Article 4. Criminal liability.

- Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30801

March 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.

Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).

The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more security.

Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.

Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.

Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.

Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).

The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder. 1

It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae. 2

In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.

Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.

Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.

The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.

Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.

Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.

The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.

This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).

The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones

patologicasdel lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).

The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).

There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result thereof.

The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell.

When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.

Fernando, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.

Fernando, J., concurs.

Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines ...

Province of Zamboanga del Sur ...)

Municipality of Pagadian

JOINT-AFFIDAVIT

WE, ERNESTO OGOC married, and JUANITO DE LA CERNA, single, both of legal age, farmers, residents of Lakewood, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur and at Buug Zamboanga del Sur, respectively, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and say:

That both of us were confined inside the municipal jail of Buug Zamboanga del Sur on July 31, 1966 for offenses allegedly committed by us and on same date our companions inside the said jail were Anisio Siton and Felix Napola, the latter being confined for being drunk;

That at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less on July 31, 1966, our policeman guard by the name of Domingo Ural entered the jail and called for Felix Napola. He called for him and told him that Felix Napola is aggressive. When Felix Napola went near Domingo Ural, the latter boxed him at his lower chin and he fell to the cement floor of the jail. He kicked him also at the same spot after Felix Napola fell to the floor. Because Felix Napola cannot stand anymore, Domingo Ural got a bottle and poured the contents of said bottle to the dress of Felix Napola. Domingo Ural lighted a match and burned the spot where the substance in the bottle was poured in the dress of Felix Napola. The dress of Felix Napola got burned and Felix Napola got burned. He was forced to stand up and asked mercy from Domingo Ural. Instead Domingo Ural locked the jail and went out and Domingo Ural threatened us not to talk about the burning of Felix Napola to anybody or else he will burn us also.

When Felix Napola was already suffering much from the burns he sustained, Ural became frightened and he and Anisio Siton helped put out the fire.

Affiants further sayeth none.

(SGD.) Ernesto Ogoc

(SGD.) Juanito de la Cerna

ERNESTO OGOC JUANITO DE LA CERNA

(Affiant)

(Affiant)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1966 here at Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.

(SGD.) Basilio T. Roque

BASILIO T. ROQUE

Special Counsel

2 Mrs. Napola (Mapola) testified at the preliminary investigation conducted by Basilio T. Roque, a special counsel, that she learned from a neighbor that her husband suffered burns in the municipal jail in the evening of July 31, 1966. Her husband told her that Policeman Ural had burned him. Ural allowed her to bring Napola to the dispensary where he was treated. Because of the injuries on his mouth and his swollen gums, he could not eat and move his head. He was confined in jail due to drunkenness. He was burned from the waist up to the neck and on the back and right arm. She reported the case to the mayor. That functionary said that he would not take any hand in the case. Mrs. Napola was crossexamined by Ural's counsel.

At the same preliminary investigation the witnesses, Ernesto Ogoc and Juanita de la Serna, testified and were cross-examined by Ural's counsel. The accused presented evidence at the preliminary investigation.

3 "Un sujeto, despues de cohabitar con una prostituta, encendio un mixto que aplico a uno de los latones de petroleo que habia proximos a la cama en que yacieron, inflamandose el contenido de aquel y cayendo el liquido sobre la prostituta, que fallecio a consequencia de las quemaduras.

El Tribunal Supreme declara:

Que segun el articulo 418 del Codigo penal, es reo de asesinato el que por medio de incendio mata a persona que no le este ligada por alguno de los vinculos familiares senalados en el art. 417, entendiendose empleado el incendio en este concepto juridico cuando se mata o intenta matar por medio de fuego aplicado directa o immediamente sobre la persona objeto de la accion criminal, siempreque lo sea con riesgo de propagacion a cosas distintas, en cualquiera de las condiciones previstas en el capitulo 7, titulo 13 del libro 2. del Codigo penal; cuyo medio de ejecucion de aquel delito, principal en la intencion del culpable estima la ley con el grave caracter que atribuye tambien a la inundacion y al empleo del veneno, no solo por los peligros que implica, sino igualmente por la notoria malicia, semejante a la alevosia, que revela la accion que para su exito no se detiene ante el respeto de otros derechos que pone en inminente riesgo o quebranta y lesion a impulso de decidia resolucion.

