be signed: The:Belgian presa has reported that a new trade agreement...between Belgiuth and Poland will be signed in November. (U BrUssels Joint Weeka 44, 31 Oct 51) Comment: No official confirmation yf this report has been receiVed. There' has been nu information on the comModities to be exchanged under the agreement, although the Belgian:Government has not "admitted Contemplating" a commitment of strategic items to Poland.in return for coal.
8.

TOP SECRET
11
NETHERLANDS Socialist trade union protests government's socioeconomic policies: At a recent well-attended Socialist trade union meeting at Utrecht, a strong protest against the government's socio-economic policy was voiced. The trade union was especially alarmed at the lack of policy to balanee foreign trade, to proteat the standard of living, to construct homes at the present rate, and "to maintain opportunities for employment..". The government was asked to construct at least 50,000 houses rin 1952 and to control investments directly'. (U The Hague, Joint Weeks 44, 2 Nov 51)
'
Comment: To insure fulfillment of the government's defense program, the Socialist trade union agreed, albeit reluctantly, to support the Cathloic-Labor government's economic policy providing for a five percent cut in the standard of living among all segments of the Dutch population. Labor, however, has taken about a seven percent cut, and no remedial action is in sight at present.
9.
ITALY. Italian officials seek to remedy surplus in European Payments Union: Italy's surplus in the European Payments Union (EPU) rose by another 64 million dollars in October to make a total of 206 million. This surplus is thus one million dollars more than is permitted.
Comment: The accumulation of such large Italian surpluses in the EPU is in part attributable to the fact that steps taken last year to liberalize most of Italy's imports have not had the expected effect. This appears to be due to the Italian general customs tariff, which came into furce about the same time as the liberalization measures and which is considered by financial experts to be too high.
Budget Minister Pella and other Italian officials are now in Paris to discuss new Italian trade and payments Measures designed to remedy the situation and to reach an agreement on the disposition of the surpluses accruing beyond the Italian quota. (S Rome Joint Weeka 45, 9 Nov 51)
15 Nov 51
Approx. For Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP7X1146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
abolition Consequently, the government has authorized the temporary affeCting most goods quantitative restrictions of all quotas and other imported from the European Payments Union.
the EPU has Another method of reducing the Italian surplus in if Italy They suggest that been offered by ECA officials in Rome. increased of defense spending, embarks on an adequate program imports so domestic demand will be sufficient to stimulate Italian However, Pella is unlikely to that the EPU surplus will be reduced. fear of inflation. approve suCh a course of action because of his
widespread opposition. Italian Government anti-strike bill meets final draft of the is about to present its The Italian Government stringent than anticipated long expected anti-strike bill, which is less and non-Communist but apparently still unacceptable to both Communist conciliation. preceded by compulsory labor unions. All 'strikes are to be permissible only aftnr a eeven-day notice, Thoes in public services are Lockouts are and those in the government service ars outlawed. prohibited under penalty of fine' or imprisonment.
10.
Confederation Aside from the opposition from labor, the Italian (Confidustrie) objects to the lookout provision!. of Industrialists probable, with A long discussion of the bill in Parliament seems made to:satisfy unless modifications are final passage ln doubt (S Rome Joint Weeka 45, 9 Nov 51) dissident groups.
Another reason Tor labor's opposition.to the bill is Comment against the'mass that it would in effect prevent strikes in protest which plague Italian industry. dismissals of surplus workers
ofthe bill as The Communists would undoubtedly welcome passage of the bill The governMent's support a useful issue for exploitation. push the non-Communist lator further and to is likely to alienate Communist-controlled Italian unions into greater cooperation with the of Labor. General Confederation
military aid criteria: UNITED KINGDOM:. British request broadening of US Military AsSistance Ministry has asked the The 'British Defense aid given Great Britain whether the military Advisory Group in London Assistance Program can by the United States under the Mutual Defense equipment, (2) technical be applied to (1) research and development equipment, (3) component assistance fur the overhauling of US type and (5) British forces parts, (4) engineering conetruction equipment, 51) (S London 2297, 12 Nov not Committed to NATO.
11.

TOP SECRET
12
,
15 NOV 51
ApproArtor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79*146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
Comment: For many months British officials have attempted to bring about a broadening of the criteria by which US military aid to Britain is determined. They probably see an immediate opportunity for increased aid, pending the results of NATO studies, and quite independent of any forthcoming requests for US economic assistance.
12.
Comment: Norwegian officials initially made some attempts to exclude aluminum from the agreement, despite their conviction that the Czechoslovaks would, as they ultimately did, make any agreement contingent upon aluminum imports. Norway was willing to include aluminum rather than precipitate a breakdown in trade relations.

TOP SECRET
13
NORWAY. Trade agreement with Czechoslovakia concluded:, Trade agreement negotiations between Norway and Czechoslovakia have been concluded, according to a Norwegian Foreign Office official. In addition to non-strategic commodities normally exchanged by the two countries, the agreement provides that Norway will send 500 tons of aluminum in exchange for 500 tons of ship plates from Czechoslovakia. The Foreign Office official expressed his doubt that this latter exchange would ever materialize, since difficulties'in fulfilling inspection requirements for the ship plates may prove insurmountable and Norway will not export any aluminum until receipt of the plates is assured. (S Oslo 460, 9 Nov 51)
15 Nov 51
25X1

Approve Wor Release 2002/05120 : ClA-RDP79171146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
15 November 1951

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
Approved For RASEMBIlabiNSTWAINAblunn9To1146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
ApprovhsWor Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP7ael146A000500250001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
25X1
Egyptian Minister of Interior indicates interest in Middle East The Egyptiah Minister of Interior, who is also the politically Command: powerful Secretary'General-of the Wafd Party, has informed the US Ambassador in Cairo that Egypt could accept the Middle East Command under certain conditions.
EGYPT
Comment: The fact that the second most influential official in the Egyptian Cabinet has followed the Prime Minister in broaching Egypt's possible acceptance of the Western defense scheme indicates that the Government's abrupt rejeetion of the plan three weeks ago did not close the door to further negotiations on the subject. It is noteworthy that the Sudan issue was not mentioned.
The wide gap, however, between Egyptian and Western thinking on the defense issue and the extreme demands made in public by Egyptian Government officials still minimize the hope for any settlement.
2.
however, shows no signs of relenting in its disagreement with this pro

cedure.
Recent approaches to the French Foreign Office have confirmed that French opposition reflects (1) a conviction that the Soviet Union is less likely to approve the shorter treaty than the old draft, (2) a belief that introduction of the new proposal will swing world public opinion against the West, and (3) a fear that Soviet rejection of the abbreviated treaty will destroy the mechanism of the treaty discussions and lead to a fundamental
TOP SECRET
1
Western strategy on Austrian settlement blocked by French AUSTRIA. opposition: With the British Foreign Office having now accepted in principle a new approach on an Austrian settlement, it is apparent that the primary obstacle to an attempt to negotiate an Austrian treaty remains French opposition to the abbreviated reaty proposal suggested by the US. The British and Austrian Foreign Ministers have agreed to the shorter treaty draft, provided it is submitted as an alternative proposal subsequent to a failure to achieve agreement on the old treaty. The French Foreign Office,

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
15 Nov 51
Approved ForRelease 2002/05120 : CIA-R0P79101146A000500250001-0
ApprovebelFor Release 2002105120

TOP SECRET
CIA-RDP791.111146A000500250001-0
alteration in the status quo in Austria which these discussions have until now maintained. The French are in favor of -- but will not insist upon -conceding to the Soviet Union on the outstanding issues in the old draft in a supreme effort to obtain agreement, and they favor threats to withdraw previous concessions if the Soviet authorities remain adamant. Foreign Office officials assert, however, that they have no intention of dropping their opposition to any effort which they feel may jeopardize the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conferences as such. The US State Department is increasingly concerned over the deadlock, pointing out that more than two months have elapsed since the Western Foreign Ministers called for a resolute effort on the Austriar treaty. An attempt will probably be made to resolve the impasse with a direct approach to Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris. (Factual data based on: S S/S London 2202, 6 NoV 51; S S/S Paris 2689, 6 Nov 51; S S/S Vienna 1640, 7 Nov 51; S S/S to Paris TOSEC 19, 10 Nov 51)
3.
Soviet Government seen reluctant to discuss Austrian treaty in The Soviet political adviser in Vienna has questioned Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber as to the likelihood of US reference of the Austrian treaty dispute to the UN General Assembly in Paris. According to Gruber, the Soviet adviser indicated that his government is reluctant to discuss this subject at the Paris meeting, and will take the position that the USSR is in favor of an Austrian treaty provided World War III can be prevented. The Austrian Foreign Minister interprets the adviser's observation as indicating that the Kremlin will sign such a treaty only as part of a general settlement of world issues. (S S/S Vienna 1691, 9 Nov 51)
Paris:
Comment: The Soviet Government may be puzzled as to what to expect from the West on the Austrian treaty in view of the Foreign Ministers' deolaration in Washington calling for a resolute effort. Gruber has strongly supported an appeal.to the UN on the Austrian issue, but has otherwise indicated his belief that an Austrian settlement will be achieved only with a general relaxation of world tensions.

TOP SECRET
2
15 Nov 51
16PSECRETSUElemr-TOP-SEORET-SUEDE-
S.
KOREA. KOREA. Communiet dober Communist military military afraid afraid to to molest molest Korean Korean civilians: civilians: A A SO 30 O October %oioe'transmiieion that the the sender sender be supplied supplied with with "ink "ink and and voioe,tranimiision 'requestea requested-that paper." 'It_wes Tt was observed observed that-"thera's tha6 "there's i:lot a lot of of papers papers in in the the civilian oivilian piper." house6 around b o u n d here here but but we we dare &are not not use uae any any of o f it it because beoauae of of scary soary court courf hOUsee martial." (aWEFll3 5 8 , U-U, U-U, 30 30 Oct 51) 61) martial." (SUEDE 1334, Comment, Comment:
This tends to t o confirm oonfirrn reports r e p o r t s of o f rigid r i g i d disoipline governing governing

-7012-8EGRET-8VEDE-
the relation'e r s of the of Chinese Chinese Communis0 Communist eoldiers soldiers rrfbh with Korean Korean civilians. civilians. The The fear of of severe severe punishment punishment will will probably probably keep keep friction f r i o t i o n between between the t h e two two fear ''peoples peoples at a* a.minimum. a minimum.
'
16 Nov 61
ce
Approved Fd'falkelease 2001/03122 : CIA-RDP7W01146A000500260001-9 TOP SECRET

sEouRITT INFORMATION
16 November 1951
143
DAlLY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
'
Approved Folikelease 2001/03122 : CIA-RDP74101146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Soviet Union reportedly sends 15 Austrian oil technicians to Iran: The Soviet Oil Administration in Austria (the SMV) has reportedly sent
25X1C. the group consists of en

EIEft7FIgh drilling delegation.
15 oil technicians to Iran to instruct theIranians. neers ind drillers 11111,1111111111e
25X1C
25X1A
2.
25X1 C
Increased Soviet activity near8pitsbergen: 25X1C Soviet merchant 141111111111111ents ea has increased by 199 ships (160 of which ire trawlers) since March 1951. Although there has been a growing demand for fish by the increasing population of northwestern areas of the USSR, the 25X1A increasing activity may be related to the recent strong Soviet notes to Norway.
.
25X1C 25X1A
the increase of merchant shipping plus the presence of three Soviet cruisers and smaller naval units suggest the pOssibility of a move a dinst S iteber en which would not have been possible last year.
Comment: The increase of shipping activity since March may be explained by the normally increased shipping during spring and summer months, and the usual presence of Soviet'shipping fleets in northern waters.
3.
BULGARIA. Importance of women in leadership stressed: In speeches delivered before the third national conference of distinguished agricultural cooperative workers on 8 and 9 November, Premier Chervenkov and Minister .of Agriculture Stoilov laid great emphasis upon the importance of women in the cooperative movement. Remarking on the hesitancy shown by the cooperative workers to elevate women to positions of leadership, Stoilov stated that "we'must at all costs put more women in managing positions." Urging that more women be offered positions of responsibility and leadership in the cooperatives, villages, okoliyas, okrugs, and in the national government, Chervenkov noted that women "represent a great power. A broad road must be cleared for this powet; it must be given priority." (R FBIS'Sofia, 8, 9 Nov 51)

TOP SECRET
1
Comment: The processing of oil technicians in eastern Austria, for possible work in Iran, his been reported several times in the nest months. There is no evidence to date that any technicians have arrived in Iran. Skilled technicians could be spired from the oil operations in eastern Austria; however, if 'and when they Might be.accepted by the Iranian Government.
16 Nov 51
Approved FoXelease2001/03/22 CIA-RDP79T01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
25X6 25X6
4.
Comment: The strong eaphasis given to this prbblem during recent months would appear to reflect a growing shortage of labor within Bulgaria.
'
Russian general reported civil airline chief:

e ie o e gar an- v e r Transport Company, s a Russian general, all scheduled civil air services in Bulgaria are opered by TABSO, whIch is said to operate ten DC-3 type aircraft of Russian construction. International flights are routed through Sofia-Bucharest-Prague in agreement with the Czechoslovakian airline, CSA, and through Sofia-Bucharest-Odessa-Kiev-Moscow by arrangement with the Soviet Civil Air Fleet. Occasional special and charter flights to Budapest, Warsaw and Berlin are also said to be arranged by TABSO. (C Rome Desp. 871, 9 Oct 51)
25X6
25X6
This information contradicts an August report concerning an alleged incorporation of Satellite state-owned airline companies into the Soviet Civil Air Fleet. (See 0/CI Daily, 23 Aug 51). If this estimate concerning TABSO equipment is correct, doubt is also cast upon recent Bulgarian claims of significant improvements in civil aviation, including acquisition of "new and comfortable" equipment. (See 0/CI Daily 31 Aug 51) This is the first indication that TABSO might be directed by a Russian officer.
Comment:
25X1C
5.
25X1A
Rumanian am hibious maneuVers re orted: amphibious maneuvers involving Rumen an army, navy, and air elements were held in mid-October in the Mangalia-Albesti area south of Constantsa. Colonel General Emil Bodnaras, Rumanian Minister of the Ground- Forces 'and Soviet military officials reportedly were in attendance.
Comment: This is thefirst report of amphibious maneuvers and is unconfirmed. Although Rumanian naval forces probably have had training exercises of this type, the level of army training for this type of operation is probably low. It is, therefore, doubtful that the army attempted maneuvers of such complexity. An army unit, the 25th Motorized Brigade, subordinate to the comaandant of the sea forces, has responsibility for defense of the Black Sea Coast and could well have been involved in a coastal defense maneuver. Soviet forces are also present in the area.
RUMANIA.

TOP SECRET
2
25X1C
6.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia sends notes to Bulgaria and Rumania charging unfriendly acts: Yugoslavia has officially protested against the aggressive policies of Rumania and Bulgaria. The Yugoslav notes to Bucharest and Sofia call attention to a number of border violations perpetrated by
16 Nov 51
Approved Far Release 20124,4Eari CIA-RDP7O1146A000500260001-9

its two eastern neighbors. The Rumanians are charged with 24 provocations in.35 days, from 10 September to 15:0Ctober, and Bulgaria with 140 provocations during the ten-month period from January to October. (R.FBIS, 13-14 Oct 5i).
These latest protests follow closely a similar-note The tiping of the submission Coincided conspicuously with the submission to the UN-General Assembly.of a fOrmal Yugoslav complaint charging the USSR. and herSateliites with unfriendly
Commenti
.
liven7a7fludapest last week.
acts and pressures.
25X6
7.

TOP SECRET
3
25X6
25X6
'
Theliague reports Yugoslav trade with the Sate itee: US-AMbeaseder Chapin at The Hague reports that following up 6 hint the Embassy learned tons of YUgoslaV lea 1 embargoed un er n une, tha cport Control Program, were transshipped through the Nethere Western lands to Eastern Europe: 200 to East Germany, 170'to Czechoslovakia; and 100.to Poland. In August, 1,597 tons were ehipped to Satellite coun297 to East Germany, and 1300 to Poland. (S The Hague 457, tries: 9 Nov 51)
-
5X6
25X6
:
;There is no reason to believe that the YugoslaV Government4s aWare of the final,destination of this shipment. In the,past, the Yugoslays have attempted to prevent the shipments of their produCts to the Satel lite countries. In late June the Yugoslays asked ANG in Trieste to stop a ferro -chrome shipment because they had reason to believe that it was destined for Czechoslovakia. Further, in June, the Yugoslays turned down a Swiss offer tO buy a considerable quantity of lead On highly ad vantageous terms in dollars because they learned thatthe shipment was likely to find its way to 'Satellites. H
16 Nov 51
25XA6pproved For Release 2001/03122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500260001-9
'Approved For 'htlease 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP791t14146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
go*ernment, the Greek situation no lehger requires the maintenance Of UN observers. The Greeke believe that UNSCOB should be terminated without a successor body at this time. If, in the future. Greece feele the need'for renewed observation, this could be arranged through an interim cotmittee. (S Paris DELGA 139, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Greece has previously favored the retention of UNSCOB and in this had the support of Most of the UNSCOB representatives, if not of their governments.. Recently, however, eome Greek officials had indicated that they supported the US-approved suggestioh that UNSCOB'be replaced with a subcommittee of the Peace Obeervation Committee which would not include Soviet or Satellite observers Agreement to absildon any observation committee in the Balkahs should eliminate anY possible dispute at the impending GA discussioh of the question and make if , uhhecessary to urge the POC subcommittee on Turkey or Yugoslavia, who are reluctant at this time to accept
delegates suggest 'delegates have told US delegates'indissolution of UNSCOB, Greek UN Parts that; in the opinion of their
,
GREECE. Greek UN
2. ata.
25X6 25X6
Iraq'S FriMe Minister; NUri Said, has suggeeted a plan to break the" cUrrent Anglo,AILptian impasse.
ur s p an apparently provides Middle Eastern country should have that each should aleo'seek "auxiliary troops" its own "regular troopen'and from other nations to Supplement its own forces, is reportedly not very hopeful that Nuri's efforte to conciliate current Anglo-Egyptian 4t does believe that these attempt's, differenced will produce results, but the right direction. (S Paris SECTO which are Arab in origin, are'in 37 and 39, 13 and 14 Nov 51)
Comment, While Arab leaders continue privately to express interest in and.protete the coneept of the Command, their public statements reflecting popular sentiment resolutely support Egypt.
3.
INDIA. Communist Party of India adopts new policy: According to the Indian press, the Coituhist Par.*. of India has fihally adopted the party!'s draft policy statement, first publiehed in May 1951 (see Daily Digest 5 ..rul 51). The policy aims at creating a united.front of-workers and peasants under-the leadership of the working Clase to participate forthcoming national elections. in the It does not eschew the 'zee of violence, although the party's General Secretary, that the party would resort to violence A. K. Ghosh, stated on 8 November only after exhausting all peaceful methods. 'The press has also reported that five members of the Indian
.

border observers'.
-E,
TOP gORET
.......
.
16 Nov 51
'Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T1146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
Palitbureau, including former General Secretary Ranadive, Were suspended froMparty membership for from two to six years. (U New Delhi 1691 and 1694, 10 Nov 51) It seems apparent that the united front line of last May Comment: is totg-ralowed until after the national elections and that prominent Comnunists, whose names are associated with policies of violence are, at least publicly, being censured,
4.
5.
Polioe placed under imrodiate direction of Prime Ministers The Indonesian "State Police" reportedly have been placed under the immediate direction of the Prime Minister, Formerly, the police ware administered by the Minister of Home Affairs.' The US Army Attadhe Assumed that the term "State Police" is intended to mean the National Mobile Police Brigade. (C Djakarta 704, 10 Nov 51)
Comments The Mobile Police Brigade is a force of 25,000 men which has been intensively used, with the support of Army troops, to enforce seourity. Within recent weeks the Prism Minister has appeared to assume more immediate responsibility for internal security than either the Minister of Home Affairs or the Defense Minister. This develormunat and the transfer ef tbe Police Brigade to the office of'the Prime Minister are probably part of a concerted effort by high level offioials to achieve a more rapid and effective implementation of security decisions.
6.
THAIIAND. Thai concerned over cost of aid programs: The US Enbassy in Bangkok reports that consideration of the 1952 budget has "brought home" to the Thai Government that the various aid programs or which it is the beneficiary entail considerable expenditures. While it is the Embassy's opinion that Thailand is unquestionably able to bear.this finanOial burden, the growing Thai concern"nay necessitate that the CS.recommend financial measures which would ob4iously be politically unpopular. (C Bangkok 1067, 8 Nov 51)
Comment: The unpopular recommendations the Embassy has in mind:are tax Mira, more effeotive mobilization of domestic capital, and the elimination of "squeeze," protection and kiokbacks in official circles.

TOP SECRET
6
INDONESIA. Strict press censorship evident on military me:VW:Monts: During the pas; week the local press contained fewer reports on insecurity than during any similar period within the past several months,. The ArmyAttache states that the complete absence or reports on military movements in West Java and the Celebes probably are the result of a very strict press censorship. (C Djakarta 704, 10 Nov 51)
16 Nov 51
Approved Fth-Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP1f01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
7.
Sarit's position enhanced: On 1 November the entire Government lottery board was fired and General Sarit, Assistant Commander in Chief of the Thai Army, vas appointed the new chairman. The US Embassy in Bangkok comments that the presentation of this "juicy plum" to Sarit is evidence of his growing importancelAnd.that he may Supersede Felice Direotor (C Bangkok 1066, 8 Nov 51) General Phao as Thailand's number one strongman.
Comments There have been a number of reports indicating that Prender ,Phibleigsfleen building up Sarit in order to reduce Phae's increasingly aggressive influence. The description of various generals as "strongmen" of Thailand appears to be an exaggeration. Until he is deposed, .Phibun the dominating authority in the oountry.
25X6

t
I
80
osition in Manchuria:
A former
25X6
25X6 25X6
nese ommun power n anc ur a s n . pos s Are held b'Moscoe-trained Chinese whose devotion to Soviet.interests no Soviet combat units'have been observed is "complete." recently in Herb n or in Mukden, nor ia there evidence of the presence of "international volunteers"; and that the Communist authorities, who reportedly.intend to "rid MAnchuria of all foreigners" in the next few months are.now encouraging rather than hindering their.departure. CS Paris 2842, 13 Nov,51)
.....
.
'Ciitments Although other Western observers have also reported that Oinesiriaittdrity in Manchuria appears undisputed, the Soviet poeition in ,the,area, which is dominatenY Chinese' Stiliniets under the.supervisien OP:Soyiet.advisers, is strong. Other'souroes agree on the lak of evidence of the,presence of "international volunteers" or of Soviet combat units Otside. the Port Arthur naval base area. It_has long been assumed that the.Chinese Communists intend to expel all remaining Westerners from Manchuria.
9.
Hong Kong enforces export oontrol regulationss Suspecting that a cargo of steel oonsigned to Pakistan WWI in fact destined for Communist China, the Hong Kong authorities investigated before the vessel departed. When the broker would not disclose the owner of the goods nor the documents of sale, the Government ordered the steel discharged from the ship and stored in a controlled warehouse. Upon being congratulated by an officer from the US Consulate.General for this prompt aotion, Hong Kong's newly appointed Director of Commerce and Industry declared that it was his intention to administer controls.. very strictly in an effort to reduce clandestine trade with the Communists. (C Hong Kong Deep. 611, 27 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
'
16. Noir 51
Approved FoPikelease 2001/03122 : CIA-RIDP7W01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
Comments This indident is illustrati*e of Hong Kong's 'efficiency in-applying its export controls. Since June 1951, Hong Kong has banned the export to China of a igicie range of-strategio items. llthough-permitted .experts froth Heng:Kong (e.g., of pharMaceuticals) continue to-be substantial; over-all export volume has dropped sharply.
10. 10
CHINA. -Chinese Communist press Maintains aMbiguous tones A 14 Novels:'bar dhinese Communist press review broadoast comments on the oease-fire "intrigue" of the UN and observei.that the Chinese will "continuously ihtensiTY their effort to strive... 4-fdr-suooess of the Korean armistice negetiatione.- At the saMe tithe, they are fully prepared to fight and frUitiate.the Americin-attuks and-to comPel the enemy to accept a just peace. .61 (RFBIS:Ticker Peiping, 14 Nov 51) _
.
--COMmenti 'This broadoest is of partioUlar interest in view of the
PhrairStrate the American attack." While this may be interpreted

in the broader sense of defending China and Korea from American "aggressors," it may equally well be interpreted as meaning a oontinuation of the present enenly defensive aotion in Korea.
11.
KOREA.:COMMunist Counter-prepaganda follow UN's'atroeity:announcement. 1.15 November Chinese Communist breadeast for domestic consumption prelented'a Korean CoMMentary on "aft adousatien against the Ameriean murderers." The commentary indiets, oh the basis of "ironolad evidence," the'Arierican:"aggiessore" as Murderers, and aski the Chinese:people to "AVenge-the hundreds and thousands Of Korean victime murdered by the Alerican executioners." (R FBIS Ticker, 15 Nov 51) _
.
T-COMMenti"ApperehtlY interpreting reeent UN charges of CoMmunist
Militird7Wooities as propaganda, the-CoMmunist prepaganda machine has

reaoted by reviving A story of UN,combat atrocities.
.
.
"-- 'COMMUnist atrobity-prepaganda regarding Korea has nearly exhausted the PoSiibilitiesJef inhuftan behavior, including genocide and the Use of pars in atomic bomb experiments.
12.
JAPAN: AntiLEMPerer Oiganiiation dissolved: Kyoto University has ordered the dissolution of the bogaku-Kai, leftist-controlled student organization whieh allegedly'Plahned the demonstratien against the visit of the EMperor on 12 November. (U FBIS, 15 No* 51)
Comments The Japanese strongly objected to the Owupationd-direoted The
deletTrirthe lese majesty clause from the criminal code in 1947.

TOP SECRET
16 No* 51
Approved Fol?'Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP70.01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
Iyeto inoident,'Whioh was f011owed a few days later by the pOsting of eInti4MPoror'elogiani-in Ctsui-Ii111-lead'tedetrong pressure for the
reedtabliihkent-of apeoial letaI prOtectioii for:the Emperor's -position's,: 14tritiit-18MbriC1iii6ediately after the'incident demanded remedial
action by the Minister of Eduoation.

TOP SECRET
9
16 Nov 61
25X6

TOP SECRET
5X6
4.
'
AUSTRIA. Union of Independents charges Socialist-Communist labor cooperation: The Union of Independents (VAU) neWspaper, The Independent, charged editorially last week that the Socialists and Communists are cooperating in the current shop-steward elections. The paper alleges that, through Socialist support, a Communist was named chairman of the shop-steward council of the Lend Aluminum Works although only three of the nine cpuncil members are Communists. In return for this support, the paper asserts, the Communists will votb fpr a Socialist chairMan of.the cduhoil-in the large Kaprun hydroelectric project in the-preVince of Salzburg. The VdU organ attributes: this SocialistCommunist "fraternization!, to the common Marxist origins of the two parties. 1(R.FDIS, Der Unabhaengige, Salzburg, 10 Nov 51) Comment: As a result of the shop-steward election referred to above, the nine seats on the shop council were equally divided among

TOP SECRET'
11
16 Nov 51
'
Approved FthRelease2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP7e01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
the Communists, Socialists, and VdU. This was a very considerable achieveMent for the VdU and an apparent defeat for the Socialists,
The Socialists, who are firm in their opposition to the Communists, have after some equivocation adopted an equally firm attitude toward the VdU -- which they regard as neo-faecist and disruptive to the Austrian coalition. It is therefore possible that in western Austria the Socialists may be willing to support Communist candidates in isolated instances where the VdU has achieved some successes among the workers. Such support should not be interpreted as indicating a weakening of general Socialist opposition to cooperation with the Communists.
Schaerf and other Socialist speakers demanded a continuation of the housing program, new measures to support the purchasing power of the sehilling, a full employment policy, prosecution of profiteers, and an anti-cartel law, (R HIS, Vienna, RAVAG, 10 Nov 51; P Vienna 1710, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: This strong Socialist support of the coalition government is in contrast to the frequently expressed view of Socialist leaders that the coalition is disintegrating because of People's Party weakness. Vice-Chancellor Schaerf informed the US Embassy during.the Socialist Congress of his fears that the People's Party had insufficient control over the farmers to permit proper economic controls in Austria. There is little doubt that the Socialists, support of the coalition is genuine as indicated in their moderate demands on the People's Party and their opposition to the Union of Independents.

TOP SECRET
12
5.
Socialist Congress expresses confidence and affirms support of the coalition_government: In the first Congress of the Austrian Socialist Party (3P0e) since its victory in the presidential elections last spring, Socialist leaders hailed the strength of Austrian socialism and of postwar European socialism in general. Pointing to the Socialist presidential victory and to the success of the party's recruitment campaign, Chairman Schaerf declared that, in contrast, the Union of Independents is tottering from one crisis to another and that the Communist Party loses strength each year. Schaerf continued that, while Socialist collaboration with either radical party is out of the question, both the world situation and Austria's internal policy require . the cooperation of the two government pasties. Future Austrian elections would determine whether the People's or the Socialist Party is the stronger, but it is unlikely tfiat either would achieve a clear majority.
16 Nov 51
Approved FecRelease 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
6.
;
25X6

TOP SEC
A US defense !expenditure: greater indicated favors Pella has Budget Minister now that lludget Minister for defense. ITALY. indicated Italian expenditures attitude, the official in Rome has greater this 'new toward a changed attitude Pella can be encouraged in defense program will be Italian He reports that if an adequate American task of getting will be greatly facilitated. Parliament political reasons the same that for approximately increase in Pella has indicated investment program of However, the with a civilian spread defense program. presented program mill be defense the expanded that of investment size as under the civilian in cash expenditures for the cash expenditures while increases TOECA 1240, 6 Nov 51) (S Rome over several years, telescoped. effort and program will be defense the obstructed an adequate anticipate it is difficult to Comment: Pella has his fear of inflation because.of of such a program. be materialization spending mey in part level of defense on reduced of attitude surpluses in EPU, the Pella's change and the Italian industry, the large sectors of Italian an adequate occasioned by industrialists'for activity in the metalmechanical within Italy from strong pressure defense effort.
6 25X6
16 Nov 51
13
'
Approved kW Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDPM01146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
?5xe
25
10.
ARGENTINA. Top army command shifted: The President's press office has announced extensive changes in'the top army command ranging from the lt Commander in.Chief down through three armies and eight divisions, was explained that nine of the generals affected had requested retirement in order to facilitate the promotion of:younger officers to high posts. The hew Commander in Chief, who replaces Lieutenant (U NY Times General Angel Solari, is Major General Alfredo Avalos.
15 Nov 51)
General Solari has been reported to be the leader of a Comment: iieVoliciraii-Y group, but until now he and other poWerful generals have. dOntinued to give Peron at least conditional Support. There have been indications that the army would prefer to have Peron remain in power subject to their terms. The retirement of these key generals is
probably a lightlycamouflaged attempt to neutralize army influence, and it may spark new efforts to oust Peron.

TOP SECRET
14
16 Nov 51
H
TOP SECRET
.
E. i
fled when fined APThilaagcralirKeleaSeiti

SOURCE
DOC DOC
.
UNCLASSIFIED &ken blanic-7-1101SECW,when atE,tVi5iaI*phSe.creiRoiktygI76uttrf.ttfgyAto66t.ocaeo6vEi.sg-

REG ISTRY
CIA
NO.
DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
UMBER OF PAGES
ATTENTION: This form wilt be placed on top of and attached to each TOp Secret document receiv d by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it Is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access tO Toy Secret matter 17 limited to Top Secret Control personn I and those individuals Whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign thls form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECE I VED
s I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
7 I ME
orric
SEEN BY
5 I GNATURE
AO
25X1A

R
2 9 MAY 1997 .
IFAUSATELY AFTER USE
DATE
T I ME
OFF ICE/DIV .
DATE
irrUAN TO WAVES Et RE CORDS CENTER
JOB r7911141,
BOX_
6
(OUTSIDE CIA)
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect ed from Top Secret material it shalt be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted lo Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
DESTROYED
By (Signature)
TO
D I SPATCHED
BY (Signature) OFFICE
DATE
BY (Signature)
DATE
Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP74Th 146/W005002 0'151 ..,...1-9

Cli
OFFICE
-0A 261.73
1551 PREVIOUS KO/ PIOUS.
TOP SECRET
X-74c
(40)
Approved Ferlkelease 2001103/22 : CIA-RDP7W01146A000500260001-9 TOP SECRET

16 November 1951
CIA No. 49430-A

Copy No.
49

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved FoMelease2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79.61146A000500260001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
LEBANON. jabanon's position tOward Middle East Commend hardens: LebanoWe position is hardening agatnat the Middle East Command 'proposal. It is rapidly reaching a point where cooperation with the West will be difficult pending settlement of the Egyptian affair.
Comment: In the past weeks Lebanese officials have not only privately expressed interest in the Middle East Command but have urged other Arab leaders to assist them in a cautious promotion of Arab consideration of Command proposals. If Lebanon, with its progressive and relatively westernized population, is now inclined to go along with militant nationalism, there is little hope that other Arab States will react favorably to the Command.
2.
PERU Admiral Saldias interested in acouisition of cruiser: Admiral Saldias, during his trip to the US later this month, plans to inquire in Washington as to whether Peru can hope to purchase a cruiser. If such a purchase is out of the question, he could be free to dispose otherwise of the funds now reserved for that purpose. (C, S/S Lima 260, lA Nov 51).
Comment: With the announced successes in Korea of the battalion sent by Colombia, Peru's traditional rival, Admiral Saldias may be prepared to discuss the acquisition of a cruiser for the purpose of increasing the prestige of the Peruvian military establishment. On the other hand, it is possible that he may be willing to discuss the sending of a contingent to Korea in accordance with the informal Peruvian promises of last April.
Admiral Saldias is the Minister of Navy and has the reputation of being more pro.rUS than most members of the current Peruvian administration.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
The US Minister in Beirut voiced this opinion after noting the government's unwillingness to oppose public opinion on the Egyptian issue. The Minister felt that his general impressions were supported by a statement made to him by a Lebanese Parliamentary deputy who said: "I think we are now in a position to dictate terms to you, and if I were the responsible .government official I wouad make them hard." (C, S/B Beirut 5041 13 Nov 51).
TOP SECRE7
16 Nov 51
Approved For Reiser
SEeRE5DA0094.90480001-4
25X1
18 November 1951
25X1
Copy No.
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETINA..

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE INCLA7S-Sy-
-5
t"'=7"1.70
DECLASSIRED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE:
;Via 7
25X1 25X1
AUTH. HR TO-ass
DATErtiyet
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1

Ap$6*44,For F elease 2003112/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00040048Q 001-4
SUFMARY
GENERAL
1.
British disturbed by course of Korean truce negotiations (page 3).

NEAR EAST
25X1
4.
5. 6.
Communist-led strike cripples French economy (page 5). Italy seeks approval of barter agreement with Czechoslovakia (page 6).
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
Greece suggests abolishment otUN Balkan Commission (page4 ).
-225X1A
25X1A
GENERAL
British disturbed by course of Korean truce negotiations:

25X1A
he United States Embassy in London believes at Foreign Secretary Eden's 19 November arliamentary statement on Korea,will be elpful in giving "a badly, needed explanation" confusion over the issues at stake, and doubt is pu over the source of the obstacles placed in the way of a settlement, ' is re-
given out by the UN Commander in Chief.
Comment: Left-wing criticism has also focused on the lack of British or Commonwealth representation on the negotiating committee; and Prime Minister Churchill on 15 November evidently found it necessary to re-affirm publicly the Government's confidence in UN leadership in Korea.
25X1
25X1A


-3-
flected in the press and "extends even into the Foreign Office. " Press comment has questioned in particular the competence of the present UN negotiators as well as the accuracy and completeness of the information
25X1
4.
25X1A
25X1A
Greece suggests abolishment of 'UN Balkan Commission:
25X1A

The Greek UN representatives in Paris have told US delegates that Greece favors the abolition of the UN Balkan Commission without _.
-4-
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400}80001-4
25X1A
replacement by a new body and without the continuance of observers the field. Greece fears that continued UN supervision of its borders in implies a weakness and so jeopardizes its position in NATO. Greece, rnoreover, does not wish its frontier case to reappear on the General Assembly agenda, especially since there is an almost complete absence of significant frontier incidents. Comment: Abandoning its original contention that the Commission should be retained, Greece recently expressed itself as sympathetic to the US view that the Commission should be replaced by a subcommittee of the Peace Observation Committee without Soviet or Satellite members. Mote recently, however, Greek spokesmen have been very critical of the Observation Committee and expressed the view that the Committee was worse than no UN supervision at all.
5.
Communist-led strike cripples French economy:
25X1A
The American Embassy in Paris sees no early solution for the serious strike by which French Communists are obstructitg the strategic French coal industry. The Government ar s own no willingness to back down while such a large-scale strike is under way, and it now seeans likely that the walkout will spread to the important Saar and Lorraine basins. Despite the opposition of Socialist union leaders, the Socialist locals have been unable to withstand the pressure from the rank and file and have joined the strikers.
'
By curtailing medical benefits which French miners have enjoyed for over 50 years, the Government precipitated the strike and presented the Communists with a perfect situation to exploit economic grievances for political ends.
Comment: Premier Pleven has described the 1951 coal shortage as the greatest problem currently facing The Government has recently declared its intention of curtailing France. coal imports from dollar sources. Even with their current imports, estimated at over


WESTERN EUROPE
-525X1A
Approved Fo
: CIA RDP7OT0007GA0004 480001-4
25X1A
duction over 85% of capacity. The loss of as much as one week's production will be a serious blow to the French economy.
15 million tons for the year, the French are still unable to lift steel pro-
In view of the speed with which this strike has mushroomed, the Government can be expected to offer an early compromise in order to prevent a greater loss to the defense effort.
6.
Italy seeks approval of barter agreement with Czechoslovakia:
25X1A
all bearings against Czechoslovak special steels, coal, cellulose, and other goods. Sixty percent of the ball bearings are types now embargoed, but private contracts covering their delivery were made prior to the
COCOM embargo.
The Italians are defending the barter agreement on the basis that 90 percent of the Czech counterpart deliveries are raw materials essential to the Italian economy, that such raw materials are in short supply in the West, and that a rupture in Italo-Czech trade may result if the agieement is not approved. Because further delay would compromise the export of certain seasonal Italian products, the Italian Government has already begun to implement part of the agreement.
lights the difficult position in which the Italians find themselves as a result of their lack of natural resources. In return for important quantities of coal, wheat, manganese, and other raw materials from the Communist bloc, the Italians feel they must export a certain minimum of strategic items.

25X1A
The Italians are pressing the Coordinating Committee on East-West Trade (COCOM) for approval of a barter agreement which rovides mainly for the exchange of Italian
Comment: This situation, in essence, high-
HR70-14
-110P-SEORET-seaDB-
'NR
14. L
NR
15. KQREA. Soviet-operated doviet-operated searOhlights searohlights believed believed 000rdinated ooordinated with with air air 16 + KOREA. diTnse aystem'in northmleitern = io's etem'in northwvistern Korea: A KOrearcto.eznesziageon' 9 0ctober Ruea&arimessage on %he g r o d ooitriolfed'interoept oontmyzd Snteroept ( G C i ) radar net Korea the groUnd (O0I) net 'in in norbhwlestern northWestern Korea mentioned "with pmvisions (for) ( f o r ) searchlight searohlight operators." operators." (SUEDE mentioned""with.provisions (SUEDET-1 2777, 21-M, &M, 9 Oct 51) 61)
'
airor-northwestern airorai* in nOrthweitern Korea. Korea. Ibis This message message mould m u l d seem 8eern to t o indicate indicate %hatthese Seirohlights searohlights are ape manned mannod by by Soviet Soviet!personnel personnel and.coordinated, and 'ooordinated, that-these a t least l e a s t administratively, administratively, through at through the the GOI OCX net. net.
oriment: Radar-directed Radar...directed searchlightshave have been beeh deteoted deteoted by UN bo&entt searohlights UN
16. 16i
'NR
19 Nov 51 51 19
ATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE. 20-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
n. - -
!
I
HR70-14 HR70-14
.._.
' 3 '
_TeP_SECRET-SUED
"20 kow-S1
c(f
USSR
1. 1.
More "Soviet" arrive at "Soviet" MIG-15's MIG-la's arrive atAntung Antung for combat: combat: A interception of of a message pessage A field field unit unit reports reports interception announcing the arrival of 36 "Soviet" announcing the arrival of "Soviet" MIGr16 MIGr15 :SUEDE AP-7/0BUEDE A m A o-361 2 6 ' aircraft at &tung on 17 November. On the same same aircraft at Antung on November. On M1G-15's day, two two groups groups of of 36 36and and 34 94 "Soviet" Y30vietTt MlG-15'5 17/4 7a eid-2V$L* .Antungfor for combat combat and and on on the following depwted Antung day day one one group group of of 16 16similarly-dtrffied similarry-daffied MIG-15's MIG-15's were were reported reported departing departing from from Aritung, Aqtung, also for combat. combat.
I
US USAir Air Force 17 Nov a7 NOV 51 51
Previously reported have have been the flight flight of of at least least 30 30 MIG-15's MJG-16's from from the the Soviotaoccupied Soviet.occupiedPort Port Arthur-Dairen Arthur-Dairen area area to Antung Mating early early in October and a flight of of 19 19 MIG-15's MIG-15'sfrom fromPort Port Arthur Arthur to &tung Antung on 12 November. Soviet Soviet personnel personnel have been been flying flying combat combat missions missions from the Antung Antung area since the the spring springof of 1951. 1951. Chinese a b have area since Chinese ground groundn nets have rereby these these aircraft aircraft as "allied" ferred to to some some flights by "allied" or "friendly" l'friendly'l flights. flights. The exact subordination subordination of of jet jet aircraft aircraft referred referredto toas as"Soviet" "$ovietttis is not notknown. known.
\
2. 2 . ,Cornmupist UN over northwestern northwestern Korea: Korea: ,Pornmunistnight nightair air activity activityfurther further restricts restricts UN
I
I
.- 3
. r
While While Communist Communistnight nightinterceptor interceptor aircraft aircraft have have been encountered been encountered in in limited numbers over North 1950, until recently no no Korea since December 1950, UN known to UN aircraft aircraft was known to have been been damqged damaged in such meetings. ' On On the night of of 16 November November a a UN UNlight lightbomber, bomber, flyiqgat flyingat near the the ChongchOn Chongchbn river, was caught caught in i n a light light cone cone from from 15 15 6,000 feet near river, was searchlights andwas was immediately immediatelyattacked attackedby by two two conventional qanvlentional fighters fighterswhich which searchlights and "major damage. inflicted .damage. l"t
~PPROVED RELEASE FOR RELEASE (DATE: 20-Mar-201 0 ATE: 20-Mar-2010 VPPROVED

FAR FAR EAST
Comment: Comment: This This is is the the third third report reporton on the the Chinese Chidese Communist Air in commitment commitment of IjovietCommunist Air Force network suggesting suggesting an an increase increase hi ot Sovietmanned jet to combat combat in in the area area since sincethe thebeginning beginning of October. manned jet fighters to
=," 'e tile "skilled "skilled manner in which which the pilots combined Lombined attacks e use of o r a r-directed attacks with th the ra highdegree. degree of of proficiency. " searchlights indicatesaahigh searchlights indicates
I'
Anticipating an in both the number and and Anticipating an increase in effectivenessof of enemy enemynight nightMter iqterceptions, the enemy's effectiveness ceptions, capability to restrict restrictUN UNnight night 'operations 'operations has has considerably considerably improved tmprJved and and may may on future futyre UN UN night north of of the the be expected to be a limiting factor on night air air activity north Chongchon river. Chongchon river.
Comment: If the Communists fully attain the capability to deny the air over northwestern Korea to UN night bombers, it will permit the nearly unmolested completion of their program of basing jet and conventional airc,raft on airfields within Korea.
Many of these night interceptors are believed to be LA-11 LA-ll penetration fighters penetration fighters These aircraft are based at Anshan and have been on almost nightly "combat" patrols over North Korea since early October.

- 4 4 --
HR70-14 HR70-14
-Top-szenT-SVEDr
c
~
NR NR
6. 8.
CHINA KOREA. More More "SoViet" "Soviet" MIG-15's M I Q - l S f a arrive a r r i v e at a t Antung_for Antung f o r combat: combat: A A field Eield CHINA/KOREA. s & iatsroeption OX message minounoing t h e arrival of 36' 36' unit reports interception of a a messaiiiiiia3Ouncing.th7e arrlval of "Soviet" MfQ-15 aircraft a i r o r a f t at a t Antune; on 17 17 November. November. O n the y , two two On the same b day, "Soviet""MIG-15 Anturg on groups of 36 and 54 34 "SOViet"IIIG-16's "Soviet" MIG-lS's departed d e p a r t e d Antung A n k n g for f o r combat, combat, and and Of 56 on the. t h e f follOWing o l l o w i n g day f 16 MfG-16's were were on day one one group group oof 16 8i1?1i18rlpdeflned similarlydefined NIG-16's reported departingfromAntung, (SUEDE USA-251, AFSA261, r eported d e p a r t i n g irom Antung, also a l s o for f o r combat. oombat. 17462, 1 9 Nov 51) 51) 17461, 19
P r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d haVe have been been the-flight the' f l i g h t of of at at least l e a s t 30 30 MIG15's PrevioUslirePorted MIG-15's f rom th e '6oviet-oboupied P o r t Arthur-Dairen o Antung in froth the-Soviet-oedupied Port Arthur-Dairen &ea area tto Antung early in Ootolier and'a end'a f flight of 1 19 MIG-15's ffrom Port Arthur Antung on Ooto%er l i g h t of 9 MIQ-l.5'8 rom P ort A r t h u r tto o Ant12 1 2 November. Novembero S o v i e t personnel p e r s o n n e l have been flying f l y i n g combat oombat missiODA missions from from the the Antung Antung Soviet area s hoe t h e spring of o f 1961. Chinese Ohinese ground n e t s have referred r e f e r r e d to t o some some since the nets f l l g h t a by these t h e s e aircraft aircraft; as "allied" " a l l i e d " or ox 'friendly" " f r i e n d l y " flights. flightbr The exact exaot flights a u b o r d i n a t i o n of o f jet jet aircraft airoraft referred referred to t o as "Soviet" "Soviet" is i s not not known. known. subordination

3vFsERw
5 5
Comments Commenta Thia This is is the t h e third t h i r d report report on on the t h e Chinese Chimse Communist Communist Air A i r Force Form netwOiT-77iTesting an netwo-eeting an increase inoreaae in in commitment aommitment of o f Soviet-manned Soviet-manned jet j e t fighters fighters to t o combet,in oombat i n the t h e area area since since the the beginning beginning of of October. Ootober.
20 20 W Nov o v 61 61
APPROVED FOR RELEAS (DATE: DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
B'D 55 55
HR70-14
THP SECRET SUEDe

".
.
KOREA. To Top NorCh North K Korean planners may 1 1 . KOREA l F $ J Lmilitary --a&bnns re m 11.
k
not be in a Pyongyang: I.
text Manaulrian-Korean border border 0 h h t e x b message fiOm 6 o m the t h e bhnohurian-Korean r"rrNoveniber-pTian town Manpo (Manpojin) to Office" in Pyongyang t o w n of of Mmpo (hnpojin) t o the khe "Central "Central Fuel Control Offioe" to tons o of gasoline and ordered that office offios t o ensure ensure the issuance issuance of "three n t h r s e tons f g asoline a d tons Mobile oil to Home Name Affairs Affairs Department Department . to the . nine t o n s of mobile a a t o reonnstruot recwsk~ot the to The message states e t a t e e that t h a t this is t o be done 'by "by order road and and bridges." bridgeno" The (SUEDE A8 NOV 51) 52) AS CM IN 54026, 64026, 18 18.Nov Military Committee." of Militiary Committee." significance in t this message is is t the COmment2 CotMlenta Of oonsiderable aignifioanoe h i s message he the North North refei4757176-"Mi1itary Committee," With r s f o r ~ % ? M i l S t a r y C~nrmlt-t;es~~' With the t h e outbreak outbreak of o f war, war, the Korean Committee" oharged with Uorean OCvernment advermant; set up a "Supreme Military Committee" t h i s massage oannot be interpreted interpreted message cannot oonduoting military mil5.tary operations. operation#. Although this a8 o a t i o n oof f t this h i s high-level atioonfirming confirmingthe the l o location high-level strategy strategy body body in in Manpo, Kanpo, it it &kiwi suggest t h thnt an admlniRtrative administrative h body with the minimum minimum a authority of doe4 suggast d i Rn dy w i h the u t h o r i t y of fdel in in Pyongyang Pyongyang is i.8 located located there. there. allOoating fuel alloaating
13. 13
12.
/NR !NR
-TOP-SECRIT-StIEDE5
21 Nov NOT 51 61 21 -93 -x>1>

9 . S
MB Aft a
IP -
PPROVED FOR APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to our website
JPOP-SBORET-SUEDE-
OoMmentt the QonunentsTrade of of this t h i s nature falls within t h e normal pattern pattern Is the first f i r s t reoent Thia is o f gr-hit aortheaHtern Korea. Korea. This of giZgaelicit northeastern evidence, however, however, that evi.denoe, %hat such 0uch trade trade is 1s continuing. continuing.
14. 14.
'
'
Two North Worth Xorean Korean ooaL,E&uz$LOz coaliroduotion suffers suffers from from labor l a b o r troublesi Croubles a Two NOrtlirrean N o r t h x r e a nplain-text plain-text massages messages Or-lg.-add o m r a n d 17 November reveal r e v e a l a shortage shortage o f labor l a b o r for f o r minee i n coal o o a l producing pmduoing areas areae of o f North Korea. A Kanggya Kmggye of mines in Korea. A message t to o tthe h e "Froduotion n Pyongyang t a t e s tthat h a t "due "due-to the MAC:saga "Production MinistryR Ministry" iin Pyongyang s states to the shortage of n t h e Tokohon mine, t a y here." of labor power i In the mine, I must must s stay here." Another to the message from from Kwannae Kw-ennae at a t the t h e mouth of o f the Chongohon Chongohon river river t o t h e "Mine "Mine COntrol much t trouble Control Bureau" Bureau" in i n Pyongyang Pyongyang reports that thal; "there '%here is i s muoh r b u b l e in i n the the production production bsoauss because of the t h e laborers." 1aborarB." (SUEDE (SUEDE AS AS OM I IN N 63651, 53651, 16 Nov 51) 61)
Oommentilibile mine i8 is well well iidentified is an ankhraoita anthraoite Oomosttg While the Tokohon mine d e n t i f i e d as o o a l $~-r, s knom o bs at Kwannae. Kwannae. There is, coal "Frall"ar, no no mSne mine iis known t to be 1rx:atod located at is, however, s$ma low lowgrade grade lignite l i g n i t e produced produoed in in the th8 Sinanju Sinanju area area just just east east howeVer,VOme f u r t h e r pc:edibility poseibllity is 18 that t h a t the t h e Kwannae mine exploits of Kmnnfie. AAfurther Of Drannae. aIlnVial a l l u d a l deposits deposita of of monazite whiah which occur ooour with some frequenoy frequency in i n this this area. area.
, . -

-410P-SBARPTT-EFRODB-
A shortage of of labor, labor, particularly p a r t f o u l a r l y skilled s k i l l e d labor, labor, has has been been chronic chronio A shortage in North North Korea Korea since sinoe the the end end of o f World War 11. The exigencies of in Wax II. o f the the ourrent War /lama have d ivertad a f all a l l manpower into the the current war diverted a major major portion portion o of manpower into m i l i t a r y , with a consequent ooneequent further furf;har aggravation aggrauation of o f the labor problem. problem. military, with a
21 Nov 51
.10
mod
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression go to our website
HR70-14
%NI
W113 ssuRt,
NR
11. 1 1 .
KOREA. KOkEA. iAirfield OAirfield oonetrUotion oonetruotion work work south lrouth of of Pyongyang Pyongyang again again noted: nokedr ReReOZWUN aerial reconnaissance bas OdntUN aerial reoonnaieaanoe hasrevealed revealedconsiderable omeiderable repair repair at a$ OnjongOnjoagni n i airfield a i r f i e l d northwest northweet Of of Ohinnampo, Chimampu, with with all a l l except exoept ape one bomb bomb crater orater filled. filled. A new also obeervbd observadless Pyongnew airfield airfield was also l e e a than than ten tan miles milee southeast southeast of Fyongyang. m g *
Commas While the construction activity Conoasntr While the oonstruotion aotivityon onthese these fields f i e l d # has haa not reached the activity Sinanju area, r eaohm p rpresent e s e n t pitoh pitoh of a c t i v i t y at fields f i e l d o in i n the Sinanju area, it it
1`.7C-5)ECRET.--

1 -
8 8
21 21 Nov N O V 51 51
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE I 16-Dec-2009 DATE: 16-Dec-2009
D b. D.O.
.. .
ij
i is s interesting interesting t to o note note that that forward forward aairfields i r f i e l d s are arebeing beinOcept kept in repair repair and new It that these f fields are ourournew ones are a r e being built. built. I t is i s probable probablq t h a t these i e l d s are f m emergenoy emergenoy purposes purposes or or for f o r staging staging small small soale'harassing aoale' harassing attaoke attaoks r e n t l y for rently OD UN installations. in8taiiati011~~ on UN
12. 12.
North KoreanA: Koreantl offer o f f e r further further unacceptable unaooeptable peace peaoe demands: demandat On O n 19 19 November, NoVeMber, North North Korean Korean Foreign Foreign MinlstsrPak MinisterFak Run IIu n Yong addressed addressed a a communioaoommunioationrAo the gnited Nations in whiCh he repudiated Colonel Henley's charges of Communist-oonmitted atrocities in Korea, aooused the UN.of committing greater atrodities, and added a new note to the Communist peaoe offers. Pik proposed that all hostilities ()ease, the "just and reasonable" Commvnist I:mese-fire line be agreed to, all foreign troops withdraw from Korea, end those responsible'for atrocities against KOreans be severely punished.
-
the prfUfrof ourrent Communist propaganda. as inclusion of the punishment of those guilty for such atrocities in the demands for a cease!..fire is a hew note and would seem completely unacoeptable to the UN. Equally unaooeptable is the flat demand for withdrawal of foreign troops. This latter line, however, is a familiar one and has consistently figured in Connunist propaganda since the beginning of the war. Its resurrection at this time, along with the somewhat similar Vyshinsky proposal, does not bode well for the future smooth progress of the cease-fire talks.
13.
ROK enVisagelrelease of POIVIs originally-oonsoripted in South Korea by CommunistiFil joint US-ROK Army plan is under discussion oonoerning South Koreans oaptured by North Koreans, forcibly inducted into the Communist:army, and subsequently reoaptured by UN forces. The proposed plan Por this group, treated currently as POW's, is to distribute them throughout South Korean provinces "for reeducation and indoctrination." Pressure from relatiVes of the prisoners and the PORPs themselves haw protpted this plan. Apr proximately 50 peroent of the 40,000 nowinterned will-be released and carefully scrutinized by the South Korean arty in hopes that they (AA be salvaged for future military and oivilian use.
,
1
Comentr these plans, plans, the the ROK Reflecting these re... ROK National NationalAaSetbly Asremblyhas has reComment: Beflsoting o o l m uthat a ~ repentant repentent t Communists who desire desire tO t o beoome faithful f b i t h f u l oitizens oitizens commended Communists with ensuing privileges privileges may may do do ao so by by taking taking aa loyalty loyaltyoath. oath. It it was was with further proposed proposed tbt that comnittees oommittees be established established &n in all a l l local looal administrat tive t v e districts d i e t r i o t a to t o determine determine the t h e loyalty loyalty of.former of former Communists. This offer offer is probably also direoted direoted at at guerrilla g u e r r i l l a elements elemefrts in i n South South Korea.: Korea.

