OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O.

2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Pelaez vs. Auditor General September 29, 1988 | Paras Facts: The President issued a number of executive orders (pursuant to Section 68 of the Administration Code), which created 33 municipalities. Petitioner Emmanual Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, filed for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Auditor General from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders. He alleges that said EOs are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. RA 2370 provides that: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Issue: WON the EOs are null and void for being an undue delegation of legislative power (WON the President can create a municipality, which is composed of several barrios) Held: NO. The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of

the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines. The case of Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan doesnt apply to the present petition because said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan),likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, notthe clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is "purely a legislative question or a political question. If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal

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impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio. Bengzon, J.P., concurring and dissenting: The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result. The power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities. Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-existing barrios. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons,

local autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality. It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null and void. Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya September 29, 1988 | Paras Facts: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of petitioner. This conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao. Since no action was taken thereon, respondent then filed a complaint with then CFI of Davao, presided over by public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya, against the Municipality of Kapalong for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute and recovery of collected taxes and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the lower court and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration (MR) and second MR. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WON the Municipality of Sto. Tomas legally exists Held: NO. Petitioner was correct in contending that based on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, it is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of. It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must remain part and parcel of Kapalong. On the ground of jurisdiction, as petitioner has correctly argued, the settlement of boundary disputes is administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions.

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Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless. Cawaling vs. COMELEC October 26, 2001 | Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: In 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor. The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. The creation of the City of Sorsogon was later proclaimed as having been ratified by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr., as resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the ground of non-compliance with periods prescribed for the conduct of the plebiscite. Later on, he instituted another petition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional. According to petitioner, the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code (cf. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city. In addition to that, he argued that there was no compelling reason for merging the merging the two municipalities, considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. He also pointed out that R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subjectone bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Issue: WON R.A. No. 8806 is unconstitutional Held: NO. The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Petitioner contends that contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city in Section 450 of the LGC is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the LGC distinctly provides: Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Petitioners submission that there is no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which the Court is not competent to rule. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. League of Cities vs. COMELEC Facts: During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives. Of the 57, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. The 24 other bills were not acted upon. Thereafter, the 12th Congress passed into law R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted the Joint Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted

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upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29. Then came the 13th Congress, which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval. The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution Sixteen municipalities later filed, through their respective sponsors, their individual cityhood bills, all containing a common provision exempting all the municipalities from the P100M income requirement under R.A. No. 9009. Congress approved such cityhood bills, which subsequently became effective as law without the Presidents signature. By virtue of the said Cityhood Laws, the COMELEC held plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners LCP et al. sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause. Issue: WON the Cityhood Laws are constitutional November 18, 2008 | Carpio Held: NO. The SC En banc, by a 6-5 vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. The classification criterion - mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress - is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities. The SC held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million income, the requirement

under Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. ***Upon the respondent municipalities first motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the motion on March 31, 2009. On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied the respondent municipalities second motion for reconsideration. The November 18, 2008 decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009. December 21, 2009 | Velasco, Jr. Held: YES, it is constitutional. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured. The last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution, a 6-6 deadlock. On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision The Supreme Court En Banc reversed the November 18, 2008 decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that: a. By constitutional design and as a matter of longestablished principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the Local Government Code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the

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local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, B.P. Blg. 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to B.P. 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. b. Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the PimentelDrilon exchange, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100 M minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. It is immaterial that said deliberations were undertaken in the 11th and/or 12th Congress (or before the cityhood laws were passed during the 13th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative body. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to the enactment of RA 9009. c. The equal protection clause extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned. Petitioners could not invoke this constitutional guarantee because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b) is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) applies equally to all members of the same class.

All of these requisites had been met by the subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondent municipalities had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However, due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100 M income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of P20 M. Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. d. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question should be upheld. Carpio, J. dissenting: In actions instituted originally in the Supreme Court, if there is a tie-vote, the Court en banc shall deliberate again. After such re-deliberation and the Court remains equally divided, which means that no decision had been reached, the original action shall be dismissed. In such a case, the tie-vote results in the dismissal of the action without establishing any jurisprudential precedent. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Certainly, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, and the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision. The Court en banc need not deliberate again because in case of a tie- vote on a second motion for

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reconsideration, which is an incidental matter, such motion is lost. August 24, 2010 | Carpio Held: NO, it is not constitutional. The SC finds the ad cautelam motion for consideration by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. (This decision reiterates the November 2008 ruling of the Court.) RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." February 15, 2011 | Bersamin Held: YES, it is constitutional. The Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 was met with a favorable action by the Court. It ruled that the 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9009, the respondent municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of

trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. (They are the following: Batac, Ilocos Norte; El Salvador, Misamis Oriental; Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte; Borongan, Eastern Samar; Lamitan, Basilan; Catbalogan, Samar; Bogo, Cebu; Tandag, Surigao del Sur; Bayugan, Agusan del Sur; Carcar, Cebu; Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; Tayabas, Quezon; Tabuk, Kalinga; Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu) Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. Carpio, J. dissenting: In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Abad, J. concurring: The Court should not ignore the legislative history of R.A. 9009, including the pertinent exchanges during the interpellation of Senator Pimentel and Senate President Franklin Drilon. From the said exchanges, it is clear that the legislature intended to exempt from the amended income requirement of R.A. 9009 the municipalities that had pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. As a matter of fact, such legislative intent was carried over to the 12th and the 13th Congress when the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolutions 8 that sought the exemption of 24 municipalities, including the 16, from the application of R.A. 9009. The continuing intent of Congress culminated in the inclusion of the exemption clause in the cityhood bills and their subsequent passage. In addition to that, it could be culled from their dialogue that Congress did not anymore insert an exemption clause from the income requirement of R.A. 9009 since such exchanges, when read by the Court, would already reveal the lawmakers intent regarding such matter. The Court should have adopted an attitude of becoming humility, upholding the constitutionality of the acts of a co-

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equal branch of government regarding a matter that properly fell within its powers. Further, petitioner League of Cities failed to show that the creation of the sixteen new cities discriminated against other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the majority of the present cities in our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local Government Code. Actually, the existing cities would not cease to exist nor would their liberties suffer by reason of the enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to deprivation of property sincethe IRA is not their property until it has been automatically released.12 Mere expectancy in the receipt of IRA can not be regarded as the "property" envisioned in the Bill of Rights. April 12, 2011 | Bersamin Held: YES, its constitutional. On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata applyherein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality. On the substantive issues, Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.

It should not be overlooked that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. Carpio, J. dissenting: There is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that the Cityhood Laws further amended the Local Government Code, which exclusively embodies the essential requirements for the creation of cities, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Each Cityhood Law contains a uniformly worded separability clause. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Abad, J. concurring: Justices look at cases through different lenses. Disagreements in their conclusions can and often happen. Thus, they are forced to take a vote and the will of the majority prevails. The Court is no orchestra with its members playing one tune under the baton of a maestro. They bring with them a diversity of views, which is what the Constitution prizes, for it is this diversity that filters out blind or dictated conformity. June 28, 2011 | Bersamin Held: The petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the respondents own second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between then and now, however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2, 2009 that the respondents second motion for reconsideration was "no longer a prohibited pleading." No similar declaration favors the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Also, considering that the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the issues previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011),

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the Court, having already passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy. Carpio, J. dissenting: (reiterates his earlier dissent) Sereno, J. dissenting: The Court has been entrusted by the sovereign with the duty of voicing out and sharpening with finality societys collective ideals in its written decisions. Yet, if cases are litigated in perpetuity, and judgments are clouded with continuous uncertainty, the publics confidence in the stability of judicial precedents promulgated by the Court would be greatly diminished. In this case, the Court has reviewed and reconsidered, no less than five times already, the constitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. During this time, the public has been made to endure an inordinate degree of indecision that has disturbed the conduct of local government affairs with respect not only to the municipalities asking to become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful of the destruction of the standards for the creation of cities and the correlative diminution of the internal revenue allotments of existing cities. In the instant case, there is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that would warrant the reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. There is no injustice in preventing the conversion of the sixteen municipalities into cities at this point in time. In fact, justice is more equitably dispensed by the stringent application of the current legislative criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC), as amended by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities without distinction or exception. The route purportedly chosen by Congress to indirectly amend the LGC through the exemption of annual income requirements in the Cityhood Laws is improper. If Congress believes that the minoritys construction of its intention in increasing the annual income requirement is erroneous, then the legislature can show its disapproval by directly enacting amendatory legislation of the LGC. By indiscriminately carving out exemptions in the charter laws themselves, Congress enfeebled the normative function of the LGC on the legislative power to create cities. Municipality of Condjay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals December 28, 1995 | Panganiban Facts: This case involves the barrio/barangay Pagahat located in Bohol. The lower court declared that it was within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia to respect

plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio. The Court of Appeals rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place practically all of Barrio Pagahat, part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay. This will result in Candijay eating up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. The Court of Appeals also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the municipalities. Issue: a. WON CA applied the principle of "equiponderance of evidence properly b. WON respondent municipality has the juridical personality to bring this case despite having been created under a void executive order (EO 265 issued by President Quirino, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers) Held: a. YES. The decision of the Court of Appeals is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing. b. YES. It is to be noted petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality 35 years after respondent municipality first came into existence. The Court found the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. controlling: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness,

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. The Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. (creation of municipal courts, apportionment of seats of the House of Representatives) Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. The municipality of Alicia had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof.