Manin - On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation

On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation Author(s): Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, Jane Mansbridge Reviewed work(s): Source: Political
Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 338-368 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191208 . Accessed: 09/03/2012 19:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.
http://www.jstor.org
ON LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL DELIBERATION

BERNARD MANIN Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris) Institutefor Advanced Study (Princeton) Translatedfrom the French by ELL Y STEIN and JANE MANSBRIDGE
A SKETCH OF A THEOR Y OF POLITICAL DELIBERA TION The theoretical controversies that the notion of social justice provokes today go far beyond the traditional framework of debates about the respective roles of the market and the state in the distribution of wealth.' The principal arguments that have been proposed seek, in effect, to define social rules capable of bringing about the unanimous agreement of individuals. The most radical form of liberalism maintains that protection against arbitrarycoercion is the sole common aim of all human beings living in society The liberty of individuals is identified with their security protected from coercion by others, every individual may freely seek happiness as he understands it, determine his own goals, and attempt to realize them, at least as long as this exercise of his freedom does not encroach upon the freedom of his fellows. Security is thus the only acceptable political principle; while all individuals have different concrete goals, they all wish to pursue their own goals in peace. If the rules promulgated by the political authorities limit themselves to guaranteeing liberty as defined in this manner, they can be universal, and apply to all in an identical fashion, because liberty is the sole aspect under which all individuals are strictly identical. Indeed, whenever
EDITORS' NOTE: This is a translation with minor modifications of an article published by thejournal Le Debat (Paris: Gallimard, Janvler 1985) under the title "Volonte Ge'nerale ou Deliberation? Esquisse d'une Theorie de la Deliberation Politique." Vol. 15No. 3, August1987338-368 POLITICAL THEORY, ? 1987Sage Publications, Inc. 338
Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION
339
political powers try, beyond concern for security, to make individuals substantially better off or to affect, even to some small degree, the material situation of one or another group deemed to be particularly underprivileged, they will be led to enact rules that do not treat all individuals in the same manner. By the very nature of their objective, such rules can never achieve the assent of all. The aim of the political order must, therefore, be liberty (that is, security) and not well-being, as individuals would not be able to agree on a single definition of wellbeing.2 The only type of state acceptable to all, and, therefore, legitimate, is one that limits its functions to the guarantee of internal and external security within the society' such is the traditional "minimal
state."3
This argument, however, runs into a major objection. Liberalism assumes that each individual is to have the right to pursue his objectives freely, protected from the interference of others. But for those individuals whose income and situation place them below a certain threshold, this rightjust loses its meaning. The minimal state will thus be one in which certain people cannot seek to realize their objectives. The universalism that was sought after is thus not attained; it can only be attained, or at least approached, if one accepts the promulgation of rules that are nonuniversal in their application, and that aim specifically at the well-being of certain social categories, and, therefore, cannot command universal agreement. It is possible, however, to try to demonstrate the rational and universally acceptable character of a theory of justice that bases the actions of the state on broader functions than those of the minimal state. Rawls makes this attempt.4 He tries to prove that by assuming that rational individuals,5 who wish to form a society, are indifferent to one another and are unaware of their potential position in the society they are about to establish, it is nevertheless possible to deduce that these individuals must accept two principles of justice, the second one of which justifies a certain redistribution of wealth.6 There is no need here to examine in detail Rawls's demonstration. What matters is his aim. If his process of deduction is correct, the two principles that he proposes follow necessarily from the rationality of individuals placed in the original position. These principles can thus, at least in the abstract, be the basis of universal agreement. It has, however, been convincingly argued that the second principle (inequalities should be so arrangedthat they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged) cannot be rigorously deduced from the data of the
340
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987
original situation. There is, in effect, an implied asymmetry between the most and the least privileged. The second group is favored over the first. If people nevertheless prefer it, it is because they tend to adopt the point of view of the least advantaged implicitly and without compelling reason.7The universalism that was aimed at does not obtain because the second principle rests on the particular point of view instead of the universal point of view of the rational individual. The second principle would, however, not be undermined by such a criticism if Rawls were able to recognize that adopting the point of view of the least advantaged, while not absolutely rational, is nonetheless partiallyjustifiable. But he cannot acknowledge such a possibility because his aim is to deduce a strictly universal conception of justice. Faced with these failures and inconsistencies, one may be tempted to dismiss the very premise of a project that attempts to define a conception ofjustice that will produce, at least in principle, a unanimous agreement among rational beings. The theses of radical liberalism, like those of Rawls, are in fact efforts to carry out a program, based on unanimous agreement. Rawls's work expresses this aim with particularclarity, but it is no different in the case of the radical liberals. Rawls states explicitly that he wishes to give his theory a certain and unshakable base. It must rest on an "Archimediean point,"8 that is to say, on a unanimously agreed-upon position, considered necessary by all. "The original position is so characterized that unanimity is possible."9 To justify his choice of unanimity, he adds: "For the most part the philosophical tradition including lntuitionism, has assumed that there exists some appropriate perspective from which unanimity on moral questions may be hoped for, at least among rational persons with relevantlysimilar and sufficient information."'0 The project of basing political legitimacy on unanimity cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that it appears at first glance unrealistic, for it also seems to derive inescapably from the fundamental principles of modern individualism. By nature, every individual is free and equal to every other individual. There is no essential difference or natural hierarchy among individuals to justify the domination of some over others. Political power and the rules it promulgates can have no other legitimate basis than the will of these equal individuals. This power and these rules bear on all members of society and constrain them all. The rules can, therefore, be legitimate only as long as they arise from the will of all and represent the will of all. In order to be realistic and to relax the exorbitant demands of unanimity, one may add that this unanimity is
341
not required for each individual decision, but rather for the larger principles and rules from which particular decisions flow. Rawls, for example, does this. One could also distinguish unanimity in principle from the actual unanimous agreement of all parties, and argue that philosophical justification requires only the first. For example, if it can be shown that a rule, opposed by some, actually supports what they, as free and rational subjects, should have wished for, then one could argue that their actual disagreement does not invalidate the rule, because the rule reflects only what they should have wanted in principle. These distinctions and nuances, however, in no way change the fundamental principle: that unanimity alone is the basis of legitimacy It is in order to meet this requirement that universalist theories of justice seek to show that principles do in fact exist that can form the basis for unanimous agreement.
UNANIMITY AND MAJORITY Liberal theories of justice try to answer the question: How can we establish a political and social order based on the will of individuals? From its inception, modern democratic thought has been confronted by the same problem because, like literalism, it is based on the principles of individualism. This is so regardlessof the differences between the liberal and the democratic points of view Both arrive at an identical conclusion: in the political sphere, it is unanimity that provides the principles of legitimacy Most democratic theories, however, are concerned not only with legitimacy, but also with efficiency. Thus they must bring into play a more realistic principle of decision making than that of unanimity, namely the majority principle. Yet the means they use to reconcile the principle of decision making (by majority) with the principle of legitimacy (by unanimity) underlines even more strongly the requirement for unanimity in any political thought that is based on individualism. The thought of Sieyes presents a remarkable example of this process. Sieyes states that men are by nature free. When they form an association or a society, "only relations based on the free act of will of each individual can be established among them."1' Only an individual's will can give his agreement the character of a moral obligation. Consequently, "laws can only rest upon the will of individuals."'2 In order for a society to exist and to act, it must have a common will. "This will
342
must of course be the sum of all individual wills, as was doubtless the case when a group of men joined in a political society, and the common will representedexactly the sum of allindividual wills."13 This sum of all individual wills is what is meant by unanimity. Elsewhere Sieyes writes: "A political association represents the achievement of the unanimous will of its members."'4Yet he continues as follows:
Its public institution [that is its government] is the result of the will of the plurality [that is of the majority]of its members. Unanimity being a very difficult objective to attain even among a rather small group of people, it becomes impossible in a society of several million individuals. Since civil association has certain goals, reasonable means must be used to attain them. We must be satisfied with plurality. Thus, with good reason, plurality becomes legitimately a substitute for unanimity.15
To require that the common will always equals the exact sum of all individual wills would lead to the "dissolution of the social union. It therefore becomes absolutely necessary to recognize all the characteristics of the common will in whatever plurality a community sets as
decisive.