Que todas estas consideraciones aparecen manifiestas en el acto ejecutado por el procesado, puesto que voluntariamente empleo el petroleo inflamado para lesionar a la interfecta, poniendo el fuego, que por su natural poder se propago al local en que se cometio el delito, al servicio de su proposito punible; constituyendo por esto el incendio, elemento integrante del delito de asesinato, ... (Sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1887, 11 Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 175).

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect or a result. A reason for an action or condition. A ground of a legal action. An agent that brings something about. That

which in some manner is accountable for a condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state.

A suit, litigation, or action. Any question, civil or criminal, litigated or contested before a court of justice.

Cause and Causality in American Law

If an individual is fired from a job at the bank for Embezzlement, he or she is fired for causeas distinguished from decisions or actions considered to be Arbitrary or capricious.

In Criminal Procedure, Probable Cause is the reasonable basis for the belief that someone has committed a particular crime. Before someone may be arrested or searched by a police officer without a warrant, probable cause must exist. This requirement is imposed to protect people from unreasonable or unrestricted invasions or intrusions by the government.

In the law of torts, the concept of causality is essential to a person's ability to successfully bring an action for injury against another person. The injured party must establish that the other person brought about the alleged harm. A defendant's liability is contingent upon the connection between his or her conduct and the injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that his or her injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's Negligence or intentional conduct.

Actual, Concurrent, and Intervening Cause

The actual cause is the event directly responsible for an injury. If one person shoves another, thereby knocking the other person out an open window and he or she breaks a leg as a result of the fall, the shove is the actual cause of the injury. The immediate cause of the injury in this case would be the fall, since it is the cause that came right before the injury, with no intermediate causes. In some cases the actual cause and the immediate cause of an injury may be the same.

Concurrent causes are events occurring simultaneously to produce a given result. They are contemporaneous, but either event alone would bring about the effect that occurs. If one person stabs

another person who is simultaneously being shot by a third person, either act alone could cause the person's injury.

An Intervening Cause is one that interrupts the normal flow of events between the wrong and the injury. It comes between an expected sequence of occurrences to produce an unanticipated result. If someone driving under the influence of alcohol grazes a telephone pole that is rotted and thus knocks it down, the condition of the pole would be the intervening cause of its collapse. This is important in determining the liability of the intoxicated driver. If the telephone company knew or should have known about the unsafe condition of the pole and negligently failed to replace it, the telephone company would be responsible for the harm caused by the falling pole. Depending upon how hard the driver hit the pole, the driver may be held contributorily negligent, or partially liable, for the accident that took place.

An intervening efficient cause is one that totally supersedes the original wrongful act or omission. For example, an intoxicated cabdriver transports a person in a cab with faulty brakes. An accident occurs, which is a direct result of the intoxication rather than the faulty brakes. The injury resulting to the passenger is attributable to the driver's condition. The intervening efficient cause thereby broke the causal connection between the original wrong of the faulty brakes and the injury.

Proximate, Unforeseeable, and Remote Cause

The proximate cause of an injury is the act or omission of an act without which the harm would not have occurred. This is a concept in the law of torts and involves the question of whether a defendant's conduct is so significant as to make him or her liable for a resulting injury. For example, a person throws a lighted match into a wastepaper basket that starts a fire that burns down a building. The wind carries the flames to the building next door. The act of throwing the match would be the proximate cause of the fire and the resulting damage; however, the person may not be held fully liable for all resulting consequences.

An unforeseeable cause is one that unexpectedly and unpredictably results from the proximate cause. The degree of injury sustained is unanticipated or far removed from the negligent or intentional conduct that took place. For example, if a customer in a supermarket irritates a clerk and the clerk pushes the customer out of the way, which results in prolonged bleeding because the person is a hemophiliac, the bleeding is an unforeseeable consequence of the clerk's action. Even if the clerk intentionally pushed the customer, the resulting injury is clearly far removed from the conduct.

