Foreign Marriages CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS G.R. NO.

186571: 11 AUGUST 2010 FACTS: A became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. A later married B a Filipino. A worked abroad and when he came back to see B, B was having an affair. A filed a petition for Divorce in Canada which was granted. A fell in love with C. A went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the marriage between him and B still subsists. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular. RTC- A was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code.1 ISSUE: WON Art. 26, 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.
1

Art. 26, 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, 2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art. 26, 2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond. An action based on Art. 26, 2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the Void & Voidable alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

SUAZO V. SUAZO G.R. NO. 164493 : MARCH 10, 2010 FACTS: A and B were married when they were 16 years old. They lived with Bs parent. A took odd jobs while B refused to work and was most of the time drunk. A urged him to find

work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, A left B 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36. A testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that B was psychologically incapacited. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage but the CA reversed it. Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36. Held: As evidence is insufficient to establish Bs psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Bs psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Bs psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to As psychological condition, this is not true for Bs. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Bs purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and

the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. TORING V. TORING AUGUST 2010 G.R. NO. 165321 FACTS: A and B were husband and wife. B filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that A was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Ricardo offered; the psychological evaluation of his expert witness, psychiatrist. Dr Albaran testified A had Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations based on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on B and the couples son, C. The doctor did not personally examine A. B alleged that A was an adulteress and a squanderer. The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed saying that RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused As psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on As overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of the marriage. RULING: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed. According to Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article are the following: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.13 The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that A was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. However, it is still essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition. In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of As psychological evaluation was C, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness because he could not have been there when

the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth. Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was As psychological disorder. B failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that TA suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. B also failed to show the adverse integral element and link to As allegedly disordered personality. Moreover,B failed to prove that As alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code. What is not required is the expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. CA decision affirmed.

CAMACHO- REYES V. RAMON REYES G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010 FACTS: A and B got married. Their marriage was rocky because B did not support his wife, nor did he take good care of his children. B entered into a lot of business ventures but all were unsuccessful adding to the problems in their marriage. A sought to have the marriage annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity (Article 36). RTC -ruled that there is Psychological Incapacity Marriage annulled ISSUE: WON a finding that Psychological Incapacity is curable will not warrant a petition for annulment of marriage under Art. 36? CA- reversed the findings of RTC on the ground that (yung na-mention ni sir sa class) Upon recommendation of one of the psychiatrists that the psychological incapacity is curable because B is referred for psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning - WRONG RATIO: A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. LIGERALDE VS. PATALINGHUG AND REPUBLIC G.R. No. 168796; 15 April 2010

FACTS: During the marriage of A (Husband) observed that B (wife) was acting immature, irresponsible and carefree. B admitted to A to having lived an adulterous life. A came to believe that B is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. A approached Dr. C who performed a psychological evaluation which certified that B was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. Issue: Is Sexual Infidelity of the wife Tantamount to Psychological Incapacity? RATIO: Bs act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Neither As testimony nor the psychologist findings failed to establish the root cause of Bs incapacity to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The Court stressed that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code? RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, As to who may file a 2003. case Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC G. R. 158298 / August 11, 2010 FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B.

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC; and 2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens. Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation Property Relations between over the property in favour of Winifred. H&W Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to InterDimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. (Note these reasons given by the CA.)

MARIO SIOCHI VS. ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, ELVIRA GOZON INTER-DEIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC GR NO. 169900 March 18, 2010 FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains. Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in