6
Sieyes's argument indicates how the requirement for unanimity follows from the original postulate (that the individual will is the sole source of legitimate obligation); but it also stresses the extreme difficulty of reconciling this principle of legitimacy with the practical necessities of political life, which make it essential to settle for a majority This solution, in a way, transsubstantiates majority into unanimity majority is not identical to unanimity, but we must resolve to find "all the characteristics"of the latter in the former. MaJoritymust be considered as equivalent to unanimity. Unanimity thus remains the true source of legitimacy MaJoritywill becomes legitimate when one has conferred upon it all the attributes of unanimous will. It is obviously possible to object that the difference between the will of the majority and the will of all is an incontrovertible empirical fact. The ingeniousness of Sieyes's argument cannot mask this fact. Sieyes simply presents the transfiguration of majority will into unanimous will as a practical necessity, whose uniquejustification is the need for a realistic principle of decision making. Yet this move remains completely unrelated to the rest of the argument;the majority principle is a simple necessity of fact with no reasonable link to the principle of legitimacy It is merely a convenient convention. Rousseau, too, trusts unanimity as the only true source of legitimacy although the theory stated in Of Social Contract differs in several
343
essential aspects from that of Sieyds. This is particularly true with respect to the question of representation, which Rousseau rejects, and Sieyes justifies. Furthermore, Rousseau offers a different solution to the problem presented by the requirement of unanimity But the terms of the problem are the same. The only legitimate source of political obligation is the will of individuals. In obeying the common will, each person is in fact merely obeying himself. Therefore, the general will must equal unanimous will as a matter of principle. As is well known, Rousseau distinguishes between the general will and the will of all. But the difference between the two is merely the distinction between principle and practice. It is empirically possible for all individuals not to have agreed with what came to be the general will, but in principle, they are necessarily in agreement. "The more agreement prevails in the assemblies, that is to say the more closely opinions The general approach unanimity, the more the general will prevails."17 will is, in principle, the will of all the members of society; otherwise, it would be impossible to understand how they could remain free, and obey only themselves, while still submitting to it. If disagreements arise, and certain people do not agree with what has been decided, it is because those who disagree had in fact misunderstood the question put to them.
The firm will of all the members of the state equals the general will. By its exercise they are citizens, and free. When a law is proposed in the people's assembly, what is asked to them is not exactly whether they approve of or reject the proposition, but rather whether it conforms to the general will, which is also theirs. Each person in voting, gives his opinion in this matter, and the general will is then deduced by counting the votes. Therefore, when an opinion contrary to my own prevails, it merely proves that I was mistaken, and that what I had taken to be the general will, was not.18
A minority opinion is, therefore, nothing but a mistaken opinion about the general will. But we must then also acknowledge that people were not really asked what they wanted, but only what they believed to be the general will. Unanimity is no longer required, but this result has been obtained at the cost of an obvious contradiction with the principles presented at the outset of the Social Contract. The ideas of both Rousseau and Sieyes demonstrate with exemplary clarity the strength of the requirement for unanimity in democratic thinking, and the difficulties to which it leads when one tries to reconcile it with a principle of realistic decision making-with the majority principle. The latter cannot be challenged, but neither can it be justified by the assumption that the sole source of legitimacy is to be found in the
344
will of individuals. Only one doctrine connected to modern individualism manages to propose a coherent theory of the majority principle. This is utilitarianism. For utilitarians, the goal of social life can be summarized in the formula "the greatest happiness for the It is admitted at the outset that all individuals have greatest number."19 different concrete objectives, but all seek the greatest possible happiness with these objectives in mind. A decision or a law is seen as just and legitimate when its effect on the social entity is to raise the amount of happiness of the individuals concerned. As a result, the procedure of majority rule is by far the best because it results in the adoption of a solution that corresponds to the happiness of the greatest number. Such a doctrine assumes that it might be legitimate to sacrifice the objectives or the liberty of some, if such a sacrifice increases the sum total of social happiness; that is, the sacrifice must raise the satisfaction of a larger number of individuals so that the total happiness thus created outweighs the inconveniences experienced by those who opposed the solution. Utilitarianism presupposes a homogeneity of individual utilities, which makes a comparison among these different utilities possible. Rawls notes that "utilitarianismdoes not take seriously the distinction between persons."20Ultimately, utilitarianism is not sufficiently individualistic. In fact, individual wills are absolute, and not to be compared to one another; there is no superior point of view from which they could be legitimatelyjudged and compared to one another. On this point, liberal criticism of utilitarianism is entirely convincing, with the result that the only doctrine capable of justifying the majority principle falls short.
THE WILL OF INDIVIDUALS The remarks of both Sieyes and Rousseau show that it is impossible coherently to reconcile the majority principle with the requirement for unanimity that seems to derive from a rigorous form of individualism. But these theories make it possible to understand the particular interpretation of individualism on which the requirementfor unanimity is based. These theories do not merely affirm that legitimate collective decision making must proceed from individuals; they also state more precisely that political obligation flows from individual wills, that is to say, from choices arrived at by individuals. Thus it is not only the free individual who makes legitimacy possible, it is his already determined will.
