Section

2 Search and Seizures Art 3, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Art 3, Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. RULE 113, RULES OF COURT Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. RULE 126, RULES OF COURT Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. PEOPLE VS. MARTI [193 SCRA 57; G.R. NO. 81561; 18 JAN 1991] Facts: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents. He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana flowering tops. The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Issue: Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his possession. Held: No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.

STONEHILL vs DIOKNO FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin, Respondents-Prosecutors, Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question; alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Respondents-prosecutors answered (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. But in a resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations (referred in the case as 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question) above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners (referred in the case as 2nd group). As regards the first group, the Court held that the petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, because said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. The court further stated that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties and the petitioners therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the 2nd group, the resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining the Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against the petitioners.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not. 2. If the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. HELD: 1. Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. However, none of the said requirements were complied with. The warrant only stated that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." Hence, the accusations were abstract, no specific violation stated, and the judges who issued such warrants would have not found any probable cause. Upholding the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence; adopting the Revised Rules of Court provision which states that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense" and "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense;" the court invalidated the said search warrants for being general ones and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof. 2. Furthermore, reiterating previous jurisprudence on evidence illegally acquired through faulty search warrants and searches and seizures authorized under such warrants; and explaining the exclusion doctrine, where evidence obtained unlawfully acquired cannot be admitted as evidence against the accused; the court did not admit said documents, papers and things be used in evidence against petitioners. We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Leovigildo U. Mantaring vs. Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. et. Al M. No. RTJ-93-964. Feb. 28, 1996. 254 SCRA 158 Facts: Mantaring filed an administrative complaint against Judge Roman charging the latter of conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. Thereafter, Judge Roman issued a warrant of arrest against Mantaring and his son. The Judge alleges that the warrant was issued against Gamo and it just so happened that the place where the illegal firearms were seized was owned by Mantaring; hence, Mantaringand his son were arrested for they were in constructive possession of the illegal firearms. Mantaring now comes before this court alleging that it was improper for the Judge to take cognizance of the application of the arrest warrant. According to Mantaring, the Judge should have inhibited himself for there was a pending administrative case which involved him and Mantaring. Mantaring claims that the judge issued the warrant of arrest as a form of revenge against Mantaring and his son for filing the administrative case. Issue: Whether or not the judge should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the application for the warrant of arrest. Held: Yes, the judge should have inhibited himself. For the judge's failure to inhibit, he is reprimanded and warned that commission of the same act shall be severely dealt with in the future. It is true that the court had consistently held that mere filing of an administrative complaint against judge does not constitute a ground for the disqualification of the judge. However, the factual milieu of these cases is different from the case at hand. In those cases, the administrative complaint was filed during the pendency of the criminal case. In the case at hand, however, the administrative complaint was filed before the involvement of the judge in the criminal case against Mantaring. It cannot be otherwise concluded that a spirit of revenge against Mantaring for having filed the administrative complaint in this case dictated the judges action. This circumstance should have underscored for the judge the need of steering clear of the case because he might be perceived to be suceptible to bias and partiality. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988] Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. Issue:

Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President. Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

Morano v. Vivo Facts: Petitioner, a Filipino, brought this action since his wife, Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China and her minor son Fu Yan Fun, her minor son by first marriage, is ordered by the commissioner of immigration to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest. Contention: The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent contends that Chan Sau Wah is not a Filipino Citizen. Petitioner on the other hand assails the constitutionality of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 which allows the Commissioner of Immigration to issue a warrant of arrest for deportation proceedings. Issue: WON petitioner's contention is correct. Held: No. Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a convict of, crime, nor is it a punishment.

Silva v Presiding Judge Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers. Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva. Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money. The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.

 *** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits. Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 June 1988 FACTS: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now. Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. ISSUES: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. (2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. HELD: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based

on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people. ALVAREZ v. CFI FACTS: The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him. On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night of June 4, 1936 and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. The seized articles have not been brought immediately to the presiding judge.

