People v.

Concepcion Case Digest

People v. Concepcion G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922) FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a copartnership. Defendants wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law.

1. Saura Import &Export Co., Inc v. DBP G.R. No. L-24968 April 27, 1972 Facts: Saura Inc. applied to the Rehabilitation Finance Corp (before its conversion to DBP) for a loan of 500k secured by a first mortgage of the factory building to finance for the construction of a jute mill factory and purchase of factory implements. RFC accepted and approved the loan application subject to some conditions which Saura admitted it could not comply with. Without having received the amount being loaned, and sensing that it could not at anyway obtain the full amount of loan, Saura Inc. then asked for cancellation of the mortgage which RFC also approved. Nine years after the cancellation of the mortgage, Saura sued RFC for damages for its non-fulfillment of obligations arguing that there was indeed a perfected consensual contract between them. Issue: Was there a perfected consensual contract? Was there a real contract of loan which would warrant recovery of damages arising out of breach of such contract? Held: On the first issue, yes, there was indeed a perfected consensual contract, as recognized in Article 1934 of the Civil Code. There was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in this case: the application of Saura, Inc. for a loan of P500,000.00 was approved by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage was executed and registered. But this fact alone falls short of resolving the second issue and the basic claim that the defendant failed to fulfill its obligation and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover damages. The action thus taken by both partiesSaura's request for cancellation and RFC's subsequent approval of such cancellationwas in the nature of mutual desistance what Manresa terms "mutuo disenso" which is a mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a concept derived from the principle that since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties can cause its extinguishment. In view of such extinguishment, said perfected consensual contract to deliver did not constitute a real contract of loan.

Credit Transactions Case Digest: BPI Investment Corp V. CA (2002)

133632 February 15, 2002 Lessons Applicable: Simple Loan Laws Applicable: Facts:

Frank Roa obtained a loan with interest rate of 16 1/4%/annum from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the predecessor of BPI Investment Corp. (BPIIC), for the construction of a house on his lot in New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa.

He mortgaged the house and lot to AIDC as security for the loan. 1980: Roa sold the house and lot to ALS Management & Development Corp. and Antonio Litonjua for P850K who paid P350K in cash and assumed the P500K indebtness of ROA with AIDC.

AIDC proposed to grant ALS and Litonjua a new loan for P500K with interested rate of 20%/annum and service fee of 1%/annum on the outstanding balance payable within 10 years through equal monthly amortization of P9,996.58 and penalty interest of 21%/annum/day from the date the amortization becomes due and payable.

March 1981: ALS and Litonjua executed a mortgage deed containing the new stipulation with the provision that the monthly amortization will commence on May 1, 1981 August 13, 1982: ALS and Litonjua paid BPIIC P190,601.35 reducing the P500K principal loan to P457,204.90. September 13, 1982: BPIIC released to ALS and Litonjua P7,146.87, purporting to be what was left of their loan after full payment of Roas loan June 1984: BPIIC instituted foreclosure proceedings against ALS and Litonjua on the ground that they failed to pay the mortgage indebtedness which from May 1, 1981 to June 30, 1984 amounting to P475,585.31

August 13, 1984: Notice of sheriff's sale was published February 28, 1985: ALS and Litonjua filed Civil Case No. 52093 against BPIIC alleging that they are not in arrears and instead they made an overpayment as of June 30, 1984 since the P500K loan was only released September 13, 1982 which marked the start of the amortization and since only P464,351.77 was released applying legal compensation the balance of P35,648.23 should be applied to the monthly amortizations

RTC: in favor of ALS and Litonjua and against BPIIC that the loan granted by BPI to ALS and Litonjua was only in the principal sum of P464,351.77 and awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees for the publication

CA: Affirmed reasoning that a simple loan is perfected upon delivery of the object of the contract which is on September 13, 1982

ISSUE: W/N the contract of loan was perfected only on September 13, 1982 or the second release of the loan? HELD: YES. AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of private respondents is DELETED, but the award to them of attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000 is UPHELD. Additionally, petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents P25,000 as nominal damages. Costs against petitioner.

obligation to pay commenced only on October 13, 1982, a month after the perfection of the contract contract of loan involves a reciprocal obligation, wherein the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. It is a basic principle in reciprocal obligations that neither party incurs in delay, if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Consequently, petitioner could only demand for the payment of the monthly amortization after September 13, 1982 for it was only then when it complied with its obligation under the loan contract.

BPIIC was negligent in relying merely on the entries found in the deed of mortgage, without checking and correspondingly adjusting its records on the amount actually released and the date when it was released. Such negligence resulted in damage for which an award of nominal damages should be given

SSS where we awarded attorneys fees because private respondents were compelled to litigate, we sustain the award of P50,000 in favor of private respondents as attorneys fees