345
This appears with great clarity in Rousseau and becomes particularly apparent in the meaning he gives to the term deliberation. Following a usage that goes back to Aristotle, philosophic tradition generally takes deliberation to mean the process of the formation of the will, the particular moment that precedes choice, and in which the individual ponders different solutions before settling for one of them. Rousseau uses the term deliberation in a different sense, one that is accepted in common language, and uses it to mean "decision." We can see the difference that separates these two definitions: in the vocabulary of philosophy, deliberation describes the process that precedes decision; in Rousseau's writings, it signifies decision itself.21He writes as follows:
It follows from the preceding that the general will is always right, and always tends toward the public good. But it does not follow that the people's deliberations have always the same righteousness [rectitude]. One always wishes for one's own good, but one cannot always see it. The people cannot be corrupted, but they are often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to wish for what is bad.22
In this passage, the "deliberations of the people" obviously refers to the choices the people make, and not to the process that leads to the choice. There would be no sense in saying that a process is morally right or not. In the Discourse on Political Economy, the term is used in the same fashion. Rousseau shows how the existence of "partial associations" harms the general will. He says, "Such deliberation may be to the advantage of a small community, but very harmful to the larger one."23 Here again, deliberation clearly means decision: It is the decision made by a group that can be both beneficial for the small group and harmful for society at large. The term deliberation taken in this particular sense comes up precisely in those passages where Rousseau condemns those groups that normally constitute the mainstay of public discussion: the groups or parties who face each other in an exchange of argument. "If citizens had no communication between each other while a sufficiently wellinformed public deliberated, the general will would always become apparent, in spite of a great number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good."24This formulation is remarkable because we can simultaneously see the reduction of deliberation to decision (in this context, only a decision can be either good or bad, but not the process of the formation of the will) and the rigorous exclusion of communication between the citizens. The remainder of the chapter develops the famous critique of "partial associations," and/or parties. The interests of groups or parties corrupt the general will:
346
When special interests begin to make themselves felt, and when smaller societies influence the larger one, the common interest changes, and finds opponents. Unanimity no longer reigns, the general will is no longer the will of all, contradictions and debates arise, and the best point of view is no longer accepted without disputes.25
The existence of parties is not the only cause for alarm; the mere communication between citizens is considered dangerous. What danger does Rousseau wish to ward off? The answer is to be found in the passage of the Discourse on Political Economy, which I have quoted above. Rousseau wants to show that the public will is always right, except if the people are
seduced by special interests, which certain shrewd people, by means of influence and eloquence manage to substitute for the general will. Then public deliberation will differ from the general will. Athenian democracy ought not to be brought up against me, because Athens was not in fact a democracy, but rather a very tyrannical aristocracy, governed by scholars and orators.26
What we must exclude from a democracy are the effects of rhetoric and the powers of persuasion that some individuals might exercise over others. A careful examination of Rousseau's texts shows the real reason for his desire to exclude parties, a desire often noted by commentators. Contrary to what is wrongly supposed, this desire does not result from a sort of pretotalitaran point of view but rather in a much deeper way from the fact that Rousseau's individuals are already supposed to know what they want when they come to a public assembly to decide in common. They have already determined their will, so that any act of persuasion attempted by others could only taint their will and oppress it. One could object that instead of deliberating collectively, Rousseau's citizens have only deliberated within themselves, in the secret of their hearts. Certain texts might lead one to such an interpretation. That interpretation would nevertheless be false because, strictly speaking, when all decide for all, the choice becomes absolutely simple, and there
is nothing uncertain.
Whenever men who have gathered together, consider themselves as one single body, they will have only one will, dedicated to the preservation of the community, and the general well-being. Then all the actions of the state would be vigorous and simple, its maxims clear and luminous. There will be no tangled, contradictory
347
interests, the public good would be evident everywhere, and would only need common sense to be apprehended. Peace, unity, and equality are the enemies of political subtleties.27
What is evident, simple, and luminous does not need to be deliberated in the strong sense of that term. On the contrary, deliberation is necessary for what is uncertain, when there may be reasons to decide one way but also reasons to decide another way. "The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities; about things that could not have been and cannot now or in the future be other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in The citizens of Rousseau's democracy do not deliberate, deliberation."28 not even within themselves, because Rousseau considers politics to be essentially a simple matter. That is why the process of the formation of the will, individual as well as collective, does not concern him. He is thus able to identify deliberation with decision making and decision with self-evidence. But aside from the objections that such a concept of deliberation gives rise to, it is important to note that, for Rousseau, the basis for legitimacy lies not in the free individual capable of making up his mind by weighing reasons, but rather in the individual whose will is already entirely determined, one who has made his choice. This insight allows us to understand the grounds of the requirement of unanimity in Rousseau's thought: the individualistic and democratic principle requires that collective decision emanate from all individuals; but as they are seen from the start as bearers of a completely determined will, it follows that if a collective decision does not conform to the sum of individual decisions, democratic individualism will no longer be respected. Furthermore, as the terms of reference (the individual choices) are supposed to be completely determined, the collective decision either does or does not conform to the sum of individual decisions. There is no other solution. The requirement of unanimity does not spring from individualism, but from the manner in which the individual is perceived: namely, as the possessor of a completely determined will. The lack of deliberation in the strong sense of the term is only a consequence of this fundamental presupposition. We find the three elements of Rousseau's conception (the requirement for unanimity, the absence of deliberation, the predetermined will of individuals) in the work of John Rawls. One cannot avoid being struck by the close resemblance between the situation of Rousseau's citizen and
348
that of the individuals in the original position that we find in the work of Rawls. Rawls, as Rousseau, uses the term deliberation: individuals behind the veil of ignorance are supposed to deliberate in order to know what principles of justice they are to adopt. But what does deliberation mean in this situation?
To begin with, it is clear that since differences among the parties [i.e., the individuals] are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random.29
Therefore, there can be no arguments among individuals because, by definition, they all have the same point of view It is true that Rawls imagines individuals communicating between each other through a referee, "and that he is to announce which alternatives have been suggested and the reasons offered in their support," but he adds immediately, "but such a referee is actually superfluous, assuming that Public deliberation is, the deliberations of the parties must be similar."30 a Rawls adds and therefore, excluded, precise point that cannot but recall Rousseau: the formation of coalitions is forbidden. This point is in fact also superfluous because the hypothesis states that only one point of view exists, which is the same for all. Must one, however, add that the representativeindividual deliberates within himself?It does not seem so. This is how Rawls defines the rational individual: he is exclusively concerned with finding the solution, that is, those principles of justice, that most clearly advance his own interests. He is the classic "homo oeconomicus."
A rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which have the greater chance of being successfully executed.31
This means that what Rawls calls deliberation is nothing but the calculation of the classic economic agent: he is provided with a coherent set of preferences (that is, A may not be preferred over B, while B is simultaneously preferred to A), certain given constraints restrict his actions, and he chooses the optimal solution, taking these constraints into account. He is assumed to have criteria for evaluation that permit taking all possible solutions into account, and ranking them so that he
349
can select the best one. One might be tempted to say that the individual does not know a priori which solution he will prefer, and will discover it while applying his criteria of evaluation to the propositions put to him. Such an implication is in fact incorrect: the criterion for evaluation is given, as is the set of solutions, so that the procedure of forming the will loses its importance. The result is already contained in the premises and is only separated from them, one might say, by the time needed for calculation. Reflection and the calculations necessary for obtaining a solution teach the individual nothing new; in particular, he learns nothing about his own preferences.32 There is, therefore, no deliberation, in the full sense of the term, to be found here. The process of forming a decision is reduced to calculation. As with Rousseau, the individual is already supposed to know exactly what he wants, or more precisely, he already possesses the criteriafor evaluation that will permit him to appraise all possible alternatives. But this assumption cannot be accepted. As the work of Herbert Simon shows, it is not even justified in all economic situations, and is even less justified in politics. In the real world, when individuals make a decision concerning society, they can never avail themselves of all necessary information. They certainly have some information, but it is fragmentary and incomplete. Yet they must reach a decision within a limited time, there is generally an urgency pertaining to action ("life's actions brook no delay," as Descartes put it) that acts against the search for complete information. During both collective and individual deliberation, information, which at the beginning was incomplete, becomes firmer without however becoming complete. In any case, due to the complexity of social life, individuals could never avail themselves of all necessary information. Political decision making is by its nature a choice under uncertainty In the process of exchanging evidence related to proposed solutions, individuals discover information they did not previously have. They learn that a given choice will have a given consequence, and if these consequences contradict the original objective they may be led to alter that objective. Real political life offers many examples of this. It is not reasonable to suppose as Rousseau does that individuals deliberate when they are already sufficiently well-informed ("If when sufficiently well-informed people deliberate"). In reality, deliberation is in itself a procedure for becoming informed. There is also no reason to suppose that individuals have from the first a complete set of preferences. When they enter a political debate, they are likely to have certain wishes, but these do not apply to all the subjects
350