ISSUES: 1.) What is the nature of searches and seizures as contemplated in the law? 2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant? 3.) What is the purpose of the deposition of other witnesses in addition to the affidavit? 4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night? 5.) Whether or not the search warrant must contain a particular description of the place and the thing to be seized? 6.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional? HELD: 1. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them. 2. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. There should be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be base upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witness he may produce. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. 3. It is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected. 4. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night. 5. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with.

 6. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself Soriano MATA vs Hon. josephine BAYONA Facts:Soriano Mata was charged with violation of PD 810, the complaint alleging that he took and arranged bets onthe ja i alai game by selling Masiao tickets without authority from the Phil. Jai alai and amusement corp. During the hearingof the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected with its issuance could not be f ound from the records of the case. He was given copies of the affidavits connected with the issuance of the warrant but the same were not certified or were just photocopied records. When he inquired from the City Fiscal the certified copies of the records pertinent to the issuanceof the search warrant, respondent Judge replied, "its with the court". Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, invok ing Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge denied the motion stating that the Court had made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo Golez and Reynaldo Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of the Police District, and that the co urt had made a certification to that effect and the rule does not specify when the pertinent documents are to be attache d to the records of the case. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of the Masiao lottery, she thought it mor e prudent not to conduct the taking of the deposition which is usually done publicly in the court room. Issue: WON the absenceof certified depositions would render the search warrant illegal Held: yes, the absence of certified depositions would render the search warrant illegal, for being violative of the constitu tuion. Mere affidavits are not sufficient in issuing a warrant. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the com plainant and the witnesses he may produce. The written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may properly de termine the existence of probable cause. Deposition is the written testimony of the witness given in the course of the judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oralexami ation.it must be under oath and must be in writing. Rule126: the judge must, before issuing the warrant,personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writinv and attach them to the record, in addition to theaffidavit s presented him. In issuing a search warrant, Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provi sions. People vs. Del Rosario G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994 Facts:

Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Cavite City, Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo de Guia issued in the morning of September 4, 1991 a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City. After the issuance of the search warrant, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure a black canister containing shabu, an aluminium foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and three wallets, one containing the marked money. They also found inside a show box aluminium foils, napkins and a burner. Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Held: No. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia. Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, Facts: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when

he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Issues: Whether the policemen have personal knowledge of the person to be arrested has committed the crime when they proceeded to scene crime and the witness pointed the appellant? Whether the evidence that was found to appellants pocket is admissible? Held: Yes, the policemen have personal knowledge that the person to be arrested have committed the crime. The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. Yes, the evidence was admissible. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized." UMIL v. RAMOS Per Curiam FACTS: Consolidated cases for Habeas Corpus. RE: ROLANDO DURAL Ronnie Javellon was arrested without a warrant while he was confined at the Saint Agnes Hospital and receiving treatment for gunshot wounds. The doctors alerted the military to his presence there. He was identified

