SYSTEMATICS

Volume 2, Number 2 September 1964

THE METABIOLOGY OF MAURICE VERNET

J.G. Bennett
The Estate of J.G. Bennett 2009

1. Biology and Philosophy It would appear that the attention of English readers has been little drawn towards the work of Dr. Maurice Vernet, the author of a series of books that have aroused much interest among French philosophers and scientific workers. Several of Vernet's works have been crowned by the Academy and he was, in 1955, the recipient of the Lecomte de Nouy prize. It seems, therefore, desirable that an attempt should be made to present to English readers the main features of Vernet's philosophy. His medical and biological researches are the foundations on which his special position has been erected, but they are not discussed in the present note. It is called here Metabiology - a term not used by Vernet himself - to distinguish it from the work of biologists turned philosopher such as Claude Bernard, Driesch, Lloyd Morgan or Lecomte de Nouy, who seem rather to have used the data of biology to illustrate their philosophical convictions than to have sought through biology itself a way to approach the mundus intelligibilis. Aristotle himself, had the choice of terms occurred to him, might well have described his own work as metabiology rather than metaphysics and yet the authority of a mistranslated word has somehow fixed in men's minds the belief that the only authentic path to reality is through the Looking-Glass of the physical sciences. There are other mirrors that are perhaps less distorting and Vernet's work is evidence that biology has its own valid categories of thought of which physical science knows nothing. The philosophical perspective of Vernet is the prolongation or complement of his biological researches. He treats biology not as a purely descriptive and utilitarian science, but as a discipline that makes it possible to apprehend human life and experience as a whole-that is, in their two-fold nature as animal and spirit. The method consists in searching for the active principle of life itself while remaining within the framework of well-established biological data. Facts, carefully established and scrupulously verified, acquire a significance far greater than bare sense datathey bear witness to the idea that contains and explains them. Vernet's Great Idea arising naturally from the analysis of data leads - not to an abstract system floating in the air but to a coherent scheme that links the biological with the metabiological. Metabiology necessitates the revision of many of the traditional concepts of philosophy. There are two phases; first, the analytical and experimental study of the functional mechanism of life; and, second, the philosophical synthesis. Vernet starts by demonstrating that the activity of life which, among all living creatures , is sustained by the nervous system, is also conditioned both primarily and ultimately by the organic sensitivity upon which all functions and all rhythms depend. Without the mechanism of organic sensitivity no powers can be exercised neither those of the body nor those of the mind. This primary phase of Vernet's work has been described by Prof.

Louis Lavelle in his preface to The Problem of Life: "It is from an alliance between science and philosophy - so often foes - and perhaps through the mediation of medicine, which studies the incarnate spirit, that we may hope to form a true picture of man as a being conscious no less of his natural limitations than of his spiritual vocation, capable of knowing his rightful pace in the world and - knowing it - able to transcend it." 1

2. Organic Sensitivity as the Functional Mechanism of Life 2 Vernets basic hypothesis consists in ascribing to the nervous mechanism of excitability the two properties of dynamism and sensitivity. The former is that which is actualized by the life-energy and the latter is the power of reaction to the inner and outer influences that act upon it. The excitability or Organic Sensitivity is the essential mechanism by which all forms of life are organized and regulated. The organic sensitivity is limited in time and space by duration and forth. It produces and governs an organization limited by death and holds it to a definite biological equilibrium that remains constant from birth to death and gives it the power to reproduce its kind 3. Life, accordingly, should not be defined by its form or its function-as has usually been the case-but by its fundamental sensitivity and its capacity for reaction. There is a reactional margin by virtue of which the organic sensitivity regulates all reflex activity and enables the organism to adapt itself for reaction or defence and to do so, moreover, upon all levels. Within the limits of the reactional margin, physiological fluctuations occur which leave the organic sensitivity unaffected, but there are also pathological fluctuations when the reaction exceeds the natural margin. A simple example is to be seen in the temperature curve of the body for normal and pathological states. The fluctuations of temperature are produced under the control of the organic sensitivity, which is unceasingly engaged in its regulative work. Moreover, the norm towards which the regulative activity is constantly directed is a set of equilibria that is characteristic of each species. Only when the sensitivity is extinguished by death is the equilibrium permanently disrupted and fluctuations cease. 3. The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics 4 Vernet shows that the commonly accepted thesis that there is no hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics is based upon a misconception of the functional mechanism. Hitherto the conditions that must be satisfied to make such inheritance possible have not been understood. The point is that only pathological fluctuations can produce a permanent change in the organic sensitivity and, as is well established, the results can be transmitted by heredity. Fluctuations of a physiological nature, whether of adaptation or defence do not produce any appreciable modifications of the sensitivity. Where, however, pathological fluctuations are sufficiently prolonged to result in a deterioration of the mechanism of sensitivity, they are undoubtedly transmitted to the descendants. Under normal conditions the genetic consequences are soon eliminated by cross-breeding. Vernet concludes therefore that the evidence for the transmission of acquired characteristics is abundant, but the results do not persist and after a few generations the progeny return to the type of organic sensitivity that characterises the species or genus to which it belongs. 4. The Evolutionary Fallacy 5 The study of organic sensitivity places the whole subject of organic evolution in a perspective that has important philosophical-metabiological consequences. Until recently the classification of organisms has been based solely on morphology and although genetical factors are now being taken into account, this does not go nearly far enough. It is necessary, first of all, to study the mechanism and ascertain whether the fundamental
1 2 3

Le Problme de la Vie. Preface by Louis Lavelle. Work crowned by the French Academy (Vitet Prize) Paris 1947 Plon diteur.

La Sensibilit Organique. Paris 1949 Flammerio diteur. Collection de Philosophic Scientifique Equilibres et dsquilibres biologiques. Paris 1954. Doin, diteur 1949. Plon diteur. 4 Hrdit. Preface by Daniel Rops. Crowned by the French Academy, Paris 5 LEvolution du Monde Vivante. Paris 1950, Plon diteur

modifications that are ascribed to various agencies - lamarckianism, darwinism, mutationism, etc. - are possible at all. There is in fact conclusive evidence that no agencies however violent may be their action, including irradiation by radioactive elements and cosmic rays, ever result in a modification of the pattern of organic sensitivity. All observed changes without exception are of a secondary character. All the evidence tends to the conclusion that, on the one hand, there is no absolute fixity of species, since minor variations of type, race or variety are possible, but on the other hand there is no evolution in the sense of the origin of species or the transformation of one species into another, since the fundamental organic sensitivity of the species persists unchanged through all generations. As with the individual organism there is a reactional margin, so with the species there is a range of fluctuation within the determined equilibrium. One and the same sensitivity - whatever may be the environmental conditions - unites all the individuals of the same species in a community of constituent characteristics. The philosophical importance of a radical breakdown of the belief in organic evolutionism - which is the foundation of all evolutionary philosophies - requires no demonstration. For a century our metaphysics has been falsified by the initial fallacy which lay undetected at the base of the transformist hypothesis. 5. The Essential Distinction Between Life and Matter The specific determination of the vital organisation and its temporal limitation provide a clear distinction between the phenomena of life and those of the physico-chemical substratum. The latter are not determined either in spatial configuration nor limited in time by death. They do not exhibit organisation, nor regulation nor reproduction. We can discern no laws but those of a statistical nature which govern the composition and size of material objects. We do not observe in them either the functions or the rhythms of life, nor do we see the power of assimilation or the manifestations of mind. All these are present in living organisms and, moreover, each species has a characteristic level of organisation beyond which it cannot pass. The level of organisation is registered in the organic sensitivity which is also the mechanism of its actualisation. 6. The Laws of Life Irreducible to Physical Laws There is an essential distinction between the energy used by the organism and the energy that regulates the organisms. 6 The first takes part in the exchanges of nutrition and respiration and is subject to physical laws: c'est 1'nergie d'entretien. The second is autonomous: it regulates the exchanges but does not participate in them: c'est lnergie propre de la ne. Contrary to an opinion long entertained, there is no interconvertibility between the energy of life and the energies of the physical world. There are, for example, electrical phenomena to be observed in nerve impulses but they are not to be compared with ordinary electric currents. 7. The Reversibility of Vital Phenomena The law of reversibility is one of the master ideas of metabiology. There is no such law in the physical world. As examples may be cited the constant return to equilibrium of the organic functions and the chromosomic reduction of male and female gametes at each generation, the incessant return to homogeneity and the `dedifferentiation' of all paths in the processes of regeneration. 8. Predetermination but not Predestination The fundamental pattern manifested in the organisation of life from the germ throughout all stages of development is a predetermination. It is present in posse in the germ, but there is no question of preformation. The organic sensitivity is the bearer of potentialities only. Moreover, the predetermination is also a non-determination as may be observed in the fluctuations that occur within the limit of the reactional margin of the organic sensitivity. The fluctuations are incalculable and they allow freedom of action to the mind. Consequently there can be no question of predestination in the absolute sense of the term. 9. Finality
6

La Vie et La Mort. Paris 1952 Flammerio editeur Collection de Philosophic Scientifique.

Biological indeterminism remains within the framework of biological predetermination. Man can, by his conduct, influence his personal destiny, but must remain within the limits dictated by his own pattern of organic sensitivity. The functional mechanism is and remains what it is but it has not the rigidity of a physico-chemical mechanism. There can thus be an end-seeking finality that is fully consistent with an initial predetermination.