Comments
Pee's treatment of atrocities Was expeoted and falls into
. .
TMO fSEGRET____
- 9 9
21 21 NOY Nov 51 51
. _ . .
HR70-14
i
SUEDt
/.304 SI
NR :NR
'
FAR EAST FAR

NR
4. 4.
Sizeable food stockpile reported reported at Sizeable Communist Communist food ahSinuiju: Shuiju:
Army Security SecurityAgency Agency Korea Korea 19 IO Nov Nov 51 51
SUEDE SUEDE (it)
044
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE
ATE: 23-Mar-2010 ATE: 23-Mar-2010 VPPROVED

Three Three North North Korean messages messagesof of 18 18 November Novepber report the bordercity city of ob Sinuiju Sfxauiju report the status status from the border of there and 0 f foodstuffs stockpiled there and the the progress progress being made in constructing constructingunderground underground storage storage facilities. facilities.
-4-
-TOP-SECRET-SUEDE
'MP-SECRET- SUED`z"
One message message lists lists 45,881 of rice and 31,479 tons of of other other grains and .One 45,881 tons of 31,479 tons
vegetables.
-war reports Based on onprisoner-of prisoner-of-war Comment: Based that food comprises comprises the the daily diet of a that approximately approximately one kilogram of of food Communist soldier soldier in Korea, Korea, this Communist this stockpile stockpile would would provide a four-month four-month reserve theestimated estimated600,000 600,000 Communist Communist troops troops in in Korea. Korea. reservefor forthe
Althoughno noindication indicationis is given givenin inthe the messages messages Although as as to to the source source of of this t h i s food, food, it it is i sprobable probable that it was was collected collected from farmers farmersin innorthwestern northwestern Korea. Korea.
I
4
E X -TOP SECRET SUEDE SUEDE
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
AM lb
MIL
-110E-SEORET-StEDE-
'NR
6. 6 .
North i Korean messages % Kor&n % masages i
K0REA. $soable Sizeable Communist Communist food food etookpila stockpile reported re ortedaat Sinuijur Three Three KOREA. t Binuijur of e "border o f 18 18 November November from f'rom t tho Order o oity i f y oof'FinUip f ju report the status Peporb status of o f foodstuffs stockpiled stoakpiled there t h e r e and the progress progress being being
constructing underground underground storage storage f faoilities. OneMbeeage made in oonstruoting a o i l i t i e e . One mbssage llists ia-ts 45,881 Oons tons of rioe 0=1'31,479 tons of vegetables. 46,801 and 31,479 tons of other grains and vegetablee. (SMIDE AS CM CM IN S4275, 54275, 19 NOT Nov 51) ( S W E AS
Comments that Comment: Based on on prisoner-of-war prisoner~of-war reports report8 t h a t apProiimataly approximately One' one ' " k i l d g m f o o d comprises ocrmprlaea the the daily d a i l y diet d i e t Of of i a COmmUnist Comunlaf soldier solt35er ih In Korea, Korea,' kildg171717-food this would provide t h i s etookpile would pr4vide a a foUr-month four-month reserve reserve for f o r the the estimated estimated 600,000 i n Korea. 600,000 Communist troops in Korea.
.
AliJhough no indication indil;ation is i s given given in in the the messages messages as a8 to t o the+ t h e souroe souroe Although no o f this thia food, food, it it, is i s probable probable that that it it WAS was oolleoted oo3;lsated from f r o m farmers farmers in in of northwestern Korea. Korea. NR
-T0P-9Ee-leff-81333DB-
23 Nov Nov 51 51 23
SS
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 'APPROVED
HR70-14
-ITIP-SECRET- SUEDY
2-1-t
rg
FAR EAST
43. *3. ,
> -.-
reports Chinese desire" cease-fire: reports Chinese "genuinely "genuinely desire *'cease -fire:
,
Ireports a "general "general reports a impression" there there that that the the Chinese Chinese Communists, Communists, with the 38th nowwith their their forces forces near near the 38th parallel, now "genuinelydesire" desire" a a cease-fire cease-fire in "genuinely in Korea. 1 if the ceaserfire talks will etiffen, stiffen, and talks fail China's attitude will that the US cannot "drive back the Chinese and gain more favorable terms. "
have been reportingfor iiionths an "impression" of a genuine Chinese Communist desire for a cease-fire in Korea, and, at the same time, an unwillingness to make major concessions. Judging from Peiping's propaganda on Korea, the above views appear to be those which Peiping's leaders wish to encourage.
NR /NIR
- 4 4-
PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: l'6-Dec-2009 rPPROVED
Comment:
SUEDE SUEDE
......
HR70-14 HR70-14
'Doi) SECRET SUEDw

-TOP-SECRET-StrilDS"
NR
8. 8.
North KOREA. KkU. Aontinued Bonttwed ConnunieLpsepeTations Coxatmxtx-L.~earationefor. far oease-fire oesse-firre Seen: d e e m A No&h railroad IWQU<~,? r e g d h T ~ e a d x i m Korea sent a 1%7aln RIIIY;a7;;;Trity reg.rerre"TrinortheTkiiiiiii1G1%.ea.eenT a routine rOutine message requesting memage to eo its it8 headquarters headquartere in i nPyongyang Pyongyangon_21. on 21 Notrember November requeslting elarifioation "with olrrrifi.rus.t;S.on with regard regard to Bo drawing dradng up up a a list U e t of names nmes of of liberated liberated The mesnage indteatsa that the the message indicates m w serving serving in.our in bur unit." &l;* pr5vatea . , now privates "liberated privates": are either eithOr.conspripted. South Eorem Korean civilians liberated primha arb aoasarlpted Boulh oSvlMsuzs Or. c w (SUEDE u9 U8AFSS 088 CM IN 65319, 55319, 23 Nov 61) 61) captured military personnelo oaptured ROK military personnelo (811103
.
Comment! Comentt The The compilation oomplltrtiaa. of of suoh sush aa Iist Xet of o f former former 'South Sow& Korean perscagr now serving in thp Communist...army suggeets tthat preparatiOns pernoGGTZw ssrviug in the ~ o n ~ h m i eamy t auggasttJ h a t preparatioaa ate are being made made for f o r future future negotiations negotiations on 00 the t h exehange erohaags of of prisoners. prisoners.
9. 9.
CommUmist air from SarLmn Sariwon'in early Novtmber: NoveMber! Com~&i.sC d s unit w d t withdrawn. withdrawn from in early R e o e n ~ i air ~ meisages;WW-Alg ~ ~ ~ ~ the Che~ perfw ~ to Reoer115776illini-WoriE7Weam perfFri to 4 NoveMber Noventher suggest auggeet that that operations opesat5,ons from that Chat field f i e l d have have been been suspended, auspended,
although construction oonrrt;rur,tion activity aoeivity continuos. continma e
The Sariwon Sariwm airfield a i r f i e l d commander, aomIIIZ(ler, Chloe Choe Kun K u n Pil, Pil, was waa informed informed by by The A i r Headquarters Headquahere in i n Pyongyang Pyongyang that "your your wit Air unit aomtwndercl commanders are are being being transferred. He replied r e p l i o d on on 3 3 November Novanher that khat "there there will w i l l not not be be any auy trausforred." personnel remaining rrundning at at Sarivon." Saa*Pmn. personnel
-T6P-BEGRBT-BUBESI-
'6
26 Nov 51
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
'POP SECRET SUEDE'

-TOP-Ment-SUEDEOn November, however, Sariwon r: or,ted orted that that "we "we are are aonatruoting oonstruoting O n 4 Eovember, 1853, 1852, 1855, PyongyangP (SUEDE a0QOrding r a000rding to o or 1851, 185 , ariwon-Pyongyang, 5, 3, 4 Nov 51) 51) Sari:won, 1 1, 2, 2'lVmj 2 Nor; Sariwon, , 2,
.
These message8 messages suggeet suggest that that tho tbs personnel Involved involved i in this n thia installations. Thew insrtalhtione. relatiVely withdrawn further to the rear. rear. r e l a t i v e l y unprofitable unprofitable endeavor are being withdraw
Comments B nuMber of a small airfields the vidinity vioinity o of Sariwon are Coment: A number mdl d r f i e l d s in the f Sariwon suspeoted attacks on ON UN S U 6 p e of m being bases for f o r one and two-plane harassing attaaks
NR

TOP SECIIET SUEDE
7 7
26 Nov Nov 51 6 3 . 26
HR70-14
ItIP SECRET SUEDY

-TOP-aBetter-strErs8. 8.
,j/NR
possibly mission." oasibly IA-9 U-9 conventional oonventiond fighters, on on an an "aerial " a e r i a l combat oombat mission." (SUEDE AS, AA,CM ?SUEDE CM IN 55821, 55821, 25 Nov NOV 51) 51)
10. 1 0 .

t h e Korean a i r war. -the Korean air war.
Commentt regularly scheduled oonventional fighters r e g u l a r l y soheduled Uomentr The only conventional f o r -ombat misdions ChineseCommunist Communist messages are Are a a group group for PMir7Fombat missions ini n Chinese Melisages of I A - l l night fighters f i g h t e r s based a t Anshan. C o U a t e r a l Sourees, sourdes, of Soviet-led Soviet-led IA-11 at Anshan. Collateral however, however, have indicated indicatsd the the possibility p o s s i b i l i t y that t h a t ik-910 IA-9ls have been used uoed in in
There is i s some 8ome doubt doubt that the the Communists are are sending sending alrcraf't There aircraft to oombat from from KLrin ( e t least l e a a t 200 miles from the oombat oombat Kirin (at combat area), area), and this may may be be 4 c praotioe praotioe on on border patrol paCrol fight. fight.
KOREA. Koreaacoperated G C I net reported i n northwestern Korea: Re0en.t; iri7Torce field morae f i e l d enelyils analygis indicates indioates the t h e presence presenoe of o f an an active active ground ground This new net,
KOREA. Korean,operated OCT net reported in northwestern Koreas Recent controlled oontrolled intercept interoept net net using uaing the t h e Korean rbrean language. language. This new net, possibly looated in has reported both aerial aerial i n the t h e Sinuiju-Antung Ginuiju-Antun area, area, ha8 oombat oombat and and the t h e landing landing of of aircraft. a i r o r a f t . ?SUEDE (SUEDE hF58 ARSE; Korea Korea CM CM IIN N 66379, 55379, 23 Nov NOT 51) 63)
Comment:, Inasmuch as.North as _NorthKorean8 Koreans are are not not known known tto possess either Commontc Inasmuoh o possess either
jet flaWaTtor airoraft jet i w t o r airoraftor orradar, radar, it itis ispossible possib1.e that t h a t this thie net n e t employs employs visual visual means m a n s to t o supplemant supplemant the t h e known known Russian Russian GCI GCI radar net in i n this this area. area. There There is i s insuffioient i n s u f f i c i e n t information information available t to o oonjeoture oonjeoture on on the t h e Korean Korean netIA net's position position in i n the t h e air air defense defense of o f northwestern northweatern Korea. Korea.
Tor SPARET SUEDE

6 6
9. KOREA. Conventional Conventional fighters f i g h t e r s scheduled scheduled on on combat oombat mission: A A CRINA/KOREA. 9 , 'CHINA n i & kirin to t o MUkden W den on on 23 23 November November pohedu/ed eoheduled nine nine planes, planes, mossage;from Kirin
27 NV7 61
IAPPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 20-Mar-2010 (DATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
TOP SECRET SUEDE s I
TbP SECRET SUEDe

2 9 MN
HR70-14 HR70-14
c to.
NI
2. Communists Communists mav may be be accumulating accumulatingDrlsoner prisoner of ofwar wardata datafor for cease-fire cease-fire neiiotiations: negotiations:
Korea Clarification Clarlflcation was was requested requestedfrom fromPyongyang Pyongyang on Army Security SecurityAgency AgencyKorea 21 November 23Nov Nov 51 51 November by bya a North NorthKorean Koreanrailroad railroad secu14, 23 rtty and and training regiment "with "wtth regard regard to to SUEDE rity SUEDE (?,.nsudsrJ/t - S d O 77 drawing up a list of names of liberated privates suo II drawing up a list of names of liberated The message message identifiesthe identifiesthe "liberated "liberatedprivates" now serving in our unit. " The privates" ., . now South Koreans. as South as
- .
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010 DATE:

FAR EAST EAST FAR
-3 3 --
TOP SECRET SUEDE
-1146P-SEeRET-SUEDe
A n earlier An earlier message of of 14 14November November from a North Korean tactical division on the the west west coast to to one one of of its its subordinate subordinate regidivision on ments ordered that unit unit to to "report the of the the prisoners prisoners of ments the investigation investigation of of war and liberated troops will be assigned assigned in in the the future future in accordance with with the troops who who w i l l be prisoner of war investigation.. investigation.... o f war . ,"
tf
,Commenh: The coincidence of this Comment: this compilation with the the approach approach of of point pointfou? fourof ofthe thecease-fire cease-fire agenda agenda -- exchange exchange of prisoners of war -- suggests are prepreprisoners-of suggeststhe the possibility possibility that the Communists Communists are paring documentation documentation for for serious serious negotiation negotiation on point, on this this point.
--
--
IR NR

HR70-14 HR70-14
-TOPSGRET--
NR
15 . 15.
linter uniforms Manufactured for Chinese Communistss Winter uniforma manufactured fo r Chinese Communlstss factory in Tsinan ordered in September a uniform unifom factory i n was Tslnan waa ordered i1951 n 300,000 padded winter uniforms 200,000 fur-lined mili300,000 padded winter and uniforms and 200,000 fu-lined nlli' to t omanufacture manufacturb were procured i in Mid-September, and by by 1 1 n mid-September, tary jackets. jaakets. Raw materials ware 200,000 uniforms were were Completed and and en route route tto Nhnchuria. October 200,000 o ?danchuria. 1 191Nov 1 9 $ov 51) 51)
I-[
i n Hong Kong have reported t hat t extile f actories that textile factories Comments Comments Newspapers in caTITE-Rve been uniforms f for Chinese in C a v e beenmanufacturing manufacturing cotton,,padded cotton-padded uniforms o r Chinese "volunteers* in Korea since August. August. One report states that that 100,000 wvolunteers* October, with with another another 250,000 2500000 uniforms had been sent to t o Korea by early October, on order. order.
.
Since uniforms at uniforma are a r e presumably being manufactured also a t Shanghai, Tientsin, Tlentsin, and and other other major centers centers for f o r textile t e x t i l e manufacturing, manufacturing, the Chinese Chinesa Communists may be succeisful in Comnunists succeseful in i n clothing their t h e l r troops i n Korea this thi~ winter. wtnter.
KOREA. ICOREA.
18. 16.
North Koreans Koreans urged urged to t o conserve conserve foods foods "There "There is i s stillimuch stillimuch to t o be be conservation states pyongvang editorial e d i t o r i a l of conservationmovement, iEWERW-gites aa Pyongyang of 20 November. 20 November. Illegal I l l e g a l brewing of of r i c e sake, aulty rice sake, unneaeseary unnecessary rationing, rationing, f faulty storage and waste of storage of foods are 'tfeudalistic "feudalistic habits" habits" t that h a t must be be WliquG dated,* dated," it i t continues. continues. Despite Despite successful succeasful achievement achievement in i n the the production produckton of of food, food, it it is i s asserted asserted that t h a t food food conservation conservation must be be "realized." nrealized.~ (U ( U FBIS FBIS 20 Nov Nov 51) 51)
dons" in the the food rood azgr in
Comments a r t i a l l y supporting supporting an over half Commentt The The necessity neoessity of p partially an army of of over half a million m i addition to t o .8 8 million a in addition million civiUans,and civilians,and the the aevere severe agrioultural agricultural l o s q hwe left the North agriculture in in straitened straitened circirpopulation loesphamtlift population North Korean Koreamagriculture cumstances. It is i s believed believed that t h a t this t h i s year's f a l l harvest harvest w i l l be smaller smaller cumstances. It year's fall will than 19501s admittedlY admittedly poor poor output. output. Continuous Continuous demands demandsby by the, the party than 19501s party leaders prodUction and attest to serious leaders for f o r increased increased production and conserVation conservation a ttest t o the the serious condition. condition.
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
+e-swwF Tor SEOREN

10 10
28 Nov 51 28 Nov 51
' 5 9
.............
HK I u-fl 1-11-KlU-1
-T-OP-SEGRET-SUEDE-
NR /NR
8. 8.
g. 9.

"strafing" on the t h e night night of of 24 24 November. November. "strafing" on 2115Z, 26 26 Nov Eov 51) 61) ' 2115Z,
'
a e r i e n o e d "Soviet" " S o v i e t " fighters fightere practice practice strafing s t r a f i n g at at Anshan: Anehanr Twelve Experienoed U 1 1 oonventional fighters at a t Anahan were scheduled soheduled to t o practice practioe ZA-11 conventional fighters Anshan were
'
(SmDE Rouadup 246, 246, (SUNDE Air Air Foroe Force Roundup
Comment: A Soviet-oonCrolled group o f about Camment: A Soviet-controlled of about 25 &ll IA-11 oonventional conventional c a r r i e d out out nightly nightly patrols patrole into i n t o Korea Korea from f r o m Anshan fighters has; fighters ha* carried Anshan sinoe sinoe This message message suggests suggests that khat these t h e m aircraft aircraft, are are aleo alao early October. October. This early t r a i n i n g for f o r ground ground support support or o r harassing harassing operations7-whioh operations--whioh is f 8 in,contrast in oontraet training t o the"exolusively t h e exolueively defensive defensive r ole h itherto p k y e d by to role hitherto played by Soviet-controlled Soviet-controlled airorsf't in Korea. Korea. aircraft in
More SOviet-oontrolled 8dviet-oontrolled f ighter a i r o r a f t indioatsd More fighter airoraft indicated in in Manchuria; Manchuria: A A .message .meerrage from Antwig Antung tto o Mukden Mhkden stated t that h a t seven "Soviet" "Soviet" yAI[ YAK-15(?) l6Ej(?) jet .let Ten TA-11 U 1 1 oonventional t%g&ers. f i g h t e r s 'sere ware t to o leave fighters leave on on 24 24 November. November. Ten oonventional ftghters, with oviet p i l o t iin n the for "target "target viith a a SSoviet pilot the lead lead alroraf't, aircraft, were were scheduled scheduled for 66821 and pradtioe" on on 26 26 November November at at Changchun. Changchun. (SIEDE preetice" (SUEDE HQ HQ PAC PAC OM OM IN IN 55821 and 66006, 25 26 Nov Nov 51) 61) 56006,
-T4P-SEORR-SIJEDE-
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 DATE:
TOP SECAT SUEDE
28 Nov 51
99
c<
5-c
-TOP-SECRET-STEDE-
Comment: These messages meisages l indicate the Manchuria o of Comment: ndioate t h e existenoe in Manohuria f Soviet-controlled airoraft in addition MIG-16's i in Antung area and S oviewolled a iroran i n a d d i t i o n tto o MIO-15's n tthe h e Antung Chinese Communist Communist messages messages have have not not previously previously Ili711's at at Anshan. Anshan. Chinese U-ll's referred inferior to r e f e r r e d to t o "Soviet" "Soviet" TAL-151s YAK-lS1s (an (an older o l d e r jet j e t aircraft, aircraft, i nferior t o the the U-11 ooqventional oonventional TG-15), MIG-16), ind bndthis t h i smessage messagemay maybe begax4bIed. garbled, While LA-11 fighters no , f i g h t e r s at a t Anshan h h m have have occasionally oooasionally been been referred r e f e r r e d to t o as as "Soviet:' "SovieG1 no LA-ll's were Were known U-U's known to t o be based based at at Changchun. Changohun.
10.

-TOP-SECRET-NEDB5
KOREA. North Korean seourity mutiny": The 8 KOREA. N o r t h ,Korean 8eourit.y regiment "anticipates "antioipatos mutiny": th 8th rii171.ent, railway security andt r training unit looated located near near *he the Chongjin Chongjin e n % , aa railway se o u r i t y and a i n i n g unit Reservoir, n o t i f i e d its its divisional d i v i s i o n a l headquarters.on headquarters on 23 23 November November that that an Reservoir, notified i n d i v i d u a l in i n the the regiment regiment had been been "gathering "gathering his h i e members for f o r approxiapproxiindividual mately ton t e n days. days. . out .out the the obmmunioations o o m m i o a t l o n s line l i n e and and shot shot the t h e responsible responeible officer o f f i c e r of o f each eaoh seotionr seotion" before deserting. deserting. The message "We message. oonoludedt oonoluded: fte
an
anticipate mutiny." A a n t h i p a t e mutiny." A second seoond regimental regimental message measage stated-that s t a t e d t h a t 62 62 individuals individuals were inV07.ed invo4vved and and that that a a pursuit p u r s u i t had had been been organized. organized. (SUEDE were (SUEDE AS AS CM IN 55620 65620 and 56621, 56621, 24 24 Nov Nov 51) 51.)
Oornmentr h e division d i v i e i o n and t a regiments Comments Message8 Messages between t the and i its regiments ovor over a p e r i o m v e r s lweeks weekshave have indioateld indiaatdd t h a t desertions deaertions a re a peridalTITIVeral that are a oontinuing continuing in th e past c i d e n t s have i m i t e d tto o f lve problem, although pilobleon, although in the pastthese thesei n inoidents havebeen been llimited five individuals i n d i v i d u s l s or o r less. lese. The The present present "mutiny" "mutiny" is i s on he l a r g e s t scale w a l e noted noted on t the largest t o date d a t e and indicated indiaated that that divisional d i v i s i o n a l mathorities a u t h o r i t i e s are still s t i l l unable to to to control t this control. h i s security a e a u r i t y problem. problem.
28 Nov NOY 51 51 28
-TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Re lele 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0090060001-0
ff!!!tIti=
...29. November .1951
25X1
145
DAILY DIGEST
DIA AND DOS REVIEW COMPLETED
25X1
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.represent the

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re Nide 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C400060001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
POLAND. New identity cards to be issued: In a decree dated 22 October the Polish Government provided for the issuance of identity cards to all Polish civilians over 18, except lunatics, and over 16 if employed and not under parental care. These cards All provide the sole documenta tion of the individual, will replace the domicile registration cards which were renewed last March, and will be valid for five years. Local rumor links the issuance of these new cards to full rationing, although the US Embassy in Warsaw regards them as a step by the government to obtain fuller control of the population.
.
25X1
25X1
Comment: The issuance of the new carda will probably proceed at once, although present information does not specify this. Less than a year ago the Polish Sejm decreed a new system of personal identifica tion documents. Under that decree a comprehensive registration of all Polish civilians was made late last winter. Probably the new registra tion and the issuance of the identity cards will be checked against the earlier registration.
2.
New rationing regulations to be issued to combat meat shortage: US Embassy.Warsaw reports that new regulations are being issued for meat ration.cards in December and that the cards will have to be validated by the block warden. In cohnection with the new regulations workers are being urged to surrender their meat cards "voluntarily', for use by the Army. A decree to this effect is expected by the Embassy. That the meat situation is serious is.also indicated by recent propaganda to popularize horse meat in Poland, a country long accustothed to something better than horse flesh. In addition in late October the Government announced a special two year plan for meat production. Finally a plan for hunting 1.2 million hares was announced with the stipulation that the plan must not be exceeded, probably because of the ammunition involved and a desire to protect the stock from extinction.
25X1
'
The Embaesy comments that as living conditions have worsened be cause of shortages, rising unrest is rumored even within the Communist Party.
Commentt Unrest and dissatisfaction has been apparent during the past-several months among the population at large, though so far there has been no.report of.trouble within the Communist Party.

TOP SECRET
1
If the workers are forced to surrender their meat ration cards to
29 Nov 51
Approved For Re Range 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,600060001-0

TOP SECRET
.the Army, unrest will be further aggravated. The purporie of urging suCh Meat contributions to the Army is unclear. However it may indicate a lack of meat stockpiles for the military which can be drawn upon, ar a desire not to deplete existing stockpiles;
RUMANIA. ilumania again denies knowledRe of American plane: In response to the latest American representations) the Rumanian Foreign Office has again informed the American Charge in Bucharest that it has no information regarding the missing American plane. Deputy Foreigm Minister, Bunaciu, stated that "naturally" his government would inform the US Lagation of "any news concerning the plane.
25X1

TOP SECRET
2
Comment: In response to a US verbal inquiry as to the whereabouts of the plane, the Rumanian Government initially protested against the alleged 19 November violation of its border. On 20 November, Foreign Minister Pauker called the American Charge, demanded more information concerning the plane and registered a further oral protest. Since that date, the Foreign Office has informed the Legation that while a search has been made, it has no information regarding plane and crew.
29 Nov 51
Approved ForRele 2002/08/21 :CIA-R131379T01146A0G0800600010

TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
25X1
INDIA, Numerous Political parties to contest natigua_olsigaug: AcCording to an Indian broadcast of 25 November, 11 political parties in the State of Uttar Pradesh have entered candidatee ig the forthcomin general elections. In Madras State, 19 parties are participating'.
25X1
.gammats with thie number of parties participating, there is bound-to be 'confUsion at the polls. The division of the opposition into so many political parties should ensure the victory of the well-established Congress Party in the elections, despite the loss of many of its Members during the past year.
-
2.
.
25X1C
25X1 C
1
The Burma Communist Party, was to sponsor a "World peace congress"during November Other insurgents including the Karene of' eastern Burma and the Colimunist Party (Bur41 were invited to send delegates. Ithe congress may well mark a further step designed to tighten the BCP-Karen alliance and to consummate generil insurgent collaboration. r
s
.
BURMA.

Communist "peace
oongress"
25X1A
are referred to is an alliance. The Karens of eastern Burma are the most cohesive group, militarily and politicaily, and it is doubtful that they have yet reached the stage where an alliance with the Communists would be deemed necessary.
Comment: Communist efforts to win Karen support have been under way for some tithe. However, this ie the first time that their relations
25X1 25X1
3.
BURMA/7.HIEW
S
th a
Accordiny
lestimatp of Communist intentions in.
the 'Chinese Communists will not attack Burma for the present--1 no matter how 'great the provocations of Li Mi's activities. These sources state that Chinese Communist strategy entails fullscale military intervention in Indochina, a war of nerves against Thailand and intensive political activity in Burma.
I
25X1
25X1
Comment:
25X1
Southeast Asia,
This report is a somewhat watered-down version of the regarding Chinese Comiunist intentions towards
4.
THAILAND/MALAYA, Increased Communist activities reporteda According to press reportsjrubber plantation strikes are spreading from Malaya
TOP SECRET
3
29 Nov 51
Approved For Re Ittgat 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W0060001-0

TOP SECRET
'Into southern Thailand. The strikes have been for higher wages and have been marked by occasional seizures of owners and'foremen:. The. Thai Government's English language outlet, the PanRkok Tribune, blames the trouble upon Chinese Communists.who have infiltrated'into Thailand from Malaya. The US Embasey in Bangkok points out that the wage issue appears to be merely a pretext, since the laborers on these plantations already receive a 70 percent cut of the income from all latex which tap. The Embassy also comments that this development mey signify a shift from the "peaceful" attitude of Malayan bandits while in Thailand to a program of active terrorism.
1
-
25X1
5.
25X1
INDOCHINA, Vietnamese Premier denies extreme nationalist demandss Premier Tran Van Huuj now in Paris as head of the Vietnamese delegation to the High Council of the Trench Union, press reporta that he would insist that has expressed surprise at' the French Union be modeled after the British Commonwealth. ac ording to the French newspaper Figaro.
Comment: Aside from this denial, Premier Huu has been making increasingly nationalistic utterances in.connection with Vietnam's pesition in the French Union. These statements are probably more a reflection of Huula quarrel with General de Lattre--as a result of which Huu has felt obliged to seek popular supportthan of any genuine hope on Huu's part that he can persuade the French Government to accept an equal voice in the French Union with Vietnam. The Vietnameae, although aWare of their weak bargaining position, will probably be somewhat more outspoken at the forthcoming been in the past, and may cause the French conference than they have considerable embarrassment by their demands.
6.
INDONESIA. Success in West Java security campaign is doubtful: The gevernment's security campaign in West Java is reported nearing 'pletien. comGuarded press releases report the capture of dissident bases but admit that the Majority of the guerrillas have broken into small bands and escaped. The US Army Attache comments that, considering the disaidents' opportunities to escape and reassemble later, the success of the goVernmentis campaign is doubtful. government troops leave the area, an early He feels that as soon as resurgence of dissident atrength is likely.
1
Comments Inereased police activity along both sides of the ThaiMalayan border has been noted in recent weeks. The strikes in seuthern Thailand may be the Communists' reply to the increasingly aggressive Thai actions to denY them sanctuary from British forces.
25X1
TOP SECRET
29 Nov 51
Approved For Re Imse 2002108121 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C090060001-0

'TOP SECRET
COmtentr This is the pattern which previous security campaigns-haVe followed. 'Security improves somewhat atii long as government troops are in the area but rapidly deteriorates when they are withdrawn.
It had been hopedthat following the appointment to West Java of Col. Kawilarang, considered the best tactical commander in Indonesia, operations would take on increased efficiency. However, Kawilarang has had to cope with the same difficulty which faced his predecessore-poorly trained troops opposed by guerrilla ferces who are able to disappear, when hard pushed, into the local population.
-
7.
25X1
The term "Peonles'Fighting Army" appears in Indonesia: The US Army Attache reports that the term "Peoples' Fighting Armya appeared for the first time six weeks ago and is being used with increasing frequency in decidedly Communist areas.1
1
25X1
Comnent: This report does not itdicate which areas are considered "decidedly Communiat" or in what circumstances the term "Peoples' Fighting Army" has been used.
For several years Communist armed strength has been concentrated in Central. Java but has been relatively inactive there since 1948. During recent months there have been indications of a consolidation under Communist direction of lawless activity in West Java. It is probable that the term has appeared in this area.
Communist and Communist-led military units have operated chiefly as lodal armed gangs bearing individual names. If an over-all name has been given to Communist-directed armed Strength, indicating an organized approach to military activity, this development would parallel the united front tactics instituted several months ago on a political level.
8.
Riots occur in Flores: A belated Indonesian news release reports that large acale riots occured in Flores (an island in the Lesser Sunda group) on 27, 28 and 29 October. The riots developed over an attempt by the PKTI (meaning of abbreviation undisclosed) to force radical changes in the traditionally feudalistic land tenure system. The conservative element of the population resisted violently, resulting in 112 killed, 50 wounded, 3500 evacuated to safer areas, and an undisclosed number of houses burned. Following intervention by the Army and police, instigators of the incidents were arrested and a "form of martial law" was established.
TOP SECRET
5
29 Nov 51
Approved For Rehmose 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A014000060001-0

TOP SECRET
The up ArmY Attache comments that the riots in Flores are "typical" Of-the-Christian Populationle resistance to attempted changes in their
cc:din:1nel methode-of administering land and crop yields: He atatea that CoMmuniet Connections with the riots are possible but unconfirmed; the PKTI'may refer to the Communist Farmers Party of Indonesia. He also Cites the possibility that the incidents were caused by resentment toward agricultural chengea nronored by the central government.
25X1
9.
25X6
10.
CHINA. Soviet training program for Chinese forces in Manchuria deseseed: Up to 50 Chinese Communist divisions may be involved in the 'current Soviet-SuperVised re-equipping and training program centered in Manchuria, according te preliminary US Far East Command analysis; Training in the combat arms is believed to constitute the major part 'of this program.
Confirmed reports of the departure of Chinese Communist troops from.South and East China towards Manchuria'since late 1950, and the failure of these troops to appear in the Korean war, form the basis for FECOMIs analysie.
-
Far East Command further believes that the supplying of Soviet equipment to troops currently in Korea is a measure to enable China
TOP SECRET
29 Nov 51
Approved For ReNmpie 2002108/21 : CIA4RDP79T01146A0Q800080001-0
TOP SECRET
25X1
tO remain in the Korean war until the 50 divisions in Manchuria, modernly eduipted and trained, are ready for combat.
I
A Soviet program for training andre,equipping Chinese communist trbund forces in Manchuria has been frequently reported,-but nothing is reliably known of the scope of such a program.
11.
Comment:

TOP SECRET
7
KOREA. Five enemy twin-let aircraft encountered oVer Korea: During the'hight of 22 November, a UN medium bomber encountered five enemy twin-jet night interceptor aircraft over the Uiju target area on theKorean-Manchutian border. The enemy aircraft followed clpiely behind the B-29 and criss-crossed over it for 25 minutes, finally breakihg off some'20 miles west of Hamhung on the east coast. The bomber crew16 identification of the enemy aircraft "strongly indicates.. . a Type 8 twin-jet (Russian version of the German ME-262).T In at least one instance an enemy plane was visible in searchlight beams from the ground.
.
25X1
Of additional interest in this encounter is the fact that all indications point to the enemy aircraft being vectored into the B-29 bv ground-controlled intercept radar rather than by airborne radar.
Comment] While UN bombers have regularly encountered similar aircraft In isolated incidents over North Korea, this is the first encounter id which a group of more than three was, sighted and in which a seemingly positive identification could be made.
29 Nov 51
Approved For Re Ala 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001490060001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
MSTERN)
GENERAL. Canadians requested to give economic aid to Europe: NATO committee examining politico-economic The special capabilities of its mexthers has proposed that Canada in 1952 extend 200 million dollars in economic aid European member nations. to In its view, adding Canada to the US of economic aid would have an important as a source psychological effect in Europe and would greatly facilitate passage of the 1952-53 Mutual Security Agency appropriations by the US Congress.
25X1
The Canadian Finance Minister objected that the defense 1952-53 represent the maximum portion proposals for of its gross national product that Canada can contribute, The Minister of Commerce and Defense Production te however, that these problems did not seem serious. Canada is a strong supporter of NATO and is somewhat selflits military commitments. may well meet this request. Therefore, it
Comment:
25X1
25X6
conscrEF1MOutl
The Canadian decision will be influenced by the rate of US purchases in Canada. In the first six defense months of 1951 Canada ran a 344million-dollar deficit with the US, the second largest in history. deficit is mainly attributable to This defense purchases decision to standardize its military resulting from its equipment with the United States.
2.
25X1
GERMANY. Adenauer o.timjstic for early com letiOn of contractual ventions: West German conhancery officials repor IFTO-Tdent that complete t a C ance or A enauer agreement can be reached on all the details or to the General Agreement shortly after Christmas.
It is quite likely that negotiations on the new political will not be completed as soon as Adenauer will. Yet his optimism hopes they is significant, present he has no unexpressed exorbitant since it may indicate that at demands to present to the Allied negotiatora. The absence of such demands would augur well for rapid progress in the negotiations reasonably and for their eventual successful pletion. com-
Comment:
staturMF-Tiermany
3.
FRANCE. De Lattre may be ready to relinqUish his Indochina de.Lattre osts se General s prose.. y resignation as High COmmissionere source o rumors pre ng his in Indochina, according to French official. It is quite likely a well-placed that the general wante to leave
TOP SECRET
8 29 Nov 51 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-R0P79101146A000600060001-0
Approved For Re Image 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00490060001-0

TOP SECRET
25X1
Indochina while he,is still at the height of his success; particulat since ths fulfillment of French desires in that area is increasingly uncertain. It is also possible that he has politidal ambitions, which could lead him into the Gaullist camp or into accepting an important diplomatic post.
25X1
Cement: The persistence of these rmnors recently led the French Minist-FF-nar the Aseociated States to deny that De Lattre's repladement is under consideration.
General de Lattre's health has been in Indochina and he might resign en this probably disrUpt the military effort and position to France's continued burden in
.
adversely affected by his service account. _His departure Would thus increase parliamentary opIndochina.
4.
SPAIN.. Intensification of COMMunist intelliS ance activities reported: 2The STIEnh Communist Party (PCE): is 'reportedly planning to reorganize its guerrilla brigades in Spain into an intelligence net'with the primary mission of gathering information at Spanish ports on arrivals of US war material. According to the same report, the majority Of PCE political cadres in Spain have been destroyed as a'result of pollee repression and two independent sources have stated that the PCE has been trideraoine a.ourae in Spain for. about six months. /
. .
25X1
25X1
Comment: PCE political end guerrilla activities within Spain have been largely ineffective for several years because of poor morale and police repression. ..The morale problem has been particularly evident ameng ICE eXiles in France who, because of disillusionment tith the motives of the USSR and lack of trust in ICE leadership, have been unwilling to join the guerrilla brigades or undertake other missions inside Spain. In view of the PCE's political and numerical weakness, it:seems quite likely that it has been directed to focus its principal effort on the collection of intelligence and that it is now in the process of tightening up organization and security in anticipation of a US-Spanish military pact
'
S.
25X6
TOP SECRET
9
29 Nov 51
APproved For Re lege 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79101146A0411800060001-0

TOP SECRET
25X6
6.
7.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.
east tip of Africa, Jordan and Israel, according to Chief of the General Staff du Toit, He is violently opposed to the idea of a Turkish ground forces commander, maintaining that South Africans would refuse to fight
proposed aiddle East Command: The Union of South Africa is interested in the formation of a Middle East Command only as it would affect the north25X1
under a ^non-European." The US Military Attache believes that these views are shared by Defense Minister Erasmus. I
TOP SECRET

South Africa has reservations on participation in
10
29 Nov 51
Approved For Re look 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400060001-0
TOP SMUT
Comment: This:is the first 'autheritetiVe delimitation of South Africa's commilmenkto send one Armored divisien Without equipment
.
to aesist in the defense of the Middle East against Communist aggression. Since final plans for the proposed Command have not yet been Agreed on, South African troops may not be called on to serve under a Turkish comnander.
25X.1
.DominIE.1777viali4onary
TheDominican Government claims that the Quetzal, owned hy Miguel A. Ramirez, was not mseizedo. outside Dominican wsters, but Was yoluntarilibrought to a Dominican port by itecaptain, who haa now beertreinstated.in the Deminican navy.... Crew members were tried for activity'against the DominiCan Government, which may possibly welcome an OAS investigation as a..means of:publicizing Revidencest obtained with the Quetzal of Cuban complicity in Dominican revolutionary activities.
.
_COMMeei:
8, 'CUBAGUATEMALA. dovernMents protest, DOMiniCath actiOn.to Organization of American States:. The Cuban and Guatemalan Governmentehave protested to the Inter-Americen.PeaCe.,Comdisaion of.the Organization of American:States over the Dominidan Government's capture, trial, and sentencing 'three Suatemalan.creflembers of the'vesselQUOtzal. _The of five Cuban and. men have been. sentenced to thirty yearelard labor The State insists that."we cannot admit that any.coUntry. has. the right to illegally apprehend outside its territory Cuban citizens who have not committed any crime, much less-that they be tried 'and dondemned.P1
al-annistry. of
25X1
9.
25X1
PANAMA., :Foreici Minister expresses appreciation ofimportance of Panama F.E7Thtry problems The Panamanian Foreign Minister informed the US lmbassador on 27 November that he had not yet had an opportunity to.study the.possibility of strengthehing.laws and regulations governing the transfer of vessels from Panama registry but mind do so as soon as possible. According to Ambassador Wiley, the Foreign Minister showed.keen apprediation of the.importance of the matter and of the, urgent desirability of atteipting to meet the sittationi. but explained that preoccupation over the domestic politioal situation had to this time precluded-attention to anything else.
I
25X1
:documents.-
Comment: Panamanian Foreign Minister Molino tends to.create the impression that he can and will take.action on US requests sooner than,is in fact the case. On 19. (*taper he assured AMbassadorliley.that he would give thorough study to the question of extension of Panamals.Control.over. : ships of its.registry. A week later he expreeped the belief that a new law or decree waeunnecessary since any application for transfer could and would .be held up for four to eix months by bureaucratic red tape.. Inlact, however, Panama law'does'not prohibit the voluntary surrender of Panama registry
.
TOP SECRET
29 Nov 51 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79101146A000600060001-0
11
s
Approved For Relate& 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP79701146A004p0060001-0
TOP SECRET
It -is:true that the domestic political preclude attention to external affairs, bUt situation has been such as to there has been no significant amelioration of this situation in recent meas. Speedy adoption of-the::. new law or issuance of a decree continues, therefore,
to be questionable
10.
VENEZUELA. US .Steer subsidiary ready te beiin' Mining operations:- The Orinoco gluing 'Company, a US Steel subsidiary, has agreed to dredge the Orihoco and Macareo rivers for use in transporting .iron ore from its .venezuelan. dencessiOns. Irving 5.1 Olds, chairman of the Board. of US. Steel,. said that the dredging viill start soon, and that- ore mav- begin to reach ths up by early 1954e
I
1
25X1.
-
US Steel had already begun construction Bolivar deposits of eastern Venezuela. and other preliminary work, but not legally begin minin.g operations could until 'it had agreed to devolop traneportatiOn routes satisfactory to the Venezuelan Government.. Bethlehem Steel, which .has smaller depesits nearby, has been shipping about 60l000 tons per month over a different route.since last April.'
.

TOP SECRET
12
Comment: The dredging: agreement is the product of years 'of dickering over the mining. of. the nabuloUsn Cerro
.
29 Nov 51
25X1

- Approved F
25X1
elase 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T011a1r4000600060001-0
TOP SECRET 29 November 1951
CIA No. 49438-A

Copy No.
45
25X1
TO ME DAILY DIGEST
25X1
reports has been This summary of significant Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of Current current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage of allComments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

prepared primarily
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release
21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600060001-0
25X1 -rook
Appr;ved For Re leilefi 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,90060001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1.
AUSTRIA. Leaks weaken Western strategy on Austrian treaty: The French influenced radio in Dornbirn, Austria, broadcalt attributed to uauthoritative US circlesu that.a on 25 November a report new Western move will be made within a few weeks to resume Austrian treaty discussions basis." The French Government on new is alleged to have received these with great reserve. The substance proposals of French Information Service, appeared this broadcast, attributed to the in a Viennese Communist newspaper under a Washington dateline on 27 November, and earlier in the issue of the Parin Pignrn November
25X1
Comments While a leak on Western strategy appears to have taken place within the French Foreign Office, the Austrian Vice Chancellor himself caused copSiderable speculation in the Communist press he remarked that certain clauses some weeks ago when Of the old draft treaty may meaning, now have no
Premature disclosure of Western plans will give the Soviet Union opportunity to adapt its position and ample to exploit Western differences. West's sincerity in offering to Ile settle on the basis of the old draft also be brought into question, may ganda offensive to place full and some of the impact of a proposed propa7 responsibility for the fai/ure of on the Russians may well be lost. agreement
21
25X6

TOP SECRET
Nov 51
HR70-14 HR70-14
ks
09.9vov c
(1?
FAR FAR EAST

2. Experienced EbcperiencedSoviet Saviet fighters fighters practice practice strafing strafingat atAnshan: Anshan: 2.
US i r Force US A Air 10 Nov 51 ! # $ 51 I SUEDE

ki
3. Soviet Soviet training forChinese Chinese forces forcesin in Manchuria Manchuria assessed: trainingprogram ro ram for
L2_8 Nov 51

stitute the major part of this program.
1
Comment: The The lead aircraft of this this group group w as Comment: aircraft of waa Russian-v -- Efliv -who has been leading LA-11's on piloted by by the the same Russian -- who leading night combat combat patrols into into Korea from Anshan Anshan since early early October. October. Chinese to these theseAnshan-,based AnshanAbased LA-11'.s LA-1 1ls as Communist, Communist,messages messages occasionally occasionally refer refer to "Soviet. s the suggesting tthat b t these "Soviet. " This message message i is the first first suggesting theseaircraft aircraft are training for night night offensive operations ---which which would would be be in in cohtrast contrast to the exclusively defensive defensive role hitherto played played by Soviet-controlled in by Soviet-controlled aircraft aircraft in Korea.
3/ ) 2 / 1 5 2f
2"
According to to an an intercepted Chinese Communist According Communist message, one LA-9 and twelve LA-11 message, one LA-9 and LA-11 convenconventional fighters atAnshan Anshan ,were ,were Scheduled Scheduled to fighters at practice-"straf ingrl.on thenight night of of 24 24 November. November. practice "strafing" on the
Up to 50 Chinese Communist divisions may be involved in the current Soviet-supervised reequipping and tr. ini Manchuria, Training in the combat arms is believed to con!-1.
departure of of Chinese Chinese Confirmed reports Confirmed reports of the departure South and China towards lateCommunist troops Communist troops from South and East East China towards Manchuria Manchuria since late 1950. troops to to appear appear in the Korean war, 1960. and the failurA nf theRPtroops war1
I
Ithe the supplying of measure to to supplying of Soviet Sovietequipmint equipmentto totroops troopspresently presently in in Korea Korea is is a measure enable China remain in in the the Korean Korean war war until until the the 50 50 divisions divisions in in Manchuria, Manchuria, China to to remain ready for for combat. combat. modernly equipped modernly equippedand andtrained, trained, are ready
-4 4 --
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE 22-Mar-2010 iATE: DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 VPPROVED
Comment: Sovietprogram program for for training and Comment: 4 Soviet groundforces forces in Manchuria has been reequipping Chinese Communist ground nothing is is reliably reliablyknown known of the scope of frequently reported, but butnothing of such a program.
VR
4.
5 .

-5 5 -
HR70-14
-4012-SEGRET--SUEDr
NR
11. 11,
K O m , . Soviet Soviet "teohnioians" "technioiane" remain remain in i n Korea: Koreat A 21 2 1 November plain plain text text KOREA. 715773;17,e fram Pyongyang compleaETThat North Pyoagan Pyongan province province message from S i nSinuiju u i j u t o to Pyongyang co m p h m a t North
will because o Orthe will not not be given any funds because f the freezing f r e e z i n g of of the t h e "7th "7th term term budget." budget." message adds t that "the Russian Russian ttechnician will not not be be authorized authoriZed tto The message h a t "the e c h n i c i a n Will o (SUEDE CM IN IN 65195, 65196, (SUEDE AS CM propose the plan p l a n for for produetion production in i n the the ymar year 1951." 1 9 6 1 . " Sinuiju-Pyongyang, Sinuiju-Pyongyang, 22 Nov Nbv 51)
Comment: Prior t to of 1950, it was wee believed believed that that Comment; o the outbreak o f war in 1950, betweTirrarand betwe--and 1,000 1,000 Soviet S o v i e t personnel personnel wre wereserving serving in i n various varioua industrial, industrial, mining and Korea,for the purpose purpose of of safeand businees business establishments establishments in i n North Korea.for safeguarding Soviet interests. The oryptio guarding Soviet ecionomio eooaomio interests. he S oviet cryptic statement statement tha-b that t the Soviet technician t e c h n i c i a n "will '%ill not n o t be authorized authorized to t o propose t the h e pLan plan f for o r produation" production" apparently represents apparently reprosonte a a reversal r e v e r s a l of o f previous previous praotices. praotioes.
NR INR
feEt-sseRBT-seDE-
5 5
2 9 Nov Nov 51 51 29
"1,))
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0
Approved For Rel
e 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001160070001-9
TOP SECRET
30 November 1951
CIA No. 49439
Copy No.
145
DAILY DIGEST
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*

Oftice of Current Intelligence
MOD SECRET
/
Approved For Re brie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP791111146A004100070001-9
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. rosIrldil Visit to Tashkent related to poor cotton harvest: The US Embassy in Moscow believes that the presence of A. N. Kosygin at the 7 NoVember celebration in Tashkent may be related to difficulties encountered with the cotton harvest in the Uzbek SSR. The Embassy observes that Kosygin, as Minister of Light Industry, is probably the Politburo membermost concerned with the cotton harvest, whioh is .closely'connected with the development of textile production. This' action recalls a similar visit of trouble-shooter Kaganovitch to theUzbek 25th anniversary celebration in Tashkent following a bad cotton year. (R Moscow 506, 23 Nov 51)
2.
RUMANIA. Rumanian labor frozen: A. 20 November decree ty the RUmanien Government plades new restrictions on workers' transfers. Management may now release them from contracts only for specified reasons, such as conclusion of work, health, transfer of spouse, etc.'.,Stitt: 'penalties are provided for violating the decree by forging medical certificates or by hiring workers without proper separation documents; management may also be penalized for refusing separations where valid reasons exist. Oi Bucharest 222; 23 Nov 51)
Comments The Rumanian regime is attempting to consolidate further its Oontrol over manpower. The creation in April of a General Direeterate of labor Reserves (OCI Daily Digest, 28 May 51) provided for recruiting, training and distribution of the labor force; the new decree is directed at reducing turnover.
3.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia appeals for additional financial assistance: In an informal appeal to the Tripartite delegations for assistance, the Yugoslays estimate that $70-80 million will be needed to complete the present investment program in addition to the International Bank loan of 28 million dollars and excluding compensation loans now being discussed in Washington.
Tripartite delegates believe that the IBRD should provide a second loan of 30 million dollars, which would leave an additional 50 million dollars needed to fulfill the needs of the Yugoslav investment program. (S Belgrade TOECA 239, 26 Nov 51)
Comment: The US Embassy in Belgrade warned ECA officials last week that Yugoslavia urgently needs additional funds for capital investment over and above the new IBRD loan.

'
TOP SECRET',
1
30 Nov 51
Approved For Reimese 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOS00070001-9

TOP SECRET
Last June the US, UK and France made the assumption that the IBRD. would furnish sufficient capital development funds. The YugobleV economic position, however; is such that unless additional capital ie provided, certain key investments will not be completed and production *ill not be realized. In the abisened of this production, the trade deficit will hot be balanced without raising by some 35 million dollars the 125 million dollar ceiling agreed to last June.

TOP SECRET
2
30 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDPf9T01146A000600070001-9
Approved For Rersob Se 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004000070001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
SYRIA. Military coup d'etat engineered on 29 November: The day-old LWITan Cabinet of Maruf al-Dawalibi was arrested early on.29,November when the government was taien over by the army under the leadership of the Chief of Staff, Colonel Adib al-Shishakli. According tO the US Legation in Damascus, the immediate ocoasion-for the coup was the assumption bY the deposed Prattler of the defense portfolio. Shishakli apparently believed that his own position was threatened and decided to Throe a showdown with the Peopulist Party. (0 Dement's 306, 29 Nov 51)
Comments The military coup d'etat in Damascus, an essentially internal affair, re-emphasizes the dominant position of the Syrian Chief -of Staff, Col. .Shishakli;who for-the past two yearth&bitaintained-thebindthe-scenes control oter governmental affairs. This madden military action will probably put an indefinite clamp on influential Populist Party leaders, who have been attempting to eliminate military control of the country.
Shishakli is essentially an opportunist, intent pn maintaining his. own strong .position'in Syria. Since neutralism is strong in this country, hiris not likely.to direct Syria'into a closer relationship with the West. Shishakli has been appreciative of French arms shipments, but annoyed over the lack of similar military supplies from America and Britain. He A.s not believed to be sympathetic to the USSR. He is opposed to a Syrian-Iraqi
Union and haMfriendly relations with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
This ooup d'etat, the fourth in the last two and a half years, underscores the inetability of Syria. Even though the military-controlled government may, in the short run, prevent Syria from eMbarking on an anti Western foreign polioy, the establishment of a dictatorship encourages further violence.
2.
IRAN. Mbseadeq victory antioipated in Iranian Parliamentary elections: The TWElan Prime Minister-has announced that the coming elections will be "free" and that the government will not support any particular Candidate. Neverthe, less, Mossadeq's National Front, through ito sympathizers now established in the provincial governments, is in a position to oontrol the electoral machinery. The Shah, Who reportedly fears that Mbssadeq will allow dissident elmments to enter the next Parliament; has extended support to sOme of Mbssadeq's opponents among the tribes. (4 Tehran 1973, 28 Nov 51)
Comments Iranian tradition and electoral law make it impossible to hold WiTraeotions lin the American sense of the word. The coming elections are unlikely to depart from the traditional pattern. Presenre from the

TOP SECRET
3
30 Nov 51
Approved For Rehbeee2001/09/06:QA-FHDP79T01146A0046.0070001-9
TOP SECRET
army, the landOwnere and the British will influence the outcome, but all indiCatiens now point to a National Front victory. The Shah's fear that the COmmunists and.their sympathizers maY gain a foothold in Parliament is not unfounded, for the Tudeh Party is reportedly aotively attempting to engineer the elections of its members, disguised as National Frontists, end Nesse deq's lenient attitude toward the Tudeh suggests that it May succeed.
3.
Shah seriously depressed over turn of events in Iran; The Shah is reportedly extremely de ressed by the present situation in tran and,
is
25X1C
25X1C
25X1C
25X10
bilged
25X1C
25X1A
25X1A

__
considering abdication. have expressed disappointment at the Shah's lack or determination and forcefulness and have told one of his confidants that, under the circumstances, there was little that oould or would do to su orLiSithe monarchy if it were threatene .
.
25X1C
Comments The Shah is undoubtedly depressed by the fear that the elec. 'dens will result in an overwhelming victory for the National Front and the con nt reduction in the influence of the moderate elements. 25X1C want the ahah to replace Mossadeq with Ovens, wha they consider uiU be more amenable on the oil issue, and their threat to do nothing to support the monarchy probably represents a last effort to spur the Shah to sone action. However, abdication in the near future is not anticipated.
. . . '
Prime Minister justifies goVernment's actions by blaming Britishs Prime Minister Mossadeq's 25 Novembbr report to Parliament on his trip to the US was consistently anti-Hritish in tone. Blaming the British for the failure of the Washington tallcdt and for Iran's:economic deterioration, the Prime Minister emphasized that oil nationalization was only the first step Of the fight to end British influenoe, and that the government's future program would be to balance the budget, exploit its oil, end hold free elections* (C Tehran 1939, 26 Nov; C Tehran 1935, 26 Nov51)
Cothvont, Nossa4sq is now in a positiOn where he must reibe his antiBritish oempaign to new heights in order to gein continued support and to escape blame for Iran's economic difficulties. His tactios are currently successful -- Parliamentary opposition has again collapsed -- but they pose serions problems for Iran's relations with the West, Without reVenues from oil, Iran must have foreign aid if it:is not to collapse economically. Mossadeq has led the Iranians to believe that they will receive extensile assistance fromthe United States; if they do not obtain this aid, Nessadeq may be forced by the strength of nationalist sentiment to hold the US, as well as the UK, responsible for his woes. ThePrime Minister is neither Communist nor pro-Communist. Nevertheless, there is a possibilitY that he may, through his current polioy, out himself off from the West.
TDP SECRET
4
30 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00(400070001-9

TOP SECRET
5.
INDI44PAL. Indian Prime Minister effects changes in government of Nepal:

According to ihe Nepalese Ambassador in New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru of India was instrumental in effecting the repent changes in the government of Nepal, which culminated in the ousting of the century-old, hereditary Rana regime and its replacement by a "popular" government. Nehru was also responsible for the appointment of.the Nepal Congress Party leader as Prime Minister. (S New Delhi 1877, 27 Nov 51)
Comment: India has been intimately, though covertly, connected with politral-Mheuvers in Nepal since the Indian-supported "denmcratic" revolution of January 1951. Much of this maneuvering has resulted in lessening the power of the Ranas and in strengthening Indian influence. India is increasingly concerned with the security of its northern frontiers adjacent to Tibet. It may be expected.to continue its interest in Nepalese affairs, possibly to the point of obtaining outright control of their administration.
Growing Indian influenoe in Nepal may also cause a delay in the opening of a US Embassy there, since Nehru is reportedly unsympathetio to US aims.
INDIA.
IFEET A British source in New Delhi reports that E.M9.Panikkar, Indian

171:Essador to Communist China and member of the Indian delegation.to the current UN General Assembly, has assuMed leadership.of the Indian Communist movement. CS Paris Delga 281, 17 Nov 51)
Comment: Though Fanikkar is known to be inclined toward Communism, it is unlikely that this report will be confirmed. It probably stems from the facts that Panikkar recently returned to India and that he has made several publio remarks complimentary to Communist China since his return. Panikkar himself states that he hopes to be appointed Ambassador to Egypt in the near future.
7.
THAIIAND. Coup d'etat reported: Press reports indicate that a nine-man "provisional executive committee*" composed oP leading military personalities and headed by Army Commander Phin, has assumed oontrol of the Thai Government. This committee has announced the return of the 1932 Constitution and has appointed an "interim cabinet" headed by Premier Phibun. (U US press reports, 29 Nov 51)
Comment: It appears from these reports that the military element in ThaillrariEbse influence over the political scene was enhanoed following the abortiNm coup of June 1951, have now assumed full control 'of the government* .ftile they will probably continue the country's pro-Western foreign polioy and are not expected significantly to alter domestic policy, their high-handed seizure of power will alienate large numbers Of civilian

TOP SECRET
5
Indian Ambassador to Peiping allegedly heads Indian Communist move -
30 Nov 9.
Approved For Re lade 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00%90070001-9

TOR SECRET
leaders and thus contribute further to Thai political instability.
The military committee which now possesses de facto authority is - riven with personal rivalries, Jockeying for position by its members will also cause instability and may eventually lead to an open clash.
8.
doMMent: Since MacDonald reportedly does not enjoy the esteem of Churdbill, there is a strong possibility that he will befremoved in the near future. His re:novel, if it occurs, is not likely to be aecompanied by any basic'ehange in British policy, whioh attempts to balance severity with suasion,
9.
INDOCHINA. Vietnamese Premier reportedly moderates views on French Unions Premier !ran van Huu arrived in Paris as head of his conntry!s.delegation to the High Council 9f the French Union simultaneouslywith an AP despatch from Saigon quoting Huu as stating he would insist.thit the French Uhion he modeled on the British CoMmonwealth. IMmediately afterward, a parisnewspaPer quoted Huu as denying this report and stating.that Vietnamese independence had been achieved, that he was determined to strengthen the Frenoh Union, and that there was no intention of rePudiating agreements with France. Frenoll'autherities in Saigon, however, continue tO affirm that Huu did indeed make the remarks attributed to him hy the AP despatch.. (C Paris 5142, 26 and-27 Nov 51)
'

TOP SECRET
MAIM. Conservatives may remove Malcolm MacDonald: The US Consul in INala Lumpur notes that, notwithstanding press references to CommissionerGeneral MacDonald's popularity among Indians and Chinese, anti-MacDonald sentiment remains widespread and strong. Both conservative Malays and the British planter-merchant oommunity oppose him largely because of his kid gloves policy toward local Chinese. General Briggs told the US Consul in confidence that his most urgent recommendation to Colonial Secretary Lyttelton will be the removal of MacDonald's influence from Federation of Malaya aotivities. (S Kuala Lumpur 93, 27_Nov 51)
Comment: Huuts "denial" as spelled out above is not necessarily inconsirtraflith the position:attributed to him by the AP despatch. The Vietnamese will attempt, in the name of the French Union, to reduce the poeer of the French to intervene in Vietnamese affairs. With the French in effeotive military control of Indochina the Vietnamee have no weapon but pure diplomacy with which to struggle toward this
end.
10.
CHINA.
Antante of the proceedings of the recent general meetings of the Southwest,

Central-South and East China regional governments reveal that the principal
Political leaders strengthening positions vis-a-vis military:
30 Nov 51
Approved For Re lose 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0061690070001-9

TOP SECRET
addresses were made respectively by Tong Hsiao,ping, Teng Tzu-hui and Jao Shu-shih. (R FBIS, 27 Nov 51)
11.
Students are found "indifferent" to politica: Chungking radio asserts that a liuniversal disregard of polities" has been observed among university,and high sehool students in two.major cities of the Southwest region. The broadoast states that the students have defended'this ."indifferenee" with the argument that they are "very busy" with their academie assignments. (R FBIS, 28 Nov 51) Comments Only,two menthe ago the Communist authorities publicly lamented the "chaotic situation" in education, admittedly the partial result of excessive mobilization of students for political projects. the regime has evidently not yot solved the dilemma presented by its great need for educated personnel and its simultaneous insistence upon time -oonsuming political activity. Peiping may thus deprite itself, in large part, of both well-trained personnel'and the support of student youth, one of the few segments of society still:generally favorable to the regime.
12.
Electronic reconnaisanoe reveals extensive radar network on China Electronic reconnaisance since March 1951 hae deteoted 37 radar riEFEfons in Manchuria and 18 in China Proper. Theee Trovide an almost complete early warning system along the China coast, from Canton to Antung. In addition, there is a "picket ship" operating in the Shantung Peninsula-Dairen area which is used to extend the detection range of the ooattal system. Possibly other vesseld along the China coeist are also equipped with early warning radar sets.
coast:
Vbst ef the radar detected in China is used to give early warning of approaching aircraft. Gunlaying radar (to improve the accuracy of anti-airoraft fire) is located at Dairen, Antung and possibly Shanghai. (TS FEAF, IR-93-51, 30 Sep 51) TOP SECRET
Comments In each regional governMent of Communist China, authority is divided between the military leader of the aree, who is usually Chairman:of the military and administrative council and commander of the Field Army stationed in the region, and a political watchdog, who is the Party's regional secretary and political commissioner of the Field Army. The three persons named above are the political leaders of their respective areas. Ihamilitary leaders of these areas-respectivoly Iiu Po-cheng, Iin Piste end Chen Yi-.-would ordinarily be expected to deliver the major addrbssee at general meetings of their councils. Although no firm thesis can be constructed on the basis of this one occasion, it is possible that the regional political bosses are now definitely superior to the military leaders.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : ClX-RDP79T01146A000600070001-9
50 Nov 51
Approved For Re !bade 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004111100070001-9

TOP SECRET
Comment: There were few known radar sets in China before 1951, This r7778717which is undoubtedly incomplete, indicates how the uile of radar for defense of the coast of Communist China has expanded.
13.
KOREA. UN carrier-based airoraft attacked by enemy jets on east coast: On 27 NSTeiber, four UN carrier based airoraft were attaoked by two GemMuniet mitg-15 jet aircraft north of the east coast city of %neon. Some .damage was inflicted on one UN plane. The Far East Air Force observes that since the UN aircraft were engaged in a rail outting mission, this enemy interception may indicate an "increased sensitivity to naval interdiction of rail traffic in this area.u: (8 FEAF AX 7226, 28 Nov 51)
Comment: A more serious implication to be derived from this latest enemy Ti=eption of NN aircraft is that the Communist air force has
now begun to expand its air defense activities Over the Korean east coast.
14.
ROK Goiernment attempting to silence opposition pressi The US Nilitary Attache in Pusan reports that the Rhee Government's attempt to silence the-oppoeition press "threatens to become a major issue in the ROW' Indignation among members of the press and the opposition DemoOratic Nationalist Party (DNP) is mounting over the recent indictment of:the editor and a reporter of 6 DNP-controlled newspaper. The Government oontends that the paper printed inormation "conducive to pyschological panic!" and "injured foreign relationi" of,South Korea. (8 PUsan %eke 16, 28 November 51)
,
COmment: The charges against the oppoeition newspaper are reported as beilTWATemely weak. Nbreover, the indictment is based on laws imposed by the Japaneee during,Abrld War II and olearly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the current constitution.
16.
Production_Oooperativee organized in North Korea: Production cooperatives were organised in North Korea on 6 November 1951 for the pro dilation of civilian liVing necessities,:acoording to Radio Pyongyang. Created to "raise the material and cultural life of the people by raising the quality.and quantity of production," the establishment of these cooperatives should be oompleted by the end of Ebyember, a full month ahead' of echedule. This system hes reportedly resulted in an increase of 200 to 400 percent in the production of textiles and foodstuffs and greatly "over fulfilled" quotas in other consumer items. (U FBID,,28 Nbv 61)
tOmMent: There is ample evidence of the serious deterioration in the living standard of the North Korean civilian popUlation. The strengthening TOP SECRET
30 Nov 61
Approved For Re IOW 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004901070001-9

TOP SECRET
and emphasis plided on these cooperatives may be interpreted as another attempt by the Communists to alleviate this gravo problem.
16.
17.
JAPAN KOREA. Korean Government claims island in ja.an Seaa n Pusan repor s The US Embassy a an o ficia via the local press,that.Takeshima spb esman of t e I. Government claimed, Island belongs to Korea. lease was inspired by a report indicating The press rethat seven Japanese correspondents had visited the island and asserted it belonged to Japan. Nov 51) (P Pusan 495, 28
Comments Takeshima Island consists of an uninhabited islets group of rooky Japan Sea, lying approximately midway between Japan and Korea. Despite an official ROK request to islands renounced by Japan in the include Takeshima among the group of peace treaty, this was not done--a decision undoubtedly Considered final by the Japanese. The islands corporated into' a Japanese prefeoture were inp. in 1905, but Korean claims were stimulated by the fact 'that they were specifically excluded from the SOAP 1946 definition of "Japan."
18.
JAPAN. Ja an to be re uestsd to ado t Western ex ort US Etbassy ar s reports control rocedure: , at t e 26 ovem.er mee mating Committee on Export Controls ng o t e oor (COCOM), the German delegate withdrew his proposal for Japanese membership. Instead, the favor having the question Committee appeared to of Japants export controls taken by the US, which would attempt up with Japan to persuade Japan to adopt COCOM on exports to Communist areas. polioies (S Paris 3172, 27 Nov 51) Comment: Current export applied in the Western European controls in Japan are more rigid than those nations. It is expected that Japan will

Thrittg
TOP SECRET
9
SoUth HereinAmbassador to Japan recalled: ROK Foreign Minister Pyun advlseZ Ambassador Muceio on 28 November that the South Korean Government has di:aided to recall Ambassador Sihn Sung-mo, Chief ROK Miteion in Japan. of the The Embassy has learned inforMally that the chief prosecutors involved in the National Massacre trials left Pusan for Tokyo Defense Army scandal and the Kochang on 19 November presumably\to investigate Sihn's involvement in the scandals, (C Pusan 494, 28 Nov 51) Comment: Sihn was forced out of his previous office of Defense ter la75716 to momentary Minispresidential pique over his alleged bility for the Scandals. As one of South responsiKorea's most powerful political figeres,'Sihn has disdained for several months, probably with Rhee's approval, invitations tacit to return home to teetify at the sumably suffieient scandal triali, Prepressure has now developed to foroe Rhee's Sihn's return, land and order
30. Nov 51 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-1201379101146A000600070001-u
Approved For Re lost 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00000070001-9

TOP SECRET
adjust ito control policies in the post-treaty period to conform with the more liberal attitude of the COCOM participants.
19.
Electrical Workers to pp on nationwide strike3 The A11-Japan Eleatrical Workers Union decided on 28 November to go on full strike for.an indefinite period startihg.1 December.. The union has been oonducting partial work-stoppages for this past week in an unsuccessful effort to gain a .60 percent wage inorease. (R I3I8 Tokyc Jiji 29 Nov 51)
.
..expineninflapanla industrial output.
Electric power shortages are the'primary deterrent: to an This'otrike., which mili not affect Occupation installations or produotion for the Korean war, is serioUs enough -be require 'possible government intervention. The government, in a similar strike last Deoeiber, took the position that any serious'interference with the economyymuld be illegal.
Comments
TOP SECRET 10
$O Nov 51
Approved For Rehaase 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146/40Q2A00070001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
Western European estimetee ef'defens&expenditures fall short: of The Western European countries recently submitted estimates of their defense expenditures (inCluding US aid) for the current fiscal year t6 NATO's Temporary Couneil Committee, which is reassessing their politico-economic capabilitieel. The following tabulation shows haw these estimates compare with previous US estimates of wbat those expenditures should be;
U3-178,Fosed figures.;
GENERAL.
ESTIMATED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR 1'951-1952

.(in millions of dollars)

previous US estimates of desirable levels
Country estimates of Prebable levels
Differences
.(percent)
Belgium Denmark France
Italy.
Netherlands Norway United Kingdom
375 120 3100 1005 465

1140
400
+
-
4270
102 2340 811 395 98 14000
25 19 15 30
- 6
American officials in Paris have warned that even after proper 11owances are made for the different bases -- such as price levels -- used in calculating the figures above, the remaining discrepancies are so great that the various national estimates should not be Considered merely as initial negotiating positions which can easily be brought up to levels desired by the US. In view of their growing economic difficulties, the European countries involved will probably lose their earlier optimiMn and refuse to make substantially larger commitments to the defense effort than these now sub mitted. This, plua the publicized .11S4ntehtion -not to increase economic or military aid to Europe-in the currentfiscal year, makee sizeable modifications in NATO.plans most probable. (Factual data fret; TS Paris REPTO 5712, 15 nov 51)
Showdown on the European Defense Community n sight: The Ibreign Ministers of the countries participating in the European Conference coneur, that uhleas basic agreement is reached before the Army January NATO Council meeting, the plan had best be abandoned.
TheNetherlands Ambassador in Washington, who received this report from the Dutch delegation at the recent special ministerial conference on
TOP SECRET
11
30
Nov 51
Approved For Re leapt 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00490070001-9

TOP SECRET
the European Army, believes a crisis may be deVeloping because the Foreign Ministers have only now recognized the "real sovereignty issUes involved." (S to RoMe 2467, 28 Nov 51)
Comment:
recent FiencraTiaents that political union is essential to the European Army concept. Should the European Defense CommUnity fail.t0 materialize, German rearmament and all phases of European integration would be further retarded.
The Benelux countries have voiced strong opposition to

TOP SECRET
12
US interests considered harmed by impact of sensational journalism on Weetern Europe: The US delegate to the UN General Assembly dedlared that It would be "difficult to exaggerate the unfavorable impact" of Sensational American journalism on French public:opinion and warned that the proposed reprint in French of the dollierte Atomic lar issue wduld be harmful to'US interests abroad. In urging the_discontinuance .of thie .prejecto the delegate etated that unfavorable agitation about the article that a protest is being raised in a General Assemblycontinues to grow and committee against the magazinels use of the UN flag and Symbol. At the recent Council of Europe meetingl.French Socialist leader Guy. Mollet:told US: Congressmen that such lurid journalism, epitomised by the Collier!s issue, "could only serve Communist :propaganda ends and increagrET7Fan tensions." (C Paris DELGA 400, 28 Nov 51)
'
CoMment:. This latest statement corroborates and strengthens earlier reports from the US Embassy in Paris of the depressing and confusing effects upon informed public opinion in Western Eurone Of sensational US: articles on war. It is probable that translation and greater circulation of any articles describing the horrors of a third world war would revive the trend toward neutralism in France and would continue to aid the Soviet peace campaign by associating the US with warmongering. These articles are particularly ill7timed in view of the lukewarm French attitude toward costly rearmament.
4.
West Germans.pressink-for UN Unity hearing's: Chanaellor Adenauer be particularly disturbed-by the latest East German unity election proposals. He is anxious that the Allied UN meeting support a resolution giving lest Germany delegations at the Paris a hearing before the ad hoc committee on conditions for German unity. Adenauer declares that he Will need maximum UN support to counteract these East German proposals and preserve the lest German anti-Grotewohl front of the coalition and major opposition parties. (p Paris DELGA 388, 28 Nov 51)
GERMANY.
reposiited to
dOmment: On 26 NoVember the East German commission for all-German elections formalZy outlined the principles for the drafting of an election law. These principles acknowledged East German assent to some of the conditions Which the West German Government declared must be met before allGerman elections could be held,
30 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0119.00070001-9

TOP SECRET
Adenaueris plea for a German hearing at the UN mill not be very favorably recdivedby all the Allied delegations, since some of them-feel that this would complicate current German contractual and European defense negotiations.
5.
FRANCE. French union High Council will not consider Chinese interneee: Repatriation of Chinese Rationalist troops from Indochina will not appear on the agenda of the High Council of the French Union because of General de lettrefs etrong objectiets. According to a French Foreign Office spokesman, however, this decision may be reversed if French need for Chinese support in the UN makes such action desirable. (C Paris 3176, 26 Nov 51)
6.
AUSTRIA. West-East transit shipMents through Austria decrease: Statistics recently made available by the Austrian Federal Railways show that shipments ,of Western goods, probably including embargo items, transiting Austria by rail to Eastern bloc destinations are levelling off at a sharply reduced volume. While transit shipments of 11,212 metric tons in July repreSented a slight increase over the figure for May, the Jtly total is little.more than one-third of the monthly aVerage for the period from November 1950 to May 1951, and less thanene-half the -betel shipments in February, when the monthly figure fell from 44,000 to 28,000 metric tons.
Italy and Switzerland remained the primary sources, of goods reaching Eastern-orbit countries via Austrian railways. French, Belgian, Dutch, British; and Turkish shipments were insignificant in quantitative terms, and French shipments throligh Austria were only one-tenth of the'previous NoveMber-May average. Hengary and Czechoslovakia received the largest amounts of Western goods. It Should be noted, however, that the bulk of Italian shipments to Hungary in JnlY (4,390 metric tons) was apparentlY fertiliter.
While Austria id Only one of a number of transit areas for East-gest trade and Austrian railways only one means of transport, the sharp decline in the volume of Such shipments may be an indication Of the declining availability of Western goods for Eastern shipment and/or a measure of effectiveness of Weetern trade controls. The consequences for the Satellite countries-Of. the declining volume of Western goods maY be-responsible for repotted enfortsto coordinate Satellite procurement actiVities'in Vienna and to make increased (Statistical data from: use of Sevietrcontrolled trade agencies in that city. Intelligence Summary No. 333, Hqs, USFAI 14 Nov 51)
-

TOP SECRET
13
Comment: The French will be ex-14ms to avoid any discussion of the interned Chinese as long as 'the Korean negotiations are in progress. If a settlement is reached in Korea, Ihe resulting relationship of Communist China tO the UN will probably determine the French attitude.
30 Nov 51
Approved For Re kW 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q00070001-9

TOP SECRET
7.
ITALY. Dismissal of surplus Workers Continues in Italian heavy industry: both the Communist and the non-Communist labor unions terminated a strike on 1 November at the Breda works at Sesto"San GieVanni, Milan, and have accepted the disMissal of 11000 workers, of wham 250'.are.to be rehired between February and June next year. Of the remainder, 1,500 will receive retraining courses under the Ministry of Labor.
The Communists and the left-wing Socialist papers claimed that the etrike had some good results, but that the strikers were "compromised" by the stand:taken by the Italian Confederation of Labor Unions (CISL),.which first accepted the original terms offered by the management. (S Rothe Joint 1%eka 47, 24 Nov 51)
Comment; The dismissals at Breda illustrate the Unutilized Italian econagrriMential far defense prOductien." The amount of idle induetrial plant capacity is particularly important in the armaments and munitions industries.
Another important aspect of the strike at Breda is the fact that apparently the pro-gevernment labor union, CISI, again unwittingly forced the moderate Socialist-labor unionists into joint action with the ComMuniste4
8. .8PAIN. Apathy pervades first of series Of municipal-elections; The n6 ESElary in Madrid reports that the nation-wide municipal elections of councillors. representing heads of familiee took place en 25 November, apparently Without major incidents. The Spanish press reported that 80 to 90 percent of those eligible voted but admitted that only about 60 percent voted in certain northern areas.
There was a general lack of interest and the large vote was probably due chiefly to a radio announcement urging retention of.certificates of having voted for use in renewing ration cards. The EMbassy concludes that :most Spaniards view voting in this eIeetion as a chore-and a necessary 'precaution against government sanctions. (C Madrid 550, 26 Nov 51) This was the first in a series of three nation-wide elections There will be elections on 2 December for councillors representing the Falange labor, syndicates and On 9 DeceMber for reprebentativee of economic;Oultural, and professional entities*, ' Only goverhMent-approved candidates may run, no campaigning on partisan lines is permitted, and the electorate is restrieted.
Gemnient:
of nerairalpal councillors.
The Basque clandestine radio has urged Spaniards to show their contempt forthe Franco government by not voting. The lighter vote reported in northern Spain May be attributable to Basque nationalist propaganda.