the day before as being one of the people who shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Javellon later turned out to be Rolando Dural, a known NPA member. RE: AMELIA ROQUE, WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, DOMINGO ANONUEVO, RAMON CASIPLE, AND VICKY OCAYA The accused were arrested after military agents received information from a former NPA member that two houses one occupied by Renato Constantine and located in Molave Street, Marikina Heights, Marikina; and one occupied by Benito Tiamzon were being used as NPA safehouses. The houses were put under military surveillance. Pursuant to a search warrant, Renato Constantine was confronted. He could not produce any permit for the firearms in his house, as well as the ammunitions, radio and other equipment in the residence. He also admitted that he was a ranking member of the NPA. Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the safehouse and had letters for Constantine and other rebels. He also admitted to being an NPA courier. Amelia Roque was arrested in consequence to Buenaobras arrest because he had in his possession papers leading to her whereabouts. Subversive documents and live ammunition were found in her possession and she admitted to belonging to the group. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the safehouse and agents frisked them, finding subversive documents, and loaded guns without permits. Vicky Ocaya was arrested without a warrant when she arrived at the house of Benito Tiamzon. Tiamzons house was the subject of a search warrant. Ammunition and subversive documents were thereafter found in Ocayas car. RE: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU The accused was arrested without a warrant on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses that at 5:00pm, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, and on November 22, 1988, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, saying Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, hanggang sa magkagulo na. RE: NARCISO NAZARENO Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa. 14 days later, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects, was arrested and he pointed out Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing. That same morning, Nazareno was arrested without a warrant. ISSUE: Were the arrests validly effected? HELD: RE: ROLANDO DURAL YES, the warrantless arrest was valid. He was committing an offense when he was arrested being an NPA member. The NPA is an outlawed organization and membership therein is a continuing crime. He did not cease to be a subversive for purposes of arrest simply because he was confined at St. Agnes Hospital. Military agents were dispatched on confidential information to verify if an NPA member had indeed been admitted for a gunshot wound. The information was based on actual facts, supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member truly was in that hospital. RE: AMELIA ROQUE, WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, DOMINGO ANONUEVO, RAMON CASIPLE, AND VICKY OCAYA YES, their arrests were all valid. They were searched pursuant to search warrants and were found with unlicensed firearms, explosives and ammunition. They were caught in flagrante delicto. The reason for all their arrests was that military authorities received information about 2 safehouses being used by the NPA, with exact locations and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon. At the time of their arrests, they had ownership of unlicensed firearms, ammunition, subversive documents. They also admitted to membership in the NPA. There was probable cause to support their warrantless arrests.

 RE: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU YES, the warrantless arrest was valid. He was arrested not for subversion but for uttering words which the arresting officers believed to constitute Inciting to Sedition. The case was mooted anyhow, considering the failure of the investigating officers to appear at the re-investigation. RE: NARCISO NAZARENO YES, the warrantless arrest was valid. Although Nazarenos arrest was effected 14 days later, the arrest falls under Sec.5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court since it was only then that the police came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. The arrest had to be made promptly, even without a warrant, to prevent possible flight.

People vs. Sucro Facts: March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo Aklan was instructed by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi, Jr (Station Commander) to monitor the activities of respondent because of the information gathered that he was selling marijuana. About 5pm, Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo street. Adjacent to the house, was a chapel. Fulgencio saw the respondent enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be a marijuana. He handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. He also gave marijuana to a group of persons. Fulgencio then radioed Seraspi and reported what was going on. After witnessing a third buyer identified as Ronnie Macabante, Seraspis team proceeded to the area. The team caught up Macabante and admitted that he bought marijuana from the respondent. The police team arrested the respondent and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags were sent to Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. Upon arraignment, trial court rendered judgment finding Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under the Dangerous Drug Act. Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful Held: Court ruled in the affirmative. The contention by the reposndent that his arrest was illegal and that the police team has enough time to prepare for a warrant is without merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. (1) When a peace officer or private person, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (2) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that said person has committed it. In this case, Fulgencio witnessed the commission by the respondent of the offense and the police team had personal knowledge since Macabante admitted about the sale of prohibited drugs by the respondent. In People vs Bati: Police officers have personal knowledge when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

The failure to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the previous surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that a probable cause existed. That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. One exception granted by law: Rule 126, Sec12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure, a peson lawfully arresred may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without search warrant. Go vs. CA Case Digest Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990 ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS:

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City ISSUE: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid. HELD: The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. People vs. Rodriqueza (G.R. No. 95902, Feb 4, 1992) Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and a certain object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to

headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or Not the raid conducted by NARCOM agents is in violation of unreasonable Search and Seizures? Held: The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: People vs. Mengote GR No. 87059 June 22, 1992 *Under warrantless search and arrest FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. Information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. HELD: YES. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating

the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer-could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security. Malacat v CA Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as follows: On or about August 27, 1990, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. At pre-trial, the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade. Rodolfo testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade On 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two

others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner Ito ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth and said, You are the one who shot me. Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest done by the police officers was valid. Held: The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were Confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers Had to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus It is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner Later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Searches and Seizures: People v Aminnudin GR No. L-74869 July 6, 1988 Facts: The Philippine Constabulary (PC) officers of Iloilo City received a tip from one of their informers that the accused, Aminnudin, was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo and was carrying Marijuana. The vessel was to arrive a few days after receiving the said tip. Upon arrival, Aminnudin was immediately arrested after the PC officers had accosted him, inspected his bag and found 3 kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves. The accused alleged that his bag was confiscated without a search warrant and that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed without a warrant of arrest after the marijuana had been found in his possession.