raised in the debate, nor to all aspects of the decision to be made. They do not a priori have a set of preferences relating to a multitude of problems and solutions (here again empirical analyses of electoral processes offer much evidence), and even when they reach a decision at the close of the debate, their preferences are still not complete, their choices do not cover the entire ground of the debate, but they have become more focused. Let us suppose, for example, that a citizen wishes a priori a reduction in taxes, and that otherwise he has no particular preference as to the level of social benefits. He has given no thought to this problem. In the course of the debate, he discovers that if the level of taxation is to be reduced, it will also be necessary to lower social allowances. He can either accept this consequence, and thus discover a preferencehe did not have at the start, or he cannot accept it, and he may then choose to revise his original choice. In the course of collective deliberation, the individual may also discover that the opinion he held at the outset was nothing more than prejudiceand he may decide to change it. Finally, it is unrealistic and unreasonable to suppose that individuals have from the first a "coherent"set of preferences. Experience shows, on the contrary, that their initial desires are most frequently in conflict. This is so not only because different individuals wish for different things, but because each one has wishes that conflict with one another. For example, everyone simultaneously wishes for a reduction in taxes and an increase in social services. In the course of deliberation and the exchange of points of view, individuals become aware of the conflicts inherent in their own desires. This leads them to modify the objectives they held at the start, to give up some of them and to tone some of them down in order to make them compatible with others, thus bringing about a conciliation or compromise. As Weber noted, politics remains a conflict of values, a "conflict among the gods," not only between one individual and another but within each person. It is unreasonable to assume that this conflict is already settled at the outset, given that politics is by nature the arena where opposing demands must be weighed, where an attempt is made to reconcile these demands wherever possible, and where a decision is taken in favor of those whose position seems most justified. All this must also be done in a timely fashion. We can, therefore, state that during political deliberation, individuals acquire new perspectives not only with respect to possible solutions, but also with respect to their own preferences. Rawls is currently reproached for what is taken to be an excessive individualism. He has been criticized for reducing the citizen to an
351
economic man who calculates his own advantage in a solitary and egoistical manner. Some critics contend that the Rawlsian theory does not give sufficient weight to the fact that man is also a social and political being, belonging to a community and attached to it. Such criticism misses the point. Neither Rawls nor Rousseau denies the collective dimension of human existence. The real problem for a society that claims to be based on the liberty of individuals is to find a way to reconcile each individual's free pursuit of his own objectives with the common good. As Rousseau understood, it is a matter of reconciling the interests of each individual (the good as he sees it) with justice. Reproaching Rawls with neglecting the "collective" dimension of life and the importance of the sense of community does not advance the philosophical debate at all, because the problem consists precisely in finding out how it is possible to constitute a collective entity that does not violate the freedom of individuals. When one confines oneself to commending the virtues of collective existence and of community, one assumes that the crucial problem is already solved, or rather one throws it into the darkness of incomprehensibility Critics such as these invariably find their conclusion in the pathos of "community" and its unfathomable mystery.
THE WILL OF ALLDELIBERA TION BY ALL In fact, what must be criticized in Rawls's and Rousseau's theories is not their neglect of the collective dimension, but the assumption that individuals in society, in particular, those having to make a political decision, possess an already formed will, already know exactly what they want, and at most only need to apply their criteria of evaluation to the proposed solutions. This criticism can be conducted in accordance with the principles of individualism. We need not argue that individuals, when they begin to deliberate political matters, know nothing of what they want. They know what they want in part: they have certain preferences and some information, but these are unsure, incomplete, often confused and opposed to one another. The process of deliberation, the confrontation of various points of view, helps to clarify information and to sharpen their own preferences. They may even modify their initial objectlves, should that prove necessary It is, therefore, necessary to alter radically the perspectivecommon to both liberal theories and democratic thought: the source of legitimacy is
352
not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself. An individual's liberty consists first of all in being able to arrive at a decision by a process of research and comparison among various solutions. As political decisions are characteristically imposed on all, it seems reasonable to seek, as an essential condition for legitimacy, the deliberation of all or, more precisely, the right of all to participate in deliberation. We must, therefore, challenge the fundamental conclusion of Rousseau, Sieyes, and Rawls: a legitimate decision does not represent the will of all, but is one that results from the deliberation of all. It is the process by which everyone's will is formed that confers its legitimacy on the outcome, ratherthan the sum of already formed wills. The deliberative principle is both individualistic and democratic. It implies that all participate in the deliberation, and in this sense the decision made can reasonably be considered as emanating from the people (democratic principle). The decision also proceeds from the liberty of individuals: those individuals deliberate together, form their opinions through deliberation, and at the close of the process each opts freely for one solution or another (individualistic and liberal principle). We must affirm, at the risk of contradicting a long tradition, that legitimate law is the result ofgeneral deliberation, and not the expression of the general will. There is a double dimension to the process of deliberation; it is simultaneously collective and individual. It is individual in the sense that everyone reasons for himself, finding arguments, and weighing them. Becausethe aim of the deliberativeprocess is to broaden the participants' information and enable them to discover their own preferences, that process requires a multiplicity of points of view and/or arguments. As the individual listens to arguments formulated by others, he broadens his own point of view and becomes aware of things he had not perceived at the outset. Deliberation requires not only multiple but conflicting points of view because conflict of some sort is the essence of politics. The parties in deliberation will not be content to defend their own positions, but will try to refute the arguments of the positions of which they disapprove. New information emerges as each uncovers the potentially harmful consequences of the other parties' proposals. Thus deliberation tends to increase information and to pinpoint individuals' preferences. It helps them to discover aspects both of proposed solutions and of their own objectives that they had not perceived earlier.33But deliberation is not only a process of discovery the parties are not satisfied with presenting various and conflicting
353
theses; they also try to persuade each other. They argue. Argumentation is a sequence of propositions aiming to produce or reinforce agreement in the listener. In this sense, it is a discursive and rational process. Yet, in contrast to logical proof, argumentation does not result in a necessary conclusion that the listener cannot reject. A conclusion developed from argumentation is not a necessary proposition. The listener remains free to give his agreement or to withhold it. The listener is free because argumentation does not start from evident premises or from conventional ones. Rather, one starts by taking propositions one assumes are generally accepted by the audience being addressed. In politics, one would argue by assuming certain common values as held by the public at a given moment. Argumentation is, therefore, always relative to its audience. Someone who does not share these values will not be convinced by the arguments presented. Nor are the procedures of linking the propositions logically binding. One may use, for example, arguments by analogy and afortiori arguments. These do not make the passage from one proposition to another strictly necessary. It is, therefore, not said of a conclusion developed from arguments that it is either true or false, but that it simply generates more or less support depending on whether the argument was more or less convincing. Nor is an argument either true or false; it is stronger or weaker. Whatever the force of an argumentation, its conclusion is never strictly necessary. The listener may withhold his approval, and it must even be acknowledged that his refusal to approve a conclusion may have reasons as well. The force of an argumentation is always relative.34 One argues in order to try to persuade others. But one tries only to persuade, that is, to produce or reinforce agreement to a proposition, in cases where no proposition imposes itself with unimpeachable and universally recognized force. People need not be persuaded of the truth. In this sense, argumentation differs from a logical demonstration. On the negative side, it differs also from refutation. One piles up several arguments against a thesis, one tries to weaken it because one lacks the refutation that would incontestably destroy it. Thus argumentation is particularly suited to the nature of political debate, which most frequently consists of a confrontation between opposing norms or values. We must admit, with Weber, that no science can resolve this conflict in a rigorous and necessary manner. However, contrary to Weber's thesis, it does not follow that the choice of values remains ineluctably arbitrary Some values are more likely than others to win the approval of an audience of reasonable people. It is impossible
354
to demonstrate their soundness; they can only bejustified. A decision or a norm is not either true or false. But we are nevertheless not reduced to pure arbitrariness because a norm can be more or less justified. The relative force of its justification can only be measured by the amplitude and the intensity of the approval it arouses in an audience of reasonable people. Political deliberation and argumentation certainly presuppose a relatively reasonable audience. They also require a certain degree of instruction and culture on the part of the public. But they constitute processes of education and of training in themselves. They broaden the viewpoints of citizens beyond the limited outlook of their private affairs. They spread light. Such a concept of deliberation implies that the majority of citizens should be educated, but it is not the kind of pedagogic model in which an enlightened elite is intended to bring the light of science down from its pulpit to a backward people. Rather, the people educate themselves. Certainly, knowledge is not distributed equally, and all speeches will not have the same weight, but because those who are more knowledgeable tend not to be in agreement among themselves, their exchange of opinions, refereed by the public, offers an education without a unique and eminent teacher. J. S. Mill has analyzed this educational function of arguments remarkably well. In the political sphere, deliberation does not permit us to arrive at necessary and universally admitted truths,35but it also does not permit the absolute and incontestable refutation of a norm or a value. It is doubtless possible to show that a policy that was based on given normative principles failed, but most of the time, this failure is not sufficient to refute either the policy in question, or the normative princlple from which it was derived. This is so because first of all it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discover exactly what in a given policy caused the failure. In order to find that out, it would be necessary to isolate exactly what derived from the initial conditions in which the policy was adopted and what derived from the normative princlples themselves. Even supposing that one succeeds in isolating the normative principles that caused the failure, the unhappy outcome does not necessarily prove that this principle should be rejected. One can always argue that it should have been put into practice in another form or to a lesser degree. The planned economy is surely a failure with respect to its own objectives, but for all that, economic planning as a normative principle is not absolutely refuted. A limited nonbinding form of planning may be defended. Ascertaining a failure does not refute a
355
political principle; it merely creates a presumption against it. Despite a certain closeness, political deliberation and scientific argumentation remain separated by an irreducible difference. One does not really say that the scientific community deliberates when it exchanges conjectures and refutations.
POLITICAL PLURALISM AND THE MARKET The process of the formation of the collective will is the essential moment of political decision making. It does not consist in totaling up previously formed intentions or wills. Individual intentions, individual wills are decided progressively in its course. A diversity of points of view and of arguments is an essential condition both for individual liberty and for the (for individuals must have a choice among several parties)36 criticisms and the of of the exchange arguments rationality process (for creates information and permits comparing the reasons presented to justify each position). However, this perspective differs from that of The latter views the pluralism of social groups in traditional pluralism.37 of the of market model competition. Various groups or elites enter light into competition to win over the voters just as they would build up a clientele. The competition among parties with respect to the voters is, in this model, analogous to the competition of producers facing consumers. The public chooses in each case. However, the analogy is misleading. In the marketplace, competition among producers is justified because it favors producers who produce goods at the lowest cost. From the collective point of view, this is rational because these producers use the smallest amount of scarce resources, thus leaving a larger amount available for the production of other goods. This outcome is assured because it is in each consumer's self-interest to select the most competitive producer. Buying goods from that producer will permit him to devote larger resources to other purchases. If the consumer makes a poor choice (i.e., if he does not choose the most efficient producer), he himself is penalized and he (in the purest model) experiences this disadvantage both directly and within a short time. The same is not true in politics: both the negative and the positive effects of political decisions often make themselves felt only in the long
356
run. The effects are often diffuse and scattered. If a voter chooses poorly, that is, if he opts for the least effective policy for society, the effect on his own position will usually become apparent only after a long time. At that time, the voter would presumably change his original position, but the change would come too late to correct the initial decision in an effective manner. Such a system is bound to engender a succession of chaotic measures ratherthan real self-regulation. Furthermore, if the voters behave just like consumers in the marketplace, they are apt to choose from among proposed policies those whose consequences they perceive as affecting their particular situation most deeply and clearly But the consequences that affect them only marginally will tend to be neglected, regardless of their importance for society as a whole. These two reasons (the remoteness in time of the effects and their dispersion) make it impossible to attribute the selfregulating virtues of the economic market to the political one. They also explain the need for political persuasion. Citizens must be persuaded to adopt a policy because they cannot simply choose according to the immediate effects that they perceive themselves. In the marketplace, individuals feel the effects of their choice immediately and directly. This cannot be the case in theforum where they deliberate political decisions. Furthermore, individuals entering the marketplace know their needs. They may discover new products they had not looked for a priori, but they choose those that correspond to some sort of previously felt need. On the other hand, when citizens enter the political forum, they do not know exactly what they want or need. The aim of political competition is, therefore, to offer voters not only a range of solutions, among which they may choose according to predetermined needs, but also to enlighten them about their needs, and have them weigh the options presented by the parties. Pluralism, therefore, has a different function in the forum. The market requires not simply some diversity as in political pluralism, but rather a great multiplicity of agents. In order to be as efficient as possible, competition in the marketplace requires the maximal dispersion of forces. In the model of the perfect competitive market proposed by neoclassic economics, the formation of coalitions among producers or consumers is not permitted. But if the object of the conflict among varying points of view is the forming of the will, then some degree of diversity and not an extreme multiplicity is necessary. In fact, political pluralism implies a drastic reduction in the number of proposed solutions. But this is precisely what is requiredby the nature of deliberation. It is not possible to deliberate everything, or all the
357
possibilities permitted by a given situation. In highly complex systems, the cost of exploring all possibilities, even if that were theoretically possible, would be enormous. Chess players, for example, cannot examine all possible moves with all their consequences; they examine only certain types of moves, and explore only those moves that seem most promising. This situation characterizes deliberation. It is not possible to deliberate all possible outcomes; the range of proposed solutions must by necessity be limited. In the political arena, the limited pluralism of parties is required for effective deliberation. The people, as such, before the intervention of any mediating process, do not have a determined will,38but rather offer a multiplicity of incomplete preferences, which are often incoherent. It is only when more well-defined issues are proposed for its deliberation that the influence of the people on the government of their society can become real and effective.39 If the parties that specify which issues would come up for collective deliberation had no connection to the bulk of citizens, some kind of deliberative opinion formation would still unfold, but the original definition of these matters would completely escape the control of the ordinary citizens. (This would occur, for example, in the case of closed oligarchies competing between one another to win the support of the mass public.) That is why it is important, in a democratic society, that the parties themselves be set up by the mass of citizens. Under such conditions, the proposed solutions originate in part from the people themselves. But this goal can only be partially attained. It has been known since Michels that political parties are, at least in part, oligarchical. Yet one should not conclude that for that reason they are harmful to democracy Their essential contribution to democracy comes from the fact that they allow the deliberation by all of matters already relatively determined. The existence of political parties is essential for deliberation. The parties face each other, and the process of argumentation is submitted to the arbitration of all.
