B.3 Anonymous v. Radam Facts: Ma.

Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth outside wedlock. The complainant claimed that respondents behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. In connection with the complaint, Judge Abella conducted a discreet investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. He find out that truthfulness of the allegation. He was told by the respondent that they are unable to marry because they plan to migrate to Canada. In a further investigation it was revealed that the father of her son is unknown, as shown by the childs Certificate of Live Birth. In this connection, Judge Abella recommends that respondent MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that, respondent be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker. However, it proposed that she be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine ofP5,000 for stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father was "unknown" to her. Issue: whether or not respondent may be held liable in relation to her entry in her childs birth certificate regarding her sons father? Held: No. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain ones side, whether written or verbal. This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child. She was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed. Judge Abellas investigation focused solely on that matter. She was neither confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process. Case dismissed.

B.4 Macias v. Macias Facts: This involves an administrative complaint filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Judge Macias, with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos, single and in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the filing of the complaint. On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution referring the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order setting the initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28, 2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2002. On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order that both parties should be ready the following day if no settlement was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement. On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and circumspection in his actions. The case now comes before this Court for final resolution. Issue: whether or not is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the
judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Held:
No. When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability. There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges.

However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint. If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge. This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.

Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Macias is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

B.5 Agabon v. NLRC FACTS: RHI is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. They filed an illegal

dismissal complaint wherein the Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal to be illegal. The NLRC reversed the LA because it found that pets. had abandoned their work and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis when they reported for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. RHI, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. In fact, they sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. PRs manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone to tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers involving 40,000 square meters of cornice installation work. However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was afforded due process? Held: No. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
B. 6 Michael H. v. Gerald D.

Facts:

In May, 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June, 1984. In November, 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to paternity Moreover, the court denied Michael's and Victoria's motions for visitation pending appeal The California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting Michael's procedural and substantive due process challenges as well as Victoria's due process and equal protection claims. The court also rejected Victoria's assertion of a right to continued visitation with Michael on the ground that California law denies visitation against the wishes of the mother to a putative father who has been prevented from establishing his paternity.

Issue: Whether or not due process was violated? Held: There is no merit to Michael's substantive due process claim that he has a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest in the parental relationship he has established with Victoria, and that protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of that relationship. Michael has failed to meet his burden of proving that his claimed "liberty" interest is one so deeply imbedded within society's traditions as to be a fundamental right. Not only has he failed to demonstrate that the interest he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been accorded protection by society, but the common law presumption of legitimacy, and even modern statutory and decisional law, demonstrate that society has historically protected, and continues to protect, the marital family against the sort of claim Michael asserts. Victoria's assertion that she has a due process right to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald is, at best, the obverse of Michael's claim and fails for the same reasons. Nor is there any merit to her claim that her equal protection rights have been violated because, unlike her mother and presumed father, she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy, since the State's decision to treat her differently from her parents pursues the legitimate end of preventing the disruption of an otherwise peaceful union by the rational means of not allowing anyone but the husband or wife to contest legitimacy.