TOP SECRET
.14
30 Nay 51
Approved For Re Ihde 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00Q030070001-9

TOP SECRET
9.
NORWAY-SPITSBERGEN.. Soviets to extend. h1pp.h actitities-until mid-, 25X1C ecem er: mile% ,officials. ey will continue shipping.to'and fram the archipelago until 15 December. This will necessitate the use of icebreakers, since S itsbergen usually becomes ice-bound by 15 November.
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: The sigdficaxe of this decision is unknown, However, if the Soviet-TETErse is other than the support of its legitimate commercial interests in Spitsbergen, it is doubtful that they would hive notified the Norwegian authorities of their decision. Alsol-it has been previously reportedFthat (1) shipping to Spitsbergen continued Until late November in 1948 and'during that winter the Russians requested additional navigational aids to continue, shipping in the area:of their claims, and (2) the Soviet icebreaker Lenin rad (10,000 tons) was in Spitsbergen waters throughout the winter of 1950-1951, While ice conditions normally terminate shipping to Spitsbergen by Mid-November 'complete icing precluding entrance to the Isfjord (main bay on which Soviet and Norwegian mining' claims are located) does not usually take place until early January.
10,
UNITED KINGDOM.- Israeli request to finance pipeline opposed: Both the UK Ministry of Fuel and Power and the British oll-companies have agreed that construction of a pipeline from Elath, Israel, on the Gulf of Aqabo,to Haifa is not a commercially attractive proposition. Oil tranpported by such a pipeline would cost only a shilling less per ton than oil transported through the Suez Canal. In addition, the Foreign Office is not inclined to take the political risk involved in suPplying the Haifa refinery with Persian Gulf oil in the face of strong Arab opposition. (0 London 2512, 27 Nov 51)
Commentv Israel felt that the closing of the Abadan refinery would povea.FST talking point for the cOnstruction of this pipeline, which would Pernit the full-scale operation of the Haifa refinery.. However, the British Government's reluctance to antagonize the Arab world further by supplying Middle Eastern Oil to a refinery in Idrael has already been shown by its refusal to send British tankers through the Suez Canal with oil for the Haifa refinery, despite its present military control of the canal zone.
11.
Japanese PeaCe Treaty ratified amidst eritiCism: The bill ratifying the Japanese Peace Treaty has passed the third and final reading in the House of Commons. The US Embassy in London comments that possibly 100 Labor Mrs'were opposed to ratification and that the majority of these abetiined at the second reading in order to avoid committing themselves. Many members of both parties who later voted for ratification indulged in vigorous criticism for the record. This criticism was generally directed at the treaty's lack of safeguards against a resurgehce of Japanese trade competition. TOP SECRET
15
30 Nov 51
Approved For Reese 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A041i600070001-9

TOP SECRET
The Bevan group based its opposition on claims that the treaty had been dictated by the US and would handicap a general settlement in the Far East. Former Foreign Secretary Morrison, however, emphasized that there was a clear understanding with the US that the JaOgnese were to decide their (U NY Times, 29 Nov 51; R London 2517, 27 Nov 51) own relations with China,
Comment: A division forced at thp second reading had resulted in a 382 to 33 vote favoring ratification.
The debate suggests the prevalence in Britain of the belief that Japanese econoMic revival is likely to be rapid and expansive.. The fact that British textiles end pottery interests have already experienced mild Japanese competition Appears to have etrengthened.this belief, On the other hand, the Churchill government has as yet given no indication of unusual concern.
12.
US Embassy fteseeo:possibilitY of Mexican neutrality in event of In commenting upon the acceptance speech of Adolfo Ruiz Cortihes as presidential candidate of-the official administration party forthe July 1952 elections, the VS Embassy in Mexico City states "it would seem that Ruiz Cortines, if elected, will not deviate from Alemants foreign'Polioy. Hence in all probability, as far as we can now envisage, Mexico's attitude towards the free nations in the fight against the growing danger.of Soviet aggression Will continue to be one of cautious detachment. That Mexico "147 decide to remain neutral and play the part of a mediator in case of a world (P Mexico City D-960, 15 Oct 51) war should not be overlooked."
MEXICO.
767177.4mr:
Comment: _Ruiz Cortines is virtually assured of the presidency for the term 1952-1958. As a reputedly honest but colorless politician who "has never outshone his political sponsors," who has been trusted "never to make any move withOut consulting his political leaders," and to wham party loyalty is the chief concern, he will probably be prone to follow conciliatory policies which will preclude strong support Of the US in international,affairs. The recent election of a Mexican, Luis Padilla Nervo, as president of the UN General-Assembly ihdreases the possibility that Mexico may choose to remain aloof from international conflicts.
.
13.. PANAMA. Communists involved ih Student strike: Colonel Antonio Remon,r5FEFF police chief, expressed to Ambassador Vtiley the belief that all the elements Of the political opposition to his presidential candidacy, including at least some Communists, were supporting a curreht student strike in Panama. Colonel Remon also stated that the Communists who were involved W ere being supported not only by money left in .Panama by:Guatemalan expresident Arevalo, but also by funds being supplied from Cuba, AMbaSsador W iley commenta that in the situation as a whole the only element of strength

TOP SECRET
16
30 Nov 51
Approved For ReI4Bat 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004,00070001-9

TOP SECRET
which he can see is the Communist leadership,. and that it alone seems to him to know what it is doing and vrhy. Mc-president Arevalo is believed to have contributed money to either Communist or nationalist elements in Panama for the anti-Remon compaign. There has been no previous indication that funds are being supplied
Comment:
from Cuba.

TOP SECRET
3CB Nov 51 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600070001-9
17
al
I Vr OLVIIL
UNCLASSIFIED when
- declassilapowatecigotaReleesotgamicramp:twearaprnto' iftwisttbSyrampled or

REG ISTRY
DOCUMENT DESCR I PT I ON
0
--
CIA CONTROL NO.

SOURCE
DOC
DOC
. .
NO.
DATE
LOGGED BY
COPY NO. NUMBER OF PAGES NUtADER OF ATTACHMENTS
OFF ICE
When this form is detached from Top Sec et mate tat it shall be completed in the appropriate space below d to Central Top Secret Contro for record. and transmitt (OUTSIDE CIA) D I SP ATCHED DESTROYED DOWNGR AD ED
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:
TO
BY
(Signature)

S I GNATURE
Agency ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence destroyed. or or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, individuals whose official transmitted outside of CIA. ACCess IC Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or and and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document win sign indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. SEEN BY RELEASED RECE VED REFERRED TO DATE
I
DATE
TIME
DATE
T I ME
S I GNATURE
OFF ICE/0 IV.
gy (Signature)
WITNESSED BY
TO
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF ICE
Apptaired For ReffaW 2001/09/06 : ciAittipnro114a6ifos000nool -9

Wit PRIVIOUS EDITIONS.
TOP SECRET
(40)
Approvedytor Re latit 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79701146A001490070001-9
TOP SECRET
00 November 1951
CIA No. 49439-A

Copy No.
45

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approyed For Ramie 2001/09/06 : CIA-R0P79101146A04000070001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
SOUTHEAST ASIA. British considering Southeast Asia defense problem: According to the Foreign Office, the problem of the defense of Southeast Asia is being recondidered wdthin the British Government. It is realized that obtaining the most competent military advice is a prerequisite to high level political consideration. The current thinking is that the US and UK should exchange views before the French are consulted. A formal defense arrangement, euch as an extension of the Pacific Pact, is considered premature at this time. (TS S/S London2167;,' 28 Nov 51).
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
GENERAL. SHAPE progress report presented to NAC Meeting: In a SHAPE report to the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome, General Gruenther gave the following estimate of the readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces:

46
97
Required to Contain Forces as of Soviet Thrust 31 Dec 51
Forces as of _31 Dec 52
Ground force divisions on D-day Ground force divisions on D 30
30
44
55
Aircraft
7600
1580
3250
Present NATO ground forces are not fully effective, howover, due to deficiencies in training and equipment; and the air force suffers from shortages of spares, pilots and airfields. Of the 51 airfields promised by the end of 1951, only 16 are now operational; but 35 are expected by Nkrch 1952. If war occurs before NATO forces have grown adequate for containment, an The role of navy carriers was emphasized, particularly in the operation of the emergency plan. A total of 16 carriers is needed to operate in NATO waters. (TS 8/8 Rcame,88) 27 Nov 51).
emergency plan exists for the use of present forces.
Comment: Highlighting of present NATO deficAcies in this report has led to a resolution that the special Harriman committee on reconciling economic capabilities with military requirements submit its report sufficiently in advanoe of the expected February council meeting to permit action by governL ments at that meeting.
TOP SECRET
1 30 Nov 51 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79101146A000600070001-9
Approved For Ravise 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q9400070001-9

TOP SECRET
'
The UK UNITED KINGDOM. Libyan independence prior to 1 January unlikely: Fereign Office considers it probably impossible tolhave arrangements for Libyan independence completed before 1 January 1952. The UK hopes, however, that agreement will have been reached by then for an interim military arrange ment with the federal government of Libya so that its signature can immediately follow achievement of independence on that date. Possibly the general treaty of alliance between the UK and Libya will also be ready for signature at the same time. (81 BA London 2490, 24 Nov 51).
Comments The UN General Assembly resolution specifies 1 January 1952 as the date for Libya to attain its independence. However, SOMB efforts hadbeen made to accomplish this earlier.

TOP SECRET
With the end of the British administration their influence will still be maintained through the continued presence of Britieh troops and through a UK guarantee to,.underwrite the budgetary deficit of the federal government,
30 Nov 51
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
ILL
TtIP SECRET SUED)?

TOP BEG T
SECTION . (EASTERN) SECTION 2 2'(EASTERN) NR /NR
NR
3. CHINA CHINA KOREA. KOREA. Reoord Reaord number number of o f "Soviet" "Soviet" fighters f'ighters scheduled soheduled On on night nipht 3. n o i & Communist measage r e p o r t s that that oombat Is anion to to Korea: Korea: A A Chinese 0hinese.0ommunist message reports '44 44 S Soviet o v i e t 4-11" U - P conventional oonventional fighters, fightere, led l e d by by a a pilot p i l o t with a Russian Ruasian with a name, wnre were scheduled eoheduled to t o fly fly a a combat combat mieeion from h t u n g tto o Korea on name, mission fram Antung the the night night of of 29-30 29-30 November. November. (SUEDE (SUEDE USA-261, 14162, 29 29 Nby NOT 51) 51) AFSA-251, 1415Z,
.
-701r-SEUREr-stiEDE--
3 3
30 Nov 51
))6/.5/-S
MI/

E;ATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010 rPPROVED
TOP S S
SUEDg T SUED
SUEDE SUEDE
Comment: is t the largest number nuMber of of oonventional oonventional fighters fighters noted noted Commerrt;; This Thir is h e largest "Soviet" oonventional conentional aircraft i n this t h i s area. area. The only "Soviet" a i r o r a f t previously noted in in at Anshan, Anshan, Manohuria, Manchuria, whioh which i n the.Korean t h e Korean theater were about 20 LA-11's U-llls nt Communist have, made night night,patrols patrols i into Korea s since early October. Chinese Communist have made n t o Korea hoe e a r l y Ootober. aircraft as "Soviet." "Soviet." messages have have also also referred to these a i r o r a f t ns
NR

UWE
SUEDE _TOP-SEeth SUEDE

30 30 NOT Nov 51 51
Tt5PSECRET SUED.ra
+W%WRBY 44313-SEORET- SUEDE SUEDE
. . . .
/NR NR
8. 8.
engaged 30 Communist; Communist llighthombers'edoorted MIO-15 j jets i g h t bombera' es'corted by 16 1 6 MIQ-16 e t 8 in an a r e a "jUst " j u s t south south of o f the Yalu Yalu river" river" in in a a 30 SO minute encounter. enaounter. The UN area airoratt claim nine bombers bombers and and one one jjet were destroyed destroyed and t three airoraft olairn thltthLt nine e t were hree (SUEDE U AFSA-251 S A - 2 6 1 19552, 19662, 29 29 Nov; NOVJ VS Us press press ticker, ticker, bombers damaged. dsmaged. (SUEDE bombers 30 Nov 51). 61)
Comment; Uonrmentt It is i e probable probable that theee these Communist Comunist bombers were were on on UN-heldislands ielande in i n the the Sinmi Sinmi group group dust $ust west of a n o t h e r o n againstUN-held anotheFiniron against clatns t to have enoountered encountered 30 30 enem# enemy Sinoe the UNUN olaime o have the Cho1sat Cholsarl area. areaL. Sinoe bombers, it.is it is possible possible t h a t other Communist i r units bombers, that CommUnist a air units rendezvoused rendezvoused with nine with the %he nine TU-2's TU-2's from from Antung bntung for for this t h i a ill-fated ill-fbted raid. raid.
'.&
arean-language GOI GCI net net cOntrols controls operational operational airohaft; airobaftr More Eorean-language recent.analysia reoent' analysia of of a a Kbrean-language ground-oontrolled,interoept ground-oontmlled, intercept net net reveals of two' two'oontrollers, one looated located aat UidU4irfield reveals the existence of controllers, one t Uiau'airfield stations, believed t h e other other at a t an an umidentified unidentified airfield, airfield. The two statione, and the t o control oontrol MIG-15 WG-16 airoraft, a i r o r a f t , are a r e in i n touoh touoh with eaoh eaoh other; other; they they may may also also to oommunicate oomuualcate with the t h e Soviet l o v i e t OCI GCI net or or with vdth ground ground obserVers. observers,
Of n t e r e s t iis e the f a c t that, e language used Ot equal I interest the.faot that, although althoUght h thelenguage used is Korean, inter-net inter-net transmissions Cransmissione are are repeated repeated in in Russian. Ruseian. In Ebrean, instanoe In one instance on 23 Ohinese, and on. 23 Woyember, NqTember, Korean, Ibrean,Qhinese, and Buseian-language Russian-language transmissions transmissions were made. (SUEDE made. OM IN (SUEDE AFSS CM IN 56557, 66667, 23 28 Nov Nov 51) 61)
.
C o m e n t t The The KOrean Korean border k irfield a t Ulju, Comments airfield at Uiju, the the first first &rean Ehrean f l e l d -ioh MIG-16's are are knob t o be tield from which MIG-...1.5ts /mu**, beoperating, operating, was WAS the ihe destination destination of a a "ohange "ohange of of airfield" airfield" f l i g h t by of flight by seven North North Korean Korean U-9 LA-9 conventional conventional fightera on on 27 27 November. November. fighters
,

.
. .
EOM:. Communist A 29 November KORIU. OomPnuniat attempt atbempt to t o bomb bomb UN-held UN-held islands islands beaked: balkedr A Chinese Co~mun,l.st Communist air message message'fram MUkden to Antung.reported Chlinese from Mukden t o Antung reported that t h a t nine light bombersomuld proceed via Antung, and return TU-2 f i g h t 'Ijombera~wuuld prooeedto t oXeres., Korea, v i a dntung, rekurn on on Kbrea w'as Was given given as as Cholsan. Meagan. n &rea 30 November. Novedber. The destination iin 30
American press Novakber state that Atne&.oan press reports reports of of3.0 30 NovAber'state t h a t 26 26 UN UN F-66'8. B-86'e
1
1
-TOP-SECTITITREDE W T SUEDE
5
50 30 Nov 51 61
SUEDE
-itrSECRET SUEDTOP $ECRET SUEDE Based Based on on the the multilingual multilingual qualities q u a l i t i e s of of this t h i s new new net, net, it - t is is POsitible t that the North North Korean Korean Air Air Foroe Force may may soon soon aaeume assume a more more possible h a t the Olierational mission, miSsion, possibly possibly inoluding including the the piloting piloting of of MIGts, MIGIs, i in n operational ',Operation w mith i t h Chinese and and Soviet pilots p i l o t s already already aotive aotive in in the the oooperation Korean war. Korean air a i r war.
ia
'Element of e a n we& series 'Element Of North Nbrth b Korean west oosst coast oorps moves moves east: easts A series orean messages h a t on ovmber tthe h e 82nd of reoent North of-reeent north It Korean messages indicate indicate tthat on 26 26 N NoveMber 82nd Eetiment Division, I Corps, Corps, moved moved from from i its west Regiment Of of the the North North Korean 8th 8th Division, t s weet ooast aeourity seourity station s t a t i o n near Kaesong Co ooaet to a point point some some '20 20 miles miles south south of of AFSA SIB 398, 398, 27 Nov 51) (EIUEDE AFSA t h e east e a s t ooast ooast city o i t y Of of Iltonsan. the Wonsan. (SUEDE
mhether the e entire regiment made made tthip move fa ia A question question as to t o whether n t i r e regiment h i s move raided r a i s e d by another amther 26 November message message tto o #e the 8th Bth Diviaion DiVision a artillery rtillery commander from the 82nd 82nd regiment, regiment, reporting the t h e positions of of the the oomnander regiment's artillery regiment's a r t i l l e r y pieces p i e o w in i n the Kaesong Kaesong area. area.
This move may may'foreoast foreoast a move move of of the the e entire n t i r e North North Korean Korean Comments This I Corps G o r p - to the,east east coast. coast. Suoh Sueh a t tranafer ranafer m mould u l d be be llogical o g i a a l iin n view view o of f r e l i e f of of I I Corps Corps units units engaged engaged in i n ooastal ooastal and and internal Internal the reoent relief security duties by the elements elemerita of the Chinese Communist Communis% 40th Army. Army.
NR
"TOP-SEMET-SUEDE SUEDE
6 6
30 Nov 61 51 30
_TOP-SECRET SUEDE SUEDE
-. ...
-1'161)7-SECRETSUEDt' SUEDE
30 No,r
FAR EAST
HR70-14
cg
2. Record number of o f "Soviet" "Soviet" fighters fightersscheduled scheduled on on night combat mission to to
Korea: -
Armed Forces Armed Security Agency Security Agency 29 Nov 51 51
A Chinese Chinese Communist Communistmessage messagereports reports that Soviet IA-11" IA-11"conventional conventional figlters, led by "44 Soviet fighers, by a with a Russian scheduled to fly pilot with Russian name, name, were scheduled SUEDE combat mission from from Antung Antung to Korea on on the the a combat Bp F.fi A41 - a s / flOrlet night night of 20-30November. November. of 29-30 4

l1
ventionalfighters fightersnoted noted ventional inin t thir-"Eli: h m The only "Soviet" "Soviet" conventional conventional aircraft previously noted noted in the Korean Korean theater about 20 aircraft previously theater were about 20 IA-11's IA-11's at at Anshan, Manchuria, Mdnchuria, which which have have made Anshan, made night night patrols patrols into Korea KOrea since since early early October. Chfnese Chinese Communist Communistmessages messageshave have also alsoreferred referred to tothese these aircraft aircraft as "Soviet. "Soviet. "
INR NR
-4
SUEDE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: -.)ATE: 24-Mar-201 24-Mar-2010 0 11cPPROVED
> t 6 2 f 0 7 S * s 4 Commnt: number of of conconComment: This This is is the the largest largest number ; t41Y ".
...
A
HR70-14 HR70-14
-TOP-SECRET--SUEDtiv
2:ber. 5 t
FAR FAR EAST
C 13 1s
1. War's cost to negotiate negotiatea a cease-fire: cease-fire: cost forces forcesCommunist Communist China China to 1.
I
lp
more national economy. econom
Premier Chou Premter Choy En-lai En-lat recently told told a a Chinese Chinese artistic and and cultural cultural society society that thatCommunist Communist artistic China was China was forced forced to to negotiate negotiateaacease-fire cease-fire because because the Korean Korean war war had had already already cost the e apanese hostilities. " and has been adra_inAn_thel a anese hostilities, '*and has been a drain onthe]
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~
Comment: Comment: The The Korean Korean war war has has unquestionably unquestiona4ly put new put new burdens burdens on on the the Chinese Chineseeconomy, economy,as as is is evidenced by by higher higher taxes, taxes, forced contributions from the the population, population,and andinflationary inflationary pressure. NeverNeverpressure. contributions from andindustrial industrialoutput output appear appear to to be be at at comparatively comparatively theless, agricultural agriculturaland and no economic economic collapse high high level's, levels, and collapse is is in in sight for for the the near future.
APPROVED FOR FORRELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE:
16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

-3 -
Ithis report the belief belief that that China is readyto tonegotiate negotiateaacease-fire, cease-fire, and s ready strengthens the hina i subject to to the the inevitable inevitable face-saving face-saving bargains. presumably presumably an armistice, subject
bis
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14
NR
9. 9.

.. .
-TeP-sEeRsT-sunz-
KOREA. combat effectivenesss effectiveness: Communist 39th 39th Army Army probably probably has has low, l o w combat KOREA. Chinese Communist Chinese 'Two Pwo i n e s e Communist C o p u n i s t messages of 25 and.28 and 26 November M overnber indicate 'indicate that t h a t the .the Communist 39th Army, j u s t resumed an an operdtion61 status Chinese Communist Army, which has just operational Status in maybe i n Korea, Korea, may bo undergoing undorgoing aa further f u r t h e r reorganization. reorganization.
beoauee h e y have just just One message stated s t a t e d that t h a t "the "the 39th 39th Army Army .a a because t they recently recently taken taken over over . . are of their.capabilities ' t h e i r o a p a b i l i t i e s and supplies." supplies." are not not sure suraof e a r l i e r message queried as t o whethdr t o reorganize The earlier to whethar "the suggestion to the 39th 39th Army Army (has) (has) been been adopted adopted . . .'I the ." (SUEDE AS AS CM CM IN IN 56836, 66836, (SUEDE 29 Nov NOT 51) 51)
Comment: Comment, Although. Although ffar a r from seem to to from conolusive, conolusiVe, these these messages massages would would seem l n d i o that n t i the t h e 39th 39th Army returned to t o an an operational status staCus probably probably indicate Army has returned with with a a low low degree degree of o f combat combat effectiveness.. effectiveness.
"he 39th 39th Amy, last looated b o a t e d in in t h e Pyongyang area, area, was withdrawn from The Army, last the withdrawn from aombnt in i n the the early early summer summer of of this this year and and has haa probably probably been undergoing undergoing combat rehabilitation rehabilitation in i n North North Korean rear rear areas, areasr
TOP SECEtET SUEDE

5 Dec 51
-(>1)
S*5
Approved For Relettsd 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400090001-7
TOP SECRET
sECURITY INFORMATION
4 Decerpber 1951
CIA No. 49458 Copy No.145
DAILY DIGEST
State Dept., USAF reviews completed

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/05120 : ClA-RDP79T0T146A000600090001-7
Approved For Re Igase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q4600090001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
Arrival of Soviet personnel at East German airfield: Twe trains oatrying Russian airforce personnel and twe aircraft arrived in the Russian zone of Germany and proceeded to Koethen airfield on 14 and 15 November respectively. These trains ware in addition to those previously reported, whieh arrived at Grossenhain and Kdathen on 8 and 16 Noiamber. This may indicate the early return of the jet fighter regiments withdrawn froth the Russian zone of Germany in mid-October. It could not be determined that the Koethen-bound trains carried units from the USSR,,sinoe the numberi observed on the aircraft now at Koethen have been reported exclusivelv froM rrhhAr finl s in the Russian
zone.
I
USSR.
While the Barbet airfield was undergoing repairs during the summer, the twe regiments based at Zerbst.operated out of Koethen. When construction was completed, the regiments returned to Zerbst.
1
Possible re-deployment of three divisions of the 24th'Air Army, based at Finow, Grossenhain and Alt LoenneWitz,has leen observed and reported. The arrival of trains carrying personnel at an airfield other than those belonging to the three diVisions suggests-tete generalized 24th Air Army shifts. While it is impossible to determine the status of the now personnel at Koethen, they may be new pilots and ground personnel from the USSR.
2.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-HUNGARY.. Trade agreements with GDR signed: Czeches- 7 lovakia and Hungary have signed new trade agreements with 'East Germany. On 29 November Hungary and the German Democritio Republic signed a :trade agreenent for the year 1952, which reportedly provides for a considerably larger exchange between the two ceuntries than list year. Long-tert exnhanges until 1955 were also agreed on.in principle. The GDR will export primarily machines, electroteohnical and optioal products and instruments, chemical products and fertilizers.. Hungary will export diesel engines, agricultural products, and bauxite.
.
The reported Czechoslovak-East German trade agreement is a threeyear pact under which Czechoslovakia W111 ship tires, machinery and spare parts to the GDR in exchange for machine tooli, optical instruMents, miming equipment and chemicals. (R FBIS, 29 Nov 51; q Washington Post, 3 Deo 51)
Comment: With the decrease of trade between West and East Gerthany, it oan be expected that the GDR will turn to Eastern Europe for more and more of its trade. East German officials stated that other 'pacts will

'Comment:
25X1A
TOP SECRET
1
4 Dec 51
Approved For Re Usage 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400090001-7

TOP SECRET
be signed soon with Communist China,

3.
Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.
Comment: In the Tess dispatch announcing the whereabouts of the US C-4i-WICHThwas lost two weeks ago, the USSR claimed "that the airoraft's flight to Yugoslavia was to enable Yugoslav spies and diverpianists to board the plane and to parachute them on the territory of the Soviet Union and the People's Demecracies."
4.
Purge of Army officers underway: During the past two months 36 army officers have been removed from office, according to the US Legation in Budapest. Legation sources have no informatin regarding the rumors of more extensive purges among officer survivals of the old regime. General Radv4nyi is the only high ranking officer mentioned. (C Budapest 354, 30 Nov 51; S MA Budapest 2741, 24 Nov 51)
.
This is the first reported purge on such a scale since July 1956 when fifteen high ranking officers, including the Chief of Staff, were arrested. Those officers have never received a 'public trial,
5.
was replaoed as chief of the presidential groupOnErMinistry of National Defense last.summer.
POLAND. Polish Government protests US Mutual: Securit Act: The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs has formally protested the recently approved US Mutual Security Act. In a note of 1 December to the US Ambassador La Warsaw, the US is charged With brutal interference in Polish internal affairs, abuse of diplomatic privileges Polish terrorist bands, and organization in the past, liaison with antiof subversive centers awmng Polish refugees. The note ends with a demand for the immediate annulment of the act. (R Warsaw 406, 1 Deo 51; R FBIS ticker, 2 Dec 51) Comment: Poland, like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, has followed the example of the USSR in sending a note protesting the US Mutual

Comment:
HUNGARY. Propaganda attack shiftsto Tito: After several days of Vielent press and radio attacks against the Mutual Security Act and the espionage and sabotage aotivities of the US, an editerial in Szabad Nep, the Budapest Communist daily, shifted the attack to Tito and identified him as the spearhead of American aggression against Hungary, It stated: "Oa reading a list of American crimes one remembers the ignominious activity of the Tito gang, this most treacherous agent of American imperialism, these Belgrade murderers who ere foremost in outrages committed against Hungary." The editorial added that the "Tito Fascists" were doing the dirtiest work in the UN in the "American Union and Satellites." (R Bu3apest 348, campaign against the Soviet 29 Nov 51)
General Radvanyi
TOP SECRET
2
4 Dec 51
Approved For Reteiese 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S00090001-7

TOP SECRET
Seourity Act as evidence of aggressioo US intentions. The tenor of Poland's note, like those of the other Satellites, suggests a feeling of alarm at the iMplications of the US Mutual Seourity Aot. Such alarm is probably due in part to the anti-CoMmunist resistance and :widespread unrest reported from certain of,the Eastern European countries.
On the basis of these protests it is possible that steps will be taken by some of the Satellites to reduce further the effectiveness of existing US diplomatic establishments in Eastern Europe.
6.
This move was foieoast by a confidential informant in the in thine 1951. The proposed office is a counterpart of the Soviet ,Burobin,"
Rumanirrvernment
7.
YUGOSLAVIA. Tito promises Yugoslav support against Soviet aggressini During interviews with US Congressmen, Tito that the West could depend on Yugoslavia's ,being actively on itspromised side in the event of a war in Europe, whether Yugoslav territory was attacked or not. Tito added that Yugoslavia had made a great mistake in the last war in thinking that it could remain aloof. Moreever, he repeated the cOnviction that collective security was the only way to halt or overcome a powerful aggressor. Regarding aid to Greece and Turkey, Tito said that specific Yugoslav commitments could be given only to the extent that reciprocal undertakings mere assured in return. (S Be/grade Joint Weeka 48, 30 Nov 61)
He probably predicates his promise of Yugoslav participation on the assumption that YugoslaVia vannot-possibly hope for immunity from any Soviet-Saiellite-military attack in Europe. Yet the Marshal has been oareful to avoid any outright, unequivocal statement that Yugoslavia would "go to war" to defend Western Europe.
questioning conform with reoenT717CF statements concerning Yugoslav attitudes toward regional defense projects and Western defenses.

Comment: CoMment:
RUMANIA. Rumantene set up new office to service Diplomatic Corpss. The Rumanian Foreign Office has informed the American ef the establishment of an "Office for Servicing Legation in Bucharest Diplomatic Corps" to provide and maintain housing for offices and personnel and to find necessary office, teehnioal, and domestic personnel for diplomatic offices and members thereof. (R Bucharest 237;2 Teo 51),
Tito's answers to Congressional
TOP SECRET
3
4 Dec 51
Approved For Reisatte 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S6500090001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2
(EASTERN)
1.
BURMA, Au's Position reportedly seeurs: The recent flurry Prime Minister Thakin Nu would be replaced have died down.
c
25X1X cLp_cisofite
that
25X1X
US harge during his recent visit to Rangoon that his observations supported the probability that Nu would continue in office. The US Embassy comments that Nu's political durability and popularity with ethnic minority groups
are factors in his favor.
(C Rangoon 520s 30 Nov 51)
testae take with Karen, renerteds. Press reports that efforts were being made to end the Karen insurgency have been confirmed by US Embassy (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51) contacts. Comment; The end of hostilities between the Burmese Government and the Karens would be the most important step towards establishing stability in Burma since the various insurgencies began in 1948. Since Karen-Burman animosities are of such long standing and have been severely aggravated during the past ten years, no truce would be perfect and would require extremely delicate handling over a prolonged period. However, even a state of armed neutrality between Karen and Burman would reduce the Communist threat to Burma.
3.
SAPP activities continue& In a recent press interview, a spokesman of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party criticized the Burmese Government's failure to attack the Chinese Nationalist troops in northern Burma. He stated that 'IA certain power" was supporting the Nationalists in an effort to incite the Chinese Communist Army into a pursuit action and turn Burma into "another Korea." (C Rangoon 5209 30 Nov 51)
4.
Comment& Communist propaganda concerning the Chinese Nationalists has heretoforfleen comparatively light. It is not clear whether this report is the beginning of a new propaganda drive, merely an "off-the-cuff" statements or a threat to.the Burmese Government.
BURMA/CHINA.
I
1
Comments Thakin Nu unquestionably possesses important political attributess not the least of which is his reputation of being a devout Buddhist. Neverthelesss so long as conditions continue to deteriorate in Burma, the appeasers'are likely to become increasingly evident and insistent upon a change in leadership.
Chinese Communists training :gents for eperations in Burma&

I
25X1X
-------lthe Chinese Communists are tr ning agents in several places in southwestern Yunnan for the collection of military
25X1X
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIADP79T01146A000600090001-7 4 Dec 51
Approved For Relays 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400090001-7

TOP SECRET
intelligence in Burma. Other agents are also said to be training in methods of spreading Communist propaganda and will be used in an effort to induce the defection of the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in north BUrma. (S FRO, AX 7138, 25 Nov 51)
Comment&
This report ia Plausible
but unconfirmed.
5., THAILAND. MacDonald mments on Thai coups The UK Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, told the US Consul General'in Singapore that the Thai coup was "a mixture of good and bad." The Com-. missioner General believes there is more good than bad, since Phibun con tinues in power. (S Singapore 6300 1 Dec 51)
Comment: MacDonald has always had a tendency to be overly optimiatic. The basic causes of instability in Thailand remain and well be accentuated by growing authoritarianism on the part of the military may regime.
6.
ps Embassy commenta on coup: Commenting on the recent coup dletat, the US Embassy in Bangkok states that, despite the peaceful beginnings of the new regime, the situation is comparable to the rise of Fascism in Italy where accusations of subversion and corruption were used to justify the overthrow of a liberal, parliamentarian government. The hew regime, according to the Embassy, is little short of a military dictatorship and represents a backward step so far as the development of democratic processes are concerned. Pointing to the sordid record of those taking over the administration in the alleged interest of clean government; the Embasay believes the Communists have been presented with some "real ammunition" which they will not fail to exploit. (1 Bangkok 1241, 2 Dec 51)
Comment& The Embassy's critical view of the new Thai Government appears to be well founded. A more immediate danger however, is the probable early reemergence of rivalries within the military clique. A serious division between any of several factions could easily embroil Thailand and present the Communists with an excellent opportunity to expand their influence.
7.
INDONESIA. Cabinet_scnroves draft Dutch-Indonesian aereemwnts: Supomo, chairman of the committee for replacing the Round Table Conference agreements, told American Ambassador Cochran that the Cabinet and party leaders had approved drafts of five documents which his committee will submit to the Dutch as separate draft treaties. These will deal respectively with (1) general arrangements, (2) financial and economic matters, (3) trade and commerce, (4) military affairsprincipally the Netherlands military mission to Indonesia, and (5) exchange of cultural objects.

TOP SECRET
5
4 Deo 51

TOP SECRET
There is no reference in the treaties to any Dutch-Indonesian union or to any political or religious relationships. Supomo said these drafts would offer the Netherlands practically the same rights for holding property and doing business in Indonesia as provided in the RTC agreements.
Supomo aaid that although he expects to begin the discussions with 'the RTC agreements, he wishes to negotiate the West New Guinea question concurrently. He told Cochran that his tactic will be to let the Dutch know that the more favorably they treat Indonesia on the Nei Guinea issue, the more favorably they will be treated on the bilateral agreements. (S Djakarta 780, 30 Nov 51)
Comments The RTC agreements of 1949 set up a Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Croin on the basis of which the economia, commercial. and cultural agreements were negotiated. Most Indonesians consider the Union a vestige of colonialism and desire its abrogation. The moderate Indonesian Government wants little change in Netherlands-Indonesian relations and apparently is renegotiating the RTC agreements chiefly to the extent of reMoving them from a Union status and placing them on the basis of an ordinary international agreement.
84
priocHINa. goA Chief in the Far Eastmssimistic over oroeress in Indociqinv The Chief of ECA operations for the Far East emphasizes that the greatest impediment to US aims in Indochina is the weakness and conservatism of the present Vietnamese Government. He believes the Viet Minh "revolution" will continue despite massive US military aid and a sizeable US economic program unless a socially-aonscious government with "grass roots" instincts is formed.
The EGA Chief further believes that French officials in Indochina now realize they are fighting a war that cannot be won without a political solution and that the conservative Vietnamese "mandarins" they have been supporting as leaders will never attract the masses sufficiently to achieve such a solution. The US official recommends, therefore, that the United States now consider this problem jointly with the French to the end of developing a government with a broad popular base. (4 Singapore 613, 30 Nov 51)
gammst There is no convincing evidence available that the French authorities in Indochina have undergone such a change in attitude as described by the EGA Chief, Those Vietnamese politicians who have shown the clearest social purpose are the ones whose political life under the French-sponsored Vietnamese Government has been briefest.

TOP SECRET
6
Dec 51
Approved For Re lupe 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004000090001-7

TOP SECRET
9,
25)t1C
25X1C
CHINA. thinem Communist arMYsidentified in nrovince adiacent to Indochina: 1"confirmed" information that the Chinese Communist 44th Army has moved from Canton to Kwangsi Province, although its exact location is unknown.
this brings the number of Chinese Communist armies now in Kwaneli and Yunnan to a total of eleven.
25X1A
25X1A 1
Comments The 44th Army reportedly has been preparing for a move from the Canton area for the past several weeks.
Elements of nine other armies have been reported moving into Kwangsi over the past month, but.their arrival there remains unconfirmed.
25X1X
10.
25X1X 25X1X
25X1X
25X1A
Motor tornado boats Been A/ d'ampoa for first timq: 'two motor torpedo boats, with "Europeans"' on board, were seen at Whampoa in the third week of November, motor torpedo boats; probably of Russian construction, have now been reported at Whampoa Tientsin; Tsingtan and in the Gulf of Tonkin, 9
Comments Motor torpedo boats have also been seen at Dairen; where 50 to 80 were reported under construction for the Chinese Communist Navy in July 1951. MT/39s are the only naval vessels so far known to have been 'acquired by China from the USSR, although the transfer of many vessels, including submarines and ,destroyers has often been rumored.
11.
gammmatanqumentattaijafiong Kona and Meow.' After a suspension of buying activity.following the failure of the Nan Kuang Company, princiPal Communist buying agency in Macao, the Chinese Communists have decided to resume purchase operations in Macao and Hong Kong. According to the Chinese press in Hong Kong, "limited foreign exchange" will be available for purchases in December and the first quarter of 1952. Buying will be more selective than heretofore. (S Hong Kong 1792, 30 Nov 51)
12.
The Chinese are not yet ready to deprive themselves of the services offered by Hong Kong and Macao as sources of supply for Western goods. Because of Hong Kong export controls, Communist buying will have to be On a less extensive scale than formerly. These controla have already effected a sharp drop in the volume of shipments from Hong Kong to the mainland.
gommAnti.
Nationalist CnIntiarns ofaluallgueejf peace is concluded Ap Korea: Nationalist China should maintain her "political vigilance" against the consequences of a possible armistice in Korea, according to
TOP SECRET
4 Deo 51
Approved For Re Use 2002105/20 : RA-FIATETT01146A0Q,600090001 -7
Tao Hsi-sheng, former Kuomintang party spokesman. Tao believes that, with the Chinese Communists Treed of their commitment in Korea, Formosa would face a long period of military, political and psychological pressure. While believing that the military safety of Formosa should not be dependent upon an armistice in Korea, he stated that an invasion of the island *ill not be attempted by the Communists unless considered a "sure gamble." (U Taipei Pan-Asia, 2 Dec 51)
Qom= This is one of several Nationalist reports predicting

disaster if American protection of Formosa is withdrawn following an armistice in Korea. It is probably true that US "neutralizationw of the island is the principal deterrent to a Communist military operation against Formosa.
13.

TOP SECRET
national conference of deans of engineering colleges has announced a plan ,for "readjustment" of higher technological training, which is intended to 'make more .engineers available,to the regime. The plan envisages amalgamation of existing facilitieS, increased apecialization and emphasis on short-term training. The plan recognizes that large-scale expansion is impossible at this time, and that an increased number of students must be trained with existing facilities. The US Consulate General at Hong Kong notes that thefl plan would lower engineering educational standards in order to produce partially-trained specialists rapidly, ind suggests that this concept, already introduced in the medical field, was probably adopted from the USSR. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)
Etiminz...12na ctatisraLtdast_t_n_satamlater
3_:
2DAMMAL The Peiping regime has chosen in many fields to produce half-trained personnel rapidly rather than well-trained technicians slowly. This plan is adequate for the operation of most existing industry, but reflects Peiping's awareness of the probability that industrial expansion will be limited for some years.
14.
ElpiDLregiMe Shows high_ollgue_of centralization: The US Consulate-General at Hong Kong notes that redent lists of personnel.changes approved by the State Administration Council clearly demonstrate the high: degree of centralization of the Peiping regime. The Consulate-General observes that one or the other of the regimes two principal organs must approve appointments of all officials down to the level of commissioners of administrative districts under provincial governments, office chiefs in provincial governments, and even members of municipal governments under provincial governments. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)
amesuici There is evidence that Peiping not only merely approves but initiates appointments and dismissals of most or all'signifieant provincial officials, as well as the policies administered by those officials. The objective of-maximum central control inevitably conflicts with the objective
4 Dec 51
Approved For Re lade 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004500090001-7

TOP SECRET Of maximum local efficiency. Chinese Communist pronouncements have indicated Peiping's awareness of, but inability to resolve, this conflict.
15.
Ill-fated 30 November Communist bomber raid re-emohailizes offensive capability: The Far East Air Force states that the fighter-supported Communist bomber formation Of 30 November, which suffered high losses from UN interceptors, "re-emphasizes the enemy capability for offensive action in Korea." While it is believed that any future offensive action against UN rear area installations by the estimatedone combat-ready enemy bomber,regiment would suffer comparable losses, FEAF estimates that "the vulnerability of our crowded airfields and the possible destruction of a proportion of our fighter strength on the ground" might influence the enemy to accept such losses. (S CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51) While the considerable Communist air capability both for challenging UN air superiority over Korea and launching air offensive aeion against UN ground installations is recognized, the degree of damage inflicted upon the enemy in this encounter by UN interceptors might well make him hesitate to take similat action in the future. enemy will probably husband his offensive air potential until 41uplitical or military considerations
KOREA
16.,
appear south of battle line: On 3 December four unidentified jet aircraft were sighted over the city of Seoul from several ground positions. UN F-86 aircraft dispatched to intercept the aircraft lost sight of them over the Yellow Sea southwest of Chinnampo."
Eerlier on the same day, three unidentified aircraft strafed a UN artillery position in the rear of the battle line west of Chcrwon, causing light UN casualties. A UN ground force the attacking aircraft had "swept-back officer at the scene stated that wings and red stars." (D CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)
17.
gienet.L. If, as seems probable, these aircraft were Communist, these incidents represent the southernmost enemy jet penetration and the first recorded instance of jet action against.UN ground installations.
hnother Chinese Communist 4th Field Army unit The Far East Command, reappears in Koreas on the basis of reports received, reaccepts the .Chinese Communist 38th Army in Korea, located in the Sunchon area nor th
TOP SECRET
9

amok.
In any event, the
dictate its use.
actua.1
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00060009000+-Pee 51
Approved For Rajgase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79101146A094600090001-7

TOP SECRET
of Pyongyang with a strength of 35,000.

Comment:
(5 CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)
The reappearance in Korea of this veteran army, after having been Withdrawn in the spring, signals the reappearance of almost all of the Chinese Communist units involved in the original Chinese intervention in 1950.
18. Zee. Factional disbute Within Javan Communist Party seen resolved:
CINCFE reports that the-Japan Communist Party his reinstated a Diet member whowas expelled from the JCP for "internationalist faction" activities. The.Diet member is one of several former internationalists who have submitted to "self-criticismi" --althoughtheywerenotexpelled from the party. -.7and are awaiting readmittance tO the centrist faction. CINCFE concludes that the strong factional cleavage has thus been practically resolved. (S Tokyo Weeks 48, 1 Dec 51)
Comment: Intraparty bickering and dissension, which has been going on in the JCP for nearly two years, has noticeably declined.in the past few months due in some part to the influence of Peiping and Moscow. Japanese Communist leaders appear to have been eager to correct the problem for some time, and in the 1951 Party statutes the leaders apparently adopted a compromise approach which would be acceptable to both factions.

TOP SECRET
10
4 Dec 51
Approved For Rejrose 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0119600090001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GENERAL. Latin Americans may support Byelorussia for Security Council seat: The chairman of the Latin American caucus at the Paris UN meeting has advised the American delegation that the United States should "not now" count on Latin American support of Greecels candidacy for the Yugoslav Seat 'on the Security Council. He added that the Latin Americans attached particular importance to retention of "the London understanding on geographic distribution" of Security Council seats and the "right of each region to select its own candidates." This would lead them to vote for Byelorussia. f(CUS UN Del Paris No, 448, 30 Nov 51)
The attitude of the Latin American delegates at Paris was described as rpnging from "disappointed to furious" over the US decision not to back a Latin American candidate for the seat on the International Court of JuStice left vacant by the expired term of a Mexican judge. The Latin Americans fear that this US move may presage further reductions in their representation on international bodies.
2.
GERMANY. Constitutional Court geta case outlawing Communist Party: The German Federal Government has presented its case against the German ComMunist Party (KPD) to the Constitutional Court. However, Deputy Minister of Interior Lex feels that the government may be unable to prove its charges, and thus be unable to outlaw the party.
The Constitutional Court is concurrently investigating charges against the Socialist Reichs Party (SRP), the radical rightist organization which has the largest following of all the neo-Nazi political aggregations; Lex is confident that the Court will ban the SRP. (C Bonn 534, 28 Nov 51)
Comment: On 17 November the Federal Cabinet decided to prosecute both partierin-ner the terms of a constitutional provision that political parties may be Outlawed if they seek to overthrow the libertarian democratic order. The EPD is being charged with, amOng other things, Committing acts of aegression against the present government which are in Seer-id With the plans of the Soviet Zone rulers. -The US element of the High Commission, as Well as important German leaders, regret that the party as a whole is being prosecuted rather than individual members. -Outlaiging the party, whiCh ab a legal entity is relatively impotent, will, it is feared, bnly force the movement underground where it will be more difficult to observe. Banning

TOP SECRET
11
ComMent: Support of Byelorussia over Greece would reflect a definite change-17-Fisition by a number of the Latin American nations. Brazil, for example, had informed the US that it would not support agy Soviet state to succeed Yugoslavia.
4 Dec 51
-v
Approved For Re Wade 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0426,0090001-7

TOP SECRET
the SR?, however, will greatly hamper its activities, because that party has been comparatively successful in recent elections. Its poPsible extinction will probably cause its followers-to flock to the German Party, or even to the Free Democratic Party; and thus these groups might then assume more rightist tendencies than they now evidence.
The action being taken against the KPD and the sRp is a reflection of the current drive by liberal and trade union circles against subversive organizations. In this drive the Christian Democratic Party has been taking the lead,
3.
Comment: British concern was increased last week by the report NATO Council in Rome on the status to the of negotiations for thelestablishment of a European Defense Community and for contractual arrangements German Federal Republic, With the This report showed many points of disagreement requiring settlement before the February Council meeting.
,
French Premier Pleven has given assurance of personally pressing the Paris Conference to produce a draft treaty on the European Defense Com munity by the end of this month.
Increased production somewhat relieves situation: The prospect of UFOs critical coal a critical domestic fuel shortage in Britain has diminished considerably, according to the latest coal production figures. From midOctober to midNovember, coal production increased by cent over the same period in 19506 seven per increase averages three and onehalfFor the first 46 weeks of this year the As of 17 November, coal stocks stood percent above last Yearts figuree. at 17.1 million tons, 1,9 million tone higher than in November 1950, At present there are 9,000 more miners there were a year ago. than (U London Financial Times, 28 Nov 51) Comment: Although these current coal stocks fall short of the figure of 18.5 million tons for target the end of 1951, they are comfortably above

TOP SECRET
UNITED KINGDOM. Eden considers European Foreign Secretary Eden views the European Army situation critical: British feels that the whole NATO structure will Army pituation as critical and be endangered if something is not done about the European Defense Forces. EXpressing the view that be had perhaps been too negative in his press conference statements, Eden asked Secretary Acheson if a more positive UK contribution could be made by suggesting some sort of British institutional association with the European Army, or by statements from Montgomery and Churchill on its military effective ness. Eden suggested that the US and Britain devote some "vigorous" to the European Defense Forces thinking problem, since a really critical situation might arise by January. (TS Rome Secto 1150 29 Nov 51)
12
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00060009dISAN 51.
Approved For Relays 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A04OV0090001-7

TOP SECRET
the 16.5 million tons estimated last July to be the maximum that could be produced by November.
If coal production stays at the present level for the remainder of the year, the recently intensified restrictions on consumption are maintained, and the 750,000 tons of US coal are imported as adreed during the next four months, there will be no serious coal crisis within the UK itself. However, the over-all European coal problem will remain critical, for the UK mill notbe able to export even the Same small amount of coal..as last year and by drawing upon US coal reserves will divert it fromWestern European countries where it is also vitally needed,
5.
Comment: Sy this action South Africa is defying a Trusteeship Ccovhittee resolcaari-Fequesting that these travel be granted. Since the Committee decided on 16 November to give facilities the Chiefs a hearing, SouthAfrica has boycotted its sessions -- the most vigorous position yet taken hy the Union on the recurring question of the status of the sparsely inhabited territory held under League of Nations mandate, Minister of the Interior Donges who came to Paris especially to plead South Africa's ease, has hinted at a walkout of the General Assembly; although most effective action would be a strong South he riei,sonally feels that the African protest to the President of the General Assembly.

TOP SECRET
13
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, South African relationship to the General-AsseMbly deteriorating on South-West Africa issUe: The South African Government has refused to grant travel facilities to a delegation of chiefs from SbuthWest Africa who have been invited by the Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly to appear before it in Paris to submit their petitions in person. (U NY Times, 3 Dec 51)
/4 Dec 51
TOP SECRET
1
UNCLASSIFIED when
ViclittratiM6P9Rethesetat12$05/ 2017.3300F4OPMEM14,413A0001000901YeieSi or declassi-

SOURCE
DOC. NO.
REG I STRY
CIA CONTROL NO.
'94'77,
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
ATTENTION: Thls harm will be placed on top o/ and attached to each Top Secret document receiv d by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain, attached to the document until such time as It is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the lett-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and Indicate the date 01 handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECE I VED
S I GNATUR E
RELEASED
DATE
T I NE
SEEN BY
5 I GNATURE

DATE
T I ME
OFF ICE/DI V.
DATE
DOWNGRADED
TO
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT. When this jorm is detect ed Horn Top Sec et mate MI it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
inu i--
and transmitted to Central Top Seret Contro Jor record.

By
DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
W I TNESSED BY
(Signature)
BY (Signature)
DATE
4401
OFFICE
FoRm 8.73
Mil3Foved For FtWae 2002105120 : COVADP79T0 i4VAb00600090001-7.

u.
26
Ptv101.1111011'100.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Relbsee 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0V0090001-7
TOP SECRET
sEcuRny INFORMATION
4 December 1951
CIA No. 49458-A
Copy No.
45
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. not represent a complete It does coverage of all current reports in or in the Office of Current Intelligence. CIA Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current
Intelligence.

Not for dissemination outside 0/CI Office of Current Intelligence
and 0/NE.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Wease 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146)1060600090001-7

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3 (1ESTERN)
Plan Uncertain: Premier Pleven has FRANCE. French ratificatiqn of Schuman can be "straightened told the US Ambassador that, if the Socialists' position of the Schuman Plan have a majority for passage out", the government will when it is debated on 6 and 7 December.
I.
Ass eiribly.
favor the Plan Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Socialists, who accept responsibility in principle, would, in a showdown with the government, for nonratification.

TOP SECRET
demand negotiation The Embassy reports, however, that the $Ocialists may condition which the covering their objections, a of a supplementary agreement votes will be decisive, because government could not accept. The Socialists t the Plan rather, than it is hew- clear that the Gaullists will vote .agains coalition, are re abstain, and even the Radicals, a rightist group in the interests to discredit the ceptive to a current "major campaign" by the steel 51) 51; C Paris 3227, 29 Nov (C S/S Paris 3232, 30 Nov Plan. expected the Flan_to pass by wa Comments In early October, Pleven economic groups, whose comfortable majority"; howeVer, powerful political and influence felt in the opposition was evident earlier this year, made their
14 Deo 51
.~
. ~ .
HR70-14
.
__
Ttel) SECRET SUEDE'

40PSBOBBTERIBDE-
/NR
~-
lo 10.
Communists rotate mediaal personnel in i n Manchuria: Manohurlat A A surgery surgery unit unit , Communists rotate medioal personnel in wae informed infonned in in a a message mes6am from from Shanghai Shanzhai that l l Iits t s Dereonnel. in Mapohurla Manauria was that a all pereonne with the the exception sxaeption of o f three three individuals, individnhs. must must prepare &are to t o leave. leave. The lith mesrags also a180 stated etated that that all a l l comrades oomradee who had returned returnad f r o m Korea msseage from Korea muld mould S A Military rstwn at once once to t o Shanghai. Shanghai. (SUEDE return"at (SUEDE U 4FSA Military Idsntifioatlone Identifications Bullatrin Bulletin No. 46, 46# 28 28 Nov NOY 51) 61) No.
;
T L
Oomaeniis During During the Comments the past past year year tho the Chinese Chinese Coxnt~mists Communists have have been been f o r o i n 7 rsouth s sou*of OS the Oreat W a lto l to "vollunfeer" Sor medical medioal fordirEaFors the Great Wall *volunteer" for teame go go by by rotation, rotation, each each servloe service in in Manohurio MAnehuria and and Korea. Korea. Volunteer Valunteerteams syetem avoids avoidp team reportedly reportedly staying staying about about four four months. months. The team The rotation rotation system
*he protracted protraotsd vrithdrawal withdrawal o f dootors institutions and and also also the of doctors from from medioal medical institutions gives as a8 many dootorr as as possible possible experience experianae in i a military military medical rnsdioal service. ~lervioo. gives many doctors
loasee in.30 in SO November November 1 1 . auzu Komi. Communist messages confirm heavy air losses U. a+tempton on Boder ra s Chinese Communist messages reporting the attempt 3030 Wove:saber 1RO-hrld islands islands 50 60 milee ; f Antung k d i o a t e that to bomb US-held miles aoutheast southeast ; of Antung iindicate that %he the
"2431"2"3"4/ED3
5 Doc 61
a
.
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED ATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 :DATE:
pmemY lost four and qomy four TU-2 TU-2 light l i g h t bombers, bombers, one one MIO-15 MIG-15 jet 36% and'possibly possibly six six airoraft; are are U-l.2 Z4-12 oonventional fighters f i g h t e r s in in the t h e engagement. engagsmest. These aircraft to Eighth, Second and believed to to have have been subordinate aubordinate respectively respeotively t o the Eighth, (SveDE Air Air Foroa Force Roundup Roundup 251, 261, Third Chinei Chinese Communist Conumpdat Air A i r Divisione. Divisions. (SUEDE Third 2203Z, 3 3 De03 Deo; W MUSS 22052, F 0 Sam OMIN I N 57218, 57218, 30 30 Nor NOV 51)
aomPaentr Communioations Uommunioations i n t e l l i g e n o e provided the ahanas Comient: intelligence &drones information of bombing m mission East Air Foroa Force jet o f this this enemy enemy bhbing i a s i o n which whioh enabled eqabled Far EaeB j e t fighters fightera t o intercept i n t e r o e p t it. it. to
~
. .
The losses are are comparable oomparable to t o initial i n i t i a l Far EaeC o r t s statements statmonte The East Air F Force that three t h a t six e i x TO-21s, TU-2'8, one MIG-15 IdILt-1s and t h r e e 14-9's I15-9'~ (conventional (oonventional fighters, easi3y mistaken for f o r LA-114s) Lb-lIqr)from from a a total total of of 60 SO MO's, MIG*s,12 12TII-21s TU-2'6 and and easilymistelen 16 Ii-916 U-Vs were were destroyed in the the 30 Movember November eaaounter. encounter.
.