THE DELIBERA TIVE PROCESS Deliberation is freely conducted because each person, who may or may not be convinced by a given argument, does have ultimately a choice between several alternatives. That is why it is necessary that individuals have a genuine choice among different alternatives, all of which should seem realistically possible. If only one solution were
358
proposed, and the citizens were free to choose it or not, their eventual choice would be both unbalanced and misleading as a guide to their preference. There would not even be a real choice because the option would be between the unique solution proposed and the the absence of any solution at all. The first term of the choice would have an exaggerated advantage, for it would be too easy to convince people to select it. Yet they would still remain free either to give or to withhold their assent. In many cases, the different points of view that are presented first to the public's scrutiny and then to its choice are defended by parties or individuals who wish to accede to positions of power. Admittedly, individuals who support a particular point of view are elected, not only the programs themselves. Schumpeter is correct in stressing that democracy is a process that alms to select those who govern. Candidates for positions of power compete with one another and try to collect the greatest number of votes for themselves. Because they wish to exercise political power, in a sense, they act in their own self-interest; and, in accordance with Schumpeter's formula, they may be compared to "entrepreneurs"dealing in votes. Yet we need not deem the programs these entrepreneurs represent and the points of view they advocate as being without Importance, as Schumpeter does.40 Politicians offer simultaneously both their services in governmental functions and a particular point of view concerning the public good. The two elements are indissolubly linked. Experience shows that voters do not make up their minds solely on the basis of written programs or projects explicitly announced by the candidates, but they do take these programs and projects into account. Even when voters decide primarily on the basis of a global, though often confused image they have of the candidates, this image is still related to voters'idea of his or her community good. It may owe more to the personality of the candidate as the voters perceive it than to the expressed declarations about programs, but the "image"still represents some idea of what is admirable, successful, and fit in that country Competition among the different points of view of the candidates also encourages each protagonist to make use of those principles and arguments likely to win the largest possible agreement. The process of argumentation takes place before a universal audience, the complete set of citizens.41In order to increase its support, each party has an interest in showing that its point of view is more general than the others. Therefore, universalism also plays a part here, but it is not assumed at the start. It
359
seems rather to be the ideal term of the process. In truth, no party will ever become an actually universal party; there will always remain opponents; this is the core of political pluralism. Nevertheless the structure of the deliberative system usually makes the protagonists strive to enlarge their points of view and propose more and more general positions. There is a sort of competition for generality The deliberative process never results in strictly universal proposals; universality remains the unattainable end, but the system provides an incentive to generalization. The deliberative process is brought to a close by a choice-the vote. In the vote, the process of the formation of the wills is finished. The final tabulation lets the people know which solution prevailed, that is, which has won the approval of the largest number. The approval of the greatest number reflects, in that context, the greater strength of one set of arguments compared to others. The process nevertheless institutionalizes the admission that there were also reasons not to desire the solution finally adopted. The minority (or minorities) also had reasons, but these reasons were less convincing. We can now see the justification for the majority principle (it is not a simple necessity of fact). Because it comes at the close of a deliberative process in which everyone was able to take part, choose among several solutions, and remain free to approve or refuse the conclusions developed from the argument, the result carries legitimacy The decision results from a process in which the minority point of view was also taken into consideration. Although the decision does not conform to all points of view, it is the result of the confrontation between them. The decisions that will be made by the elected officials will come from the candidates and the points of view that have won a majority These decisions are legitimate because they are, in the last analysis, the outcome of the deliberative process taking place before the universal audience of all the citizens. These political decisions do not necessarily have to apply to all the citizens; nor do they require the agreement of all the citizens. In the last analysis, and taking into account the mediation that the elected representatives introduce, a political decision is legitimate because it has been able to win the approval of the majority at the conclusion of a process of free confrontation among various points of view. Political decisions dealing with particular objectives (selected social groups, for example) may be legitimate if they satisfy this condition. With respect to the law, the deliberative perspective allows us to drop the requirements of either strict universality of application or unanimity of approval.
360
We must note, however, that the mere fact of being the will of the greatest number does not by itselfconfer any special privilege upon it. The majority will is legitimate because it is ascertained at the close of a deliberative process in which all the citizens (or at least those who wished to do so) have participated. The procedure preceding the decision is a condition for legitimacy, which is just as necessary as the majority principle. It is the conjunction of these elements that creates legitimacy As a result, there is no need to have recourse to the untenable fiction that the majority will is in essence the will of all, or that it must be considered as the equivalent of unanimous will. The decision of the majority is only the decision of the greatest number, nothing more. We must, therefore, recognize that in the period between two elections, the minority or minorities are forced to abide by decisions that do not correspond with their will. Yet paradoxically, the lucid recognition of this fact makes it possible to take the minority, its opinions, and its interests into serious account. As long as one considers the will of the majority the expression of the general will, the minority has no status at all. It is supposed that by submitting to the decision that was finally made, the minority merely obeys itself, or achieves what it really wanted or should have wanted. If, on the contrary, and in accordance with empirical evidence, one acknowledges that minority will is in no way included in the will of the majority, it becomes necessary to find the means that will allow the minority to express its opinions and interests between two elections. Institutions must be set up that will compel the majority to take the minority point of view into account, at least to a certain extent. This is the essential justification of social pluralism, of associations and interest-groups. Their power must force the majority to take into account in its actions the interest of those it does not represent. These counterforces, checks, and balances are necessary because majority will is not the equivalent of the will of all. On this point, the thesis of traditional pluralism is inadequate. It is true that, contrary to Rousseauist tradition, pluralism has always stressed the need for a variety of interests, groups, and forces in opposition to each other. But the pluralist view has also assumed that the spontaneous interplay of these forces would generate an equilibrium, and would in the end almost dispense with higher levels of political decision, being able to enforce obedience by all and to settle the conflicts.42Classical pluralism has most frequently seen the interplay of social forces as a form of equilibrium, conceived either as a mechanical
361
equilibrium or along the lines of the economic equilibrium of the market. It is unrealistic to suppose that a plurality of forces can alone produce an equilibrium, and it is even more unrealistic to think that such an equilibrium will automatically be an optimal one. Rather, the existence of counterforces is justified because it is necessary to give social forces that are in a political minority the means to have their point of view considered. It is a guarantee against the omnipotence of the majority. The fact remains, however, that the decision of the majority must be able to impose itself in cases where no compromises acceptable to it could be worked out. The superior strength of the majority should be checked, not eliminated. Therefore, the process is not balanced, but rather necessarily unbalanced, in favor of the majority The pluralism of social forces, of groups and associations, offers only limited protection for minority views, but when it works well, it would encourage the majority to take these views into account, because the majority knows that if it did not do this it would meet with resistance that would hamper its actions. If, in the last analysis, and despite these obstacles, the majority were to choose simply to impose its decision on a minority, we may assume that such a choice would be a more deliberate one than if the majority had believed at the outset that the decision under consideration would meet with no opposition. The government is compelled to justify itself before the public while its opponents argue as well. A power that faces no obstacle will have both less cause to deliberate on its decisions and less need tojustify them. The true goal of the pluralism of counterforces is not equilibrium; it is deliberation itself. This is a second form of deliberation, not the kind that results in a majority decision, but one that the majority, after the choice of policy, must itself carry out. In the last analysis, the majority principle remains a principle of decision making. The majority is capable of deciding and resolving conflicts that do not have a solution within the simple process of confrontation and negotiation among different social forces. We cannot content ourselves with the idea that pluralism and the irreconcilable conflict of social forces are a necessity. If pushed to its extreme, such conflict and pluralism would mean the dissolution of society On this point, Hobbes's argument has lost none of its force. There must be some locus of decision endowed with a will that can carry the day in a case of last resort. It does not follow that this institution must be all-powerful, or that it should settle everything. The pluralism of forces, and the conflict among them, form the very conditions for social liberty, while
362
the unity of the ultimate decision guarantees political and social cohesiveness, and thereby liberty. Germanyduringthe Weimar Republic was doubtless free, but it did not remain so for long. The conception of political deliberation that I have advocated here does notjustify the sovereignty of the majority. There are certain actions that the majority must be forbidden to take: it ought not, for example, exclude anyone from the rights to vote and to participatein deliberation. Nor ought it to suppress the fundamental liberties necessary for the effective exercise of this right: freedom of conscience, of opinion, of speech, and of association. Complete universal suffrage, of course, cannot exist. There are always some individuals who are excluded (children, those who have been deprived of their civil rights, and so on). It is, however, possible to rely on the currently accepted definition of universal suffrage to set the limits of the deliberative body. Above all, the majority must be forbidden to exclude any group from the deliberative body on the pretext that it disagrees with the majority, however overwhelming this majority may be. The majority should also not be permitted to eliminate the diversity of proposed solutions. The same is true for the variety of social forces, interest groups, and associations. Finally, the deliberative process and its conclusion by a vote that can result in the dismissal of those who govern must take place at regular intervals. The majority should not tamper with this principle.
