I.

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1. ASTEC vs. ERC September 18, 2012 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: The Petitioners BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I, QUEZELCO II, and PRESCO are rural electric cooperatives established under P.D. 269 or the National Electrification Administration Decree. The Petitioners are no-profit organizations engaged in the distribution of electricity. On 8 December 1994, R.A. 7832 was enacted, which imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that the rural electric cooperatives may charge to their customers. Pursuant to said law, the Energy Regulatory Board issued Orders on 19 February 1997 and 25 April 1997 provisionally authorizing the petitioners and other rural electric cooperatives to use a prescribed formula or the computation of the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). On 8 June 2001, R.A. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). In an Order dated 17 June 2003, the ERC noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was silent on whether the PPA formula approved by the ERB was based on gross or net of discounts. For uniformity, the ERC ruled that for past PPAs, power cost shall still be based on gross while for future PPAs, power cost shall be based on net. Several rural electric cooperatives filed motions for reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) that they are non-profit organizations such that their rates do not include any possible extra revenue except the discounts; and 2) that they are burdened with expenses in their continuing expansion programs for rural electrification. On 14 January 2005, the ERC issued an Order, in which it stressed that the purchased power cost is a pass though cost to customers and, therefore, the rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. Consistent with this, any discounts extended to rural electric cooperatives must necessarily be extended to end-users by charging only the net cost of purchased power. The ERC then directed the Petitioners to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users arising from the implementation of R.A. 7832. The motions for reconsideration filed by the Petitioners were denied by the ERC. Court of Appeals: denied the petitions for review of the rural electric cooperatives, and affirmed the Orders of the ERC directing the various rural electric cooperatives to refund their respective over-recoveries. ISSUE 1: Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of 1) publication, 2) nonsubmission to the U.P. Law Center, and their 3) retroactive application. HELD: 1) No, publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. RATIO: 1) Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. The purpose of publication is to duly inform the public of the contents of the laws which govern them and regulate their activities. Art. 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by E.O. No. 200, as well as E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 both provide that [l]aws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is other wise provided. 2) Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order to be effective. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the S.C. held: ALL statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 3) Exceptions to the requirement of publication: 3.1. An interpretative regulation, to be effective, needs nothing more than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. It adds nothing to the law and does not affect the substantial rights of any person. 3.2 A regulation that is merely internal in nature. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. 3.3 Letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties.

4) The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend or supplant the IRR. 4.1 ERCs policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts merely interpret the cost of purchased power as a component of the PPA formula under R.A. 7832s IRR. The guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous meaning of cost in said IRR. Cost is an item of outlay, and must therefore exclude discounts since these are not amounts paid or charged for the sale of electricity, but are reductions in rates. 2. ERCs policy guidelines uphold and preserve the nature of the PPA formula. The nature of the PPA formula precludes an interpretation that includes discounts in the computation of the cost of purchased power. The PPA formula is an adjustment mechanism the purpose of which is purely for the recovery of cost. HELD: 2) As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. RATIO: 1) The Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule adopted by an agency to be filed with the U.P. Law Center to be effective. 2) However, in Board of Trustees of the GSIS v. Velasco, it was held that not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center. (Paragraph 9 (a) of the Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with the U.P. Law Center) HELD: 3) The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are not retrospective. RATIO: 1) No statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so. A law is retrospective if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past. 2) The policy guidelines did not take away or impair any vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. The usage and implementation of the PPA formula were provisionally approved by the ERB in its Orders. The said Orders specifically stated that the provisional approval of the PPA formula was subject to review, verification and confirmation by the ERB. Thus, the rural electric cooperatives did not acquire any vested rights in the usage and implementation of the provisionally approved PPA formula. 3) Furthermore, the policy guidelines of the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new disability. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend or supplant the IRR. ISSUE 2: Whether the grossed-up factor mechanism implemented by the ERC in the computation of the over-recoveries is ineffective and invalid for lack of 1) publication, 2) non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and its 3) retroactive application. HELD: The grossed-up factor mechanism is ineffective and invalid for lack of publication and non-submission to the U.P. Law Center. The grossed-up factor mechanism is an administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. 1. It does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the overrecoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid. 2. The application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism invalid for having been applied retroactively. The grossed-up factor mechanism imposes an additional numerical standard that creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty in respect of transactions or consideration already past. RATIO: 1) The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural electric cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. While the IRR explains, and stipulates, the PPA formula, the IRR neither explains nor stipulates the grossed-up factor mechanism. The grossedup factor mechanism is admittedly new and provides a different result, having been formulated only after the issuance of the IRR.

2) The grossed-up factor mechanism serves as a threshold amount to which the PPA formula is to be compared. According to the ERC, any amount collected under the PPA that exceeds the Recoverable Cost computed under the grossed-up factor mechanism shall be refunded to the consumers. In effect, the PPA alone does not serve as the variable rate to be collected from the consumers. The PPA formula and the grossed-up factor mechanism will both have to be observed and applied in the implementation of the PPA. 3) The grossed-up factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR. It is also not merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR by providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied in the implementation of the PPA.

2. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. REP November 27, 2012 VELASCO, JR.,J. FACTS: In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which was to be sourced from a Php 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the Php 0.55 levy, Php 0.02 was p[laced at the disposition of the COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) as having the largest membership. The declaration of Martial Law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees (P.D.) purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. One of such decrees is P.D. No. 755, with its avowed policy of providing readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this policy, said decree authorized the PCA to utilize the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank interest free. A part of the coconut levy fund went into the acquisition of the First United Bank (FUB), subsequently renamed United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). An Agreement, dated May 1975 was entered into between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and in behalf of certain other buyers, and Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly accorded the option to buy 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (option shares), at PhP 200 per share. On its face, this agreement does not mention the word option. A related contract, dated May 25, 1975, denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines had PCA, for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for PhP200.00 per share. As additional consideration for PCAs buy -out of what Cojuangco would later claim to be his exclusive and personal option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive equity in FUB of 7.22% of the 72.2%, of the fully paid shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangcos equity position in FUB, later UCPB, the PCA agreed under the second agreement to cede over to Cojuangco a number of fully paid FUB shares out of the shares it (PCA) undertakes to eventually subscribe. It was further stipulated that Cojuangco would act as bank president for an extendible period of 5 years. While the 64.98% portion of the option shares (72.2% 7.22% = 64.98%) ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund. And PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares. Shortly after the execution of the PCA Cojuangco Agreement, President Marcos issued, on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing as narrated, PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with readily available credit facilities at preferential rate. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the PCGG, created under President Corazon Aquinos administration, issued orders of sequestration to recover the Marcos il l-gotten wealth, among which were those handed out against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the names of (a) the coconut farmers, (b) the CIIF companies and (c) Cojuangco, Jr., including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit In Republic vs. COCOFED, the SC declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds. And since the sequestered UCPB shares were purchased by such funds beneficial ownership thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain to the government. On the strength of the SCs ruling in Republic vs. COCOFED, the Republic interposed a Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment, praying that: a. Declaring that Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is unconstitutional insofar as it validates the provisions in the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement dated May 25, 1975 providing payment of ten percent (10%) commission to Cojuangco with respect to the [FUB], now [UCPB] shares subject matter thereof;

b. Declaring that Cojuangco, Jr. and his fronts, nominees and dummies have not legally and validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares; and c. Declaring that the government is the lawful and true owner of the subject UCPB shares registered in the names of Cojuangco, Jr., et al. for the benefit of all coconut farmers. The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the Republic and declaring the subject shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB that were transferred to Cojuangco are conclusively owned by the Republic. Cojuangco moved for partial reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the agreement between the PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., dated May 25, 1975 has attained the status of a law. HELD: No, said agreement cannot be accorded the status of law for the lack of the requisite publication. Consequently, the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code. RATIO: 1) Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers executed by the PCA. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to in said provision of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as annex to the same law. 2. Laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the SC held: Publication [of the law] is indispensable in every case. the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. 3) The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement. 4) While it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published.

3. Quiao vs. Quiao July 4, 2012 REYES, J. FACTS: On October 26, 2000 Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against Brigido B. Quiao. The RTC rendered a Decision, dated October 10, 2005, declaring the legal separation of Brigido and Rita and further ordering that the parties properties be divided equally between them and the net profits of the conjugal partnership forfeited in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. On December 12, 2005, Rita and her minor children filed a motion for execution, which the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005. On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed. On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC: The phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouse and the debts. Also, after

determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. (In Order dated August 31, 2006) After reconsideration, RTC: NET PROFIT EARNED is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. Thereafter, the RTC had changed its ruling again and reinstated the Order dated August 31, 2006. Brigido argues: Since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, he has acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insist that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right. Brigido also claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUE 1: Whether Article 129 of the Family Code is applicable to the present case. HELD: Article 129 of the Family Code applies since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. RATIO: 1) Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between Brigido and Rita is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides: The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. 2) Since at the time of the issuance of the decree of legal separation, the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the F amily Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law. 3) A vested right is not one which is written on stone. A vested right is one whos e existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right exp resses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and individual rights, cannot deny. To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or future enjoyment of property. (Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals) The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. ( ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita) Therefore, while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. 4) Brigido was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the Rita prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, Brigido never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.

ISSUE 2: What is the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code? HELD: Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved. RATIO: 1) Distinction between the applicable law as to the property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of net profits. Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. The computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. As to the definition of net profits, Article 102(4) of the Family Code, expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. 2) Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved.

II. VESTED RIGHTS; SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAWS; RETROACTIVITY VS. EQUITY PRINCIPLES 4. DUEAS VS. SANTOS June 4, 2004 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land located at General T. De Leon, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Santos Subdivision. The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. P.D. 957, regulating the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums, became effective in July 12, 1976 and was amended by P.D. 1216 in 1977. Sometime in 1997, the members of the Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association (SSHA) submitted to Dueas a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216. Dueas, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. The HLURB-NCR dismissed the case, which decision was later affirmed by the HLURB Board of 1 Commissioners. The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel Dueas to provide an open space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on July 8, 1966, did not provide for said space and there was no law requiring the same at that time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957 could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of an express provision in the law. CA: On petition for review, the CA found for the SSH. The CA relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976. In this petition for review on certiorari, Dueas points out that there is no retroactivity provision in the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in subdivisions. Dueas stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977 or more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos. ISSUE: Whether P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216, can be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. RATIO: Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. It was ruled therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, the non-payment of amortizations was justified
1

The regulatory functions of the NHA have been transferred to the HLURB.

under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project. Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, it was held in a subsequent case that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus: Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation. At any rate, the principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1216 do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.

5. BERNABE VS. ALEJO January 21, 2002 PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. he son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife died on the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estat e, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. RTC: dismissed the complaint. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action. he trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation. CA: ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. Ernestina: contends that Carolina is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. ISSUE: Whether Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, is barred from filing an action for recognition HELD: No, the right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition. RATIO: 1. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows: ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code: ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 2. Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do i f he or she is already dead. 3. Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired: ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. 4. Adrians right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 5. Ernestina, however, contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws. Bustos v. Lucero distinguished substantive from procedural law : Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. Fabian v. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive: In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the pra ctice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. 6. Under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones. However, Divinagracia v. Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285. Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. The overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. The State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

6. REPUBLIC VS. MILLER April 21, 1999 PARDO, J. FACTS: On July 29, 1988, spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that Claude and Jumrus were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare. RTC: granted the petition for adoption.. In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the SC because the petition raised only questions of law. ISSUE: Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. HELD: Yes, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. RATIO: 1) An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of the spouses Miller, who are aliens, to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. 2) A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 3) Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law." 7. ATIENZA vs. BRILLANTES, JR. March 29, 1995 A. M. No. MTJ-92-706 QUIASON, J.:

FACTS: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila. Atienza alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw Brillantes sleeping on his [Atienza's] bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that BRillantes had been co-habiting with De Castro. Atienza claims that Brillantes is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part, Brillantes alleges that Atienza was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Brillantes denies having been married to Ongkiko. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, they went through another marriage ceremony in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned Brillantes leaving their children to his care and custody. Brillantes claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Brillantes argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether Article 40 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: Yes, Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. RATIO: 1) Under Article 256 of the Family Code, said law is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. 2) The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected [Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 (1968)]. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 8) TY VS. CA November 27, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, or on April 4, 1979, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding. On January 3, 1991, Reyes filed a Civil Case praying that his marriage to Ty be declared null and void. He averred that at the time he married Ty, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married Ty the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ty, in defending her marriage to Reyes, submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. RTC: declared Reyes marriage to Ty null and void ab initio. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. ISSUE: Whether in the case at bar a decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly. HELD: No, the first marriage of Reyes being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.

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RATIO: 1) Reyes first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis and Mercado v. Tan, both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly require Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. 2) Jurisprudence Originally, in People v. Mendoza (1954) and People v. Aragon (1957) the SC held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. In Gomez v. Lipana (1970) and Consuegra v. Consuegra (1971) however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, the SC upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. But in Odayat v. Amante (1977) the SC adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986) the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Yap v. Court of Appeals (1986) however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings. 3) The confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. 4) In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993) the Court held: Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a

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second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, the SC applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, and held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of Reyes was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of Reyes being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that Reyess second marriage to Ty is valid. 5) The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case , for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of Ty and of her children . As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of Ty and the children is patent.

9. ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC August 11, 2010 BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: On October 17, 2000, Isidro Ablaza filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. Isidro alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. RTC: dismissed the petition, which was later affirmed by the CA on the ground that while an action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage, Isidro is not a party to the marriage. ISSUE: Whether Isidro may file an action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1) The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. 2) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.

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Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. 3) Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. SC; and Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply to Isidro. 4) The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. However, the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action.

III. ARTICLE 8. STARE DECISIS; CASE LAW; ALSO ARTICLE 36, FC 10. Ting vs. Velez-Ting March 31, 2009 NACHURA, J.: FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting were wed in on July 26, 1975. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to Benjamin, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations: 1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession; 2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking; 3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and 4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family. In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. Carmen presented as witness Dr. Oate, a psychiatrist. Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of Carmen are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. To refute Dr. Oates opinion, Benjamin presented Dr. Renato Obra, a psychiatrist. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes and psychiatric evaluation report prepared by a psychiatrist from South A frica, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with Benjamins personality. RTC: declared the marriage between Benjamin and Carmen as null and void. Giving credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, the RTC found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. CA: reversed the RTCs decision, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina. Carmen, thus, filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than

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five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. CA 2: reversed its first ruling and sustained the RTCs decision. ISSUE 1: Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases. HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1) The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the SC in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. The principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 2) Historical development of the principle of stare decisis (Justice Punos dissent in Lambino vs. COMELEC)
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision. The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution. It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources. In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them. In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is inherently unequal. In the Philippine

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setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits. The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

3) The interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the SC is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. ISSUE 2: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized. HELD: No. RATIO: 1) By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 2) Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 3) Far from abandoning Molina, the SC simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pretrial conference.

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. ISSUE 3: Whether Benjamins alleged psychological incapacity has been proven.

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HELD: No, the totality of evidence adduced by Carmen is insufficient to prove that Benjamin is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of their marriage. RATIO: 1) The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 2) In this case, Carmen failed to prove that Benjamins defects were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that Benjamin would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable. 3) The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations. 4) It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

IV. HUMAN RELATIONS; ABUSE OF RIGHTS; UNJUST ENRICHMENT; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; ARTS. 1724, 2142, 2154, 2164, 2176, NCC

12. Cheng vs. Sy July 7, 2009

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: 1) Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases against spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Checks, in payment of their loan, which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. On January 20, 1999, Cheng likewise filed against spouses Sy two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22. RTC: On March 16, 2004 dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing the Criminal Case against Tessie contained no declaration as to her civil liability but the one dismissing the Criminal Case against William contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature. MeTC: dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the spouses Sy. 2) On April 26, 2005, Cheng instituted against the spouses Sy a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court. In this petition for review on certiorari, Cheng argues: (1) that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective application; (2) that her case falls under the exceptions to the rule that the civil action corresponding to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter. She also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings. She indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

ISSUE: Whether Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case (where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the spouses Sy was based on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused). RATIO: 1) The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against spouses Sy, where the Cheng has NOT made any (a) waiver, (b) express reservation to litigate separately, or has NOT (c) instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.

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This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada that the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping. Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, Cheng, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other. 2) The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt where in the criminal case against Tessie there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused and in the criminal case against William where the trial court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature produced the legal effect of a reservation by Cheng of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code. However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling. 3) May Chengs action to recover spouses Sys civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed? - Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. xxx (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Xxx Cheng is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. Rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 4) Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. This policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action . In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 5) However, in applying the procedure discussed above, Cheng would be left without a remedy to recover from the spouses Sy the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, Chengs recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to the spouses Sy corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence. Chengs failure to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule. 6) It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross

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negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Tested against these guidelines, the case at bar falls within the exceptions. Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to Cheng to be able to recover the money she loaned to the spouses Sy, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases. By this failure, Cheng was denied her day in court to prosecute the spouses Sy for their obligation to pay their loan. 7) If the loan be proven true, Chengs inability to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of the spouses Sy, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality. There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract, quasicontract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so, we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of Cheng. 13. ASJ Corp. vs. Evangelista February 14, 2008 QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Efren and Maura Evangelista, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, spouses Evangelista availed of the hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of Antonio San Juan. Sometime in 1991, the spouses Evangelista delivered to ASJ Corp. various quantities of eggs at an agreed service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Initially, the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to the spouses Evangelista. But as their business went along, the Evangelistas delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping goodwill. Sometime in 1993, San Juan refused to release the chicks and by-products due to the spouses Evangelistas failure to settle accrued service fees. The parties tried to settle amicably their differences before police authorities, but to no avail. Thus, the spouses Evangelista filed with the RTC an action for damages based on San Juans retention of the chicks and by-products. San Juans obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: the date of hatching, the delivery/pick-up date and the date of spouses Evangelistas payment. On several setting reports, the spouses Evangelista made delays on their payments, but San Juan tolerated such delay. When the spouses Evangelistas accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on several setting reports, San Juan opted to demand the full settlement of their accounts as a condition precedent to the delivery. However, the spouses Evangelista were unable to fully settle their accounts. Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura promised to settle their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan. San Juan disliked the idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him. RTC: ruled in favor of the spouses Evengelista based on a finding that the retention of the chicks and by-products was unjustified. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether the retention of the chicks and by-products constitute an abuse of rights. HELD: Yes.

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RATIO: 1) San Juans act of withholding the chicks and by-products is entirely different from his unjustifiable acts of threatening the spouses Evangelista. The retention had legal basis; the threats had none. The spouses Evangelistas offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More so, the spouses Evangelista cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they expect to derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Thus, there was no valid application of payment in this case. It was the spouses Evangelista who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to San Juans right of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other party begins. Since the spouses Evangelista are guilty of delay in the performance of their obligations, they are liable to pay San Juan actual damages 2) Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening the spouses Evangelista should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Here, while San Juan had the right to withhold delivery, his high-handed and oppressive acts had no legal leg to stand on. Since it was established that the spouses Evangelista suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on San Juans abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are recoverable. 14. UP vs. Philab September 29, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos. The Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof. Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its approval. On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and down payment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project. Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract for the project, and that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract. Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and approval. Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon. On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an Invoice for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. FEMF failed to pay the bill. President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF. Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos, wrote then Chairman of the

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Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga , submitting PHILABs claim to be officially entered as accounts payable as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG. In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal. Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH. Thereafter, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. RTC: Dismissed the complaint without prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF. CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. It further ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. ISSUE: Whether U.P. is liable for PHILABs claim based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another. HELD: No. RATIO: 1) Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. 2) To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads: Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie. The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. PHILAB had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. U.P. legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture. 15. LBP vs. Ong November 24, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.: FACTS: Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the amount of PhP 16 million. Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer pay their loan. On December 9, 1996, they sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangelines mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Evangelines father, Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and assumption of mortgage. Atty. Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch Head, told Alfredo and his counsel that there was nothing wrong with the agreement with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. They were also told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at PhP 750,000. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a check for PhP 750,000

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and personally gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never materialized. Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after several months. Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale. Thereafter, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank as Alfredos payment was not returned by Land Bank. RTC: held that the contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit investigation conducted on Alfredo. It noted that Alfredo was not even informed of the disapproval of the assumption of mortgage but was just told that the accounts of the spouses Sy had matured and gone unpaid. It ruled that under the principle of equity and justice, the bank should return the amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the complaint. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. It held that Alfredos recourse is not against the Sy spouses. Although Land Bank was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo and Land Banks active preparations for Alfredos ass umption of mortgage essentially novated the agreement. In filing this appeal before the SC, Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the principle of equity and justice in ordering it to return the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo. Alfredo was allegedly in bad faith and in estoppel. Land Bank contends that it enjoyed the presumption of regularity and was in good faith when it accepted Alfredos tender of PhP 750,000. It reasons that it did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredos expense during the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sys outstanding loan obligation. ISSUE: Whether Land Bank is liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo. HELD: Yes, Land Bank is liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment. RATIO: 1) Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it . The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay Land Bank and the latter had no right to receive it. 2) Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Land Bank, however, did not even bother to inform Alfredo that it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sys mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in the loan when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughters loan had not been paid. Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP 750,000, he would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment without returning it when demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the application would have been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit investigation before accepting Alfredos payment. He would have been notified that his assumption of mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP 750,000. The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredos application cannot be said to have been fair and proper. 3) As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to Alfredos case, we hold that Alfredo had no other remedy to recover from Land Bank and the lower court properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in resolving the collection suit.

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Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 16. Ty vs. CA November 27, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, or on April 4, 1979, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding. On January 3, 1991, Reyes filed a Civil Case praying that his marriage to Ty be declared null and void. He averred that at the time he married Ty, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married Ty the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ty, in defending her marriage to Reyes, submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. RTC: declared Reyes marriage to Ty null and void ab initio. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. ISSUE: Whether Ty may be awarded damages. HELD: No. RATIO: Ty wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies.

18. Pantaleon vs. AMEXCO August 25, 2010 BRION, J.:

FACTS: Polo Pantaleon, together with his family, went to Europe and joined an escorted tour of Western Europe. The controversy of this case began when the tour group went to Amsterdam. At Amsterdam, the group arrived at the Coster Diamond House at 9 am. Before arriving thereat, the group agreed that they will only tour the diamond house for thirty minutes to allow enough time to take a guided tour of Amsterdam. At the diamond house, petitioners wife purchased diamond jewelries amounting to $13, 826.00 and in order to pay for the same, petitioner used his American Express Credit Card (credit card issued at 9:15). However, respondent American Express took 1 hour to approve the purchase; as a result, the tour of Amsterdam was cancelled due to time constraints. Petitioner and his family apologized to members of the tour group but they alleged their apologies were met by stony silence. Upon returning to the Philippines, Pantaleon wrote respondent and demanded an apology for the Amsterdam incident; AMEXCO did not accede to Pantaleons demand thereby prompting Pantaleon to file an action for damages against AMEXCO with the RTC. In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Pantaleon on the ground that AMEXCO. On appeal, the CA reversed the TCs decision and ruled that AMEXCO did not breach any of its obligations to petitoner. In this petition, Pantaleon argues that even assuming that AMEXCO did not breach its obligations, the latter is still liable under Art. 21 of the Civil Code for abuse of rights.

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ISSUE: Whether AMEXCO is liable under Art. 21 of the Civil Code. HELD: Yes. RATIO: During the trial of this case, the credit authorizer of respondent testified and admitted that a credit transaction took only 3-4 seconds. Further, the evidence adduced proves that the charge purchase was received by respondent 5 minutes (9:20) after petitioner issued his Credit Card for payment. However, respondent approved the same one hour and 18 minutes later. Although the court recognizes the right of respondent, if not the obligation, to verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a particular purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within his means to make such transaction. However, the failure of the respondent to timely act on the same was unjustified. The court held that respondents actions ``mounts to a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply with its contractual obligations, or at least abuse of its rights, under the contract.

19. Valley Golf v. Caram April 16, 2009 Tinga, J.:

FACTS: In this case, the husband of respondent, the late Congressman Fermin Caram (Caram) owned 1 fully paid Valley Golf share. Petitioner alleged that beginning the year 1980 until June 1987, Fermin Caram stopped paying his membership dues. Then in Dec. 1985, Valley Golf sent a letter addressed to Fermin Caram informing him of his account and his unpaid dues. Fermin Caram did not respond to the said letter thus, prompting Valley Golf to send four more letters. In its final letter on May 1987, Valley Golf gave Caram a final deadline for the payment of the unpaid dues or otherwise face the sale of the Golf Share to satisfy the claims of Valley Golf. Still Caram failed to satisfy the dues; thus, Valley Golf sold Carams share in a public auction. As it turned out, Caram died on October 1986 or before the final letter was sent. Caram died intestate and his heirs instituted an action for the settlement of his estate. In the settlement proceedings, the heirs included the Valley Golf share as part of decedents estate an d paid the corresponding estate tax thereon. However, they later found out that the Valley Golf share of Caram was later on sold in a public auction because of being delinquent. The heirs thereafter filed an action with the SEC for reconveyance of the share. The SEC ruled in favor of respondent and the heirs. The SEC Hearing Officer ruled that the auction sale conducted on Carams share had no basis in law because it was contrary to Sec. 6 (restrictions to the shares should be provided in the AOI; Valley Golf only authorized itself to conduct auction sales of shares of delinquent accounts in its by laws) and 67 par. 2 of the Corp. Code (Delinquency occurs when the shareholder fails to pay the unpaid subscription, and not membership dues). SEC en banc affirmed the SEC HO in toto, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA. In this petition, Valley Golf argues that the auction sale was authorized by its by laws and pertinent provisions of the Corp. Code. ISSUE: Whether the auction sale was valid and proper. HELD: The SC held that the Corporation Code under Sec .91 thereof, allows the manner of terminating its members to be provided under its by laws. Further, Valley Golf is non stock non profit Corporation; thus, the rule provided under Sec. 67 cannot apply to Valley Golf. Simply put, the auction sale conducted by Valley Golf was valid pursuant to he Corp. Code and its by laws. However, the court found out that Valley Golf acted in utter bad faith because the evidence adduced showed that Valley Golf knew that, at the time the share was sold in the public auction, Caram was already dead. This was shown under the third and fourth letter sent by Valley Golf that was addressed not to Caram himself but to his heirs. Whatever the reason Caram was unable to respond to the earlier notices, the fact remains that at the time of the final notice, Valley Golf knew that Caram, having died and gone, would not be able to settle the obligation himself, yet they persisted in sending him notice to provide a color of regularity to the resulting sale. Moreover, the utter and appalling bad faith exhibited by Valley Golf in sending out the final notice to Caram on the deliberate pretense that he was still alive could bring into operation Articles Articles 19, 20 and 21 under the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. Non-stock corporations and its officers are not exempt from that obligation.

21. Beumer vs. Amores 3 December 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS: In this case, petitioner Willem Beumer, a dutch national, was married to respondent Avelina Amores, a Filipina, on March 29, 1980. After several years, however, their marriage was dissolved on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the FC. Subsequently, petitioner filed an action for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage:

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1. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon; 2. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre containing an area of 806 sq. m. including a residential house constructed thereon; 3. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre containing an area of 756 sq.m 4. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covering an area of 45 sq. m. 5. Lot 2055-A and Lot 2055-I by way of inheritance. In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money/personal and exclusive funds to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as 12 his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. Ruling of Trial Court: 1. The RTC awarded all parcels of lands to respondent as her paraphernal properties on the ground that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law/constitution to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance. 2. The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment, which have an equivalent amount of P500k were awarded to petitioner; 3. The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 were declared to be co owned by petitioner and respondent on the ground that there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. On appeal to the CA, petitioner contested the award of all the parcels land to respondent arguing that the money used to purchase the said properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife. CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. In this petition, petitioner asserts his right over the purchase price used in the purchase of the said properties and asks the court that he be reimbursed on the ground of equity and unjust enrichment. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of the purchase price. HELD: No. RATIO: 1. Evidence adduced clearly showed that petitioner knew of the Constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine lands at the time he allegedly bought the parcels of land and such was the precise reason why they registered the said properties in respondents name. This only shows that palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. In deciding the case, the court cited the case of In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, which involved the same issue as with this case. In the Muller case, the court emphasized that the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Thus, petitioners attempt to skirt the constitutional prohibition shows that he did not came to court with clean hands and is thereby precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 2. Neither can the court reimburse petitioner on the ground of unjust enrichment as provided under Art. 22 of the CC. The court emphasized that the provision on unjust enrichment cannot apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution (Frenzel v. Catito). SC held in this wise: An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff

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23. Ilusorio vs. Bildner (2000) May 12, 2000 PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. Erlinda and Potenciano got married on July 11, 1942 and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. On December 30, 1997, upon his arrival from the United States, Potenciano stayed with Erlinda. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of antidepressant drug. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated. Thereafter, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Meanwhile, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to live with Erlinda. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano and enforce consortium as the wife. She alleged that Lin and Sylvia refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to live with her in Antipolo City. CA: dismissed the application for habeas corpus but, nevertheless, granted Erlinda visitation rights to Potenciano. ISSUE: Whether a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her. HELD: No, Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. RATIO: 1) A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. 2) Object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus: to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. 3) With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will deprived of his right to privacy. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus or by any other mesne process2. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

24. Ilusorio vs. Bildner (2001) July 19, 2001 PARDO, J.:

FACTS: This is Erlinda Ilusorios motion for reconsideration of the SC Decision dismissing her petition for writ of habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, Potenciano.

2 MESNE PROCESS. Any process issued between original and final process; that is, between the original writ and the execution. See Process, mesne.

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Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. ISSUE: Whether as spouses, Potenciano and Erlinda are duty bound to live together and care for each other HELD: Yes. RATIO: The law (i.e. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code) provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy has been defined as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with " amor gignit amorem (Lat. for Love produces love) respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

25. Padalhin vs. Lavia November 14, 2012 REYES, J.:

FACTS: Nelson Lavia and Nestor Padalhin were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul-General, respectively. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Lavia was raided twice. On both instances, the raid was conducted while Lavia and his wife were not present and photographs of the residence were taken. Subsequently, both Nestor and Lavia were recalled from their posts in Kenya. On November 17, 1997, Lavia filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his wife. Lavias complaint alleged as cause of action the affront against his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated by Padalhin and participated by the other defendants as conspirators. Nestor, for his part, denied any involvement in the raids conducted on Lavias residence. RTC: ordered Nestor to pay Lavia damages for the formers participation in the raid conducted in the Ambassadors residence on April 18. 1996. The RTC based its ruling on Nestors own admission in his affidavit that he caused the taking of pictures of the raw elephant tusks in the official residence of the ambassador. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA explained: Lavias complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only

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purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. The question, therefore, is whether Nestor intended to prejudice or injure Lavia when he did the acts as embodied in his affidavit. We rule in the affirmative. Nestors participation in the invasion of Lavias diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without Lavias consent were clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find that Nestor was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed out by the RTC, Nestor made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in Lavias diplomatic residence. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Nestor questions the grant of damages in favor Lavia. He asserts that his admission of having caused the taking of photographs in Lavias residence was subject to the qualification that he did so without malice or bad faith. He merely intended to verify the complaints of some embassy personnel against Lavia, with the end in mind of protecting and upholding the image of the Philippine diplomatic corps in Kenya. He insists that he may have committed a lapse in the exercise of his discretion, but he never meant to cause Lavia harm, damage or embarrassment. ISSUE: Whether the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavias favor is proper. HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.

25. Lim v. Kau Co Ping aka Charlie Co August 23, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: This case revolves around the WITHDRAWAL AUTHORITIES issued by FR CEMENT CORP. (FRCC), a corporation engaged in cement manufacturing. These withdrawal authorities indicate the number of bags of cement a dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance unless revoked by the FRCC. Fil Cement Center and Tigerbilt were the first holders of these withdrawal authorities as they later sold/assigned such withdrawal authorities to Kau Co Ping aka Charlie Co covering 50k bags of cement for the amount of P3.15 Million or P63.00 per bag. Then on Feb. 15, 1999, Charlie Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lily Lim for P 3.2 Million or at P64.00 per bag. Lily lim, thereafter, successfully withdraw 2,800 bags of cement from FRCC. Lim then sold back withdrawal authorities of covering 10,000 bags of cement to Charlie Co. Thus, 37, 200 bags of cement were still to be withdrawn from FRCC. Sometime in April 1999, Lim presented the withdrawal authorities in order to withdraw the remaining 37, 200 bags from FRCC. However, FRCC disallowed the withdrawal on the ground that the prices of the cement bags had increased; thus, Lim had to pay the difference first in order to withdraw the cement bags. Lim then tried to resolve the problem by demanding Charlie Co to fix the problem but to no avail; thus, prompting her to file a criminal complaint for ESTAFA through misappropriation or conversion. The criminal complaint was, however, subsequently dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Lim, undaunted, appealed the civil aspect of the criminal action to the CA. Thereafter, Lim filed another action, a complaint for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE and DAMAGES before the RTC. This Civil action involved the same facts and issues as with the earlier Estafa case. As a result, Charlie Co filed motions to dismiss for each case on the ground of FORUM SHOPPING and LIS PENDENS. (THERE ARE NOW TWO ACTIONS: CIVIL ASPECT OF THE ESTAFA CASE and CIVIL ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES). As regards the civil aspect of the Estafa case under appeal to the CA, the appellate court granted Cos motion and thus, dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. The CA in this case ruled that because Lims appeal and her civil complaint are identical, forum shopping existed. With regard to the Civil Case under the RTC, the court denied Cos m otion on the ground that the elements of Forum Shopping and litis pendentia are not met because the two actions are based upon two different causes of actions. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. (THUS, THE CA HAD TWO

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DIFFERENT RULINGS IN THIS CASE INVOLVING THE SAME ISSUES and with this, the TWO CASES WERE CONSOLIDATED). ISSUE: Whether Lily Lim committed forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa? HELD: No, there is no forum shopping (and even lis pendens). Both actions under consideration, although they involve the same set of facts and issues, does not involve the same causes of action. The civil aspect of the criminal action for estafa was based on culpa criminal/civil liability ex delicto whereas the civil action for specific performance was based on culpa contractual/civil liability ex contractu. Corollary, the SC applied Art 31 in relation to Art. 33 of the Civil Code, which provides for the independent civil actions. Art. 31 of the Civil Code provides that an independent civil action may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of. Notwithstanding this, Art. 33 provides that even if the action is based on the same act or omission complained of, another action may still proceed independently if such involves cases of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries. RATIO: A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender -- (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries"). The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip: One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual. In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forumshopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative. The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms:

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that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has caused her. TITLE I. CIVIL PERSONALITY

V. CIVIL PERSONALITY; BIRTH; DEATH; ARTS. 40, 41, 42, 390, 391, 712, 777 NSS; ARTS. 41, 96 & 124, 99 & 126, 142, FC; SEC. 2, RULE 92, RRC 27. Continental Steel vs. Montao October 13, 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: In this case, Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of respondent union, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. Under the CBA, it provides Continental Steel agreed to provide bereavement leave benefits in favor of its employees in case of death of a legitimate dependent i.e. child. Continental Steel also agreed to provide for death and accident insurance benefits for its employees in case of death of a legitimate dependent provided that legal documents must be presented to substantiate the same i.e. death certificate. Hortillanos claim is based on the death of his unborn child, which was brought about when his wife had a th premature delivery during her 38 week of pregnancy. As result, Hortillano filed the aforesaid claim with Continental Steel. However, Continental Steel denied, except for the paternity leave, the bereavement leave and death and accident insurance benefits on the ground that the death of an unborn child or a fetus was not contemplated in the CBA when the provisions on bereavement leave, death and accident insurance benefits were made. Continental Steel argues that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that pursuant to Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, only one with civil personality could die. Conversely, Continental Steel argues that because the unborn child failed to have a juridical personality, no death was effected. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported. Subsequently, the matter was brought to arbitration. Arbitrator Montano ruled in favor of the union, which was later affirmed by the CA. In this petition, Continental Steel argues that what was contemplated under the CBA was the death of a legal person and not of a fetus that do not have any juridical personality. ISSUE: Whether civil personality is required before one could be considered as dead. HELD: No. RATIO: The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. First, the three articles must be taken in conjunction with Art. 37, which provides for the definition of a persons juridical capacity and capacity to act. Considering the foregoi ng provisions, the court emphasized that the issue in this case is Hortillanos bereavement leave and other benefits and not his unborn childs civil personality (juridical capacity and capacity to act). Thus, Articles 40, 41 and 42 are inapplicable in this case. Second, the court emphasized that Articles 40 42 does not expressly provide for the definition of death; they only provide that a persons civil personality is extinguished by death. It does not mean, however, that only those with civil personality can die. And third, death has been simply defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. Is Hortillano entitled for the benefits? Yes. As found by Atty. Montano, the elements of the bereavement leave benefits pursuant to the CBA are: 1. Death; 2. Death must be of a dependent and; 3. Dependent must be legitimate. For death and accident insurance benefits, the CBA adds another requirement and

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that is the submission of legal documents to substantiate the claim. All the elements were present in the case: the unborn child died; the unborn child was dependent upon the mother for support and sustenance and the unborn child was legitimate.

28. Dueas vs. Santos June 4, 2004 QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land located at General T. De Leon, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Santos Subdivision. The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. P.D. 957, regulating the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums, became effective in July 12, 1976 and was amended by P.D. 1216 in 1977. Sometime in 1997, the members of the Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association (SSHA) submitted to Dueas a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216. Dueas, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. The HLURB-NCR dismissed the case, which decision was later affirmed by the HLURB Board of 3 Commissioners. The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel Dueas to provide an open space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on July 8, 1966, did not provide for said space and there was no law requiring the same at that time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957 could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of an express provision in the law. CA: On petition for review, the CA found for the SSH. The CA relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976. In this petition for review on certiorari, Dueas claims that SSHA failed to present any evidence showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity, authorized by law to sue or be sued in its own name. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it has no legal capacity to file this suit before the HLURB and the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether SSHA has legal personality to sue. HELD: No, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action. RATIO: 1) Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court , only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. 2) Article 44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the complaint given the SSHAs lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a party. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. 29. Oropesa vs. Oropesa April 25, 2012 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Nilo Oropesa filed with the RTC a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, Cirilo Oropesa.
3

The regulatory functions of the NHA have been transferred to the HLURB.

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In the said petition, it is alleged among others that Cirilo has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke twice; that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, Cirilo was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend. After presenting evidence, Nilo failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Thus, Cirilo filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentatio n of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. RTC granted Cirilos Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, Cirilot filed his Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the RTC. CA: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether Cirilo is considered an incompetent person as defined under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, who should be placed under guardianship. HELD: No. RATIO: 1) Nature and purpose of guardianship (Francisco vs. CA) A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis4 as well. 2) In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court provides that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. 3) Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. With Nilos failure to formally offer his documentary e vidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action. Even absent Nilos procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. 4) Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the per sons state of mental sanity will suffice. Thus, it is significant that in its Order the trial court made known its own observation Cirilo is still sharp, alert and able.

4 Latin for "in the place of a parent".

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VI. DOMICILE; ARTS. 50 & 51, NCC; ARTS. 68 & 69, FC; RULES ON RESIDENCE VS. DOMICILE (ANNULMENT/NULLITY OF MARRIAGES AM 02-11-10 SC; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ELECTION LAWS)

31. Morigo vs. People February 06, 2004 QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines from working in Canada and proposed to petition Lucio to join her in Canada. They agreed and were married on August 30, 1990. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy. RTC: found Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. As to the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. In this petition for review on certiorari, Lucio submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy. ISSUE: Whether Lucio is guilty of bigamy. HELD: No. RATIO: 1) Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis: Elements of bigamy (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, it is to be noted that during the pendency of Lucios appeal in the criminal case for bigamy, the trial court, on the civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage, declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. 2) The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, Lucio was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no

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first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.

33. Ugdoracion vs. COMELEC April 18, 2008 NACHURA, J.: candidates in

FACTS: Jose Ugdoracion, Jr. and Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections.

Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ugdoracion, contending that Ugdoracions declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a green card holder or a pe rmanent resident of the USA. Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol for 41 years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country. Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in this jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence, and he retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque, Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in the USA. COMELEC: cancelled Ugdoracions COC. In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, Ugdoracion argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of a permanent resident status in the USA which, as he insists, did not result in the loss of his domicile of origin. ISSUE: Whether Ugdoracion has lost his domicile of origin. HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1) The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones status as a resident of the Philippines. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that a Filipino citizens acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. 2) Residence, in election laws, is synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return ( animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the (1) intention to reside in a fixed place but also (2) personal presence in that place, coupled (3) with conduct indicative of such intention. 3) Three basic rules on domicile: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time. 4) Classifications of domicile: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention. The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instant case, however, Ugdoracions acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA. 5) The contention that Ugdoracions USA resident status was acquired involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sisters beneficence, does not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration laws, the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status. Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of law. And to reiterate, a person can have only one residence or domicile at any given time.

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6) Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his status.

34. Limbona vs. COMELEC June 25, 2008 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: In this case, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband Mohammad Limbona were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 synchronized national and local elections. The spouses filed their certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007. However, another mayoralty candidate, respondent Malik Alingan, filed separate petitions to disqualify the spouses for alleged violation of the one year residency requirement. Subsequently, petitioner withdrew her candidacy, which was subsequently granted by the COMELEC. Meanwhile, the COMELEC granted the petition of MALIK and disqualified Mohammad from the race. Such disqualification prompted petitioner to substitute her husband as mayoralty candidate. After the elections, petitioner won as Mayor of Pantar. However, the COMELEC continued with the resolution of the petition filed by Malik against her and like her husband, the COMELEC disqualified her on ground, among others (Mohammad and petitioner were not registered voters in the area), that she failed to comply with the one year residency requirement as mandated by law. In this petition, petitioner argues that she had been residing in Pantar of almost 20 months prior to the election and alleging that she had been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner violated the one year residency requirement. HELD: Yes, Limbona violated the one year residency rule for having failed to establish a one-year residency at Pantar at the time of filing her candidacy. RATIO: The SC emphasized that the term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only INTENTION TO RESIDE in a fixed place but also PERSONAL PRESENCE in that place, coupled with the CONDUCT INDICATIVE OF SUCH INTENTION. The intent of the law is to exclude newcomers or strangers who are unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community. For purposes of election law, the court emphasized that the question of residence is mainly one of intention and in order to determine a persons residence, the court provided the following established rules: 1. A man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; 2. Where a residence or domicile have been established it remains until a new is acquired and; 3. A man can have but one domicile at a time. In the case at bar, the court ruled that in order to effect a change in domicile or domicile by choice, one must demonstrate an actual removal or actual change of domicile; a boni fide intention of abandoning the old domicile and establishing a new one. Conversely the court ruled that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, three (3) requisites must concur: 1. residence or bodily presence in the new locality; 2. an intention to remain there and 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile. In view of the facts of the case, petitioners allegation that she had been residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the election cannot be given any evidentiary weight for they are self serving and unsubstantiated. There is no other evidence that would show petitioners intention of establishing a domicile in Pantar and abandoning her domicile at Marawi city. Furthermore, the court noted the COMELECs findings that petitioners husband, Mohammad, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on Nov. 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and the wife live together in one legal residence, then it also follows that petitioner effect the change of her domicile also on Nov. 11, 2006 pursuant to Art. 68 and 69 of the FC, which provides the obligation of the husband and the wife to live together in a fixed domicile.

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