10. What can be understood by the powers of life Metabiology admits the existence of powers that permit the activity of the body and also powers that permit the activity of mind. The powers reside in the organic sensitivity. They include organization, regulation, assimilation and reproduction for the life of the body, and thought volition and free appreciation for the life of the mind. From the purely biological standpoint, we are led to postulate a soul as the energy principle of life itself. Since it is the vehicle of predetermination, it is also the source of the powers of the body and the mind. As life is actualised, it seeks and finds its support in the nervous system which is the instrument for the exercise of its powers. Thus from the processes of life, we infer the existence and the nature of the power that determines them. The powers are inseparable from their source and without it they would have no meaning. 11. The defects of the Classical Body-Soul Dualism7 We must be careful not to confuse the energy-principle, that is the soul, with the activity of the body and the mind. The latter are material and temporal whereas the former is immaterial and non-temporal. In passing from the `potential form' represented by the soul to the `realised form' as it exists, the exercise of the bodily and mental powers entrains with it fluctuations in the activity of both body and mind. This serves to differentiate the two activities from the nonmaterial and immutable soul. The triadic conception-body, mind and soul-supplies us with the means of carrying to a further stage the analysis of the functioning of the mind according to whether it stands related to body or to the soul-the source of life. At death the actualised form disappears-it is this that characterises the exercise of the powers of the mind and of those of the body. The pure form, which is non-material, does not die. We may suppose that it retains the witness of the experience of life. Thus each soul acquires an individual character according to the manner in which the powers have been exercised. It must here be noted that according to Vernet's conception the soul itself does not exercise the powers of life. It is the mind as the activity of intellect and consciousness that serves as the link between the determinations of the body and the deep-seated freedom experienced from the direction of the soul-the very source of its own activity. In the activity of the mind, two modes of perception are to be distinguished -those derived from external sense impressions and those which the organic sensitivity encounters in its own contact with the source of life. These can be called the `sensible' and the 'supersensible' data of mental activity.
12. The problem of the Communication of Substances

The metabiologist encounters no problem of communication. We constantly observe the transition from potential to actual in the exercise of the powers of the organic sensitivity. By the interplay of sensitivity and dynamism the union of the material and the non-material is constantly renewed. They coexist in all the activity of life. The double process is clarified by the conjoint study of the qualitative and the quantitative aspect of phenomena. The unbreakable association of sense data and powers in the activity of thought and volition bears witness to the unifying influence of the organic sensitivity upon life at all levels. 13. The power of Appreciation, Consciousness and Freedom
7

Lme et La Vie. Paris 1950

Consciousness is neither container nor content: it is the power of appreciation or judgment that resides in the organic sensitivity in its reactions to every kind of datum. Understanding, and with it knowledge of the external world, would be incomprehensible but for this power of the organic sensitivity. Consequently the awareness of understanding and the power of reflective thought implies awareness of the organic sensitivity itself. Each of us apprehends the world by virtue of the power of judgment present in our own sensitivity. The same power is the basis of conscience, with the difference that judgment is directed not towards sensible but suprasensible data. Freewill is the consequence of the reactional margin or non-determinism already referred to. Thus freedom is one of the powers of life. The exercise of the power resides in the mind. Freedom is not a subjective intuition but a living reality. The powers latent in the soul appear in the mind as the power of thought combined with its exercise. But without the original pattern there could be no power of thought nor life itself.

14. The Soul as Potential Form The contrast of which every biologist must become aware between the immutability of specific form and the fluctuations of activity in the actualised form corresponds to the distinction between soul as potential and mind as actualised power of action. The activity of mind and body betoken their temporal nature; the non-active but eternally potent form betokens the non-temporal nature of the soul. The soul remains unaffected by the fluctuations suffered by the mind in consequence of the combined action of the data and powers derived from the life principle and the impressions of the external world and the visceral reflexes. The powers proceed from a single immutable source but mind and body exercise them in very different ways. Here we see the extent to which metabiology parts company with existentialism. According to the latter the life principle and the powers manifested in existence are equally undetermined. Although it invokes freedom as a primary datum it cannot reveal its genesis. In metabiology, on the contrary, all the observed data confirm the thesis that both predetermination and freedom must reside in the same regulative principle that governs both the development and the maintenance of life. The species is the expression of the essence which generates existence. Indeed, the stability of species is the most cogent evidence for the immutability of essence. 15. Ethics In his latest work 8 Vernet undertakes the critique of moral activity in the light of his doctrine of organic sensitivity. He shows that the condition of an authentic morality-freedom of the will-is satisfied by the reactional margin within which consciousness is not determined. In the final chapter, he discusses the transition from biological science to metaphysics, and shows that it remains true that in order to understand phenomena we are drawn beyond the phenomenal. When the phenomena are those of human physiology, the division between biology and metabiology is not to be made in terms of the data studied but of their significance. It is precisely because biological science remains within the framework of physiological observation-and yet at the same time transcends it in its significancebut that metabiology can furnish a new instrument for resolving many of the ancient `metaphysical' enigmas. Man lives in two worlds but when these are labelled the `physical' and the `metaphysical' they appear to be separated by a gap that can be bridged only by speculative philosophy. If the two worlds are called `biological' and 'metabiological' or, in Vernet's terminology, `sensible' and 'suprasensible', it becomes evident that they have a common frontier in the physiological mechanism of organic sensitivity. It is, by the study of this frontier that we may hope to discover the mutual relevance of the two worlds. In this brief survey, little can be conveyed of the penetrating analysis that Vernet brings to bear upon the problems he examines. His critiques of heredity and evolution are of special value in view of the changing attitude of many biologists to the older theories of Darwin and Weismann.

LHomme: Mitre de sa Destine, Ethique et Biologie. Paris 1956.