12.
'
The Chinese Chinese Communist C o d s t A i r Foroe appear6 to have carriwd The Air Force appears carried out this without or Soviet p participation. operation w i t h o u t substantial s u b s t a n t i a l Korean o r Sovie6 articipation.
KOREA. North Korean air confer at AOW headquarters headquarters i in Sinuiju: KOREA. a i r officers o f f i o e r e oonfer a t new n Sinuiju: m e NovelLer m b e r North A, v 30 North Korean Korean air air message metsage from from Sinuiju Oinuiju to to Pyongyang Pyongyang stated etated t h a t !there "there is is a a conference:on oonferenoe on 5 Deoember, 0 8 dee that December, 8 eo, see that the the 8ariwon, Sariwon, m a g y a n g , Eangdong (ohiefe) a r r i v e in byby 44 Deader.* Pyongyang; Kangdon (chiefs) arrive inBinulju Sinuiju Deoedber.7(SUEDE *EDE AFSA-251 AFSA-2@ 0020Z, OO2OZ, 3 3 Deo 511 51)"
Qommentr Comment: Beoent Recent indicatione indioations have pointed pointed t to o the t transfer r a n s f e r of of oon.tro1 oontrol of.most NOrth Korean air prinoipally training, from Pyongyang of iodtTlGFE KWS~UI a i r operations, operatione, p rinoipally t r a i n i n g , irom ~yongsang t a - 8 i n u i j u r This change, te-SinUiju. ohange, ooquring ooauring between between 30 30 October Ootober end a d4 4 November, November, was s i g n a l l e d by by the the movement of of Wmg Ryon, North Korean A i r Force Foroe Was Sign011ed Wang Ryon, Air oommander, oommander, from Pyongyang to Sinuiju. Sinuij u .
appearance of a Korean-language Korean-language ground-oontrolled ground-oontrolled The recent appearanoe interdept intsreept net net in in the t h e Sinuiju Sinuiju area area is i s 'probably prabably ttied i e d in in wlth with tthis h i s headheadqnarterwshift, quarterr s h i f t , but but inan i n anas a s yet y e t Uneiplained unexplained manner. manner. Itis It is believed believed t h a t the t h e North North Korean Korean Air Foroe, Foroe, Olong along w i t h t h e Chinese Chinese A i r Foroa, that with.the Air Force, has reached reaohed a a considerable oonaiderabla !tate state of o f operational-readiness. o p e r a t i a n a l readinwm.
13. 1 3 .
North Koreans oontAnue traininL t r a i n l a g of i r perrronwlt: Deoember North &realm continue of a air ersonnels AA 22 Deoadber North korean orean a a ir r message measage From urian t r ain g base a t Yenchi Yenohi to to e Manohurlan rom the ra ni n ng ase at air headquarters i n Sinuiju S i n u i j u reports r e p o r t s that 7440 "440 students headquarters in etudents of of the +raining training b a t t a l i o n will:be w i l l be dispatched dispatohpd to t o the lst l a t Regiment and the 2nd 2nd Regiment of of battalion students on on 3 3 December." Deoember." (SUEDE AS 51) students AS CM IN 47813, 47813, S 3 Deo 51)
.
Ifhilo indioation givsa whether these tudents Comment8 Mile Comment: nono indication isis given asas tot o whethei.. these s students were p m ground ground personnel personnel trainee6, t h e size size of t h e olase, o h a s , whiah haa Were irtira"; trainees, the the which has apparently ooMpleted aompleted b a s i c training, t r a i n i n g , indicates indibates a a continued on apparently basic Continued emphasis eaphasis on t h e training training of of air a i r force f o r a e personnel. personnelr the
-TOP-SECRET-8UEDE
TOP SECRET SUEDE
8 Dec Deo 51 til 5
-14913-8BeRBT-euBDE-
14. U B I
A 17 17 Continued North Korean Korean iinterest in naval naval ttraining indioateds A Contimed n t e r e s t in r a i n i n g indicatedl ReviMber message from from a west west ooast coast defense defensehrigade November measage brigade to t o one one of of its its battalions battalions tequested the "tho list l i s t of of names of o f students of of t h e preparatory oourse oouree requested that "the the newel aeadamy, aeademy, the the students students of of the the n navaltraining of t h e naval a v a l t r a i n i n g sohmol, I O h o 0 1 , the the requirequigate for repair of of ships, ;hips, and and tthe noncommissioned officers si6e personnel peraonnel f o r tthe h e repair h e non-oommiseioned offioere and the Wd privates privates who pOsSess possess naval teohnique is i s to t o be forwarded by by t h e 18th 16a AS CM CM I /N 57580, N 57680, 22 P Coon) ~ 61) Q (of November)." November)." (SUEDE AS
consisting of few omments embryonic North qorth Korean Korean Navy, Navy, consisting of a af ew Gomenta The embryonic motor-ITIFTRU"boats, converted minesweepers mineyweepers and andarmed junks, was was largely largely maCor-'boati, oonvertsd .armed junks, Since tthat h a t period the eaemyte enemy's destroyed destroyed in i n the the early e a r l y days dayu of the t h e vat. wap. navy has hasheen one navy beenprinoipally p r h o i p a l l y aashore4hased ehoreC~b'ased one charged oharged with with coastal ooaetal defense defense and minelaying. and Minelaying.
rhile the training lllhils t h e soopevand scope and character aharaoter of of naval navalt r a i n i n g in i n North Borth Korea Xorea are are unknown, message unkaoun, this -8 message seems seem to t o indicate Indicate a a continued oontinued interest i n t e r s e t in i n sea-going sea-going peraonnel. personnel.
16 16. 0
.Sarly North Korean Korean mearages messages reveal reveal,gnerrilla Early North ,guerrilla organizations organfzakieat Recently Beoenfly rvaila6le North Korean messages f June AM &ad July1951 1951 shed same some li.ght l i g h t on a:mi3e:1)1e North Korean messageso ofJune July .shed on the organization Bhe organization of North North Korean Korean guerrilli-foroes g u e r r i u d - f o r m a in in South South Korea Korea during during that t h a t period. period.
Most of the measages messages were addressed t to Moqt o either e i t h e r the iliaison "Ualeon Officer" Offioer" or the the "Section "Seation Chief" Chief" of of the the "Eastern. "Eaetern Seoticn"i Section"; however, howevwr, one mesaage message -6 was addreesed addressed to t o the the. "Southern "louthern Seotion" Beotion" and and another another referred referred to to a a "Western Weetern during this this period period Seems seems to t o have have been been $ e o t i o n o ~ The The "Eastern "Eastbra Section" Beotion" during $0tinn." operating operating under under.radioed radioed ordere ordorsAn .in mountainous mountainous eastern eastern Korea, Korea, in in the the to t he .vioinity South Korean Korean ooastal coastal aity oity o of Samchok. dubordinate Subordinate to the o f .the t h e louth f Samohok. v5oinity of '!Eastern "Eastern Beotlon" 6eotion" w0re were f five i v e "detaohments," "detaohmenie one one of of which uhioh had had a a strength s t r e n g t h of OP "approximately 1,000 light l i g h t armed troopu." "approxiMately armed troops."
One diotinguiehed between these "detachments" "detaohmente" and guerrillas, guorriUae, Ono message distinguished i in:that n t h a t the t h e detaphments dgbaohmebts were ordered ordered to t o maintain maintain liaison l i a i s o n Prrith with t tho h e guerrilla guerrilla AS 0% CM I IN 68265, 27 Novj Nov; 56266, 66286, 27 Novj Nov; 56272, 56272, 27 Nov S1) 51) troops. (SUEDE AS N 66265# troops. (SUEDE
Comments FECOM carried oarried enemy enemy guerrilla g u e r r i l l a strength s t r e w h in in South South Korea Korea Comments , d u r i a this g m eperiod r i o d at a t 8,000. 8,OOO. .during
16,
5 De6 61 6 Dec 61
A Approved For Release2600/05/15 : CIA-RDP79701146M00600100001-5

TOP SECRET
5 December 1951
CIA No. 4945
Copy No.
1/1.5
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
sEcupan nwoRmATION
Approved ForReleast000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146*600600100001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1,
US2a. Airfield construction in Soviet Zone of Austria: Earth moving equip:mei/lc including caterpillar tractors, rollers, disc harrows, and
other construction equipment has appeared recently at the Vienna/ASpern airfield. The equipment is being used to grade and level a large area
25X1A
etthe:Set ria Of-theeaStWest runwaY: Thie is the firatlarge quantity of construction equipment to be:usecrin Austria'during the-pestwar period and possibly foretells the initiation Of a ma or airfield construction program in Austria in 1952
Comment: While improvement of existing airfields and construction of new airfields within the Eastern European Satellites is a continding part of the Soviet plan for increasing air.capabilities in the Orbit, airlield construction such as that observable in all Satellites except Albania has not previously been noted in the Soviet Zone of Austria. Lack of evidence precludes interpretation of the current construction at Vienna/Aspern to mean a major airfield construction program in Austria, although the recent evacuation of several other fields in Austria by light bomber units has suggested that construction.work may be planned for them.
Since the Soviet prograin of intensive airfield improvement and construction was first noted'in the eastern zone of Germany and then spread throughout the Satellites, this repert may indicate that the Soviet zone of Austria has had the lowest priority.
In Austria, there are Soviet military airfields onZy one of whicb has a completed hard-surfaced runway of 6000 feet or more at thie-date.
2.
Lack of ipecialists to operate giant collective farms: Recent cotment in Pravda and Izvestia indicates that deficiencies in collective farm leadership and -IIT477.1.on represent a major unsolved problem confronting Soviet agriculture. The seriousness of the leadership problem is said to have been intensified last year by the mass campaign for collective farm mergers and enlargement.
.
Soviet newspapers note that many of the enlarged farms employ hundreds of workers and require mnooth coordination of labor and machinery to prevent chaos and waste. Collectivefarm heads,,accustomed to operating much smaller enterprises, are thought'to be having difficulties in adapting themselves to the larger and more intricate problems presented by the new farms. (U Nei./ York Times, 4 Dec 51)

TOP SECRET
1
5 Dec 51
" Approved ForReleas000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146*00600100001-5

TOP SECRET
The Soviet GovernMent has endeayored to have collective Comment: farm Ohairthen picked from the ranks of agronomists, veterinarians, and other specialists, rather than from rank and file peasants. The apparent Slowness of the Government'e progress along this line tilay result from resistance offered not only by peasants but by the farm specialists as well.
3.
25X1A
Cement.: The Department of State has instructed the US Legation in Budapest to present a note to the Hungarian Foreign.Office demandinflrompt release of the plane and crew, but is planning to ,defera protest to the SeViet Government pending the outcome of negotiations with Hungarian authorities..
4.
25X1A
Slow progress on Danube-Black Sea Canal: American and British diplomats who traveled by train in August anneptember from Bucharest to the Black Sea coast and observed about two-thirds of the project have reported unfavorably on the progress of the Danube-Black Sea Canal. Most work was being done by hand; there were few evidences of mechanical equipment. A large proportion, estimated by the British Air Attache at 30 percent, of housing for workers was fenced and guarded, indicating forced labor, and many laborers were seen working under armed guards. Other unguarded workers appeared to be members of the gray-uniformed Labor Corps. At the present rate, the American Legation does not believe that the 1955 target date for completion of the canal will be met.
RUMANIA.
HUNGARY. Note protests frontier violation by US plane: The Hungarian Government in a note to the US Legation in Budapest on 3 DeceMber strongli protested the violation of Hungary's frontier by a US military cargo plane: The mote charged that "the act was committed for criminal purposes, namely, to smuggle spies and diversionists into Hungary." Reference was made to a recent Hungarian declaration which listed examples of "brutal interference by the US in Hungary's internal affairs and the organization and support by the Americans of spies and saboteurs on'Hungarian soil." The Most recent violation of Hungary's frontier proves that the.US continues tO smuggle members of its intelligence service into Hungary, the note charges. R FBIS, 3.Dec 51)
'
25X1A
Comment: Despite propaganda extolling the progress of Rumania's first gigantic construction project, this and other reports indicate that the project is not going as satisfactorily as claimed. Difficulties in the procurement of machinery and construction materials and reliance upon forced labor are detrimental to fulfillment of the initially overambitious plan.
TOP SECRET
2
5 Dec 51
Approved ForReleale2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01149011500600100001-5

TOP SECRET
5.
25X1A
RUMANIA. Telegation goes to Peking: The American Legation in Bucharest reports that on 28 November a Rumanian delegation left for Peking to conclude a cultural agreement. Minister of Education Popescu-Doreanu, whose Administrative fall was speculated upon some months ago, is chairman of the dele ation and Ana Toma Deputy Foreign Minister, is a member.
Comment: Radio Peking announced on 3 December that the delegation had arrived in Peking. This is another instance of closer relations between Communist countries of the Eastern and Western orbits. The presence of Ana Toma in the delegation may be significant, since she is reportedly a close collaborator of Ana Pauker and may have gone to China fez* other than purely cultural reasons.
6.
YUGOSLAVIA. Party officials express concern over closer US relations: Communist Party reaction to the evolution of Yugoslav-US relations is evidenced in two recent developments inside party circles.
First, Koper District committee officials of the par y organization have circulated the following comments: American aid in no way subverts Yugoslav independence; the aggressiveness of the Soviet UniOn has forced Yugoslavia to accept Western aid; but Yugoslavia will not join or become involved in the Atlantic Pact; Yugoslavia will remain neutral and independent, steadfast in its goal of building socialism.
25X1C
25X1A
Second, The Secretary of the Croatian Communist Party, Spiljak, has accused the party masses of falling victims to ideological decomposition and apathy: He roundly condemned affinity for Western non-Communist ideas among party members and attacked wishful thoughts that closer Weetern ties would mean that liberal bouneois overnnent would return to Yugoalavia. U NY Traune, 25 Nov 51)
Comment: There are increasing signs at discomfort among the middle ranks of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Yugoslays trained in Marxism and Soviet relations find it extremely difficult to accept the proposition that Western aid does not involve domination or interference. The question of how to preserve And strengthen the ideological rationale which serves to justify the present regime during a period of closer relationships with the West is one of Tito's major problems.

TOP SECRET
3
5 Dec 51
Approved For Release1000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146M90600100001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
_
.
.
1.
War and NationalEconomy, respectively.
IRAN. Prime Minister reshuffles Cabinet in preparation for eleotions: The US Embassy in Tehran has confirmed press repors of aCabinet reshuffle on 1 December. According. .to the Embassy, Amir-Alai, MOhammed Kalali, General lazdanpanah'ind hive been apPointed Minister of Justice. Interior,
'
25X1A
Comment: Iranian law requires that government officials who desire to 'run for Parliament must resign before the elections, and these ministers will thUs be ineligible for re-election .to the Majlis. Their appointment, howeVer,'will materially increase National Front chances of victory in the election, for these men are all supporters of Prise Minister Messadeq and the posts to whioh they have been appointed are vital to National Front control of the elections.
25X1X
2.

Communist aotivit TOP SECRET
25X1X
INDIA.
increases near the Tibetan border.
25X1X
25X1A
e ndian Government is serious y concerned over increased Communist activity at Kalimpong, Best Bengal, one of the two southern termini of the main trade route between India and Lhasa, Tibet. According to the oonsular attache, who himself witnessed a Comsmnist demonstration in Kalimpong, the Communists are exploiting political discontent among the large Gurkha population of the area. They maybe able to defeat the Indian Con ress Party in sone of the forthcoming national election contests.
25X1X
Comment:
to establish border posts along the frontiers of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. By forging links with the Indian Communist or-.ginizations, whioh have existed in Kalimpong and Darjeeling for SORB time, the Chinese may soon develop their first strong trans-Himalayan line of communication and infiltration into the plains of India.
troop=a'enow stationed along the trade routes from India into Tibet, and that they are preparing
Reports from Khlimpong indicate that Chinese Communist
3,
BURMA. Insurgent attacks upon railways continue: Insurgents have seriously 371T3Ffered with rail communications south of Mandalay. For example, since the resumption of traffic between Rangoon and Mandalay on 2 November there have been only two days of effective service, and a seotion of the line has now been closed indefinitely because of constant sabotage. North of Mandalay, however, there has been a notable slacking off of insurgent attacks upon communications. The US Embassy in Rangoon oomments that the insurgents appear to be in favor of preserving communications between Mandalay and the China frontier.
25X1A
'5 Deo 51 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600100001-5
'
Approved ForReleaW2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146W00600100001-5

TOP SECRET
Comments The insurgents in the areas referred to are mostly Communists. It is therefore logical that they should wish to keep the pipeline into China open both in the interest of maintaining the flow of smuggled goods to China and the receipt of supplies from their Communist colleagues.
14.
25X6
INDONESIA, Foreign and Prime Ministers reasbert necessity fez. Hew Guinea disoussions while latter e resses desirability of US mediations The Indonesian ForeignMinis
25X6
25X6
25X1C
Shortly afterward, Prime Minister Sukiman expressed similar viewa. He added that he coniiderestthat the best way to settle the New Guinea ihou14 be through American mediation, stressing that the friendly spirit of Indonesia toward the US would grow in res onse to continued American confidence and support,

'
reasserted s position in favor of free and frank discussions. He again argued that failure of Indonesia to obtain now the opportunity to discuss the Union and New Guinea questions with the Netherlands would lead inevitably to unilateral aotion on the part.of Indonesia.
25X1A
TOP SECRET
5
5, Deo 51
Approved For Re lea* 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP791"011419400600100001-5

25X1C
TOP SECRET
7,
25X1A
Cruiser. Chungking reportedly repaired: The Chinese Communist cruiser Chungking made a trial run in the Chihli Gulf area and subsequently anchored near Port Arthur, according to a Communist source. The Chun kin reportedly has a mixed aino -Soviet crew and a Soviet no:mender.
-
8.
CoMmunists announce new Sino-Czech trade agreement: .11: Prague announcement on 2 December declares that "a Chinese tradsudelegation of 15 MeMbere-arriveCtin PragUe lait-night-toTsign the trade agreement between the Chinese People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. (U FBIS Prague, 2 Dec 51)
:
.
Communist China and Czechoslovakia signed a trade pact only Comment: six months ago. At that time the Communists.announced that the pact provided for a several-fold increase in Sino-CfechoslOvak trade. The new agreement offers added evidence of the growing impertance of the Satellites in China's foreign commerce. According to Peiping, one-fourth of Chines' fOreign trade was with Eastern Europe in the first three quarters of 1951, as compared with some two percent in 1950.

TOP SECRET
It has never been clearly established whether or not the ChunglWras salvaged by the Communists after being bombed at Hulutao in early 1949. If operational, this cruiser would be the Chinese Communists' largest naval vessel.
Comments
25X1A
25X1C
9.
25X1C
10.
Chinese Communist airlift operations over Korea reported: repoFEiUthat the Chinese Communist Air Transport -Wing, under the Changchun Air Base Command,fl ha:: flown four airlift' operations over Korea since it was formed in.:July 1950. The most recent missicn of this transport wing occurred in September 1951. -when about 30 tons of materiel were dropped over Hsinmu.
Comment: Airlift operations fromManchuria to Korea have not pre viousTrbTart noted. However, the Chinese Communists have enough transports to airlift into Korea on a small scale.
25X1A
US adviser to be pluced in Chinese Nationalist Political Department: General Chases chief of the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group on
5 Dec 51
Approved ForRelease1000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146M00600100001-5

TOP SECRET
.25X1A
Formosa, reports that he has appointed a US adviser to the Politioal Department of the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense, at the suggestion of General Chiang Ching-kuo, chief of that-department. This adviser is to observe the political officers' methods of o eration , particularly ' those assi ned to the Nationalist armed forces.
'Comment:
The system of political officers, directly responsible to General Cbtang, is in operation at all levels in the Nationalist military structure. General Chase recently asked fer the abolition of the entire Political Department, claiming that, by creating a dual chain of cOmmand, it impaired his efforts to reorganize the Nationalist armed forces. Thie is the first offer by Chiang Ching-kuo to disclose the activities of the Political Department,
25X1A
11.
ne:men
25X1A
Bicameral legislature and direot election of the executive are zomen s o e RI ons u on, e ounci yngman Rhee's eabinet--approved on 27 November a Bill of.Axendments:to the ROK Constitution calling for a bicameral legislature and direct popular election of the President and Vice President, according to the US EMbassy in Pusan, Under current preoedure, one month will be allowed as a "Period of discussion and debate," after whioh the amendments will be submitted to the National Assembly whnre a two-thirds vote is required for ratification.
COMment:
KOREA.
These amendisants are pet projects of Rhee, who fears that under the existingelection prOcedure (1.1031,., by the National Assembly) he could not again beoome President, Inasmuch ea his name is practicallY the only one known to the great mass of peasants, would considerably enhance the possibility of his direct popular election re-election,
.
12.
JAPAN. Indonesian and Philippine ratification of apanese Treaty held up over rep7Fianiiiiii Ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty by the Indonesian and Philippine Parliaments appears douhtful, according to Department of State reports, unless "concrete engagements".in reparations by Japan are assured. As the minimum claims of these ceuntries are in excess of gapanese capabilities, the Department, in order to prevent an impasse and ill feeling, ii suggesting that the Japanese Government promptlY initiate
It is believed by the Embassy that Rhee will probably spend the intervaning month in carrying the issue to the people. the present feeling in the Assembly is that the amendments have little chance of passage, as the Assembly is loath to relinquish the important power of electing the President.
-
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : ElA-RDP79T01146A00066011:1061:11-5

__
.
TOP SECRET
Approved ForReleage2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146*600600100001-5

TOP SECRET
25X 1 A
negotiations with Manila. end D akarta to offer s eoific projects and an interim.advance program.
.
. .
COMeent: In order te shaw good faith, Japan.will undoubtedly be receptive to temporary arrangements which will not place an undue.burden en its precarious foreign exchange position.' Because of its ancertain eoonomic future,-Japan does not want to enter into any long term commitments.
15.
.COMMont: Yoshida's government, in power now for nearly three years, has graterThe most stable postwar administration. The Liberal Party, According to recent polls, is at a high point of popalaritY, ancLit no doubt is confident of being returned to power with a publip vote of,, 9OnfidenCe. With:the peace treaty effective and Japan's aovereignty returned, 4 new Cabinet could start off with a clear slate. Additionally, there is considerable pressure on the government to hold elections in order to provide the many prominent recent political depurgees with an opportunity to filter back into publio life.

TOP SECRET
Lower House Speaker predicts Diet dissolution next spring: Joji Hayashi, Speaker of the Diet's lower Souse, pre4icted that the Diet mill be dissolved next April oM May, at which time he believes the Peaoe Treaty will have become effective, Hayashi stated the Yoshida administration will te able to remain in power until next spring and that it will be to the best interests of Japan to have the present Cnbinet handle the problems connected with the completion of the Occupation,t (U FB1S Ticker, Kyedo Press Service, 1 Dec 51)
5 Dec 51
Approved For Releas4"1000105115 : CIA-RDP79T01146A900600100001-5

TOP SECRET
25X1C
_
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
25X1C
De Lattre considers Indod I a situation hO eiedS:
FRANCE-INDCCHINA.
General
25X1C
eves that victbry in Indochina is impossible and at "dioaster is imminent." The General feels that the United States -fails to understand the gravity of the situation.
,
25X1A
De Lattre, who expects to be the next SSE comMander, has reportedl notified the French Government that he will not' return to Indochina.
25X1A
De Lattre, who is reportedly anxious to leave Indochina while he is ,stiltat the height of his success, may use ill health as an excuse to resign his present position. He probably feels that he has a Vested interest-in the NATO command because of the groundwork he laid with General Montgamery under the Brussels Pact. He regretted leaving the top French military post in Europe to his archrival, General Juin,
2.
AUSTRIA.
.Comment: The conclusion of the French and other military officials in Indochina is that the Viet Minh cannot be defeated in the forepeeable future underthe present political and military circumstances. Unless,:however there is a Chinese Communist invasion, no "disaster" is expected.
EariErthat the rank and file of Austrian trade unions may be dissatisfied
with the ctrrent progress of the price roll-back campaign and the governmentis economic stabilization pregram have endouraged COmmunist leaders to intensify their deMands for wage adjustments. Communist efforts are-cencentrated on achieving works-council support for a 300-to 400-schilling bonts payment for Austrian workers and a 200-sChilling tax.4ree monthly wage increase: While Communist Claims Of success in this campaign are probably. exaggerated, sone scattered support ap ears to have been aOhieved among:nori-Communist 25X1A morka-oeundils. R FBIS, Vienna Volkstimme 2 Dec
,
COmmunist wage demands capitalize on Workers' discontent:
Indi-
Comment: DeSpite the obviouS attractiveness of the irresponiible Communist demand for higher wages, Socialist leadership of Austrian labor does not appear to he challenged at the-present time-. Nevertheless, it 'will increasingly embarrass the Socialists intheir support of a:program which holds little promise of achieving any real alleviation of the Workers' problems. Perhaps indicative of a protest psythelogy within labor ranks are initial and unconfirmed reports from current shop;stewards,elections showing losses sustained by government candidates, snail gains by the Communists, and larger gaint by non-party and "unity" candidates.
TOP SECRET
5 Dec El
'.ApprovedForReleasH000/05/15:CIA-RDP79T01146A000600100001-5
TOP SECRET
3.
25X1A
BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS: Benelux opposes pressure for early European Defense agreement: At the 26 November meeting of the Foreign Ministers of,France, Great Britain-and the United States with the'BehelUx Foreign Minister-6, the latter complained over the fact that bor.:elusion of the contractUal arrangement with Germany depends on agreement on the Eutopean Defenee'FOrces. The Benelux Ministers also resented being put into the position of blocking EDF, adding that constitutional. roblems made theit situations different from France and Germany. Comment: A Benelux draft reselution SUbmitted te-the NATO Council just prior to this meeting suggested that-the Benelux countries would resist any pressure for concluding the EDF Conference which might resUlt in their having to accept a French dictation of the treaty. The French insist that the contractual arrangement must be linked with Germany's acceptance of the European Defense Forces:
The Belgian Foreign Minister had previously doubted the chances of parlimnentary appraval of EDF as it now stands.
4-
ITALY.
Trrerms of the latest one-year Italo-WSR trade agreement have been

analyzed by the US Embassy in Rome at "Vety faverabbs-toAthe Italians.' Principal Italian imports are 100;000 tohs of Wheat, 100,-000-tens:d) petroleum,: 2009000 tons .of fuel oil, 100,000 tons of anthracite ooal, 20,000 tons of manganese ore, and other raw materials. The'USSR offered an additional 1009000 tons of wheat which the Italimnueenld not accept because of its high pricei In exchange the Italians will export artifidial fibres textiles lemone, ditrus fruits, abnonds, oils, cork, and-ball and toiler bearillgs. The Italians granted only 350 million lires worth of ball and roller bearings as competed to the 1.-.2 billion lires-worth sought by the USSR. In addititoms the unutilized quotas Of the iong-term agreement concluded-in No*ember-1948y under which Russia furniehed raw materiels for the manufacture in Italy of s ecified'industrial equi mentywill remain in-effect.
25X1A

TOP SECRET
10
Italy and the USSR conclude negotiations for new trade agreement:
25X1A
5.
out.
damnent: The Italo\41SSR-ttade negotiatiOns-have been long and drawn Soviet petreleum deliveries to Italy have in the paet riot been entirely satisfactory as to price and quality. The terms of the Italian /jeade.treaty require Italy to manufacture machinery for which the USSR will provide the raw materials.
VATICAN-GERMANY. Vatican reportedly supports Brueningls return to Germa The Vitican is "sponsoring" the re urn of former German Chancellor. Bruenfng from the United States to Germany. Statements attributed to Monsignor
5 Dec 51
Approved For Re leaset000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146AWI0600100001-5

TOP SECRET
Montini, in charge of "Ordinary Affairs" in the Vatican Secretariat of State and Monsignor Kaas, leader of the Catholic Center Party during the Weimar l Republic and novr working on the Vatidants-German desk,:inclicatethat the Vatican has briefed Bruening to try leader Schumacher from negotiating with'East tb prevent German Socialist German Miniater President Grotewohl concerning the reunification Of Germany'. aril:ening is also to' work against any alliance between British Socialierb'Bevan and French and Italian Socialist leaders "on a basis of neutralism."
The Vatican is said to be concerned over Chancellor Adenauerts failing health and over the animosity between him and Schumacher.
Comment:
25X1A
25X1A
in the political strife which the Vatican fears weakening Western Germany and blocking the.unification of Weatern-Europe against the threat of Communist aggression, overestimates Brueningts influence on current The'Vatican, however, probabIY German affairs after his long exile in the United States,
6.
Spain avoids open ties vrith Eurcran faacist organization: According detailed report on the meeting of European fascists held in Spain in late September, representatives of the Spanish Falange sidestepped any official connection with the fascist Spaniards allegedly stated that although European Social Movement. The the government wanted to coOperate, Franco wishes to avoid any action that might jeopardize Spain's prospects of receiving economic and military aid from the United States.
SPAIN.
ne first
25X1A
The leaders of the Movement are purported to have accepted reluctantly the fact that cooperation between the Falange and other fascist organizations would have to be on a personal basis. For tho moment the fascists are prepared to acce ershi unti ist threat is overtome.
Comtent: This report is believed of_th4-5F5Teht opportunistic attitude to represent an accurate etatement of the Spanish Government toward open participation in any international fascist movement.

TOP SECRET
11
a former member of the Catholic Center Party-M:33F the Weimar Republic, is probably considered a potential moderating influence
Bruening, like Kaas'
25X1A
7.
UNi EV KINGDOM. British hint possible intervention to save Schuman Plan .and European Defense Community: Julian Amery, one of the leading British Conservative spokesmen at the Council of Alurope debates; has empheaized to the US observer there his conviction that the Schuman and Pleven plans must not fail, He said that his government wpuld go to "considerable lengths" to see that some acceptable coal-steel pool and European Defense
5 Dec a
Approved For ReleaseitS00/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW600100001-5

TOP SECRET
Conraunity evolved, especially if -- as Reynaud, the French had predicted
25X1A
the French National AsSembly ref without British participation
representative, ify these plans
8.
25X1A
25X1A
Government cuts researCh and develo of Supply has been axed nt e ec a allocations of research percen and development fundb. prepared to determine Which projects Priority will be curtailed. will be the first affected.

A reduction in funds for
. '
Comment: Council of Europe delegates do not necessarily their governments. SPeak for On 27 November at the Rome NATO meetin6 Foreign Secretary Eden said that Britain would hot send troops to the European Defense Forces, but would be "associated" With British Government is Prepared them; and there are no indications that the to go:beyond_this position at present. Earlier in the Council of Europe proceedings, Conservative representative, Robert Boothby, another and the influential advodated contributing Manchester Guardian two British divisions to theElirepeanTerecire The British may be holding Forces. out the prospect of their dramatic the European Defense Community entrance into and similar organizatiohs prop to wavering continental Europeans as a psychological -- without, however, selves to aRy specifiC actions. committing them-
fluids:
The Minister re uction in current studies are being Basic researc
25X1A
Comment:
research and development, which are and -which shielded from budget purposes cuts, reflects the have up to now been conSpicuousIy current British Gdvernmentts to cut expenditures wherever possible attempt available as well as the trend teWarcLueing resources to obtain more inunediate The 1951-1952 defense biAdget results in the defenee development, an inerease of allowed 76 million pounds for research program. and 13 million pounds, or about the preceding year. 21 percent, oVer
9.
largetr?Braefense
25X1A
TUNISIA French Resident .0 General feara.treuble Resident Gener in Tbnisia: The French n unis a ears political groups toward Tunisia s X en ng a itude" Of French ie preventing a mental reform. He predicts AY 6oncessions on governthat incidents will be able to maintain t that the French
order.
Comment: The overwhelming 29 NofeFEJF: success of a 24-hour general strike,on called by the nationalist labor union to demonstrate solidarity with the demands Tunisian presented in Paris by Tunisian Chenik, apparently hae Prime Minister caused concern in French and his delegation governmental circles. mill probably become more Chenik insistent, General, who failed to and the Resident keep the delegation The French are considering away from Paris, may be replaced. the appointment of a joint mission to study the French-Tunisian comreform question. TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/16a. CIA-RDP79T01146A00003jp901-5
TOP SECRET
downgraded or declassi-
UNCLASSlFlELAPIPINfitthiceisRedeate 2000/0611.53:5CrAasktlisnttisinaelb 00600100001-5
SECRET DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP

REG I STRY
DOCUMENT DESCR I PT I ON
CI A CONTROL NO.
SOURCE

DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
COPY NO. _NUMBER OF PAGES
LOGGED BY
destroyed, Or to each TOp ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, whose official within the CIA and will remain personnel and those individuals or classified Toy Secret is limited to Top Secret Control form to Top Secret matter transmitted outside of CIA. Access release the attached Toy Secret material will sign this receive and/or Top Secret document wilt sign and duties relate to the matter. TOp Secret Control Officers who Each individual who secs the provided. and Indicate period ot custody in the left-hand columns Indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
,
Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agent!,
OFFICE
S GNATURE
appropriate Spaces below from Top Secret material tt shall be completed in the When this form is detached NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: record. and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for D I SPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) DESTROYED DCWNGRADED TO
By
TO
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
FOR
Approvel 'Far Releasevroom5115 : CIAIFkb1379T01

TOP SECRET

DATE
TIME
REFERRED TO
RECE IVED
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
5 I GNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
(Signature)
WITNESSED DY
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
O4.6k0006001000OLD5ATE
140)
Approved For Re leage 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDI279T011116000600100001-5

TOP SECRET
5 December 1951

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDF79T01146A000600100001-5

TOP SECRET
SECURITY pIFORMATION
Approved For ReleagV2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146600600100001-5

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
American Congressman invites Tito to visit the US: US Ambassador Allen reports that during a polite conversation with Tito, Congressman Edblocki of Wisconsin said that he hoped Tito would visit the The Marshal replied that he has always had this United States soon. aspiration and hoped that the appropriate occasion would arise.
YUGOSLAVIA..
25X1A
During a press interviewrwith touring Congressmen the following day, Allen emphasized that Eablocki was speaking as an individual member of Congress and not for the Department of State.
25X1A

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2.
De Lattre intends to resigns
25X1A
Genera
de Lattre recen y
25X1X
inferred in an interview aep
eoresign because the war in
Indochina was impossible.,, De Lattre is said to be planning the replacement of French forces by a' Vietnamese army. In addition, De Lattre gave the impression he expected to succeed General Eisenhower if the latter tecame 25X1A President of the United States.
It is Comment: Similar information has just been reported from Paris. not kRZWFWether the same interview was reported twice or whether the two reports are separate statements by De Lattre containing identical views.
SECTION 3 (WES1ERN)
3.
The AUSTRIA. Soviet authorities repeat Austrian remilitarization charges: Soviet representative on the Allied Council on 30 November repeated charges that the three Western occupying powers are remilitarizing their zones of Austria. The three Western High Commissioners rejected the charges and refused to accept a Soviet resolution demanding a quadripartite investigation. A US counterproposal confirming the completion of demilitarization, requiring commercial enterPrises operated by the occupying powers to comply with Austrian laws, and urging the early conclusion of a treaty was rejected b the Soviet High Commissioner. The meeting ended without agreement.
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: With the assistance of the Austrian Communist press And the forum provided by the Allied Council, the Soviet element has succeeded in extending these charges over a two-manth period. Austrian and Allied
TOP SECRET
5 Dec 51
. Approved ForReleasb4000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146S0600100001-5

TOP SECRET
obserVers believe that Soviet emphasis an this issue has been designed to provide a convenient excuse.for refusing to sign: an Austrian treaty. Rejection Of the Soviet resolution, however, will deprive Soviet allegations of the dignity which would have been lent them by a pending investigation.
U.
25X1A
ITALY. Italians .essimistic on chances of obtaining UN membership: The Italian Government appears to have no hope that the USSR will forego a veto in the Security Council on Ital es adm ion conditions unacceptable to it or the US. Comment: The Soviet note of 11 October on revision of the Italian peace treaty made Italy's admission to the UN contingent on that of the Satellite countries.

TOP SECRET
2
5 Dec 51
HR70-14
TC71) SECRET SUEDt'

-TOP-GERET-HEDE-
NR
12* 1 2 .
n north ChineSe Oomupist Communist 50th Army Army oonfinned confirmed i in North Korea; Korea: A North KOREA. Ohinear KOREA, 1tttii*ean message 4 DeceMber reports "combatr e results Chinese message of of 4 Deceaiber reporta t hthe e "oombat s u l t 8 oof f t the h e Chinese alio states tthat "the ttroop the 50th Army ArmY on-the on the 16th." 15th." The report a 60th l s o states h a t "the r o o p of t he
50th Chinese ChineSe Army Armyvtioh 60th whioh has has been been guarding guarding the t h e wooden wooden ship s h i p met m e t with lnrith the the followingsooident" m anti-Communist anti-Communiet guerrilla guerrilla following aooident" and and proceeds prooeeds to t o describe desoribe an (SUEDE AS AS CM IN 58274, Dec 81) 68274, 5 6 Deo 61) raid. (SUEDE raid.
-
13* 15
North Korean Korean use use of o f GICI GCI equipnsntr 4 December Worth Morth North equipment reportedr reported: A 4 Korean to Pyongyang Pyongyang reports reports tthat "the a air oontrol Korean air a i r message message from from dinui,ju Sinuiju 00 h a t "%he ir o ontrol van did (SUEDE AS N 58274, van d i d not work work during during the t h e night...." night..*." (SUEDE AS CM IIN 58274, 5 Deo Dec 61) 61)
This is i s the the first f i r s t mention in in a 8. North North Korean Korean message of af Comment: This 'Commentr this tiFfrnrequipment. recent weeks a Korean-language Korean-language ground-oon0rolbd ground-controlled s e q u i p n e n t , In In, r w e n t weeks intercept i n t e r o e p t not n e t has hae been been noted noted controlling oontrolling operational operational aircraft a i r a r a f t in i n the the Them are soma indications indioations %hat i s integrated i n t e g r a t e d with Sinuiju are some that this noti net is with Blnuiju area. area. There or o r at a t least l e a s t parallels p a r a l l e l s the the Soviet Soviet GC/ G C I radar radar net n e t in In Korea. Xoroa*
14. 1 4 .
North Korean Korean IY,Corpt I V Corps may have have new new coMbat ooybat mieeionr A badIy badly garbled garbled missions A North b !ores:4 message of of 3 S'December; probillY addressed addressed ttO North.Korean r e a n meadage Deosmbar, probably o tthe h e North Korean 23rdBrigade onvast m8t coast ooast defense defense duty, duty, stated s t a t e d that t h a t "beginning "beginnilfg 10 10 December, Deaember, 23rd'Brigade on in in aopordanoe aooordanoe with'the w i t h t h e general general plans plans of ofthe t h enew new.1 (landings?) of of the the (landings?) 4th will commence, will without 4tih Corps, Corps, and since sinoe the combat aombat training t r a i n i n g will oomenoe, you w i l l , without fail fail prepare prepare the the first first phase phase of of the the * * equipment; by 9 Deoembsr." equipment December." (SUEDE AS CM IN (SUEDE AS IN 58066, 68066, 4 4 Deo 51) 51)

-TOP-nem-sin=
7
14rmy has been been t tentatively my has entatively &roe, north in northwestern northwestern.Korea, in'the message that ongohon river. rlver. There is 18 some 60me indioatiOu ibQ i n t h e message Of the Chongonon elaiaints Of t the 50th Army Army partioipated participated in in recent recent enmy enemy amphibious amphibious operaoperaalements of h e 60th tions this i is not confirmed. in this t h i s area; area; home/ter, however, this s n o t oonfimed. t i o n s against a g a i n s t UN-held WN-held islands i r l a n d s in
Oommentr Comments
Tha Chinese The Ohinese Communist Comunist 50th 5
aooepfird-
vu
'Comments Comment8 'While While tthis h i 8 message s so o prevent accurate aocurate message i is so garbled garbled as t to analysis, it analyaw d doep o e s suggest suggest IV I V Corps Corps preparations preparations for for a a new new assignment. asa'ignment. , . duty may be a further f u r t h e r expansion expansion of of the t h e corps, aorpe' ooastal o o a s t a l security aeourity This new duty may be'a mlssion on on the t h e west m e t ooast ooast in in anticipation a n t i d p a t i o n of o f UN UN amphibious amphibious operations, operations, or or mission I t may may presage presage preparations preparations of of elements elemsnts of of the t h e oorps oorps for f o r limited l i m i t e d amphiamphiit bious bious operations., operatlone ,
61 6 Deo 61
"I)
-TOP-SECRET SUEDE
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
" -
S25
SS
Tots SECRET SUEDt1

' 40P-SEORET-SUBBS
16 16.
A 3 3 DeoeMber December North North Korean. Korean Comm~jnistaealvage ealvaKe orashad oraehad airorafts airoraft: A CommUnists message from from an an unknoen unknown souroe,to souroe t o the.00mmander the ooxmnandor of o f an an "artillery 'artillery troop" troop" *engage ordern the latter l a t t e r to t o "keep 'keep and end cemouflage oamouf'la e the the enemy enmy and and our our aircraft'whioh airoraPt lnhioh Orderethe orarhsd and and not not handle the the aooessories." aooeasoriee.' The Orashed The mesaage message also also states states that that %he the 'troop who have the'aluminum the'aluminum for f o r the the me68 equipment' should rrhould report report the the "troop who have mess equipment" It warn8 that punishment puniehment !ill $11 be be meted metedout outto t oanyone anyonewino who qu&+ity. qUentity. It earns that (SUEDE AS 4 Dec Doc 51) 61) *dmetroys" the orashed orashod aircraft. airoraft. (SUEDE "destroys" the AS CM CM IN IN 68093, 58093, 4
,
.
This message, message, probably, probably to n t i d r o r a f t unit i n the the rear rear Comment: This Comment' to an an a antiaircraft unit in &rea, -eAcme he interebt the Communists Communist8 have i n salvaging,airplanes salvaging airplanes and and area, nteregt the have in l s o ofnOte oi'nbteie the suggestion suggestion that that the the aluminum aluminum from from airoraft parts. parts. A airoraft Also is the mashed airplanes airplanes is is used used for f o r me88 Mta. orashed mess kits.

8
6 ' b o $1
T SUEDk -TeR-SEC-RE-T-SUEDhw
02-L.51
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
ClB
FAR EAST FAR

1. 1. .More fly to t o China: China: More Soviet light bombers fly
US WS Air Air Force
6.
China more' China in inlate late November, November,seventeen seventeen mor TU-2's TU-Z's in two flights were to Chita two flights scheduled to leave Chita for % . 7s.t Peiping n n the the first firstweek week of December. December. The The aircraft aircraftleading leadingthese thesetwo two flights flights Peiping appear to be be part of of the the Soviet SovietFar Far Eastern Eastern air force.
4 Dec 51 51 SUEDE
In addition to flights of of twenty twenty TU-2 TU-2 light bombers from Chita Chit8 in the Soviet Far East, East, to
Comment: Comment: The:arrival Theanrival nf )of!these >theseaircraft aircraft may may be be connected comected w with i t ha a build-up build-up of of-strength bomber strength in the.Chinese the Chinese Communist Communist Air Air Force, following of jet fighter strength. The Chinese CommuForce, following the build-up build-up of Communist Air .Force Force is i salready alreadyestimated estimatedto tohave have150 150 TU-2' T u - 2 's. ~ . On two two occasions occasions in November, November, Chinese Chinese TU-2 TU-2 bombers were used against UN-held UN-held islands off northwest Korea.
NR
-3 3-
SUEDE TOP-SECRET SUEDE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 24-Mar-2010 DATE: 24-Mar-2010
HR70-14 HR70-14
9
gm"
Igt:SECRET-SUBDE---
7. 7 .
8. 8.
message8 Chinese Communist Communist messages NQW a i r f i e l d oporakional n Antung area: Chinese airfield operational i in Antung area: - 'New r5,noe l a t e November have made frequent referenoes t o f l i g h t s t o and sinow lite November havwmade frequent references to flights to and &om from 8hihohiaokang, believed believed located looated between between Antung hntung and and Tatungkou Tatungkou airfields. airfields. Shihohiaokang, The airoraft a i r o r a f t noted noted may may be be those those of of the t h e 1L-117equipped U-31-equipped Fourth Fourth Air Air Regiment Regiment The (SUEDE USAFSS CM 58284, 4 51) from a i r f i e l d . (SUEDE.USAFSS from nearby nearby Fengoheng Fengoheng airfield. am IN IN 58284, 4 De0 Dec 51)
Comen-bz j e t aotivity a o t i v i t y has ha8 yet a t tthis h i n new new airairComment: No No jet yet been been observed obeerved at f i e l d o m m a y be u i t a b l e only o r oonventional i r o r a f t , whioh equire fieI.11.-7771gy be asuitable only ffor oonventional a airoraft, which r require muoh s h o r t e r runways runways than t h a n jets. jete. muoh shorter
A 44 Deoember Deoember message, message, North Koreans Koreans form form small small amphibious KOREA. KOREA. North amphibious unit: unit: A probablyfrom froma aNorth North Korean Korean Brigade Brigade on on west west Coast ooast defense defense duty, duty, ordered FoTarly ordered The 80 men men for f o r the t h e attack a t t a a k unit. unit. The "Organize 80 a subordinate subordinate battalions b a t t a l i o n s "Organize a unit w ill b e equipped equipped with with three t h r e e light l i g h t machine maohine guns guns or o r automatic automatic weapons, weapons, unit will be You may use use You ahould prepare t h e ship6 t o land o n . four 8hmnllDrtPr6* You ahould prepare the ships to land on. fOur A32mmeortare. You may should r e p o r t the the the wooderr a t t a l i o n oaptured. You the wooden ships ships which which your your b battalioncaptured. You should report (8UEDE AS 61) by 17 17 December." Deoember." organieation results r e s u l t 8 by organization (SUEDE AB CM CM IN IN 68443, 68443, 6 5 Deo Deo 51)
,
During November, November, Chinese Chinese Communist Communist forces Poroes of of battalion battalion Common%! During Comment: f a ir ~ ~ p p ~ rhave r t , suooeeded n oapturing a t r e n gvil.a t m varylng strength, varying degreela degrees o of air support, have succeeded i in capturing a l l imPortant important Ubl-held islanda in i n the t h a Sinmi-group, Simni-group, south Qf t h e Yalu Yalu river. river ail UN-held islands pouth bf the estuary. More More recently,on rsoently on 3 8 Deoember)a Deoember,a North north Korean Korean Unit uiit of of unidentified unidentified estuary. oomposition unsuooessfUlly uneuooesaf&ly attempted attempted to to oapture oapture a a UN-held UN-held island ialand south aouth of of composition t h e 58th 38th parallel p a r a l l e l and and due due west west of of Seoul* Seoul,. the
4 Deoember Deoember North North Korean North Korean opinion opinion on on oease-fire cease-fire given: given: A A 4 North Korean Korean o tactical t a o t i o a l unit unit in i n thelaesong-Panmunjon theIhesong-Panmunjon area, area, message, probably probably from from a message, "in tthe h e peaoe-talk oonferenoe, they they ar.; eru d i s o w s i n g tthe h e ceaseceasereport8 that t h a t -"in reporte peace-talk conference, discussing f i r e inepeotion a o m i t t e e and a r e a l s o making records of t h e P . V . ' s and fire inspection committee and are also making records of the POT.'s and aeaeei s in i n reference referenoe t o the t h e i r location. location. This This is their to the P.W. P.W. exchange. exchange. The The cease-. f i r e agreement agreement will w i l l be be possible poseible as a8 the the enemy fire ensmy de1ee;atee delegates have have oonoeded oonoeded muoh muoh at this this meeting." meeting." (SUBDE 58464, 5 5 Deo De0 51) 51) at (SUEDE AS AB CM CM IN IN 68464,
9, 9*
TOP
6 6
7 Deo
51
'Di)
:11
$5
APPROVED FOR REL1ASE RELkASE DATE:22-Mar-2010 22-Mar2010 ATE: IDPPROVED
-TOP-SBGRETSUEDE
Comments It appears from the oontext t that h a t tthe h e sender is a North brth C0mmen.b: Koreanneirigntal mith t the staff offioer o f f i o e r in i n the the taotioal t a o t i o a l Unit unit oharged with he Korean regimental staff The message message iis probablyan seourity s e o u r l t y of the area a r e a south 8011th of Kaesong. Kaesong. The s probably M rofleotion of o f information and propaganda circulating oiroulating in i n the the aoourate reflootion area the h e regiment's regiment's reeponsibility. responsibility. a r e a of t
10. 1 0 .
North Korean Xorean Produotion of ammunition ammuniCion in in North NoAh Korea oontinues: oontinuset A North Production of mesaage meeiage'of of mid...November mid-November from fromXanggye Kinggye t to o th the e Ministry Ministry o of f Industry Industry i in n PYoneyang announced factory 26" had been been Pyongyang announoed that "the gun powder (fort) (for?) faokory unloaded from 4 a freight f r e i g h t oar o w at at t the h e Kanggye station a t e t i o n +nd and later l a t e r transported transported "to the mtrehouse and (stored?) * to t h e warehouse (stored?) there." thare." AS CM CM IN 58124, 58124, 20 Nov 51) (SUEDE A8 51)

TCALSE8BET-81313DE.-TOP'
- . Comment: CommentZ This TMs me8sage the oontinued of' mossage indioates indicates the continued produotion of atumudiT37117, North North Korea, Korea, eeither at Kanggye o or Pyongyang, o or at some uhmuniither a t Kanggye r Pyongyang, r a t aome point point biltween. between.
6 8
7 7 Deo 81 61
V.
_ -~
HR70-14
--T&P-SEeRET SUEDkri -Dec- sk

IR
2. 2.
.
small ---amphi-bious wit: North Koreans form small amphibious unit: US Army US
51 5 Dec 51
A4 A 4 December December message, message, probably from a North Korean Brigade on west coast defense duty, duty, battalion: "Organize SUEDE ordered a subordinate battalion: Organize 80 89 will be the attack unit. men for unit, The unit w i l l 4%. IN s-.w3 equipped with equipped withthree three light light machine machine guns guns or or automatic weapons, weapons, four 82mm 82mm Youshould should,prepare preparethe theships shipsto toland land on. on. You You may may use the the mortars, mortars. You should report report the Organiwooden YOUshould organiwooden ships ships which which your your battalion captured. You zation results resultsby by 17 17 December. December."
a,. v. sitYr3
0
Comment: Comment: During During November, November, Chinese Chinese w c e s of of batallien-65-ergti b a t a l l i b j f l h ,h,with air Communist f forces withvarying varyingdegrees degrees of of air islands in the the support, have have succeeded succeeded in capturing all important UN-held UN-held islands
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-201 0 IDPPROVED

FAR FAR EAST
-3 3 --
4X3P-SE-B SUEDE TOP SECRET SUEDE
Tte SECRET SUEDkl

on 3 3 December December More recently recently on Sinmi-group, south south of ofthe the Yalu Yaluriver rivereatuary. estuary. More ginmi-group, unidentified composition compositionunsuccessfully unsuccessfully attempted attempted to a North Korean unit of of unidentified of the 38th capture a UN-held WN-held island south of 38th parallel parallel and and due due west west of of Seoul. Seoul.
3.
---
N R NR
,'NR :NR
SUEDE SUEDE
HR70-14
i i E E E - SUEDt-' SUEDE'
c
NR'
FAR EAST
3.
Chinese US or Chinese Communists Communists alerted alerted for for US or Nationalist Nationalist attacks attacks at at Christmas: Armed Armed Forces Security Security Agency Agency 51 6 Dec 51
American action expanding the Korean conflict on about Christmas Day, and and conflict on or or about T I = + / -/ f states that that the the United.States United States has "instructed" Ynstructedrfthe the Chinese Chinese Nationalists states to "make "make disturbances" along along the China China coast.
4. Communists continue continue efforts efforts to take Korean islands:

4
Armed Forces North Korean communications communications of of early 1" December Security Agency Agency 5 s /HS b 4*3 Security December indicate indicate that that an an attack is to be 8 Dec 51 51 / 13bL //a7" launched, probably by elements of the North launched, North SUEDE Korean 23rd small SUEDE Korean 23rd Brigade, Brigade, against the small UN-held UN-held island island of of Yuk, Yuk, on on the the west west coast - ' north of of the the 38th Parallel. just north
APPROVED FOR RELEASE ,DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-201 0

SUEDE SUEDE
-4 4-
A Chinese A Chinese Communist Communist naval naval message message from Tsingtao on on 6 6 December December alerts alerts observation China coastal stations in the East China coastal area for
Comment: Comment: Mounting Mounting Chinese Chinese Communist Communist concern with with coastal coastal security security has has been been noted noted in in recent months, and and even Chinese and and North Korean even in in Korea, Korea, Chinese Korean forces forces have been been increasingly increasingly deployed deployed against against possible amphibious amphibious assaults. assaults.
SUEDE --TOPSECRET- SUEDE
Tt5?-SEeRE-TSUEDn'
Comment: The Communists Communists have Comment: The have recently recently made systematic systematic efforts efforts to to eliminate eliminate UN UN guerrilla and espionage bases guerrilla and espionage bases located on many of the small islands off central western Korea. many of the small off central western Korea. Dur,ing:lthe ,fir,&. wweek m k of unusually hwvg.vphicu!ar During. lithe fir,st. of,+.Becembqr ,..December unusually heavehicular -. was observed on traffic was on principal principal north-south north-south routes routes in in this this isolated possibly the one one which is to area. Recently a North Korean Korean brigade, brigade, possibly is to make the assault on on Yuk Yuk Island, was ordered ordered to to form forman anamphibious amphibious make the assault Island, was 80 men men by by 17 1 7 December. December. of 80 unit of
NR :NR
HR70-14
-1"ISCRET-8112MrNR
11. 1 1 ,
12. 12,
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 18-Mar-2010 DATE 18-Mar-2010 'APPROVED
13, 1 3 .
Comment* While Ahile available evidence i is inconclusive, it itappears Commentt available evidenoe s lnconolusive, appears that that the -Korean Ik-9 ffighter unit stationed stationed iin Fengcheng may may be returning the North North r e a n U-9 i g h t e r unit n Fengcheng returning to t h e disposition of the t h e 110 110 t o Korea. There is no evidence indioating the conventionalfighter to be subordinate adbordinate oonventional f i g h t e r and and ground ground attack attaok aircraft a i r o r a f t estimated t o be that a oonsiderable i s known, known, hawever, however, that; oonsiderable to A i r Foree, Foroe. It is t o the t h e North North Korean Korean Air number of of conventional conventional aircraft a i r o r a f t are a r e based based both both at a t Sinuiju Sinuiju airfield a i r f i e l d and and at at the t h e newer.field newer field at a t Uiju. Uiju.
Communists take C m u n i a t s oontinua oonkinuq efforts e f f o r t s to ta t a k e Korean Korem islands, lslande: North Korean Korean North oomunioatione of a r l y Deoamber indioate that thak an an attack a t t a c k ie ia to t o be b e launched, launohed, communications of e early DeoeAer indicate by against probably b y elements of the t h e North North Korean Korean 23rd 23rd Brigade, Brigade, a g a i n s t the t h e small small UN-held i sisland l a n d of f tthe h e 38th Parallel. 1111-held ofYuk, Yuk,on on%ha thewest West ooast ooast just just nort;h north o of SUEDE SUED3 AFSA AF8A SIB SIB 403, 403, 1135Z, 11362, 7 7 Dec Doc 51) 51)
Comftents Comentr The Communists Conanmiate have reoently rsoen.t;lymade systsmatio sfforts e f f o r t s to to made systematic e 1 i m j . Ug m guerrilla g u e r r i l l a and and espionage espionage bases bases located looaked on on many many of of the the small small eliMinate islands During the Korea. During the first f i r s t week f Deombar ielanda off o f f central o e n t r a l western western Korea. wtek o of December unusually heavy heavy vehioular vehioular traffic t r a f f i o was was observed observed on on principal p r i n c i p a l north.-south north-south routes roueas uallY in this Recently a North Korean Korean brigade, poasibly t h e one one In t h i s isolated i s o l a t e d area. area. Recently a North brigade, possibly the which whioh is is to t o make make the the a assault e a a u l t on on 'LA Yuk Island, was was ordered tto o form a an n &phl.amphibious b l o w unit u n i t of o f 80 80 men men by by 17 17 DeoeMber. Deaetnber.
d e n t i f i e d in h e Sinuiju North Korean unit unit iidentified in t tha Sinuiju area: areas B A 13 November November message from northeastern northeastern Korea to m e m a p from t o an an individ ual i n tho inaividual in the "815th "615th Unit, Unit, Korean Korean People's Army" Amy" looated looated at a t "Namsinuiju "Nwinuiju (south (eouth Sinuiju)" Sinuiju)" states s t a t e s "I "I wish wish your your People's success suooes8 in i n battle." battle." On 4 November a North Norkh Korean air.unit a i r u n i t in In Sariwon Sariwon south south
1_211.1ECRET-91YEDE TOP
KOREA. North Korean air unit KOREA. u n i t returns_to returns t o Koreas Korear I In n oonneotioa connection with a ZEZuled Air m u l e oonterenoe d r e n o e of of senior senior air a i r offr3WITTTbe of'fioere t o b eheld.at held a t North North Korean Korean A ir Headquarters in December, a senior senior o ()Motor at Fengoheng iin Beadquartere i n Sinuiju on 5 Dsoamber, ffioer a t Fengoheng n Manchuria December t that can't take take p part the meeting meeting on 4 Deoember h a t "I can't a r t iin n the Bdanohuria reported on.4 seven h i s reported this reported.move, =VS, seven because moving." Possibly explaining t beoauee we are a r e moving." LA-9 L4-9 conventional oonventional fighters, f i g h t e r s , believed subordinate Subordinate to t o the North North Korean Korean Air Air Forcels Force's "855 "856 unit" unit" at a t Fengoheng, Fengoheng, were soheduIad eoheduhd to t o depart depart for f o r the the North Nora ab The oontinued continued prssenae presence at Korean border airfield a i r f i e l d at a t Ulju Uiju on on 27 November. November. The Yengoheng Air Foroe Force is indiotted, Fongoheng of of aircraft a i r o r a f t subordinate subordinate to t o the North Korean Air indiooted, however, in howover, i n recent reoent messages measages seheduling aaheduling training t r a i n i n g flights flights for f o r IL-10 I t 1 0 grouna ground AS CM IN 684'79, 58479, 5 5 Dea; Dec; SUEDE A Air Force Roundup Roundup 254, i r Foroe 264, attack attaok planes. planes. (SUEDE AS 21162, 21162, 6 Deo Deo 51) 51)
.
TOP SECRET SUEDE
10 Dec 51
Ds)
55 55
E D of Pyongyang queried then-Airforoa n Fpngyang then-Airforoe Headquarters i in Pyongyang as to *a% what they thoy should do isinoe "sinoe the 815th 815th Mi transferred.., Unit is being transferred...." (SUEDE AS AS CM IN 58347, 5 Decj SUEDE (SUEDE 6 DOC) 8 U E D E m1859, 4 Mov Nov $1) 1)
."
Comment: "815th unit" on an air f o r c e network, Commoat: The mention of the *815th force network, and iits t a location, looation, makestt apparent tthat h a t it i e an air foroe unit. is unit. There is no indioatiOn, indioation, however, o whether ground maintenanoe no however, a8 as t to Whether it it is is aaground maintenance or oanconstruction unit, or an operational air unit. unit. s t r u o t i o n unit,
I
___20.-aECARE,T-314EDE--
8 8
10 Dec De0 51 Sl 10
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Rel4lode 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0040130001-2
TOP SECRET
10 December 1951
145
DAILY DIGEST
"
DIA and DOS Reviews Completed

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re aide 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,2220130001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION.' (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. S viet lumber o t t raised by niecework pay s stems A broadcast for the'workers of the Khabarovsk Krai lumber siderable success had been industry stated that con achieved in the six months since of a multiplefunction the adoption timber brigade. One of the uting to this success was described major factors contrib as the new labor pay system which "fully satisfies the interests of the workers, and plays part in the fulfillment apredominant ancioverftlfillment Extensive tesearch of a plan by each lumber worker." was said to have demonstrated gadethe vast advantages to the members of the bri..-L, of a pay system and wage scale basis of piece work. established on the (iFHIS, 6 Dec 51). :
.
unit s' In con retary of the Soviet Embassy the First Sec in Stockholm be interested in the unification stated that Scandinavia should of Germany, and that the Democrats should exert Swedish Social ressure on the German Social Democrats this objective. to achieve
Comments The report.indicates a new approach in the centinued Soviet effort to. confuse:Wet forestall German rearmament. German thinking on the unity issue and to' The West German Social Democrats ready taken a firm stand have al on the unity issue should always be left by maintaining that the door open for unity discussions.
.
versation' with a

Soviet official a.. oa hes
2.
25X1
25X1
.3.
25X1
Finnish and Swedish Communists ma su...rt idea of Nordic Alliances an inde endent bIligeditosupport Finnish and Swedish Communists are reportedly the idea of an independent being moc-' and the recent Nordic Peace Scandinavian Defense Alliance, Congress in Stockholm part of the'Communist is saidto have been buildup. The Finnish Sans and Tyokamsan Sanomat, Communist newspapers, Vapaa recently printed ofan independent articles stressing the idea Nordic bloc, and stating .people must assist the Danes and Nome lane that the Swedish and Finnish lantic Pact. to break awa from the At
'
Comments A previous an independent Scandinavian report states that the Soviet Union,favored Alliance. As yet, however, little concrete example there las been of Communist activity in doubtful that the alliance this field and It is project will have much popular appeal. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Communist Party President GottwaldandpiemierZapotocli6DeceMber,s.t.naring:the' prepares to e Slane followers: Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slansky elements within ranks, said that the fight its against "hostile elements" -. was not ended and "enemy agents" by the removal of Slansky essary, and that fUrther steps were nec
'
TOP SECRET
1
1
Approved For Re lade 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004590130001-2

TOP SECRET The Central Committee took steps to overhaul-Party cadre,, Party-Contrel Commissien A new was elected and it was decided to restore the Membership of the Presidium of the of members prior to the September Central Committee to 30 - the number reorganization. In addition Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Information, and Antonin Novotny, former. Party Secretary of the Prague district and a secretary of the Presidium, were appointed members of the Party Politburo. (R-FBIS, Prague, 7 Dec 51). Comment: In his five years as Secretary-General of the Party, Slansky had ample opportunity to install officials loyal to him throughout the organization. The personnelshake.sun in the Control Commission, whose duty it is to take steps against deviators and slackers within the Party, is significant. Of seven new members, only two have been since it was created in November on the Commission One of the 1948 members, Jarmila Taussigova, was expelled from the 1948. Party at this meeting. Ste d-u milit activity observed in Slovakias Attache in Prague was impressed by the The US Military sten-up of military activity which he observed, on a recent field trip through Slovakia. Training centers and barracks seemed to be more fully occupied than they did when he made ei similar trip six months before. Units apneared to be conducting sive basic training of recruits. intenIn addition, there were indications firming the reactivation of conthe Czechoslovak Fourth Division. 718, 4 Deo 51). (S,MA Prague Comments The call-up of recruits on 1 November explains intensive basic training. The apparent fai/ure to release classes mobilization, and the return scheduled for deof units from summer maneuver account for expanded use of barracks facilitiea. areas would Increased military may reflect Army which occurred during activity expansion of the Czechoslovak the past year. Reactivation of the Czech 4th Division is a further indication it had been previously reported of the expansion of the Czech Army since inactivated and its personnel to bring unit strengths distributed closer to table of organization Schedules.
6,
5.
Czechoslovakia re uests air landing ri hts in Bel iums Czechosloyakia has requested landing rights in Belgium for a weekly Prague-Brussels flight of the CzeCh Airlines via Copenhagen and Amsterdam. The Belgian Foreign Office told US officials based on the Reciprocal Aviation that the Czechoslovak request, which is granted, because the government agreement of 1937, would probably be feels that there are no valid treaty for denial and desires to groundS maintain existing Belgian service authorities have to Prague. US requested the Belgian and Danish Governments ing rights to the CzechosloVak to deny landAirlines. (54frussels S-Copenhagen 423, 7 Dec 51). 774,, 791, 4 and 6 Dec;

TOP SECRET
2
Approved For Re lhaele 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79701146A00a00130001-2

TOP SECRET
Comments Pending settlement of the Oatis case and related problems, the State Department is anxious to retain the full force of the ban on Czech overflights of Western Germany by keeping Czech air communications with Western Europe severed.
7,
25X1C
Communists reported stepping un illegal activity: A report from the activity of the Finnish Communist rarty has given rise to anxiety among members of Finland's strongly anti Communist Social Democratic Party. The points out that the legal activity of the Finnish Communist Party has remained the same as before, but that there is a definite feeling that they have started something il legal. Because the nature of the suspected illegal activity is known to so few, people, it has been impossible to uncover it. However, the states that during the past six months illegal travel by Finnish Communists has increased.
p .
FINLAND.
25X1
25X1
25X1A
Comment: The Social Democrats are the strongest active antiCom munist force in Finland. They have infiltrated the Finnish Communist Party and are continually on the alert to illegal antiFinnish Communist activ ities. A feeling of anxiety on the part of the Social Democrats is not to be taken lightly.
There is only fragmentary evidencephowever, indicating that the anxiety of the Finnish Social Democrats might be justified. This includes the formation last summer of a motorized courier service.
8 POLAND.
Troop movements in Poland difficult to detects The US EmbasaY inliarsaw, basing its comments on the observations of the Service Attaches of the Western diplomatic missions, points out that a large xthmement of troops through Poland, including Russian troops, might well take place un observed by the Western missions, In support of this view the Embassy re ports that Polish troops returned to their regUlar barracks from suhmer maneuver areas almost undetected by the Service Attaches, despite the fact that the attaches travel a]most constantly throughout Poland. The troops probably were transported by special trains and thus escaped surveillance.
The Effibassy also states that the railroads in Poland are in a re markably good state of repair and are given constant attention by the Pol ish authorities. Roads, while not of the best, are described by the Em bassy as being kept in a good state of repair, particularly the main arter ies, In conclusion, the Embassy states that Soviet communications through Poland are being maintained in good order. (Sarsaw Desp #131 16 Oct 51).
Comments. The general observations on the condition of transporta tion facilities in Poland are believed to be correct.
TOP SECRET
3
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CWRDP79T01146A000600130001-2
Approved For Re lallee 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009490130001-2

TOP SECRET
There is fragmentary evidence that the USSR may be increasing eecurity of transit the operations on the Po/ish railroads. of the liMited faCilities available Moreover, because to the Western Attaches that there are three main rail and the fact lines through Poland from the USSR Germany, it is likely that a Soviet .troop to Eastern movement through Poland would escape detection.
9.
25X1C
25X1A
Soviet police detachment arrives in Rumanias la special Soviet police detachment ny a Russian major general, of 2,000 men, headed recently arrived in Rumania. Soviet citizens and know Rumanian All members are very well. They are always clothes and have orders to give in civilian warninus_of man4festations regithe. l' againet the
I
RUMANIA.
25X1
10.
TRIESTE. yugoslavoistiTriestennect
no settlement: The members of the Yugoslav economic delegation in Trieste recently predicted is most probable that the status that it quo in Trieste will prevail. stated that Yugoslavia One delegate could not give up any portion of because the Yugoslav peop/e Trieste to Italy have not forgotten the Italian Yugoslavia. occupation of In a broadcast interview pro-Tito Party in Trieste stated on 2 December, Branko Bahia, leader of the that Trieste Slovenes desire smalleet part of the Free Territory not even the to come under Italy again. Field Comments
se
.
25X1
presse line.
ammignIs Evidence of strengthened Soviet control of Rumania lends credence to this report. Continuing resistance against the government account for the arrival of the Soviet may police detachment.
The simularity of the Babic statement and that exse

ql
fit
do
..--
'
.:lav Party
11.
In the meantime, Yugoslav authorities are'drawing up rules of igation for the Yugoslav navsector of the Danube. These rules all those provisions which will include the Yugoslays without justification proposed but the majority rejected at last June's session of the Commission and not contain will provisions of the and letter of the Convention. voted rules which are contrary to the spirit (R-FBIS Ticker - Belgrade to Europe, 6 Deo 51). in English Morse
Comment: There is no evidence that either Yugoslavia cerely desires or Italy sina settlement of the Trieste issue at this time. YUGOSLAVIA Dele ates to attend Fifth Session of Danu e Commissio in Rumania: 'Yugoslavia is sending a delegation headed in Moscow, Dragoje Djurio, by the Yugoslav Charge the fifth session of the Danube which begins on 10 December to Commission at Galati, Rumania.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re Ihee 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00,91100130001-2

TOP SECRET
Comments The Yugoslav delegation out of the fourth session of the Sovietdominated Danube Commission walked in June because the session re fused to adopt Yugoslav proposals and proceeded to adopt new amendments which denied the right of states to investigate accidents which occurred within their territorial waters.
Subsequently, the Yugoslays explained that they were not withdrawing from the Commission but declared that they would draw up their awn rules of navigation. The Yugoslav delegation will probably present these new rules to the Danube Commission this month. As these rules will undoubtedly be rejected by the Cominform states, a Yugoslav attempt toeimplement them may result in additional tensions in the Balkans.