A remote cause is one that is removed or separate from the proximate cause of an injury. If the injuries suffered by a person admitted to a hospital after being hit by a truck are aggravated by Malpractice, the malpractice is a remote cause of injury to that person. The fact that the cause of an injury is remote does not relieve a defendant of liability for the act or omission, but there may be an Apportionment of liability between the defendants.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE DIGEST ON URBANO v. IAC [157 SCRA 1 (1988)] November 10, 2010

Facts: Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters opening of irrigation system which flooded farmers palay storage. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident, Javier died due to tetanus. Issue: WON Urbano is criminally liable? Held: No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, w/c, in natural & continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldnt have occurred. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,

natural, & logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal conviction). Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct & foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD 1508, 2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was

caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx

xxx

xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx

xxx

xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor P10,000 as compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as attorneys fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorneys fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has appealed said decision to us.

The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are stated in the following portions of its decision which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Pealozas house was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident took place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the

house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.

At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the media agua on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that all wires be kept three feet from the building. Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the media agua but from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a media agua an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from the edge of the media agua, the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct a media agua only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.

It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by the city authorities for the construction of the media agua, and that if he had not done so Appellants wire would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three feet from the edge of the media agua. It is also a fact, however, that after the media agua was constructed the owner was given a final permit of occupancy of the house cralaw .

cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts. There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand secondly, because the only insulation material that may be effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive

The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff is that although the owner of the house in constructing the media agua in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after making that media agua, its construction though illegal, was finally approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the house; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was the company that was at fault

and was guilty of negligence because although the electric wire in question had been installed long before the construction of the house and in accordance with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary measures as may be warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat negligence cannot be determined by a simple matter of inches; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that the city did was to prescribe certain minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors. The appellate court, however, refrained from stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures could and should have been adopted.

After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Pealoza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a media agua, had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his media agua, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said media agua would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the media agua the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the media agua was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the media agua and the yawning 2-story distance or height from

the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.

We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the house or its media agua was always a source of danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but the claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.

In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was liable for damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was a public place where persons come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves. The electric company was clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without much difficulty or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was in no position to realize the danger. In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the street where there was no possible danger to pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons standing on the media agua, but a media agua can hardly be considered a public place where persons usually gather. Moreover, a person standing on the media agua could not have reached the wires with his hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long enough to reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and media agua. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that although it is a well- established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages or personal

injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.

But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and media agua in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15year old boy found and carried home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it out with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to explode and injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this Tribunal in denying recovery for the injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless Plaintiffs own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into

operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).

We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila authorities and the electric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there stepdown to a voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.

In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

----------------------------------------------------------------article 6 RPC Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

------------------------------------------

Case Digest on PEOPLE v. DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ G.R. No. 133695. February 28, 2001. January 3, 2011

Case Digest on PEOPLE v. DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ G.R. No. 133695. February 28, 2001. The trial court found accused guilty of raping his 11-yr old daughter and sentenced him to death. He was also found guilty of attempted rape in the other case, and sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum. HELD: With regard to the first criminal case, the SC convicted the accused of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, although the Information did properly allege the complainants minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant and accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. With regard to the second criminal case, the SC ruled that the evidence on record cannot sustain a conviction for attempted rape. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Applying the above definition to the facts of the case, it would be stretching the imagination to construe the act of the accused of throwing the victim to her bed as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. The external act must have a direct and necessary connection with the crime that the accused intended to commit. Whether accused indeed intended to commit the crime of rape cannot be seen merely from this particular act. Thus, accused should be acquitted of the charge of attempted rape.

case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[G.R. No. 133695. February 28, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ, accused-appellant. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.:

DANIEL MAURICIO y Perez, accused-appellant, will elude the gallows because of a simple, although vital, omission in the Information charging him with rape. To the uninitiated in the workings of the justice system, this seeming leniency to a felon who raped his 11-year old daughter is a blatant outrage. But for those who are abreast with the law, the imposition of a lower penalty in this case is consistent with due process. The rule that saves Mauricio today from the capital punishment is not a mere technicality but a safeguard of one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Jonalyn Mauricio was born on 16 June 1986 to Daniel Mauricio and his common-law wife Emedelyn Geotina. But they separated when Jonalyn was only three (3) years old. She and her father lived in Shaw Boulevard with her paternal grandparents Alfonso and Ely Mauricio, while her mother and brothers resided in Pasay City. The grandparents owned a boarding house, a modest eatery and a commercial space which they leased out as a barber shop. Since Daniel Mauricio did not have a stable income and was always out drinking, her grandparents supported Jonalyn and sent her to school. Jonalyn would sleep with her grandparents in the room above the eatery, while Daniel stayed in the other building where the apartments and the barber shop were located. Later, Daniel took in a live-in partner and occupied one (1) room in the third floor with her, while the other room was occupied by his brother Reynaldo.

One evening in 1995 when Jonalyn was fast asleep in her room, she was awakened when she felt someone taking off her shorts and panty. It was her father, who then removed his own pants and underwear. Daniel then whispered to Jonalyn his bestial intentions, "Maglaro tayo." He appeared to Jonalyn to be high on drugs. She had seen her father take drugs before and knew what it did to him. He

then went on top of her as she was lying face down and inserted his penis into her vagina. "Taas-baba 'yung ari niya sa akin, sir,"[1] she would later testify in court. After the painful ordeal that evening, Daniel wiped off the sap of his dastardly act, and then left without uttering a word. Jonalyn, in shock, went to a corner and cried until she fell asleep.

Jonalyn lived out this harrowing scene over and over again. She could not recall how many times her father raped her, nor the exact dates. Sometimes, he would just fondle her breasts. At one time, her father raped her when she fell asleep in her uncle's room after playing video games on his computer. Another time, Daniel abused her when she baby-sat her half-sister at the request of his current live-in partner. As Jonalyn would later testify, "Basta pag natutulog ako sa restaurant, he always touched me, sir."[2] When asked how he did it, "Hinahawakan po niya ang ari niya tapos pinapasok po niya sa vagina ko, sir."[3]

Sometime in 1996 Jonalyn and her grandparents transferred to Welfareville Village in Pasig City. Her grandfather Alfonso eked out a living by selling ice to neighbors while her grandmother Ely worked as a manicurist doing home service for clients. As usual, Daniel was jobless and seldom sober, and continued to rape his own daughter. Jonalyn recalled one incident where she was asleep in the sofa when Daniel inserted his finger into her vagina and mashed her breasts. She also recalled another incident, which occurred sometime in July 1997, when her grandparents were out of the house. Her father Daniel laid behind her, spread her legs and inserted his penis inside her organ. All this time Jonalyn did not say a word to anyone about her father's lechery.

On 16 August 1997 Daniel committed his last act of inhumanity which prompted Jonalyn to finally to break her silence. Daniel arrived home from work at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, apparently in his usual state of drunkenness. Only Jonalyn was in the house; she was washing dishes. Daniel suddenly grabbed her by the waist and carried her to her bed. She struggled and was able to escape Daniel momentarily, but he succeeded in grabbing her again and threw her down her bed. Daniel told her, "Maybe, your lolo is molesting you." Fortunately, Daniel returned to his senses and apologized to his daughter saying, "Pasensya ka na anak, may problema lang ako sa trabaho." He then told her not to tell anybody about the incident.

But his apparent repentance and pleas not to squeal on him came too late. Jonalyn, no longer able to tolerate the physical and mental torment, rushed to the house of her neighbor and classmate Myrna Marcelo. With the help of another neighbor, she called Bantay Bata 163. The person on the other end of the line identified himself as Elmer Chavez. She then initially narrated her ordeal to him.

The next day, she went to the house of her classmate Anna Patricia at Jose Fabella St., New Correctional Compound, Mandaluyong. There she met Elmer Chavez, the Bantay Bata staffer who answered her call, and Bella Zabala, a Bantay Bata social worker. She was interviewed by Zabala about the molestation. The two then accompanied Jonalyn to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for medical examination.

The examination revealed that Jonalyn had "elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healed laceration at 1o'clock position x x x the vaginal canal narrow with prominent rugosities," and concluded that "subject is in non-virgin state physically."[4]

Jonalyn was brought to the ABS-CBN office in Quezon City for another interview. She was asked if she was willing to file charges for rape against her father even if it would result in him getting the death penalty, and Jonalyn answered in the affirmative. Then accompanied by Coleen Samar, another Bantay Bata staffer, Jonalyn went to the Mandaluyong Police Station to give her statement to the police.

