Article I Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968 Facts: A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications,

is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional function to tax. Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty. It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." 7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. People v Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces. Held: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the

principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,et.al v . HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC(Carpio, J.) The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. Facts: R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the t e r m s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e L a w o f t h e S e a ( U N C L O S I I I ) , which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine a r c h i p e l a g o a n d c l a s s i f i e d a d j a c e n t t e r r i t o r i e s s u c h a s t h e K a l a y a a n I s l a n d Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including over flight. Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters Held: Petition DISMISSED. T h e C o u r t f i n d s R . A . 9 5 2 2 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d i s consistent with the Philippines national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal W a t e r s i n t o archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III; an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the w a t e r s e n c l o s e d b y t h e a r c h i p e l a g i c b a s e l i n e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r d e p t h o r distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein Article II TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA Facts: President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the changes in the roles, functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health

services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. Issue: WON EO102 is constitutional? Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. Nor if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as nonself-executing. Section I In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno Facts: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. Issue: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33. Held: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking. Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832) FACTS: Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners. The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the rest house and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first

seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Rest house was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash. Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is valid. HELD: No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG. In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it ill -gotten wealth, and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition. As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight. *Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Rest house with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case. CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945 FACTS: The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during a de facto government are good and valid. 2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation. 3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands. HELD:

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de factogovernment, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio. 2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. 3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in this connection says: From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all

preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content. ACCFA v CUGCO G.R. No. L-21484. November 29, 1969. J. Makalintal Certiorari Facts: (ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA). On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal. During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court agreed with this move. However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted. Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified Ratio:Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include powers non really accorded to non-government entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise. Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a government agency tasked t implement land reform. Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself. The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these letter functions being ministrant, he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals." continue to lose their welldefined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA. This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides: "SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations." People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) vs. Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) Facts: The PHHC seeks a reversal of the Resolution of the CIR en banc in ordering them to pay private respondents wage differential for work. The Philippine government and World Food Program (WFP) entered into an agreement in a plan for the Sapang Palay resettlement area in the PHHC proposing a self-help project to be undertaken by the squatter families for the construction of two dams. The undertaking is for the purpose of water irrigation to be used for additional food production. In recruiting participants to the program, the WFP issued an application form mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered. The participants were assigned to work on canals and roads; however, the projects agreed between the PHHC and WFP were never fully implemented. They were ordered to accomplish a time sheet which is the basis for the payment of 50 centavos/day and a weekly food ration. They were also provided with work tools and assigned a work supervisor to manage and administer the Sapang Palay project in which the latter also conducted ocular inspection in the area. However, the participants went to the Department of

Labor complaining about their work and compensation which Secretary Ople suggest that the workers in the said project must be paid in minimum wage law. After that, petitioner suspended work and the workers assert their minimum wage and the 50 centavos be paid to them. The petitioner answered before the CIR that they were exercising governmental functions and that they did not hire private respondents and CIR had no jurisdiction over them. The Court dismissed the action of the petitioner since there was no evidence that private respondents rendered overtime work. The petitioner moved to reconsider before the CIR but denied the claims. Thus, they elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and/or controlled corporation performing governmental function. Held: The Court ruled that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over labor disputes involving GOCC but not the performing governmental functions. Since the National Housing Association was created, the Philippine government has carried mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is governmental institution performing governmental functions. Thus, the Court grant the petition and set aside the assailed resolution of the Court of CIR. SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions) FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions. ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver. HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.1973-10-26 En Banc 1973 October 26FERNANDO, J: Facts:Defendant-appellant, Loreta Gozo was convicted by the Court of FirstInstance of violating an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition of the same. She filed this motion seeking to set aside the judgment, while yielding that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she asserts that we cannot exercise therein, administrative jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not municipal corporations have administrative jurisdiction over naval bases leased to the American armed forces. Held: Municipal corporations retain administrative jurisdiction. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validlyexercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country. The Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Governmentretains not only jurisdictional rights notgranted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The appealed decision is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964.

Section II Agustin vs. Edu 88 SCRA 195 Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power. Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways. J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983 Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held. On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied. Issues: 1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila. 2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger. Ruling: The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly. Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy. Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional? RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the

provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Lim v Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002 Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. Held: The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

Mijares v. Ranada Facts: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee. Held:Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for 13 enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property. Shangri-La v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc. -Nature: -Facts: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court o Petitioners Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. (SLIHM) assail to set aside Court of Appeals (CA) decision on 15 May 2003 and resolution on 15 September 2003 On 18 October 1982, Developers Group of Companies, Inc. (DGCI) filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for registration covering the Shangri-La mark and S logo On 31 May 1983, BPTTT issued in favor of DGCI, Registration No. 31904 DGCI has used the S logo since then But as far back as 1962, the Kuok Group of Companies has adopted the name Shangri-La in all Shangri-La hotels and hotel-related establishments worldwide (SLIHM) In February 1975, William Lee, a Singaporean design artist commissioned to design the logo of Shangri-La hotels, launched the stylized S logo SLIHM has used the name Shangri-La and the S logo since then Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. was incorporated in the RP beginning 1987 when the Kuok Group put up two hotels in Mandaluyong and Makati On 21 June 1988, SLIHM filed with the BPTTT a petition, praying for the cancellation of the Registration No. 31904 and for the registration of the mark and logo in their own name

 -Issue:

DGCI filed a complaint for Infringement and Damages with the RTC of Quezon City against SLIHM because they have been using the mark and the logo for the last eight years SLIHM pointed to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and further claimed that they have used the mark and logo since 1975 On 8 March 1996, RTC ruled in favor of DGCI Therefrom, SLIHM went on appeal to the CA, but the affirmed the lower courts decision with the modification of deleting the award of attorneys fees o SLIHM moved a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied

What constitutes trademark ownership? -Decision: -Ratio Petition is granted and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA is set aside o SC ruled in favor of SLIHM RA No. 166 (law in force at the time of DGCIs application) o The root of ownership of a trademark is actual use in commerce o Section 2 of RA No. 166 requires that before a trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in commerce and service for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application for its registration Moreover, registration does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the registered mark o The certificate of registration is merely a prima facie proof that the registrant is the owner of the registered mark or trade name o Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade name by another can overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the former to be declared owner in an appropriate case In other words, registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership o The actual use in commerce or business is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of the right of ownership In his testimony, Ramon Synhunliong, stated that the alleged jeepney signboard artist commissioned to create the mark and logo submitted his design only in December 1982 o That was two-and-a-half months after the filing of the respondents trademark application o Ramon Synhunliong has been a guest at SLIHMs hotel before causing the registration of the trademark, which gave rise to the allegation that he must have copied the idea there Section 2 of RA No. 166 provides for what is registerable, containing the clause actually in use in commerce in services not less than two months in the Philippines o But Section 2-A sets out how ownership is acquired o Under Section 2-A it states: The actual use in commerce is the test of ownership The mark must not have been so appropriated by another Whether or not the actual use of the trademark is in the Philippines DGCI did not fulfill the requirements of ownership under Section 2-A International Law o The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines o The said convention runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or devise o The conflict was settled by the Supreme Court: o "Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20) o Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere

Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16)

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the pr J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983eambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional; Held: YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature