People v.

Vera Reyes Main topic: Police Power Facts: The defendant was charged with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958 The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and some time after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands. The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional. After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether the said provision on penalties for non-payment is unconstitutional seeing as the constitution denies imprisonment for non-payment of debt. HELD: No. The last part of section 1 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of the salary within the periods specified is considered as a violation of the law. The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary, should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment. The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12), Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second is estafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In the exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers or employers in the specified periods of time. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties. Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they would receive in case of a decision in their favor.

Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives Main Topic: Constitutionality of Rules, Impeachment & Checks and Balances Facts: The House of Representatives adopted a new rules of procedure on impeachment cases. On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue: (1)Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and (2) Whether the adopted rules are unconstitutional. (3) Whether or not the Court can make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Quick Answers: (1) Yes. The second petition was filed within a year. This conclusion has been reached after determining when the one-year count will run once the proceeding is initiated. (2) Yes, since the new rules are violative of the constitution as they create a new meaning between filing, referral and initiate. The constitution uses the word initiate in its ordinary meaning. (3) No. This is a political question.

Held: On Jurisdiction: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible.

Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all

cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional - The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing. Consequently, Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. On Political Questions: *** From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature. Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine. The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

Olmstead vs vs. US (Brandeis dissent) American Jurisprudence Main Topic: Search & Seizure and Privacy Synopsis of Rule of Law. A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than ethical conduct by government officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it. Facts Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes, including conspiracy. The operation grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading conspirator and the general manager of the business was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the Petitioner). The main office of the business was in Seattle and there were three telephones in the office, each on a different line. There were also telephones in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his associates and various other places in Seattle. A lot of communication occurred between Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia. The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by four federal prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four of the suspects and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants. They were made in the basement of the large office building. The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the houses. Various conversations were taped and testified to by government witnesses. Issue Whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

When it comes to interpreting the Constitution, are judges limited to the ways in which the text was originally understood by the authors? When it comes to the constitutional proection against "unreasonable serach and seizure," does that refer only to the sorts of things that could be searched and seized at the time that the Constitution was written?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 against the plaintiffs and in favor of the government, holding that wiretapping was not an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and was not compulsory self-incrimination within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. According to Chief Justice Taft:

The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The amendment does not forbid what was done here for there was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the sense of hearing and that only. There was not entry of the houses. The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded. Since the evidence was a conversation and no entry was made into Olmstead's home, there was therefore no violation of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Brandeis Dissent Particularly important in this case was Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion, in which he laid the groundwork for understanding constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. I shall quote him at length, but the salient points of his dissent are: first, that the Constitutional language should not be limited to just the ideas in the minds of the authors and must instead be applied to modern issues; second, that the Court has a tradition of applying the words in the Constitution broadly rather than narrowly or literally, and third, that the language of the Constitution guarantees everyone basic rights to liberty and privacy which are inherent in, even if not expressed by, the actual words of the Constitution. The Government makes no attempt to defend the methods employed by its officers. Indeed, it concedes that if wire-tapping can be deemed a search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, such wire tapping as was practiced in the case at bar was an unreasonable search and seizure, and that the evidence thus obtained was inadmissible. But it relies on the language of the Amendment; and it claims that the protection given thereby cannot properly be held to include a telephone conversation. 'We must never forget,' said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 'that it is a Constitution we are expounding.' Since then this court has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the fathers could not have dreamed. ...We have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of government, like those embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern conditions by regulations which 'a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.' ...Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world. Time and again this court, in giving effect to the principle underlying the Fourth Amendment, has refused to place an unduly literal construction upon it. This was notably illustrated in the Boyd Case itself. Taking language in its ordinary meaning, there is no 'search' or 'seizure' when a defendant is required to produce a document in the orderly process of a court's procedure. 'The right of the people of be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,' would not be violated, under any ordinary construction of language, by compelling obedience to a subpoena. But this court holds the evidence inadmissible simply because the information leading to the issue of the subpoena has been unlawfully secured. The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the

right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. ***Brandeis' dissent has formed the foundation for civil-libertarian arguments in all cases involving privacy since this decision was handed down.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). Main Topic: Equal Protection Disputed the Separate but Equal doctrine.

Facts This case is a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Several black children, through their legal representatives, sought admission to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. The plaintiffs alleged that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In all but one case, a judge federal district court cited Plessy v. Ferguson in denying relief under the separate but equal doctrine. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that segregated schools were not and could not be made equal and that they were therefore deprived of equal protection of the laws. Issue Whether or not the race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools is constitutional Held: No. The race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though their physical facilities and others may be equal. Education in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in American life today. The separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place in the field of public education. Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they would receive in an integrated school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.

Delaware v. Prouse Main Topic: Search and Seizure Facts: In Delaware, a policeman stopped William Prouses vehicle in order to make a routine check of his drivers license and registration. The officers decision to initiate the traffic stop was not based upon any observable traffic violation or suspicious conduct by Prouse. After initiating the stop, the officer found marijuana in the vehicle. He seized marijuana in plain view on the car floor. Respondent was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a controlled substance. The marijuana was ultimately used as evidence in the successful indictment against Prouse. At a hearing on respondent's motion to suppress the marihuana, the patrolman testified that, prior to stopping the vehicle, he had observed neither traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he made the stop only in order to check the driver's license and the car's registration. The patrolman was not acting pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot checks, promulgated by either his department or the State Attorney General. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the stop and detention to have been wholly capricious, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. Issues: Whether or not the officers search of Prouses vehicle violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Held: The Court found that Prouses constitutional rights had in fact been violated. The Court reasoned that the states interests concerning discretionary traffic stops (spot checks) did not outweigh the privacy interests of travelers (drivers). The Court ruled that random checks did not greatly improve road safety, and therefore did not constitute a prevailing state interest that would outweigh citizens privacy interests. The Court finally reasoned that officers must have probable cause for such searches or else it would blur the limitations imposed upon the government, which is the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. This case was significant because the Supreme Court ruled that law enforcement must have some modicum of probable cause in order to stop a vehicle; that there are limitations to searching vehicles and seizing evidence, particularly when borne out of stops not based on probable cause.

FACTS: Main Topic: Constitutional Right to Remain Silent & Counsel, Confessions and Inadmissibility of Evidence Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a robbery. He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit. He then signed the confession they prepared. The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession is admissible in evidence. HELD: Galit should be acquitted. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

People vs. Morico Main Topic: Constitutional Right to be Informed & Assisted by Counsel, and Inadmissibility of Evidence Facts: Morico was accused of the act of selling, delivering, and distribute and give away to another, three (3) hand rolled sticks of marijuana leaves which are legally considered prohibited drugs. Appellant, assisted by his counsel-de-oficio, asserted his innocence to the charge. Subsequently, another lawyer entered his appearance as counsel-de-parte. Trial court found him guilty.

According to the NARCOM, On November 12, 1987, at about 3:00 P.M., elements of the AntiNarcotics Command (NARCOM) in Bacoor, Cavite received an information from their confidential informant that a certain "Sixto," a resident of Barangay Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, was engaged in the sale of marijuana leaves. A team, composed of Sgt. Rodrigo Espiritu, CIC Roberto Gelido and Pat. Allan Alcantara, was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. A marked ten-peso bill was given to the informant, who was also tasked to act as the poseur-buyer. The poseur-buyer then went to the house of appellant and engaged him in a conversation. Later, the poseur-buyer handed the marked ten-peso bill to appellant, who in turn, gave him a small package. It was at that instant that the poseur-buyer raised his tshirt, the pre-arranged signal. The members of the team swooped down on appellant and arrested him. They recovered from him the marked ten-peso bill. Thereafter, appellant was brought to the district office of the NARCOM in Imus, Cavite. Appellant claimed that he was working as a mason at Barangay Sabutan when he was arrested. When appellant asked why he was arrested, he was told that he was peddling marijuana. Appellant was then brought to the municipal building in Silang, Cavite. From Silang, appellant was brought to Imus. He related that he saw the sticks of marijuana presented in evidence against him for the first time in Imus. He also claimed that a policeman got the marked money from the pocket of Sgt. Espiritu and handed the same to him. On the third day of his detention, he was manhandled and ordered to sign the "Receipt of Seized property" without the assistance of counsel. He was threatened with bodily harm if be failed to sign the document. Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exh. "D"), the same was never explained to him nor was he assisted by counsel. On the fourth day of his detention, the policemen demanded money from him for his release. He refused. According to Morico, he was convicted of a crime not charged on the information. Issue:

(1) Whether or not the trial court erroneously convicted him of an offense which is not charged in
the information.

(2) Whether or not his signing in the booking sheet without the assistance of a counsel is violative of
his constitutional rights and must be admissible as evidence.

(3) Whether or not his signing on the Receipt of Property without the assistance of a counsel is
violative of his constitutional rights and must be admissible as evidence.

Held: Appellant's argument should be sustained. (1) The information only charged appellant with violating Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. However, he was convicted of violating Sections 4 and 15 of the same law. Section 4 and Section 15 are two separate and distinct offenses. Section 4 penalizes any person who, unless authorized by law, sells, administers delivers, distributes and transports any prohibited drugs. Section 15 penalizes any person who without authority of law, sells, administers, distributes and transports any regulated drugs. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. To do so would constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, i.e., to be informed of the charges against him and his right to due process (People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 [1989]). (2) No, it is not incriminating in nature. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and maybe useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction (3) Yes, appellant's signature on this document is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken from appellant, as a result of a violation of his constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. Appellant still guilty since despite the absence of the disqualified pieces of evidence, the remaining evidence still has weight and is adequate to confirm his conviction.

Lansang Vs. Garcia Main Topic: Suspension of Habeas Corpus Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant. It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities (mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is nonexistent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. (2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b)

to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negated by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.

Abrams vs. United States Main Topic: Limitation to Freedom of Speech Facts of the Case The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The first of these leaflets says that the President's cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia reveals the hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington. It intimates that "German militarism combined with allied capitalism to crush the Russian evolution " -- goes on that the tyrants of the world fight each other until they see a common enemy -- working class enlightenment, when they combine to crush it, and that now militarism and capitalism combined, though not openly, to crush the Russian revolution. It says that there is only one enemy of the workers of the world, and that is capitalism; that it is a crime for workers of America, &c., to fight the workers' republic of Russia, and ends "Awake! Awake, you Workers of the World, Revolutionists!" A note adds It is absurd to call us pro-German. We hate and despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical tyrants. We have more reasons for denouncing German militarism than has the coward of the White House. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The other leaflet, headed "Workers -- Wake Up," with abusive language says that America together with the Allies will march for Russia to help the Czecko-Slovaks in their struggle against the Bolsheviki, and that this time the hypocrites shall not fool the Russian emigrants and friends of Russia in America. It tells the Russian emigrants that they now must spit in the face of the false military propaganda by which their sympathy and help to the prosecution of the war have been called forth, and says that, with the money they have lent or are going to lend, "they will make bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia," and further, Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing bullets, bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans, [p626] but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom. It then appeals to the same Russian emigrants at some length not to consent to the "inquisitionary expedition to Russia," and says that the destruction of the Russian revolution is "the politics of the march to Russia." The leaflet winds up by saying "Workers, our reply to this barbaric intervention has to be a general strike!" and, after a few words on the spirit of revolution, exhortations not to be afraid, and some usual tall talk ends, "Woe unto those who will be in the way of progress. Let solidarity live! The Rebels." The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Issue: Whether or not the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment.

Conclusion No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a classic libertarian pronouncement.

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) Main Topic: Taxation and Freedom Of the Press Facts: The appellees, nine publishers of newspapers, had brought a suit to enjoin the enforcement against them of a legislative requirement 'that every person, firm, association or corporation ... engaged in the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising or for advertisements, whether printed or published ... in any ... publication with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week ... shall ... pay a license tax ....' Failure to pay the tax was punishable by a fine, or by a maximum sentence of six months' imprisonment of six months, or both. The appellees filed for an injunction, among other things on the ground that the tax constituted a violation of the right to freedom of expression. The lower court held for appellees, granting a permanent injunction. Issue: Whether or not the tax sanction constituted a violation of the right to freedom of expression. Held: Yes, as it serves as a double restraint with two layers of taxes for advertising and for registration. The Court considered that the tax was designated as an advertising tax. In the instant case, the tax operated as a tax of 2 percent on the gross receipts derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers when, and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. The Court considered that the tax, therefore, acted as a double restraint. First, its effect was to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising; and, second, the Court considered that its direct tendency was to restrict circulation. The Court considered that, historically, such taxes as the one under consideration, revenue to the government was of subordinate concern. Instead, the dominant and controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs. The form of the tax itself as suspicious since its basis is the circulation, or the number of people reached and not the number of advertisement. In this sense, it is curtailing the right of the people to participate in forming opinions about misgovernment. These were reminiscent of taxes on knowledge which were rampant on the olden days as enacted by the English Crown the main role of which is to suppress the cheaper papers which were the only media available to the poorer masses. These were protested against not due to their financial tax burden but on its ability of denying information to the people. The Court considered furthermore that it had no doubt been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to ensure that such abusive imposition of taxes should not be allowed. It quoted with approval from one of the standard legal textbooks: The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. (reference omitted) The Court reiterated that this should not be interpreted as relieving newspapers and other publishers from paying any tax whatsoever. However, the 'registration tax' under consideration could not be justified. The Court recalled the important function of the press: The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the

suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. For these reasons, the tax constituted a violation of the right to freedom of expression.

Reyes Vs. Bagatsing Main Topic: Constitutional Right To Peaceful Assembly Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila, pursuant to the Vienna convention, prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves. Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble was violated. Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. It is important to note that since time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise

whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice should be given to applicants for the denial. There was no clear and present danger in this case nor is there any proof that the distance between the embassy and the area is less than 500 feet, therefore, the denial is without basis.

De Knecht Vs CA Main Topic: Eminent Domain Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The original plan for expropriation for the extension of EDSA was along Cuneta Avenue but was later changed to the Fernando Rein Del Pan route. Among the questions involved were the validity of the sudden change of proposed extensions and covered properties by the project. The Municipal Trial Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished. The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation. Petitioners also pray for the prohibition of the Republics immediate possession of the properties in question. Issue: (1) Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject. (2) Whether or not the change in choices of lands to be expropriated is justified. Held: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been

already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government. Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

(2) No. There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." However, it is also recognized that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property should be taken. This is what the petitioners are questioning. Both the National Housing Authority and Departhment of Public Highways have provided that their analysis and studies do not see the functionality and practicality of the proposed change. The change justified by social impact cannot be given merit since the strip along Cuneta Avenue is marred by motels only, as opposed to the other route proposed which is abundant with settlements, private enterprises and home. From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

Lozano Vs. Martinez Main Topic: Non-imprisonment for Debt and Involuntary Servitude Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated: The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword. In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which

means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.