On 8 September 1997 two (2) Informations were filed by the City Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City, one alleging that in August 1997, or prior thereto, with force and intimidation, the accused Daniel Mauricio willfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of Jonalyn Mauricio y Geotina, a girl eleven (11) years of age. The other Information alleged that on or about 16 August 1997 Daniel Mauricio, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, willfully and feloniously attempted to have carnal knowledge of his daughter Jonalyn Mauricio Y Geotina, a girl eleven (11) years of age, thus commencing the commission of rape directly by overt acts but did not produce the crime by reason of cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., she was able to flee from the accused.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Ma. Luisa Capili of the Mandaluyong Police Station Women's Desk who took the statement of the victim, Jonalyn's grandfather Alfonso Mauricio, Jonalyn Mauricio herself, Coleen Samar, Elmer Chavez and Dr. Dennis D. Belin, the medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory who examined Jonalyn.

Dr. Belin found a laceration in Jonalyn's hymen in the 1:00 o'clock position and concluded that she was in a non-virgin state. The doctor determined the degree of resistance of Jonalyn's vagina by introducing his finger into her organ and found her resistance to be strong, which meant that "the subject had limited sexual experience." The width of the vaginal canal, which he found to be narrow, indicated that the subject had had limited sexual experience, or not more than three (3) times. He also opined that the "sexual experience" could have been caused by a finger or any instrument other than the male sex

organ. He further stated that only one (1) laceration was found but that it was possible for a single laceration to manifest even when there were several intercourses. He concluded that based on the condition of the wound it was inflicted at least two (2) weeks before the examination. He also said that the laceration might have been caused by other "stressful activities" since the laceration was less shallow and had less parameters than one normally caused by rape.

Daniel Mauricio denied he raped Jonalyn. He claimed that in their old house in Shaw Boulevard, Jonalyn slept in the sala where the waitresses of the eatery also slept. Thus, according to him, it was impossible for him to have committed rape because the waitresses were always in the sala at night. He insisted that he could not possibly have raped Jonalyn in his brother Reynaldo's room because Reynaldo always came home from work at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, and that it was very unlikely that his livein partner would ask Jonalyn to baby-sit for her because the two (2) were not in good terms. According to Daniel, Jonalyn was jealous of his live-in partner and wanted her own parents to reconcile.

The trial court[5] sustained the prosecution evidence, found Daniel Mauricio guilty of rape and sentenced him to death. He was also found guilty of attempted rape in the other case, and sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum. He was further ordered to pay complaining witness Jonalyn Mauricio P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

We sustain the conviction of Daniel Mauricio for rape. His barefaced, uncorroborated denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of his victim. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.[6] Thus the trial court observed of the testimony of Jonalyn -

She gave a very straight-forward and spontaneous account of her horrible experience she encountered from the hands of her father but sometimes interrupted by her sobbing and by the tears dropping from her eyes probably reminding her of the dark and sad episode in the early chapter of her life authored by no less than her father x x x x

To the mind of this Court these feelings of anger and emotional outbursts of the victim is (sic) but a normal and ordinary behavior of a human being against a satyr whose beastliness was the cause of her loss of virginity at a tender age especially so if he is the person who brought her to this world.

We find no reason to reverse the trial court. Factual findings of trial courts, particularly the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded much weight and the highest respect on appeal. Trial courts have the opportunity to observe first hand the demeanor and conduct of witnesses and examine other proofs as well, thus they are better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions.[7] The emotion and tears displayed by the victim convinced the trial court of the genuineness of her testimony. Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible to feign such a convincing demeanor. We find it hard to imagine how a girl of tender age could give so vivid a depiction of such acts of bestiality if such acts were not inflicted on her. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit.[8]

The credibility of Jonalyn is not diminished by the fact that it took her two (2) years from the time she was first violated to come forth and break her silence. In People v. Narido we said that considering that the complainant was a child of tender years, effectively under the control of the appellant, it was not difficult to understand why even after she was abused she stayed on and did not complain. Indeed, a daughter raped by her very own father must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion as to why the very person that gave life to her could be capable of such a detestable act.