The failure of unanimlstic theories of justice or legitimacy leads us to note, once more, that the definition of what s just remains the subject of constant debate, and, on the theoretical level, an attitude of constant questioning is surely the only warranted one. But a society cannot live and maintain itself solely on the basis of principles and institutions that reflect only an ultimately indeterminate justice. For a society to continue to exist, decisions must be made and conflicts resolved; power also must be exercised and in the last resort must be sufficient to restore some unity to the multiplicity of actions and desires that make up social life. To make room simultaneously for the indeterminacy ofjustice and the necessity for decision, those in power and their idea of the common good must be questioned, if not constantly, then at regular intervals. Between those intervals, societies need to keep in place some power of ultimate decision making, even if it does not constantly interfere
363
everywhere. Therefore, unless we believe that this power of decision making may be constituted simply in any manner, as long as it somehow exercises the function of making a decision, we must try to uncover the procedures most likely to make those decisions reasonable. If such procedures cannot be found, the indeterminacy of justice and the practical necessity of decision making will in reality simply result in arbitrariness. But between the rational object of universal agreement and the arbitrary lies the domain of the reasonable and the justifiable, that is, the domain of propositions that are likely to convince, by means of arguments whose conclusion is not incontestable, the greater part of an audience made up of all the citizens. The theory of deliberation offers only an imperfect method for making the decision process as reasonable as possible. We cannot guarantee that a deliberation consonant with the stated rules will always be rational, or even as rational as possible. But this process makes the realization of reasonable results more likely, especially if one takes into account the dimension of time and the educative effect of repeated deliberation. The weakness of universalist theories of justice lies not in their lack of realism (indeed, they often explicitly concede their nonrealistic character). Rather, those who propose these universalist theories present them as models that simultaneously permit the evaluation of actual societies (making it possible to determine whether society approaches the model more or less closely) and at the same time set a standard: a goal that must be pursued with the knowledge that it can never be attained. This is where the inadequacy lies. We want not only to know whether a society is more or less just, and what the ideal society should be like, but we also want concrete means to make real societies as reasonable as possible. The idea of setting standards that are explicitly unrealistic is unsatisfactory because it leaves totally open the question of the means necessary to approach this state. As long as we accept the predetermined will of individuals as the unique basis for legitimacy, we must inevitably conclude that only the object of unanimous agreement is legitimate. The requirement for unanimity is justified in a pure theory of justice because a pure theory does not encompass the practical conditions for its realization nor the means necessary for attaining it. Yet unanimity is an inadequate requisite for a theory of political decision making; a theory of decision making cannot, without falling into pure empiricism and relativism, avoid concerning itself with legitimacy. It is unrealistic, and, more important, unjustified, to assume that individuals faced with the
364
necessity of having to make a political decision already know exactly what they want. The free individual is not one who already knows absolutely what he wants, but one who has incomplete preferences and is trying by means of interior deliberation and dialogue with others to determine precisely what he does want. When individuals approach political decision making, they only partially know what they want. We arejustified in taking as a basis for legitimacy not their predetermined will but the process by which they determine their will. This is the process of deliberation. This perspective is strictly compatible with the principles of individualism. It in no way implies that someone who possesses knowledge should teach other individuals what their wishes are, but rather that they find them out for themselves. Without renouncing a concern for legitimacy, which in the modern world can only be based on the individual, deliberation makes it possible to avoid the exorbitant requirements of universality and unanimity.
NOTES
1. This article does not purport to deliver a full-blown theory of political deliberation; it intends only to show why deliberation, instead of unanimity, ought to be the basis of any modern theory of legitimacy. Therefore, some questions that a theory of political deliberation might raise will not be addressed here (for example, the determinatlon of why a question has been sufficiently deliberated), and others will be answered only in broad terms (for example, the definition of a "universalaudience"). 2. Radical liberalism is derived from Kant with good reason. Kant already claimed that happiness (Gluckseligkeit) or welfare (Wohlfahrt) could not form the basis for political right and legitimacy. Freedom alone can constitute the basis for right because it can be defined in purely universal and a priori terms, whereas happiness or welfare are empirical ends, and as such are not amenable to universal principles. According to Kant, the "whole concept" of right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relations of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e., the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end. Men have different views on the empirical end of happiness and what it consists of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will cannot be brought under common principle nor thus under any external law harmonizing with the freedom of every one. Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,' "Kant's Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 73-74. "The principle of happiness (which is not in fact a definite
365
principle at all has ill effects in political right just as in morality, however good the intentions of those who teach it" (Kant, "On the Common Saying," 83). Kant applies the same reasoning to reject welfare as a basis for right: "But welfare does not have any ruling principle, either for the recipient or for the one who provides It, for each individual will define it differently. It depends, in fact, upon the will's material aspect which is empiical and thus incapable of becoming a universal rule" Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," Kant's Political Writings,ed. by Hans Relss (Cambridge University Press, 1970), 183-184. 3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 149. Hayek, who can be viewed as another advocate of the extreme version of liberalism, accepts that the state should take upon itself the distribution of a minimum of revenue to those who, without it, would fall below a certain threshold of poverty. However, this comes in direct conflict with his general argument. In order to assure such a minimum, it would be impossible not to use procedures and rules that establish distinctions among individuals and are applied in a way that distinguishes among men. There is no reason to suppose that the setting of a threshold for assistance, as well as of its level and its beneficiaries, could be based on a universal agreement, even in principle. It would be part of a policy of well-being and, as such, vulnerable to the Kantian objection (namely, well-being or welfare is not amenable to universal rules). Hayek's position is more moderate than that of Nozick, but at the price of some incoherence. 4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 5. The rationality assumed here in no sense implies the substantial rationality of the alms. On the contrary, Rawls assumes that all individuals have different objectives among which it is impossible to determine any objective hierarchy. Rawls's idea of rationality simply implies that subjects have coherent objectives (or, more precisely, coherent preferences) and are able to calculate the means necessary for the realization of these objectives. This is the definition of rationality common in the social sciences (see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 143). 6. The two pnnciples are the following: (a) "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 60). (b) "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 1) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and 2) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 83). 7. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 189-197. 8. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263. 9. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263. 10. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263. 11. Emmanuel Sieyes, Vues sur les Moyens d'Execution dont les Representants de la France Pourront Disposer en 1789 (Pans, 1789), 15. Sieyes is mostly known as the author of the pamphlet Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat? and as a leader of the French Revolution; his importance as a political thinker is often underestimated. In fact, he is probably one of the first and most important theoreticians of representative government; his influence on French and German constitutional thought has been considerable. Because most of his writings have not been published since the French Revolution, they must be consulted in their original editions. 12. Siey6s, Vues sur les Moyens d'Execution. 13. Sieyes, Vues sur les Moyens d'Execution.
366
14. Emmanuel Siey'es,Preliminaire de la Constitution Francaise (Pans, 1791), 38. 15. Sieyes, Prdliminaire,38. 16. Sieyes, Vues sur les Moyens d'Execution 17. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 2, OeuvresCompletes, ed. by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Pans: Gallimard,), vol. III, 439. 18. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 2, 441. 19. Jeremy Bentham, "Constitutional Code," The WorksofJeremy Bentham, vol. IX (Edinburgh: J. Bowring, 1838-1843), 5. 20. Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 27 See also, on the same point, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 33: "No moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others" (emphasis in the original). 21. The term has in fact two meanings in French. This ambiguity surely justifies Rousseau's usage, but in no way lessens the importance of his choice in favor of one and only one of the two meanings. 22. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book II, chap. 3,371. The term rectitude in French has the meaning of both "rightness"and "righteousness";however, the context makes it clear that Rousseau wants to stress here the moral character of the decision. 23. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur I'Economie Politique, Oeuvres Completes, vol. III, 246. 24. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 3, 371. 25. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 1, 438. 26. Rousseau, Discours sur l'Economie Politique, 246, emphasis added. 27. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 1, 437, emphasis added. 28. Aristotle, Rhetorica, I, 2, 1357a, 3-6, vol. XI, The Worksof Aristotle Translated into English, ed. by W D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910-1952). 29. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 139. 30. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 139. 31. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 143 32. The nondeliberative aspect of the classic conception of economic rationality is especially highlighted in the work of H. Simon. He has constructed a model of "procedural"or "limited rationality" to take into account a certain number of empirical situations with which the classic model of optimization (or maximization) did not seem to be able to deal. In this conception, "the conditions for choice, for the ends as well as for the means, are not given to the decider, but are the object of the search," whereas the classic conception "regardsthe conditions for choice as fixed, and therefore identifies decisionmaking with the mere application of criteriaof evaluation given to a set of possible actions, as equally given" Philippe Mongin, "Modele Rationnel ou Modele Economique de la Rationalite?" Revue Economique, 35, no. 1 (January 1984), 26, 27. The most recent formulation of Simon's theses can be found in Herbert A. Simon's Models of Bounded Rationality (2 vols.) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983) and H. A. Simon's Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). For a sociological application of this model of limited rationality, see Michel Crozier and E. Friedberg. L'Acteur et le Systeme (Pans: Seuil, 1977). 33. Individuals deliberate because at the start they are relatively uncertain as to the solution they should adopt. The concept of deliberation used here is, therefore, in a sense, close to that of Aristotle, for whom deliberation bears on that which is neither absolutely
367
certain (that is, the domain of "science") nor completely contingent (in this case, deliberation could serve no purpose). See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, III, e, 1112a181112b31, The WorksofAristotle, 1910-1952, vol. IX. However, in Aristotle's thought, this relative indeterminacy results from the nature of things and the order of the world. It is a cosmological and ontological indeterminacy. In the theory of deliberation outlined here, I make no assumptions about the order of the world. Individuals are assumed to be relatively uncertain, not because of the intrinsic nature of the subjects they deliberate, but because they lack complete information, and their preferencesare not entirely determined. This relative uncertainty is related to the deliberating subjects themselves, and not to the nature of the objects of their deliberation. Aristotle furthermore assumes that people deliberate only the means and never the ends. The ends are give by nature. Such a vision is too closely linked to the teleological conception of the world for the theory presented here. 34. With reference to the conception of argumentation sketched here, see Chaim Perelman and Lucle Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatiseon Argumentation, trans. by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN.. University of Notre Dame Press, 1969); and also Chaim Perelman, L'Empire Rh6tonque: Rhetonque et Argumentation (Paris: J. Vrnn, 1977). 35. The conception defended here differs, therefore, from that of Habermas. For him, deliberation plays the central role in "practical questions," that is, questions about the validity of norms, whether they are moral or political; furthermore, the validity of a norm is neither, in Habermas's conception, susceptible of proof (reducible to deductive argument) nor is it decided only by an arbitrary act of will, as is affirmed by decisionist theories; as a result, for Habermas, the recognition of the validity claim of a norm can be rationally motivated. On all these accounts, I find myself in agreement with Habermas's conception. However, when Habermas deals with this rationally motivated agreement about norms, he apparently means the consensus of all, at least in pnnciple. "Since," he writes, "all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the 'rationality' of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest. The interest is common because the constraint free consensus permits only what all can want;" Juirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. by T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 108, emphasis in the original. Thus Habermas maintains, in my view, the requirement for unanimous consensus, at least in principle. He fails to recognize that there are various degrees of agreement, which if the appropriate rules for deliberation are respected, reflect in turn the respective strengths of the arguments put forward in the defense of the conflicting norms. Given the appropriate procedural rules for deliberation, the better argument is simply the one that generates more support and not the one that is able to convince all participants. 36. Here I use the term party in two senses, as a matter both of taking sides (deciding) and of choosing the platform of a political party. 37 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), and, especially, Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). 38. On this point, see the short but remarkably suggestive and profound article of Erich Kaufmann, "ZurProblematik des Volkswillens," Gesammelte Schriften (Gottingen: Otto Schwarz, 1960), vol. III. Kaufmann, whose perspective is very different from what I have sketched here, nevertheless comes to a similar conclusion: "The more the people as a
368
multitude want to express themselves directly, the more they lose influence over the details of what really happens"(p. 278). According to him, this justifies the mediation of parties, which permits the will of the people to take shape; before this mediation, the people's will is simply a chaotic set of inchoate and confused desires. 39. It is striking to note that the theoreticlans who stress the role of deliberation (in contrast to the will) in politics are also those whojustify the existence of parties (which, as we have seen, Rousseau opposes). See Burke ("Speech to the Electors of Bristol") in Burke's Politics, Selected Writingsand Speeches, ed. by R.J.S. Hoffmann and P Levack (New York: Knopf, 1969). The same connection appears in J. S. Mill's thought; see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. by H. B. Acton (London: Dent, 1972), in particular, 78-114, and the remarkable passage on the "function of antagonism," 267-270. 40. For the definition of democracy in the work of Schumpeter, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), 250-283; and especially concerning parties' programs, p. 283. 41. The citizens constitute a universal audience in comparson with the different parties that compete for their support. These parties are defined by some point of view, some values that are specific to a particular group, whereas the universal audience is characterized by the views and values commonly shared by all the citizens. The universal audience, as it is intended here, is not a set of abstract beings without any commitment to particular values or weaned from all traditions; it is the set of all the citizens of a concrete political community at a particular point in time. 42. On this point, see the remarkablecriticism of traditional American pluralism(only the pluralism of special interest groups is dealt with here) presented by Theodore J. Lowl, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (2nd ed.) (New York: Norton, 1979). See particularlythe criticism of the idea of "automatic society."
Bernard Manin is with the Centre National de la Recherche Sclentifique in Paris where he also teaches at the Ecole Normale Superleure. He has written on social democracy and on the thoughts of Montesquieu.

Manin - On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Manin - On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation Author(s): Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, Jane Mansbridge Reviewed work(s): Source: Political

ON LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL DELIBERATION

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION

POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

You might also like