Issue: Whether or not the search of defendants bag is legal? Held: No, the search is not legal. The warrantless search was illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused- appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." The Supreme Court found that the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused- appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent. Accused-appellant was acquitted. People vs Malmstedt Gr. No. 91107 Facts: Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of May 7 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. At around 7:00 am of May 11 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on May 13 1989. At about 8:00 am of that same day, Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning,that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of 7 NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 am. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The 2 NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. The officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. In the report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed because by reason that the search and arrest made was illegal. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

The warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant. RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: 1. The petitioner was charged under: That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug. 2. Based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 3. A forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section confirmed that the articles sent to her by Pat. Aquino tested positive for marijuana. 4. By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure was constitutional, provided that the petitioner was apprehended based on evidence, which was irrelevant and not properly identified, and he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process. HELD: Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts. The findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail. The issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; NOTE: The Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip 461 SCRA 574 Facts: Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip. The seizure of the finished and unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins; Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins; and Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins in violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203. A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search warrant. Thus, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant on January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Later, the respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building, where items in open display were allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant.

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant and issued an advisory that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed. UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. Issues: (1) Whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench; (2) Whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3) Whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid. Held: Search Warrant A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.

 Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Plain View Doctrine The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution. In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin. It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for reconsideration. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately

apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine. Papa, et al. v. Mago and Jarencio, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857. FACTS: - Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, having received a reliable information to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. - By orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone and when trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila and found that the two trucks were loaded with nine bales of goods, and were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. - Mago and Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction alleging, among others, that Mago was the owner of the goods seized, and that she hired the trucks from Lanopa to transport said goods to her residence. Furthermore, she argued that the goods were confiscated by the police without a valid search warrant and prayed that the good confiscated to not be opened and to be returned to her. - Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining herein petitioners from opening the nine bales in question. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago. - After many pleadings and counterclaims, Mago filed a petition for the release of goods which was granted by the respondent judge. Hence, the petitioner filed an action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: - Whether or not the police had probable cause to make the warrantless search and seizure upon the goods of the respondent using the Tariff and Custom Code as a basis. HELD: - Yes, the Supreme Court held that It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.

The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. ****Furthermore, respondent Mago did not even mentioned or complained about the search but instead complained about the interception without warrant. ven if there was a valid warrant, it has been held that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Petition GRANTED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant. Facts: The appellant Mari Musa appeals for a reversal of the decision dated on August 31, 1990 by the RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch XII finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The information against the appellant was filed on December 15, 1989. On January 11, 1990 the appellant pleaded not guilty. The 3 witnesses presented were Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr of the the Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City or NARCOM, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga also of NARCOM, and Athena Elisa P. Anderson of Regional Command or RECOM. On December 13, 1989 Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr was instructed to go to Suterville, Zamboanga City which was the residence of the appellant in order to buy from the appellant a newspaper-wrapped marijuana packet for P10.00 and later present it to his team leader T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. The next day, December 14, 1989, on 1:30 P.M. Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr was given P20.00 as marked money in order to obtain again from the appellant the marijuana. The appellant gave 2 newspaper-wrapped marijuana packets and on Sgt. Amado Ani, Jrs signal the NARCOM agents stormed the appellants house and arrested him. Upon entering the appellants house the NARCOM agents including Sgt. Ani saw 4 persons inside the house, 3 family members and the manicurists. While searching house the agents also found a striped plastic bag containing marijuana in the kitchen. However the marked money was not found since the appellant Musa claimed that he gave the money to his wife who later fled the scene. Later Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson confirmed that the 3 marijuana specimens obtained in the buy bust operation (#1 Dec. 13, 1989 packet, #2 The 2 packets on dec. 14, 1989, and #3 the contents of the striped plastic bag) were positive for marijuana. The appellant Musa claimed that while he was in detention he was tortured. The trial court later found Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty

beyond reasonable doubt for selling marijuana in pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425. The appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20, 000.00 and without subsidiary imprisonment. Issue: 1. Whether or not the appellant has been illegally arrested? 2. Whether or not the white plastic bag found in the kitchen of the appellant was correctly admitted as evidence? Held: No, for the first issue the appellant tried to raise several claims stating that his arrest was without basis. First the appellant claimed that he could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other. The court however found the appellants claim to be without merit. The Court ruled that what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller since the parties to the transaction usually may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana. Second the appellant also had doubts on the credibility of Sgt. Anis testimony since it was impossible for him (Mari Musa) to sell marijuana while his family and the manicurist were present. However the court ruled that place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs is not crucial. Also the presence of other people aside from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. The court cited that in People v. Paco the presence of family and friends may at times camouflage the commission of the crime. Third the appellant claimed that there was no witness who could positively identify him selling marijuana to Sgt. Ani. In addition he claimed that T/Sgt. Belarga could not be a credible witness since he was 90 to 100 meters from where he (appellant) and Sgt. Ani were talking. The court however could not give credit to the claim of the appellant since they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies. Overall the court dismissed the grounds of the appellant and held. Yes, the plastic containing marijuana may be admitted as evidence. In the second issue the appellant assailed

the seizure and admission as evidence of a striped plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. The constitution in line with the doctrine in the Stonehill v. Diokno case rules that evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from reasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible. However the Alvero v. Dizon ruling allows for an exemption to the necessity for a search warrant which is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. Furthermore Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure

incident to a lawful arrest, thus: Sec. 12 (Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court) ,Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Also in Ker v. California the Plain View Doctrine allows for warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest. However there are 2 requisites that must be met: 1) prior justification for search, and 2) and the object must be in plain view. The plain view doctrine however is inapplicable in the case since the 2 requisites of the

object to be in plain view are missing. Except for the plastic bag containing marijuana found in the kitchen the other evidences presented are enough to convict the accused-appellant Mari Musa. The appeal of the accused-appellant is dismissed and the ruling of the RTC is affirmed.
People vs Peralta (searches and seizures) Facts : An information was filed charging appellants and and their co-accusedof qualified theft alledging that in the morning of Nov 4, 1992 in the city of Manila the accused take, steal and carry away punctured curreny notes due for shredding in the total amount o f Php 194,190.00 belonging to the CBP(now BSP) as represented by Labita to the damage and prejudice of the latter. On the basis of the complaint, Garcia was apprehended in the front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pinas City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to BSP. While in custody of the police officer, Garcia gave 3 separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices. However the defense has its version of the facts, they alleged that the accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the ar mored car of the BSP. On Nov. 4, a person who identified himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting f or a passenger bus without warrant and forced him to ride a car. In the car he heard that he will be salvaged if he would not tell the t ruth. While he was dragged out of the car someone frisks his pocket. At the safe house, the policemen asked him if he knew his co-accused and when he denied he was tortured until he cooper ated. He was forced to ride in a car while someone return his things in his pocket. Then he was brought blindfolded and handcuffed t o the office of Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District where he was interviewed. Labita arrived, interrupting the interview and in structed SPO4 Coronel to get Garcia's wallet wherein they found 3 pieces of perforated bill. Coronel took the statement of Labita. It was actually Labita and not Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in Garcia's alleged 3 sworn statement.Nov 5, he was brought to the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of WPD where his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify them but he was instructed to put his hands on the shoulders of each while Labita took a picture of them. Garcia came to know Atty. Sanchez on Nov 4 when Coronel introduced him as his lawyer, however he did not agree to have him as his lawyer. It was the first and last time he saw him and he was not present when Atty. Sanchez signed the alleged sworn stat ements. It was also alleged that Garcia only signed such statements due to Coronel's warning that if he did not do so, he will again b e tortured. RTC favored the prosecution and ruled that the coordinated acts of the accused wherein the co-accused handed to Garcia t he perforated bills which were then loaded to the armored van and delivered it to anothe person, unerringly led to the conclusion th at they had conspired to pilfer the said notes. RTC rejected the disclaimer of Garcia of his own confession as such disclaimer was an 11th hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused. With regards to the torture and coerced confession 0, RTC found the m to be unsupported with evidences. ISSUE : Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged 3 sworn statements of accused appellant Garcia and the al leged 3 pieces of 100 pesos perforated notes. Held: RE SWORN STATEMENT The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by Garcia and the three perforated P1 00 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissibl e. Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent a nd independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waive d except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomun

icado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of t he latter on those documents was affixed after the word SAKSI. Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower courts action is manifest error . The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extrac ting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing a nd executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and t hat the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the firs t question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession. Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it ind icated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counse l. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel , the waiver has no evidentiary relevance.The Constitution states that [a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the af orecited Section shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x. Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncoun seled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes m oot. RE PERFORATED NOTES Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits N to N-2) allegedly confiscated from Garcia afte r his arrest were fruits of the poisonous tree and, hence, inadmissible in evidence. The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the C ash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to c ommit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was prese nt. Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have w aived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures[18] of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant, these are allow ed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, ( 3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search.[19] Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated P10 0 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are ina dmissible in evidence.Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utte rly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Valmonte vs. De Villa Facts: On 20 January 1987, THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,

maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Issue: WON the installation of CHECKPOINTS violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Section 3 Privacy of Communication and Correspond Ramirez vs CA GR. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 FACTS: This petition involves a recording by the petitioner, Soccoro Ramirez, of her conversation with the herein private respondent Ester S. Garcia. The conversation was recorded for the purpose of filing a civil action against the private respondent and uses such conversation as a proof. As a result of the petitioner's act of recording event, private respondent alleged that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal and filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200 and the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that (1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that (2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order null and void then the petitioner filed a

Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner vigorously argues that Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. The petitioner also agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication, not a private conversation and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent were not illegal under the said act. ISSUE: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the said act ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. HELD: First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "Even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200. Moreover in enacting the said law in conflict, our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. the intent of the Act was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation, thus, according to Sen. Tanada This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties, R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200i. Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada. Because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
i Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. ULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin Ponente: J. Mendoza Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.


Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence; Held: (1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit. OPLE vs TORRES (SORRY GUYS, HINDI KO LANG TALAGA PWEDENG I-REPHRASE.. LALO NA YUNG DECISION - GRAHAM) FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows: ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following: Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established. Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:


Head, Presidential Management Staff Secretary, National Economic Development Authority Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government Secretary, Department of Health Administrator, Government Service Insurance System, Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing Director, National Computer Center. Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC. Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference. Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies. Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking. Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six. (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. Petitioner contends: A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE. C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL 2 VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. Respondents counter-argue: A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW; B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;


C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES; D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Unconstitutional siya kasi sabi ng court, aside from the power of the Congress na hindi pwedeng i-practice ng President which former Pres. Ramos did eh not narrowly drawn daw yung A.O. No. 308.. Yung sobrang pagka-general niya ang dahilan kung bakit siya threat sa privacy ng bawat individual kasi to grant such law daw would allow the authorities to have unrestrained power, they are free to choose what they want to do sa information na makukuha sa ID system na pino-propose nung A.O. No. 308. Hindi ini-specify nung A.O. yung mga method ng pagkuha ng information,kung paano at saan sila ii-store, and the like.. kaya siya not narrowly drawn. For specific details, please read the Ratio.. J Ratio Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, viz: Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held: xxx xxx xxx The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own. So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
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Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red


cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless. A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject. Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins. Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them. We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to


create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System. Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress. Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions. The case of Whalen v. Roe cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient- identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.


Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, introduced the concept of cyberspace and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net. In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit: The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.