TOP SECRET
5
Approved For Re Ihere 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011000130001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
King legalizes coup government: The King of Thailand on 7 December signed a royal proclamation legalizing the government which emerged from the .29 Noventher ooup d'etat. The proclamation also approved the restoration of the 1932 constitution (although the King intimated that certain modifications were in order) and accepted the provisional national assembly appointed by the coup government. (U Press Ticker, 7 Dec 51)
Commsnt: This action by the Thai King removes concern over the possibili25xi ties Z7EF75arly abdication or a serious constitutional crisis arisinz out i25X1 of a royal vete Of the recent chanzes. I
THCAND.
2.
25X1
Forrer Premier said to be plotting overthrow of resent government: Istates that (1) the new Thai Government is more corrupt than its predecessor and will probably not last long, (2) the exiled forrer Premier Pridi is now in northern Thailand planning a coup d'etat and has agents in the governrent, and (3) Pridi is in contact with the Malayan Communist Party and has the support of the Chinese Communists of Thailand and the viet Minh supported Carbodian rebels! (C Singapore 650, 7 Dee 51) The strong military government of Thailand should endure for Pridi's whereabouts have been . variously reported by numerous sources over the past year, but his actual sanctuary has never been reliably established. Numerous reports have also linked him with one or another Communist group.
Comment:
"the.roi16-peeiiblePutitre.
3.
INDONESIA.. Indonesian President seeks US support on New Guinea question: During a conversation between President Sukarno and the US Ambassador to Indonesia, the forrer expressed a hope for American support on the New Guinea issue. Sukarno explained that if the pending Dutch-Indonesian conference fails to solve the New Guinea question he anticipates a lateral denunciation of the Union by Indonesia; he said he could'not predict "to what level the sentiments of the populace might rise." The US Ambassador observes that should Indonesia resort to unilateral

TOP SECRET
6
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re Idea 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0130001-2
TOP SECRET
action and incur the ill will of the western world, a "strong reciprocal reaction Might be expected" from /ndonesia. Such k reaction could involve the loss of Indbnesia as a link in the eventual Pacific seourity chain, and the less to the United States of Indonesia's genuine and growing friendship. (S Djakarta 817, 6 Deo 51)
in Indonesia will press for abrogation of the Union and other Dutch-Indonesian agreements, which woUld create serious economic problems for both Indonesia and the Netherlands.
discussions on the disposition of New craiNTire expected to end in an impasse. In such an event, leftist and nationalist elements
Comment:
Netherlands-Indonesian
25X1A
Communist Party in North Sumatra plans to resume activity: Sidartojo, a member of the Central Committee of the North Sumatra Communist Party, expects to make a trip through North Sumatra in December and January to seleot a oadre of some thirty persons from Communistraffiliated political, labor, and agricultural groups. This cadre will be responsible for forming."a new pro-Communist mass organization" in North Sumatra. munist members in the area are ComL. ourrently passive as a esult of the securitY roundup.
e
Comment: The security sweep in North Sumatra was fairly thorough by removing a number of Communist and, lsaders, temporarily broke down the Communist hierarchy and working relations among various CoMmunist organizations. A redesignation of responsible persons is therefore probably necessary at all levels of the Communist movement.
Sidartojo himself has apparently been assigned to replace Jusuf Adjitorop, North Sumatra Communist Commissioner, who was arrested in the government security sweep.
5.
The source of this report,1 personal reasons have a tendency to exaggerate may for the Chinese Communist threat to Indochina. (S Hong Kong 1836, 6 Deo 51)
1
CHINA/iNDOCHINA. Chinese Commmnist troops US Consulate General in Hong Kong reports reportedly enter Indochina: The cruited and trained Chinese troops wearing that six columns of newly-reViet Minh uniforms crossed the border into Indochina. The number of troops involved is not known.
25X1
Comment:
chine7TUBEEunist
Numerous reports have alleged the overt participation of troops in the Indochina hostilities. All are unconfirmed.
TOP SECRET
7
10 Deo 51
Approved For Reteise 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00$600130001-2

TOP SECRET
6.
25X1
CHINA. Chinese Communists allegedly control island between Indochina and Borneas !the US Assistant Naval Attache in Singapore reported that the Chinese Communists are using Spratly Island; located about halfWay betWeen Saigon and North Borneo, as a smuggling base. He stated that junks transporting oil are met two sailing hours off Spratly Island by Chinese Communist motor torpedo boats whioh escort the junks to the island. .(S ASTALUSNA Singapore, 0807Z, 6 Deo 51)
Commenti Smuggling of oil in small vessels from Southeast Asia to South China probably occurs, but the use of Spratly by the Chinese to support this smuggling is unconfirmed.
7.
25X1
British vessel supplied with bunker fuel at Hainan Island port of Tulin: The British-flag Arundel Hill, 7133 GT, while en route to Canton 7.74:7bly with a load of cotton from India, ran short of fuel and was diverted to Yulin for bunkers. The vessel was expected in the Pearl River estuary on 7 December, according' I the source of this report. (S ASTALUSNA Hong Kong, 06252,
Comment:
25X1
shipping has heretofore been luma to vesselsloading iron ore for export. Yulin is not included
The use of Yulin by western-flag
in the Communist list of South China ports open to foreign trade and shipping.
8.
Peiping stresses austerity program: Mao Tse-tung's call for "increased produotion and austerity' is beginning to produce a new nationwide campaign with the usual pattern of meetings and exhortations designed to keep the people at a high pitch of emotional tension. Although the austerity orimPaign is linked with the current Korean conflict, the Peiping People's Daily points out significantly that it is not merely a "temporary meansof solving certain diffioulties, but is the basic way of building the people's state."
In carrying out the austerity program, party members will be expected to set an example of simple living, economize in the use of materials, and reduce bureaucratic delays. ((S Hong Kong 1791,, 30 Nov 51)
Comment: In compliance with the austerity directives, government bureaus in dhina are now publicizing their efforts to curtail expenditures (and increase working efficiency. Land taxes have been raised, and the drive for "voluntary' contributions by the people is being vigorously pressed.
9.
Nationalists look for increased US aid. At meetings of the Economic Stabilization Hoard in Taipei on 8 and 15 November, the possibility of inTOP SECRET
-8
,
10 Dec 51
Approved For Releate 2002/05/20 : CIA4RDP79T01146A000600130001:2
Approved For Rebate 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A041000130001-2

TOP SECRET
creased American aid to balance the Nationalists' 1952 budget was considered. One suggested solution to the deficit problem was an increase of 20 million dollars in US economic aid. The diversion of 10 percent of military aid funds to the economic field was also proposed as an alternative possibility.
ECA representatives on the board opposed these suggestions, which they stated did not appear realistic at this time. (S ECA Taipei Memos MGW-1490 and MCDC1491, 27 Nov 51)
Comment: Projected American economic aid to Nationalist China for the fisoariggi7-1952 is in excess of 80 million dollars.; the military aid figure is about 200 million dollars. Although supplemental appropriations later in the year to increase aid to Nationalist China are possible, EGA officials want the Nationalists first to exhaust all other means for balancing the budget.
10.
KOREA. Continued BOK opposition to cease-fire arrangements manifested: Recent reports from the US Embassy in Pusan refleot a renewal of the Arang but reoently dormant ROK opposition to any cease-fire agreement. A National Assembly resolution condenned any permanent partition of Korea, urging the UN to aohieve an "independent unified democratic Korea." Meanwhile, an offioial press release, alluding to the recent Communist proposal for neutral inapection teams, proclaimed the RON'S "unalterable opposition" to any arrangement which would bring into Korea additional unfriendly national representatives, i.e., from the USSR or its satellites: In the same vein, two demonstrations in'Pusan, one by North Korean refugees and the other by university students., were ostensibly spontaneous, but the Enbassy feels-that they were probably officially inspired. (U Pusan 529, 5 Dec; It Pusan 530, 5 Dec; R Pusan 540, 6 Dec 51) Comment:
the eTrEnr cessation of hostilities, has been constant. War weariness and a growing realization of the inevitability of the continued division
of Korea, however, are mitigating this attitude somewbat.
11.
UN aerial observers report that the main street of the North Korean port eity of Haeju, only 75 air miles from Seoul, has been heavily paved and is wide enough for a runway. On 7 December a UN reconnaissanceaircraft observed nine swept-wing aircraft on this new airstrip. These aircraft were not seen during later reconnaissance. (S CINCFE Telecon 5445, 9 Dec 51)
Comment:
Comnnnist air activity continues to expand southward: On 8 December, 16 unidentified aircraft believed to be MIG -15's were sighted at 45,000 feet over Seoul.
enenurn-Wanding his aerial operations southward.

BDP SECRET
9
The opposition of South Koreans to a division of Korea, in
Both of these incidents reflect the growing boldness of the
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDPi9T01146A0006001301001D-r 51
Approved For ReteSe 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0.4000130001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GENERAL. Continued-sizable flaw'of strategic materials-to'Orbit-forebeeri for 19521 The US. delegation to tile current Coordinating Committee negotis EalialiCairstrategie eXpoitd believee that in I952-eXParte te-the-SOViet bloc, which are subject to quantitative cOntrole, may be lidited tb onetenth of the pattieipating countriest total experte to the Orbit.- Pre-Viable-1Y; it had been detiMated that strategic items would account for possibly one-third of total exports to the East.
-
:The delegation assumes that the total exports till reach a value of ' 510 Million dollars, cbhpared to 535 million in 1950. These estimates do not (S Paris 3359, 5 Dec 51) include "illegal" trade.
.
The eetimates of strategic exports do not take into account tin, rubber, and ships, not covered by the COMmitteets reetrictione. 'During the first six months of 1951, moreover, even embargoed iteme, valued at nearly 3 million dollars, were permitted to enter the Orbit as exemptions under embargo agreemente.
- 'Cohhent:
items-FiEETth

TOP SECRET
Furthermore, illegal or "unrecorded" trade will be largely in strategic materials and will eupply the Soviet bloc additional imports which Are likely to equal in value the 1952 export total assumed above.
2.
GERMANY. West debate's defense cost With' Adenacer: The Allied High Cam- missioners in Germany plan to meet with Chancellor Adenauer on lh Decehber
t6 diecuss the question of a lest German contribution to *Stern Eurepean defense. An effOrt will then be made to cOnvince.the Chanbellor of the reasonableness of the Allied request for 3.2 billion dollars for the neXt year and to offset the campaign waged by Finance Minister:Schaeffer against the size of the contribution. (S Bonn 641, 6 Dec 51)
- Cohment:
Schaeffer, representing the reaCtionark ming of 'Adenaterts
government, has alwaYe been hostile to Allied-ecOnothic 'PolidieS in Gertatutyr.
3.
Although backed by German financial interests, he has no widespread popular support.
German Party pursues chauviniem to preserve Unity: -Ultranationalism was the keynote at the recent convention of the German Party, whieh is part of Adenauerts coalition. Despite the neo4lazi tenor orthe gathering,' hoWever,.party chairman Heinrich Hellwege, leader of the moderate wing, seemed to be in full control. that Pri6r to the convention, Hellwege had privately told US his party had to sound nationalistic in order to keep its members from
officials
10
10 Dec 51
Approved For Rebate 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0C000130001-2

TOP SECRET
defecting to the self-avowed Nazi-like Socialist Reich Party. 627, 5 Dec 51)
(C Bonn
Comment: Although Hellwege's control seems unthreatened at the moment, it is significant that the extremists must be courted in order to preserve party unity. This may force the party still more to the right and embarrass the Adenauer coalition. This rightist trend will be strengthened by the reported accession of seven Bundestag delegates of the Bavarian Reconstruction Party, another rightist radical organization, and by the likely accession of members of the Socialist Reich Party if, as is probable, this party is outlawed.
4.
Comment: This is the first report of any consequence that East German Communists have been cooperating with and financing West German right-wing extremists. There have been indications, however, that the SRP has been in close liaison with the German Bruederschaft, another rightist group, which has had confirmed contacts with East Zone Communists. It is anticipated that eventually there will be more direct cooperation between extreme organizations of the left and right in Germany for the purpose of weakening the Federal Republic's stability. Intermittent Communist-Nazi cooperation occurred on a number of occasions during the Weimar Republic era.
5.
Plan to double size of border police is vetoed: Officials of the West German Ministry of Interior are pessimistic about the future of their plan to increase the size of the federal border ,police from 10,000 to 20,000, because of the refusal of the Finance Ministry to sanction the move. The Interior Ministry is still convinced that doubling the force is necessary to ensure adequate forces for real emergencies. The Finance Ministry insists, however, that anticipated defense costs rule out the increase and maintains that once the Germans are participating in the EDF, the security of the Federal Republic will be adequately guaranteed. (C Bonn 609, 4 Dec 51)
Comment: Lehr has for some time tried to raise a large security force. The Finance Ministry decision deals another blow to his
West German rightists cooperate with the East Zone National An unconfirmed report alleges that members of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) discussed matters of common concern with several East GerMan National Front representatives in a series of meetings last August. Ithe SRP repeived 25X1C substantial campaign funds from them. 1 25X1A 28 Nov 51)
Front:
1
TOP SECRET
11
10
Dec 51
Approved For Re lelseie 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001400130001-2

TOP SD3RET
attempts to secure control of the principal West German security forces, rather than to permit any future force to come under the embryonic Defense Ministry. When the opposition of individual states hampered the formation of the 30,000-man mobile alert police force authorized by the Allies in late 1950, Lehr succeeded in establishing the partially militarized border police as a substitute, and has planned since then to increase that force.
6.
Comment: Assembly approval of this motion would be an important step toward cooperation of rightist coalition elements with the Gaullists as well as a serious blow to the centrist coalition on which present Cabinet is based.
7.
FRANCE,LIBYA. French tactics are delaying Libyan independence: Declaration of Libyan independence may be delayed by French Foreign Oftice insistence that France retain a paramount position in the Fezzan and that French financial contributions be earmarked for the Fezzan. French intransigeance is preventing the transfer of powers necessary to effect Libyan independence, which must be accomplished by 1 January 1952. (5 Tripoli 242, 6 Dec 51)
Comment: Ever since the deadline for the formation of French have sought to retain, southwest Libya, known as the
Although of minor importance economically, the French consider the Fezzan to be strategically important as a relay point for air traffic between France, central Africa, and Madagascar, and politically important as'a means of consolidating the frontiers of French North, West, and Equatorial Africa.
8.
AUSTRIA. Communist gains recorded in labor elections: Unofficial reports on the shop-stewards election at the nationalized United Iron .and Steel Company, Austria's largest enterprise, show a considerable

TOP SECRET
12
FRANCE. Pleven government threatened on ratification of Schuman Plan: The U5 Embassy in Paris estimates that the Pleven government "should be able to muster a narrow majority" for the vote of confidence on the Schuman Phu on 11 December. Although this vote will be taken on a motion by non-Gaullist rightists to return the treaty to committee for further study, rather than on the question of ratification, Pleven made it plain that approval of this motion would amount to rejection of the Plan. (C Paris 3429, 8 Dec 51)
fourth UN General Assembly established a a united, independent Libyan state, the if at all possible, their hegemony in Fezzan.
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re ISA 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001490130001-2

TOP SECRET
shift in strength from the extreme right to the extreme left. Compared with 1949, the Socialists now have 20 mandates (one gained), the Communists 14 (eight gained), the Union of Independents (VAU) 13 (six lost), and the People's Party one. The Communist press has hailed the results as a landslide victory. (P Vienna 1961, 7 Dec 51)
Comment: Since the current works councils elections will continue until spring, it is too early to draw conclusions as to their final outcome. More disappointing than the failure of the Socialists to do better in the elections which have so far taken place is the success of a number of unity or "nonpartisan" tickets. These successes are regarded by the Communists -- in some cases rightly -- as Communistvictories, largely because they suggest a weakening of the Socialists' traditional hold on Austrian labor. After a victory by such a unity ticket in the Eisenerz iron-mining districts of Styria last week, a 24-hour strike ensued in support of Communist demands for a workers bonus and wage increases.
9.
NETHERLANDS. Dutch see Western European support for German admission to NATO: The Dutch Foreign Minister believes that all NATO members except France would approve the admission of Germany to'NATO in a status of full equality. -He has stated that this is the only means by which the West can gain Germany's cooperation in European defense.
The Foreign Minister fears that, as a condition of all-German elections, the USSR would insist on a simultaneous vote on neutrality, for which sentiment in Germany "appears to be growing at an alarming rate." (5 The Hague Unnumbered, 6 Dec 51)
Comment: Though West Germany will probably be willing to enter the European Defense Community without being a member of NATO, it will probably expect membership after a relatively short
time.
There is no evidence that sentiment for neutrality is growing in West Germany.
10.
ITALY. Italians seek to reconcile differences on European Defense Force: Prime Minister de Gasperi will attend the Council of Europe to help retrieve the Council's prestige and to reconcile at the highest policy level the outstanding differences on the creation of a European Defense Force. The Secretary-General of the Italian Foreign Office has been .given the task of "working on the Benelux countries." (Slone 2545, 6 Dec 51)
Comment: The creation of a politically united Europe remains one-of the principal objectives of Italian foreign policy. The role of arbitrator which the Italians are assuming with regard tothe problem
10 Dec 51 Approved ForRalease 2002/05/20:0A-MMT01146A000600130001-2

TOP SECRET 13
Approved For Relepet 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79101146A00900130001-2

TOp SECRET
of the creation of a European defense force is another instance of the objectivity which the Italians wish to maintain in their foreign policy relations.
11.
Comment: The Vatican has insisted that release of Stepinac without, as was the case, restoration of full freedom to carry on his ecclesiastic duties, did not represent the complete rehabilitation demanded and did not represent any easing of "the painful situation of the Church in Yugoslavia." Referred to after his release as "former Bishop," Stepinac himself told press correspondents: "No government .can deprive me of my rank."
The Italian Communist charges reflect those previously made by the Yugoslav Government to the effect that Stepinac had been a party to Nazi persecution of Yugoslav patriots.
12.
SPAIN. US position regarding Spanish pyrites shipments to Orbit: .Contrary to a recent statement in this publication (see OCI Daily Digest, 30 Nov 51), pyrites are on the US embargo list of strategic materials. Therefore, the Department of State has instructed the US Embassy in Madrid to protest Spanish shipments of iron Pyrites to East Germany. The Embassy is to point out that such shipments are contrary to the spirit of Spain's certification under the Kem Amendment since the European Satellites-are largely dependent upon pyrites for the strategically important production of sulphuric acid. While Saxe of the Spanish dilemma -- the Spanish must either send the nearly 30,000 tons of pyrites still due East Germany under previous barter, agreements or else forfeit scarce dollars -- the US contends that Spain's moral obligation to prevent shipment overrides other restrictions. (Factual data from: C to Madrid 435, 3 Dec 51; C 110111 701, 4 Dec 51; C Madrid 541, 23 Nov 51)

TOP SECRET
14
Communist and Vatican-sponsored press agree in opposing release of Stepinac: The press organs of both the Italian Communist Party and the Vatican lay organization, Catholic Action, have attacked Marshal Tito for his recent "conditional" release of Archbishop Stepinac 'from imprisonment. The Communists declare that the freeing of the Archbishop is.an "insult" to the heroic Yugoslays who fought a8ainst Hitler. Catholic Action objects because Stepinac is going "from one prison to another." An editorial in the semi-official Vatican newspaper pointed out, with examples, that persecution of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia is not confined to the Stepinae case. (11 Rome 2571, 7 Dec 51; FBIS, Reuters, Rome, 6 Dec 51)
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re !ale 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0000,0130001-2

TOP SECRET
13.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. Government threatening withdrawal from UN on South-West Africa question: Secretary for External Affairs Forsyth has informed the.US Ambassador that the Union continues determined to refrain from participation in the UN Trusteeship Committee while the South-West Africa issue is being discussed, and will consider withdrawing from the UN itself if the Committee action goes "too far." (C Pretoria 155, 6 Dec 51)
Comment: The government's current defiance of the,UN Trusteeship Committee is fully supported by South African public opinion. Both the Nationalists and the Opposition refuse to recognize South Africa's international obligations in South-West Africa, and resent what they consider to be UN interference in South Africa's domestic affairs. This resentment is further aggravated by the fact that the UN is again about to,consider the treatment of Indians in the Union.
Although the threat of voluntary withdrawal from the UN has been voiced from time to time, it is not likely to be carried out, since the Union already has complete control of South-West Africa.
14.
ARGENTINA. Government may request new whaler to carry Iranian oil: According to rumors, the Argentine Government has asked the Compania Argentina de Pesca to offer its newly-completed whale factory ship, the Juan Peron, for carrying Iranian oil. The Juan Peron, reportedly the largest ship of its kind in the world, is designed to operate as an oil tanker when not in use during the whaling season. Reportedly, the company's president is strongly opposed to such a proposal. (U Belfast Desp 106, 1 Nov 51).
Comment: The Juan Peron has 10 cargo oil tanks capable of carrying 25,000 tons of petroleum and bunkers with a capacity of 3,080 tons. There are no further indications that the government would like to use this ship to carry Iranian oil. The ship could possibly be employed more advantageously on shorter runs within the western hemisphere.
Should Argentina decide to purchase Iranian oil, one ship would not appreciably affect Iran's financial situation, but it might serve to further Iran's intransigence in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.
15.
Government organizes industrialists and businessmen: The Argentine Government has announced the formation of the "General Economic Confederation," to be composed of 150 delegates from chambers of coMmerce and trade and industrial organizations. The Confederation's basic objectives are to support and coordinate all efforts to improve and increase production, to cooperate more clOsely with labor, and TOP SECRET
15
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re leN(2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000t9130001-2

TOP
sEcan
(R Radio Buenos Aires,
to give positive support to the government's aims. 6 Dec 51)
Comment: This new organization will strengthen the control over commerce and industry government's and will serve to tighten Peron's control over the country. At present labor, and welfare activity press, radio, schools, are all government-controlled; congress is dominated by Peronistas; and the policies of the provinces coordinated with federal policy are through Peron's monthly meetings provincial governors. with
.
16.
25X1
Comment: The receipt of these arms will help to army and may, in turn, strengthen strengthen the the personal political position President Arbenz vis-a-vis extremists of of the left and right. The acquisition of fighter aircraft, although unlikely, would improve morale of the air force and the would increase its relatively capabilities. insignificant
Guatemalan attempts to purchase surplus Spitfires from Government earlier this the Italian year were unsuccessful (see OCI Daily Digest, due to US intervention 3 Jul 51). The Italian Government allowing the export of arms is evidently in small quantities, Italy is prohibited by the Peace despite the fact that Treaty from possessing arms in of its own military needs. excess This is another indication of Italian disregard for the Peace the increasing Treaty.

J.
TOP SECRET
16
GUATEMALA. Arms purchases will stren then ar : At least part consignment of surplus arms of a Government from an Italian and ammunition ordered by the Guatemalan surplus arms dealer was reported to Guatemala in October. en route The Guatemalan Military Attache es to obtai twent in Italy also Macchi f* hter aircraft from the same dealer.
Approved For Releage 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00060011ARPP-251
25X1

-!
Approved For Re Idal6 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0130001-2
TOP SECRET
10 December 1951 CIA No. 49462-A

Copy No.
45

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
ApprOved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0006001,30001-2

,
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
EGYPT. New British restrictions increase Egyptian animosity: The new series of restrictions imposed by British military authorities in the Suez Canal area have again resulted in a reduction in Egypt's oil supplies.
The US Ambassador in Cairo warns that, while he appreciates the current difficulties of the British which have led to imposition of these restrictions, Egyptian animosity toward the British "has risen to such a white heat that a .real explosion seems inevitable." (SI S/S Cairo 825, 5 Dec 51):
2.
Ihe French Ambassador was pessimistic about the entire continent of Asia, feeling that eventually it may all be lost to Communism. (C,.S/S Djakarta 822, 7 Dec 51).
3.
JAPAN. Prominent Indian visitor criticizes.Japan: According to US Political Adviser Sebald, Dr. J. C. Kumarappa, President of the All India.Village Industry Association, in a press'interview in Tokyo reportedly criticized Japan as a "cheap copy of the West." The Indian, who recently completed a tour of Communist China, added that the Chinese people in general pity. Japan as a tool of American. imperialism. Speaking of Japanese rearmament, -. Kumarappa asserted that it will lead Japan to destroyitself. (C, S/S Tokyo 1205, 5 Dec 51).
-Comment: Such cements by a leading Indian economist play into the handg of the left-wing Socialist leader Suzuki in his 'opposition to all phases 'of joint US-Japan security planning. Kumarappals comments to a certain extent parallel the attitude displayed by the Indian Mission in Tokyo, whose representatives have encouraged the Japanese Socialists. While this attitude may be intended to win Japan to a-more neutral position in Asia, Indian cooperation with the Socialists has irritated the Japanese Government.
4.
Yoshida denies Diet to be dissolved in spring: The Premier, through a Liberal Party spokesman, on 4 December denied recent predictions by the Lower House Speaker and of other politicians that the Diet will be dissolved next spring. A determination was voiced to carry on until January 1953, when
TOP SECRET
INDONESIA. French Ambassador concerned over Dutch-Indonesian difficulties: The French Ambassador to Indonesia observed to US Ambassador Cochran that the Netherlands Government did not seem sufficiently aware of the danger tette economic interests in Indonesia which may result from the position it is taking on West New Guinea. He thought the Netherlands was being even .more stubborn than udual. He termed the manner in which Australia had intervened in the manner as genuinely stupid.
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re !liege 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0014100130001-2

TOP SECRET
the four year terms of the Lower House members expire, as provided by the Constitution. The Political Adviser believes that the Yoshida statement suggests he has no intention of stepping down from the Premiership at present. (R, S/S Tokyo 1307, 5-Dec 51). Comments 'Rumors have claimed that Yoshida desires to retire after the The Opposition parties, recent depurgee peace treaty becomes effective. politicans who are eager to return to power through Diet elections, and an internal Liberal Party clique eager to oust Yoshida are all putting pressure on the government to hold elections sooner than January 1953. These factors, combined with the Party's present popularity, which should enable it to return to power, may create conditions conducive to new elections six to ten months earlier than the date fixed by the Constitution.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
25X6
25X6
25X6
6,
British Southeast Asia officials approve UK policy toward Communist Chinas The recent conference of top British representatives in the Southeast Asian area agreed that British policy toward Communist China remains .sound, according to a.reliable report received by the US ConsulGeneral at .1 Singapore. the conference recommended a highlevel approach to Washington to develop joint means of counteracting the widespread impression of a widening gulf between the US and Britain as a result of their disagreements over policy
TOP SECRET
10 Dec 51
Approved For Re hose 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009800130001-2

,
TOP SECRET
toward Communist China.
(S, S/B Singapore 648, 7 Dec 51).
Comment: This report provides further evidence discrediting recent specu lations that the Churdhill government may be considering basic changes in British policy toward Communist China. However, further tactical adjustments may be expected, such as the recent Foreign Office decision to emphasize hostile criticism of the Peiping regime in British propaganda to Malaya and other areas where this may seem useful.

TOP SECRET
3
10 Dec 51
HR70-14 HR70-14
loP SECRET SUEDì

FAR EAST
2.
11 Dec
C
"Swe,pt-wing close to to Seoul: Seoul: "Swept-wingaircraft" aircraft" sighted on airfield close
US rewnnaissance bomber On 7 7 December December a US reconnaissance bomber flying low altitude "sweptflying at at a low altitude observed nine nine "sweptwing aircraft" on an an airfield airfield on on the the 38th 38th wing aircraft" on parallel at at Haeju, Haeju, about about 75 75 miles northwest northwest of o f
Seoul. were no no longer longer on on the fhe field the The aircraft aircraft were
ÂPPROVED RELEASEDATE: PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: 22-Mar-2010

3.
following day.
Comment: The MIG-15, the standard Soviet Soviet Comment: The fighter, has has sharply sharply swept swept wings. w w e m y jet aircraft have never before been Enemy aircraft have before been observed on an airfield in in such such close close proximity proximity to the battle line. line. In view d e w of of increase in in both day of the considerable increase day and and night nightenemy enemyjet jetactivity activitysouth south of Pyongyang, s possible possible that the airfield at at Haeju Haeju is used as asa a staging staging point point Pyongyang, it it i is rather than than as as an an operational operational base. base.
Chinese Communistjet jet fighter fighter division divisiontransfers transfers to combat airfield: Chinese Communist
em e 10- ff?r, -704'
US Air Force US Air Force About 50 50 MIG-15 MIG-15jet jetfighters fighters of of the Chinese About 8 Dec Dec 51 4-731.3 6 ~ ~ A Communist ~ . SixthAir Air Division Division transferred on 7, 8 II A.1 Communist Sixth SUEDE 8 December December from Mukden to Tatungkou, Tatungkou, near 8 Mukden to h / ru 5 9, r f 7B.y the Korean Emergency landing landing fields Korean border. border. Emergency for the the flight flight were were Fengcheng Fengcheng and Langtou, Langtou, both bath within within fifty fifty miles miles of of the Korean border.
Comment: The The Sixth Division, has Comment: Division, as as a unit, unit, has not had previous combat scheduled to the ' combat experience. e x p h e n c e . It may be scheduled to replace the Antung area since depleted Third Division, which which has been based in the Antung area since 20 October. This is is the the first firstreference referenceto toLangtou Langtou as a s an an emergency emergency field jet fighters. fighters. for jet
-4-
.-
.
i .
"MP-SECRET-SUEDE
4.
North quick end North Korean Korean tactical tactical unit unit sees quick end to to truce talks:
North Korean M i l i t a r y Military 51 8 Dec 51 SUEREL
An North Korean An 8 8 December Decembermessage, message, from a North regiment area, regiment probably probablyin inthe theKaesong Kaesong area, reports reports that "the truce conference conference is is expected expected to come 001/3"/ to an end end within withinfive fivedays. days. " The The message message also ,4 00 / states that "shelters "sheltershave have been been completely completely prepared for the winter. " states that "
.
?h
Thore is is no no other other evidence evidence indicating indicating a CommuCommuThere cease-fire or orto tosuspend suspend or orbreak breakoff off negotiations negotiations intention to agree to a cease-fire nist intention before 13 13 December. December. on or before
NR
Comment: The The normal Comment: normal periodic periodic reporting prothis North North Korean Korean unit has been to ingiude inqlude a summary of developcedure of this i n the truce talks. talks. ments in
SUEDE SUEDE
'
TOP SECRET SUEDE

ToH_LAmilET__sum-
HR70-14 HR70-14
NR
9. 9.

2_91_,sEcist-surbi
4 4
Chinese Communist jet igh t e r division r a n s f e r s tto o combat oombat airfields airfield: Chinese'Communist et f fi bter division t transfers About 50 M IG-15 jet fi f i g hters t e r s of of t e Chine86 Communist Sixth A L n iaZZiAbout G 5 jet th e nese ommunist Sixth liTtivision t r a n s f e r r e d on on 8 8 DeceMber December from from MUkden Mukden to t o Tatungkou, Tatungkou, near near the the Korean Korean border. border. traneferred h e r p n o y landing landing fields f i e l d s for f o r the t h e flight Might were were Fengoheng Fengoheng and and langtou, h g t o u , both both Emergency irkthin f i f t y miles milee of of the the Korean Korean border. border. (SUEDE (SUEDE USdFSS 59289 and Within fifty USAFSS CM CM IN IN 59289 and 59383, 7 7 and and 8 8 Deo Deo 51) 61) 59383,
whioh has has been been based based in i n the the Antung A.ntung area area sinoe sinoe 20 20 October. Ootober. This is the which This is the first referende refersnoe to t o Langtou langtou as as an an emergency emergenoy field f i e l d for for jet jet fighters. fightera. first
Commentc 8 a Comments The The Sixth Sixth Dlvision, Division, 8 as a unit, unit, has has not not had had previous previous combat combat e x p e r It may be scheduled replace the depletedThird Third Division, Division, experre= Its may be scheduled to Co replace the depleted
APPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
l l Deo 11 Deo 61 51
'D I> D'D
s s55
TOP SECRET SUEDE
-T-dP SECRET SUEDE.'

2.013_,SECAWB-SUEDEr
1 0 . 10.
Both Communists continue UN-held islands: islandst B KOREA. oontinue campaign against UN-held oth KOREA. Communist8 o h a n and nene Coxnmunist r e planning r have North K Ko'rean andChi Chinese Communistunits unitsa are planningOOr havemade made amphi=phibiOus bious landingi landings on on several s e v e r a l of of' the the Many many small small UN-held UN-held islands i s l a n d s of of westwestcentral o e n t r a l Korea. Korea.
'

'
On 9 Deoeniber a coMpany oompany of of Chinese Chinese Communist.troops Communiattroope landed DeoeMber a landed and and foroed forced t h e withdrawal withdrawal of of UN UM foroes forces from from Chungsan Chungsan island, i s l a n d , southwest eouthwest of of Kaesong Raesong the below the t h e 38th 38ah parallel* parallel. On On 8 Deoember December t the h e NoAh North Korean 26th 26th Brigade below ordered t h e commander commander of of its. Ordered the i t s 18th 18th Battalion, Battalionia a self-propelled self-propelled a Artillery rtillery unit u n i t on on ooastal a o a s t a l security s e o u r i t y southwest southwest of of Chinnampo, Chinnmpo, to t o attack.Pi a t t a c k Pi island, Using one Peration f from tbs mainusing one company-of company o f 76 76 mm mm ZIA= guns to $0 support support the the o operation r o m the l m d . This aame a t t a l i o n was o "report "report t h e ensmy land. same b battalion wss ordered t to the enemy movement in Cho, Cho,.Sok 80k and and Haohiwira Hachiwira ielends." islands. Some d difficultywas i f f i o u l t y was experienced experisnoed by t h i s self-propelled self-propolled artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, howsver, however, because beoauaq personnel personnel sent sent this inland earlier wooden boats for the e a r l i e r to t o "repair "repair the the wooden for t h e attacking attacking party party . . . deserted * (SUEDE AS AS CM CM IN IN 59923, 59325, 59327, 59327, and and 69722, 59724 with the t h e ships." ships." (SUEDE 8, 8 and 10 10 Dec 51) 61)
...
energy with with which which the t h e enemy enemy seems seems to t ob b e going going about about Comment: The energy 'Comment: this -opping campaign indioates indiontee a determination to t o eliminate eliminate all all island-hopping oampaign UN UN influence influence from from this t h i s area. area.
TOP -
SEC-RET-STTEDE-
5 5
D
11 Dec 61 51 11
'. . .
HR70-14 HR70-14
w'
--T-OF-SEGRIET-
w
NR
13.
14.

mg111. POREA.
(1
at Hagaru H m u in i n northeasterp -v becpglg Famed air strip at Korea may become operational for oaerafional f o r Communiatst C m s UN UN carrier-based carrier-based aircraft aircraft obierved observed grading grading equipment, at and occupied buildings a t Hagaru airstrip, airstrip equipment, large l a r g e black crates c r a t e s and just 7 Dec j u s t south south of of the the Changjin Changjin reservoir. reservoir. 4 17 Dec 51) 51j
Comments Hagaru Marine'engineers Hagaru airstrip a i r s t r i p was was built b u i l t by US Marine engineers for for supply supply E;ommentr and and evacuation evacuation purposes purposes while while the the lst 1st Marine Division was surrounded at at the t h e Changjin Changjin reservoir reservoir in in December December 1950. 1950. 41though Although no no operational enemy enemy .aircraft yet a i r c r a f t have y e t been sighted on airfields a i r f i e l d s in i n northeastern northeastern Korea, Korea, the the recent expansion expansion of o f enemy enemy jet j e t operations operations in i n this t h i s area may foreshadow an an attempt attempt to t o base base aircraft a i r c r a f t at a tsome somefieldr. fieldc there. there.
The Far Far East Chinese C q m m u n i s f m a . i o r g & & e i n the -e the line: l & : The East Command Command reports reports that t h a t the the veteran veteran Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 39th 39th Army A r m y has has relieved relieved report is i s based based on on a a lack lack Thia report the t h e 47th 47th Army Army in i n the the line l i n e west west of o f Chorwon. Chorwon. This of o f contact contact with with the t h e 47th 47th and and the the capture capture of o f aa prisoner prisoner from from the t h e 39th. 39th.
Tor 3ECRET
9 9
jits
11 Dec 51 51 11
DD
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 l';kPPROVED
1.
..
w
(I
9 Deo Dec 51) 19 51)
Comment: The veteran Chinese Communist 39th 39th Army, Army, committed i in the n t he -r initial and withdrawn withdrawn f for last spring, spring, has has i n i t i a l intervention and o r rrehabilitation e h a b i l i t a t i o n last ts r e l i e f of h e battle-weary 47th Its relief of t the.battle-weary 47th been carried i in the area. I been n t h e Pyongyang area. further of policy o of major u units io f u r t h e r evidence o f the Communist policy f rrotating o t a t i n g major nits Army is the area. iin n t h e combat area.
15.

-701'--SECRIPT-
the ( t h e 47th 47th Division. Division. 91-(
Ccament: Inasmuch as aa the a s a reasonably the North Korean 19th Division Division w was reasonably Comment: n tthis h i s aector, h i s rrelief elief f resh u n i t in i n comparison with other units fresh unit units i in sector, t this would not unit such such a8 as t the III would not seem aeem to t o be be intended intended to t o allow a l l o waabattle...weary battlwweary unit h e I11 Corps Corps to to be be rotated rotated for for rehabilitation. rehabilitation.
10
9 Dec Dec 51) 51)
Porth Korean I 9ors takes ovpr on extreme east past: the North Korean 47th Division, I Corps, has relieve "tne lvtn uivision, Corps, in the extreme eastern portion of the line. hanized -- a re The other divisions of the I Corps -- the 8th and 17th Mechanized are still 8 t i l l b believed e l i e v e d to t o be in i n the the rear r e a r area a r e a of of the t h e eastern eastern sector. sector. There is some evidence that t h a t the t h e 19th 19th Division will will withdraw withdraw to t o the t h e Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area. area. This the rrotation North Korean Korean u units is based based on on a a lack lack o of T h i s rreport e p o r t oen n the o t a t i o n oof f North n i t s is f contact with t the Division and and the the taking taking of of prisoners prisoners of of war war from from contact h e 19th Diviaion
0-
1 1Dee Dec 51 51 11
Approved For Re !Mee 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009960150001-0
TOP SECRET
12 December 1951
145
DAILY DIGEST
ARMY, DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re !ANA 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006600150001-0

TOP SEORET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
BULGARIA.
Movement of factories from Sofia re orted:
25X1C
25X1C
t e Bu garian Government has ordered the dismantlement and transfer of two tofia factories. The two establishmeate ;.. one a "mechanical technidal faotory" and the othet a metal-workin lent -- will allegedly be relocated in northeastern Bulgaria. 25X1A
25X1A
Comments
This report has xot been confirmed by other sources-.
2.
POLAND. Civilians trained for Air Defenees The US Air Attache in Warsaw 77:5Fart that during a train trip from Krakow to Warsaw he observed a group of Polish civilians whose donversatima,indicated that they were rest turning from an ait defense confer:thee held during early October in Ktakow. The Poles had a paper:bound b6ok entitled "Organization Of Civil Air Defense, Volume 1, to the back of whidh Was attached an enVelope containing airoraft silhouettes. Daring .the tiip the Poles, who appeared most enthusiastic, practiced identification of the sketches and discussed aircraft identification.
The Air Attache expressed the opinion that the training of this small group is connected with reoent rapid development of Warsaw's antiaircraft defenses, which has.inoluded the installation of apptoximately sixty.85 mm antiaircraft guns around Warsaw. (C Warsaw IR-242-51, 11 Ott.51)
.
3.
Comments Although there have been a number of general reports since last June that the Polish Government was Organiiing a national civil air defense organization, this is the first specifio report of the training of civilians along that line.
YUdObLAViA. AntiWestern offitials reportedly purged: The Turkish Consulate at Skoplje reports that 10 or 12 high tanking Yugoslav army officers and government officials in Macedonia wete recently relieved for spreading defeatiSt propaganda and for stating that Ametican army offitets would take over the direction of the YugoslaV Army.

TOP SECRET
1
Although numerous rumors concerning decentralization of indUstry and movement of governmental agencies from Sofia were current during the latter half of 1950, few reports to this effect have been received since the beginning of 1951.
12 Deo 51
Approved For Re 10.4 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006S150001-0

TOP SECRET
A previous report received last week alleged that,15 officers had been arrested in Macedonia during General Harmony's last Visit to Belgrade. (S Belgrade Joint Weeka 48, 30 Nov 51; S Belgrade 759, 7 Deo 51)
Comment: Althougb seme officers may have been arrested on charges of Cominformism, these rePorted arrests may be connected idth the US arms aid program. Certain high-Tugeslav staff officers with antiWestern reputations will probably be reclassified in in effort to prepare the ground for General Harmony's missiOn, although it is improbable that they would be arrested for this reason.

TOP SECRET
2
12 Dec 51
Approved For ReleaW2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0004919150001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
annuls election of left-wing deputies: The Greek eleotion court has decreed that the election of ten deputies :to,parliament is annulled because EDA (Union of Democratic Ieft) been candidates while in exile or in prison they oould not have legally charged with Communist activities. Meanwhile,:Interior Minister Rendis has announced that he has ordered the oanoellation of the exile orders and all the ousted deputies will remain free. (R FMB Tioker, 8 boo 51)
COmMent: The left-wing EDA won ten seats in the 8 September elections, and se773177rthe eleand deputies were allewsd to return from exile their seats. Although their to assume eleotion wus confirmed, it wee contingen a court ruling as to the'legality of their upon original candidacy. Rendist action in allowing thelbrmer exiles to go free is clearly a bid for leftist support in maintaining the present coalition government and in possible future elections.
ORME. Court
IRAN.: Iranian nationalists spin resort to violence to check opposition: supporters of Prime Minister Unssadeq'were.responsible Most-Of -the damage during the.6 December for rioting in Tehran', in which 50 polioemem and 150 civilians were injured and twu policemen Despite National Front claims that reportedly killed. Communists started the riots, the CommunistLiled deMonstration was orderly until National Front groups attacked demonetrators. The police reported the that National Front hoodlums were also responsible for the ransacking of opposition and Communist newspaper offices which took place at the same time. (8 USARMA Tehran M 29, 9 Deo 51) Comment: The Nationalist lence renes especially serious practice of combating opposition with vioas elections neat. It not only augurs for the afree" elections Which Mossadeq ing of future polioies should the National has promised but sounds a warnFront win an overwhelming victory.
1171111)nal eront
3.
IND/A. Kashmir settlement appears no nearer: During the Graham's second attempt to find course of Dr. a solution to the Kashmir problem, bertain officials and newspapers in India and Indian-held Kashmir have publicized India's allegedly conciliatory attitude soitins Soon as satisfactory conditions and its willingness to hold,a plebitherefor have been established. Others, howsver, indicate that onoe the knotty question of demilitarization has been solved, additional ones, such as the repatriation who have left Kashmir sinoe 1948, yill of 'all refUgees retain. Dr. Graham himself little tendency on the part of the Indians finds to agree to any reasonable preposition even on the matter of demilitarization. (S Paris 'Delp 601, 10 Deo; $ New Delhi Weeka 49, 7 Dec; U New Delhi 1949, 3 Deo 51)

TOP SECRET
3
12 Deo 51
Approved For Re lead 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000410150001-0

TOP SECRET
Comments Despite the wide publicity being given to Indials allegedly conciliatory attitude, there is still no indication that Dr. Graham will be able to report concrete progress toward eventual solution of the Kashmir issue by the time his current mission ends on 22 December.
4.
Atomic pile to be completed in 1954s A New Delhi news dispatch reports that B. B. Goldschmidt French atomic scientist, arrived in Bombay on 5 DeceMber to advise the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on a projected atomic pile. According to the Secretary of India's National-Resources Ministry, this pile will produce isotopes for medical use and is expected to be completed by .the end of 1954. CR NEM TiCker New Delhi, 5 Dec 51)
Conaress Party winner in Himachal Pradesh electionss A Delhi broadtest of 9 December announced that the Congress Party had won a clear majority inthe elections for the 36-member state assembly in Himachal Pradesh by capturing 21 of the 30 seats thus far announced.. SeVen were.won by the Independente one by the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, and one by the scheduled Cotes Federation. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajaya Perished lost the very,few seats they contested. (R FBIS, 9-Dec 51)
Comments The Congress Party is expected to obtain similar majorities in most of the other states of India.
5.
.6.
Chinese-trained Burmese forces plan attaoks An attack in northern Burma by 10000 Burmese Communists who have ordination with a group of ChXnese-trained been training in China, in coto take place inJanuary or February 1952. Kachin tribesmen, is reportedly The important town of Lashio,. Aouthern terminus of the Burma Road, is named as an objective. The attacking force will be called the "Burma Liberation Army." Communist China will "extend re on" and supply this force with arms ammunition. and
BURMg..
25X1A
25X1A
Commen0 Several hundred Burmese Communists are known to have been training in China for the past several in China, has previously been reported months. A Kachin group, also trained as planning an invasion in December or January.
The Burmese Communist leader, Thakin Than Tun, has publicly proclaimed an intention soon to establish a "liberated area" in north Burma to be ruled by a "People's Government." His forces in Burma have been reported as planning,a "fnll-scale" offensive in November, but this attack may have been postponed to occur simultaneously with attacks from across the China border.
TOP SECRET
12 Dec 51
Approved For Reldas6 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00564150001-0

TOP SECRET
7.
25X1A
Durmese Soci iets The Burmese Socialists are Premier Thakin Nu when the ists' first choice for the Secretary General.
Plenning to rePlace Premier with pro-Communists reliably reported to be plotting the removal of new parliament convenes in January. The Socialpremiership is re orted to be U Na Swe, the party's
Comments A number of reports have-been received that U Ba Swe an extreme leftist, has been maneuvering to replace Thakin Nu, Who is under attack from several influential Sodialists because of his pro-Western orientation. The Socialist Party is the dominant faction supporting the government and could accomplish a change in premiers at any time. The convocation of the new parliament; which they will control, offers them an excellent opportunity to effect such a change, as a new cabinet must be appointed at that time.
The Socialists would have to be certain of the noninterference, if not the cooperation, of Commander in Chief Ne Win in replacing Thakin Nu with,2Ba Swe. They would also have to risk losing considerable popular support because of Thakin Nuts great prestige.
*government headed by U Ba Swe would be hostile to the US and would probably peek much closer relations with the Chinese Communists.
8.
INDOCHINA. Chinese invasion of IndoChina Dredictadg The Chinese Communists plan an,overt attack on Indochina on 28 December, according to an intelligence source in Formosa. Chinese Communist troops will also threaten the Thailand border. ( TS USAIRA Taipei 287, 8 Dec 51)'
Comments Predictions by this source have often proved inaCcurate. Numerous recent reports; however; have alleged preparations for an attack on Indochina, and the Chinese have troops estimated at a minimum of 150,000 near the border.
French intelligence in Indochina has nbt provided any information to support the likelihood of such an attack. The:French believe that a recent ugmentation of Chinese Communist troops near the Indochina border has been nocesSary to contain guerrilla activity.
9.
INDONESIA. Mass meeting A maps meeting in Djakarta, sponsored by 15 political parties and organizations and attended by 5,000 persons, demanded that the government call off pending Dutch-Indonesian negotiations and that it take unilateral action to nullify the Round Table Conference agreements of 1949. The meeting also pasded a motion calling on the people to runite in the struggle to free Irian from the chains of colonialism," and asked the government to "cooperate with the people" in taking positive steps to incornorate West Irian (West New Guinea) into Indonesian territory. (R FBIS Ticker STATSPEC 10 Dec 51)

TOP SECRET
5
demands vaiatezeknull,Mcstagajalltagragalutas
12 Bec 51
Approved ForRelease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A000600150001-0
Approved For Re leNtli 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0061490150001-0

TOP SECRET.
Comments Although the report does not so state, the action taken by the mass meeting indicates that it was leftist-sponsored. The meeting is the first such undertaking which the Communists have attempted during the current New Guinea crisis. Should the government fail to take action,-the Communists may be expected to continue such activity and to bacome increasingly vehement in denouncing the government's attitude on the New Guinea issue.
10.
STATSPEC
'Comment: "The Indonesian Army is a poorly trained, ill-paid, indifferently officered conglomeration of guerrilla bands who fought against the Dutch during the independence atruggle. Loyalties are dubious and desertions are frequent. Desertions usually occur, however, in smaller numbers than four companies.
.
The report does not indicate to what extent the Darul Islam is active in Central Java. The organization hal largely confined its operations to West Java and to the border area between the two provinces.
11.
CHINA. Chinese Communist naval plans in South China reported: According tO the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense, a Chinese Communist naval conference held at Hankow in early October decided to (1) complete the construction of 1,500 armored speed boats in Canton shipyards before the end of 1951, (2) give top priority to logistical support of Soviet submarines at Tulin, Hainan Island, and (3) avoid battle between Chinese Communist and Nationalist naval vessels along the South China coast to aveid disclosing Communist strength. (S ALUSNA Taipei, 0104Z 3 Dec 51) Comment: Construction of small vessels in the Canton grea has often been reported, but it is doubtful if there are sufficient shim yard facilities in the Canton area to construct 1,500 armored speed boats in a short time. Submarines have been reliably observed in South China, though not at Yulin.
12.
A Taipei press despatch states that Nationalist guerrillas operating off the Shantung coast recently captured a large army transport from a Communist fleet.

as_sa_tassillatuati-brnrrilli
TOP SECRET
Four Army companies desert to loin Darul Islam: Four companies in Central Java deserted the Indonesian Army on 7 December to join the Darul Islam, a fanatical Moslem organization which has attempted to establish by force of arms an Islamic state in Indonesia, s captured 69 op the deserters and killed 22. (R FBID Ticker 10 Dec 51)
12 Dec 51
Approved For Re We 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S100150001-0

TOP SECRET
The shipwith its cargo cf 1,000 pigs was brought to the guerrillas' home base near Formosa. The despatch reports that the guerrilla forces "recently obtained a number of vessels capable of such high speed and navigating radius that they Can easily stage lightning raids a ainst the Shantung coast and escape with impunity."
25X1A
armati, Guerrillas, labeled pirates by some observers, have operated extensively in South China watere. laipei's allegation that the guerrillas have extended their operations to North China waters suggests that these antiCommunist forces have considerably broadened their range of operations. These forces are not considered capable of staging more than hit-and-run raids along the Shantung coast.
13.
25X1C
Madame Chiang Kai-aiek stated, in a recent interview :that her step-son Chiang Ching-kuo, who heads the olitical Department, has achieved virtual control of the Nationalist Government. She blames him for initiating adverse propaganda concern-. ing the US and the Military Assistance and Advisory Group mn Formosa, attempting to control American aid for his own purposes, and seeking to undermine.her connections with mainland guerrillas so that he may control this activity,

'
Medan, ch gni& Kattait.i.CADSISSIADE.-Qh2:ngriadltar:

25X1C
25X1A
25X1A
'
amaekti According to other observers, Chiang Ching-kuo's privileged position in the government (accorded him by his father), and the Political Department's extensive control in the Armed Forces have impeded the progress of the MAAG and have undermined the morale of Chinese civilians and military personnel.
Madame Chiang's remarks, however, are probably exaggerated, due to her desire to gain American support for her -lique
14.
CHINA/KOREA, Gunkaatd laClinese amphiblaw.attack on Korean

.island:
The 30 November amphibious assault on a small is3.91-0.pff Northwest Korea by CCF troops was preceded by shelling from,:an'enemy vessel reportedly of PC class (PC class ships are 173 feet long and Mount 4-inch and 40-mm guns). (S CINCFE Telecon 5449, 11 Dec 51)
Comment: AssuMing this ship to be Chinese; this incident is the first indication of Chinese naval participation in the Korean war. The vessel reportedly sighted cannot be identified but was presumably a small One, since it is doubtful if the Communists would have risked one of their few large vessels in this attack.
TOP SECRET
12 Dec 51
Approved For ReIe'Y. 2001109106 GlARDP79T0h146A00Q0150O

TOP SECRET
15.
KOREA,
STATSPEC
Radio.Pusan on a new political party -' wasn the (Liberal Party) Chayu Tang being formed by 95 National party has professed is Assemblymen,. The flew Itself as broadcast, however,. adthits to representing "farmers and laborers." The "liberals have refused to joinsome difficulties encountered, in that the nS nirtiz_do not understathforces, charging that the- promoters. of what constitutes a popular party." (a ThIS 10 Dec 51)
10 December announced that
,artv uther
16.
'

TOP SECRET
new parts' represents an attempt by to consolidate the various President Rhee "non'political" organizations him. It is supporting anticipated, however, that bonsiderable resistance met from existing pro-Rhe elements' will be would be merged and lose identity in the new party. The headwho their of the lew party apparently is Rwal, leader of the largest Lee proRhee group, the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Indepehdenoe.
A US Embassy current anti-guerril1a observer, j-ast returne d from the scene of the campaign in southwestern Korea, operations are being conducted reports that field commanders are determined,ix a disciplined manner and that ROtC to avoid a repetition of affair, in which an entire viflage the Kochang ration with guerrillas, There Is was massacred for alleged'collabono guarantee, however, that unit will not commit similar some small the campaign to date Is. in exeesse; The observer stated that, while a sense disappointing numbers, of 'guerrillas have &en in that 'no large taken, Lts disraption partisan base "may seriously of hamper future.operations." tha Chin-San liDec 51) (R Pusan 554,
Qj This.
tsU
continuing danger in such nist elements within operations against CommuSouth Korea is that thoughtless committed against relatively excesses will be by alienating those people innocent local ithabttants, who know the guerrillas' habits Such excesses, quently jeopardize the success best, freof the entire operation,
17.
Prominent Japanese businessmen credited Mission as stating on 26 November that two members rf the Soviet they wanted Japan t trade with the Soviet Union alone and not with other China, None of the Communist countries, including .Tajanese btzsinessmen who attended considered pro'-Commuuist; the conference is rather, all are associated with ist group, since they the capitalheld important positions in government or businesses before the war, (S Tokyo Weeka large 49, .7 Dec 51)
Q, The
j{
S
.
12Dec51
Approved For Release 2001I09106 CtARDP79T0l 146A000600150t.O
Approved For Re 1044 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0150001-0
TOP SECRET
g2mmeRIL Strong Japanese interest in resuming trade with mainland China may have caused the businessmen to place undue emphasis on the attitude expressed by the Soviets toward Sino-Japanese the USSR representatives were not empowered to discuss trade. Obviously the problem. It is also possible that the Russians desire to establish their own trade on a Priority basis. However, the USSR ostensibly does not interfere with foreign trade between other orbit countries and the West.

TOP SECRET
9
.
12 Dec 51
Approved ForFWease2001/09/06:0AARDP79T01146A000600150001-0
Approved For Re lee 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0064160150001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GERMANY. Berlin trade interference slackened: While the USSR is retaining the principle behind its various harassing measures in Berlin, the actual measures have been relaxed in recent weeks. Soviet interference With parcel post shipments between Berlin and West Germany has been coneiderably less since 2 November; the USSR has not rejected any export permits submitted for approval by West Berlin firms since 3 November; and the important ROthensee banal lock was, as previously reported, opened to lbst German traffic on 2 November, The principal Soviet interference now is the allowing of export permits to backlog, with results detrimental to Mbst Berlin firms.
2.
Desire for autonomy increasing among Nenni Socialists as result of Autonomy sentiments are reportedly gaining strength in the ranks of the Nenni Socialists (PSI) throughout north Italy as the result of the increasing conformity of the party's policy with Communist political ideology. The disproportion between Socialist and Communist representation in those proVincial councils which the extreme left:captured in the May-June local elections has seriously disturbed PSI members opposed to CoMmunist domination of their party. In northwest Italy the PSI federdtiond hate secretly agreed to sabotage efforts of their party's leadership to conform with Communist policy by not attending pacifist meetings of the peace partisans and by disregarding circulars which urge joint actionwith the Communists in the labor field.
ITALY.
PraTs pro-Communist ties:
Meanwhile, there is evidence that the backlog of cargo awaiting shipment by the Allied small airlift is not so large as the West Berlin city officials had recently indicated. In explanation of this, these officials maintain that many Berlin firms have completely capitulated to Seviet demands :by supplying the certificates of origin demanded by the USSR, contrary to Allied and West Berlin orders, Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which Berlin firms have done thia, they have in the past been able (Factual data from: S Bonn to circumvent the USSR demands by various ruses. unnumbered, 7 Dec 51; C Berlin Trade-Transport Cables 75-100, 1 Nov-10 Dec 51)
To Prevent further dissatisfaction and a possible splitting of the party, the PSI leadership has decided to appoint as Federal Directors the Youth Cadres who support the Communist policy and to.reject all.the older elements who still nurture autonomist tendencies.
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: There have been other indications that the PSI is restless under the domination of the Communists, to whom it is bound by a longstanding unity-of-action pact. PSI leader Nenni recently announced in a
TOP SECRET
10
12 Dec 51
Approved For Relesde 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009S0150001-0

TOP SECRET
press interview the terMs he proposed for "a truce and agreement to collaborate" between his party and the Christian Democrats of Premier de Gasperi.
3.
Italian upper-income classes ignore tax lawt The Italian Minister of Finance reports that of the 3.8 million tax returns filed this year, Only one has indicated an income in exCess of 320l000 dollars. He stresses that the wealthy in general have not complied with the tax law and-that he Will enforce the new tax measures for making big businessmen and corporations file accurate returns. The Minister was satisfied in general with the response to the new tax reform and praised the honesty of small- and mediumincome classes in declaring their income. Tax payments will amount to approximately 80 million dollars more than were collected last year under the old tax system. (S Rome Joint Weeka 49, 7 Dec 51)
domSent: The amount collected in excess of last year's returns exceeds previous estImates. As far as the iniddle- and lower-income groups are concerned, their good showing may be attributed in large measure to the fact that income taxes are collected at source, The widespread evasion of the income tax by corporations and higher-income groups is a particularly serious problem.
4.
Italian Covermnent to shift from fiscal year to calendar year in preparing budget: Budget Minister Pella has indicated that the Italian Government has introduced legislation in Parliament designed to shift from a fiscal year to a calendar year basis in preparing the national accounts. Under the existing system the budget must be submitted in January. Under the new proposal, Pella would have until next May to submit the budget for 18 months -- the last half of 1952 and all of 1953.
'
This change will make for greater economy, because now the government must prepare financial data both on a calendar and fiscal year basis, mlth considerable duplication of effort. The additional time the government will have will place it in a better position to know the amount of US aid and the progress of offshore procurement contracts placed in Italy by the US before submitting the proposed military budget to Parliament. (C Rome, 2496, 4 Dec 51)
Comment: Pella has recently pressed for information on US plans for offshore procurement of military items in Italy and made it known that Italy is relying heavily upon these plans. He has given assurance-that the Italian defense program will be executed even if domestic prices should rise moderately, but has hinted that if there is an international inflation, Italy will not feel bound to promote a defense effort beyond its economic capabilities.
TOP SECRET
11
12 Dec 51

TOP SECRET
5.
SWITZERLAND.
25X1A
he world market because of heavy buying by the Chineie Communist Government. A Chinese Communist Government agent has been buying all available stocks in Switzerland. Such purchases are significant because such watches are needed for artillerymen, and because watch movements can be converted for use in almost any kind of precision equipment including fuze heads f r projectiles.
dommerit: The US receives the largest part of Swiss watch exports, West has not requested apy controls over Swiss watch exports.
urChases: There is reportedly a temporary shortage of Swiss watches an
Swiss watch shortage attributable to Chinese Communist
The
6,
The Ambassador feels that, although the Spaniah Government is partly at fault in the matter, further delay, cnupled with the absence of information as te what Spain may expect, is detrimental to American interests and rmastige. (C Madrid 592, 8 Dec 51)
.
.
Comment: Spanish expectations for aid were_ unjustifiably high. Government officials had apparently anticipated a free hand in the use of Exportimport Bank credits. Among the chief causes of delay in execution of these credits have been the efforts of Spanish officials to obtain funds for government-controlled projects, frequently economically unsound as well as unacceptable under the Bank's policy of favoring private enterprise, and the failure of the Spaniards to submit adequate data to justify their requests.
.
7.
France willing to contribute to Libyan financest According to the Foreign Office, France will make financial contributions to the Libyan Treasury, but is seeking an exchange Of noted by which the would agree to earmark French funds to make up the deficit in the Fezzan's budget and for a national development_inStitute. The French state that the British agree and have dropped the request.that the French financial adviser -- who will be concerned solely with Fezzanese questions -be subordinate to the British adviser.
LIBYA. 117gEnt central Libyans

TOP SECRET
12
SPAIN. Spanish criticism of delays in US aid increade':: The US Ambassador irigdrid reports influential Spaniards are becoming increasingly impatient at the delays in American aid. Spanish officials, preoccupied with the countryis tight dollar position, are annoyed that although-the Exportimport Bank credits were authorized over a year ago, not all the 62.5 million dollars have yet been allocated. Moreover, thqy apparently resent the fact that other nations are already receiving allocations fram 1952 Mutual Security Act funds, whereas in Spain only an economiC survey has been made.
12 Dec 51
ay"
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000a0150001-0

TOP SECRET
The French realize, however, that independence will occur automatically on 1 January. (S Paris 3436, 8 Dec 51)
Comment: US inquiries about the report that Libyan independence might be delayed by French intransigence (see OCI Daily Digest, 10 Dec 51) 'prompted the Foreign Office statement. Essentially, however, the French position continues to impede the declaration of Libyan independende, which has been most reOently scheduled for 15 December.
'

TOP SECRET
13
.
12 Dec 51
UNCLASSIFIED when LitgiroTeiledVfiRERelettteta06009/06RRRPOOR71811W11140%0906:00460iDOOR or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE
DOC. NO.
00C
.
CIA
coy , 7,7 i
I TED
REGISTRY
DATE DOCUMENT REC

LOGGED BY
DATE
COPY NO.
NUMBER OF PAGES
ATTENTION: This form toll! be placed on top 0/ and attached to each Top Secret document received by Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret udthIn the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as itthe is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter ts limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /OM and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and Indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE RECE IVED
S I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T !LIE
SEEN BY
5 I GNATURE
OFF I CE/D IV.

T I ME
DATE
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this /arm is detacl ed from Top Sec et material it shall be completed in the appropriate Spaces Deltno and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO.
DESTROYED
By
D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
DY (Signature)
OFFICE
W !TRESSED BY
BY
(Signature)
A'DATE
pproved For Reiease 2001/09/06 :
OFFICE
CIYA TfRDP791-0
f i MO00600150001-0 A TE
140/
KAM els
RIVIOWI COITION..
TOP SECRET
Approved For Re %We 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0099150150001-0
TOP SECRET
12 December 1951
CIA No. 49464-A

Copy No.
45
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SBCRET
....A...2v
infor
Approved For Re Web 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0098100150001-0

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Britinarga, the Greek Government has as yet refrained from giving full
vent to its irritation, presumably with the hope that diplomatic pressure will yet save the day. In- this connection, Greek diplomats have already informedZritain, as well as the US, of their displeasure, and Greek attempts to inflUence the British by linking Greece's recognition of King Farouk as "King of Egypt and the Sudan" with the-Greek candida-cy for the Security Council may well follaw. An adverse vote Alll undoubtedly give .rise to increased.Oriticism of the already shaky government, and Greek politicians mey accordingly feel forced to take a firmer stand against the British on the Cypriot and Egyptian issues.
2.
American Consul General in Libya concerned over British diplomatic The US Consul General in Tripoli has expressed his concern lest the first British Minister to independent Libya be Sir Alexander Kirkbride, Minister tO Jordan for the past twenty years. According to the Consul General, Kirkbride's appointment would confirm the worst suspicions of Mosleth states that Britain plans, to make "another Transjordan" out of Libya.
LIBYA.
Warns
The consul General points out that elections for the new Libyan parliament, which must ratify the American airbase agreement and also the British and French agreements, must be held According to the.constitution by 22 February 1952. Kirkbridels appointment, he .fears, will strengthen the hand of opposition elements_and lessen the podeibility that the new Libyan parliament will be controlled by persons favorable to Western interests. (S S/S Tripoli 249, 9 Dec 51)
Comment: Recognition of the precarious political situation in Libya has resulted in the.US and UK urging the advancement of Libya's independence date to 15 December. The US Legation in Jordan recently.stated that Kirkbride had been ordered by the British Foreign Office to arrive in Libye by 14 December so that he might become the.dean of the diplomatic corps.

Comment:
GREECE. Greek UN delegate incensed over British and French failure to support Greece's candidacy for UNSC seats The Greek UN Delegate hes expressed his indignation over the "treason" of France and Great Britain, who failed to support Greece's bid for a seat on the Security Council. The Greek delegate insisted that he had been promised French support for Greece.in exchange. for Greece's abstention on the Moroccan question. He was especially bitter, according to the US UN delegate with whom he discussed the matter, over the British vote, asserting that the British, despite their promise to support Greece after the first ballot, had con tinued to vote for Byelorussia up to and including the last ballot. S/S Paris DELGA 581, 10 Dec 51)
'
Although extremely bitter over the adverse French and
TOP SECRET
12 Dec 51
........ . . ~
HR70-14
TOP SECRET SUEDe

TOP SECRET OUEDE
SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASTERN)

__
/NR

2. 2,
CHIU. -Communist a i r a c t i v i t y increases8 Analysis o f Chinese Communist messages reveals t h a t f l i g h t s during the period 26 November t o 2 December
CHINA. Communist air activity increases: Analysis of Chinese Communist messages reveals that flights during the period 26 November to 2 December averaged 605 a day, erveraged day, or o r higher than any m y week since since 22 22 to t o 28 2 8 October, October, J e t fighters fighters a day day were were recorded. recorded. Jet when an an all-time all-time high high of o f 673 673 flights flights a accounted (SUEDE Air Air Foroe Force aaaounted for f o r 55 peroent peraent of of the t h e recent reoent activity. Rctivity. (SUEDE Roundup Roundup 257, 257, 21152, 21152, 11 11 Dec 51)
Comment: Commentt These Those flight f1igh-t reports r e p o d s inolude inolude the activity a c t i v i t y of o f transtrensports ariaE7tiners s i g h t i n e s confirm confirm and t r a i n e r s as as well well as as oombat combat aircraft. a i r c r a f t . UN sightings a substantial s u b s t a n t i a l increase inarease in i n enemy enemy fighter f i g h t e r activity h o t i v i t y over over Korea Koree in i n this this period. perioda
,,,,'
NR /NR
TOP CEORET SUEDE
2 2
13 Deo 51 51 13
h-b
<s s'S
TOP SECRET SUEDE
TtIP SEQULSIJEDis'NR
1 0 . 10.

KOREA. KOREA.
-8 IS7;37.1
Reoent message suggests Chinese Chinese Communist Communist u n i t movement into Reoent message Suggests unit movement into
A ragment r y h i nChinese e s e Communist Communist message measage stated atatod . A f fragmentary 8a December " a t "at 060C 060C hours hours we a r r i v e d safely a a f e l v at a t Hui-ohon Hui-ohon without 1 0 8 s or or that we arrived without less o a s u a l t i e a . We W e stayed s t a y e d for f o r one one day day at a t the the waiting w a i t i n g oamouflaged omouflaged area a r e a before before casualties. boarding the t h e vehicles vehicles to t o continue oontinue our our journey journey forward forwnrd in i n the the afternoon. afternoon. boarding (SUEDE AS Has the t h e seoond seoond eohelon eohelon . . e rrived a t tpir position?" (SUEDE Has * a arrived at their position?" AS CY CM I N 59882, 10 Deo 61) IN 59882, 10 Deo 51)
Comment: "Hui-ohon" r eferred t o i n this this t a t may Comment, The The "Hui-ohon" referred to in text may be be Huioh'on, Huich,on, on t h e very mmp o r t a n t supply supply and and movamsnt r o u t e from from Mmpo j i n on on the the on the important movement route Manpojin The size size and and Manchurian border to t o Sinanju Sinanju in i n northwestern northwestern Korea. Korea. The Manchurian border
TOP SECRET SUEDh
4
13 Deo 51
TOP SECRET SUEDE
-'14911-13-13eifff-SUEDE-
composition o f t h e unit riginating t h i s message s n o t known; it is is of the unit o originating this message i is not known; it t is o l e a r from t he It clear the possible that of replacements. replacements. I p ossible t h a t it could be a body of text, t e x t , however, hawever, that t h a t movement movement. WAS W ~ by E by truck t r u c k and and was was cionducted conducted at a t night. night.
11. I l .
December Chinese Communist Communist engineer units units a are in Korea: A 3 December Chinese re i n Korea; Chinese Communist ground f forces message m mentioned the 1st B Battalion of o r m s message e n t m h e 1st a t t a l i o n Qf e a r l i e r message message of of 26 26 November November mentioned mentioned the t h e lst 1 s t Engineer'Regiment. Engineer Regiment. An earlier (SUEDE AS 69114, 3 and AS Chl CM IN 57883 57683 and and'59114, the the "14th "14th engineer engineer regiment.'" regiment.' 7 Dec 51) 61)
Comment: Normally, Normally, an engineer_regiment in the Cormnentt engineer regiment i n t h e Chinese Communist Communist; would to and presumably presumably would would b bear the Army 1 6 be 6 organic orgmic t o an army group and e a r the however, is the initial same numerical designation. designation. This, This, howover, is t he i n i t i a l identifioaidentifioation a numbered numbered engineer unit, t i o n through through communications cornuniontione intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e 'of of a unit, and it i t is i s noteworthy that t h a t neither neither a a lst l e t nor a 14th 1 4 t h Chinese Chinese Communist Communist In A p r i l 1951 Army Group Korea. 'In April 1951 a Chinese Chinese "8th "8th Group are a r e identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n Korea. Engineer Division, Field Army" Army" was was rreported Korea. Reportedly Ehginser Division, '4th 4 t h Field e p o r t e d iin n Korea. subordinate to t h e 4th, 4th, 5th, 5th, 6th, 6th, and and 7th 7 t h Engineer Engineer t o this unit were the

Regiments. Regiments.
The presenoe of o f independent engineer units u n i t s in i n Korea may may indicate, indioate, among mogg other o t h e r things, t h i n g s , the t h e construction c o n s t r u c t i o n of of permanent permanent fortiftoations f o r t i f i o a t i o n s in in North Korean Korean rear r e a r areas. areas.
" a .
12. 12 b
' message: A 9 . North Korean jet j e t unit u n i t indioated i n d i o n t e d by redent r e o e n t rnessager 9 December December Chinese Communist a air message from from Antung Antung reported reported tthat "the Korean i r message hat " t h e Korean MIG-15 training t r a i n i n g flight P l i g h t began began at a t 1400." 1 4 0 0 . ' ' Previously noted indirect MIG-15 indirect references t to aotivitylend existence of a referenoes o Korean jjet et a o t i v l t y lend credence credence to t o tthe he e x i s t e n c e of North North Korean Korean jet j e t unit. unit. (SUEDE. (SUEDE AAir i r Foroe Roundup 257, 11 Dec Dec 51) 51) Foroe,Roundup 257, 21152, 2115Z, 11
?Comment: Comment: This development dsvelopment is n o t surprising s u r p r i s i n g in i n the t h e light l i g h t of of the the not o o n s i d ~ C h i n eCommunist se Communist j etraining t training programand and thoexisi7enoe exis-kenoe consiaaTreChinese jet program the of sizable of s i z a b l e Chinese jet j e t units. u n i t s . The The North North Korean Korean A i r Force, Air Force, based on on f i e l d s both in i n Manchuria Manchuria and and in i n Korea, Koren, is is currently c u r r e n t l y estimated estimated to t o be be fields training operations with conventional t r a i n i n g and and carrying c m r y i n g out o u t limited limited o perations w i t h some 110 c onventional fighters and fightere B nd ground ground attack a t t a c k airoraft. aircraft.
I
I
13. 13.
North Koreans Koreans forced foroed to t o use use extremely extremely circuitous oircuitous rout North rout t o supply supply to northeastern from t t he e North N o + rn n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea; oreas A 10 0 December eoember message message from Korean of Railways Railways in in Pyongyang Pyongyang to to a a Vioe-Minister Vioe-Minister in I n Hamhung Hamhung b b i n e t Minister M i n i s t e r of Cabinet reports r e p o r t s that t h a t 'I. u i t s were t Manpo 5,760 suits suite . 5,000 5,000 s suits were supplied a at MAnpO and 5,760 were shipped shipped from from Antung Antung via v i a the t h e northeast nortsheast on on 22 Deoember. Deoember" . . You were You should arrange arrange things t h i n g s to t o receive r e c e i v e them them at a t Namyang Namyang (near (near Chongjin Chongjin in in should n o r t h e n s t e r n Korea). Korea). . . ." (SUEDE northeastern (SUEDE AS CM IN IN 60019, 60019, 11 1 1 Dec 51) 51)
-T0P-SECRET-STEDE-
T D D
l3 Deo Deo 51 61 13
T&PSECRET SUEDhe
-TOP-SECRET-SUEDE-
Coment: The The oircuitousness oircultousness of o f this r oute a ttests t o t h e consiconsiroute attests to the Comment: d e r a b m of of the t h e UNIs U"S interdiction i n t e r d i o t i o n program p r o g r m against a g a i n s t Communist COmXIIUni6t lines lines derable va l ue of cOmmunioations. oommunications. A A shipment shipment originating originating in i n these t h e s e western of western Korean Korean border towns would normally go go south south almost almost to to Pyongyang, Pyongyang, east east to to border towns would normally Hamhung,and then northeast n o r t h e a s t along dong the t h e ooastal o o a s t a l rail r a i l line. line. The route The route Bamhungoand then suggested by by this t h i e message message wculd would involve involve a a movement movement deep deep into into Manchuria, Manchuria, suggested n o r t h to t o Kirin, H i r i n , east east to t o tho tho Korean Korean border town t o w n of of Tumen Tmen near VladiTfiadinorth vostok, and and thence thenoe south south on on the the coastal o o a s t d rail rai.1 line l i n e to to its i t s destination. destination.
NF
-Tel-srettET-turrir
6 6
l.3 Dec 51 13 Dec 51
HR70-14
ate
CI
NR /NR
FAR FAR EAST

3. Report of of "swept-wing "swept-wing aircraft" aircraft" on on Haeju airfield believed erroneous:
4. Soviet air division division reported reported in inNorth North China: China:
A of 10 December A Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message message of repor@. scheduling of reports . the scheduling of a a flight flight of often ten aircraft aircraft SUEDE of division" to fly of "the "the friendly Soviet fighter fighter division" from Tangshan 3c7 Tangshan to Peiping the next,day. nextday. The 4atiid:Ictg:hich a r etentatively tentativelyidentified identified as as MIG-9's, MIG-g's, in this this flight flight are aircraf which participated participated in an older model model jet fighter fighter inferior inferior to tothe theMIC-15. MIG-15.
G*
ManchUria. Manchur ia.
US Air US A i r Force 11 Dec 51 11 51
Comment: This This is isthe the first first messagein inwhich which Comment: message the Chinese specifically designate a a'unit Chinese Communists Communists specificallydesignate 'unit as "Soviet", "Soviet", although although since November November there there have have been been many many references. references to "Soviet" llSpvietltplanes. Soviet a air in operations operations from i r personnel personnel have have long long been been actively engaged engaged in
~PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ILkTE: 03-Mar-2010 IDATE: 03-Mar-201 0 IPPROVED

X. as-7
The The US USFifth FifthAir AirForce Force in inKorea Koreareports reports that sighting by a US US reconnaissance the 7 December sighting reconnaissance bomber on bomber crew of of nine nine "swept-wing "swept-wing aircraft" aircraft" on Haeju, 75 miles from Seoul, an airfield near Haeju, Seoul, has now been discredited. discredited. It is now been is believed that formations formations of of ice ice and and snow snow on the ground may may have have given giventhe theair air crew members a false false impression! impression, In addition, it is that jet aircraft is doubtful doubtful that aircraft could could operate from this field, field. addition,
-4-
TOP SECRET SUEDE
e:
Approved For Re least 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0096110160001-9

*
TOP SECRET
13 December 1951
DAILY DIGEST
15
*Army, USAF, DIA and State Dept.
reviews completed*

TOP SECRET
SECURITY
INFORMATION
Approved For Reigate 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09411700160001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Italian envoy believes Kremlin does not expect US attack: In the opinion of the Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Soviet officials do not actually expect an attack from the US despite their charges of American aggressive intentions, as evidenced by NATO rearmament, German remilitarization, the Japanese treaty, and the like. The Italian Ambassador concludes that the Kremlin's primary fear is that when Western "positionsof strength" are established and German remilitarization completed the West will make demands upon the Soviet Union which it could not tolerate. These demands would primarily involve the status of the Eastern European Satellites and the Baltic states.
The USSR Char6 comments that the Italian Ambassador has had long experience in the USSR and that he had unusual opportunities to see high Soviet and Satellite officials recently preparatory to departure from his post. (S Moscoia 995, 11 Dec 51)
2.
Middle and Near East Communists will make another attempt to hold a Peace Conference: Partisans of Peace delegates from the Middle East and. North Africa met in Rome in September and planned another attempt to fulfill the World Peace Council's instruction to hold a regional Peace Conference. The conference is reportedly scheduled for January 1952
in Cairo. I
1
25X1A
'
3.
25X1C
ALBANIA.
1
Comment: There is no confirmation that this Communist conference, long planned by the Moacow-oriented WPC, will actually take place in Cairo. The Egyptian Government refused to permit it to meet there last July, and it has previously been banned when scheduled for Tunis and Tehran. Egypt has always opposed local Communist activities, but the possibility exists that Egyptian authorities might permit such a conference to be held as a means of publicizing their stand against the UK. Items reportedly to be featured on the conference agenda include all the controversial issues of the area, such as the Middle East Command, Iranian oil, the Suez Canal, and the Sudan. Since the local Communist Parties and the USSR have currently been championing the nationalists' point of view, the conference, if held, would serve both Communist and nationalist objectives.
Rumored Shehu-Hoxha rift causes snlit in Communist Party: A (the split between Premier Hoxha and Minister of Interior Shehu has become pronounced since the visit of 'these two Albanian leaders to Moscow in May 1951, causing fantional dissension in the Albanian Workers' Party. Failure to resolve their personal differences has deepened the enmity which stems from Shehu's.imprisonment
TOP SECRET
1
13 Dec
51
Approved For Ramie 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004960160001-9

TOP SECRET
25X1A
of certain Hoxha sympathizers on the grounds of political infidelity. Hoxha is also irritated by Shehu's efforts to expand his personal power under the guise of protectin/ Albania's internal security. I
25X1A
Comment: Rumors predicting Hoxha's political downfall have been reported from time to time, but there has been no confirmation of a real split between the Albanian Premier and the Minister of Iliterior.
4.
25X1C
25X1A
Comment: It cannot be confirmed that Czechoslovakia is foremost of the Satellites in the China trade, although it is one of the leaders. The, alleged Polish-Czech shipping agreement is reported here for the first time. In October three vessels chartered by Poland arrived simultaneously at Gdynia and loaded for the Far East. This fact, together with the fact that the vessels were apparently new to the Far Eastern trade, suggests that their employment was an emergency shipping measure to meet an increased volume of goods and furnishes some confirmation of a growing backlog on the docks.
5.
TRIESTE. Trieste Cominformists' policy reportedly shifting to the Italian Communist position regarding Trieste: A US official in Trieste reports that recent developments suggest that the pro-Cominform Communist Party is preparing the groundwork for a fundamental shift in policy on the Trieste issue in anticipation of a gradual adoption of a position compatible with the party line current in Italy. This would mean that the Trieste Cominformists would drop their agitation for the creation of a Free Territory and discontinue their opposition to a return of the entire FTT to Italy.
The principal support for this hypothesis is the failure of key .party leaders in Trieste to emphasize or allude to the previous party line on this issue, ahd their conspicuous failure to deny charges made by the pro-Titoist press that the Cominformists had deserted their policy calling.for a Free Territory and the fulfillment of the provisions of the Italian peace treaty. (S Trieste Despatch 174, 25 Oct 51)

TOP SECRET
2
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-HUNGARY. Trandportation difficulties hamper SatelliteChina trade: Czechoslovakia is leading other Satellites in developing export trade with China and has secured the pick of Chinese barter goods because it has the best transport agreement with Polish shipping companies, 'the Czechs have successfully cornered available transportation, which is at a premium, and put the Hungarians in particular at a disadvantage. Hungarian exports to China are held up, and the head of the import department of Technoimpex was in China in September attemntinp tn resnlvnithe transportation dilemma.
13 Dec 51
Approved For R&M& 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00S0160001-9

TOP SECRET
Comment. Questionable reports alluding to this development have been received in the past tun months. Such a shift in policy, if implemented, would probably alienate many Slovene membersof the Cominform group, as wall as those non-Slovenes who based their sympathy for the party on its former policy.
The apparent failure of the pro-Cominformists to emphasize the Soviet line suggests that the party may be preparing for the assumption of a new policy which would become explicit only when Italo-Yugoslav accord appeared iMminent.
25X1
Comment: This report appears to be a reliable summary of the impasse facing the Italo-Yngoslav negotiators. Neither side appears willing to make those concessions needed for the establishment of an acceptable basis for a settlement. Negotiations to date have not evidenced a sense of urgency or an understanding for the need of compromise; the Italians have reportedly threatened to terminate negotiations unless the Yugoslays show a willingness to adopt a more flexible approach. Italyis believed to be in favor of postponement of a settlement until after the Italian national elections which are scheduled for late 1952.

TOP SECRET
3 23-Dec 51 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0006001600ui-u

TOP SECRET
SECTION.2 (EASTERN)
1.
IRAN. Iranian Minister of War threatens resignation if US military aid is eut off: The Iranian Minister of War told the Chief of the US Military
Mission in Iran that he would resign if Prime Minister Mossadeq does accept his recommendations for the continuation of US military aid. US Mission chief, during their conversation, had pointed out the bad on army morale and efficiency which would result from a cessation of military aid. (S Tehran 2067, 5 Dec 51)
.
not The effect US

TOP SECRET
4
Comment: Prime Minister Mossadeq has long maintained that Iran should not nreMr7747:eign economic or military assistance. While the oil dispute and the consequent financial difficulties of his government have persuaded him to try to obtain eoonomiC aid from the US, he has continued his opposition to grants of US military aid and to the linking of the two. Accordingly, he may not be willing to sign the asSurances necessary under the Mutuill SecurityAct and thus go on record as promising to build up Iran's defense forces. In view of his desire to maintain Iran "aloof from the cold war," he may also object to that portion of the assurances which calls for him to contribute to the defensive strength of the free world.
.
2.
INDIA. Indian Government te sell seventy war surplus aircraft: The Indian MireFnment has decided to sell 70 war surplus C-46 aircraft to Banwari Lal and Co., Bombay, although .the sale has not yet been officially announced. The sales contract'forbids export of the planes to "unapproved" destinations, including both Nationalist and Communist China. The government reportedly used various unerthodox procedures in handling the bids, and Banwari Lal allegedly was not the highest bidder. (C New Delhi 2066,-11 Deo 51) Comment: The Indian Government called for bids on these aircraft last August. Once they are out of the government's hands, there is some danger that the planes or their components will illegally find their way to Communist China.
3.
FAR EAST. Consensus of Singapore conference is reported: A participant in the recent Singapore conference of British representatives in Asia reports that opinion Was "nearly unanimous" on the following points:
(1) Communist China has been'heriously hurt'in Korea, in terms of trained manpower, equipment, and control of inflationary pressure;
(2) China "badly wants peace" in Korea, while the USSR would prefer the conflict to continue;
13 Dec
51
Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T0I146A000600160001-9
Approved For Re Note 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009B00160001-9

TOP SECRET
(3) Indnohina is secure against Communist forces unless China provides major assistance, which is unlikely;
(4) the most dangerous spot on China's periphery is Burma, where the situation is "explosive" and there is a possibility of mere aggressive Chinese,Communist action;
(5) there are no signs of trouble between Moscow and Peiping, although sharp differences may eventually develop; and (6) although Nehru indulges in 'wishful thinking" about Peiping, his influence on the Chinese Communists "generally will be in the right direction." (S New Delhi 2043, 10 Dec 51)
Comment: This report probably represents correctly the thinking of British officials in Asia, but it appears over-optimistic in sone respects. Evidenoe is still not convincing that China has been sufficiently hurt in the Korean fighting to desire a settlement on terms acceptable to the UN. Overt Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh, including the oommitment of com'bat forces, is a continuing possibility. There is no indication that Nehru has had or will have the slightest effect on Peiping's policies.
L.
BURMA. Karens threaten to attack Rangoon: The Karen radio on 10 DeceMber warned foreign residents that Rangoon would be attacked on 15 December. The US Military Attache comments that he believes this broadcast to be no more than a manifestation of the new psychological warfare campaign recently begun by the Karens. He doubts that the Karma could even mount a serious raid against Rangoon's outakirts. (S USMA Rangoon 103, 10 Dec 51)
The Karens are not known to have sufficient forces near However, they recently raided the tot of Della, across the river from Rangoon, and caused a new influx of refugees into the overcrowded Burmese capital.
RangorT3Threaten the city seriously.
5.
Communism gains among Chinese in Burma: The US Embassy reports that one of the two leading Chinese secret societies in Burma plans to call an all-Burma Congress in late February for the purpose of passing a resolution in support of the Chinese Communist regime. The chairman of the society is reliably reported to have received 30,000 rupees from the Chinese Embassy, and the Chinese Ambassador is known to be pressing Chinese leaders in Burma to 000perate with his government.
Meanwhile, the only anti-Communist Chinese newspaper (pro-KMT) in Burma is reported threatened with bankruptcy because of mismanagement, corruption and ineptitude. (S Rangoon 540, 7 Dec 51)

Comment:
TOP SECRET
5
13 Dec
51
Approved For INgoese 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A1156600160001-9

TOP SECRET
secret society, the HungMen Ho Sheng, Comment: This particular claim 40,000 members.throughout Burma. It is the local branch Of the secret society utilized by Sun Yat-sen to,overthrow the Manchu Dynasty in China. Control of this troup would obviously give great impetus to the extension of Communist control over the Chinese in Burma.
Ihe difficulties of the Nationalist newspaper re-emphasize the lack of a sense of mission or responsibility among the followers of Taipei in Burma.
THAILAND. Smugtling of arms into Thailand reported: The US Naval Attache irrngkok has .een informed by the Philippine Army Attache that at least six submarines have unloaded hand grenades and mmill arms on an island off the southern ooast of Thailand. The arms are said to be stored by the few inhabitants there before distribution in Thailand. The island is leased by a Chinese firm in Bangkok which deals in birds nests and which, so far as is known, is reputable and has not been previously implicated in the arms traffic. Although the sub-source of this information is unknown, the Attache rates it as a 0-.3 report . and suggests that a Thai naval underground, which developed after the abortive coup in June, may somehow be involved in these activities. (S ALUSNA Bangkok, 0245Z, 30 Nov 51)
Comment: There have been several unconfirmed sightings of unidentified submarines in the Gulf of Siam. If this report is true, it appears more likely that the arms involved are destined for the Communist guerrillastatter layaanithe undergrOund in Thailand (mostly Chinese) rather than for Thai ex-naval personnel.
6.
7.
INDOCHINA. Viet.Mihh launches attack: The Assistant Military Attache reports that Viet Minh forces are attacking a point at the extreme south of the Tonkin delta, and that Frenoh paratroops have been flown in frem Hanoi. ($ Hanoi 316, 11 Dec 51)
Comment: No further information is available. A press report of 12 Decenler datelined Hanoi states that the French army has !crushed a new, imo -pronged Viet Minh offensive to link Communist forces in central Indochina with those near the Chinese border." According to the report, "the drives were the biggest by the Viet Minh since last May."
8.
Morale of Chinese Nationalist troops in Indochina reportedly The morale of the Chinese Nationalist.troops interned by the French low: =Indochina has deteriorated greatly during the past six months and the rate of desertions is very high, according to a Nationalist Foreign Office official who just returned from a tour of the area. Disillusionment conberning.repatriation to Formosa, the hardships of confinment, and the lure of Viet Minh promises have caused many of the internees to escape. General
TOP SECRET
'
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : 6A-RDP79T01146A00060016000P9 Dec 51
Approved For Re Maine 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A080600160001-9

TOP SECRET
Huang, commander of the troops, considers that those left would be of little use to the French in case of a Chinese Communist invasion as the troops are bitterly anti-French and unprepared for combat. (S ALUSNA Taipei, Weeka
Ei Deo 51)
Comment:
General Huang's estimate of the dombat capabilities of these
troorrirrafirmed by other sources.
9.
Cochran:comments that the incident could prove an obstacle to the pending Netherlands-Indonesian talks at The Hague. (S Djakarta 843, 11 Dec 51)
Comment: Varioum Indonesian officials are increasingly taking the view that,on the basis of mlauses in the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty, West New Guinea is legally part of Indonesia.
Indonesian seizure of the arms is not surprising. Dutch shipments of weapons to New Guinea through Djakarta would seem to be a particularly unwise move during a period when the Indonesians are especially agitated over the New Guinea issue.
INDONESIA. Military police confiscate Dutch arms destined for West New Guineas A Cabinet meiber told US Ambassador Cochran that on 9 December military police at the Djakarta harbor re:a:lived from a Dutch merchant vessel considerable quantities of automatic weapons destined for.Netherlands troops in West New Guinea. The Indonesian police'acted on the grounds that West New Guinea is within Indonesian surveillance.
10.
CHINA'.
I
25X1
Kwangtung pppu1ace is hostile to Communist program: northeastern Kwangtung reports that
25X1
(1) the coastal area is undergoing a second land-redistribution program which is adversely affecting nearly half tile populace, and resistance to this program is widespread, (2) marriages between Kwangtung women and military personnel now serving with the Nationalists have been declared void, with the marriageable ordered to remarry local men, the unmarriageable employed on public works projects, and the ohildren of former unions taken over by the State, and
(3) guerrilla forces in the mountainous area of northeastern Kwangtung have grown from an original group of 300 to'a (C Saigon 1172; 11 Dec 51) present strength of 13,000.
TOP SECRET
7
13 Dec 51
Approved For Re !bode 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001400160001-9

TOP SECRET
Commenk The Communists have admitted and decried popular opposition to advanced phases of the agrarian reform." The reported rulings on marriages are sIso plausible. The assertion regarding guerrilla strength in the area, however, is doubtful, as almost all sources report guerrilla forces in the province to be scattered and dwindling.
11.
Li also expressed his desire to assume leadership of the mainland guerrillas, who, he feels, could overthrow the Chtnese Cimmunists if they had. the proper backing. 1
.
Li Taung-jen plans to ehallenals Chiang Kai-shek's position on legal arounds: General Li Tsung-jen, Vice-President of China who has resided in the US since December 1949, recently stated that he has no plan to "oust" Chiang Kai-shek from the Presidency of Nationalist China. However, Li admitted that he hopes to compel Chiang to "relinquish" the presidency. Li denounced as misleading the New York Times, account of his 6 December press conference, and stated that his plan does not include the use of force but is rather based on "logic and law."
25X1
ipmenS: The Times on 6 December reported that Li was planning to oust Chiang. Li argued that he had become Acting President in 1949 when Chiang "retired" and, although Chiang reassumed the presidency in 1950 when Li was in the US, Chiang legally had never been re-elected. This argument appears to lack validity, since Chiang never "resigned" the presidency.
12.
The US Fifth Air Force in Korea reports that the 7 December sighting by a US reconnaissance bomber crew of nine "swept-wing aircraft" on an airfield near Haeju, 75 miles from Seoul, has now been discredited. It is t*lieved that formations of ice and snow on the ground may have given the air crew members a false impression. In addition, it is doubtful that jet aircraft could operate from this field. (S CINCFE Telecon 5455, 12 Dec 51)
13.
KOREA. &port of "swept-wina aircraft" on Hasiu airfield believederroneous:
Current indications continue to point to an enemy defense: The Far East Command believes that Communist forces in Korea will continue to defend in their present positions. Indications pointing to such an intention are seen in (1) the disposition of enemy artillery in depth, (2) additional prisoner of war statements that by the enemy to reinforce their fortifications orders had been issued and to prepare their quarters for a defense until the spring of 19520 (3) prisoner of war TOP SECRET
13 Dec 51
Approved For Re Rade 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041600160001-9

TOP SECRET
reports of construction of defense installations in the rear of present defense lines, and (4) the depletion of the enemy's forward reserve force by the relief of long-committed.units by reserve units. (S CINCFE Telecon 5455, 12 D8O 51)
14.
North Koreans from east coast unit desert on west coasts Three North Korean soldiers from the 13th Regiment, 6th North Korean Division, deserted to UN forces on 10 December in the Panmunjon area CINCFE Telecon 5449, 12 Dec 51)
15.
Communists develop new Propaganda theme: Radio Pyongyang on 8 December initiated a new propaganda theme. It decried the "vicious scheme, unpardonable by heaven and man," to register forcibly the 600,000 Koreans resident in Japan as ROK nationals and to deport certain elements to South Korea as cannon fodder. (11 FBIS, Radio Pyongyang, 10 Dec 51)
'
Comment: Koreans are so violently natiOnalistic and remain so anti-Japanese that this new propaganda line will probably heavy emphasis for some time to come, particularly since receive it lends itself to associating the "Syngman Rhee traitors" and "American imperialists" with the "reactionary Japanese Yoshida government."
16.
Consumer Union stores in Norib Korea active in preparation for Radio Pyongyang reports that Consumers Union stores throughout North Korea, in order to "stabilize the livelihood of the people" during the winter, are supplying the people with necessary winter commodities as well as preserving and processing vegetables and fruits and other foods. Mobilization of all transportation facilities to distribute the supplies and also fuel to the people is "being pushed vigorously." All quotas have been fulfilled, and in many cases over-. fulfilled. (U FBIS Pyongyang, 11 Dec 51)
winter:
Comment: Frequent statements such as this are further indications .of North Korean efforts to alleviate an apparently desperate civilian situation. Lack of criticism seems to indicate that this program is meeting with some degree of success. TOP SECRET
9
Comment: The North Korean 6th Division has recently been subordinate to the V Corps, currently believed located in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. While the location of the parent unit can not be fixed by the area in which desertions occur, it seems strange that the deserters would make a trans-peninsular trek to give themselves up.
13 Dec 51
5X6

Approved For Reirese 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A091000160001-9

TOP SECRET
25X6
U.
Heinrich Rau, EAST GERMANY. East German Government announces price cuts: Chairman of the East German State Planning Commission, announced oh 8 December that "extensive price reductions athounting to betmeen 10:and 79 percent" mould.go into effect on 9 Deeember. Rau described the price cuts, which cover primarily food and consumer goods, as a "Christmas gift fram.the government to the working population." West Berliners have been urged to (1l FBIS, 8-10 Dec 51) take advantage of these cuts by shopping in East Berlin.
Comment; The recent removal of certain commodities from the ration list combined with these and previous price reductions is part of a series of' measures designed to improve worker morale in the hope that industrial production mill thus be increased. The invitation to West Berliners to buy in East Berlin suggests an effort to enhance the value of the East mark by inereasing the demand for it as well as an effort to attract West marks for use in illegal East-West trade or for financing the activities of the West German Communist Party.
5.
GERMANY-AUSTRIA. Austro -German rapprochement stressed at Salzburg political congress: The Bundestag leader of the West German Free Democratic Party, August Martin Euler, stated at the recent congress of Auserials Union of Independents (VdU) in Salzburg that the foremost aim of his party is reestablishment of cooperation between Germany and Austria. To promote this end, Euler called for an increase in trade between the two countries, a settlement of the question of German assets in Austria, and the expansion of Austro -German cultural exchange. German culture, Euler observed, must

TOP SECRET
3_3.
33 Dec
51
ye
Approved For Rekase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S0100160001-9

TOp SECRET
become a new incentive for the revitalization of Europe and a bulwark against25Xl the East. (R FBIS, Salzburg Die Neue Front, 8 Dec 51)
6.
AUSTRIA. Further difficulty anticipated in closing Austrian payments gap: Evaluation of the Austrian Government's revised import-export program for fiscal year 1951-1952 has left ECA officials in Vienna with sone doubts that the anticipated Austrian net deficit will be within the figure now expected for US aid. While the import program has been Scaled down to 619 million dollars despite inflexible requirements for coal, grains, fats, and raw materials, exports are not expected to exceed 492 million. The scheduled deficit will be covered by 130 million dollars of US aid, Austrian earnings on invisible exports, and other minor financing. If, however, the deficit continues at the rate established during the first four months of the current fiscal year, the deficit will exceod available financing,.and the SCA mission expects the Austrian Government Will request additional aid on an emergency basis. (0 Vienna TOECA 926, 9 Dec 51)
Comment: While a prospective cut in US aid in the vicinity of 100 million dollars has made imperative a general tightening-up of the Austrian economy, the Austrian Government has appeared reluctant to adopt the kind of reforms required. The current economic stabilization program, designed to restrain Austria's creeping inflation and to prevent further inereades in export prices, is not yet, for example, reflected in any significant downwsrd trend in prices.
7.
FRANCE: Police disperse Algerian nationalist demonstration in Paris: Six tErn.3.nd Algerians were arrested in Paris on 5 December when, despite a governmental ban, they attempted to hold a public meeting organized by the nationalist Movement for the Triumph of Demodratic Liberties. Police also raided various Algerian residential quarters. These measures were inspired . by the suspicion that the Communists had organized the meeting and that inflamatory speeches would be made. (R Paris 3463, 10 Dec 51)
Comment: The more than 10,000 Algerians imported to the Paris region for mailigrIabor have been the target of both nationalist and Communist

TOP SECRET
12
13 Dec 51
Approved For Re Iltaie 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009.160160001-9

TOP SECRET
proselytism and propaganda. Highly emotional and for the Most part ignorant, theso workers have on previous occasions partiaipated in Communistsponsored demonstrations. Firm measures have checked such demonstrations and made serious or violent incidents unlikely,
8.
25X1C
9.
25X6

TOP SECRET
13
13 Dec 51
25X1

Approved For Reidy% 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00(420160001-9
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORmATION

Copy No.
45
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
SECUR
IIWORMATION

25X6

HR70-14 HR70-14
,N R 1CIR

11, 11. KOREG. KOREA.
Tor SECRET
Soviet a i r defense defense unit w i t reported reported in i n Sariwons Sariwonr y p p l Soviet air ]reports iold i n mid-Novernber of a a reports boing. being told in mid-November of k'Russian a i r force radar unit...in ~riwon...com~risina one Russian "Russian air force radar unit...in Sariwon...comprising one Russian lieutenent-colonel, troop;." The Russians lieutenent -colonel, two two captains, captains, and and 200 200 troops." The Russians wear wear Russian uniforms uniforms and and state s t a t e "openly Wopenly that t h a t they they are are members.of members o f Russian Russian adadRussian such units n a e area visory groups." groups." Other visory Other such units are are raportedly reportedly i in the area between between NamNamchon and and Kaesong. mesong. ( ( j 1 10 Dec Dec 51) 51) chon 10 The presence presence of of a a considerable considerable number number of o f Soviet Conmento The Comments Soviet personnel personnel servivariety ofroles r o l e sin i nNorth NorthKorean Koreanrear roar areas areas is i s aocepted. aocep.ted. UIi servirrErE variety of UN electronic reconnaissance aircraft a i r c r a f t have confirmed the the presence o f an early electronic reconnaissance haVe confirmed presence of an early Of a dditional i n t e r e s t is is warning radar installation I n s t a l l a t i o n in i n the tho Sariwon Sariwon area. area. Of warning radar additional interest the RussiansI statement that t h a t they they are are members of "advisory Iladvtsory groups." groups.* the Russians' statement members of
8 8
14 Dec Dec 51 51 14
'1)b
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: APPROVED
18-Mar-2010
HR70-14
-ThP-sEeRET-suEDt-,,'
NR /NR
,,,'
NR NR
9.
'
Xorsan jettraining j o t t r a i n i n g activity a c t i v i t y :oontinues: aontinues: lo. 10. KOREA. Korean
PPROVED FOR APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
Four MIG-15's MIG15's of o f the the Mukden-based jet fighters tonAntung: Mukden-baeedjet f i g h t e r s fay f e A t u n : Four Fourtia517171on 11 CCAF F z t & x i z i r n a rarrrionTlaung r g e m t u n gon Gn i e December, c e r n b e r , according according to a IN 60259, 60259, Chinese Chinase Communist Communist message message from f r o m Antung Antung to t o MUkden. Mukden. (SUEDE (SUEDE CM IN 12 Deo 51) 51)
Comment: are the first MIG-151s o of Fourth Division Division (which These B rG t he f i r s t M1G-15'~ f tthe h e Fourth (which based u lMUkden) t d e n ) to t o be observed observad in i n the Korean border hordor area a r e a since s i n o e midmidis based at Oatobor. October. If If t the h e Fourth Division moves t to o Antung Antung without mithout r replaoing e p l a o i n g any of of t the h e CCAF units now now there, thore, t the h e number o of f MIGMIG- 15's 16's based a at t R airfields i r f i e l d s near t h e Korean the increase to nearly four.hundred. Korepn border would i ncrease t o n early f o u r hundred.
.Two 12 Two 1 2 December Chinese Chinese f l i g l i t patterns, patterns, nEETInist Cbmmunist air air messages detail d e t a i l Korean Korean N1G-15 MIG15 training t r a i n i n g flight Oneflight from i n one one oase oase 12 1 2 and and in i n another another 16 1 6 aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Onellight involving in is also also made of o f the t h e "First "Firet Antung was was oonduoted oonduoted over over Korea. Korea. Mention is (SUEDE AS I IN 68446 and 60447, 60447, 13 13 Deo DBO 61) 51) (SUEDE AS C CM Korean Air Korean A i r Division." Division."
Comments further u r t h e r confirmation that t h a t Korean Korean Connuenti These messages provide f p e r s o m m e i n g trained t r a i n e d in i n high-performance high-performance jet j e t aircraft, a i r o r a f t , and and that that personE77177being some apparently to where t they to a p p a r e n t l y have progressed progreeaed t o the t h e point where h e y are able t o make make flights flights into i n t o the t h e oombat combat zone. zone. Additionally, A d d i t i o n a l l y , this t h i s is the t h e first first mention of of a a North North Korean Korean MIG-15 divisien. division. mention
RET SUEDE-
14 Deo Dec 51 51 14
4OP SECRET SUEDE5
Db Db
55 55
HR70-14
TOP SECR T SUEDtr

ic Pee- sl
I
FAR EAST' FAR EAST'

1. Chinese ground groundatkick attackaircraft aircraft transferred transferred to 1 . Chinese to Korean Korean border:
Comment: Thirty-two Thirty-two IL-10's IL-lo's of of the Eleventh Eleventh Air Division Division moved moved from Manchuria in late late from the.Nanking the Nankingarea area to to central Manchuria October. It is i s unlikely unlikely that these slow, conventional aircraft of limited slow, conventional aircraft of becommitted committed in inany any area areain inwhich which the the Communists Communists did did not not range would wouldbe possess a degree of air superiority. superiority.
NR
The Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Eleventh Eleventh Air Air Division, equipped i t h IL-10 attack aircraft, equippedw with IL-10ground ground attack aircraft, was schedbled Eengcheng (near the scheduled to move to Pengcheng &71. //V' Korean 9t7 Korean border) border) on on 19 13December. December. The reporting @n* //v L o O Z. 2V C that t the Eleventh Division Division was was recently recently noted noted carrying carrying field unit comments t out ground attack training out intensive ground training withlive withlive ammunition, ammunition, and and that that this this move support, will augment the Chinese Chinese Communists' Communists' immediate immediate capability capability for for close support.
US Air Force US Air
12 Dec 51 51 SUEDE
-3-
ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
-TOP-SECRET--SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
VII' SECRET SUEDE'

NR /NR
1 0 . 10.

s uperiority. superiority.
40P-aseary-TSUEDEL-
Chinese Seoond Seoond Division Division airoraft e l r o r a f k return r e t u r n to t o Shanghai Shanghai area a r e a from from Mandhuria: Manohuria: Chinese The Fourth. Fourth Regiment i r Division, equipped - -The Regiment of of the the Chineso Chinese Communist Communist Seoond Second A Air Division, equipped with U-11 penetration p e n e t r a t i o n fighters, f i g h t e r s , was was scheduled soheduled to t o move from the t h e Korean Korean with LA-11 move from The fact f a o t that t h a t 28 28 border airfield a i r f i e l d of o f Fengoheng Fengoheng to t o Shanghai Shanghai on on 14 14 Deoember. Deoember. The border 3A-llts o Fengoheng 22 Ootober, 9 a r e now scheduled IA-11's moved moved t to Fengoheng on on 22 October, while while only only 1 19 are now scheduled (SUEDE A i r Foroe 269, t o leave, leave, indicates i n d i o a t e s this t h i s regiment's regiment's losses. losses. .(SUEDE to Air Force Roundup Roundup 259, 21102, 13 Deo 51) 2110Z, 13 Deo 51) Colrdnenta The The MOW' move of of a a fighter f i g h t e r division d i v i s i o n to t o Shanghai Shanghai is is Comtent: about 1,300 1,300 miles miles sinoe for f o r several s e v e r a l months months about defense measure, measure, sinoe defense Tsingtao have have been been without known fighter fighter between Canton and and Tsingtao between Canton without known apparently a a apparently o f coastline ooastline of protection. protection.
The Chinese Communists Communists have also a l e r t e d observation s t a t i o n s in i n the the The Chinese have also alerted observation stations f o r Amorioan and Chinese Chinese N a t i o n d i s t action action East China ooastal o o a s t a l area area for East China Amerioan,and Nationalist expanding the t h e Korean Korean confliot oonfliot on on or o r about about Christmas Christmas Day. Day. expanding
12I 12,
Chinsse ground ground attack a t t a c k airoraft a i r o r a f t transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o Korean Korean border: border: CHINAKOREA. Chinese Communist &Seventh Air A i r Division, Division, equipped'with equipped with IIr10 ILlO ground nround Ihe.0 inese Communist-Eleventh a t t a o k aircraft, airorRi%, was was scheduled scheduled to t o move move to t o Fengoheng Fengoheng (near (near the t h e Korean Korean border) border) attack field u n i t oomments hat t h e Eleventh reporting field on'13 on'13 December, Deoember. The The reporting unit comments t that the Eluventh Division was recently r e o e n t l y noted noted carrying oarrying out out intensive intensive ground ground attack attaok training training Division was and that t h a t this t h i s move move Will w i l l aup;ment aument the with l i v e ammunition, m u n i t i o n , and with live the Chinese Chinese Cdmunists' immediate capability c a p a b i l i t y for f o r close c l o s e support. suppcrt. (SUEDE (SUEDE USAFSS Communists' immediate USAFSS CM CM IN IN 60247, 12 1 2 Deo Dec 51) 51) 60247,
t h e Nanking h n k i n g area a r e a to t o central c e n t r a l Manchuria Manchuria in i n late l a t e October. Ootober. I t i s u nlikely the It is unlikely t h a t these these slow, slow, oonventional oonvontfonal aircraft airoraf't of of limited l i m i t e d range range would be committed oommitted that would be i n any any area a r m in i n which whioh the t h e Communists Communists did d i d not not possess possess a a degree degree of o f air air in
Commsnt: Thirty-two i r Division from 'Comment: Thirty-two ILlO's Ilr10's of of the the Eleventh Eleventh A Air Division moved moved from
(APPROVED RELEASE 'APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: 20-Mar-2010
1 7 Deo Dea 51 51 17
D-5 Db
55 5$
TtiP SECRET SUEDE'

I
12. 12
0
Messages disclose disolose another another Manchurian Manchurian airfield a i r f i e l d on on operational operational status: status: Reoent.messages both t the Chinese Communist dommunist and and North North Korean Korean air nets Reoent me811ace8 on on both h e Chinese air n ets reveal t thit east Manchuria i is reveal h a t Tunhwa iunhwa airfield a i r f i e l d in in e a s t Manchuria s on operational operational status. status. Ativity vas previously previously noted noted on the North North Korean Korean A Air A c t i v i t y at a t this airfield a i r f i e l d was ir 7oroe training Foroe net some some months ago, ago, so so that t h a t North North Korean Korean air air t r a i n i n g may have i r Force Air Force Roundup Roundup time. (SUEDE A been in i n progress progrees at a t this t h i s field f i e l d for f o r some some time. 260, 23302, 2330Z, 1 14 Deo 51) 260, 4 De0 61)
'
Comment: T This of f four airfields at which the North Commentr h i s is i s one of o u r Manchurian a irfields a t whioh KoreWt7137375 been been t training air force p pilots; other f fields Fengoheng, Korearaining a i r foroe i l o t s ; tthe h e other i e l d s are Fengoheag, training Tunghwa; and Yenohi. Tunghwa, Yenohi. The progress of North Korean air air t r a i n i n g is i s indiindicated by evidence, recently, t that pilots ilots reoeived only reoently, h a t North Korean p oated evidence, received are flying a re f l y i n g MIG-15 H E 1 6 airoraft. airoraft.
13. 1 3 .
14. 14
15. 1 s .

though rudimentary, rudlmentary, necessary.. ne oe SB ary though
A 13 13 December Deoember KOREA. Korean-piloted Korean-piloted MIG-15's MIG-15's a at Uiju a airfield revealed: A KOREA. t Uiju i r f i e l d revealed: Chinese Mnkden that G s e Communist air message from Antung to t o Mukd e n reports t h a t "Korean i r o t a f e desoended 2 a aircraft descended atIUiju." at Uiju." (SUEDE (SUEDE 14 arrived Antung Antung . . . 2 14 MIG-16 MTG-15 arrived USAFSS USAFS8 CM CM IN IN 60647, 60647, 14 14 Dec Deo 51) 51)
. .
Comentr s oonoeivable h a t t the.jet h e j e t t training r a i n i n g of Comment': It It i is conoeivable t that of Koreans, Koreans, only only reeently reoen-eoted, deteoted, and and the t h e possible basing of o f Korean-piloted Korean-piloted jets j e t s on on a a North Korean to X0ro.m airfield a i r f i e l d as a6 part p a r t of of a a larger l a r g e r plan t o strengthen strengthen Korean armed armed forces foroes in i n anticipation antioipation of of a a cease-fire. cease-fire.
Early-Varning net Early-warning air a i r defense dofens e t deteoted deteoted in i n Korea: Korea: Reoent analysis analysis by T3 A Air i r Fence Foroe fielFaiTE-FiVeals nelrevaals the the existence existence of o f aa Chinese Chinese by a lJ5 Communist "aircraft "aircraft spotter s p o t t e r system" system" in North N o r t h Xorea. U t i l i z i n g either either ComMunist Korea. Utilizing v i s u a l or o r non-GOI non-GCL radar radar and and operating operating during during the t h e day, day, the t h e system system visual extends from Prom below below Pyongyang Pyongyang to t o Uiju Uiju on on t h e Sino-Korean Sino-Korean border and extends the from the t h e west i n the t h e Pyongyang area to t o 40 o a s t of o f that that from vest ooast in 40 kilometers east oity. oity. From From t h e field f i e l d report it it seems evident t h a t the n e t has direct direct the that net w i t h interoepting interoepting enemy enemy aircraft, a i r c r a f t , rather r a t h e r than than servioing servioing an an air air oontaat with contact defense defense control control center. oenter. (SUEDE (SUEDE AFSG CM IN I N 60585, 60586, 13 13 Dec Dac 51) 51) AFS8 CM
Comment; It It has ha6 long long been been suspected suspected thsct t h a t some dditional a i r defense Comment: some a additional air defense GCI, were wereavailable available in In North North Korea. Horen. This faoilmother than faoilrfiTZother than GCI, This is i s the the first r e p o r t shoving ahowing the the composition oomposition and and d u t i e s of suoh a a system. system. Of first report duties of such Of equal interest i n t e r e s t is i s the t h e faot f a o t that t h a t the the system system is Chinese, Chinese, rather rather than than Korean Korean equal Or o r Soviet. Soviet. It It i s logioal logioal t hat t h e large-scale large-soale p articipation o f Chinese is that the participation of Commuaist aircraft a i r o r a f t in I n the the Korean Korean air a i r war such a a system, system, even even Communist mar has has made made such
North Korean Korean unit unit to t o oontinue oontinue t r a i a i n g through January 18521 19521 A North training through Januarz 1 2 December December message from from a a North North Korean unit, probably probably elements elements of o f the the 12 Korean unit, 82nd Regiment Roglment in i n the t h e Kaesong-Panmunjon Raesong-Panmunjon area, area, reporti reports that t h a t "this " t h i s troop troop 82nd
. -
-TOP-SEVRET--StEDE
TOP SECRET SUEDE
17 Dec De0 51. 61 17
TdP SEcItEcT.SFEDe
will w i l l plan p l a n the t h e special s p e o i a l training t r a i n i n g in in December Deoeniber and will begin in i n January January further that this u r t h e r suggests t hat t h i s unit is 1962 1952 diligently." diligently. The message f charged with with providing the Communiat Communist s security forces for ceaseoharged ecurity f orces f o r tthe h e oease(SUI.CDE AS CM IN IN 60496, 60496, 13 13 Deo 51) 51) fire conference oonference zone. goner (SUEDE Commenti Commentt The continued oontinued training t r a i n i n g Program program of of this particUlar p a r t i c u l a r unit unif c o u l d w t h a t (a) t h ecease-fire oease-fire conference oonforenoe is is expeoted expeoted to t o continue oontinue could-rilTthat.(a) the and (b) ( b ) no major change ohange in i n the combat situation s i t u a t i o n is ia through January and expected expeoted during during this t h i s period. period. The Tho North Korean Korean 82nd 82nd Regiment'or Regiment 'or elements thereof, thereof, normally normally subordinate t to the Division, I Corps, the subordinate o t h e 8th Division, Corps, remained romained in t h e conference oonferenae eone zone area, area, p possibly o s s i b l y attached t to o t the h e Chinese Comunist Communist 65th Army, Army, when t h e balanoe t h e North Korean I I Corps Corps moved t o t he e a s t coast. the balance of the to the east coast.

-V9P-15BORET-SUEDE-
TOP SECRkT SUEDE

17 Dec 51 1 7 Deo 61
Approved For Re Wee 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0911400190001-6
TOP SECRET
18 December 1951
145
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
I.
Approved For Re lete 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A01400190001-6

4
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET).
1.
USSR Divergent tendencies reported in Soviet policy towards Germanys The Czech Government, while fully supporting the East German unity plea, is reportedly not binding itself to any final declaration of policy in view of the "conflicting tendencies prevailing in the USSR in connection with Soviet policy towards GermanY."
The reported tendencies are: (a) Molotov's intention to go ahead with the policy of German reunification regardless of the dangers and in spite of Satellite opposition;-and (b) Milenkovls reluctance to accept German influences in the evolution of Communist doctrine in Western Eur.
25X1A
The "intehse struggle" in Communist circles allegedly has been delaying the immediate application of Molotov's policy toward Germany.
Comment: The recent last-minute East German decision to go to the UN meeting might be indicative of a vacillating Soviet policy, although propaganda considerations were probably responsible for the change of plans. There is no basis for evaluating.information concerning the alleged views of Russian Politburo members.
Soviet element in Austriashiftspersonnel: Adding to ether recent shifts throughout the top echelon of the Soviet element in AUstrial. political adviser Koptelov is to be replaced and High Commissioner General Sviridov is expected to depart for a "long" vacation. The appointment of Koptelovle successor will be delayed, with A.M. Timoshenko temporarily taking his place. This development follows upon the departure of Major General Tsinev, former deputy High Commissioner, and Brigadier General Maslov, assistant deputy.
It is the opinion of the US High Commissioner that Soviet prestige has s/ipped so badly in Austria during the past year that Moscow is making a conscientious effort to provide a fresh team to recoup their position; if so, Soviet and Communiat activity in Austria is likely to be increased during the coming months. (S Vienna 18, 12 Dec 51)
3.
Improved technology sought by Soviet industry: Pravda recentlY noted that the work of industrial experts and technicians does not meet growing production needs at many enterprises. Some factories for the construction of the latest type machines "tolerate a poor standard of technology and production in their workshops." At the Kalinin railway

TOP SECRET
ope.
18 Deo 51
Approved ForRele2001/09/06:PA-RDP79T01146A001100190001-6
TOP SECRET
coach building works, production of new passenger coaches is described as being governed by outdated processes, with the latest technological achievements being only superficially introduced. At the Mosbow'Ordzhonikidze Works some experts are said to be relegated to paper work, and are sometimes 'assigned lobs that do not have the remotest connection with the improvement of technology. Pravda calls upon local party organizations to conduct constant political-educational work as an aid in solving the great problems facing the country in fulfilling state plans. (R FBIS, 14 Dec 51)
Comment: Impeded by a lack of technical specialists, Soviet industry must exploit to the utmost the limited number it does employ. Apparent17 great difficultiee are being encountered in overcoming the organizational lethargy that prevails in many of the economic and industrial enterprises of the USSR.
4.
US Embassy reports extraordinary securitymeasures in Bohemia: The US Military Attache in Prague noted.that on 12 Dec6mber there were eight roadblocks in fifty miles between Pilsen and the German border an&unusual activity in the border station at Rozvadov. An Embassy offiOial travelled the same route the following day and reported no roadblocks. The Embassy suggests that Czech authorities may have been expecting an escape attempt. (S Praha 463, 13 Deo 51)
Comment:: The measures were very probablY connected with the present precarious position of numerous party officials resulting from the disgrace of Slansky. A number of high party officials who were Slansky followers are unaccounted for; they are presumably in the nebulous position between disgrace and arrest.
CZECHOSIOulai,
TRIESTE. Pro-Titoist group in Zone A shifts lo support Independent cause: The pro-Tito Communist group in Trieste is currently supporting the independence movement in Zone A. Branko Babic leader of the pro-Titoist group, has publply affirmed that this organization has always been devoted to liberty, unity and national independence of the Slovene people, and that in present conditions this policy implies fighting for independence for the Trieste territory and collaborating with independentist groups in ZO/10 A. (S Trieste 980 14 Dec 51)
Comment: concerning the Trieste issue, claims to Zone
Moreover, Yugoslavia, anticipating Italian refusal to meet Yugoslavia's minimum demands, may advance a proposal calling for the creation
TOP SECRET
This maneuver, which conflicts with YUgoslay pronouncements desirability of a compromise bilateral solution of the is probably part of a YUgoslay attempt to discredit Italian A.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600190A-Bec
51
Approved For Re luxe 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0KIII00190001-6

TOP SECRET
of an independent Free Te rritory of Trieste or the establishment of a condominium. Such a move would be designed to force the Italians to ad vance more "reasonable demands."
6.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav press discloses motives for Yugoslav presence at According to the YUgoslav the fifth session of the DanUbe Commission: Com press, Yugoslav attendance at the present session of the Danube mission is designed to expose "internal relations between the USSR and its Satellites," since sessions of the Danube Commission represent the only remaining "formal, international forum where the Soviet Union dis Cusses problems affecting its relations with its Satellites."
:
51)
:Commentt The abovementioned motives represent the most plausible explanation for the Yiagoslav attendance at the present session. The Sovietdominated majority will certainly ignore Yugoslav demands for a voice in the formulation and revision of the navigational code.
Atoslav attendance -- after walking out at the last session and drawing up their own rules -- represents an additional Yugoslav attempt to embarrass the USSR by publicly exposing its policy of total disregard for the sovereign rights of independent nations.

TOP SECRET
3
The function of the lUgoslav delegation is to make clear to the whole world that the problem of Danube navigation is not so complex that it cannot be worked out on the basis of the equal rights of sovereign nations. In addition, the general tone of the press indicates A Yugo slav intention to offer the Cominform delegations every opportunity to settle differences, thus securing Yugoslavia's propaganda position in preparation for a negative majority response. (C Belgrade 795, 14 Dec
18 Deo 51
Approved For Reid:safe 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0091.00190001-6

10P SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
IRAN.
Election date announced: The Deputy Prime Minister has announced that the elections will begin in Tehran and the northern provinces on 18 December. (U Tehran 2189, 14 Dec 51)
ComMent: On 15 November the Majlis approved postponement of the elections until 18 December, but Mossadeq, on his return from the US, announced that they would be held immediately. The opposition seized upon this.flouting of the Majlis' proposal as an example of Mossadeq's arbitrary and undemocratic methods. This announcement probably represents Mossadeq's wish to placate the Majlis on this point.
2.
BURMA. Embassy hears Prime Minister will be replaced: Although most Burmese newspapers are now predicting that Thakin Nu will be retained as Premier, the US Embassy in Rangoon has received information that the Burmese Socialists during a secret meeting on 1 December decided that U Ba Swe should replace him. Other decisions called for Kyaw Nyein to replace Sao Hkun Hkio as Foreign Minister and Sir Ba U to succeed Sao Shwe Thaike as President. The Embassy comments that the Burmese Socialists have become increasingly suspicious of Nu's friendship for the West and may risk alienating his supporters in order to gain complete control of the government. (S Rangoon 575, 14 Dec 51)
Comment: This is the latest in a series of persistent reports that the Socialists are planning to remove pro-Western elements from the Burmese cabinet. Kyaw Nyein, currently Minister of Cooperatives, is one ofthe intelligent Socialists and, may in the long run restrain any bolt to accept a pro-Communist position. Sir Ba U is the respected Chief Justice of the Union and is probably being utilized to retain some of Thakin Nu's popularity.
3.
Premier comments on Colombo Plan: Prime Minister Thakin Nu is reported to have stated that Burma may accept the British invitation to participation in the Colombo Plan if it appears to be beneficial. The matter is being considered by the cabinet. (U AP Ticker New Delhi, 16 Dec 51)
Comment: Burma has previously rebuffed all approaches in favor of its participation in the Colombo Plan despite its obvious need for foreign assistance. Acceptance now would be a tribute to the success of ECA in Burma. Although Thakin Nu would presumably be agreeable to entering the plan, it will be difficult to obtain a formal agreement at this time in view of recent reports of Socialist maneuverings to replaco pro-Western elements in the Burmese-cabinet. TOP SECRET
18 Dec 51
Approved For Re Islase 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00411600190001-6

TOP SECRET
4.
A Chinese Communist cultural Chinese cultural mission well receive4: mission was welcomed in Ea..00n for a two week visit with a highly organized demonstration by 7,000 local Chinese, according to the US Embassy in Rangoon. The main emphasis has been on contacting Burmese official and cultural groups, and the highlight so far has been a cultural exhibition in the government-owned Jubilee Hall. The Embassy states that the exhibit was well planned and executed; Buddhism was stressed to show close cultural relations between Burma and China, and photos of China and old treasures were designed to appeal to the pride of local Chinese. (S Rangoon 575, 14 Dec 51)
CommenI: The names of many prominent Burmese -- including cabinet members, members of Parliament, and Commander in Chief Ne Win -- were mentioned in.a recent FBIS account of the Chinese exhibit.
5,
25X1C
THAILAND. Kine reported prepaud to abdicate: The King of Thailand will 25X1C unless his chmands for.modifying abdicate, it is unlikely the 1932 Constitution are accepted, that the military clique which recent,.y re.msv,.u.e. ,..,e .7..,.. Constitution
25X1A
will accede to the Kin!'s re.uest because to do so would undermine their own position.
Comment: The possibility of the Thai King's abdication was mentioned at the time of the 29 November coup d'etat, but there is no firm indication that such a development is imminent. The chances are that at least a temporary compromise has been or will be reached between the King and the coup regime. As long as the military leaders remain united, the King's abdication would not be critical despite the veneration of the Thai people for the monarchy.
6.
25X1C
25X1A 25X1A
Phin-Phao clioue reported determined to. oyerthrow Phibun: The Commander in Chief of the Thai Army, 2,eneral Phin, and his ambitious son-in-law, Police Director General Phao, are determined to overthrow Premier Phibun, A Phin-Phao cou a emp prom e ex a .
7 IND0NESI4.
Comment: Latent rivalries within the coup group have long been recognized. An effort by the Phin-Phao clique to achieve complete dominance has been a possibility for some time.
Fightins continues between Army and deserters: Fighting has continued for a week in Central Java between the Indonesian Army and 1,000 deserters who defected recently to the Darul Islam. (R FBIS Ticker Semarang, 14 Dec 51)
TOP SECRET
5
18 Dec 51
Approved For Re lisee 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009.50190001-6

TOP SECRET
Comment; On 7 DeceMber two and a half companies deserted near Kudus and one and a half companies deserted near Magelang, both towns in Central Java. Two days later two more oompanies fled their barracks, taking full eqUipment with them. Further desertions since then apparently have brought the total to one thousand.
The desertion of so large a number and the diversion of the Army from engaging the Darul Islam will further retard the government's attempt to reduce dissidence in Java.
8.
Comment: is no informatiun a is imminent.
CHINA/INDOCHINA. Chinese Nationalists believe Communist invasion of Indoohina imminent: The US Minister in Taipei states that it is impossible to confirm a report that December 28 is the date for a Chinese.Communist overt attack on Indochina: This repoit, however, agrees with information reCeived by the Chinese Nationalists from "reliable" mainland agents. Other reports from similar sources do not expect the attack until next March. The Chinese Communist build-up directed at Indochina is considered so seribus that the Nationalist Foreign Minister formally called it to the attention of the Frenoh Charge. (TS Taipei 750, 14 Dec 51)
there present to inoacate tnat a uinnose uoimnunj.st attack
25X1C
9.
CHINA. Hong Kong officials concerned over intensified security, problem: TErffong Kinig police oxmmissioner has recently reiterated officio:1 British coneern over the swollen Hong Kong population and the deteriorating economic situation, developments which have intensified the Colony's internal seourity problem. Last year's flow of Chinese back to the mainland has halted, and only unprecedentedly strict immigration controls have kept the Colony's Chinese population from Lncreasing. The attitude of even imdigent Chinese toward returning to the mainland was illustrated after a recent fire when the Hong Kong police offered to pay the passage'of destitute Chinese to their home villages in Kwangtung and to give them an additional ten dollars; there were no takers. (S Hong Kong 1928, 1)4 Dec 51)
Comment: Hong Kong's internal security problem is growing, and British control of the colony is of decreasing value to the Peiping regime, developments which bring closer an anticipated Chinese Communist effort to annex Hong Kong. There is still no reliable evidence, however, of a Communist intention to attack the Colony in the near future.
10.
KOREA. 'MIG-15 strength on Korea-Manchuria border reported growing:
Far
157Air Force estimates that 290 MI0-15's are based on the Manchurian
TOP SECRET
6
18 Dec 51
Approved For Re Isade 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00411100190001-6

TOP SECRET
airfields at Antung, Tatungkou and Takushan near the Korean border. Although in late November and early December an extremely high level of enemy jet fighter activity was noted--about 200 sorties a day over an eleven-day period --there are sufficient 1(I0-151s near the Yalu River to expand the daily number of sorties even more. The estimate forecasts that it would be possible for the Communists to mount 376 sorties daily, assuming a serviceability rate of 65 percent and two sorties a day for each serviceable aircraft. FEAF believes that, following a limited period of preparation, the enemy would possess the capability of concentrating over a specified area a nuMber. of MIG's which could attain localized air superiority through sheer weight of numbers alone. (S CINCFE Telecon 5464, IL Dec 51 )
11.
Communist MIG-9 engaged over KoreEi: Very early on the morning of 13 December southeast of Sinuiju a US light bomber engaged and damaged an enemy jet aircraft, which appeared to be a 11I0-9. The Communist plane, traveling at 500 miles per hour, was directed to the US aircraft by 12 to 16 searchlights. (S FEAF Tokyo AX 7766, 14 Dec 51) Comment: The 11I0-9 is an obsolescent Soviet jet aircraft. In view of the preponderance of high-performance MIG-157s in the area, the reason for its employment is unknown.
12.
Lone enemy aircraft uses Pyongyang south airfield: UN aerial reconnaissance of the Pyongyang area on 11 December revealed an enemy LA-9 conventional aircraft on the south airfield. This is the first sighting of an aircraft on this abandoned and unserviceable airfield. (S FEAF Tokyo AX 7724, 13 Dec 51)
Comment: It is entirely possible that this aircraft was damaged during night intereeptor operations against UN aircraft and made a forced landing on this airfield.
13.
Anti-cease-fire demonstrations in South Korea intensified: The US Embassy in Pusan reports that public displays denouncing the ceasefire negotiations occur almost daily in Pusan and Seoul. These demonstrations, usually parades or mass meetings, are "obviously aimed" at -the US Embassy and UN organizations and are, in the main, composed of university students and youth corps members. Ambassador Muccio comments that observers are left with the feeling that RON Government has organized the demonstrations to emphasize government opposition to the cease-fire terms. _Consequently, the outbreaks seem to have little spontaneity or life.

TOP SECRET
7
18 Deo 51
Approved For Re Itage 2001/09/06 : CIA-R0P79101146A00400190001-6

TOP SECRET
At one mass meeting in Pusan, a former cabinet official blamed the US for Korea's unfortunate condition an4 stated that the ComMunist domination of China was not Chiang Kai shek's fault but America's. (12 Pusan 567, 14 Dec 51)
Comment: The increased tempo of anti-cease-fire demonstrations in South Korea lends further confirmation to a report that 25X1C President Rhee recently ordered great intensification or the cease- ire demonstrations. There are, however, no current indications that the ROK Government mill take more serious actions to impede the conferences.
The Embassy reports that the blaming of the US directly for Korea's problems is the first web occurrence since 1945.
114.
JAPAN. Japanese Government plans large-scale construction of electric power sources. The Japanese Government announced on 11 December the formulation of a "gigantic" four-year plan for construction of new electric power aources. The proposed plan, based on the recognized need of Japan to increase electric power in order to support expanding industrial activity, will cost approximately 321 million dollars. The project, developed by the Public Utilities Commission, will be presented to "a nele Electric Resources Development Council and ultimately will be incorporate4 into a bill for Diet consideration. (S Tokyo Weeka 50, 14 Dec 51)
One of the most important economic problems facing Japan This step, taken by the government after it was discovered that neither foreign nor domestic capital was available, will supply low-cost electricity which will greatly enhance manufacturing and production. It is presumed that the majority of plants will be hydro-electric because of Japan's usual abundance of water power.
is

Comment:
th7-3EUFEage of electric power.
TOP SECRET.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : ClA-RDP79701146A000600190004% Dec 51
Approved ForRelesee2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009,600190001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
1.
(WESTERN)
2.
Sweden refuses to withdraw its resolution on German electiohs: A resolution,.calling for pn investigation of conditions to determine whether free elections could be held in East and West Germany, is currently being considered by: an ad hoc political committee of the UN. United States delegates report that a substitute.Swedish resolution is still pending and estimate that the Swedes will, in an attempt to maintain their neutrality on the German question, refune to yield to pressure to withdraw it. The,US delegates, however, feel that the Swedish resolution will not attract many votes, thus increasing chances for passage of the tripartite version. (S Paris DELGA 693, 15 Dec 51)
,
:
3.
FRANCE.
and would instead return question to the level of fourPower negotiations, the whole German unity which have in the past proved fruitless. US efficials believe that such a course, by permitting the' veto, would play directly into the Russian hands and might result in further costly delays in West Germany's integration into the European community:
to the Alliesberuse it eliminates the whole idea of a preliminary investigation of electoral conditions,
"stage of intensity and scope" calling for in Paris to have reached a the full attention of American government officials. TOP SECRET
9
program: The riraist propaganda campaign against the USsponsored productivity program in France is now considered by US officials

Comment:
lbst Germans seek to abolish indigenous The West German delegation at the Paris units supporting the Allied European Defense Treaty Mal-Miens insists upon the adoption of a proviso which would eliminate the German Labor Service units now serving with the Ameridan and British occupying forces. To date only the Netherlands delegation has opposed this proposa/, which the Germans declare must be accepted to secure ratification of the treaty by their parliament. 'The loss greatly affect current US defense programs. of these support units would (S Paris 3559, 14 Dec 51) Comment: German Labor Service units relieve approximately 85,000 .Agmri577171Er British Soldiers from troop support duties. Mir existence has been repeatedly denounced by the Social DeMocrats who charge, among other things, that such units are paramilitary in character and represent Allied attempts "to secure remilitarization through the back door" without parlia mentary sanction. Chancellor Adenauer fears that these allegations will probably imperil ratification of the treaty because these units are financed by occupation costs and are symbolic of the inequality of an occupied Country.
o77677:7
GERMANY.
The Swedish resolution is completely unacceptable
French Communists step up attacks on productivity
18 Dec 51
Approved ForReleamOs2001/09/06:=7RDP79T01146A00QA00190001-6
TOP SECRET
Admitting that greater productivity is in itself desirable, the Com munists charge that it cannot benefit the workers while the program is under American "Capitalist" influence. At the same time French Communiste are supporting the Soviet policy of inviting "teams" of French doctors and metal workers to the USSR for direct study of Soviet methods. (S Paris To ECA 839, 5 Dec 51)
Comment: These propaganda attacks are calculated both to reduce French milit3P7-735abilities and to aggravate the widespread irritations arising from American "intervention" in Europe.
4.
FRANCE. France must decide soon on Saar embassy proposal: The French Fbreign Office has not yet decided whether there will be exchange of ambassadors with the Saar when the changes contemplated in that area's political relation ship to France go into effect. Although the Foreign Office plans no action before 1 January, a decision is necessary soon to permit 'allotment of funds to the French representatives there,
_
Foreign Minister Schuman is "keenly alive" to the importance of the "'psychological element" involved, and he will-make the dedision on timing in the light of reports from Germany. (C Paris 3536, 13 Dec 51)
Comment: The Germans will question French motives for changing its representation in the Saar, partiCularly when the proposed contractual arrangements between Germany and the Allies will bring into force a new relationship which will be symbolized for them by the appointment of a French Ambassador to Bonn. Replacement of the High Commission by an embassy, however, will have no practical effect on French relations with the Saar.
S.
25X1C
,
Any change, real or apparent, in the status of the Saar is certain to have strong repercussions in Germany and may complicate Adenauerts efforts to obtain ratification of the Schuman Plan.
AUSTRIA. Austria reported deliv t to Ozechoslov : us ria is expected to expo or s ee processing equipment to Czechoslovakia in 1952.. Czech onlers for two 6ton furnaces have allegedly been approved, and Austrian Government approval of Czech

TOP SECRET
10
ECA officials have estimated that France cannot be expected to carry an ever larger share of its defense burden unless it increases production about five percent each year, a difficult accomplishment under ideal conditions. Laborts general cooperation is unlikely so long as popular resentment against US methods persists and the workers are uncertain of obtaining a larger share in the fruits of increased production.
18 Dec 51
Approved For Relegate 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041.00190001-6

TOP SECRET
orders for several other furnaces, including an electric arc furnace and low-frequency heating units, was expected by 24 November.
25X1A
25X1A
domment: The status of the Austro-Czech trade negOtiations which began in Prague on 12 November is unknown. Electrical smelting furnaces were among those items which the US Embassy in Vienna requested the Austrian delegation to remove from its negotiating:lists prior to its departure for the trade discussions.
6.
Comment: While it is true that many leading Austrian figures accepted membership in the Austro-Soviet Society in the early days of the occupation, the increased use of this organization for the advancement of Soviet propaganda themes has brought into question the propriety of continuing such memberships: It should be noted, howeVer, that efforts of the Vienna police administration to purge its ranks of Communist influence have been criticized primarily because their hasty action aroused the resistance of the Soviet authorities.
7.
BELGIUM. Belgian-Polish trade negotiations snagged: The Belgian Foreign Office has stated that negotiations with Poland to renew the long-expired Belgian-Polish trade agreement have not been successful because of Po1andls unwillingness to discuss Belgian compensation demands within the framework of the trade agreement.
8.
The Foreign Office also denied.that the Poles have recently approached the Belgians in order to obtain strategic materials. (S Brussels 803, 10 Dec 51)
Comment: The last Belgian-Polish trade agreement expired in December 1949. A Belgian trade mission went. to Poland in October 1951 to nogotiate a new agreement.
ITALY. Neo-fascists financed by industrialists and large landownero: Most of the funds for the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) come from

TOP SECRET
11
Election of police chief to post'in Austro -Soviet Society leads to partisan exchange: Vienna Police President Josef Holaubek was elected vice president of the Austro-Soviet Society at the organization's third congress last week. His acceptance of the office precipitated an exchange between the People's Party and Socialist press -- the former denouncing his action as incompatible with a non-political public trust, the latter pointing in defense to the membership in the Society of leading People's Party statesmen. OR FBIS, Vienna Neue Wiener Tageszeitung, 14 Dec 51;,P Vienna 2021, 12 Dec 51))
18 Dec 51
Approved For Re lessie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0001.00190001-6

TOP SECRET
industrialists, who contribute largely at the instigation of Ajmer important fascists, such as Giuseppe Bottai and Dino Graudi, and from large landowners in south Italy. Among the latter is De Martino, the Christian Democratic deputy and leader of his party's right wing, who is probably trying to ensure his own position should the MSI come to power. The various ucurrents" in the MI, however, are uniied in hostility to the Christian Democrats and Liberals, the parties from which this backing is drawn, as well as to the Democratic Socialists. Although they also oppose Marxism, many MSI members would probably join with the Communists in revolutionary measures a ainst the ov ention ot taking control later.
'
25X1A
JUne 1951. The bulk of its popular support is in south Italy, where these elections gave the NSI the balance of power between the Christian DeMocrats and Communists in the Sicilian regional assembly. Some Italians even believe that the MSI might gain enough strength in the forthcoming national elections to weaken the majority Christian Democrats sufficiently to upset the present balance of power in Parliament.
party, the MSI showed a largeriTiMtage gain than any other partyminor in the local elections of May-
Comment:
Although still a relatively
9., SPAIN. Catholic hierarchy demands withdrawal of 3overnment's educational 703714 plan: The Cardinal Primate of Spain and..ne Archbishop of Valencia, who is also chairman of the Spanish Episcopal Commission for Education have demanded that the Minister of Educat s new educational reform .25X1A plan, If the ultimatam is refUsed, a cond. pu s e n the Church's leading press organs':
-
:25X1A
The plan is regarded by ecclesiastical authorities as unwarranted interference with the autonomy of,Catholic educational institutions. Minister of Education Ruiz Jithenez allegedly ex ected Vatican surn5ort frr his plan, but failed to receive it. Franco, anxious to avoid a clash vd.thLria unuxtn at all costs. win side with it in this dispute.
'Comment: Franco may hope to use the,threat of restricting the Church's educational prerogatives to bolster a new effort to negotiate a Concordat with the Vatican. The government's plan apparently was to establish national standards for high schools which were to be maintained by a system of state inspections and examinations. A report which objected strongly to the plan was endorsed by the Board of Spanish Bishops and forwarded to the Vatican.
TOP SECRET
12 la Dec 51
Approved For Rekade 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006000190001-6 '

TOP SECRET
10.
DENMARK. Government desires CCCOM approval to send tanker to Poland: The Danish Government proposes to request the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) to approve the delivery of a Danish tanker to Poland. The Poles are insisting that they will deliver no coal unless they receive a tanker, in addition to automobile parts and streptomycin. The US Embassy fears the repercussions on the Danish defense effort if the tanker deal is vetoed unless US coal is made available when needed. This would involve' extensive additional dollar aid. (S Copenhagen h46, 14 Dec 51)
Comment: The Poles are capitalizing on Denmark's vital need for coal. In the present state of British and lest German coal production, Denmark must accept Poland's terms if this additional US aid is not forthcoming.
11.
The press intimates that a joint policy with regard to nationalism was. discussed. Although both administrators may have sounded each other out regarding nationalism, agreement mould be unlikely because ef a wide divergence in policy. ' The French, in an effort to diminish nationalism, are setting various nationalist factions against each other, while the Spanish have recently reversed their repressive policy and sought an agreement with the nationalists. (U Paris 3548, 13 Dec 51; R Madrid 624, 14 Dec 51)
12.
25X1C
25X1A
ARGENTINA. -Secret trade negotiations with Rumania and the USSR re orteds ecause o curren poor harvest, Argentina WJJJ soon sign a con ract with Rumania for the importation of a million tons of Rumanian wheat. that a trade treaty with the USSR will also be conc future Both of these negotiations are shrouded in secrecy.
MORCCCO. Officials of French and Spanish Protectorates meet: Highly Eire-antive articles published in the Spanish and French press regarding the 12 December meeting of the FrenchResident General and the Spanish High Commissioner of Morocco imply an unprecedented cooperation between France and Spain regarding the Moroccan Empire. Although this was the first conference held by the present incumbents, it is merely a continuation of a series of periodic conferences initiated by Generals Juin and Varela several years ago in an effort to expedite the dovelopment of a vast hydroelectric project in eastern Morocco.
25X1C
25X1A
bomment: One million tons would appear to be an excessive amount for Argentina to import and for Rumania to supply.
Earlier crop forecasts have indicated that the current Argentine harvest may provide only 4 million metric tons, as compared with the 3.5
TOP SECRET
13
18 Dec 51
Approved For R&M/4 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0090110190001-6

TOP SECRET
million consumed within the country. Argentina may possibly be making tentative arrangements to import sore wheat from Rumania, if it feels that the harvest may fall short of previous indications, or if it is seeking additional wheat in order to fulfill some of its normally large export commitments to other countries. The reported secrecy would reflect the Argentine Government's desire to conceal the failure of its agricultural policies, rather than its already significant trade with Eastern Europe. The nature of the trade negotiations with the USSR was not disclosed. According to Argentine official statistics, there has been no direct trade between the two countries during the past year; although the USSR may have received Argentine goods by transshipment via eastern Europe.

TOP SECRET 14
18 Dec 51
-fled when filled in form s
UNCLASSIFIED when liEtrysoilpirldrinetistrricosidept twegispirscroigmemostedisoce4e1 r declassietoc e rom controllig e document.

$ OURCE
REG I STRY
CIA
DOC. NO.

LOGGED BY
DOC. DATE
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top o/ and attached to each Toy Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret Within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter Is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Toy Secret material will sign this lorm and indicate period of custody in the lelt-hand columns provided, Each individual who sees the Top Secret document Will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
9 I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
OFF ICE/0 I V.
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect ed from Top Sec et material it shall be completed In the appropriate space below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO

DESTROYED
By (Signature)
TO
DATE
T I ME
DATE
D I SPATCHED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY
OFFICE
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
ADATE
pproved Fo Release 2001/09106 . CIACIRDP79T0ffai000600190001-6

TOP SECRET
uas PPPPP aus EDITIONS.
(40)
Approved For RelSee 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004660190001-6
TOP SECRET
niFORmATIoN
18 December 1951
CIA No, 49468-A
Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved For Re lbsisie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004400190001-6

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
GREECE. Attitude on election to UN Security Council: The Greek UN dele gate in Paris received instructions on 12 December to continue attempts
for three more ballots to secure the election of Greece to the Security Council. Thereafter, if unsuccessful, the Greek delegate is instructed to withdraw Greece's candidacy. The Department of State has notified Greece that the US will continue to support it. (S S/S Athens 2728, 12 Dec 51)
Comment: The Greek Government has been subjected to increasing domestic criticism for attempting to secure a Security Council seat without assurance of success. The balloting on 13 December gave Greece 36 votes, four short of the required nuMber, against Byelorussia's 23 votes. This increase in strength may encourage the Greeks to continue their candidacy in the next balloting.
2.
IRAN. Iranian Minister suggests American aid in developing foreign trade: TETIranian Minister of National Economy has told the U8 Embassy that, rather than a loan or other financial assistance, Iran would prefer AmeriCan help in developing longterm stable foreign markets for its exports. Iran is particularly interested in selling to Japan, Korea and the Philippines, feeling that because of the relatively low quality of some of its products it could compete successfully only in these lowincome areas. The development of such markets, the Minister believes, would prevent Iran froth becoming dependent on the Soviet Union. (S S/S Tehran 2171, 13 Dec 51)
Comment: While expansion of Iranian fokeign trade with US assist, ance would satisfy Iranian sentiments, the time required to develop new markets makes it unlikely that such a plan could be implemented soon enough to stave off the expected economic collapse. The British economic sanctions and the loss of oil revenues have increased thc sentiment in Iran for barter trade with the Soviet bloc. Iran is in no position to resist even unfavorable terns from the Russians.
3.
INDOCHINA. De Lattre re.orts heavy drain on materiel: Thefirench Government has asked the US Ambassador in Paris if the delivery of end items to Indochina can be accelerated an the basis of General de Lattrels report that nthe present Viet Minh battle was serious and was dhewing up equipment faSt.0 S/S Paris 3568, 14 Dec 51)
Comment: The Viet Minh reaction to De Lattre's midNovember seizure of ChThThd Hoabinh southwest of Hanoi has been developing daring the past eight days. French communiques on this fighting have stressed the

TOP SECRET
1
18 Dec 51
Approved For Re aide 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00000190001-6

TOP SECRET
heavy Viet Minh casualties No reports have been received which suggest that the French may have suffered serious losses in non-expendable
equipment.
The above report appears to have been especially tailored to lend urgency to a French appeal for faster arms deliveries. There is a possibility that the Viet Minh might force the French to relinquish their
somewhat precarious hold on Roabinh, which might involve the abandonment of considerable equipment.

TOP SECRET
2
18 Dec 51
TOP SECRET SUEDe

7. 7.
1iIG-15's f fly POrt Arthur Arthur possibly possibly tto Antung: O On December Soviet AUG-151s b , f rfrom o m Port o Antunct n 14 December
15 MIG-15's with with a pilot with a Russian'name, were soheduled I f EG-16'8 a lead lead p i l o t with a RussiaYl nme, were soheduled to t o leave leave Port Arthur f for to P o r t Arthur o r unspecified unspecified destination, d e s t i n a t i o n , according according t o a a Chinese Chinese Communist Communist The f field unit comments comments that that f flights of i e l d unit l i g h t s of Antung. The message from from Mukden to t o Antung. MIG-15's from MIG151s f r o m Port Port Arthur Arthur to t o Antung Antung have'been have 'been noted noted several several. times t i m e previously, previouRly, (SUEDE N (SUEDE USAFSS USAFSS CM I IN these and that th9t t h e s e aircraft a i r c r a f t have not been noted returning. returning. 60983, 15 Deo 51) 60983, 1 5 De0 51) Comment: Since MI0-15's are Comment: Sinoe early e a r l y October Ootober about 60 60 MIG15ls a r e known known to t o have have flown Mom hRt t hey It is probable probable t that they the Antung. It from t h Port e t Arthur Naval Naval ease Base Area to t o Antung. are replacements or o r reinforcements reinforoements for for the t h e Soviet-controlled Soviet-oontrollod fighter f i g h t e r units units in the t h e Antung area. area.
9. g,

TOP SECRET CUEDE
Commentr Comment: Jet aircraft a i r c r a f t now bRfi basld i d at a t the t h e Korean Korean border are are already already estimated e s t i m in w the t h e neighborhood nelghborhood ol of 350. 350. 3he f t he 4 t h Division The transfer transfer o of the 4th to increase Communist s strength on tthe Korean border border b by t o Antung would inoroase t r e n g t h on h e Korean y apProximately i r Force Air Force has has estimated estimated approximntely another another 50 50 planes. planes. The Far East A t h a t the t h e Communists may may soon soon have the the capability c a p a b i l i t y of o f attaining attaining a a temporary temporary that superiority Korea. '.16oalized l o o a l i z e d air air s u p e r i o r i t y anywhere in i n North Korea.
KOREA. KOREA. New New high high performance performance enemy enemy jet j e t sighted s i g h t e d in i n Korea: Korea: On On 14 14 December December a a right i n northwestern northwestern Korea Korea was attacked attacked by by an an enemy enemy jet 1st aircraft aircraft; US light bomber in t e n t a t i v e l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as as a a Type Type 21. 21. This This new new Communist Corn&& aircraft air&a?t was was tentatively s l m i l a r in i n appearance appearanoe to to a a US F-86D F-86D and-had and had two t w o long) l o n g j slender s l e n d e r wing wLng tanks. tanks. similar
F l i g h t characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i o s appeared appeared similar similar to to a a MIG-15. MIGG-5. Flight 61467, 17 17 Deo 51) 51)
Commenti Although certain c e r t a i n varianoes varianoes exist e x i s t between betweqn the t h e field field descripdescripComment, t i o n Zr7-tliis a iairoraft r o r a f t and a t a on e Type o s c r i p t i o n best tion andknown knownddata on t h the Type 21, 21, the the d description fits fits a a Type Type 21. 2 1 .
The The employment employment of o f this this aircraft a i r c r a f t at a t thip t h i s time time could could be be for f o r combat combat testing t e s t i n g purposes. purposes. It It is doubtful whether the Type Type 21 21 will will appear appear in i n any any l a r g e numbers nwnbors in i n the t h e Korean Korean air a i r war. war. large
4 4
8. 8.
Communists move jet j e t planes t o Korean border; o f the the to border: A A proposed move of Chinese Chinese Communist Communiet Air Force Force 4th 4th Division D iv i s i o n fromikukden from Muk$lento t o an an unknown unknown e p a r t u r e of of d e s t i n a t i o n was noted noted in i n 15 15 December Dacember flight f l i g h t forecast. foreoast. The destination The d departure ossibility t hat t h e division d i v i s i o n is i s moving 28 ldIG-36'~ NIG-151e was soheduled. possibility that the 20 soheduled. The p baok to to Antung Antung is i s suggested suggested by by interoepts i n t e r o e p t a during during the t h e past p a s t week week which which Antung. revealed flights flights of o f several s e v e r a l aircraft a i r o r a f t from from this this division d i v i s i o n to t o Antung. Air Force Roundup 261, 261, 22362, 2286Z, 1 17 Dem 51) (SUEDE A i r Foroe 7 Deo
(BOOTY USAFSS CM I N (BOOTY IN
19 Deo 51
DATE: 20-Mar-2010
al
. -.
i
--TTAY-SZORET-
HR70-14
NR
* I
7. 7.
KOREApliNA. KOREA/CHINA.
porte ported;
Communist in war again Comunist "International IIInternational Volunteers" i n Korean war
rere-
Communist 8 t "International Tnternational Voluneersn Volunteers" 1 will 1 1 3 1 enter enter 1 Korea Korea Inin January; January; if i f peace peace talks t a l k s are a r e still s t i l l in in progresS,the progreaa,the move move will will be be postponed. postponed. the "volunteer* ~%olunteer"force to to be composed composed of of one OCP CCF 4th 4t h Field Field Army Axmy army axqr group, group, one one "liberation" "liberationn army arqy of of' former former JapanJapanese PON'S, one cavalry Mongolians, one %ompositen "composite" army, army, and and eae POW'S, cavalry army of of Outer Outer Mongolians, 1500 1500 aircraft. aircraft
'
1
Ion on 4 DecemDecemone Czech Czech a r t i l l e r y battalion, ber artillery battalion, both both ber "one 'lone Polish Polish artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, battalion, one stationed at Wonsan, and a artillery unit a at Anju and and a t Woman, a Soviet Caucasian a r t i l l e r y unit t Anju AdditionSundt= Antung-Tungwha arear" area." AdditionSunahonwere were all aLIordered ordered to t o evacuate evacuate to t o the t h e Antung-Tungwha ally, Antiaircraft Division was ordered ally, "one 'lone regiment regiment of of the the Soviet Soviet 13th 13th Antiairoraft to evacuate" and "two regiments of f the the Soviet Soviet 18th 1 8 t h Antiaircraft Division was (sic) ordered to evacuate." .
~~
6 6
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009
19 19 Dec Dec 51 51
bb
TOP-SEGRET---
CoMments Although the Comment; t h e presence of an "International 'tInternational Volunteer Argya Art@ of corigFige c o e com o s i t i o n has has been.consistently.reported been consistently reported in i n the the Manchurian, Manchurianof composition t h e existence o r non-existence of of the or Korean theater theater this established. The presence of t h i s force has never been een es considerable of the considerable of Soviet Soviet military military personnel personnel believed believed to t o be in i n Korea, Korea, however, however, number of have given r rise to of a separate t tactical force. could have ise t o this t h i s concept of a c t i c a l force.
8. 8.
The ROK o f Public ROK Office of BOK ROK reacts r e a c t s immediately innnediately to t o UN UN POW P O W tally: taQs Information immediate exception exception t to nem story from Panrmrnjon Panmunjon iin Information took immediate o aa news n which a 11,000 UN UN prisoners prisoners in in ComComa US US spokesman-mentioned spokesman'mentioned only 70000 7,000 to 11,000 munist hands. hands. The ROK release release stated s t a t e d that t h a t "my "tqy government wishes to'call t o call attention to thefact in action a ttention t o t h e ' f a c t that t h a t over over 88,000 88,000 ROK ROK soldiers soldiers are missing i n action and more than than this wlls number number of o f loyal loyal South South Korean Korean civilians c i v i l i a n s were were seized seized and and statement continued, "we We carried north north by the the Communist Communist invadere." invaders." The statement_continued, are confident t that negotiato7 cannot h a t UN negotiators cannot be be overlooking overlookinp the the ROK ROK prisoners prisoners as they conduct negotiations." as they conduct negotiations.n

1
-443P-fEEIRET
are believed believed to t o be be serving serving antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y in in Soviet personnel are Soviet Korea Korea and there is is no reason reason why they they should not be in i n organized organized units. units. The reported order for f o r these units u n i t s to t o evacuate'to evacuate t o the Communist Communist tone zone of of communications comunications in i n Manchuria, Manchuria, if if true, true, could could indicate indicate preparations for for a a cease-fire cease-fire and and subsequent subsequent inspections inspections to t o avoid avoid compromising compromising the the identity identity of these covert participants n the event of In of a a breakbreakp a r t i c i p a n t s in i n the the Korean Korean war. war. I dem of would indown o f negotiations, negotiations, an an enlargement enlargement of of the the conflict conflict m u l d require increased Antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t protection protection of o f Manchuria. Manchuria.
Comments The news Coments news story story obviously obviously referred to t o non-ROK non-ROK personnel. personnel. This This retied-OE-177es evidence of of the the extreme extreme s sensitivity r e a c t m s ffurther u r t h e r evidence e n s i t i v i t y of the ROK ROK QevernQovernment tO t o any any real real or o r imagined imagined slight. slight.
The The Communists' Comunistsl atetement utatemsnt that that they they hold'Only'aome-40,00 hold only some 7,000 ROK ROK prisoners prisonere this situation, UN UN sources have claimed that t h a t upwards upwards f u r t h e r complicates complicate8 this.situation. further of 90,000 is.possible 90,000 ROK BOK prisoners are a r e in i n Communist Comunist hands. hands. It is possible that the the Communists only the the.names thoseROK ROKsoldiers soldierewho are Communists have forwarded only names oof f those who are actually in i n POW POW camps and have omitted, o m i t t e d , possibly possibly for f o r later l a t e r bargaining, bargaining, the names naMes of of those taken taken into i n t o North Korean military m i l i t a r y service. service.
19 Deo 51
HR70-14
%
TOP SECRET
-~
/NR
11. 1 1 .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 18-Mar-2010 1.)ATE: 18-Mar-2010 1PPROVED

lalaile
l&u#P
A recently.captured r e c e n t l y captured North N o r f t h e m VI G w v be d w l . U m d : A Emtalsaaan_LUsizmilajaAexatlyAtied: North Korean s o l d i e r r e p o r t s being t o l d t h a t hia division, o be Korean soldier reports being told that his division, the ths 9th, 9th9 W&B was t to be assigned to t o the t h e North North Korean Korean I I Corps Corps and arid that t h a t his h i s old old corps, corps, the t h e VI, V I , was wa8 to to assigned Another be deactivated deactivated and and itt i t s component component 18th 18th and and 19th 19th Divisions Divisions broken broken up. up. Another be prisoner from t h e 9 t h Division confirmed t h i e report of t h e deactivation prisoner from the 9th Division confirmed this report of the deactivation of of t h e VI V I Corps. Corps. the
The Far East E a s t Command, Commmd, although although currently ourrently unable o accept acaept the The unable t to the deactivadeactivaThe I I Corps Corps t i o n of of t h i s corps, attaches %uoh credence credenoe to t o this t h i s probability.* probability." The tion this corps,attaches"muoh i s now now accepted accepted as RS composed composed of the 8tl.1, is of the 8th, 9th, 9th, and and 47th 47th Divisions, Divisions, while while the the 17th Yeohanized, formerly of au1d the d 19th f 17th Mechanized, formerly of I I Corps, Corns, and the 18th 18th and 19th Divisions Divisions are are o of 718 51) unidentified subordination. subordination. ( Unidentified 18 Dec Dec 51)
(1
agnagaIs -r The most most probable probable reason reason for for the the deactivation deactivation of QE this thie corps, corpro, The i f it it 'occurs, ocaura,, iie s t the h e need o r replacements o bring till e x i s t i n g coppe if need ffor replacements tto bring s still existing corps up up t o strength strength and and to t o maintain maintain a a flow flow of of replacements. replacements. There These is Is considerable conalderable to evidence available t o indicate indicate t he i n a b i l i t y of h e North Korean o reevidence available to the inability of t the'North Korean Army Army tto replace its its casualties. casualties, place
,
4-0P-SEGRET-
6 6
20 Dea 51 20 Dec 51
Tl>
HR70-14
VIP SECRET SUEDe

-To-soem-atims
8.
9.
10.
Manohurian-based "WaterManohurie,n-lj,aeed bombers bomljers trained trained toattack t o &taok surface surfaoe craft: craft a 'iryaterlevel bombing" bombing" vat's givenas asthe themission mission oof of TU-2 light level was given f aa fflight light o f tthree h r e e TU-2 light i r Force Force Roundup Roundup2.63, 263, bombers from Air f r o m Harbin Harbin on on 18 18 December. Deoember. (SUEDE A 0347Z, 20 Deo Dec 51) 03472, 61)
TU-2 oan a r r y htwc c torpedoes oanooarry torpedoes and and could could be be employed employed Comment: Comentr The TU-.2 against naval a g a i n UN ma v a l vessels in in Korean Korean waters. watere. Bomber strength strength and and training activity inoreaaed significantly roceht months, montha, but, but, a o t i v i t y in i n Manchuria has inorea'qed s i g n i f i c a n t l y iin n rcceht exoept f o r an attack on on a,UN-held a UhT-held island ofY h e Communisrte Wicept.for off North North Korea, Korea, tthe ComMunists have those a airoraft combat. have not not yet yet ciommitted dommitted those i r o r a f t tto o oombat.
$EORET SUE E
5
21 Dec De0 61 61 21
FOR RELEASE RELEASE FOR ATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDATE: 20-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
(APPROVED
p
I
--% 55
Approved For Re Rode 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004400220001-2
TOP SECRET
25X1
21 December 1951
145
DAILY DIGEST
NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.
NAVY and DOS review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. primarily It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 40llb104121 : LIA-KUFfs I 1146A000600220001-2
'
Approved ForRelalade 2005104122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00490220001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
Comment: These articles bear out the suspicion that the controversial topic of agrogorods has been permitted to lie dormant in recent months. Economically speaking, it is conservatively estimated that the building of a new "agrogorod" rubles, and thus on an all-Union scale would amount to three million the costs of such a program would reach staggering proportions.
2.
25X1
German scientist re orted headin advanced Soviet h sics A recent Spanish broadcast to America quoted a Stockholm effect that the German scientist dispatch to the Gustav Hertz supervises all Work Soviet atomic energy and is presently on physics program. The article claims in charge of the Soviet advanced that German and Scandinavian scientists who have established contact with Hertz believe that Hertz is playing a "very important" role in Soviet atomic research, and supersonic aviation. radar, Hertz is described as being 74 years old, in excellent health, and es having He is reported to be surrounded won the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1925. by a circle of some 200 scientists, addition to groups of Russian in and German students work. who aid him in his
gamma: Hertz was formerly director of the Siemens and Halske research laboratory and a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Charlottenburg. Various members moved" to the Soviet Union, where of this group including Hertz were "rethey are known to be located on the Caspian Sea. at Sukumi While it is known that Hertz is playing an active role in the Soviet atomic energy program, there is at present no justification for assuming that he is in charge of the entire program advanced physics

TOP SECRET
1
25X1
Showdown on Soviet A ro orod Plan indiCated, A book review published in the October issue of Soviet Book reaffirmed the taken by Pravda in March 1951 against position the resettlement of the population of merged collectives into centralized agrogorods -- new "agricultural cities." In this connection, "local conditions" into consideration the review recommended taking when implementing mergers. A more significant article in Socialist A riculture, written official of the Ministry of Agriculture, by an stressed the danger of carrying the physical -H-. . omically feasible limits.
USSR.
21 Dec 51
Approved For Re lglade 2005104122 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400220001-2

TOP SECRET
3.
25X1 25X1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 'US Embassy asks Czech Foreign Ministry to investigate disappearance of American soldier: The US Embassy in Prague has requested the Czech Foreign Ministry to investigate a missing American soldier is in Czechoslovakia. the possibility that The soldier, who is a private assigned to a constabulary border post, disappeared on 12 December. Tracks in the snow near his outpost indicated that he might have been captured by the Czechs.
I
25X1
Soviet Armv women arrive in Poland: The US Embassy in Warsaw reports that girls of 18 to 20 years of age in Soviet infantry uni orms were seen in Le iCA during the latter part of November.
Comment: Legnica is the headquarters in Poland of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces. This is the first report of Soviet army women arriving in Poland and there is no indication yet of the number involved.
POLAND.
25X1
Soviet army women have also arrived in East Germany, the Soviet Zone of Austria, and Hungary. No definite estimate can be made of the number, although recent reports indicate that a total of from 7,500 to 10,000 Soviet women, civilian and military, have been brought into East Germany since last July.
The chief reason for the replacement working at Soviet military installations of native female civilians by Soviet military and civilian women appears to be a desire to further increase Soviet security measures in Eastern Europe. There is no indication yet that the total replacement of indigenous employees in Eastern EUrope is contemplated by the USSR.
5.
YUGOSLAVIA. Cominform delegates on Danube Commission adopt constructive attitude towards Yugoslav representations: on the present session of the Danube Commission Yugoslav press coverage indicates a surprising reversal in the Cominform attitude towards the Yugoslays. By 15 December, all but two of the twenty-three Yugoslav draft articles had been approved by the majority of the Commission.
A note of disappointment in the Yugoslav press over the fact that the Cominform delegates have been so conciliatory is noted by US officials. A continuation of Cominform tactics employed in previous sessions would have provided Yugoslavia with concrete proof that the Soviet bloc intended to disregard the spirit of Yugoslavia's UN resolution calling for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations and TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/2/ : ClA-RDP79701146A0006002A0M-251
Approved For Re Iltivie 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09400220001-2

TOP SECRET
25X1
observance of international treaty provisions.

Comments The Soviet-dominated majority has exhibited an astonishing though belated reversal of form during the present Danube session. As late as 12 December the Yugoslays, in reporting the present session, stated that the Danube Comailission "has demonstrated that undemocratic methods continue to be applied and implemented by the Commission."
The failure of the Cominform majority to ignore or quash Yugoslav representations may be an effort to appear "sweet and reasonable" before the eyes of the world, thus giving the lie to the widely publicized Yugoslav charges of "unfriendly acts."
-
nnnthiri
6.
Akr_Force defectors report low Yugoslav army morale and general
25X1
1Yugoslav pilots advanced the following questionable Out provocative opinions: there is a general apathy and lack of hope among the people;.Titoism is worse than ordinary Communism; the morale of the Yugoslav army is low, and the assumption that it would fight and acquit itself well in the event of a showdown is questionable. Nonetheless, the pilots stated that they thoughtit was "wise" for the West to support Tito and to use him for what he was worth, but that it was imperative to remember that Tito is a Communist and would not hesitate "to cut the throat of the West if it suited his needs."
25X1
25X1
cut that the real reason for their flight was bscure. He mentioned the high pay of Yugoslav pilots and the fact that they carried their .passports at 11 timeq And onlild hgVA flf^4-erl sily without "flourish and fanfare."
Comments The accuracy of the pilots'observations is extremely dubious. The statements are at variance with informed opinion regard" ing the army's willingness to fight and popular reaction to Titoism. Views of defectors, regardless of their political propensities, concerning economic conditions and troop morale generally lack objectivity.
TOP SECRET
3
21 Dec 51
Approved For Regal& 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0220001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1
2.
25X1
KOREA. Communists employ radar in coastal defense role: UN naval units operating off the North Korean east coast between Wonsan end Hungnam 15 December report receiving gunfire on at ranges from 8,000 to 13,000 yards which fell within 25 to 150 yards on either side of a UN ship. Navy Far East adds that "these The US uns were re orted as definitely radar fire-oontrolled."
3.
hours Of darkness and inclement weather. during While inufficient information is Provided in this report on the conditions under which this uied, it would normally be employed radar was for bearing or range information.
radar fire-control of shore batteries be exTranstaterially to increase can coastal defense capabilities
JAPAN. Four Japanese invited to the April 1952 MillWrence in MOscow: The Japanese press on 20 Japanese economists who to attend the International Economic Conference
narnurent
These four are: H. Ouchi, president of Hosei University; H. Inaba, Director of the National Economics Research Institute; S. Tsuru, a

Comment:
Utilization of
International Economic December revealed the were invited by the USSR in Moscow next April.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 it CIA-RDP79T01146A000600220001)423 51
Approved For Re Italie 2005/04122 : CIA-RDP791-01146A010:10220001-2

TOP SECRET
25X1
professor at Ritotsubashi University; and K. Hoashi, merther of the upper house of the Diet.
I
Comment: Tsuru is considered a confirmed fellow-traveler, while both ITTESI-lind Roashi are identified as Japan Commilnist Party members. Ouchi is a former member of the Diet. Roashi,_currently. representing the Party in the House of Councilors, has been active in various front groups and has long been an advocate of trade with Communist China.
.
In the past, SCAP has not permitted Japanese to attend overseas This particular invitation may have been issued to exploit propaganda-wise any refusal to permit these four Japanese to attend the conference.
'communist or Communist-front oonferences.

TOP SECRET
21 Deo 51
Approved For Reiss& 2005104/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A064000220001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
FRANCE. Russian trade demands greater than previously revealed by France: The French Government wants to postpone the Coordinating Committee's consideration of French exports of "sensitive" items until current French-Soviet trade negotiations reach a more advanced stage.
In
1z5A1
The Russians have requested up to 15 cargo ships of 5000 tons dis placement and capable of 13 knots speed. The French Foreign Office, which claims it will keep within "gentlemen'e agreement" limits, plans to offer no more than six.
I
The French plan to trade the wheat offered by the Russians for Germaa Inasmuch as the French recently disposed of the 8000-ton Wisconsin to Poland in exchange for coal, they are likely io stretch a point to meet the Russian demands for ships.
coal.
25X1
3.
BELGIUM. Belgium reluctant to increase 'financial commitments for defense: The US Embassy at Brussels comments that the seemingly intransigeant Belgian attitude toward TCC1 the EDF, the EPU, and other current European projects is the result of the country's concern over current and prospective calls on its resources. The Embassy adds that "Belgium has been forced into" extreme reluctance toward

TOP SECRET
6
Comment: The French Ambassador in Washingtonthad indicated earlier that only four or five such vessels Would be involved, without specifying the number requested.
21 Dec 51
Approved For Re Nook 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09900220001-2

TOP SECRET acceptance of new commitments until the total picture of demands is evident. In general Belgian acceptance of the TCG recommendations would require a radical shift from a tradition and policy of economic liberalism. As an example of Belgian fears of increased drains on its finances, Belgium suspects that the European Defense Forces, if the common budget proposal is adopted, will be an organization for which disproportionate Belgian financial contributions would be asked.
-
25X1
4.
I25X1
of Trieste and the Zone President agree it would be inadvisable to permit the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (NSI) to hold a national congress in the area, as it reportedly is seeking to do. They do not consider it desirable at this time to refuse permission to the Trieste MSI for a local congress since the party has not been outlawed, but are prepared to prevent rah a meeting from being transformed into a national congress.
in Trieste: The 1703-American military authorities in Zone A of the Free Territory
ITALY.
Comment: The MSI, which has been prevented from holding a national congress in Italy by a ban imposed by the Italian authorities in October 1950, has declared it would nevertheless seek to hold one somewhere, if necessary on shipboard. It is still a relatively minor party, but there are indications that it may be able to influence currents in other parties, such as the majority Christial Democrats, and to coalesce with these groups to attain power. In an effort to curb the MST's increasing appeal, the Italian Government is now pushing new legislation to enforce a provision of the constitution prohibiting the reorganization of the former Fascist Party in any form.

Neo-fascists.seek to hold national congress TOP SECRET
7
Comment: The TCC paper on Belgium's defense effort, which recommended a 40-percent increase, has been termed by the Belgian Foreign Minister as "lacking in appreciation of the Belgian effort." From a military point of view, the Belgians have, in proportion to the populations of Western Europe countries, made the largest contribution in terms of trained troops in the field. Belgium has consistently resented American criticism that its aid to Western Europe is inadequate, and has maintained that manufacturing specifications as well as a financing plan must be assured before Belgium's production capabilities can be fully utilized for rearmament.
a Dec 51
Approved For Re lade 2005104/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00490220001-2

TOP SECRET
5.
25X1
DENMARK. Denmark insists on selling tanker to Poland: Denmark has formally requested the United States to approve its sale of a tanker to Poland in return for vitally needed coal. Emphasizing the adverse effects the lack of coal would have on the Danish economy and defense effort, the Foreign Minister stated that his government would "take a very serious view of US disapproval." i Comment: Although tankers are on the Coordinating Committee's of prohibited exports, the American list Embassy in Copenhagen has stated that the only alternative to this trade is greatly increased US aid in dollars and shipping.
If Denmark should despite US opposition bring this case before the Committee, the other European members would probably side with the Danes.
6.
TUNISIA. Nationalists call three-day protest. strike: In protest against the French Government's rejection of Tunisian demands for a greater share in government, the Tunisian nationalista have called a general strike for 21 through 23 December. The Tunisian Communist Party and Communist-controlled labor union have announced their support.
25X1
Meanwhile, the nationalist leaders have convoked a national conference to redefine their policy... Their publicly expressed reaction is noteworthy for its moderation and lack of vitriolic denunciation of the French Government.
I
Comment: The success of the nationalist-sponsored strike on 29 November encouraged the party leaders to try this medium again. Although such a demonstration could possibly be accompanied by violence, the French maintain ample police and military forces to put down disorders. The nationalists any will probably follow their usual procedure of taking every precaution against inviting police suppression. The Communists' support is the Communist Party's attempt to regain some of its influence previousZy lost to recently ignored all Communist overtures. the nationalists, who have
25X1

TOP SECRET
8
21 Dec 53.
25X1

L. UNCLASSIFIED when bAprm698c0CRETRE4tetisWIEISOQUW:seMtRESP7Staffif6VENtI515tft-i or declassifidd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

.
I

DOC. (NO.
REG I STRY
0
CD
CIA CON pi
DATE DOCUMENT RECE I
DOG. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY

I
or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain, attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outstde of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose Official duties relate to the matter. Top Seere Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period Of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who secs the Top Secret document will sign and Indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE RECE IVED
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top Of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form ts detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed In the appropriate space

below
SIGNATURE
DATE
T I ME
OFF ICE/DIV.
DATE
and transmitt d to Central Toy Secret Contro for record.

DOWNGRADED
70
By
DESTROYED
D I SPATCHED
TO
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY
(Signature)
A DIA; Foved For
EDITIONS.
W I TNESSED BY
By
(Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
OFFICaE
Kewse 2005/04122 : CIUDP79T01 1400600220001-2 6A0

TOP SECRET
DFF ICE
risr 26 in. nutlet/I
(40/
Approved For Rase 2005104/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0041100220001-2

AV.
TOP SECRET
25X1

Copy Nci.
45
25X1

TOP SECRET
Approved For Releasel-200510022-r etA=RBP-79-T-01146A000600220001-2
25X1
Approved For Re IeVee 2005104/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0044,0220001-2

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
25X1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Western EUropean nations differ r on Czech request for landYrance, Be g um an. Pe let er n.e CzedhTreque5 t for landing o . rights for a weekly flight vergent v ews on Paris via Copenhagen and Amsterdam. The French Foreign from Prague to confidentially Office has advised the United States that if and when it will deny landing rights approached by the Czechs. however, argue that denial The Dutch and Belgian governments, of landing existing treaty obligations rights is difficult because ef with Czechoslovakia, im ressed b the US s although they seem estion that the em.lo dela tactics.
: '
The United States desfres tO block the Czech request, weaken the Three-Power since Germany imposed ban on overflights Of Western as part of Western pressure following Czech airlines have previouslybeen the Oatis trial. operations. used as part of Czech intelligence The
grantrii-Irwould
2.
25X1
FRANCE. French o osed to limited British lial-Pation se ernes: -rticipation in European ommen ing on urc Is recen sta ement a wis e o e associated with -t both the_Schuman a French Foreign and the Pleven Plans, Ministry spokesman said that it attempt to work out in detail the form of British was preferable not to Benelux countries might seek association because the a similar relationship participation. in preference to full The French spokesman suggested, however, Ielpful if, during ChurChillls that it would be Washington ment urged that British relations visit, the United States Governwith the two Euro be formal and as close ean interatioflchemes as possible.
Comments French Britiir5iFficipation government leaders believe that eventual full is essential
Continental to European integration. nations have used British The smaller abstention as an excuse for luctance to bind themselves their retoo closely to the proposed organizations) supranational and the French are anxious to avoid presenting pretext to back out of commitments them with a already taken. France would probably welcome 'intermediate limited British participation stage, if not made public as an before the Continental ratified the present plans. nations had

SECTION 3 (WEsTEkN) TOP SECRET
1
Comment:
21 Dec 51
Approved For Release.2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600220001-2
- Approved ForRelatte2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400220001-2

TOP SECRET
3.
,25X1
Comment: In previous high-level discussions, the three Western governments had been unable to resolve differences of opinion over the desirability of making further concessions to the Russians or of introducing a new draft treaty as a basis for negotiation. It is apparent that, if the Soviet negotiator makes any show of amenability upon the resumption of treaty discussions, the US will be under strongest pressure from the British, the French, and the Austrians to accept in whole or in part the Russian version of articles not yet agreed upon in the old draft.
U.
25X1
UNITED KINGDOM. British to suggest appointment of new Egyptian British Ambassador government: Stevenson in Cairo has been instructed to suggest to King Farouk that he appoint a new government that will at least discuss the Middle East Cannand proposals. drawal of British troops would start Stevenson is to agree that some withgovernment and the stabilization of thirty days after the advent of s. new the situation. Foreign Office officials, stating that they had little hope for the success of this move, have emphasized again Foreign Secretary EderOs firm onnositio to making any proposals on the Sudan. nww
Comment: The British and American Ambassadors in Cairo have stated that aTtil.gh King Farouk would like to dismiss the present government, is apparently unmdlling to take he the risk .at present exceptas a last resort. There is no evidence that any Egyptian reaching an agreement with the British government would be amenable to without some compromise on the Sudan.

TOP SECRET
2
Western High Commissioners submit agreed recommendations on The Western High T.F.drseussioelins with the Austrian Commissioners in Vienna have completed Government and with the US Austrian Treaty Deputy, and have submitted the following recommendations to their respective governments: (1) the treaty discussions should resume on 21 January; (2) if there seems to be hope for such a course, the West should be prepared to accept the Russian text of the unagreed articles in order to achieve an agreement; (3) if, however, extraneous objections, the conference the Russians once again raise should be.adjourned pending Western consultations among themselves and with the Austrian Government; (4) than acquiesce in a stalemate, and, rather rather than submit the Austrian question to the UN, the Austrian Government and the Western Elements in Vienna Should an abbreviated treaty as a basis for further negotiations; and the West should be prepared to (5)introduce draft, but should consider a returnmake some concessions on the abbreviated quest to do so seems to merit such to the old draft only if a Soviet re consideration in the light of the new situation which would then prevail. i
AUSTRIA.
IFiatretrategy:
21 Dec 51.
HR70-14 HR70-14
TbP SECRET SUEDhi

S(
c 18
NR
FAR EAST FAR
EastCommand Command comments Far East comments that that this message indicates the stockpiling stockpiling of r e a to of sufficient food food and andgasoline gasolinein inaaforward forward a area at least leastone one battalion battalion to draw permit at days prior to their draw supplies supplies 15-20 15-20 days FECOMfurther furthersuggests suggests thatthe thedepot depotfrom fromwhich which the the anticipated use. FECOM that supplies are drawn drawn maintains matntains at least least a a 30-day 30-day supply. supply, Comment; While While this message covers covers the the supply supply Comment: situation of of only onlyone onebattalion, battalion,a a similar s milar stockpile stockpile presumably presumably exists exists for for a large part part of of the enemy's enemy's forward area. area.
4.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE IDATE: 23-Mar-201 0 ATE: 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED

-4 4-
A Chinese Communist Communist military military message of A Chinese of 8 December December reveals reveals that that an unidentified unidentifiedartillery artillery 8 SUEDE ,A isbattalion in Korea, Korea, probably battalion probably subordinate to the 2nd Chinese Chinese Communist CommunistArtillery Artillery Division, Division, was was a/@ VI3 .5/0 -1/.3 to draw its its January January quota quota of of rations rations and and gasoline gasoline on on or or about about 12 12 December, December,
CINCFE Tokyo Tokyo 51 21 Dec 51
49XEEME SUEDE TOP SECRET SUEDE
30-day Communist Communistforward forwardarea area military military stockpiles in Korea 3. Minimum Minimum 30-day indicated:
v.
-_
.
SUED^ TdP SECRET SUEDES"
- 5 5 -
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HK / U-74
3
I.
161) SECRET SUEDt'

-rep-sEefter-WEDE-
8. 8.
'
9. 9.

TOP SECRET SUEDE
7. 7.
A Canton Canton faotory Sactory states states Army: Canton Canton factory'oontributes f a c t o r y aoontributes to t o Korean A m p A that it las t h a t 'it ha8 decided deoided to t o comply oomply with a requeat requost of o f the Canton Canton Bureau Bureau of of Army Headquarters Hbadquarterswith Industry and Commerce tto o f furnish urnish Korean Army ,with a ti (SUEDE maohine maohine for f o r making making hose. hoee. ( S U E D E 0 93663 6 8 3 Canton-Shanghai Canton-Shanghai 14 14 Nov Nov 51) 51)
Commentt This message message indioatee indicates t that donations tto Korea are are s still Commentr h a t donations o Korea till being-ialiay b e i n g m "requested" y "requested"as aspart p a r tof ofthe t h e"Resist "Resist America dmerica and and Aid Aid donation of of manumanuKorea" campaign, oeunpaign, inaugurated inaugurated abOut abou~ a year a year ago. ago.. The donation facturing facturing equipment equipment rather r a t h e r than than the the manufactured manuf aotured product product is is unusual, unusual, and this t h i s case ease is is probably probably an an exception. exception.
21 November november message Surplus Shanghai l o u r shipped o Manahurior Shanghai f flour shipped t to Manchuria: A 21 medsage states s t a t e s that Shanghai Shanghai contracted contraoted to t o send send 3,600,000 3,600,000 bags bags of of wheat wheat flour f l o u r to to Manohuria between between July J u l y and ah3 November. November. By 21 21 November 3,350,000 3,350,000 bags Manchuria had to completed "within "within B a month." month." had been been issued, Lseued, and and deliveries d e l i v e r i e s were t o be oompleted (SUEDE i 3 6 4 5 Shanghai-Mdcden gl 21 Nov Nov 51) 51 ) (SUEDRP1.3645 Shanghai-Mukden
Oommentr In August 1950 1950 the the East China China wheat flour f l o u r conference conferenoe set set Oomentr In q u o 9 million 49-pound bags bagsof o f wheat wheat flour f l o u r to Lo be be produced produoed there there a quAW-0-10 million 49-pound in i n the t h e year June June 1950 1950 to t o May May 1951. 1961. This quantity qyantity i s only one-third o f is only.one-third of the t h e annual annual capacity capacity of o f East East China China flour f l o u r mills, m i l $ 3 , although although still s t i l l in i n excess exoese i n the the East EasO China China area. area. This of o f the the normal normal &mount amount consumed oorieumod in "hie message massage indioatas that thcit much of of East China's China'a flour aurplus indioates surplus is now now being being delivered delivered t o Manchuria, Manchuria, with with Korea Korea as as the the possible possible ultimate ultimate destination. dostination. to
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED.FOR APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0
26 Deo 51
.1)25
1 0 . 10.
KbREA. Wnimwn 30-day SO-day Communist CommutrLst forward area m i l i t a r y stockpiles stockpiles in in KOREA. Mlnimum military
A Chinese Chinese Communiet Comtnunlst; military m i l i t a r y message of of 8 8 December December indicated1 A indicatedt reveaZ8 that t h a t an an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion b a t t a l i o n , in i n Korea, Korea, probably probably reveals subordinate to t o the the 2nd 2nd Chinese Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, Division, was to to subordinate draw its i t a January January quota quota of of rations r a t i o n s and and gasoline gasoline on on o r about 1 2 Deoernber. draw or about 12 December.
F a r East Eaet Command Command eomments oomenta that t h a t this t h i s message message indicates indioatea the t h e stockstookFar o f sufficient s u f f i o i a n t food and gasoline gaaoline in In a a forward forward area area t o permit at p i l i n g of piling food and to permit at l e a s t one one b a t t a l i o n to t o draw draw sUpplies s u p p l i ~ s15-20 15-20 days days p rior t o their t h e i r anticipated antioipated leait battalion prior to UBO. F'ECON further sugcests sug;;ests that t h a t the t h e depot depot from from whioh t h e supplies supplies are are use. FECOM further which the 413, 1245Z,, 3 . 2 4 5 2 , 21 51) drawn nis.intains a t lleast east a a 30-day 30-day supply. supply. (SUEDE drawn nieintains at (SUEDE SIB SIB 413, 21 Deo Deo 51) Conunent'c h i s message h e llogistical ogistical s i t u a t i o n iin n Comment':While While t this message oover8 covers t the situation only mt alion, a a similar s i m i l a r stockpile stookplle presumably presumably exists e x i s t s for for a a large large only one battalion, p a r t of o f the t h e enemyfs enemy'e forward forward area. area. part
1 1 . 11.

TOP SECRET SUEDE
.4
North Korean II 11 Corps Corps reports r e p o r t s increasing r a t e of o f desertions: desortions: The The North Korean inoreaping rate North Korean Korean II I1 Corps Corps reported, reported, on on 3 o tthe h e Supreme Sorth 3 Deoernber, Deoember, tto Supreme Command Command Headquartere i n Pyongyang, Pyongyang, an an inoredsing inoretising number number of o f defections defections for for the the Headquartera in The number number of of men men involved involved in in each each montho of o f August Augurrt through through November. November. ,The montha of the t h e four four months months was was 36, 36, 72,.100 72, 100 and 208, 208, while while the the number number of of men men of deserting with h e i r weapons also rose r o a e radually o 30, 30, 51 61 and and delierting with ttheir weapons also radually from from 14 14 t to f i n a l l y 85 85 in i n November. November. (SUEDE (SUEDE RE REqpp7010. 3 Deo 51) finally 010, 3 Deo 51)
Comment: While o r t h Korean i l i t a r y ttraffio r a f f i o has .Camment: While N North Korean m military has previously previously r e v e a mfrequent q u e n t desertions desertions in i n the the rear rear area area Railway Security Division, Mvision, revealed Railway Security theae 'defeotiona were probably due t o the d i v i s i o n i s mission a8 a these defections were probably due to the divisioWs.mission:as a trainink unit unit and and the t h e presenoe presenoe of of a a high high ratio r a t i o of o f recent reoent oonsoriptees. conscripteea. training The reported reported trend trend of o f desertions desertions from from a a front-line f r o n t - l i n e unit, unit, such such as as the the The North Korean II I1 Corps, Corpa, however, however, would appear to t o be s i g n i f i o a n t and and North Korean would appear be m0r.e more significant may be an an indicator l n d l a a t o r of o f the the state s t a t e of o f morale morale in i n this this corps corps. may'be
26 Dec Deo 51 51 26
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Re Seise 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A04.600230001-1
TOP-SECR ET
26 December 1951
145
DAILY DIGEST

TOP SECRET
Approved ForReleaSe2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W00230001-1
'
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Trade Union Plenum criticizes Soviet railway operations: The Seventh Trade Union Plenum convoked recently in Moscow sharply berated two of its prominent speakers, Minister of Rail Transport Beshchev and Rail Trade Union Central Committee Chairman Cherednichenko, for glossing over shortcomings.
The Embassy is of the opinion that the Plenum in effect warned top railroad administration and labor chiefs to get results, or expect further and More drastic penalties. (S Moscow Weeka 50, 14 Dec 51)
Comments These warnings recall similar criticism levelled at the railways last summer and imply that the anticipated improvement in railway operation has not been realized.
2.
Turkmen and Tadzhik cotton deliveries on schedule: The Tadzhik and Turkmen Republics announced fulfillment of their cotton delivery plans on 17 and 18 December, respectively. Tadzhik deliveries-were said to be 40,000 tons greater than at the same date last year; while Turkmen deliveries were reported in excess of 1950 by some 32,000 tons. (C Moscow 1074, 22 Dec 51)
Comments EMbassy Moscow believes that, considering their present delivery rate, the Soviets may be able to announce plan fulfillment by 10 January 1952. This situation is in contrast to that obtaining in in Uzbekistan, where the cotton harvest was said to have been delayed by faulty work organization and non-payment of earnings due the harvest workers.

TOP SECRET
1
While emphasizing the housing lag, the apparent real concern of the Plenum was directed at deficient rail operations, possibly centered on vital links serving the Transsiberian railway. Veiled references to accidents on the Gorky and Ufa sectors disclosed the fact that responsible officials have recently been either penalized or tried in court.
'
3.
25X1C
BULGARIA. Jo n SoViet-Satellite maneu ortedl lanned for January: combined winter maneuvers of the So r an r orce, and Rumanian Army are scheduled to take place early in January, 1952. Plans for these maneuvers are said to have been drafted by Bulgaria, aumania, and Soviet staff officers
Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0006038%%41-
Approved For Refeste 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0661100230001-1

TOP SECRET
at a meetin
he
25X1A
Stalin (Varna) during November.
Comment: So far as is known, no large-scale inter-Satellite or Soviet-Satellite military maneuvers have heretofore been held.
4.
Comments On 15 December the US Embassy in Prague asked the' Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to find out whether Private Wood is in Czech custody.
5.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-HUNGARY. New reports suggest possibility of early currency reform in Czechoslovakia, A-Czech source has reported to the US Embassy in Prague that a rumored monetary reform may take pdace in the near future. The source added that Hungary is printing new Czech currency and that-the Czech Finance Secretary is working overtime. Hungarian currency printers and other printers have been confined to their plants since 19 December, according to persistent unconfirmed reports reaching the US and British Legations in Budapest. (C USARMA Prague 7230 18 Dec 51; C Budapest 443, 22 Dec 51)
Comments There is more likelihood of a currency reform slovakia than in Hungary, on the basis of present evidence. in CzechoIn the last few months there have been persistent rumors of an impending Czech monetary reform to liquidate excess purchasing power by a new banknote issue or to place the Czech crown on a ruble basis. Excess purchasing power has been built up in both countries by a lack of consumer goods caused by concentration on heavy industry. Both countries have attempted to meet the problem of increasing raising free market prices and increasing money supply by considerably production norms.
6.
POLAND. Large number of cranes observed moving eastward through Poland: The US Military Attache in Warsaw reports that on 20 December an eastbound Soviet train with three passenger and an unknown number of flat

TOP SECRET
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Seventh Army reports that missing American'aoldier knowingly entered Czechoslovakia, US Seventh Army headquarters States that it can be "reasonably assumed" that Private Charles X. Wood of the American constabulary knowingly entered CzechosloYakia on 12 December. Tracks presumably made by Wood led across the border past clearly defined border markers to a farmhouse, joined them. Members of a Czech border-patrol where other tracks allegedly claimed that an American soldier was taken into custody about noon on 12 December and was being sent to Prague. (S Heidelberg 6o, 22 Dec 51)
Approved For Reigise 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0120600230001-1

TOP SECRET
cars was seen at Rembertow/Warsaw. The flat cars were loaded with 51 cranes mounted on Gaz truck chassis. One of the passenger cars had a tank, a red star, and the number 4 painted on the side. All of the equipment appeared to be used. (S Warsaw, MAT 224-51, 21 Dec 51)
Comments The Gaz truck is similar to the US 2i ton truck. Cranes mounted on such trucks could be used as wreckers or for the loading and hoisting of heavy ammunition such as bomhs. It is not clear from this report whether or not the train would move on through Poland to the USSR, or would unload at some point in Poland.
The report admitted that the party had failed to capture the imagination and the loyalty of the collective farmers during the critical period, but had won the struggle to preserve the collective farms. (U NY Times, 21 Dec 51)
Comments Local party members and leaders are generally vulnerable to popular pressures from below as well as to charges of deviationism when peasants become "uncooperative with the regime." Thus, regardless of their attitude, they make ideal "scapegoats."
This revelation of "disloyalty" 'on the part of party members oncollective farms may be intended as a warning to local party members, reflecting party anticipation of increasing "trouble in the countryside" this spring.
8.
Yugoslavia refuses to support revision of the Italian peace treaty" The Yugoslav Government has given a negative reply to the Italian note requesting a revision of the Italian peace treaty. The reply, which was conciliatory in tone, stated that although Yugoslavia appreciates the fact that most of the peace treaty clauses no longer correspond to present conditions, certain important issues remain outstanding between the two countries and, for.this reason, Yugoslavia
feels obliged to"adjourn"consideration of the revision for the moment. (R Belgrade 824, 21 Dec 51)
Comments Foreshadowing this rejection was a recent statement by Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister, to the effect that a

TOP SECRET
7.
YUGOSLAVIA. Purge of peasant members in the Croatian Communist Partv reportedt An official report submitted by the Croatian Politburo reveals that 881 members and 526 candidate members of the Party op the Croatian collective larms have been expelled since last spring for "developing the mentality of independent peasants."
Approved Oor Release 2001/09/063: CIA-RDP79T01146A00060etilin
Approved For Rd lease 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0t/g00230001-1

TOP SECRET
revision of the Italian peace treaty was unthinkable to the Yugoslays without a preyious solution of controversial questions, namely the Trieste problem, between the two countries, and without the creation of an atmosphere of "mutual peace-loving confidence." The timing of the Yugoslav refusal, however, may further prejudice the success of current Yugoslav-Italian talks on Trieste;
9.
In his conversation with Ambassador Allen, General Popovic remarked that in the event of a war political as well as military considerations might be involved in any action against Albania. He did not elucidate upon this remark, but mentioned that the Yugoslav Army could take care of Albanian land forces with ease. Previously Marshal Tito, in answer to a question by Admiral Gardner as to what type of naval assistance he would require, had pointed out that the most useful service of the Sixth Fleet would be to deny the Adriatic Sea and Albanian ports to the enemy. (TS Belgrade 822, 20 Dec 51)
Comment: Popoviels remarks reflect the continued interest of the Yugoslav Government in establishing a dominant position in Albania in the event of war.
10.
Tito attacks Western critics who question capabilities of Yugoslav Army: Marshal Tito, in a two-hour speech celebrating the formation of the Yugoslav Army, criticized Western observers "who speak of the Yugoslav army as a primitive unit capable of fighting only guerrilla warfare in the Bosnian mountains." The Marshal refUted this "absurdity by citing World War II partisan operations which, he claimed, engaged 580,000 Axis troops.
The Marshal attacked "those in the West.who for several reasons do not want the Yugoslays to receive heavy armaments. Rather, in the event of war, they would have us bleed in the mountains as we did in the early years of the past war, perhaps this time for some other interests, as a weak, unarmed mass which at the decisive moment would be incapable of preserving its freedom, independence, and its socialist reality." (8 FBIS Ticker, 21 Dec 51)

TOP SECRET
Yugoslav political interests conflict with military requirements: Ambassador Allen in Belgrade comments that in the event of a war, the Yugoslav Government is concerned lest Allied forces occupy Albanian territory and determine the political future of the country.
Approved For Release 2001109/064 CIA-RDP79T01146A000600,290D(K-f 1
Approved For Retieslse 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0196600230001-1

TOP SECRET
Comment: Fears that Yugoslavia may not get its "deserved share" of heavy armaments, as a result of Western misconceptions" regarding the ability and rble of the Yugoslav army, undoubtedly contribute te the sensitivity of the regtme to criticism of its army and its proper wartiam role.
In addition, and perhaps of greater importance, is the deep-seated distrust among Yugoslav Communists of Western political objectives in the Balkans in the event of a major war.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09106 . CIA-RDP79T01146A0006002086i-151
Approved For Redgase 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A069600230001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1C rient,will refuse

25X1C
foreigners, to help the "occupying troops."
1.
The Egyptian Governto consider any British proposal unless Britain firstreconizes Egypt's full rights in the Sudan and agrees to evacuate the Suez immediately. t e gyp an overnEGYPT.
Government reaffirms its unyielding attitudt:
25X1C
iensormenrmnaoenseoranyresident, including
The Prime Minister was officially informed that the Palace will not object te any project proposed by the government. The Foreign Minister has told the Prime Minister that in the event of a showdown Egypt could -rely on the USSR.
25X1A
It appears that the Egyptian Government, spurred on by Comment: the anti-Western Foreign Minister, is now promoting a local stiffening of attitude, despite the desire of some officials, including the King, for a negotiated settlement. The projected law is so drawn as to apply to any laborers the British bring in to counter the Egyptian labor boycott of the canal zone. Two Egyptian employees of the British Embassy have recently been beaten by thugs and then jailed on charges of "insulting the government." The government meanwhile has returned all the property and funds of the extremist Moslem Brotherhood following a three year seizure.
LEBANON. Elm of revival of foreigO spheres of influence in Near East: A Lebanese parliamentary leader has expressed his concern over reports that the British and French havk reached an agreement to end their rivklry in the Near East. He believes that many Lebanese will regard this as a atep toward the reestablishment of foreign spheres of influence.
2.
The US Minister in Beirut comments that one of the greatest Lebanese fears is the possible revival of a French sphere of influence. He warns that while "large power cooperation in the Neer East is essential," the US must be "very careful not to be jockeyed into the position of appearing in the eyes of people of the Near East to support colonialism or spheres of influence." (S Beirut 616, 19 Dec 51)
.
Comment: Fears of foreign spheres of influence were voiced in late November by the Syrian Chief of Staff, who saw the Middle East.Command proposals as a possible vehicle for a revival of French supremacy in Syria. More recently it was rumored that he executed his recent coup in Syria with French support.
TOP SECRET
6
26 Dec 51
Approved For Releaie 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0661000230001-1

TOP SECRET
3.,
AFGHANISTAN. Troqp movement to avert oossible tribal clash* The murder in Kabul of a Jaji tribesman and his son, reportedly by'a chieftain of a Pushtu tribe, has caused the Jaji tiibe to threaten to take the law into its own hands in revenge. The PHIS Minister of Afghanistan, who has great prestige with the tribes, has persuaded the Jajis not to act for a few days. In the meantime, it is reliably reported that 4800 Afghan troops were moved on 16 December to Gardez, near the Saji tribal area, about 75 miles south of Kabul. (0 Kabul 294, 18 Dec 51)
g2mmanI: The importance of the tribes in the relatively primitive society of Afghanistan makes tribal disputes and blood vengeance disturbing to the stability of the country. The situation presumably can be controlled by.the Afghan Army, which has demonstrated its ability to deal with regional disorders in the past.
4.
INDONESIA. Chinese-Indonesian trade negotiations no longer in imogrese: When questioned by US Ambassador Cochran on the possibility of a trade agreement with Communist China, Foreign Minister Subardjo stated that no trade negotiations are in progress; He said the original Chinese approach was dropped last June after Indonesia. adhered to the UN embargo on tin and rubber. (C.Djakarta 8999 21 Dec 51)
Comment:. There have been repeated indications of illegal shipments of rubber from Indonesia to Communist China via Macao. Some of these transactions may have involved the cooperation of individual Indonesian officials, thereby inspiring rumors of a secret agreement or a prospective agreement with Communist China.
5.
Government seizes military eoninment on second Dutch shim The Indonesian Government has issued instructions to Djakarta port authorities to proceed with the seizure of military equipment on a Dutch ship which entered port on 18 December, refusing to accept the Netherlands explanation that this was a routine shipment for renewing ordinary supplies and equipment in West New.Guinea. (S Djakarta 886, 20 Dec 51)
Comment: Military police removed an arms shipment destined for West New Guinea from a Netherlands merchant vessel on 9 December. A semi-official news agency reported that the government based its action primarily upon a 1949 Indonesian ordinance which specifically prohibits transportation of arms to any part of Indonesia without a permit. Indonesia considers West New Guinea part of its territory and therefore governed by the terms of this ordinance.

TOP,SECRET
7
Indonesials seizure of the arms shipments and its justification
26 Dec 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A06,0600230001-1

TOP SECRET
thereof represent the first Official effort to implement its claim to New Guinea. However, although Indonesian action has imposed an added strain on Dutch-Indonesian relations, there is little likelihood that these incidents in themselves will endanger current informal talks on New Guinea and the Round Table Conference agreements being conducted by the two governments in The Hague.
6.
25X1A
Police arrest North SumaIra Communist leader: On lA December police arrested Sidarto o head of the Indonesian Communist Party in North Sumatra.
-
Comment:
Sidartojo apparently was designated to lead the party in
Sumatra, last August. Since the government security sweep at that time, Sidartojo and other Communist leaders have been in hiding.
7.
25X1C 25X1C 25X1C 25X1C 25X1A
THAILAND. Larlv rebellion lredicted: A "shootihg revolt" directed a ainst the military cli ue led by Generals Phao and Phin is predicted The action 'may be expected in the near fu ure
. North Sumatra after the arrest of Adjitorup, the Commissar for North
25X1C 25X1C
Meanwhile
e com ng coup
e a
no
e p ace
be_ore
_ecem_er.
__ght_ng is anticipated when the coup occurs."
25X1A
gomment: Royalists, followers of former Premier Pridi, recently ousted civilian leaders, and various elements of the armed forces are strongly opposed to the present ruling clique. It is not possible to identify which'of these factions or combinations thereof are plotting an early coup. The present government commands sufficient armed strength to suppress any revolt against it if none of the factions comprising it defects.
8.
9.
INDOCHINA. Chinese invasion of Indochina held unlikelvt The British Defense Coordinating Committee for the Far East concluded on lA December that the Chinese COmmunist forces on the Indochinese border had been considerably strengthened. The Committee decided, however, that overt intervention by the Chinese in Indochina was unlikely in the near future. (S Singapore 692, 21 Dec 51)
French sufax_prestige loss in Catholic eras: Recent events have caused Franco-Vietnamese forces to lose "much face" in the heavily Catholic Phat Diem area and it is "very ,dangerous" there, according to a
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CILRDP79T01146A000600230001-1
26 Dee 51
Approved For Relit& lie 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09414,00230001-1

TOP SECRET
Vietnamese bishop from that locality. He further stated that when the Franco-Vietnamese forces reentered the town they subjected the inhabitants to many indignities and that anti-French feeling was running.high. (S Hanoi 406, 22 Dec 51)
Comment: The French have been extremely reticent concerning action at Phat Diem which is located near the southern apex of the Tonkin porimeter. the Viet Minh in mid-December, with the apparent. complicity of the population, thoroughly infiltrated the town, surprised the defending forces, and captured sizeable quantities of arms before withdrawing.
25X1C
10.
25X1C
(2) being organized into a "volunteer" force of 250,000 troops for an invasion of Indochina, and
-
(3) scheduled to invade Indochina of 1952.

(1) awaiting orders to enter Indochina
a e
ee
Chinese Communists a ain reported Preparing to invade Indochina: report variously that Chinese Communist orces near the Indochina border are:
as well as Burma
in the s ring
25X1A
25X1A
Comments Several recent reports have forecast a Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina--as a "volunteer" force or in Viet Minh uniforms-in the period from late December 1951 to spring 1952. Similar reports from similar sources in the past 18 months have been repeatedly disproved by eveAs. Recent reports of a great augmentation of Chinese Communist forces in the area remain unconfirmed. There is good evidence of increasing material aid to the Viet Minh from China, but no strong indication of an imminent Chinese Communist intasion.
11
BIAMA. Wave Communist forces on Burma border reportedly strengthened:

ossibl in
25X1C 25X1A
Chinese Communist forces on the c ease s nce e end of the rainy season re aration for "the invasion of Southeast
MO
26 Dec 51
25X1A
Comment: There is no evidence of a significant reinforcement of Chinese Communist troops near the Burma border since the end of the monsoon season in September. Since summer 1951 Chinese Communist forces in the area have remained at a strength of 30,000 to 40,000, constituting a substantial striking force for a possible operation in Burma.
TOP SECRET
9
Approved For Rereste 2001/09106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001400230001-1

TOP SECRET
12.
CHIN4.
Railroad construction in northwest accelerated: According to Peiping radio, the deadline for completion of the railroad from Tienshui to Lanchou in Ching's Northwest District was advanced from June 1953 to the end of 1952. (R FBIS Peiping NCNA, 18 Dec 51)
.
25X1C
13.
KOREA, CINCFC,accents three CCF rocket launcher_regiments in Korea: In view of corroborative evidence, Far East Command now accepts the presence in Korea of at least three CCF rocket launcher, "Katyushat" regiments of unknown subordination.
One recent CCF officer prisoner claimed first hand knowledge of a CCF "Katyusha" division consisting .of two Katyusha regiments and two anti-aircraft regiments. The prisoner reportod that a Katyusha regiment consists of two firing battalions of twelve 132mm rocket launchers each. (S CINCFE Telecon 5481, 22 Dec 51) Comment: The presence of these Soviet-developed weapons should augment considerably the overall strength of Communist artillery in Korea.
14.
-'
Thelerie_hagragnillargeSzielons mav be inactivated:- Far East Command reports that the 18th.and 19th Divisions of the North Korean VI Corps have been inactivated and their respective personnel have been allocated to the North Korean II and III Corps. Recently captured prisoners from the II and III Corps, claiming to be former members of VI Corps units, state that the. 18th Division of 70541 men was allodated to the II Corps and the. 19th Division with 4,782 men went to the III Corps, (S CINCFE Telecon 5481, 22 Dec 51)
Comment:. Construction of this 230-mile railroad, begun in 1950, has been delayed by a shortage of steel rairi, diversion of laborers to the Korean war, and mountainous terrain. The Communists claim that trains are now operating to a point about 40 miles west of Tienshui. It is doubtful, however, that regular service is maintained west of Sian about 200 miles east of Tienshui service east of Tienshui was irregular and that an s es and tunnel cave-ins were common. These observers did not board a train until they reached Sian.
25X1C
Commens::This report lends additional credence toprevious reports of .the deactivation of the North Korean VI Corps (Daily Digest, 20 Dec 51, Item 2) and to previous indicationS of the North Korean Army's inability to maintain the flow of replacements.
TOP SECRET
10
26 Dec 51
Approved For Rikpase 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A*600230001-1

TOP SECRET
25X1C
15.
reports on Korean war: omman ero un eer the Chinese Communist "Chinese Communist Central Government" that
a.
25X1C
advised the
Communist propaganda had succeeded in lowering the morale of UN troops,
b.
by 5 December two-thirds of the "foreign Communist troops in Korea" were evacuated and their place taken by Chinese Communist troops, and most of the South Korean guerrillas and agents in North Korea had been wi.ed out.
c.
25X1A
CommetTO Communist anti-morale propaganda in Korea is believed to be relatively ineffective. It is true, however, that during the past few months the Communists have launched an extensive anti-guerrilla campaign with a considerable degree of success. The reference to the "evacuation" of foreign troops is similar lalleging that to a previous report received Soviet, Czech and Polish troopa.7ETICTEFF,iiiia-7ed-17Manchuria.
25X1C
While, conceivably, the considerable number of Soviet personnel may be withdrawing to Manchuria, there is no confirmed evidence of such a move. No Caucasian military personnel--other than Soviet--have ever been conclusively identified in Korea.
-
TOP SECRET
11
26 Dec 51
Approved For Reigate 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0b400230001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GERNANY. French and British still reluctant to halt German interzonal trade: The French and British High Commissioners in Germany have suggested Wiremom permit the West Germans certain new exports to East Germany under the partially suspended interzonal trade pact, asserting that same trade must be maintained as a bargaining point in influencing the USSR to halt restrictions on West Berlin trade. The suggestion was shelved after NIcCloy refused to agree to any such concessions, emphasizing that the US was alarmed over the moderation of the Allied stand on East-West trade.
Comment: The French and British desire to make certain concessions may arise partly from the fact that Soviet harassing measures in Berlin have been relaxed during recent weeks. Their principal harassing tactic at present is their handling of export permits, resulting in delays harmful to Berlin firms. Interference with parcel post shipments is Continuing, although it has been sharply reduced since early November.
2.
West German ratification of Schuman Plan seen: Local US officials feel that ratification of the Schuman Plan by the West German Bundestag is now "virtually ensured by a considerable margin." Approval of the Plan by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 December has.cleared the way for.final parliamentary action early next month. (II Bonn 810, 20 Dec 51) Commentt .The aotion of the committee followed a rebuff to the Chancellor from the tower House on the issue last week. A steering committee, aroused at the Chancellorls high-handed attempts to force consideration of the Plan before Christmas, voted to postpone floor debate until after the Chridtmas recess. This committee vote had, according te local US representatives, the "somewhat sheepish concurrence" of meMbers of the government coalition, who broke ranks after a member of Adenauerfs Party, allegedly slightly intoxicated, supported the oppositionta plan to postpone consideration.
3.
West Germans may reduce demands for equal status in arms production: In discussing German security controls with the US High Commissioner, Chancellor Adenauer stated that he still wants all German arms production regulated by the European Defense Community, since this arrangement precludes discrimination against West Germany. The US High Commissioner proposedli

TOP SECRET
Discussing the current small air-lift in Berlin., NCCloy indicated that, after February, the US would be unwilling to help finance the air-lift, and suggested that the Germans might have to finance it themselVes. (S Berlin 845, 21 Dec 51)
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :3&A-RDP79T01146A0006002301g1Pec 51
Approved For Re
lea 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00660230001-1

TOP SECRET
however, that the Federal Republic enact legislation prohibiting the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, guided missilea, airplanes and certain naval craft, with all other German arms production being exclusively controlled by the European Defense Community. Adenauer reacted favorably to this by indicating that if other Community nations persisted in rejecting his view, he would consider the proposal, provided that German scientists be permitted to participate in atomic research in other countries, and that the aircraft restriction be withdrawn. The US High Commissioner feels that these two conditions are reasonable in the light of the German political situation and that Adenauer will negotiate on this basis. (S Bonn 801, 19 Dec 51)
Comment: The current negotiations over German arms restriction have bogged down on French demands for stringent controls of German arms manufacture. The Atherican proposal could break this deadlock since it may offer French negotiators enough restrictions to placate public opinion.
The French are particularly concerned about the revival of a German heayy weapons industry. American policy makers would like to see such a revival, with some restrictions, because they feel full use must be made of German industry if Europe is to be adequately rearmed. Since under this proposal the European Defense Community would control all German arms manufacture, that body might later work out a compromise between these two positions.
West Germans want defense contribution removed from contractual a reement: At the first meeting of the Bonn working group on the German financial contribution to Western defense, the German representatives stated that their contribution should be made direct to the European Defense Community budget; EEC should pay the German bill for Allied forces in Germany, thus obviating the need for a contractual agreement convention on this matter.; and the Bonn discussions should be transferred to the Paris EEC negotiations in order to avoid an unmanageable overlap.
The Allied representatives disagreed with these views, citing among other things that the Bonn,discussionstleal with many facets of the problem which the EDC meetings cannot cover. (S Bonn 829, 20 Dec 51)
Comment:
of thgrainussions may be for bargaining purposes since Chancellor Adenauer

recently instructed that all Contractual Agreement conventions be concluded by 15 January, The Germans are determined, however, to avoid making a direct contribution to the Allied Forces since this resembles occupation costs.

TOP SECRET
13
The hard attitude adopted by the Germans in the early phases
26 Dec 51
Approved For Relkrade 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006000230001-1

TOP SECRET
FRANCE.
5.
Communists make no attempt to defy governmental ban. The French neliaist Party made no attempt to defy the government's ban on a mass meeting scheduled for the eve of the National Peace Assizes 22-23 December. (C Paris 3753, 22 Dec 51)
Comment: The strong pond() measures taken on 9 December to prevent an Algerian nationalist demonstration in Paris, as well as the notably poor showings made by Communist front organizations during the past year, may have deterred the Communists from risking their prestige on a show of force at
this time
15.
Comment: Faced with such hostile extremes, the government might find it difficult to survive a serious incident in Tunisia.
7.
France has difficulty in selecting neW Resident General for Tunisia: French-Tunisian relations are now so strained that the nominee to succeed tb.e present Resident General in Tunisia is unwilling to undertake the task. Among other possible candidates, the two most obvieusly qualified are Socialists, who are unlikely to accept the post because of the Socialist objection to the Cabinet's rejection of all Tunisian demands. (C Paris 3655, 20 Dec 51)
Comment: The pressure on the Government from French "colons" in Tunisia haa resulted in the dismissal of the last two Residents General. .Because of strong opposition in France on the part of liberal groups, as well as the three7dey protest strike called by the nationalists for 21-23 December, the government may have difficulty naw in selecting a man to fill the post. Native tension ib presently so great that any untoward incident is likely to cause a riot. Although the French maintain sufficient military and police forces in the area to quell any disturbance, bloodshed would prolong native hatreds.
8.
ITALY.
means of achieving Italian membership the Soviet resolution favoring acceptance of all applications is to support naw pending, with the exception of Korea and Vietnam, hoping that the Soviet candidates would fail to receive the necessary votes in the General Assembly. TOP SECRET
United Minas: ,Italian representatives at the UN have recommended to US representatives that the best
French Government faces new crisis on Tunisian policy: The.French Government is in a precarious position with regard to its Tunisian policy. Rightist parties are .attacking Foreign Minister SChuman for being too liberal toward the Tunisian demands, while thel.Socialists and independent leftists are harassing the government for not aking more rapid progress toward liberalizing the Tunisian regime. (C Paris 3748, 21'Dec 51)
Italians favor Soviet resolution for blanket admission to
Approved ForRalease 2001/09/06 :3161A-RDP79T01146A00060023840ft 51
Approved FoiRelAeirea2001/09/06:aA-RDP79T01146A008.60230001-1
TOP SECRET
US representatives stressed the fact that in the past the US has strongly favored consideration of each applicant on its own merits, but they declared that the Department would give the Italian suggestion "most careful consideration." The US delegation further pointed out that the position of the UK and France on this issue was not clear, and that the position of nationalist China presents real difficulties in view of the fact that opposition to admission of Outer Mongolia might cause the Chinese to veto the whole resolution.
The Italians agreed not to proceed with any particular program without prior consultation with the US. (S Paris DELGA 799, 22 Dec 51)
9.
VATICAN.
'
into military expansionism, with politics receiving greater emphasis than ethics. With regard to specific aspects of US policy, the Vatican reportedly feels that the continued occupation of Japan is immoral, that the support of the Tito regime is wrong, and that the American stand on Israel will discredit Christianity.
The Vatican's policy objectives in the US are (1) to defend peace by encouraging "defensive militarism" only and not unconditional rearmament and by supporting "neutralists" if necessary, and (2) to conduct an anti Communist ideological campaign "with Christian systems, forces and principles, recognizing the primacy of the relicrinns nyp, nthpr Western ethical elements."
Comment: The Vatican would like to see Japan strengthened sufficiently to anti-Communist bulwark in the Far East. Vatican publications in the recent past have criticized the United States' retention of the Ryukyu Islands. The Holy See considers the problem of Church-State relations in Yugoslavia unresolved and has announced that the conditions of Archbishop Stepinacts recent release are unsatisfactory. The Vatican continues to urge the internationalization of Jerusalem and seeks to increase its influence among the Arab bloc.
25X1A
acrafirm
US economic and military attempts to contain Communism are probably supported by the Vatican. The Pope appears to be seriously concerned, however, over the possible effects of the all-out armaments race between the East and West.
10.
NETHERLANDS. Satisfactory settlement of Dutch-Indonesian problems appears difficult: The co-chairman of the Netherlands delegation to the DutchIndonesian talks at The Hague has stated that the atmosphere is less favorable than last week, when he considered it possible to "find a satisfactory

TOP SECRET
Vatican international policy objectives reported: The Vatican FeriliTtFdly fears that defense activity in the United States will develop
da-RDP79T01146A00060023000-Pec
Approved For RelIfilie 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009060230001-1

TOP SECRET
basis for discussions." He told the chairman of the Indonesian delegation that the Dutch would find it difficult to continue formal negotiations if there are more such incidents as the seizure of arms on a Dutch ship destined for West New Guinea and the temporary Indonesian employees of the shipping arrest of Dutch nationals and company.
Negotiations are temporarily stalemated pending the formal Dutch reply to the Indonesian note requesting that New Guinea also be included on the conference's agenda. (S The Hague 619, 19 Dec 51) Comment: Dutch-Indonesian relations are nom-being discussed informally at The Hague, and negotiations are expected to be finished by the end of January. Indonesia is insisting that it be given sovereignty over Weet Guinea, but there is yet no indication New retain interim control over the area. of a change in the Dutch policy to The Dutch will be extremely reluctant to grant Indonesia's financial and economic demands.
U.
Stikker reiterates fears concerning European Defense Forces: Netherlands Foreign Minister Stikker has stated his continued support of the European Defense Community concept, cussions now going on tend to place NATO but fears that the cenference disand the Atlantic Community concept in tho'background while bringing the continental community view more to the foreground. He added his concern regarding Benelux cooperation in foreign affairs should one of the partners be unwilling to be associated with the European Defense Community. Such a development probably would lead' .to Benelux disassociation from the defense plan. (S.The Hague 631, 22 Dec 51) Comment: The Netherlands has indicatpd continual fears of French dominall3R-71 the continent. None of the Benelux countries is expected to back out of the EDF conference before the end of January, however, when the outcome of the discussions will be known.
LUXEMBOURG. Luxembourg indicates position on steel exports to Soviet A Luxembourg Foreign Office official bloc: has stated that, because his country probably will not receive any US economic or military assistance, there some question (4 the extent to which was needed imports of Russian manganese and Czech malt in exchange for Luxembourg steel should be sacrificed. added that failure to obtain Soviet He manganese would reduce Luxembourg's steel industry's contribution to the defense program. Furthermore, Orbit payments are made in advance and in dollars. (S Brussels 853, 21 Dec 51) dement: Luxembourg is slated to receive US military aseistance a on
12.
It is believed that important quantities of steel will continue to be shipped illegally to eastern Europe in view of the longLestablished TOP SECRET
limirirrale.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ?-81A-RDP79T01146A00060023660liet Si
!YE.
Approved For Re !Nee 2001109106 : ClA-RDP79T01146A00W0230001-1

TOP SECRET
4
relationship between Luxembourg producers and their steady Satellite countries. customers in Considerable amounts of these exports are licensed to the US and deflected to the Soviet bloc.
13.
On the related but much narrower question of a British the European troop public opinion may be tendingDefense Force, there is some evidence that Several weeks ago a Manchester toward a slightly more favorable position. Guardian editorial advocated contribution, and thriallirballUirall a token troop of those polled favor British last week announced that 46 percent participation in a European which are not quite clear Army under terms in the reports opinion has, however, consistently presently available. British emphasized the distinction functional cooperation and between constitutional ties with the centinental nations.
contrEFEM"to
14.
DOMINICALREpUBLIC.
members of Quetzal crew .ardoned: The hue z crew see 29 Nov 51, and 11 Dec 51) I Dai b ges s have betrnited Aug by a pardon decree of President 51, Trujillo and delivered to the Uruguayan Charge, who will accompany Guatemala. (U Ciudad Trujillo 123, them to 23 Dec 51)
o
Comment.: The Guatemalan Government had been waiting of her seamen by Trujillo on 23 December, the next amneety for the liberation with the prondse date, in accordance made to the mediating GOvernment Dominicans in the crew, of Uruguay. The two Captain Alfredo were acquitted on 12 December following Brito and his cousin Alcides Brito, the appeal of the case. There was speculation that entire affair with a Christmas the Dominican Republic might gesture by also releasing the resolve the seamen. It is believed five Cuban that if under pardon or amnesty release, Trujillo sets the Cubans free, whether Cuba will Should the pardon not be probably consider the case closed. applied to the Cubans, it is Cuban Government reported that the plans to break relations with it feels that no other the Dominican Republic, since recourse has been left to it from national dignity and necessity the standpoint of to placate popular feeling.
Three tnreeGuatennembers

Comment:
UNITED KINGDOM. British ess su .1, orta government NMarsitatair-Tommen osition on Euro ean ng on t e recen s ream o a c es on European nte the responsible British press, the American Embassy in London estimates that the general that Britain cannot become effect has been to confirm the governmentls stand an active participant Such respected in any European federation. leaders of opinion as the London Times Guardian insist that closer and the Manchester n unity of the democraTirrmust 17S7n7T5rth Atlantic be iii7171.717-Erthe community rathee than of Europe is the only important alone; and the Observer newspaper which thinks.that Atlantic community would Britainfs p0sition1ff-f57be enhanced by joining 0/ Londen 2792, 19 Dec 51) a European federation.
Fairoir-lin
Guatemalan
'
'
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/0167: CIA-RDP79T01146A00060022at151.
TOP SECRET
-
I,INCLASSIFIED when
fied when filled in form us ctached from controlled document.
API8IFOL2111
fferRffettifftelethcfo910be difteRDP7StP00461400013009:6000414d or declassi-

DOC. NO.
DOC. DAT E REG I STRY
CI A ?Ty,
.7 erm,
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
ATTENTION: This form will be placed On top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Toy Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive individuals whose official and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form Each individual who sees the Top Secret indicate the date of handling in the riyht-hand columns. document will sign and
.
REFERRED TO
OFF ICE
RECE I VED
S I GNATURE
RELEASED
DATE
T I ME
SEEN BY
S I GNATURE
OFF ICE/0 I V.

DATE
T I ME
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT
and transmitted to Central Top Secret COntro for record, DOWNGRADED

TO
When this form is detect ed from Top Secret mate !al it shall bo completed In the appropriate space below
DESTROYED
To
D I SPATCHED
ar (Signature)
(OUTSIDE CIA)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
WITNESS D BY
OIF ICE
(Signature)
BY
(Signature)
DATE
OFF ICE
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : MERDP79TO9Y46M00600230001-1

FORM
9A no ...... ...
-- - - -
-- -
-01
Approved For Re Ilmage 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000#60230001-1
TOP SECRET
26 December 1951
CIA No. 49478-A
Copy No.
45
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

CENTRAL HITELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
Approved For Relit. Se 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00400230001-1

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
CHINA. Imprisoned Americans reportedly moved to Peiping: A diplomatic 71ffiTial who recently left Peiping reports that "about.29" Americans who have been imprisoned in Communist China were.recently moved to Peiping. The source believes that this transfer may lead to the release or deportation of these Americans, possibly as a result of recent representations made on their behalf by foreign diplomats in Peiping. S/S Hong Kong 1975, 20 Dec 51)
EPYPT. King anxious to remove present government: King Farouk has became progressively more angry with the Wafd party and the way in which it has consistently outmaneuvered him since the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. He is determined to remove the present government as soon as an occasion presents itself on which he can act without arousing popular opinion against the crown.
As a prerequisite to such action, however, Farouk requires indications from the British that they would be ready to settle with a successor along lines safficiently acceptable to the Egyptian people to make such a government's position tenable. (S S/S Cairo 904, 18 Dec 51) The British GoVernment has instructed its Ambassador in Farouk to install a new goVernment but has not offered any new proposals for a settlement. There seems to be little likelihood that the British will accept the conditions required for action by Faroak.. The return of the Egyptian Foreign Minister from the UN sessions in Paris will again give greater support to the extremists and make it more difficult for elements interested in a negotiated settlement to achieve a compromise.
cairo7FTige
3.
FRANCE. French maintain basic.position on security controls: Although the French have made certain concessions, they continue to insist that security controls over German armament production be handled by contractual arrangement with Bonn rather than through the European Defense Community. The French spokesman at the three-power security-controls talks in Paris claims

Comments
Comment: Although the source claims that this development is a matter of "general knowledge" to the diplomatic corps in Peiping, this report is unconfirmed. There hae been no evidence:to date that the representations of foreign diplomatshave induced Peiping tO release imprisoned Americans or even to mitigate its treatment of them. The prospect for all foreigners imprisoned in China remains b/eak.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
TOP SECRET
26 Dec 51
Approved For Re Ihmige 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0(1400230001-1

TOP SECRET
their preoecupation with their parliamentary situation is ',by no means unwarranted or exaggerated.11
If, at the 27 December meeting of the foreign of the European Defense Community, Schuman cannot persuade ministers Adenauer to accept a contractual arrangement, the UK representative.at the securitrcontrol talks Will suggest to his government that the High Commissioners exert pressure on Adenauer to accept Schumants proposal. (S S/S Paris 3701, 22 Dec 51)
Comment; Since all members of the enjoy equa status, the French believe European Defense Community will that security controls mustbe imposed on Germany before it is admitted to the organization.
that Foreign Minister Schuman's position before the National Assembly will be ''precarious" and approval of the Defense Community treaty very doubtSul if the French Government cannot give assurance that the Germans mill be bound by safeguards outside the treaty. The US EMbassy in Paris believes that the French intend no further concessions and that
Last spring the Germans indicated that they would accept whatever arms production limitations the French proposed. In view of the short time remaining before the Lisbon NATO meeting, it is possible that Adenauer will accede on this point, although his parliamentary situation is almost as difficult as Schuman's.
.
UNITED KINGDOM. British providing new labor supply for Suez base: The British War Office considers the labor supply the chief difficulty in keeping the Suez base operative. The War Office is dubious as to the success of the current approach to Italy in an attempt skilled workers, but is willing to try anything to recruit 11,000 Semito escape the expensive alternative of sending British labor to the eanal zone. Plans to bring in 4,000 to 5,000 semi-skilled Maltese, Cypriots, and other British subjects by May are already being implemented.
The War Office expects that the unskilled labor requirement will be filled before May with workers drawn mainly from the British African colonies and Mauritius. (TS S/S London 2790, 18 Dec 51)
4".
Comments In proceeding with these plans, the British government is following the War Office judgment that the Suez base despite the contrary opinion of the British EMbassy can be kept operative, in Cairo. The War Office has apparently abandoned an earlier estimate that the Egyptian laborers would soon return.

TOP SECRET
2
26 Dec 51
' '970-14
T64) SECRET SUEDIr'

II)
NR

10..
1 0 .
KOREA. Comuni.sts resume ro8um.s jet j e t flights flights civet over Korea f t e r lull: KOREA. Communists Korea a after lull: Chinese Chinese mossages reveal that MIG-15's of the Ghinoss Communist messages reveal that MIG-15's of the Chinese Communist Third Thitd and and Sixth Sixth Divisions were were active aotive over over Korea Korea on on 23 2 3 December. Deoember. These These are are the the first First Divisions j e t flights have been been noted noted in in the combat zone zone in in four four days. days. On jet flights which which havo the combat On bo-bh 23 23 and and 24 24 December December jots j o t s from from the the Sixth Sixth Division Division wore were scheduled scheduled to to both (SUEDE Air Foroe f l y from from their their base base near near Antung Antung to t o Pyongyang Pyongyang and and back. baok. (SUEDE fly Air Force 2404152 Deo, 2404152 Deo, CM CM IN IN 63636; 63636; Air Air Foroe Force 2323552 232355Z Dec, Dec, CM CM IN IN63458) 63450
4
A' PROVED FOR RELEASE
27 Dec De0 51 51 27
~
1)7.)
p TE: 20-Mar-2010
-T
.
55
T&P SECRET SUEDh.-.

JPG13-8BGRE'll-SUEDE-
Comment: There are Korean MIG-15's Comment: a r e sufficient s u f f i o i e n t Chinese, Chinose, K o r e a and Soviet MIG-16's Bad baserglir7The based near theKorean Koreanborder border to t o fly f l y 400 400 oombat oombat sorties sorties a a day. day. Bad weather may may have have caused oaused the t h e recent reoent absenoe abseme of o f enemy enmy jet J e t flights f l i g h t 8 over over Korea. Korea. North North Korean intelligence i n t e l l i g e n o e operation in Japan and aud Hong Kong revealed: revealed: Reoently Reoently available a v a i l a b l e North North Korean messages reveal some particulars p a r t i o u l a r s of a During t he Kong. North Korean intelligence i n t e l l i g e n o e operation operation in in Japan Japan and and Hong HongKong. the bovered--April 1951 1951--the t three principal period oovered--April 1961 through Ootober 1951-the hree p rinoipal stations involved were Antung Intung and Tungwha i in Manchuria and Canton i in n Manuhuria n h e latter l a t t e r being t he o p a r a t i o n d . base olleotion o f China, t the the operational base for o collection of South China, information information conoerning aonoerning Japan Japan and and Hong Hong Kong. Kong.
11. 1 1 .
sometimea in.the i n t h e guise Korean guise of Chinese, Chinese, were were dlapatohed dispatched b r a a n agents, agents, sometimes h e message inquires i n q u i r e s about and returned returned through through Canton Canton via v i a Hong Hong Kong. Kong. One the tho possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of of 'Chinese.nationals" "Chinese nationals" obtaining English citizenship c i t i z e n s h i p in in alight indiontions hnt e n t r y iinto n t o Japan Hong some slight indications t that entry Hong Kong. Kong. There are Borne Korea. The may have have been achieved aohieved by by passing the t h e agents through South Korea. The soope of t their not revealed, revealed, although one r report soops h e i r activities a c t i v i t i e s in Japan is not eport from Hong Kong gives oonsiderable d detail DR warships warships p passing through front e t a i l on UN a s i n g through Hong Kong well Kong as 8s w e l l as a9 data data on on merohant ships. ships. C o l l a t o r a l information informntion reveals reveals t h a t two f t h e more Collateral that two o of the more important persons mentioned in the messages, Klm Kim Tong Su and H Kim Chun, were were pereons t h e messages, m Yang Chun, and possibly still s t i l l are a r e deputy deputy chiefs ohiofs of a f the t h e Third Third Office Office of o f the t h e State' State' .5eourity Bureau i in Nbrth Korea. S e o u r i t y Bureau n North Korea. The The Third Third Office Offioe in in this t h i s bureau bureau is is
res onsible for external intelligence, inoluding South Korea. (BUEDE 51, 23 23 Apr 61 61 2,/51, 5 May 51 19/51, 14 May 511 W61, 1 Sep 51; 51, 8 Sep 51; 6 51, 10 Sep 51;1 , 30 Oot 51)
,,'
NR
-T01:1-8BER8311-SUEDE-
27 Deo Dec 51 51 27
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0fia00250001-9
TOP SECRET
25X1
28 December 1951
145
13AILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Co.mments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
*Army, Navy and State Department review(s) completed.

TOP SEIM ET
osteet._etstienenottol 25X1
Approved For Release 20
A000600250001-9
Approved ForRela2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A009100250001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
25X1
YUGOSLAVIA. Former Army Cominformists released by re ime: Minister of the Interior has The Yugoslav announced the release of 137 former members. The edict, issued army during the celebration of Army Day, that these men have been convinced announced of the seriousness can be expected to contribute of their crimes and "tn +Ain uilding and strengthening socialist country." of our
Comment: The significance of this release announcement which came during Army lies in the timing of its Day celebrations. been releasing in.the past The regime has year large numbers of "re-educated" apparently in an effort to demonstrate Cominformists, the "unity,' of the Yugoslav and the logic of Tito's anti-Soviet people position. The propaganda of this particular objective amnesty announcement increasing evidence of may be an attempt to counteract Yugoslav dependence Communist army personnel on the West and the effects of reported on arrests of anti-Western army officers.
2.
Yu oslavs re ect ma orit rules ado ted b Danube Commission: Belgrade, in reporting the Radio end of the fifth states that Yugoslavia session of the Danube Commission, voted against the majority-adopted ing the navigation regulations coveron the Danube.
The Yugoslav delegateS objected to the newly they contained clauses which established rules because conflict with Yugoslav laws, Soviet-dominated majority Moreover, the was also accused of ignoring slav arguments', "all justified Yupnsubmitted during the present session.
Comment: Ear/ier reports ty had adopted a conciliatory from US officials suggested that the majoriattitude toward Yugoslavia more crucial issues, specifically However, on the the majority should be allowed to investigate ships involved rule that the owner country waters, the majority in accidents in Yugoslav apparently fulfilled Yugoslavia's key representations. its expected role by rejecting
I 25X1
The result of a lack of unanimity will be the existence flicting navigational additional basis for codes on the Danube, a situation which of two conprovides an new provocations.
3.
Yu oslavia re acts Hun arian char e of ille of Hun arian territo The Belgrade radio has al Yu oslav occu ation no justification announced that there is for Hungary's note to fugoslavia slav occupation charging illegal Yugoof a Hungarian island situated in the Mura River.
The
TOP SECRET
1
Approved For Release 2003/04124 : CIA-R13P79101146A00060auttF1-61
Approved For Rekaaie 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00a00250001-9

TOP SECRET
25X1
Algoslave contend that the island, formed after the war by a chan e in the course of the Mura River, is still in Yugoslav territory.
Comment: Yugoslavia had charged Hungary with an illegal occupation of Yugoslav territory on 20 December, claimed that this was another in a series of planned incidents, and stated that "our peoples will yield no part of their territory to usurpers."
25X1
Hungary subsequently delivered a note to Belgrade asserting that the island had been seized illegally from Hungary by Yugoslav peasants who were unlawfUlly cutting tiMber.

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04124 :2CIA-RDP79T01146A000ERThitOb0511-9
Approved For Release 2003104/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146AOS00250001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
25X1
Iranian-Prime Minister refuses to sign Mutual Seourity Act agreement: Mossadeq has again refused to consider signing the agreement required by the Mutual Security Act which 'provides among other things that the recipient country contribute to the "defense of the free world." He insisted that if formal signatures are required1 the matter, must be_presented to the Majlis end the Senate. He stated that he would be neutral in presenting the meter and suggested that Ambassador Henderson might-judge for himself whether or nat parliament would be willing to give the required assur25X1 anOes.
Comment: There are no indications that Mossadeq will become more amenable M-rgning the agreement provided for in the Mutual Security Aot. In their present mood the two Iranian Houses Will hardly act quickly or favorably on a politioal matter of such an explosive nature.
2.
IRAN.
25X1
3.
?DPSECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/243: CIA-RDP79T01146A00060025aPif 51
Approved For Release 2003104/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A008.00250001-9

TOP SECRET
25X1
U.
AFGHANISTAN. India may be supplying arms to Afghanistan: An Afghan Army colonel told a US Embassy representative that he had just returned from an ,arms purchasing trip to India. The EMbassy coMmente that these arms may be part of Indials assistance to Afghanistan in return for the latter's pressure on Pakistan.regarding Pushtoonistan. The Smbassy-further-staies that the on*. waY Indian arms oould reach Afghanistan at present would be aboard planes of the Himalayan Aviation Company, Ltd., whioh recently inaugurated an otherwise apparently unprofitable weekly servici from India to Kabul via Iran. I I
25X1
25X1
5.
CHINA.
Earlaunohed a program for short-term modernization of Tibet, aocording to
Chinese Communists plan modernization of Tibet:
The Chinese Communists
25X1
Indian press reports. This program is said to include building of motorable' roads, construction If a radio network in southern Tibet, installation of a printing press, electrification of important towns, opening of technical schoole, and establishment op a state bank, It is reported that the modernization program is supported by the Tibetan Government and that the Dalai Lama has appealed to the monasteripm and nnbillint for financial contributions.
Comments
Short-term modernization of Tibet will necessarily be rudioccupying Tibet need transportation, communication and propaganda facilities in order to effect the political and military integration of that region with China proper. As such facilities are developed in Communist Tibet, the stability of adjacent territories in the Indian sphere will become threatened.
mentan Communists
The foroing of a degree of technical culture upon Tibetans will contribute to the ultimate elimination of Tibetan feudal traditions, It is-assumed that any public appeal made by the Dalai Lama was diotated by the Chinese Communists, who plan eventually to expropriate the Tibetan monasteries and nobility.
25X1
1
6.
25X1 25X1
Unidentified POW's seen at Dairen:lki Ireport having seen about 100 s being esoorted through the Liren dook area by Chinese guards on 16 November, The identify of the POW's who were taller than their guards, was not apparent. I
25X1
TOP SECRET
4 Approved For Release 2003/04124 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600250001-a Deo 51
Approved For Re liaise 2003/04124 : CIA-RDP79T01146A019800250001-9

TOP SECRET
z
Comments
This report doe* not specify whether the prisoners were
Caumarif so, they might have been either Soviet troops in the Port
Arthur naval base area or DE POW's taken in Korea. Several thousand of the latter have been reported at various points in Communist China.
7.
FECOM warns, hoWever, thei the enemy's logistical build-up, his increasing air,Poiver, and his strength on the groundparticularly in armor and artillery --reint to his retentien of the capability of launching a major offensive.
25X1
8.
.

TOP SECRET
5
KOREA. FECOM believes Communistemill continue on defensives As the 30-day 7;TM of relative military inactivity in Korea approaches an end, Far East Command interprets the meager evidence availeble as indicating that the enemy will pont/nue on the defensive. FECOM cites as evidence that Communist artillery is still disposed in depth and a great part of it will necessarily have to be moved forward before the enemy can engage in offensive operations. Soma POW's have asserted that their units' Missions are defensive and will remain so until mid-February, while other POW's have reported that their units are engaged in preparing defensive positions. No major troop movements.have been noted during the past 30 days, which Would suggest that an offensive is not imminent.
25X1
President Rhea states that he will not oppose planned constitutional anmaxiiments At the twelfth regular session of thelNational Assemblywhich 20 December, President Rhee made the startling ancrluite unexpeoted" statement thathe.lould not.oppose the proposed constitutional amendment which makes the 'Oabinet responsible to the assembl1.7 The US MilitaryAttache comments that there is no indication yet is:.to.the'real reasons fOrthee's announcement or if he merely intends only to give lip service to the statement. I
ZOIneon
Comments The amendment provides for the assignment to each ministry of.onThrre.mter of the National Assembly as a vice-ministet, who xtuld aot in an executive capacity and be a liaison man with the assembly. .Rhee may have aocluiesced-because Of pressure from within his own parts, a majority (sc.which favors the bill.
28 Deo 51
Approved For Re !bade 2003/04124 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00,200250001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1. FRANCE. De Gaulle attacks European integration plans: A recent statement by General de Gaulle is interpreted by the US Embassy in Paris as a possible forerunner of attacks against the US and French Governments for having failed at European unification by allowing Germany to become too powerful.
-
25X1
Comment Both the current Gaullist line andthese indications of future party tactics spell continued difficulty for the middle-of-the-road government. De Gaulle's criticism closely parallels Communist vituperations against the European Army and the "American occupation of France." Such a propaganda assault is especially serious in France, where popular sentiment is innately apprehensive both of foreign troops on French soil and of the rebirth of a ' German war potential.
2.
25X1
AUSTRIA. Soviet-controlled enterprise supplies railway tank cars to the West: An Austrian manufacturer under the control of the Administration of STViet Enterprises in Austria (USIA) is reported to have accepted a large order foi" railway tank cars from the Turkish National Railways and to have succeeded in delivering a portion of the order to Turkey throuph In Italian middleman. M two Soviet directors oi tne /irm were coincidentally removed from their positions while the transaction was in progress, but a third is reported to have consummated the deal on the plea that MIA needed the dollars involved. The Military Bank in Vienna allegedly andled the financial arrangements.
[
At a recent press conference, De Gaulle gave the first indications that if his current bitter attacks against the European Army should fail, he would then launch an assault on the alleged German comback, saying that German "hegemony" could have been prevented had he been granted power in time. The General predicted that the present "weak piecemeal approach" to European integration would lead to "disappointment and disgust" xith.the European idea, and would result in the failure of European union and in "Atlantic disunity."
25X1
ISoviet
return for needed foreign exchange, the export of tank cars must be regarded as indicative of either a pressing need for funds or unusual zeal on the part of individual plant directors.
3.
Comment: Mhile Soviet-controlled enterprised in eastern Austria have heret3TErrafered surplus and non-strategic items to Western buyers in
NETHERLANDS.. The Dutch oppose other European Defense Community nations on Internal defense force issue: The Dutch delegates to the Paris Conference on a turopean Defense Community will accept the plan favored by the French, TOP SECRET
28 Dec 51
Approved For Rajpese 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A9/0600250001-9

TOP SECRET
I.
Germans and Italians, whereby all internal defense forces would form part of the European Defense Force, provided that only the national governments -and not the Defense Community -- have the authority to commit any of these forces to SHAPE.
The German delegate, suspecting that the Dutch are trying to retain the nucleus of a national army, states that if the Dutch plan is adopted West Germany will also have to create some national forces in order to secure Bundestag ratification.
Comment:
25X1
The German delegate's remark is prompted by his Parliament's
would in effect discriminate against Mbst Germany.
The Netherlands and Belgium have intimated a willingness to accept a common budget under international control in exchange for a longer transition period (see following article). This may lead to conciliation on the less important issue of internal defense forces.
L.
BELGIUM-THE NETHERLANDS. Benelux indicates compromise on common budget proposal: The Benelux delegates to the European Defense Forces conference have indicated a willingness to accept a common budget under international The Dutch and the control in exchange for a longer transition period. Belgians have intimated that if there is agreement for a transition period beyond the proposed December 1953 deadline, they will agree to a common In general, agreebudget arrangement for the definitive period following. ment was reached that this common budget would-include all expenditures of the EDF forces and institutions.
1
insisr=ern equal treatment in the European Defense Community. Since the Allies, and especially the French Government, oppose the formation of any German national forces under a wholly German command, the Dutch proposal
25X-1
5.
25X1
ITALY.
Comment: The Benelux delegates have heretofore been adamant in their opposition to a common budget under international control. Their apparent willingness to compromise will eliminate one of the largest stumbling blocks in the EDF plan, on which the EDF Hinisters are now meeting to iron out the remaining difficulties and to reach agreement in time for the February NATO meeting in Lisbon.
Italian ratification of Schuman Plan expected: The Foreign Affairs nalatee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies has already begun consideration of the Schuman Plan treatY, but the US Embassy in Rome believes ratification by both Houses will probably not be achieved until some time in February. With ratification in principle supported by all the democratic parties, it is Practically certain that Parliament will take favorable action after some
debate.
TOP SECRET
28 Dec 51.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : JA-RDP79T01146A000600250001-9
Approved For Re See 2003/04124 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001400250001-9

TOP SECRET
Comment: The majority. Christian Democrats, with the support of other moderarei5iFties, should experience no difficulty in securing the bill's passage, even though nationalistic rightwing elements may join the Communist Party in opposition. Implementation of the treaty may be hampered, however, by interested industrial groups who have consistently opposed the Schuman Plan since its inception and have been largely responsible for the long delay in its presentation of Parliament.
6.
Differences have been reported between Pella and Finance Minister Vanoni, and even between Pella and Premier de Gasperil on the subject of defense spending. Long standing opposition by both left and rightwing Christian Democrats to concentration of financial powers in Pellals hands resulted in a Cabinet reorganization in July.
If new Cabinet changes seem indicated, De Gasperi "will certainly use the opportunity to try to get the democratic Socialists and Liberals back into the government.0 meanwhile, democratic Socialist leader Saragat stated 25X1 on 22 December that his party would remain in the opposition'until the Italian national elections.
Comment: Although the Christian DeMocrats will probably manage to resolirtgrr differences teMporarily in order to ensure support of the government in Parliament, where the party has a majority, Pella's control over the Italian economy raises serious questions regarding Italy's participation in the Western community. Italy's contribution to Western defense is limited by Pella's Hdefense of the lire policy, and the govern ment1s ability to survive the 1952 national elections is jeopardized by party division aver this issue.
7.
Because the Liberals and democratic Socialists have made it plain ever since the spring municipal elections that they have no intention of returning, De Gasperi may find it necessary to turn to the ektreme right for support.
PORTUGAL. American aid for Portuguese defense effort urged by US Embassy: The US AMbassador in Lisbon believes that political considerations make it highly important that the US reverse its tentative decision not to program economic aid for portugal in fiscal year 1953. He points out that the present Portuguese plan for defense expansion, for which Portugal seeks 30 million dollars, is the result not only of American insistence on a

TOP SECRET
Italians fear Cabinet crisis: Opposition to the government's Budget Ministry bill recently passed by the Italian Senate has led to speculation as to whether a Cabinet crisis might result if it is defeated in Parliament early in January. The bill would give added powers to the Budget Ministry, now headed by Christian Democrat Pella.
8 27 Dec 51 Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000600250001-9
Approved For Rekhate 2003/04/24 : ClA-RDP79T01146A041*00250001-9

.TOP SECRET
maximum defense effort by all NATO countries, but also of Defense Minister Santos Costa's personal cooperation with.US officials and his influence on Prime Minister Salazar. The AMbassador feels that failure to program aid for Portugal would amount to belittling the Portuguese defense effort and would undermine confidence in American leadership and adversely affect cooperation between the two governments in all fields.
25X1
25X1
8.
UNITED KINGDOM. Small rise in UK coal production seen for 1952: British secretary of State for Fuel and Power Lord Leathers has promised NSA officials a vigorous government effort to raise British coal production arid full cooperation within GEEC for solving Western Europe's coal problem. The Chairman of the National Coal Board, however, in a later conversation predicted that British output for 1952 would rise by not more than four million tons, while an additional five mdllion. tons might be saved by "improved" consumption.
,
25X1
1
Comment: Portugal had estimated that its minimum defense contribution under NATO would require 30 million dollars in additional appropriations over the next three years. The Portuguese had insisted, however, that the domestic economy could not support this added expenditure and that equivalent amounts of direct American aid would be necessary. The NATO Temporary Council ComMittee .declined to recommend either increased Portuguese defense expenditures or the American aid requested by Portugal.
25X1
Comment: Nine million tons, which represents an increase of about four perceEE-WE Britain's 1950 coal production, would go less than halfway toward meeting Western Europe's urgent need for non-dollar coal. During 1951 the various Continental countries were scheduled to import 28 million tons from the US, thus significantly worsening their international payments position. Although the UK has been exporting some coal to the Continent, it is itself scheduled to receive 750,000 tons of US coal in the first quarter of 1952.
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04124 :
_ Dec 51 1A-RDP79T01146A000600250002B 1-9
Approved For Relapse 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00600250001-9

TOP SECRET
10.
Bolivian Ambassador says US tin policy endangers good-neiAor Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, has stated t a his country is losing confidence in the good-neighbor policy because the US Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in violation of such international agreements as the Bogota Charter, has fixed arbitrary prices for Bolivian tin. He declared that "for the US the issue represents the price of two bombers; for Bolivia it means an economic crisis...." He added that what is being done today with tin may be done tomorrow with copper, coffee, rubber, and other South American raw materials. I I
BOLIVIA.
cy:
pr
25X1
Comment: Earlier in December the Bolivian Government announced that at a propitious moment it would ask the Organization of American States to judge the prolonged Bolivian-US disagreement over the price of tin. Meanwhile, Bolivian diplomats have been seeking support for its position in other Latin American.countries, many of whom share Bolivia's views regarding the defense of primary producers.
25X1
TOP SECRET
10
28 Dec
51
25X1

OrOvedFor
lide 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0001)02500016
TOP SECRET
25X1
28 December 1951
CIA No. 49480-A
Copy No.
45
25X1

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release Luu.samu4 : LIA-RDvrviu J6A000600250001-9
25X1
-Approved For Reisete 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A09a00250001-9

TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
recently told the American Ambassador that the Government of India concurs in the view that Chinese failure to make nreasonable agreements,' in Korea
CHINA/INDIA. Indian Government attempting to influence Peiping's position on Korea: The Secretary-General of the rndian Ministry of External Affairs
would be a further indication of Soviet control of Peiping's policies. Indian official indicated that his government was making this point
nvigorouslyn to the Peiping regime.
The
was confident of a successful conclusion to the Korean negotiations. Conceding that such an agreement would require a ',drastic change,' in Peiping's
25X1
The Indian Ambassador to Peiping told the American Ambassador that he
position to make any point nvigorously,n as he apparently does not have access
had no discernible effect on Peiping's policies.

2.
to influence Chinese Communist leaders upon his return, the prospects for success in such an effort are poor. Indian representations in the past have
to the top officials of the regime. While the Indian Ambassador may attempt
JAPAN. Political Adviser comments on significance of Japanese cabinet reorganization: The reorganization of the Japanese cabinet on 25 December caught both politicians and the public by surprise, according to US Political Adviser Sebald. He reports that the purpose of the change is threefold:
to reduce internal Liberal Party friction, to strengthen the cabinet for the coming Diet session, since an incresie in the effectiveness of the opposition Democrats is anticipated, and to effect the continuation of the Yoshida cabinet after the peace treaty comes into force.
On the transfers of individuals, Sebald comments that the promotion of Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki to State Minister is significant. Yoshida intends to make Okazaki the Foreign Minister after the Occupation; meanwhile, he will play an important role in negotiating the administrative agreement under the Security Treaty. Sebald believes that Okazaki's appointment strengthens the government's hand in foreign relations. Ohashils transfer from Attorney General to State Minister will make him available to head the proposed Ministry of Internal Security. 25X1
Comment: In general the Japanese press has viewed the reorganization with 7EigraFtrable skepticism and has termed it a mere reshuffle. It probably does not materially strengthen Yoshida's hand in dealing with the Diet
oppos ition.

Comment:
TOP SECRET
attitude, the Indian representative stated that, upon his return to Peiping in late Januariy, he would make nevery effort', to induce Peiping to modify its pos
It is questionable that the Indian Charge in Peiping is in a
1
28 Dec 51
Approved For Relapse 2003104/24 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0W00250001-9

TOP SECRET
The Japanese press has already announced that Yoshida has virtually ordered the Foreign Office to take its instructions from Okazaki.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3.
Comment: The significance of the Security Council's action is not known. The move may be a face-saving gesture, since Brazil_ has still offered no material aid for the UN struggle in Korea. On the Other hand, it may be
an effort to obtain additional railway equipment, since any appreciable increase in the supply of strategic materials:to the up depends heavily on the improvement of Brazil's transportation system.'
BRAZIL. Negotiations on supply of strategic materials to US authorized: 5177Toreign Minister has informed the US Amthassador that the Brazilian National Security Council on 22 December unanimously authorized President Vargas to negotiate agreements with the US on the supply of strategic materials. Vargas has instructed the Foreign Minister to conduct these negotiations soon. The Ambassador states that he "will endeavor to secure clarification of the action taken by the Security Council and the scope of the Foreign Minister's instructions."
25X1
pp
SECRET
2
28 Dec 51

1951년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 2 안치용

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

1951년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 2 안치용

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

r'

D A I L Y KOREAN KOREAN DAILY

25 JUly 1951 1951

Other UN aircraft flevr 672 sorties, including 401. coolant missions.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

General Situation Political

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

26 July 1951 26 1951

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIB

Situation Military Situation

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

SIC (9630 9630 SIC

DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

General G e ~ e r a Situation Situation l

slO 9631 9631 Sm

28 28 July July 1951 1951

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

sIc SIC 9632 96%

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

General Situation Situation 11. II. cknmrl

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

sIC SIC 9633 9633

D A I L Y X O R E A I BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY KOREAN

mortar fire daily on US X Corps positions. Enewercups in platoon

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

Land-based UN aircraft flew a total of 1,014 sorties, including

reconnaissance Ames. A total of 6/4. medium baraxers radar-bothed

II. General Situation

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

24; THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION

General situation Situation II. 11. oenersl

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

sIc 9535 9635 SIC

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY

27 z7 THE THE C.I.A. C.1.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

II. 11. General General Situation Situation

The index index number nuder of of retail retall The

delegation deleetlon as Ma a fait f a l t accompli. accompli.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

DAILY KOREAN X O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIm

Situation Military situation

General General Situation Bituatlon

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

DAILY i:OREAN BULLETIN

In ..:ho US I Corps 2one, ROX let Divieion patrols made several

Litijv:std positi one.

Artillery 611 mortar fire fell on US 2nd Division

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

Wo aignificant reports Immix:en received during the past 48 hours.

To learn how to use PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org

SIC 9639 BIC 9639 7 August 1952 1951 7

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T 1 8