Neither is Jonalyn's credibility affected by her failure to recall the exact dates of the commission of the offense. Such lapse is a minor matter and can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of other people.[9] The failure of complainant to remember some details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication, precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.[10]

Coupled with the strong corroborative testimony of the medico-legal officer who verified that the victim had prior sexual experience, Jonalyn's testimony is sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appellant.

We reject the contention of accused-appellant that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime because Jonalyn was always accompanied by the waitresses in the eatery. It is well-nigh impossible for one person to be accompanied by some other person every single second of his life. Even the most congenial person has his moments of privacy. Besides, it is an established principle that lust has no regard for time and place. For, rape can be committed even in the most unlikely places, such as a park, a roadside, school premises, or an occupied room.[11]

It cannot be said that accused-appellant was deprived of due process when the Information filed against him for Rape failed to state the exact date of the commission of the offense. Date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of the woman.[12] Thus, the precise date need not be alleged in the Information. Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states -

Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

Thus, the allegation in the Information that accused-appellant committed the crime "sometime in August 1997, or prior thereto," does not violate his right to due process and is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt for the crime charged.

Even counsel for the defense does not controvert the factual findings of the court. In the appellant's brief, counsel prayed "that the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant Daniel Mauricio x x x be MODIFIED wherein the death penalty that was meted out on him should be REDUCED to RECLUSION PERPETUA x x x x." The Solicitor General, in his Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Brief, made a recommendation to the same effect.

In this regard we agree with accused-appellant and the Solicitor General. As mentioned earlier, we cannot sustain the imposition of the death penalty. The law under which he was prosecuted is Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7610.[13] Article 335 as amended by Sec. 11 of RA 7659, or the Death Penalty Law, provides:

Art.335. When and how rape is committed.- x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim x x x x

In People v. Ramos[14] this provision was interpreted to mean that for death to be imposable the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender being a special qualifying circumstance should be specifically alleged in the Information. In the case at bar, although the Information did properly allege the complainant's minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant and accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would lead to a denial of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.[15] Thus, for this oversight, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

We likewise agree with the Solicitor General, in the other case, that the evidence on record cannot sustain a conviction for attempted rape. The Revised Penal Code defines an attempted felony thus -

Art. 6. Consummated, Frustrated, and Attempted Felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable x x x

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Overt acts" has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[16]

Jonalyn testified that in the morning of 16 August 1997 when the supposed attempted rape took place, Daniel grabbed her by the waist and carried her to the room while she was resisting. She further testified that she was able to run but Daniel got hold of her again and threw her on her bed. Daniel then told her "Maybe (your) lolo is molesting (you)," and "Pasensya ka na anak may problema lang ako sa trabaho."

Applying the above definition to the facts of the case, it would be stretching the imagination to construe Daniel's act of throwing Jonalyn to her bed as an overt act that will "logically and necessarily ripen" into rape. The external act must have a direct and necessary connection with the crime that the accused intended to commit. Whether Daniel indeed intended to commit the crime of rape cannot be seen merely from this particular act. Thus, Daniel should be acquitted of the charge of attempted rape.

The award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is sustained it being discretionary on the part of the court, and may be awarded without need of independent proof.[17] Furthermore, as the trial court failed to award the civil indemnity ex delicto, we award additional P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the complaint the same being mandatory.[18]

As to the award of P30,000.00 exemplary damages, we note that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1 December 2000, requires that aggravating circumstances, in order to be appreciated, be stated in the information. The pertinent provision of the new Rule 110 states -

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment (emphasis supplied).

The use of the word "must" indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused. Since the aggravating circumstance of relationship can no longer be appreciated against the accused in this case, there is no more legal basis for the award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision in Crim. Case No. 35-H-MD rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Br. 214, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ is found GUILTY of the crime of Rape under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead of death. He is further ordered to pay Jonalyn Mauricio P50,000.00 for civil indemnity ex delicto and P50,000.00 for moral damages. The award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is deleted.

In Crim. Case No. 35-H-MD for Attempted Rape, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Daniel Mauricio y Perez guilty is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

----------------------------------------------