ISSUES: (1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elviras conduct showed her acquiescence to the sale. SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the

property. The Court said, Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards this point, the CA erred. (2) Was the donation to Winifred valid? No, the donation was not valid. Elviras consent was absent. (3) Was the sale to Inter-Dimensional valid? InterDimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens. IDR V. SIOCHI G.R. 169977 MARCH 2010 FACTS:Elvira Gozon filed a petition for legal separation against Alfredo Gozon. During the pendency of the legal separation case Alfredo agreed to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal partnership to Mario Siochi for eighteen million pesos. A notice of lis pendens was later annotated in the title of the property. Siochi and Alfredo then entered into a contract wherein the latter was to have the property excluded from the conjugal partnership by the Court, and was to have the notice of lis pendens removed from the title. The RTC then rendered its decision in the legal separation case. Alfredo was held to be the guilty spouse and his share in the net profits of the conjugal partnership was forfeited in favor of his daughter Winfred. However, the property sold to Siochi was not removed from the partnership by the Court. Neither was the notice of lis pendens removed from the title. Alfredo transferred the title of the property to his daughter. He secured from her a special power of attorney and sold the property to IDR. Mario subsequently filed an action for specific performance with damages against Alfredo. The RTC of Malabon found in favor of Siochi and enjoined Alfredo, his daughter and IDR from entering the property. On appeal the decision of the Malabon RTC was affirmed with modifications. The Court of

Appeals held that since the property was part of the conjugal partnership, the consent of Elvira was required before it could be sold by Alfredo. Therefore the agreement between Alfredo and Siochi was held to be null and void. Siochi appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. He claimed that the sale of the property to him by Alfredo was valid because it was a continuing offer by Alfredo to Elvira. Issue: Whether or not the agreement between Siochi and Gozon was null and voild for failing to secure the consent of Elvira? Held: Yes. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ALFREDO AND ELVIRA. SINCE THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY OCCURRED AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE APPLICABLE LAW IS THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDES: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by

the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. MARTINEZ G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010 FACTS: Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained a loan from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila, where the spouses are residing. The mortgage was signed by respondent Oscar Martinez both as a principal debtor and as a president of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJMark Trading, Inc.

Pursuant to respondent-spouses failure to settle the obligation, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent spouses filed a civil case or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale seeking to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale. One of the contentions raised by respondent-spouses was that that the extrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave injustice and irreparable injury to respondent-spouses and their four (4) young children because their family home, in which they were residing since 1997, at least insofar as the unencumbered area in excess of 180.750 sq. m., is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner, on the other hand, will not suffer any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed. The trial court granted the injunction. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: issuance of preliminary

requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. RATIONALE: The court ruled that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the real estate mortgage. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders granting respondents application for preliminary injunction. MUNOZ, JR. v. ERLINA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS G.r. 156125 25 August 2010 FACTS:Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a residential house on said lot. It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name.

Whether or not respondent-spouses have shown a clear legal right toenjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagors property while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried? RULING: No. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents averment that respondent OJMark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation. However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported right, whether as majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as creditormortgagee. The rule requires that in order for a preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the

The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid even without the husbands consent. The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void. ISSUE (1): Is the property paraphernal or conjugal? RULING: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC). It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement. In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that

the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the written consent of the husband was not necessary. ISSUE (2): Was the transaction a sale or equitable mortgage? RULING: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is presumed an equitable mortgage when: (a) price of sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of redemption is executed; (d) purchase retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is for the transaction to secure the payment of a debt. In this case, considering that (a) the spouses remained in possession of the property (albeit as lessees thereof); (b) MUNOZ retained a portion of the purchase price (200k); (c) it was the spouses who paid real property taxes on the property; and, (d) it was the wife who secure the payment of the principal debt with the subject property the parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale. Fuentes v. Conrado Roca G.r. 178902 April 2010FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php

60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed. On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged; 2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such difference in the handwriting. 2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract. 3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal

Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother B Lopez G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010 A, represented by her mother B filed for recognition and support against C. C denies that A is his illegitimate daughter. B bases her claim that B and C had an extramarital affair which bore the child A. C also refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth but executed a handwritten note where he would give A financial support each month. Issues: Whether or not the note would be sufficient for filiation of an illegitimate child? No. As demand for support is dependent on the determination of her filiation (Art. 195 par. 4). The note not containing any statement on As filiation to C does not fall under Art. 172(2) vis--vis Art. 175 which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child since it must be notarized and must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Both requisites in this case is missing. Another is that the only other documentary evidence submitted by A, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

Paternity and Filiations