Property Case Reviewer

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III. The General Law on Property Rights >> A. Constitutional Framework >> Case (Year) Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (1973) This case is about Union members rallying in protest against the Pasig police despite protestations from its company that it will hamper productivity. Employees were terminated because of the no strike clause in the CBA Resolution The dismissal was not valid. The employees did not violate the CBA. Legal Basis + Interpretation The Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
III. The General Law on Property Rights >> C.Right-Holders:Who may have property rights >> Cruz vs. Constitutionality of IPRA IPRA is Valid7-7 vote tied. So Secretary of petition was dismissed. Environment and Natural Resources
Puno for validity of IPRA: Ancestral Domain(AD) and Ancestral Land(AL) are the private property of the Indigenous Peoples(IP) and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) A Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private. The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD
III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>1. With reference to the holder of the rights; basic kinds of property>>a. Public Province of Zamboanga vs. City of Zamboanga CA 39 converted Zamboanga from a municipality to a city and provided that properties left by the province when it transfers to a new capital will be paid for by the new city. RA 711 divided the province into Zamboanga del Norte and del Sur, also dividing assets and liabilities, with the result that Zamboanga del Norte became entitled to 52.39% of the amount payable by Zamboanga city. RA 3039 was passed, which provided that assets belonging to the former Zamboanga province are transferred free of charge to Zamboanga city. Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of RA3039. Zamboanga City was ordered to pay Zamboanga del Norte 54.39% share in 26patrimonial properties If the properties were owned by Z province in its public and governmental capacity, then it is Public and Congress has absolute control. If they were owned in its private or capacity, then it is Patrimonial and Z province cannot be deprived without due process and just compensation. There are 2 norms of classification in Art 423 and 424CC Under this, all but 2 of the properties would be patrimonial properties of the former Z province. Under the law on Municipal Corps, however, to be considered public property, it is enough that property beheld and devoted for governmental purposes. Using this, 26 of the lots are patrimonial. The SC used the latter classification, as to classify the properties as private could result in dire consequences (they can be
B2015 PROPERTY CASE COMPILATION
levied and attached) and the CC says without prejudice to provisions of special laws Salas vs. Jarencio The Municipal Board of Manila issued a Resolution requesting the President to consider the possibility of declaring a lot as patrimonial property for resale. After being passed by the Senate and the House, the President approved the bill, which became RA 4118. To implement it, the Land Tenure Administration proposed a subdivision plan, to which it did not object. Upon LTAs request, the city surrendered the TCT, which was replaced with a one in the name of the LTA. Later, the Mayor brought an action to prohibit LTA from further implementing RA 4118. The TC declared the statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of the citys property without due process and just compensation. The petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years. Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately 1,578,441 Square Meters for a total consideration of P1,894,129,200.00. RA 4118 is constitutional The lot is not patrimonial property of the City. It failed to present evidence showing in what manner it acquired the land as its private or patrimonial property. In the absence of a deed or title to any land claimed by the City as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality. The general rule is that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private capacity, such property is held in trust for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles
The land in question was originally part of M. Borces St., Cebu City. It was declared an abandoned road
Court held that the sale is valid and petitioner has a
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the States inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA" violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution." The city Charter of Cebu gives the City the right to declare the said road as abandoned. It empowers the City to close a city road or
through a resolution. Another resolution was passed authorizing the Mayor to sell the land through public bidding. Petitioner was the highest bidder. The Mayor executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioner filed an application to register the title. Asst. City Fiscal moved to dismiss saying the property is outside the commerce of man since it is part of the public domain. TC granted.
registerable title over the lot.
street and withdraw it from public use after determining WON the property is still necessary for public use. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioners application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Art422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. * Note that the revised charter of the city of Cebu states that: Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be sued or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>With reference to the object; things that may be subject of property rights>>a. Corporeal>>i. Immovables Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng Mabalacat Sugar Co. obtained from Cu Unjieng a loan secured by a mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings and improvements now existing or that may be constituted in the future. Mabalacat later decided to buy additional machinery, for which Berkenkotter advanced payment. He was to be paid after Mabalacat receives the proceeds from the additional loan they plan to acquire from Cu Unjieng. Mabalacat failed to obtain the second loan. Berkenkotter claims the improvement (additional machinery)was not permanent, hence not included in the second mortgage. Court held that the additional machinery constitute a permanent improvement. Art 334(now Art 415) par 5 of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to machineryintended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. The installation of the machinery and the equipment in Mabalacats Central converted them into real property by reason of their purpose. Their incorporation therewith was permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.
Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jarque
Philippine Refining Co. and Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zargazo. Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarques
Court held they are covered by the Chattel mortgage law.
Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in the registry of the
properties were then assigned to Curaminas. An issue arose on whether the vessels are covered by the Chattel mortgage law. Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor Mindanao Bus Co. is engaged in a public utility business, solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main office and branch offices. To be found in their offices are machineries and equipment, which were assessed by the City Assessor as real properties. Davao S. operates a sawmill on land owned by another. It erected a building which housed its machinery, which were mounted on cement foundations. The sawmills contract with the landowner provides that upon expiration of the lease, all improvements shall pass to the landowner but machineries and accessories are excluded from those improvements which will pass to the landowner. In a previous action, a writ was issued against the sawmill and the properties in question were levied upon as personalty by Davao Light which took possession of such. Davao Sawmill has on previous occasion treated the machinery as personalty by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential. They executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building with the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. The Sec of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank.The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses Caltex loans machinery and equipment to gas Court held that the tools and equipments are movables.
register of deeds.
Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo
Court held that the machinery is personal property
Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of law must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry o n the industrial purpose for which it was established. The tools and equipments are by their nature not essential and principal elements of petitioners business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals. While not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. The SC said par 1 and 5 of Art. 334 (Art. 415 NCC) do NOT apply. The machinery was not intended by the owner for use in connection therewith but was intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the owner to be returned to the lessee on the expiration of the lease. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of a property or plant but not when placed by a tenant, usufructuary etc. unless acting as an agent of the owner.
Prudential Bank vs. Panos
Court held that the mortgage on the building was valid.
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a Real Estate Mortgage for the building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The equipment are taxable improvements and machinery subject to
Caltex vs.
Court held the properties as
Central Board of Assessment Appeals
station operators under a lease agreement. Caltex retains ownership during the terms of the lease. The City Assessor of Pasay characterized the equipment as taxable realty. The Central Board of Assessment Appeals held that they are real property within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code and that the definitions of real and personal property in Arts 415 and 416 NCC do not apply. Caltex contends they are personal property.
immovables.
realty tax under the Assessment Law and Real Property Tax Code. Such machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building owned by Caltex, are necessary to the operation of the station, for without them it would be useless. They have been attached permanently to the station. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they may be considered personalty. (The point being that classification of property into realty or personalty is different for the taxation purposes. The NCC only supplements the Tax Code)
Benguet Corp. vs. CBAA
Realty tax was imposed on Benguet Corps tailings dam and the land thereunder. Benguet does not dispute that the dam may be considered realty under Art 415 NCC but it insists that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and independent property because it does not constitute an assessable improvement within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.
Court held that the tailings dam is an assessable improvement.
Tumulad vs. Vivencio
Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalads over their house, which was being re nted by Madrigal and company. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and Tumalads were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against Vivencio, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.
Court held that the house is a movable.
SC said that the Real Property Tax Code does not define real property so we apply Art 415 par 1 and5 NCC. From these & definition of improvements in the Tax Code(valuable addition intended to enhance value, beauty or utility.;reasonably permanent), it would appear that whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use. Permanence means only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. The dam is within this definition as it is permanent in character, enhances the value and utility of the mine and is not an integral part thereof. Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequ ently claiming otherwise. In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that Vivencio conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inc onsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
Sergs Products vs. PCI Leasing
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of mone y as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject o f a chattel mortgage executed by Serg in favor of PCI. Machineries of Serg were seized and Serg filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage.
Court considered the property as personal
The machineries in question have become immobilized by desti nation because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature. Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>With reference to the object; things that may be subject of property rights>>a. Corporeal>>ii. Movables U.S. vs. Accused and his wife were found guilty Court held that gas is personal There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes Tambunting of stealing gas property which from the Manila Gas Corporation. It was found renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried awa out that during their y. It is a occupancy of the upper portion of a house wher valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other pers ein the corporation was supplying gas, the spouses onal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger made an illegal connection so that they could quantity and of being transported from place to place. benefit from the supply. V. Ownership Case SANDEJAS v. ROBLES (1948)
This case is about (no facts in the case) Basically, there was a prior judgment on the case during the Japanese occupation. But Sandejas assailed the validity of the decision. The parties in the present and prior action are the same or represent the same interest, and that the cause of action in both are the same, that is, the performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of a contract of sale for the enforcement or resolution thereof. ISSUE: WON the Court which has rendered the former judgment had
Resolution The decision of the court during the Japanese occupation was valid as per Co Kim Chan v. Valdez. The action for the resolution of contract of sale of real property is an action IN PERSONAM so the court has jurisdiction.
Legal Basis + Interpretation IN PERSONAM- if the object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, then it is an action in personam, even though it concerns the right to or possession of a tangible thing IN REM- if the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right sought to be established and if anyone in the world has the right to be hard then the action is in rem WON IN REM/IN PERSONAM is determined by its nature and purpose In Personam- to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person even if it involves a property In Rem- object is a judgment against property, to determine its status Quasi In Rem- an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property - Proceedings whose object is the sale or disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure or other form of remedy - Judgment is conclusive only between the parties Action for Reconveyance and Cancellation of title is an action IN PERSONAM. Judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over Chings person. He could not be validly served a summon since hes already dead and no longer had civil personality. His estate can only be sued through its administrator. In Personam- judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded In Rem- directed against thing or property or status of a person and seek judgment with respect to the whole world Action to recover land- a real action but in personam since it binds a particular person only
CHING v. CA (1990)
Sps. Lumandan sold a piece of land to Ching Leng. Ching died in the US. His son was appointed administrator of his estate. Thirteen years after, Asedillo filed a suit against Ching for reconveyance of the property. Since Ching was in the US and it was not known won he was dead or alive, then the estate may be served by summons with publication. The RTC promulgated its decision by publication. Eventually, Chings son learned if the decision and assailed the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is IN PERSONAM. If so, would a dead man and/or his estate be bound by the service of summons and decision by publication. DBP awarded a lot to Hernandez under its housing project. Later on, it cancelled the award. Hernandez filed a complaint seeking annulment of cancellation of award of house and lot and for restoration of all his rights thereto. ISSUE: WON petition was properly filed in Batangas where Hernandez resides (vs. in Quezon City where the house and lot is located). Domagas filed a complaint against
HERNANDEZ v. DBP (1976)
The action is a personal action so it can be filed in Batangas. Venue depends largely on the nature of action, won real or personal. The complaint is a personal action. It does not involve title or ownership but seeks to compel DBP to recognize the award as valid.
Real Action- brought for specific recovery of land, tenements or hereditaments Personal action- brought for recovery of personal property, for enforcement of control/recovery of damages for its breach or for recovery of damages for injury to person/property
DOMAGAS v.
Forcible entry is a real action and in
In Personam- proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations;
JENSEN (2005)
Jensen for forcible entry. Jensen allegedly gained entry into her property by excavating a portion of it and constructing a fence. Summons and complaint was not served since Jensen was in Norway. The sheriff gave it to her brother instead. MTC issued a decision. Now, Jensen is assailing that decision for lack of jurisdiction over her.
personam since Domagas seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability undr Art 539 of the CC for Jensen to vacate the property and restore physical possession. Since the action is in personam, substituted service is allowed. But in this case, the summons was given to her brother who was merely a visitor in her house. It was insufficient for the sheriff to leave the summons and complaint at her house.
based on jurisdiction of person - Purpose: to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon person of defendant Quasi In rem- brought against persons seeking to subject their property to the discharge of claims - Purpose: to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property - Judgment applies only to parties; it doesnt cut off rights of all possible claimants
HEIRS OF OLVIGA v. CA (1993)
Cornelio was in actual possession of the subject property. Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for the lot in fraud of the rights of Cornelio. Heir of Cornelio filed a complaint for reconveyance of the parcel of land. ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed. Pingol sold half of his undivided land to Donasco. Donasco took possession and constructed a house on the lot. However, he was not able to pay the full price for the lot. After death of Donasco, his heirs offered to pay the balance but the Pingols asked for a bigger amount. Pingols committed acts of forcible entry and encroachment. The heirs of Donasco filed a complaint for specific performance and damages. Plaintiff alleges that respondents, through hired labor, forcibly entered into a portion of his land and began plowing. Respondents claim that the area is part of their land. Plaintiff filed an action for quieting of title.
PINGOL v. CA (1993)
Action for reconveyance of parcel of land is actually an action to quiet title. It does not prescribe if person claiming to be the owner is in actual possession of the property. Even if it were based on implied/constructive trust, it still does not prescribe since Cornelios are in actual possession of the property. The action denominated as one for Specific Performance and Damages is actually an action to quiet title. There was no enforcement of contract needed since delivery of possession of land has consummated the sale. This is an action to remove the cloud upon the ownership by refusal of Pingols to recognize the sale through their refusal to accept the tender of payment by heirs of Donasco.
Action to quiet title to property in possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of court.
In an action to quiet title, it is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title. An equitable title is sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. An action to quiet title of property in ones possession does not prescribe.
TITONG v. CA (1998)
Complaint for quieting of title should have been dismissed outright. Under Art 476 of NCC, claimant must show an instrument , record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud upon owners title or interest. In the case at bar, complainant merely alleged forcible entry then prayed
In an action for quieting of title, the court cannot order the determination of the boundaries of the property, as this is tantamount to awarding to a party the undisputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding constitutes a cloud. The determination of boundary is appropriate in a proceeding where possession
SPS. PORTIC v. CRISTOBAL (2005)
Sps. Alcantara sold the subject land to petitioners Sps. Portic with the condition that they assume the mortgage executed over the land with SSS. However, they defaulted so SSS foreclosed the lot. Before expiration of redemption period, Sps. Portic sold the land to respondent. Thereafter, the Sps. Alcantara also sold the same property to respondent. Respondent paid SSS so a TCT, originally in the name of Sps. Alcantara, was issued to respondent Cristobal. Later, the Sps. Portic demanded the balance of the price from Cristobal who refused to pay. So the Sps. Portic filed this case to remove the cloud created by the issuance of the TCT in favor of Cristobal. ISSUE: WON the cause of action is for quieting of title (or for enforcement of a written contract). Also, theres the secondary issue of prescription of the action filed. Respondent claims that the action is for enforcement of a written contract so it has already prescribed.
for a writ of preliminary injunction and that he be declared the true owner. Physical intrusion is a ground for action for forcible entry not for quieting of title. This case is simply a boundary dispute. Court ruled in favor of Sps. Portics. The action is one for quieting of title.
or ownership may properly be considered.
2 questions need to be resolved. WON Cristobalss title to the property is valid. NO The contract between the parties was a contract to sell which is subject to the suspensive condition of payment of full purchase price. So the mere issuance of the certificate of title in her favor did not vest ownership in her. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of title. Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against petitioners. WON the Portics are in possession of the premises which would mean that the action for quieting of title is imprescriptible. Yes, they are in continuous possession Action to quiet title has not prescribed since Portics are in continuous possession of the premises
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. (Take note that in this case, the Portics have retained the title to their property since its only a contract to sell.)
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BISHOP OF CEBU v. MANGARON (1906)
Defendant and his family were in possession of a land. It was not shown under what capacity they held it. In 1887, they were ordered to vacate the property because it was part of a fire zone. After vacating the land, the parish priest of Ermita Church fenced the lot claiming that it belonged to the Church since time immemorial and that defendant only held it by mere tolerance of the Church. IN 1898, defendant occupied the land again and built a nipa house on it and continued to live there with the consent of the parish priest of Ermita Church. Plaintiff then filed an action to recover possession of the land. This was later amended by the plaintiff, praying that the land be declared the property of the Church and it be restored to it. ISSUE: Propriety of action to be filed
Court ordered that defendant vacate the land. The occupation of the land by the defendant in the year 1898 was illegal, for, if he thought he had a right to the land, he should have applied to the courts for the possession of what belonged to him, and not proceed to occupy property claimed by another against the will of the latter. This possession held by the defendant in 1898 cannot be added to the former possession, which was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the municipality, so as to consider such possession continous. This is because possession was not improperly lost since it was a result of a municipal order. If plaintiff had within a year instituted the accion interdictal, or summary action for possession, he would have been, necessarily and undoubtedly, restored to the possession of the land. But a year elapsed and the plaintiff brought this summary action for possession, and the Court said that such summary action for possession could not be maintained. This quiet and peaceful possession of twenty years, more or less, thus lost in a moment, could not be recovered in a summary action for possession after the expiration of one year, but possession could still be recovered through the accion publiciana, which involved the right to possess. In one way or the other the plaintiff would have recovered such possession, in the first case the physical possession and in the second case the right to possess, which is not lost by the mere occupation of a third person, whether such occupation was effected violently, secretly, or arbitrarily. The right acquired by the person who has been in possession for one year and one day is the right that the former possessor lost by allowing the year and one day to expire. The right is lost by the prescription of the action. And the action which prescribes upon the expiration of the year is "the action to recover or to retain possession; " that is to say, the interdictory action. (Art. 1968, par. 1.) then the only right that can be acquired now, as before, by the person who was in possession for one year and one day is that he cannot be made to answer in an interdictory action, but this is not so in a plenary action unless he had some title in good faith. The former possessor who had been in possession for twenty years, more or less, was
3 remedies under the Civil Code for parties unlawfully dispossessed of property: 1. Accion Interdictal- can be brought within 1 year in a summary proceeding; has for its object the recovery of the physical 2. Accion Publiciana-Plenary action for possession in an ordinary proceeding to which can only be brought after 1 year determine who has a better right to possession 3. Action for title in an ordinary proceeding brought in case the plenary action for possession failed
11 considered as owner, and unless he was given an opportunity to be heard, and was defeated in law, he could not be deprived of such possession; and notwithstanding all this, and in spite of such prohibition, the maintenance of a possession wrongfully taken from the former possessor by a willful act of the actual possessor had to be sustained. Defendant in this case could never have lawfully and legally done what he did, to wit, to reenter upon the land which he had been ejected by the city of Manila. If the order of the municipality was illegal, and the possession was improperly lost, the defendant should have requested the assistance of the competent authorities to recover it. He should have applied to the executive or administrative officials, as the case might have been, or to the courts of justice in a plenary action for possession, for a year having elapsed since he was ejected from the premises, he could not maintain a summary action for possession.
CHACON v. CA (1983)
GERMAN MGT v. CA (1989)
Ramon Chacon was granted a fishpond lease agreement. When he died, his heirs applied for a title over the said fishpond and for the adjoining eastern portion. A title was issued in their favor. Later, they filed an ejectment suit against respondents who were then in actual possession of an area in the eastern portion. But this case was dismissed. Chacon then filed a case for recovery of possession. Respondents filed another case for annulment of certificate of title and reconveyance of the portion of land. Sps Jose, who live in the US, authorized German Mgt to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. But there were occupants in the property. German Mgt bulldozed their crops, removed their fences and harassed them to eject them from the land. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.
Despite the name annulment of title and reconveyance, the action constitutes a quieting of title or a removal of cloud over such title. Proof that respondents were in actual possession of the land is the fact that Chacon filed an ejectment case against them. Chacons fraudulent misrepresentation thatthere was no indication of occupation on the lands it was applying to buy is a ground for the cancellation of said title.
The action to quiet title to property in possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptile. The owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his rights.
Regardless of authorization by owners to develop subject property, German Mgt did not have a right to bulldoze and destroy the crops of respondents. Ownership is not the issue at present. Respondents were in actual, peaceful possession of the land. The owner must resort to judicial processes for the recovery of said property.
Art 536 of NCC
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DE LA PAZ v. PANIS (1995)
This case is about the propriety of action to be filed and the jurisdiction accorded to municipal trial courts. Petitioners claim that respondents illegally entered portions of said property, established possession and introduced illegal improvements. Respondents admitted entering the property but alleged that they did so with the honest belief that it was part of public domain. They introduced improvements without objection from any party and have been in peaceful, open and uninterrupted possession of the property for more than 10 years. Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession in CFI in Zambales. The CFI judge dismissed the case because it was one for ejectment cognizable only by municipal courts.
The action is not one for forcible entry since there was no allegation that petitioners were denied possession through methods under Sec 1, Rule 70 of Rules of Court. It is also not an action for unlawful detainer since theres no lease contract. This is a plenary action for recovery of possession so CFI has jurisdiction.
Ejectment may be effected only through action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Both actions may be filed with municipal courts within 1 year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. The main difference lies in the time the possession became unlawful. In forcible entry, it starts from the time of entry. In unlawful detainer, it starts when possession which was at first lawful then becomes illegal. Forcible entry- a summary action to recover material/physical possession of real property when the person who originally held it was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth Unlawful detainer- may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration/termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied
VDA. DE AVILES v. CA (1996)
Anastacia Vda. De Aviles was the actual possessor of a parcel of land. This is the share of Anastacias father in the estate of his deceased parents. Camilo Aviles encroached upon a portion of the property by constructing a fence and moving the dikes that served as the boundary of the properties. Anastacia filed a case for quieting of title. ISSUE: Won the action for quieting of title is the proper remedy. Baricuatro bought 2 lots which are part of a subdivision project from Galeos. Title for lots remained in the name of Galeos. Petitioner introduced improvements and has since been in
The action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling boundary disputes. The only controversy in this case is the whether the lands were properly measured.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title of real property. To avail of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property.
BARICUATRO v. CA (2000)
The action is one for quieting of title. This is the remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. It may be availed of under the circumstances in Art 476 of NCC.
Art 476 of NCC and Art. 1544 of NCC
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BA FINANCE v. CA (1996)
actual possession of the property. Subsequently, the entire subdivision was sold by Galeos to Amores. Amores registered the land and obtained individual titles to them. The subject lots were sold to Sps. Nemecio by Amores. The Sps. Nemecio caused the transfer of titles and demanded Baricuatro to vacate lots. Eventually, the Sps. Nemecio filed a complaint for quieting of title. Sps. Manahan executed a promissory note in favor of Carmasters, Inc. which was secured by a deed of chattel mortgage. This was later assigned to BA Finance. The spouses failed to pay so BA Fin filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses and Roberto Reyes. The vehicle was thereafter seized from Reyes. However, the Sps. Manahan were not served with summons. Hence, the court dismissed the case and ordered the return of the car to Reyes. ISSUE: WON a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage.
Amores and Sps Nemecio are purchasers in bad faith. For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection provided in 1544, he must possess good faith from the time of acquisition of the property until the registration of deed of conveyance.
No, he may not. Reyes is only an ancillary debtor. The Sps. Manahan are the principal debtors. The plaintiff has no cause of action against Reyes. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevin the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.
PEZA v. FERNANDEZ (2001)
The subject lot was partitioned by some of the heirs of the registered owners in fraud of other heirs. The lot
Action has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of the
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendent lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be replevined is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession. Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property. Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully registered in the name of another. But such recourse cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent
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was among the objects of an expropriation proceeding. PEZA acquired the land through a compromise agreement approved by the RTC. The defrauded heirs filed a complaint for nullity of documents, redemption and damages.
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon issuance of the certificate of title. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice. Even an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust would have already prescribed since the prescription period is 10 years from registration. The imprescriptibilty of an action for reconveyance applies only if the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In this case, the property already passed on to an innocent purchase for value. Remedy of respondents: they may sue their co-heirs for damages for defrauding them.
purchase of value.
V. Ownership -> A. Sole Ownership -> b. Rights of owners -> 3) Right to accession -> Immoveable property -> b) continua -> i) naturally incorporated Case (Year) This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation Zapata v. This case is about the claim of the Case was resolved in favor of Plaintiff. The Zapata may claim title to the increase in his property adjoining Director of Lands plaintiff to the increase in his property accreted land belongs to Zapata. creek under 457, NCC. There is no evidence to show that the (1962) adjoining creek, which was contested setting up of fish trap was expressly intended or designed to due to the setting up of artificial cause accretion. Also, the setting up of fish traps stopped or was means, designed to cause accretion. discontinued even before 1926 so it shows that the alluvial accretion was not entirely due to the setting up of fish traps. Julian Zapata owns two parcels of land adjoining a non-navigable and nonfloatable river. Soil had been accumulated by the water current of the river on the banks of the lots owned by Zapata. Zapata filed a petition claiming that the three lots belong to her by accretion, using Art. 457 of the NCC. The Director of Lands opposed her petition. Cortez v. City of This case is about the application of Case was resolved in favor of plaintiff Cortez. It has been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included Manila plaintiff for registration of a parcel of in the technical description situated between the lot to which land which was contested by the City said instrument refers and the bed of Meisic creek has been of Manila, alleging that the portion gradually formed by alluvion as the result of the current of the sought to be registered was part of the stream.
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creek which is part of the public domain. Maximo Cortez filed a written application for the registration of a parcel of land owned by him together with the buildings erected thereon. Examiner of title said that the lot was attached by reason of certain proceedings instituted against Cortes for treason and rebellion. Yet, since the land was acquired by him more than 10 years previously, he could be considered owner thereof by prescription. In order to obtain title, it was necessary for Cortes that said attachment be discharged or cancelled. The attorney of City of Manila contested, alleging that a certain area of the Meisic creek would become property of Cortes should the application be granted. Such creek was property of Manila. Hilario v. City of Manila This case is about the claim for damages against City of Manila for its excavation activities in the alleged private land of Hilario. Dr. Hilario was the owner of a large tract of land, the western side of which was bound by a river. To protect the land, a ditch was built. However, an extraordinary flood occurred which caused the river to leave its original bed and meander into Hilarios land. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises and started excavating and extracting soil from areas along the river. The estate
By right of accretion, said portion belongs to the owner of the land referred in the instrument. If lands bordering on the stream are exposed to floods and other damages due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various easements, it is only just that such risks or damages should be compensated by right of accretion.
The case was resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
Art. 339 of the old is very clear that riverbanks are property of public ownership. Moreover, Art. 73 defines the phrase banks of rivers understood to be those lateral strips at its bed, only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. This clearly shows the intent to consider the banks as part of the riverbeds for all legal purposes. Since all beds of rivers are undeniably of public ownership, it follows that the banks are also of public ownership. Art. 553 was not meant as a means of acquiring ownership of banks, but of recognizing vested rights of riparian owners, who, by prior law or custom, preserve ownership but subjected to easement for public use. Subsequent legislation made it clear that riverbanks are of public ownership.
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administrator of Dr. Hilario and the US Army paid filed a claim for damages. The defendants in the case took over the platn and continued operations. Grande v. CA This case is about the owners failure to register his a part of his property formed by alluvion. Grande was an owner of a parcel of land by inheritance from their mother. It was bounded by the Cagayan River on its northeastern boundary. The bank of the Cagayan river receded and an alluvial deposit had been added to the registered area. Grande instituted an action to quiet title to the alluvial deposit because the defendants entered upon the said land under claim of ownership. Ignacio v. Director of Lands This case is about the application for the registration of land including that formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay. The Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that it was public domain and Ignacio had not title to it. Ignacio alleged that he was occupying the land since 1935, planting trees on it and possession was open, continuous for 20 years until the possession was disturbed. This case is about the registration of lands by way of accretion. The plaintiffs sought to register three lots adjacent to their property which
The case was resolved against Grande who failed to register the alluvial property.
There is no dispute that Grande was the lawful owner of the alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. But the accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by Torrens title. Ownership and registration under the Torrens system are different things.. Registration does not vest or give title to the land but merely confirms the title already possessed by the owner making it imprescriptible.
The case was resolved against Ignacio.
The lands do not belong to Ignacio by law of accretion (Art. 457 of NCC) because the said article refers to accretion/ deposits on banks of rivers. In this case, the accretion was caused by Manila Bay. Until a formal declaration on the part of Government to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for appropriation or ownership by private persons.
Republic v. Tancinco
The case was resolved in favor of the Republic.
There is no accretion. Art. 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken place
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was opposed by the Republic. The Republic submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art 457, NCC because what happened is that the respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the riverbed, and thus, if there is any accretion, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) That it be made through the effects of the current of river 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers The lands in question are almost 4 hectares, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the effect of the current of rivers but as a result of the transfer of dikes towards the river and encroaching upon it. The lands sought to be registered are not even dry lands cast imperceptibly and gradually by the rivers current on the fishpond adjoining it. Manalo did not acquire ownership of the said elongated strip. The SC argued that Government V. Colegio de San Jose was not applicable in this case because that case particularly involved Laguna De Bay, a lake, and applied the definition of natural bed or basin of lakes found in art. 74 of the Law of Waters. What it involved here is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. Also, the depressed portion is a river bed, and was part of public dominion. Court also applied the requisites of accretion: 1) That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible 2) That it be the result of action of the waters of river (or sea) 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of river (or the sea coast)
Binalay v. Manalo
This case is about the claim of plaintiff of a portion of an elongated strip of land which forms part of his property. The western portion of Manalos property would periodically go under the waters of the river as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season. Manalo claims this part of an elongated strip of land formed by western and eastern branches of the river that looked like an island, claiming that it belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it was adjacent. This case is about the cancellation of title of Baes because the title allegedly contains a portion of a creek which is part of the public domain. The government dug a canal in a land to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes acquired the lot and
The case was resolved against Manalo.
Baes v. CA
Case was resolved in favor of the government.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage/ loss of property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him if the change is effected through artificial means. The loss was due to the deliberate act of the government. It is obligated to pay Baes for loss.
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Vda. de Nazareno v. CA
subdivided it into three. TCTs were issued in favor of Baes. On one of the lots, the government discovered that the TCT includes the Pasay Cadastre which was filled up with a portion of the creek. Government sought to cancel the title. This case is about a claim for a parcel of land which was formed as a result of sawdust being dumped into a dried-up creek. Respondents leased the subject lots from petitioners predecessor-ininterest. Due to respondents nonpayment of rentals, a case for ejectment was filed against them. The decision was against the lessees. Before his death, the petitioners predecessor-in-interest sought the approval of a survey plan to perfect his title. Respondents contested it. A decision was rendered in favor of respondents, adjudicating to them the areas they occupied.
However, Baes was already compensated for it when he was given a lot in exchange of the lot which was claimed by the government. To allow Baes to acquire ownership over dried up portion of creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state. The accretion was man-made/ artificial. According to Meneses v. CA, there are three requisites for accretion as a mode of acquiring property which must concur: 1) Deposition of the soil/ sediment is gradual and imperceptible 2) It is the result of the action of the waters (of the river or sea) 3) The land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or sea coast) In this case, the petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the duping of boulders, soil, and other filling materials on portions of the creek and river bounding their land. Also, Republic v. CA held that the requirement that the deposit should be made through the effect of the current is indispensable.
The case was resolved in favor of lessees/ respondents.
VIII. Ownership >> 1. Right to Accession >> b. continua>> ii.artificially incorporated Case (Year) EQUATORIAL VS. MAYFAIR (2001) . This case is about Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc leased its property to Mayfair who used it as movie houses (Maxim Theater and Miramar Theater). The lease is for a period of 20 years with a Right of First Refusal to purchased the leased properties. Within the 20-year lease period, Carmelo sold the property to Equatorial for 11.3 million without first offering it to Mayfair. As a result, Mayfair filed a complaint before RTC Resolution SC ruled that there was no delivery despite execution of a deed of sale because there was no subsequent actual transfer. Assuming arguendo that there was a valid delivery, Equatorial is not entitled to any benefits from the rescinded deed of sale because it acted in bad faith when it purchased the property despite being aware of the lease contracts between Carmelo and Mayfair. Legal Basis + Interpretation Rent is a civil fruit of ownership that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive/symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. The execution of a contact of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal fiction and holds true only when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of property from the vendor to the vendee
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for (1) annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, (2) specific performance, and (3) damages SC ruled in favor of Mayfair and declared the Deed of absolute sale rescinded. Carmelo ordered to return to Equatorial the purchase price; Equatorial directed to execute deeds and documents necessary to return ownership to Carmelo; Carmelo ordered to allow Mayfair buy the property for 11.3 million. Mayfair submitted its motion for execution, while Equatorial filed an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation (P115,947,867)for Mayfairs use of the subject property after its lease contracts expired. Yu-Chinco left Manila for China and died there. Then, Yu-Chiocco leased certain land in Tondo and erected buildings on such land using the materials owned by Yu-Chinco. Liwanag, as administratrix of Yu-Chinco filed an action in the CFI claiming that the building belonged to the estate of Yu-Chinco. CFI ruled that since the labor for the erection of the building was performed by Yu-Chiocco but the materials used belonged to Yu-Chinco, Liwanag as administratrix owned half of the building
LIWANAG VS. YU-SONGUIAN (1905)
SC ruled that the owner of the materials used to construct a building who did not contribute to the labor of the buildings construction does not automatically become part owner of such building. Article 360 of the Old Civil Code applies (NCC, Art 447). At most, Liwanag has a claim for the value of the materials allegedly owned by Yu-Chinco and used in the buildings.
The owner of the materials used to construct a building who did not contribute to the labor of the buildings construction does not automatically become part owner of such building. Article 447 applies. At most, owner of the material has a claim for the value of the materials allegedly used for the buildings construction. Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. (360a)
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JM TUASON VS. VDA. DE LUMANLAN (1968)
GABOYA VS. CUI (1971) .
FLOREZA VS. EVANGELISTA (1980) .
JM Tuason, the registered owner of Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, filed an ejectment case against Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan who unlawfully entered into possession of 800 sq.m. of land and constructed a house on it. Lumanlan claimed to have bought her property from Deudor, and that she is one of the recognized buyers in a compromise agreement between JM Tuason and Deudor. CFI ordered Lumalan to vacate the lot. CA reversed and held the compromise agreement to be a valid defense against the possessory claim of JM Tuason Don Mariano Cui sold three lots to his children. In the deed of sale, he retained usufruct of the 3lots (no improvements during the sale). The children built a 12-door commercial building using money loaned from RFC after mortgaging the lots with Don Marianos consent. The rents were collected by the children and were used to pay RFC. Gaboya, the administrator of Don Mariano now claims for P126,344 as fruits due to Don Mariano as usufruct. Gaboya claims that the usufructuary rights extends to the rentals of building and that the violation of the usufructuary rights entitled Don Mariano to rescind the sale Evangelistas loaned a total of P870 from Floreza. With the consent of Evangelistas, Floreza then occupied Evangelistas residential lot with a barong-barong built thereon. Floreza demolished the barong-barong and in its place constructed one of strong
SC ruled that the compromise agreement in no way obligated Tuason & Co. to sell to those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated with the Deudors, but at "the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason). As to Lumanlan's allegation in her counterclaim that she should be deemed a builder in good faith, SC held she was not because there being a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens titles issued to Tuason & Co. and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914, the buyer from the Deudors cannot, in good conscience, say now that she believed her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot purchased. She should have SC ruled that the usufructuary rights does not extend to the building but is limited over the land occupied by the building. Article 571 is not applicable. Also, the usufruct was not a condition on the sale.
To be considered builder in good faith, buyer must first make reasonable inquiry or investigation regarding the title of the property. If a vendee failed to make the necessary inquiry, he is now bound conclusively by the Torrens title.
Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial accession by modification on the principal land (Articles 445 to 456) such accession is limited either to buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed by the owner of the land with materials owned by someone else. Nowhere in these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the case of landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself. The reason for the omission is readily apparent: recourse to the rules of accession are totally unnecessary and inappropriate where the ownership of land and of the, materials used to build thereon are concentrated on one and the same person. Even if the law did not provide for accession the land-owner would necessarily own the building, because he has paid for the materials and labor used in constructing it
SC ruled that Floreza must vacate the premises and that he must remove his house at his own expense. SC held that Art 448 is not applicable because Floreza does not build his house thinking he was the owner. Since Art 448 is not applicable neither is Article 453. Floreza did not build his house as vendee a retro because
Article 448 is not applicable when a person builds his house over a land not thinking he was the owner. There is bad faith on the part of the land owner if it tolerates construction made on its land by third persons.
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Manotok Realty Inc v. Tecson (1988)
MWSS v. CA (1986)
Pleasantville v. CA (1996)
materials. Subsequently the Evangelistas sold the lot to Floreza with a right to repurchase within 6 years. Seven months before the expiry period, the Evangelistas repurchased the lot and asked Floreza to vacate the premises. Floreza refused to vacate unless he was reimbursed the value of his house. Evangelistas filed a complaint. Manotok Realty filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against Madlangawa who was in possession and introduced improvements on the said land. LC ruled in favor of Manotok approving exercise of its option to appropriate improvement introduced by Madlangawa but a fire razed the house during the pendency of the case. Manotok filed a petition for mandamus. Defendant said Manotoks option can no longer be exercised since subject matter was extinguished by fire. City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former NAWASA for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan waterworks system. NAWASA filed a counterclaim for reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for the necessary and useful improvements it had introduced. LC ruled in favor of the City of Dagupan. NAWASA now wants to remove the useful improvements. Agents of Pleasantville pointed the wrong lot to buyer Mr. Kee who proceeded to construct his residence, store and auto repair shop and other
he built his house even before the pacto de retro sale by Evangelistas tolerance. Both are in bad faith. Floreza must pay rental fees from payment of repurchase price
Petition for mandamus granted. Judge cannot deny issuance of writ of execution because of the supervening circumstance since the option given by the law either to retain the premises and pay for improvements or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the OWNER of the property. Since improvements have been gutted by fire, the basis for private respondents right to retain the premises was extinguished without the fault of Manotok. They must therefore vacate the premises and deliver it to peititoner.
The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for improvements. The builder cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land. Requisites of builder in good faith 1. that he be a possessor in the concept of an owner 2. that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The builder in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenses
As builder in bad faith, MWSS can neither seek reimbursement nor remove the improvements. (case did not include stipulation of facts but it appears that NAWASA constructed improvements while a case for recovery of ownership and possession was pending)
Article 449: A builder in bad faith loses whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity Article 546: Only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed Article 547: Only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing useful expenses
Kee was a builder in good faith. At the time he built improvements, he believed that the said lot was what he bough from Pleasantville. Pleasantville is liable through acts of its agent.
Good faith: belief of a builder that the land he is on is actually without defect.
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Alviola v. CA (1998)
Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. v. Uym (2000)
improvements on the land. The holder of the title to the said land Jardincio filed an ejectment case against Kee and demanded that he remove all improvements on the land. Tinagans filed a case against spouses Alviola for recovery and possession of a land on which Alviola built a copra dryer and copra store. Court ruled in favor of the Tinagans. Before notices to vacate were served, employees of Durano proceeded to bulldoze parcels of lands occupied by 25 parties, destroying their plantings and improvements. Duranos even filed a case for damages stating that the respondents were spreading false rumours and damaging tales which put Duranos in public contempt and ridicule. Court ruled in favor of 25 petitioners.
The rights of Kee and Jardincio are regulated by law as builder in good faith. It was was wrong for CA to make modificiation in the application of such law on the ground of equity Alviolas cannot claim indemnity fot the copra dryer and copra store because such are TRANSFERRABLE and cannot fall under article 448 of the CC. The 25 parties were possessors in good faith and such possession ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription. The lands were conveyed to them by purchase or inheritance, they were in actual, continuous and adverse possession, they exercised rights of ownership like paying taxes and introducation of plantings, and they each had completed 10 year prescriptive period. Duranos were in bad faith since their title to the land was doubtful. A requisite for Article 448 to allow indemnity if that the improvements introduced must be of such permanent character if to be considered accession.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription of immoveable propertypossession of thing in good faith with just title for a period of 10 years Right of owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in Article 451 of CC. Court perceives basis of damages as corresponding with the value of the properties lost of destroyed as a result of occupation in bad faith, as well as fruits from those properties that the owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain
V. Ownership >> B. Co-Ownership >> 1. Definition Case (Year) Pardell v. Bartolome This case is about Vicenta and Matilde Ortiz were the only two surviving heirs of their parents. Vicenta alleges that Matilde took upon herself the administration and enjoyment of the properties, and collection of the fruits. And that despite extrajudicial demand, Matilde has refused to divide the properties. Matilde denied this, stating that she was willing to make the partition. The Basas were c-owners of an undivided parcel of land with Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina. Puyat sold his share to his daughter Macaria and Resolution Matilde occupied a part of the property in the exercise of her right as co-owner. There was no proof to show that detriment was made to the interest of the community of property, nor that she prevented her sister from utilizing it according to her rights. Each co-owner of undivided property has rights over the whole property. Matilde is only liable for the part of the property that her husband made use of without payment of rent. A co-owner exercising the right of redemption under Article 1620 may do so when the share of another co-owner is sold to the child of said co-owner. The Basas may exercise the right of Legal Basis + Interpretation Article 394 - Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Basa v. Aguilar
The term third person under Article 1620 is to be applied to all persons who are not co-owners of the thing.
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Del Ocampo v. Abesia
Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals
Oliveras v. Lopez
Tagarao v. Garcia
her husband Primo Tiongson. 7 days later, the Basas filed a civil case to be allowed to exercise the right of redemption. The Del Ocampos and Abesia were coowners pro diviso of a parcel of land. An action was filed for partition of the property and this was granted. Upon partition, a part of Abesias house was found to be encroaching upon the share of the Del Ocampos. The action is to decide who is entitled to ownership of the land partially occupied by the house. Roasali and Gaudencio Bailon each sold their 1/6 share in a parcel of land to Delgado. Rosalia then sold the remaining 2/3 of the land to Lanuza. Lanuza then acquired the remaining 1/3 from Delgado. Several decades later, the heirs of the other Bailons filed a case for the recovery of property. This is a case for partition of an undivided parcel of land filed by the Oliveras brothers. Tomasa and Candido Lopez had sold a specific portion of the undivided land they had inherited along with their co-heirs to the Oliveras brothers. The brothers took possession of the portion they had bought and had introduced improvements. They now demand that partition be made in order for them to acquire title over the portion they are occupying. This is an action praying for the award of the 3 plaintiffs (Ressureccion, Serafin and Buenaventura) supposed combined share of of a parcel of
redemption.
The construction was made in good faith since it was done prior to the partition of the property. The Del Ocampos have the right to appropriate the portion encroached upon payment of indemnity. Abesia may also demolish the portion of the house encroaching upon the property of the Del Ocampos.
Article 448
The heirs of the other Bailons are entitled to the 2/3 share of the parcel of land. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will only affect his share. The shares of the other co-owners are not affected.
Article 493
The deeds of sale are valid. The parcel of land should be partitioned.
Before the partition of a land held in common, no individual coowner can claim title to any definite portion. However, the duration of co-ownership of an estate should not exceed 20 years. In this case, the heirs have held the estate for more than 20 years before the portion was sold to the Oliveras brothers. They validly disposed of the portion since the co-ownership had already ceased by operation of law.
Only Serafin and Buenaventura are entitled to their shares of the land. Ressureccions right of action had already prescribed. Ressureccion had allowed Marcos to perform acts of
Even though their rights of action arose from the same facts, their respective rights are joint and several. The disability of which protects one does not extend to the rest.
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Rivera v. Peoples Bank
Gatchalian v. CIR
land. The land was originally purchased by Marcos and his brother Ventura. Ventura died, leaving as his heirs Merced and Claro. While Merced was still living, Marcos delivered to her and her brother their share in the fruits. When Merced died, Marcos claimed the land as exclusively his. Marcos then executed a document in favor of Claro giving Claro his share of the property. Ressurecccion found out about this and started negotiating with Marcos. However, Marcos sold his share of the property to Rufino. This is an action for recovery of a bank deposit by Rivera. Rivera was a housekeeper employed by Stephenson. Stephenson then opened an account with Peoples Bank. A Survivorship Agreement was them executed over the contents of the account, stating that the money deposited by either Rivera or Stephenson to the account shall be the property of both of them during their joint lives and after the death of one of them, it shall belong to the survivor. When Stephenson died, Rivera attempted to claim the amount deposited but the bank refused to pay. This is an action questioning the propriety of the tax imposed on the 15 joint owners of a winning lottery ticket. These 15 people pooled their money to buy a lottery ticket which won. The CIR then made an assessment against them for the payment of taxes on the winnings. Due to this, they paid the taxes in protest.
ownership on the land for more than 10 years, which bars her from now assailing Marcos claim of ownership.
The Survivorship Agreement is valid. Rivera is entitled to the amount deposited in the bank. It is well-established that a bank account may be so created that 2 persons shall be joint owners thereof during their mutual lives, and that the survivor takes the whole on the death of the other. This right exists in common law.
By pooling their money to buy the winning ticket, they had organized a partnership of civil nature for the sole purpose of dividing the prize if they won. They are thus bound to pay the tax collectively.
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V. Ownership >> B. Co-Ownership >> 1. Definition Case (Year) Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay This case is about This is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land that had been leased out by one of its coowners without the consent of the others. The original owner Julian died, leaving the property to his heirs. Some of these heirs then leaser out the property for a period of 20 years, extendible for another 20, to Yap. Yap took possession and introduced ownership. When Yap died, the lease was transferred to Dy. When partition of the property was made, Liberata, the wife of Ramon who was one of the original heirs, demanded that an increase of the rent. Dy refused to comply. The wife insisted that they had no knowledge of the lease. Angela, Nieves and Antonio co-owned a parcel of land. The share of Nieves, after being offered to her siblings, was sold to Gregorio. The three co-owners then agreed to have the land subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds later to be divided among them. They then entered into a contract with Araneta Inc, wherein the company would finance the development of the subdivision. Angela, after some time, moved for the rescission of the contract with the company, alleging that it is contrary to Article 400 of the Civil Code. This is a case regarding a co-heirs right of redemption over a parcel of land. Francisco was the original owner of a parcel of land. He mortgaged the land Resolution The contract is null and void. Liberata is entitled to the land. Legal Basis + Interpretation The contract of lease is null and void for being for a term of over 6 years. It is against public policy for having such a long term. This is because only a small majority of the co-owners assented to the lease. The Court cited Articles 398, 1548, and 1713 but no explanation was made on how they apply to this case.
Tuason v. Tuason
The contract is valid. Article 400 is inapplicable because the contract, though it obliges the coowners to remain the community, has for its purposed and object the dissolution of the coownership by selling the parcel of land held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-ownership.
Article 400 - No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common
Mariano v. Court of Appeals
Grace and her other siblings are entitled to their share of the redeemed property. Applying Article 1620, the property was never the subject of partition or distribution among
Article 1620
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Arcelona v. Court of Appeals
to Rural Bank, and he defaulted on the loan. Upon his death, Amparo, one of his heirs, redeemed the property. Antonia, the wife of Francisco, along with several of the other co-heirs, executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption to Amparo. Grace, one of the co-heirs, and her other siblings, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Legal Redemption with Damages upon learning of the sale. This is a case for nullification of a final decision on the ground of noninclusion of some co-owners in a suit involving tenancy over an undivided property. A final judgment was rendered in facor Farnacio, declaring him to be the tenant-caretaker of the property. However, not all the co-heirs were made defendants in the case. They now assail the decision on the ground that the decision is void due to it being void for not having acquired jurisdiction over the other co-owners. This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by Arnelito against Emeterio and Narcisa. Ramon and Oligia were the original owners of a parcel of land. To qualify for a loan, they transferred ownership to their son Dominador by executing a simulated deed of sale. Dominador never disturbed his parents ownership over the land. When Dominador died, his illegitimate son Arnelito claimed to be the sole heir of the property. He allowed his fathers siblings to stay there on the condition that they vacate when told to. When
the heirs. This means that Grace and her siblings had not ceased to be co-heirs. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a coownership.
Adlawan v. Adlawan
A final judgment may be attacked through a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. A challenge based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. If a defendant is not summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person and a personal judgment against him is void. Coowners of an undivided property are indispensable parties. A tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire coowned land. Arnelito is not the sole owner of the property. When Dominador died, he became co-owner of the property with Graciana, Dominadors wife. Though Article 487 allows any co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, the rule does not apply when the suit is for the benefit of one of the co-owners alone who claims sole ownership against his co-owners.
Article 487
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he requested they vacate, the occupants filed a case for quieting of title. Amelito then filed an ejectment suit.
VI. USUFRUCT Case (Year) Alunan v Veloso (1928) Belonio v Novella (1959) This case is about The right of the widow to the usufruct of a money (as adjudicated to her in the settlement of his husbands estate) The interpretation of the grant of usufructuary rights to a vendee A RETRO during the entire period of redemption The responsibility of the usufructuary and the owner of the land with respect to the payment of realty taxes Resolution Widow has a right to the usufruct in MONEY. Money, although a fungible thing, may be the subject of a usufruct. The vendee a retro has the right to enjoy the usufruct of the land during the period of redemption The usufructuary does not have the responsibility of paying the realty taxes of the land. Legal Basis + Interpretation Art. 482 of the Civil Code (I think this is the old Civil Code.
Usufruct is an element of ownership, which is involved in a contract of sale
Mercado v Rizal (1939)
Vda. De Albar v Carandang (1962)
Board of Assessment Appeals v Samar Mining (1971)
The right of the usufructuary to the compensation paid by the government for the improvements in the property that were destroyed during the war and the obligation of the usufructuary to return the amount paid by the owner of the lands for repurchasing the property after it was sold in a public auction due to the usufructuarys failure to pay the taxes. The responsibility of a lessee to pay taxes for a road it constructed on the public land it leased.
The usufructuary is entitled to the sum paid by the government for the improvements that were destroyed but is also liable for the amount paid for repurchasing the lot after it was sold in a public auction due to the usufructuarys failure to pay the taxes.
The said responsibility, under Art. 505 of the Civil Code, is placed upon the owner. If the usufructuary shall voluntarily pay the realty tax, then he shall recover them upon the expiration of the usufruct. However, the provision does not apply in the case where the OWNER COMPELLED THE USUFRUCTUARY TO PAY OR USE THE USUFRUCTUARYS MONEY WITHOUT HIS CONSENT. The court did not cite any legal provision because it only discussed the procedural aspects.
A real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the owner of the land and not by a usufructuary. Since the land leased is a public land (belonging to the State), then the duty to pay taxes is placed upon the
Art. 597 of the new Civil Code
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Pichay v Querol et al (1908)
The effect of the partition of the land to the rights of the usufructuary
government (who cannot be taxed). The partition of the land made by the coowners shall affect the rights of the usufructuary
Reyes v Grey (1911)
The disposal of a usufructuary interest in real property as an interest or right to be sold under execution. The usufruct is held by the husband (Old Civil Code = spouse does not inherit but merely holds a usufruct over the property)
The husbands usufruct may be the subject of execution.
Tufexis v Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan (1915) Municipality of Paoay v Manaois (1950)
The right of a creditor to levy the property, which is not owned by the debtor but is only the subject of a usufruct.
The creditor can only levy the revenues and proceeds, but not the property itself.
Art. 490. The usufructuary of part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights corresponding to the owner thereof with regard to the administration and collection of fruits or interests. Should the community cease by reason of the division of the thing possessed in common, the usufruct of the part awarded to the owner or coowner shall appertain to the usufructuary. Under Art. 480 of the Old Civil Code, the usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another person, or alienate his right to the usufruct, even for a good consideration. Under Sec. 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any interest that can be sold may be the subject of execution. Therefore, if a usufruct may be sold or disposed of, then it follows that it may also be the subject to execution because it is similar to those items listed in Sec. 450. Test as to whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution: Does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? The debtors personal privilege of usufruct cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would mean that the usufructuary would be substituted without the knowledge and consent of the authorities for another person who took no part in the contract. The fishery or municipal waters do not belong to the municipality but belong to the property of the State. These are held by the municipality merely under a usufruct, which is granted to it by Sec. 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code. Reasons: 1. The grant to the municipality is merely temporary. The legislature may repeal or amend the law, which confirms its character of being temporary. 2. It would be anomalous because it would allow a private person to step into the shoes of the municipality. However, the rentals can be levied because these are patrimonial property and not indispensible to the municipality. The usufructuary is performing all acts related to administration, such as collecting the rents, paying the taxes, and making
The right of a creditor to levy the fishery lots held by the municipality in usufruct and the rents derived from it
The creditor may not levy the fishery lots itself but may levy the rents derived from it
Fabie v Guttierez David
The right of the usufructuary to bring an unlawful detainer case against the
The usufructuary in this case has the power to bring an unlawful detainer case and eject the
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tenant of the property when the owner of the property objects to the ejectment of the lessee.
lessee occupying the property despite the fact that the owner objects to it.
Orozco v Araneta (1951) Bachrach v Seifer (1947)
The right of the usufructuary over the stock dividend distributed from the shares held in usufruct. The alleged impairment of the usufruct by the administratix of the estate who is also the usufructuary The foreclosure of a mortgage executed before a free patent was issued over the land and within the 5year bar after the issuance of the free patent (free patent=land becomes registered under the Public Land Act, cannot be disposed or foreclosed within the period of 5 years after its issuance) The right of the seller of a land, who retained the usufructuary of the land, to the rents earned by a building that was constructed on the property
Bautista v Marcos (1961)
The usufruct has the right to the stock dividend. Only the capital (the shares) belong to the owner. The administratix cannot allege impairment of her usufruct when she gave her conformity to the agreement, which is an act of pure liberality on her part. The mortgage is invalid but the mortgagee has right to the possession of the land, which was transferred to her in usufruct, without any obligation on her part to account for its harvests or deduct them from defendants indebtedness (as agreed upon).
necessary repairs. If the usufructuary is burdened with these responsibilities, he/she must be given the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it. Based on an earlier judgment of the court, the right to administer the property has been vested by the court, with the owners consent, in the usufructuary. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently should go to the usufructuary. It is a fruit or income that belongs to the usufructuary. She is the owner of her usufruct and there is no reason for her to complain when she gave it without being subject to compulsion, or fraud, or mistake. The mortgage is invalid because it remains a public land before the issuance of the free patent. The mortgagee has the right to the possession of the land as a usufructuary. She is a possessor in good faith because she does not have any knowledge of the flaw that invalidates the title. In such case, she does not have to account for the fruits received by her during the period and has no obligation to return the same or deduct its value from the debt of the mortgagor. Art. 595 contemplates a reduction in the area of the land under usufruct and the usufructuary is entitled to indemnification for such reduction. The construction of the building reduces the area of the land available to the usufructuary because he would no longer be able to make use of the said portion. The usufructuary has jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property but the owner maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the same. The owner of the land may validly mortgage the land but the rights of the mortgagee will be restricted by the rights of the usufruct constituted on the property.
Gaboya v Cui (1971)
Hemedes v Court of Appeals (1999)
The usufruct over the property after it has been foreclosed because of the failure to pay the mortgage constituted on the property
The usufructuary is not entitled to the rents over the buildings constructed on the property after the usufruct was established. However, he shall be indemnified for the land that was occupied by the building, which reduced the area of the land under usufruct. The mortgagee is in good faith and does not have to go beyond the title of the mortgagor even though there is a usufruct annotated therein.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 1. Eminent Domain Case (Year) This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation
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Republic v. Castellvi (1974)
In 1947, the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. Castellvi then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the Republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. There was a question as when the taking should be counted, in order to determine the proper value of the land (1947, when the lease started, or 1959, when the complaint for eminent domain was filed).
The Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In this case, the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of court in 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must therefore be reckoned as of 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand.
In the exercise of eminent domain, the requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
City of Government of Quezon City v. Ericta (1983)
A provision in a city ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of private memorial park cemeteries should be set aside for charity burial of deceased paupers who have been residents of QC for at least 5 yrs prior to their death. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul said provision and declare it unconstitutional.
Republic v. PLDT (1969)
A provision in a city ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of private memorial park cemeteries should be set aside for charity burial of deceased paupers who have been
Police power is used to promote the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of property. Giving 6% of area of private cemeteries does not have a reasonable relation to the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people, and so it cannot be justified as the use of police power. On the other hand, in order for the State to expropriate land for public use under the power of eminent domain, there must be just compensation. In this case, there is none and it is thus unlawful. The Republic cannot compel PLDT to enter into a contract but it can require PLDT to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require under the sovereign power of eminent domain, subject to
There are three inherent State powers which allow interference with property rights1) Police power, 2) Eminent domain, 3) Taxation. In order for the State to expropriate land for public use under the power of eminent domain, there must be just compensation.
There is no reason why eminent domain cannot be used to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, w/o loss of title and possession.
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residents of QC for at least 5 yrs prior to their death. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul said provision and declare it unconstitutional. The Bureau of Telecommunications rented trunk lines from PLDT. They used this for governmental telephone use, and also made telephone services available to the general public. PLDT complained about this service to the public and disconnected the trunk lines. The Republic of the Philippines filed suit to compel PLDT to enter into a contract with the former for the use of PLDTs facilities, and to restrain PLDT from disconnecting the trunk lines.
the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. The power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possssion of, the expropriated property. There is no reason why it cannot be used to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, w/o loss of title and possession. In this case, PLDTs private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. The Constitution allows the State, in the interest of national welfare, to transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, and there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, subject to just compensation.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 2. Police Power Case (Year) Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty (1915) This case is about Resolution Act. No 2339 authorizes the Collector The CIRs removal order was a legitimate of Internal Revenue to order the exercise of police power, which is the States removal of any sign, signboard or right to prescribe regulations for the good billboard which is found to be order, peace, health, protection, comfort, offensive to the sight or otherwise a convenience and morals of the community, nuisance. Pursuant to this authority, which are not otherwise violative of organic the CIR ordered the signs of Churchill law. Noises and smells have long been and Tait removed. considered to be susceptible of suppression, and the sense of sight is just as valuable to a human being. The success of billboard advertising depends on its location in public streets, and as an effect of such, beautiful landscapes are marred or completely unseen. The Courts opinion is that the prevailing sentiment of the public is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive to the sight. The Board of Transportation issued In this case, the regulation of the use of private Legal Basis + Interpretation Police power is the States right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which are not otherwise violative of organic law. It supports the removal of billboards which are offensive to the sight.
Taxicab
The State, in its exercise of police power, can prescribe
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Operators v. Board of Transportation (1982)
orders phasing out and replacing old and dilapidated taxis, with the policy of insuring that only safe and comfortable taxis are available to the public. It limited the period that a car could be used as a taxi to 6 years. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. sought to annul the orders on the ground that it violated their constitutional rights.
vehicles is reasonable for the policy of making sure taxis available to the general public are safe and comfortable, and so it is a valid exercise of police power.
regulations to promote health, morals, peace, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society and regulate property rights to this end.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 5. Nuisance Case (Year) Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council (1913) This case is about Iloilo Cold Storage operated an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents complained that smoke from the plant was injurious to their health and comfort. The Municipal Council conducted an investigation which confirmed the complaints, and passed a resolution giving Iloilo Cold Storage one month to elevate their smokestacks. Iloilo Cold Storage questioned the authority of the Municipal Council to declare them a nuisance and come action on their part without judicial intervention. Resolution The Municipal Council does not have the absolute authority to declare anything as a nuisance. A nuisance is anything that works hurt, inconvenience, or damage. They may arise from pursuing particular trades or industries in populous cities, from acts of public indecency, or from keeping disorderly houses, houses of ill fame, and gambling houses. There are two classes of nuisances: 1) Nuisance per se- unquestionably and under all circumstances, nuisances, 2) Nuisance per accidens- arise from particular facts and circumstances surrounding otherwise harmless cause of the nuisance. Whether a thing is a nuisance is generally a question of fact. Iloilo Cold Storage is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people. Whether or not its manner of operation makes it a nuisance per accidens cannot be determined by a board resolution, it must be through a trial. There are 2 classes of nuisances- 1) Nuisance per se- which affect the immediate safety of persons and property, and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity, Legal Basis + Interpretation It is clear that municipal councils have, under section 39 (j) of the Municipal Code, the power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.
Monteverde v. Generoso (1928)
Tomas Monteverde owns a parcel of land, which is bounded by the Agdao river. A branch of the Agdao river, the Tambongon Creek, runs through a part
Only nuisances per se can be summarily abated without judicial proceedings. Alleged nuisances per accidens must be proven to be such in judicial hearings before they may be abated.
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of his land. He built 2 dams in the Agdao river and 5 dams in the Tambongon creek for fishpond purposes. The 2 dams in Agdao river were destroyed by order of the governor to safeguard public health and sanitation, as the dams created stagnant pools of water, which became breeding places for mosquitoes. Monteverde questioned the provincial governors authority to destroy private property without judicial proceedings, and asked that the destruction of the 5 dams in Tambongon creek be prohibited. Hidalgo v. Balandan (1952) Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. owned an ice plant factory where two large tanks of water were maintained for purposes of cooling its engine. While the factory compound was fenced, the tanks did not have any fence or top covers. There was no guard at the gate and anyone could enter the factory as they pleased. Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, took a bath in one of the tank, sank to the bottom and died. The issue is if Hidalgo Enterprises is liable by virtue of the principle of attractive nuisances.
and 2) Nuisance per accidens, which may not be summarily abated without reasonable notice to the person maintaining such alleged nuisance and after a proper hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such thing legally constitutes a nuisance. The dam/fishpond in this case is not a nuisance per se. The public health may be conserved, but only in a legal manner. Due process must be observed before citizens property rights can be interfered with. The further destruction of the dams is prohibited.
The Court ruled that such bodies of water are not attractive nuisances. Under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, EVEN IF the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The court relied on numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding
Pools of water, even if artificial, are not considered attractive nuisances.
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Sitchon v. Aquino
6 class suits were filed against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him from demolishing the houses of the petitioners, which are located on public streets. The City Engineer wanted to effect the demolitions because the houses allegedly constituted public nuisances. The owners of the houses questioned the legality of the demolitions and the authority of the City Engineer to effect them.
Velasco v. Manila Electric Co.
Velasco bought 3 lots from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. The lots are within an area zoned as a "first residence" district. Velasco sold 2 lots to Meralco and retained the third lot, whereon he built his house. Meralco built a substation without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service Commission. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets, but along the side adjoining Velascos property, it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence. A sound unceasingly emanates from the
any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' An establishment that obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street is a nuisance under Art. 694 of the CC. A public nuisance, under Art. 695, is one which affects a community or neighborhood. The petitioners houses, which are built on public streets, obstruct passageways and are clearly public nuisances. While Arts. 700 and 702 of the CC provide that only the district health officer has the power to remove public nuisances, but RA 409, the Revised Charter of Manila, places the duty of taking care of city streets to the city engineer. Arts. 700 and 702 should yield to RA 409 not only because they preceded the latter, but because RA 409 is a special provision specifically designed for the City of Manila, whereas Arts. 700 and 702 are general provisions. The state, in the exercise of its police power, may authorize the abatement of public nuisances without judicial proceedings through statutes or municipal ordinances. The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. In this case, the level of noise constituted an actionable nuisance, and medical evidence showed that Velascos ailments were rooted in his inability to sleep due to the incessant noise with consequent irritation, and the court required Meralco to adopt the necessary
Arts. 694 and 695, Arts. 700 and 702- The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance; and the legislature may authorize the summary abatement of a nuisance without judicial process or proceeding. When necessary to insure the public safety, the legislature may under its police power authorize municipal authorities summarily to destroy property without legal process or previous notice to the owner. It is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his property is subjected to restraint or destruction. Municipal Corporations generally have power to cause the abatement of public nuisances summarily without resort to legal proceedings.
Art. 694- Regarding noises, in Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, with particular reference to noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances: ...commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.
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substation. Velasco claims that this sound is a nuisance and asks for judicial abatement and damages.
Farrales v. City Mayor of Baguio
Leonor and Emilio Farrales built a temporary shack to sell liquor and sarisari goods on a cement passageway at the Baguio City Market without a permit from the government. The police threatened to demolish the shack, so Farrales sought an injunction from the SC. The SC refused because of Farrales lack of permit, so the shack was demolished. Farrales now seeks damages for the demolition.
Timoner v. People
Pepito Timoner was the mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte. He ordered that stalls protruding into the sidewalk be fenced off. The owners of some of the stalls filed a criminal case for grave coercion against Mayor Timoner, for which he was convicted. Timoner appealed to the SC.
Estate of Gregorio Francisco v. Court of Appeals
A building in Basilan was used by Tan Sin Gan as a storage facility for copra. The mayor asked him to relocate, since the location of the building did not comply with Zoning Ordinance No. 147. Tan Sin Gan refused, and so the
measures to deaden or reduce the sound by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who are being serviced from the substation. The shacks location constituted an obstruction to the free movement of the people, and it was clearly a nuisance. Under Art. 707 of the CC, a public officer extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: 1) if he causes unnecessary injury, 2) if the alleged nuisance is later declared by courts as not a real nuisance. In this case, there was no unnecessary injury, and the court found the shack to be a nuisance. Therefore, the demolition was proper and there is no ground for the award of damages. Timoners actions did not constitute grave coercion, and was a legal abatement of a public nuisance. The stalls occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the main thoroughfare, and Camarines Nortes CFI had actually declared them to be nuisances per se. The stalls on the sidewalk were unsanitary and a menace to the general public. They are annoyances and an invasion of rights to public space. Under Art. 699, an abatement without judicial proceedings is allowed. The mayor acted in good faith and within his rights and duties, and therefore incurred no criminal liability. Zoning Ordinance No. 147 does not give the mayor the authority to demolish buildings without judicial process. The proper action is to institute the proper legal proceedings in court. The demolition of the building cannot also be considered a proper abatement of a
Art. 707- A public officer extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: 1) if he causes unnecessary injury, 2) if the alleged nuisance is later declared by courts as not a real nuisance.
Arts. 694, 695, and 699- An abatement without judicial proceedings is allowed for nuisances per se.
The abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings can only be done in cases of nuisances per se, which are those that affect the immediate safety of persons and property. Municipal Councils do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se. It must be adjudged by judicial proceedings.
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building was demolished upon orders of the mayor. The authority of the mayor to order the demolition of the building summarily and without judicial process is now being questioned.
Tamin v. Court of Appeals
The municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del sur filed a complaint for ejectment against Medina and Rosellon alleging that it leased the land being occupied by them, subject to the condition that they vacate it if it is needed for a public purpose. The government wanted to build a public plaza. Medina and Rosellon filed a Cadastral Answer over the land and construction of the plaza could not be done because of a building erected by the two. The buildings were destroyed. The municipality argued that their complaint constitutes a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Art. 694 entitling them to the writ of possession and demolition. Judge Tamin of the RTC of Zamboanga del sur granted a writ of possession with ancillary writ of demolition.
nuisance because abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings can only be done in cases of nuisances per se, which are those that affect the immediate safety of persons and property. In this case, the storage of copra is a legitimate business, and by its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, health, or comfort of the community. It is not a nuisance per se. Municipal Councils do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se. It must be adjudged by judicial proceedings. The writs issued were improper. While the complaint alleges factual circumstances of public nuisance, the Local Government Code requires the Sangguniang Bayan to first pass an ordinance before a municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. They have 3 remedies in Art. 699, and the municipality chose to file a civil action for recovery of possession. Such proceeding constitutes a prejudicial question. Judge Tamin should have stopped proceedings and waited for the outcome of the cadastral proceedings. Even if the action was for eminent domain, Judge Tamin did not require any deposit of just compensation.
Art. 699 gives three remedies for public nuisance. If a civil action to recover possession of the land is chosen, then the proceedings constitute a prejudicial question which has to be resolved first.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 6. Easements >> g. Legal Easements >> a. In favor of adjacent properties >> Right of Way Case (Year) This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation
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Archbishop of Manila v. Roxas (1912)
A claim of right of way established by prescription (i.e., immemorial use), against a public meeting house (a Church.)
Roxas does not have a right of way in his favor against the Church.
The Court qualified the use of prescription as a ground for the acquisition, emphasizing the concept of adverse use as overcoming mere permissive use. When prescription is relied upon in cases where the right of way is not essential for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate, adverse use must be proved to overcome the presumption of permissive use or license. This is because such a right of way is never implied because it is convenient. In this case, mere passage of persons in common with those for whose use a passageway was constituted is permissive and under an implied license, and is not adverse. The Court qualified the way public use may be invoked in order to prove an easement of right of way. Mere tolerance of use by the owner is an essentially revocable license. A claim of right of way through public use must show evidence of the general government/province/municipalitys defrayment of the roads upkeep in any part (Bill of Exceptions.) Evidence to prove immemorial use in good faith must be averred and proved in order for a right of way to be established by prescription. The Court clarified the interpretation of contracts as to easements that they establish. It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the servient estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement. There is nothing [in the milling contract] to prohibit the [owner of the dominant estate] from making milling contracts with other planters. What Is prohibited by CC 543 is to make the easement more burdensome. The Court clarified how voluntary easements of right of way can become forcible.
Cuaycong v. Benedicto (1918)
A claim of right of way by public use as argued by the claimants.
Cuaycong et al. have not acquired an easement of right of way over Benedicto et al.s property by prescription, nor through public use.
Valderrama v. North Negros (1925)
A complaint praying that the owner of a railway be compelled to allow its use exclusively for those whose estates the railway passes through, pursuant to a contract.
The contract entered into by the hacienda owners and the predecessor-in-interest of North Negros clearly shows that the intention was to establish an easement of way only. There was no stipulation as to its use exclusively for the hacienda owners.
North Negros v. Hidalgo (1936)
A complaint to restrain the owner of a billiard hall and tuba saloon from
North Negros cannot prevent Hidalgo from passing through its property.
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entering or passing through the mill site of a sugar central.
A voluntary easement of right of way has been established by North Negros. However, because the property where Hidalgos establishments are located has no access to the provincial road except through North Negros hacienda, a forcible right of way exists in this case. Being a public utility/private property affected with a public interest, it is unlawful to make arbitrary exceptions with respect to its use and enjoyment. The Court clarified the need for annotating rights of way. The passage was not only tolerated, but allowed through a written agreement. This path was even allowed to be improved. The agreement gave a right to continue using the path. The action to have the right of way annotated allows the owner of the dominant estate to secure his right against the whole world, should there be a change in ownership of the servient estates. The Court clarified the role the requisite of the owner not causing the isolation plays in the recognition of an easement existing. Access to the public road was already had by the claimant, through an adjacent estate. However, the claimant himself closed it off. An owner cannot, by his own act, isolate his estate then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Doing so vitiates the claim. The Court clarified the importance of the concurrence of the requisites to establish an easement in Bacolod-Murcia. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, in re requisites to be established by a dominant owner seeking an easement: 1) dominant estate surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of proper indemnity; 3) isolation not due to acts of the owner of the dominant estate; 4) right of way at point least prejudicial to servient estate, juxtaposed with the distance from the dominant estate to the highway being the shortest. No claim of lack of an adequate outlet to a public highway,
Bernardo v. CA (1955)
An action to establish a right of way; a foot path previously allowed through a written agreement by the owners of estates was suddenly blocked.
The owners of the servient estate cannot block the path.
Francisco v. IAC (1989)
An action to establish a right of way; arising from a property originally belonging to a parcel of land that was subdivided, which became isolated due to the subdivision.
Ramos does not have the right to the easement sued for, having caused the isolation of his own estate.
Costabella v. IAC (1991)
An action to establish a right of way claimed to be based on an ancient road right, opposed as mere tolerance.
The claimants are not entitled to the easement sued for, having failed to prove the requisites established by law as to the claim for a right of way.
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Encarnacion v. CA (1991)
An action to widen an already existing easement of right-of-way.
The owner of the dominant estate is entitled to the widening of the easement, it being demandable in this case.
neither was the willingness to indemnify shown. The Court clarified how the needs of the dominant estate affect the easement. Inherent disadvantages of other passages that make passage difficult, if not impossible, are considered as if not being passages at all. It is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage, as such, it may change from time to time (NCC 651). The Court clarified the connection between the easements and the properties they relate to. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part (Tolentino), and cannot be alienated from the tenement (id.). It operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use. Merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person, requiring full ownership of both estates (NCC 631(1)) What is involved is a personal servitude, not in favor of a particular tenement but the general public. Therefore, merger cannot exist as there is no dominant estate to speak of (Tolentino). The Court clarified the way easements are established arising out of sales. Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, if these 2 requisites do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest (Tolentino)
Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong (1991)
An action for injunction to restore access to the easement, due to the removal of access to it, on account of a sale involving the servient estate.
The injunction being sought is proper, despite a change in ownership of the servient estate.
Quimen v. CA (1996)
An action for the declaration of a right of way in favor of a vendee who bought a property upon the assurance of the vendor that the vendor would give her a right of way.
The vendee is entitled to the easement. The voluntary easement has become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 6. Easements >> g. Legal Easements >> a. Pertaining to Waters Case (Year) This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation
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Tanedo v. Bernad (1988)
An action for legal redemption and damages, involving the right to use a septic tank servicing two parcels of land, the owner of the other parcel preventing the use thereof.
Tanedo has the right to continue using the septic tank.
The Court clarified the continuity of easements and the ways they are extinguished. The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement (NCC 631.) It continues by operation of law despite alienation, generally (NCC 624.) In this case, there was no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement in the deed of sale, nor did the original owner stop the operation as to Tanedo. The new owners of the servient estate cannot impair the use of the servitude. The Court modified the way an easement of public use may be claimed. CC 349 no deprivation of property unless for public utility, always after proper indemnity The claimed public easement has yet to materialize, so all that the City is doing is obstructing the plaintiffs use of her property, which is not within its powers. It is a denial of real rights attached to the right of ownership. The Court qualified the right to enclose estate as being limited by easements. The lands of Meneses are lower, therefore, subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to waters proceeding from higher lands. This is a statutory easement imposed by law for common public utility. (CC 552) The right to enclose an estate as provided in CC 388 is limited by the easement imposed upon the estate. The Court clarified the application of the most convenient-least onerous maxim in easements. The requisites of NCC 643 have been complied with first, the canal had been in use since the Spanish era. Second, due to the age of the canal, it would be impossible to show indemnity being paid. Besides, given the length of time the canal has been in use, there is likely no opposition that there has been no indemnity.
Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila (1907)
An action to compel the issuance of a license to build a terrace in favor of the owner of a property adjoining the San Jacinto/Sibacon canal, opposed on the grounds that the strip of land was to be used for a public easement.
The city is to allow the building of a terrace pursuant to the plans that have been presented.
Lunod v. Meneses (1908)
An action to declare a tract of land as subject to a statutory easement of flow of waters from the property of the plaintiffs, and for the defendant to remove the obstructions in place.
Meneses, the owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage and allow the flow of waters descending from the lake and from plaintiffs lands.
Salazar v. Gutierrez (1970)
An action to for the rebuilding of a canal on one lot that was demolished, depriving another lot of the irrigation facilities provided by it.
The defendants were to restore the canal at their expense.
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Relova v. Lavarez (1907)
An action for damages due to the destruction and damage brought about by the demolition of a dam along an aqueduct passing through land belonging to another person.
The plaintiff is entitled to the damages being sought.
Finally, the right of way is most convenient and least onerous to 3rd persons. In particular, the owner of the dominant estates abutment of the stream is a precipice, not practical for all involved. The Court interpreted CC 527 and 528. CC 527 and 528: It has been proved that the aqueduct and dam have been in existence for more than 30 years during which period the owner of the land in question has always reasonable use of the water in the aqueduct for irrigation purposes.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 6. Easements >> f. Extinguishment Case (Year) Cid v. Javier (1960) This case is about Javier sued Cid for constructing a building which blocked their light and view, claiming that they verbally prohibited Cids predecessor-ininterest from doing so. Resolution Easements of view and light, being a negative one and an encumbrance on the servient estate, requires a formal act, with solemnity, and acknowledged before a notary public. Absent such requirement, and other proofs such as annotations of the Orig Cert of Titles, easements supposedly acquired by prescription cannot be said to exist. Prescription by non-use equals 20 years. However, intermittent easements such as this do not prescribe, and waiver must be express. Francisco, upon payment of proper indemnity, to gain right of way through the shortest and least prejudicial route on Paezs estate. By the evidence, Heras still needed said passageway for vehicles. Even if he did not need it, renunciation of the use of passageways cannot be presumed, especially in cases of perpetual easements, as shown in the annotations on all the transfer certificates of title. Legal Basis + Interpretation CC 621: Positive easements are acquired on the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or any person who uses the easement, started to exercise it upon the servient estate. Negative easements start from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, thru a public instrument, the owner of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. OCC 564 and 565
Francisco v. Paez (1930)
Benedicto v. CA and Heras (1968)
Francisco claims easement of right of way over the property of Paez. The latter objects that the formers nonuse of the same equals waiver, and also prescription of the right to claim such (10 years to claim land). Original owners had easement of passage over two adjoining properties. Heras was claiming the same, which Benedicto had blocked by constructing a building as an extension of his lot thereon. Benedicto claims that non-use had extinguished Herass claim. TC and CA ruled for Heras.
NCC 631: Easements must be renounced by the dominant estate, and such renunciation should not be merely presumptive from non-use.
VII. Limitations on Property Rights >> 6. Easements >> g. Legal Easement PARTY WALL and LIGHT & VIEW
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Case (Year) Lao v. Heirs of Alburo (1915)
This case is about Spouses Lao wanted to register four parcels of land, but was disapproved by the Court of Land Registration due to the objection of the Heirs of Alburo that on one of the subject properties stand a stone wall belonging to the deceased Alburo.
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo (1903)
Fabie v. Lichauco and Children Roxas (1908)
Saenz v. Figueras Hermanos (1909)
Amor v. Florentino (1943)
of the windows of House 65 owned by Cortes were covered due to a new building being constructed. Cortes claims permanent easement of light, air and view due to his constant and uninterrupted use of said windows since 1843. The owners of the right and left lots of a property being sought to be registered filed oppositions on the basis that the said building violated their easements to light and view. Lichauco claims that there were signs granted by the original owner for such. Saenz sues Hermanos for having built windows in the walls nearer than 2 meters from the dividing lines between their properties. The lower court faults Saenz for not having objected while Hermanos was building it. Heir of the original owner Florentino assails the building of a new structure on the adjacent lot (formerly part of the original land) by Amor, claiming it blocked his right to light and view.
Resolution Said wall belongs to the Spouses Lao. Exterior signs: In addition to it being much higher than the adjoining walls, the support leans toward the side of the spouses, and the gutter which catches the rain does so to the benefit of the spouses. Absent more convincing proof from the Heirs of Alburo that a part of the wall belongs to her estate, it is adjudged to be owned by the spouses. The use of windows in ones own property in the absence of an agreement is an act of mere tolerance, and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of others. Easements of light and view, being a negative easement, need formal acts (in writing, notarized) for permanent acquisition. No such signs existed. Fabie bought the property before Lichauco acquired his, and all other evidence showed that there was no easement granted to either Lichauco nor Roxas.
Legal Basis + Interpretation Art. 573 of the Old Civil Code provides that exterior signs can prove the non-existence of easement of a party wall, meaning that the wall actually belongs to one of the parties and not in common.
An affirmative easement is the right to use another's property for a specific purpose, while a negative easement is the right to prevent another from performing an otherwise lawful activity on their property.
A property is presumed to be free from all encumbrances unless the contrary is proved.
The Old Civil Code expressly prohibits Hermanoss act of opening his windows nearer than 2 meters from the dividing line. Hermanos ordered to close said windows being merely 71 cms from Saenzs property.
OCC 581 and 582 provide positive easements of light and view of the adjoining property, and guidelines provided by the law must be followed strictly.
If the service of light and view has been given by the original owner to an adjacent structure, the new owner cannot then assail the easement which arises from it, unless it has been revoked in the new title or the sign which makes such easement apparent has been removed. Amor prohibited from building new structure against
NCC 624 (OCC 541) grants easements until revoked by the new title of transfer to the new owner, or the sign which signifies its existence has been removed.
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Gargantos v. Yanon (1960)
Property originally owned by one person was subdivided, structures built on, and passed on to new owners Gargantos and Yanon. Gargantos wanted to demolish his and build a new structure, which would block Yanons light and view, so the latter opposed.
Florentinos easement. Yanons right of easement arose when the property was alienated to two parties, and continued, as the windows and doors formerly existing are now considered equivalent to title.
NCC 624 states that easement, provided an apparent sign has been constituted for it, will continue on even if one of the properties was alienated unless the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> 1. Voluntary Modes >> a. Occupation Case (Year) Carino v. Insular Government (1909) This case is about A land held by an Igorot, Carino, and his ancestors since time immemorial and accordance with their customs and tradition. Carino wants to register the land but the Insular Government posits that the land is owned by the government Resolution The US regime did not adopt the Spanish feudal theory that all lands belong to the crown. The US government recognizes the stipulation in the Organic Act of July 1, 1902 that no law shall be enacted to deprive any person of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. any person includes the inhabitants of Benguet and property includes the lands that inhabitants regard as their own by native custom and by long association. Art. 12 of the constitution prohibits the alienation of natural resources, however, when the constitution took effect, the land in dispute no longer formed part of the public domain. Hence, no longer under the prohibition. The valid location of the claim in 1902 and its registration in 1929 had the legal effect of segregating the area from public domain. Legal Basis + Interpretation Land held since time immemorial is private land protected by the Bill of Rights. When, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez (1958)
Gold Creek Mining Corp asserting ownership over the Nob Fraction mineral claim in Benguet. It has done all the necessary legal procedures to register the claim (register location, survey the area, publish application, etc.). The last step was for the Director of the Bureau of Mines to approve its application and submit the necessary papers for the signature of the president. The Director refuses to approve the application citing the constitutional prohibition on alienation of natural resources.
In this case, the proof of Gold Creek that it has complied with the Annual Work Requirement for the proper registration of the mining claim was taken as a form of occupation. (this is more relevant to the topic than the discussion on natural resources) Annual Work Requirement that more than 1,600php of labor and work is done in the area.
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Atok Big Wedge Mining v. IAC (1996)
Land dispute between a surface occupant, Tuktukan Saingon, and one who asserts a mining claim over the area, Atok Big Wedge. The former claims that he has been in open possession of the land since he was 18 (hes now 70) while the latter claims that they have registered the mining claims over the land since 1921.
Saingon has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 yrs, while Atok, although it registered its claim, failed to prove that it complied with the Annual Work Requirement (performance of not less than 100 dollars worth of labor and improvements). The work requirement is was an essential requisite for continuously enjoying the rights under the mining claim. Hence, Atok is deemed to have lost its rights over the claim. The case was dismissed due to the 7-7 vote of the Supreme Court for the second time. Sir said to take note of the opions of Puno, Kapunan and Panganiban Puno IPRA constitutional Kapunan IPRA constitutional Panganiban IPRA unconstitutional Puno Ancestral lands (AL) do not form part of the public domain (PD) as they have been acquired through NATIVE TITLE by the IPs - Carino doctrine on native title the land has never been public by virtue of the occupation since time immemorial - IPRA provides a way to take out the AL from PD and converts it into public agricultural land which can be alienated by the state The IPRA talks about a different form of ownership AL is owned by the entire community The sub-terrain portion of property still belongs to the owner of the land.
The actual possession of the surface occupant was preferred because Atoks failed to prove its occupation. Occupation in the context of a holder of a mining claim is the compliance with the annual work requirement.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (2000)
Various petitions assailing the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA 8371, IPRA). Main problem: Natural resources are included in ancestral domain, hence, there is an alienation of natural resources in favor of private parties (indigenous peoples)
Kapunan - The concept of native title is not in contravention with the Regalian doctrine, since it means that the land was never public and hence, never owned by the Crown. The consti (Sec. 5, Art. 12) mandates the protection of the rights of the IPs in ALs. Panganiban the constitution applies to all. The consti expressly prohibits the alienation of the said land. Even if the ownership is collective, it still does not change the fact that the state, and other Filipinos, are being deprived of the enjoyment of the said land.
NPC v. Ibrahim (2007)
The establishment of NAPOCOR of underground tunnels without the knowledge of the surface occupant/owner of the land.
Art. 437, CC ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. On occupation the extent of occupation is up to the extent that
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one is capable of enjoying the property.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> 1. Voluntary Modes >> b. Tradition/Delivery Case (Year) San Lorenzo Devt Corp. v. CA, Babasanta, Sps. Lu (2005) This case is about Babasanta bought two parcels of land from Sps. Lu, but when he demanded for the final deed of sale, Sps. Lu refused, saying that he backed out of the sale due to his refusal to pay the full purchase price (they claimed he was asking for a reduction). SLDC intervened, claiming that the parcels of land were already sold to them. Resolution The Babasanta-Lu contract was a contract to sell, hence there was no intention on the part of the Lus to transfer the ownership of the land until full payment of the purchase price. Babasanta never consigned the amount to the Court, hence no proof that he actually offered to pay the full purchase price. Also, even if it were a contract of sale hence double sale, SLDC would remain owners thereof. A contract of sale is merely a title; the mode of acquiring ownership would be delivery, either constructive (through a public instrument) or actual (control or possession). In this case, neither existed. HELD: SLDC the owners of said lots. Legal Basis + Interpretation Sale is not one of the modes of transferring ownership recognized by the law. It is tradition or delivery which transfers ownership. Delivery could be: Actual - placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the vendee. Constructive - the execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale; symbolical tradition such as the delivery of the keys of the place where the movable sold is being kept; traditio longa manu or by mere consent or agreement if the movable sold cannot yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of the sale; tradition brevi manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the sale; and tradition constitutum possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the property in a different capacity. Ownership did not transfer to Equatorial due to lack of delivery. Although the execution of a public document is deemed as constructive delivery, this is merely presumptive and has been negated by failure of Equatorial to take actual possession. Sir noted: The decision is problematic because the court required actual physical possession for transfer of ownership which the law does not require.
Equatorial Realty Devt Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc. (2005)
Mayfair, as lessee, had a right of first refusal to the buildings owned by Carmelo & Bauerman, Inc. However, C&B sold it to Equatorial Inc. SC rescinded said sale, holding that Mayfairs right must be honored first. Now Equatorial is suing for rents to the buildings during the time they allegedly belonged to Equatorial (from the moment of the Deed of Sale between C&B and Equatorial up to the judicial rescission of the sale).
Equatorial never acquired ownership of said lots, due to the fact that the rescinded Deed is void at its inception, hence could not ask for rentals because it rentals, being civil fruits of ownership, do not pertain to them. Furthermore, there was no mode of acquisition, since Equatorial was never in possession and control of the premises being leased by Mayfair. Though the contract of sale was executed in a public document, it is mere legal fiction and must give way to reality. Since no actual possession took place, it cannot be said that delivery has been effected. HELD: Petition for Payment of Rentals by Mayfair to Equatorial Denied.
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Union Motor v. CA, JardineManila Finance Inc, Sps. Bernal (2001)
Sps. Bernal bought a Camaron Jeepney from Union Motors on installment. They discontinued payments due to alleged non-delivery of the vehicle. Union Motors presented sales invoice and delivery receipt as proof of delivery.
Union Motors sales merely requirements before actual delivery, and does not evince transfer of ownership. Delivery whether actual or symbolic must be coupled with intention. For the sale to be valid with mere symbolic delivery, Union Motor must have complete control over the vehicle. However, it was in the possession of Jardine-Manila Inc, who assigned it to another person. HELD: Union Motor to return down payment and initial installments to Sps. Bernal.
Addison v. Felix & Tioco (1918): The thing sold must be placed in the [buyers] control. Symbolic delivery thru execution of a public instrument is sufficient only when there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold in passing to the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor. In this case there is neither actual nor constructive delivery. Emphasis on the rule that in all forms of delivery, there must be intent to transfer ownership.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and termination of property rights > A. Modes in general > 1. Voluntary modes > c) Donation > 1) Definition Case This case is about Resolution Legal basis + interpretation Osorio v. The donor inherited shares of stock Donation is Future property is that which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of making of Osorio from her husband. She donated her valid. Donor did the donation. This includes all properties belonging to another at the time of the (1915) share to one of her children. In the not donate a donation, although they may later belong to the donor. first deed of donation, the deed said future property that her half was adjudicated to her Future properties are those belonging to another. BUT properties of an existing as part of her share to the conjugal inheritance cannot be considered as anothers property with relation to the heirs property. Subsequently, the donor who through a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner. The acquisition realized that the statement was an by the heirs retroacts from the moment of death of the decedent. Hence, an error because the partition of the inheritance already existing is no longer future from the moment of death of the estate has not been effected at the decedent and may legally be the object of contract. And that which may be the object time of the execution of the deed of of contract may also be the object of a donation. donation. So she executed another deed to the same donee maintaining Diways interpretation: Therefore, from the time the decedent dies, the inheritance the same donation, only that she may be the subject of donation because it is no longer a future property. It already referred to her part as one to be belongs to its heirs from the moment of death despite the fact that partition of the adjudicated to her. estate is still pending. Meanwhile, the other heirs of the donor is contesting the donation saying that donation cannot include future property. A land was donated to Iloilo city exclusively for the establishment of a
Central Philippine
The donation is onerous.
On whether the donation is valid and may be revoked: When a person donates a land to another, on the condition that the latter would
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University v. CA (1995)
medical college. When the donor died, his heirs filed a complaint to annul the donation alleging that the donee did not comply with the conditions of the donation. The donee argued that a period has to be fixed for their compliance since the deed of donation does not specify a period within which they should comply.
build something on that land, the condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. It is not correct to say that the building has to be erected first before the donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, the donation may be revoked and all the right which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished. On whether a period has to be fixed for compliance with the condition before revoking a donation: GENERALLY, Art 1197 applies (If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.) BUT 1197 cannot apply in this case considering that more than 50 years has elapsed. The donee was given a reasonable period to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation forever valid. But, they failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the period when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits Generally, an action to revoke a contract prescribes in 4 years. BUT onerous donations are governed by the rules on contract. Hence, they prescribe in 10 years. (The only issue here is prescription since this is an appeal from dismissal. The following doctrines are mere obiter) UP v. Delos Angeles: There is nothing that prohibits parties from entering into an agreement that violation would cause cancellation even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary to resort to court for rescission Angelez v. Calasanz: Judicial action is not necessary when the contract provides that it may be revoked or cancelled. BUT where extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the final award of the court can conclusively settle *whether resolution was proper or not*. It is in this sense that judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial rescission will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by acquiescence, prescription or estoppel. Hence, judicial intervention is necessary - not for the purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by agreement but in order to determine whether
De Luna v. Abrigo (1990)
A donation was made with the condition that a chapel, nursery and kindergarten school must be built on it within 5 years. The deed also provided for an automatic reversion A complaint for annulment of the said donation was dismissed by the lower courts on the ground of prescription. From this dismissal, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.
(The only issue here is prescription since this is a certiorari) The action has not prescribed. Case is remanded to the trial judge to conduct trial on the merits.
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Vda. De Tupas v. RTC (1986)
The donor donated lots to his foundation. His widow sought to declare the donation inofficious, prejudicing her legitime, because the donor gave more that what he can give.
The donation is collationable
or not rescission was proper. Collationable - when the value of the donation is imputable to the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determingn the legiitme of the forced or compulsory heirs and freely disposable portion of his estate. The rules on collation apply not only to gifts to compulsory heirs (as suggested by Art 1061) but also to donations to strangers (as decided in Liguez v. CA which is based on a decision of the SC of Spain) The defense that the property donated no longer forms part of the estate of the deceased cannot prosper because the rules on collation is precisely intended for gifts inter vivos. Procedure for determining which forms part of the legitime and the disposable portion (Art 908-910) 1. Determination of the value of the property remaining at the time of death 2. Determination of obligations, debts and charges to be deducted from the property left 3. Determination of difference between assets and liabilities, giving rise to hereditary estate (#2 - #1) 4. Addition to the net value of the value of donation subject to collation at the time the donation was made (#3 + value of donation at time of execution) 5. Determination of amount of legitimes by getting the portion that the law provides as legitime (#4 - legitimes provided by law) The remaining portion is the freely disposable portion (#5). Intention to exempt from collation must be expressed plainly and unequivocally. Classifying the donation as irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the property donated from collation. Anything less than express prohibiiton shall not suffice. Without the express prohibition, the general rule on collation must be applied.
De Roma v. CA (1987)
A donor donated some properties to one of her adopted daughters. When the donor died intestate, the donee was appointed as administratix. In her capacity as such, she prepared an inventory of the estate excluding the portion donated to her prior to the donors death. The other adopted daughter opposed to the inventory arguing that the donated property to the administratix must be collated. The administratix counter-argues that an exception to collation is when the donor expressly so provides and the deed of donation said that
The property donated must be collated and included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased.
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pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> 1. Voluntary Modes >> c. Donation>>>Inter vivos Case (Year) Parks v. Province of Tarlac (1926) This case is about A donation was made with the condition to build a central school and a public park within 6 months from ratification. It was later sold by the donor to the petitioner. Petitioner sought for nullification of a donation of a parcel of land on the ground that a condition was not complied with. This action was brought 14 years after the donation. Resolution The case was dismissed due to prescription. The action to nullify an onerous donation is governed by the law of contracts and the general rules of prescription. It prescribes in 10 years. The condition was a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent. The works cannot be done on the land without vesting title upon the donee. Non-compliance with the condition subsequent is sufficient cause for revocation of donation but so action was timely filed. It was a donation inter vivos and not a donation mortis causa, hence not taxable. The effect of the donation was produced by the acceptance of the donees during the donors lifetime, and not by reason of the donors death. If the donors life was mentioned in the condition, it is only to fix the term of the condition. The donation was irrevocable and will only be ineffectual if the conditions were not met. It is not revocable by the mere will of the donor. The condition was a resolutory one. Being onerous, they are not donations throughout their full extent, but only so far as they exceed the incumberance imposed. So far as the portion equivalent to or less than the said incumberance is concerned, it has the nature of a real contract and is governed by the rules on contracts. The contracting parties have a right to stipulate as to the application of the fruits. The new contract was in the nature of antichresis. As vendee in pacto de recto, Cabanos acquired ownership of the land including its fruits. When it was changed to one of mortgage, Javier had the right to possess the land. Since they did not change the former relations, it is understood that Javier could make use of the capital and Cabanos would remain in possession, applying the fruits to the interest of the capital. Legal Basis + Interpretation Art. 764, CC (former Art. 647)
Zapanta v. Posadas, Jr. (1928)
A donation was made by a priest to his relatives, with the condition that they will pay him in sacks of rice and in money during his lifetime. The donation was to be made upon acceptance of the donees, which they made during the donors lifetime. When the donor died, the Collector of Internal Revenue made the donees pay inheritance tax, or tax on every transmission by virtue of inheritance gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritanceof real property
Art. 733 (former Art. 622); Art. 728 (former Art. 620)
Javier v. Cabanos (1929)
Javier sold his land under pacto de recto to Cabanos. The land became under Cabanos possession. Javier later filed a cvivil case, saying that the sale was in fact a usurious loan. Subsequently they entered into a compromise, saying that the sale shall be a mortgage and that Javiers debt is exactly P10,000. Notwithstanding this change, Cabanos remained in possession of the land. Javier claims that the contract was one of antichresis (the fruits of the property owned by the debtor go to the creditor to apply them to the interest first then to the principal debt).
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Balaqui v. Dongso (1929)
Concepcion v. Concepcion (1952)
Hipolita Balaqui donated her parcels of land to Placida Dongso in consideration of the services rendered to her. In the deed of donation, it was written that the it does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels. Balaqui petitioners filed this case, saying that the donation was null and void for being a donation mortis causa not complying with the formalities of a will. Manuela Concepcion donated real and personal properties to Emilia Concepcion. It was entitled as a donation mortis causa but did not conform to the formalities of a will. Only two witnesses were present and there was no attestation clause. Instead, there was acceptance of the done embodied in the same instrument. The heirs of Manuela wanted to have the properties donated to be collated with the estate of the deceased.
The donation is a valid donation inter vivos and irrevocable. When Hipolita guaranteed to Placida and her heirs and successors the right to said property, he already granted the lands by gift. Otherwise, there would be no need to guarantee said right. Even if the donor stated in the deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land, save upon her death, such statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property.
Art. 728 (former Art. 620)
The donation is inter vivos. It is the body of the document and the statements contained therein, and not the title, that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. The donation is in the nature of remuneratory rather than onerous because it was in consideration for past services rendered, beside being partly motivated by affection. In this case, the consideration is not the death of the donor but the services rendered by the done. That the donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean in delivery of the property that must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the done, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably. Only donation inter vivos need to be accepted. Donation mortis causa being in the nature of a legacy need not be accepted (Manresa).
Art. 725 (former Art. 618) Art. 726 (former Art. 619) Art. 728 (formerly Art. 620) Laurents v. Mata is in all fours with this case. De Guzman v. Ibea: If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Joya v. Tiongco: The mere fact that the property donated was not to be delivered immediately to the done but only after death of donor did not render the donation mortis causa. Balaqui v. Dongso: Donation is inter vivos and irrevocable notwithstanding the fact that thr donor stated in said deed that
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Carino v. Abaya (1940)
Bonsato v. CA (1954)
Sisters Petrona and Dorotea Gray executed an instrument donating their property to their relatives including Jose Carino. Carino was to administer the properties and funds of the sisters. The donation was to take effect 30 days after the death of the last one to die between the two. The donees accepted the donation in the same instrument. There was no attestation clause and marginal signatures in the instrument. Abaya assailed the validity of the donation when the sisters died, saying that it is a donation mortis causa and is void for not being executed with the formalities of a will. Domingo Bonsato donated conjugal property to his brother Juan Bonsato and his nephew Felipe Bonsato. The donors signified their acceptance of the donation in the same instrument. They donations were declared to be irrevocable in the instrument. The donation did not conform to the formalities of a will.
The donation is mortis causa. The instrument used the word inherit which implies the acquisition of property by the heirs after the death of the sisters. Such donation requires the formalities of a will. The lack of attestation clause and marginal signatures render it without force and effect.
she did not transfer the ownership until upon her death. Such statement could only mean that she reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of the property. Art. 728 (Former Art. 620)
It is donation inter vivos but valid only as to one half of the property because they were conjugal. The donor only reserved for himself during his lifetime the owners share of the fruits or produce. This reservation would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Irrevocability of the donation is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of a donation mortis causa. The term donation mortis causa as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations. That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether they constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because legacy may have identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of the title to, or control over, the properties donated. This reinforces that the act was inter vivos.
Art. 728 (Former Art. 620) Art. 828 (Former Art. 737) Art. 749 (Former Art. 633)
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De Luna v. Abrigo and Luzonian University Foundation (1990)
Prudencio de Luna executed a donation inter vivos over a portion of a 7,500 square meter lot to Luzonian. It was subject to the condition that a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school will be erected on the lot. It provided that should the condition not be met, the lot will automatically revert to the donor. Even with a revival of the donation, Luzonian was still not able to comply with the condition. The heirs of de Luna filed a case for cancellation of the donation. Judge Abrigo of the lower court dismissed the case, saying that the action has prescribed, having been filed 5 months after the prescriptive period which is 4 years. Spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The deed of donation provided that the done cannot dispose of the property for 100 years. A violation of the condition will automatically revert the lot back to the estate of the donors. 50 years later, the RC Archbishop of Imus, administrator of the properties of the Archdiocese of Manila in Cavite, sold the property to Sps. Florencio and Soledad Ignao. A case was filed by the heirs of the donors to nullify the deed of donation, rescind the contract and convey the property to the estate of the donors. Don Ramon Lopez Sr. donated a parcel of land to CPU with the condition that a medical college shall be erected on it. The land should also not be disposed of by the done. No period was stipulated in the deed. After 50 years, the donor filed an action for annulment of the donation because of the nonfulfillment of the condition. CPU said that the action has prescribed and that since there was no term in the deed, the courts should fix a period.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA and the Estate of Deceased Sps. Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta (1991)
Art. 764 providing for a prescriptive period of 4 years does not apply because in this case, the parties have stipulated that the property will automatically revert to the donor upon non-fulfillment of the condition. Art. 733 provides that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The case at bar is an onerous donation because it is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal or more in value than that f the thing donated. While this is the case, Parks v. Province of Tarlac does not apply because the donation therein while being onerous had no agreement providing for automatic revocation, thus the need for judicial declaration to revoke the donation in the said case. Here, the prescriptive period is 10 years. While judicial intervention is not necessary because of the stipulation on automatic revocation, only the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not (UP v. Angeles). The action has not prescribed but there is no cause of action. Art. 764 does not apply because the deed of donation has provided for automatic revocation. An action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten years. A judicial declaration is needed only to declare that the rescission was proper. The condition that the property must not be disposed of within 100 years is void for being contrary to public policy. It places an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership. A prohibition against alienation must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time for it to be valid.
Art. 764 Art. 733 Art. 1144
Art. 764 Art. 1144 Art. 727
Central Philippine University v. CA (1995)
The donation is a conditional obligation under Art. 1181. The conditions here are resolutory conditions. Once cannot say that the action has prescribed in this case because the time from which it accrued cannot be specifically determined, as no period has been fixed. 50 years is more than a reasonable time for the condition to be fulfilled. There is no more need to fix the duration of the term in accordance with Art. 1197, as it will be a mere formality. Since the donation is gratuitous, doubts referring to incidental circumstances should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights.
Art. 1181 Art. 1197 Art. 1144
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Secretary of Education v. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr. (2006)
Asteria Bautista et al v. Epifanio Sabiano et al (1952) (1953)
Spouses Dulay donated a lot in Isabela to the Ministry of Education (DECS). It had a condition that the lot will be used for school purposes. Seven years after the donation, DECS started constructing a high school 2km away from the donated lot. 13 years from the date of donation, the lot was still idle. The donor wanted to redeem the donated property because it was not used. No building was built on the property and it was barren save for a few palay. 16 years from the date of donation, the heirs of the donor filed a case for the cancellation of the donation, saying that the condition was not fulfilled. The OSG countered that the lot was being used by the DECS as technology and home economics laboratory. Alberto Bautista donated properties to Marcelina and Candida Sabiano (minors), Atanacio Lomibao, and Alfredo de Guzman (minor). It was subject to conditions that the properties are at the disposal of the donor while he is yet living, he may also dispose of the property to cover expenses in case of illness, and when he dies, the donees will dispose of the properties to pay all his debts and give him decent burial ceremonies. The acceptance was signed by the father of the Sabiano siblings, the mother of Alfredo de Guzman, and Atanacio Lomibao. The lower court ruled that the donation was invalid as to the minors for lack of acceptance but valid as to Atanacio Lomibao who was of age. The lower court also ruled that the donation was onerous because the donor continued to be the owner in spite of the donation and because responsibilities were imposed on the donees upon the death of the donor. The petitioners argue that the donation is pure and even if it is onerous or conditional and that it is valid because the acceptance was made by the parents of
Dissent of Davide: It is an onerous donation and as such, governed by the law on contracts. The obligations imposed by the donor are conditions of the donation. The courts should fix a period. The donation should be revoked because the done failed to comply with the condition. The action has not prescribed when the complaint was filed. Art. 764 does not apply because it is an onerous donation, governed by the law on contracts. The failure to comply with the condition was manifest seven years after the donation was made when DECS constructed a high school 2km away from the lot. DECS was given more than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage. Since no period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition in the donation, Art. 1197 applies. However, following the ruling in CPU v. CA, the fixing of a period in this case will likewise be a mere technicality.
Art. 764 Art. 1197
There is no lawful and valid transmission because the disposition or conveyance takes effect upon the donors death so it is a donation mortis causa but not executed in accord with he formalities of a will. A donation is irrevocable. If the donor reserves the right to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the properties, there is no donation. If the disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect upon the donors death and becomes irrevocable only upon his death, it is not an inter vivos but a mortis causa donation. Even if the donation was made in consideration of the love and affection and the services rendered by the donees to the donor, the fact remains that the donor reserved his right to dispose of the properties. In effect, he has reserved the right to revoke the donation totally or partially.
Art. 755 (former Art. 639)
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the minors. VIII. Creation, Transmission and termination of property rights > A. Modes in general > 1. Voluntary modes > c) Donation > 3) Formalities
Case Lagazo v. CA (1998)
This case is about An owner of a property gave a son-in-law a special power of attorney. The son-in-law failed to accomplish the purpose of the special power so it was revoked. The owner subsequently donated the property to her grandson who demanded that the occupant vacate the property donated. The occupant showed a deed of assignment in her favor executed by the son-inlaw who was earlier given a special power of attorney. The occupant argued that the donation to the donee was onerous because such donee had to pay taxes in arrears. And being onerous, the formalities were not observed. Even assuming that formalities are observed by the donor, the donee failed to accept it. A family owned corporation had for its board of directors, its 6 children. One of them was appointed as Assistant SecretaryTreasurer when the mother of the family suffered from old age. The new Asisstant Secretary-Treasurer cancelled the share certificates of her mother and issued new ones in his name and in the name of another sibling (So 2 of the 2 children now own the shares of their mother). The mother eventually died. The judicial administrator of her estate filed a complaint to recover the shares of stock in order that they may be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. The appointed officer/son alleged that he acquired ownership by simple donation and that their mother delivered the certificates to him, already indorsed. An owner of a land which was used as a street died. Her grandchildren inherited the land and pursuant to the will, a trust was established. The appointed trustee paid realty taxes every year and eventually donated the land in favor of the city of Manila. The donation was approved by the lower courts which found that such donation would save the heirs from incurring tax liabilities. The father of the heirs opposed on the ground that guardians and trustees cannot donate properties entrusted to them
Resolution Donation is simple. But it is not valid because of lack of acceptance by the donee.
Legal basis + interpretation The burden which the donee assumed was not imposed as a condition for the donation. Hence, the donation remains to be a simple one Acceptance by the donee is indispensable. Its absence makes the donation null and void. The donation is perfected only from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee..
Genato v. de Lorenzo (1968)
Donation is void for lack of acceptance
There was no acceptance because one of the 2 donees was not present at the time of delivery and there is no showing that the one who accepted the alleged donation was authorized by the other donee to accept donation in his behalf. The delivery of the donor and the acceptance by the donee must be simultaneous, and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. One cannot accept independently of his co-donee unless expressly so provided, or unless they are H and W.
Araneta v. Perez (1966)
Donation is valid
Prohibition on donations by trustees and guardians (Art 736) is for the protection of the beneficiaries/ wards and evidently contemplates gifts of pure beneficence which are supported by no other cause than liberality. When the donation is clearly in the interest of the beneficiary/ ward, as in this case, to say that the donation cannot be done would go against the spirit and intent of the law.
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VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> 1. Involuntary Modes >> a. Prescription and Laches>> 1. Acquisitive Case (Year) Cutanda vs. Cutanda (2000) Petitioners: successors-ininterest of Anastacio Cutanda Private Respondents: Heirs of Roberto Cutanda This case is about Private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession, accounting and damages against the Petitioners alleging that their grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels of land in Bohol and upon his death were inherited by the petitioners. All but one established residence in Leyte. 1987, when they returned to Bohol, they found the petitioners occupying the lands. Petitioners assert in their answer that it was their uncle Anastacio Cutanda who was the original owner. Anastacio died without children so the lands were inherited by his siblings, the petitioners parents. They allege that they had a better right to possess because they occupied and cultivated the lands. RTC: Petitioners acquired ownership through prescription CA: affirmed the dismissal but held that there was no sufficient evidence that the petitioners are the owners of the land. Resolution Action of the respondents for recovery of the land Barred by extinctive prescription They did not assert ownership over the lands until 1988 or 55 years later when they filed this complaint for recovery of possession. Remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. Whether the petitioners were able to prove with sufficient evidence that they owned the lands by prescription - Yes. - The documentary and testimonial evidence establish that Anastacio Cutanda was in possession of the land from 1933 1968, a period of 35 years. Such possession appears to be adverse, continuous and in the concept of an owner because he cultivated the land, performing an act of ownership. - When Anastacio began possession, the former civil code was in force. Hence, Sec. 41 of Code of Civil Procedure applies. It says there that 10 years of actual adverse possession is needed for possession to ripen into a full and complete title. Hence by 1943, 10 years after his possession begun, Anastacio had become owner through acquisitive prescription The contention of Simeon Recasa has no merit because he has neither just title nor good faith. He did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code. He entered the property without the Legal Basis + Interpretation Art. 1106 CC: by prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time, in a manner and under the conditions laid down by law. in the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription There are two kinds of prescription: 1. Acquisitive: acquisition of a right by the lapse of time 2. Extinctive: loss of a right of action by the lapse of time
Serespi vs. Court of Appeals (2000)
Marcelino Recasa owns two parcels of land in Aklan. During his lifetime he contracted 3 marriages. When he died, his intestate estate was partitioned
Art. 1117 CC: acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
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into 3 parts by his heirs. The representative of his first marriage sold its share to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. Dominador in turn sold the share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi. Seraspis obtained a loan from Kalibo Rural bank, which they failed to pay. Hence the mortgage on the land was foreclosed and the lands were sold to Manuel Rata, bro-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. Quirico Seraspi from then on administered the property. 1974: Simeon Recasa, rd Marcelinos child by 3 marriage, forcibly entered the land in question and took possession. 1983: Seraspis purchased land from Manuel Rata and filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the lands TC: in favor of Seraspi. Acquired lands through sale and acquisitive prescription CA: reversed. Action is barred by statute of limitations. Contention of Simeon Recasa: he acquired ownership of the property by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for 10 years -
consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
Art. 1134 CC: ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. Art. 1137 CC: ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of goodfaith
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> 1. Involuntary Modes >> a. Prescription and Laches>> 2. Extinctive Case (Year) Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court This case is about Resolution The respondents cannot anymore question the validity of the deed of extrajudicial partition and the TCT Legal Basis + Interpretation - In this case, the court cited Baldin vs. Medalla saying: an action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud
This case is about whether or not the validity of a Transfer Certificate of Title can still be questioned despite the lapse of 14 years. - Sulpicia Bagsikan together with her children, Pedro, Delfina and Cristeto own Lot 86. B2015 PROPERTY CASE COMPILATION
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(1987) Petitioners: Sps. Cimafranca and Eguias Respondents: Heirs of Jalosjos
1917: Pedro sold a portion of the property to Perfecto Jalosjos. Subsequently, Sulpicia died then Delfina Died and Cristeto was presumed dead. - 1958: Pedro and the heirs of Delfina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of previous sale. Whereby lot 86 was given to Pedro and lot 9 to the heirs of Delfina. In this document, Pedro also ratified his sale to Jalosjos. The document was registered on October 24, 1958 and the original certificate of title for lot 86 was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title (TCT) was issued. - Pedro died and was survived by his widow and 8 children. - 1970: Pedros heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate of deceased person with simultaneous deed of sale and confirmation of previous sales whereby they attested that the share of Pedro over lot 86 was first adjudicated to the 8 children (1/9 each) but subsequently Vibesa Gudriel and husband Francisco Cimafranca acquired 7/9 of the and 2/9 were acquired by Fidela and Caridad Eguia. - 1971: when the lot was surveyed, it was found out that petitioners were only occupying 487 sq m. of the lot while defendants had 1109 sq. m. - 1972: Petitioners filed a complaint for partition and damages seeking partition of the property, reconveyance of what was theirs, demolition of the residential buildings and fence and damages. - Respondents filed their answer, praying for the cancellation of the October 1958 TCT and damages. TC: in favor of Heirs of Jalosjos (respondents). It found that the TCT that the petitioners had was based on the deed of extrajudicial partition. And that the said deed was a patent nullity because it was effected without the consent of the respondents. IAC: affirmed TC - Petitioners filed a petition for review arguing that the TCT has become incontrovertible and imprescriptible by virtue of the lapse of not only 4 but 13 years from its issuance in 1958 before its validity was challenged in 1972 and also that the respondents are in estoppel or barred by prescription and laches.
simply because 14 years has passed since they were made. Until 1972, respondents had not questioned the validity of the deed of extrajudicial partition in 1958 nor the subsequent issuance of the TCT in that same year. The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument is filed with the register of deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of the respondents. The registration constitutes constructive notice to the world. Moreover, an employee of the registry of deeds testified that it was Jalosjos who presented the deed for registration. Hence, it would seem that the respondents had actual and not just constructive notice of the said TCT. The respondents are also guilty of laches as they have not taken any step to have the deed of extrajudicial partition corrected until 1972. HELD: IAC reversed Ruled for the government. Gallo cannot claim to have obtained his title by prescription because it is a rule that lands of public domain cannot be acquired by prescription unless the law expressly permits it. Gallo in fact admitted this fact by filing an application, knowing for a fact that he could not acquire title by prescription unless he seeks the intervention of the courts.
must be filed within 4 years from the discovery of fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificates of title.
Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals (1987)
Filomeno Gallo is the owner of the 4 parcels of land situated in Iloilo containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares that were subject of an application for registration Out of the 30.5943 hectares, 11. 1863 hectares are coconut lands and are within the disposable portion of the public domain. Hence, the controversy in this case pertains to the remaining 19. 4080 hectares. The Director of Lands opposed the application saying that Gallo does not have sufficient title over the lands which could be registered under the Torrens system. He
The court cited Republic vs. Animas saying: As a general rule, timber and forest lands are not alienable of disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
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Bailon-Casilao vs. CA (1988)
also says that Gallo has never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the lands for at least 30 years. The Director of Forestry also opposes saying that some of the land are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland block hence classified for forest purposes. Gallo answered these oppositions with saying that the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by him and his predecessors in interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings. He claims prescription against the government. A lot was owned by 6 persons, all surnamed Bailon. Two of the co-owneres (Rosalia and Gaudencio) sold a portion of land to Donato Delgado which sold it to Ponciana Lanuza. Lanuza sold it to Celestino Afable. The rest of the co-owners filed a case of recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens against Afable. Afable claims that he has acquired the land through presciption and that the co-owners who filed the case is guilty of laches. LOWER COURT declared Afable as co-owner of the 2/6 portion of the land only. CA: dismissed the complaint, the action is barred by laches.
It is a rule that possession of forest lands however long cannot ripen into private ownership. HELD: 19.4080 hectares are forest lands hence lands of public domain therefore inalienable.
The court ruled that the action of the co-owners has not prescribed. Article 494 CC is interpreted to mean that the action for partition in a coownership is imprescriptible. Article 494 expressly states that no prescription shall lie in favor of a coowner so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. Afable also contends that following Act no. 496, prescription lies with the heirs who are not registered co-owners. (Act. no. 496 provides for the imprescribility of action of a person in whose name the title is registered. It says no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession ) The court finds Afables contention untenable. Act. 496 applies to transferees other than the heirs. In this case, the Bailons only stepped into the shoes of the decendent and is deemed as a continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. The Bailons are not guilty of laches because the delay in asserting their
Art. 292 cc : xxx..no prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
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Villagonzalo vs. IAC (1988)
Bergado vs. CA
rights was not attended with any knowledge nor with any opportunity to bring suit. The co-owners didnt have knowledge of the sale made by their elder sister (Rosalia) HELD: TC reinstated. Juan and Felicisima are the parents of Cecila, paz, Estela, The court found for Cecilia. The action Aida, Herminia, Gwendolyn, Jensine and Leonila. of her siblings has prescribed. Juan purchased a lot in Ormoc for P1500. The deed of The issuance of the TCT was Cecilias sale for this lot was in the name of Cecilia (one of the way of excluding the other siblings. children) because Juan borrowed P500 from her to pay Such registration was constructive the full price. notice to the whole world as to the July 1962: TCT 4259 was issued in Cecilias name. adverse claim. The action brought by Juan and Felicisima died. the siblings was also a repudiation of 1975: All the other children of Juan and Felicisima any fiduciary or trust relationship. instituted a complaint for reconveyance against Cecilia An action for reconveyance based on and the Ormoc lot. implied or constructive trust prescribes CFI ruled against Cecilia while IAC reversed. in 10 years, counted from the date of Cecilia now contends that the action of her siblings assertion of adverse title. against her has prescribed. Moreover, laches is present. In 1961, Cecilia refused to share the produce of the land. In 1963, Cecilia mortgaged the land in her own name and in 1969, Cecilia leased the lot. In all these instances, no preventive legal action was taken by any of the siblings. Cecilia was made to feel secure in her belief of acquisition. Alejandro and Aniceta owned a parcel of land in The court ruled for the Republic. Pangasinan which was inherited by their sole heir, An action for recovery of title to or Marciana Trinidad. possession of real property can be 1928: Marciana conveyed the said land to Pedro brought only within 10 years from the Bergado and Justina Galinato through an Escritura de date the cause of action accrues. In the Compraventa. case at bar, the date the cause of 1947: Marciana conveyed the same land through a deed action accrued could be as early as of sale to the PTA of Urdaneta High School. 1947 when the property was sold to 1964: the heirs if Pedro and Justina (herein petitioners) PTA or 1965-1966 when the wall registered the Escritura. enclosing the property was erected. 1981: Petitioners filed a complaint to annul the title of The complaint, being filed on Oct. 21, the Republic to the land, claiming that they inherited 1981, is clearly barred by prescription.
Vda. De Pama vs Pama: an action for reconveyance of real property based on constructive or implied trust prescribes in 10 years counted from the date adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
60
the land from their parents.
Casipit vs. CA (1991)
1919: Urbano Casipit bought lot 144. 1923: Because he was not able to pay installments, Urbano assigned his rights to the property to Gabriel Beato. 1932: the tax declaration was issued in the name of Gabriel Beato 1933: A certification was issued by the Bureau of Lands. The certification was not issued to Gabriel Beato. 1945: Gabriel Beato died. Subsequently, the tax declaration was issued in the name of Emilio Casipit (Urbanos son) 1961: the heirs of Gabriel Beato executed a kasulatan ng pagmamana at paghahati wherein they sold lot 144 to the Diaz spouses. 1962: the original TCT of the lot was cancelled and was replaced by a TCT in the name of the Diaz spouses. 1965: Antonia Casipit constructed houses on the property. The Diaz spouses filed complaints for anti-squatting and for ejectment, but was suspended because the Casipits filed a complaint for recovery of possession. The Casipits allege that the certification issued by the Bureau of Lands was not issued to Beato and hence the kasulatan by the heirs is void. They allege that the Diaz spouses are buyers in bad faith because they had full knowledge that Emilio was in actual possession of the
Laches can also apply here. The petitioners neglected for a reasonable and unexplained length of time to bring action. What was registered by the petitioners was the Escritura in 1964. When the said land was supposedly conveyed to Pedro and Justina, Marciana only had an inchoate ownership as Marciana was still not the registered owner because it was still in the names of Marcianas parents. Moreover, the petitioners were never in possession of the property. The court found for the Diaz spouses. Though it is true that an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible, this doctrine does not apply in this case. The basis for the present action is that the ownership of the Diaz spouses was established on false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive allegations. This would connote fraud. The 4-year prescriptive period within which to file this case for cancellation of title based on fraud must be done within 4 years after the cause of action arose. This has already elapsed. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the TCT. The 10 year period began on 1963 when the TCT was issued. The Diaz spouses were purchasers in good faith.
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Kiamco vs. CA (1992)
Ledesma vs. CA (1993)
De Cabrera vs. CA
property and that the Beatos did not have title to the property. TC: found for the Diaz spouses CA: affirmed Faustino owned a lot in Cebu that he sold to the Villamor Spouses. Because the Villamors needed money, Faustino asked his father-in-law, Jose Deguilmo, to buy the lot from the Villamors. Which Jose did. Jose took possession, introduced improvements and paid taxes. 1973: Faustino executed a deed of sale of the said lot in favor of Marcelino Kiamco. After 7 months, Marcelino filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages. Marcelino claims that Jose took possession of the lot as a trustee of Faustino. TC: the sale between the Villamors and Jose is void. Jose did not acquire the lot by acquisitive prescription. CA: reversed TC, Jose acquired it by acquisitive prescription. RCBC filed a case against Ledesma to enforce a trust receipt agreement that Ledesma failed to comply with. Since summons couldnt be served, the case was dismissed on 1981. 1988: RCBC instituted another civil case on the same cause of action and subject matter. Judgment was rendered in favor of RCBC ordering Ledesma to pay. Ledesma filed this petition contending that the second action filed had already prescribed. He insists that the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another action. 1950: A deed of sale was executed by Daniel and Albertana Teokemian (siblings) in favor of Andres Orais over a parcel of unregistered land in Davao. This was commonly owned by Daniel, Albertana and their sister Felicidad. The deed of sale was not signed by Felicidad. Later on a free patent originial certificate of title over the whole land was issued to Andres daughter, Virgilia Orais. 1972: a deed of absolute sale was executed conveying
The court ruled in favor of Jose finding that he was in actual possession in the concept of an owner from 1950 to 1973. The possession began before the effectivity of the Civil Code so the Code of Civil procedure applies. Here, the period of acquisitive prescription is 10 years whether in good faith or bad faith. As such, even if the sale were void, Jose already acquired the lot by acquisitive prescription.
Code of Civil procedure.
The court rejected Ledesmas claim. Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez and PNR vs. NLRC provide for the correct doctrine which is that the interruption of the prescriptive period by any of the means provided in Art. 1155 CC means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. It wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts a new prescriptive period.
Art. 1155 CC: the prescription of action, involving the present case that 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under article 1144(1) CC is interrupted by a) The filing of an action b) A written extrajudicial demand by the creditor c) A written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor
The registration of Orais over the property is fraudulent insofar as the 1/3 portion of Felicidad. Hence, Orais held that portion as a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of Felicidad. Hence, the right of the Cabreras to reconveyance of the subject property arises from implied trust.
Art. 1456 CC provides that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. But if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, then the action for reconveyance does not prescribe.
62
to spouses Elano and Felicidad Cabrera the 1/3 share of Felicidad in the lot. The Cabreras immediately took possession of the western portion of the lot. 1988: Orais filed a civil case against Cabrera for quieting of title to real property and damages. TC: for the Cabreras. Orais action is barred by laches. CA: reversed TC.
Art. 1456 CC provides that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. But this rule does not apply to the case at bar. Since the Cabreras are in actual possession of the land. If a person claiming to be the owner is in actual possession, the action does not prescribe.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> B. Special Applications >> 1. Possession >> b. Termination Case (Year) Ramos v. Director (1918) This case is about Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. The Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen, however, that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title. Applicant desires to obtain a title to a tract of land containing 3,000 ha and including four municipalities and a considerable part of Bohol. He relies upon open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land to prove his title. Lasam filed a for the registration of a parcel of land, containing an area of around 24M ha. He presented Exhibit L, a certified copy of an application stating that his predecessor in interest, has owned the land since time immemorial, as his proof. Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the same parcel described in another Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the
Resolution The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Legal Basis + Interpretation The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. The doctrine of lands cannot be successfully advanced where the claimant is not holding the land under color of title.
Vano v. Government (1920)
Applicant can secure title for the tracts of land of which he is in actual possession, but not the rest. Although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and the extent thereof.
Lasam v. Director (1938)
While possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.
63
land based his study mostly on hearsay. The applicant justified his possession by invoking the doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession). The Director of Lands opposed the registration. Alberto Estoista took his fathers rifle to shoot wild chickens. His father, Bruno Estoista, personally handed over the rifle to Albert. When Albert fired, he accidentally hit one of ther laborers, who died. For this, the CFI found him guilty of illegal possession of firearms (though he was acquitted of homicide through reckless imprudence). Alberto appeals, claiming that his father was with him when he was shooting, so he could not be guilty of illegal possession, Caparros is the lessee of respondents house. The contract of lease expired and was not extended, but Caparros was allowed to stay. Then, respondent gave Caparros notice to vacate the premises, as his son would be using the house. Caparros refused. Hence, respondents institution of a complaint for unlawful detainer. The Municipal Court ruled that Caparros cannot be dispossessed of the property pursuant to PD 1517 (Urban Land Reform Decree.) Restituta, while married to Juan, received a lot from her mother either by donation or purchase. A contract of lease was entered into between Restituta and Tan Queto, over the lot, for a period of 10yrs. After the period, Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer because the contract had expired. The case was dismissed by the CFI because of a barter with Juan, wherein Tan Queto became owner of the subject lot and the spouses became owners of a lot previously owned by Tan Queto. After the barter, Tan Queto constructed a building
People v. Estoista (1953)
Alberto was in illegal possession of his fathers rifle.
RA No. 4, amending Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code is directed against any person who possesses any firearm. Possession is employed in its broadest sense as to include carriers and holders. The law punishes the unlicensed holder whether or not he is the owner, because the same evils or perils to public security exist. The implied holding in US v. Samson is that intention to possess is an essential element of the Firearms Law. This does not include only intention to own, but also intention to use Sec. 6, PD 1517 shows that the law applies to a case where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party, whereby the tenant may not be ejected, should he decide to purchase the property.
Caparros v. CA (1989)
Caparros cannot avail of the protection of PD 1517, as the law is inapplicable here, where the property is not being offered for sale.
Tan Queto v. CA (1987)
The (previous) ownership of the lot was conjugal. Therefore, by virtue of the barter of Tan Queto with Juan, a conjugal owner, ownership of the lot may be said to have transferred to the former.
Art. 712 Ownership was acquired by both spouses by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of with P50.00 as the cause or consideration of the transaction. Art. 526 on good faith/ bad faith is not applicable here because Tan Queto himself was the owner of the property. There could be no such flaw or defect in the title as he himself owned the land.
64
Director v. IAC (1992)
on the lot. Later, Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto to recover the lot, claiming the lot was her paraphernal (not conjugal) property, and that Tan Queto was a builder/ possessor in bad faith. Applicant Angela Sarmiento seeks the registration of a lot in her name by virtue of four deeds of sale of smaller portions of the lot, which purportedly transferred possession of the lot to her. While the parties that sold to her remained in the property, they did so as tenants of Sarmiento, the new owner. The Trial Court ruled in her favor. The Director of Lands appealed this decision to the IAC, but the IAC found no merit in its petition.
The applicant and her predecessors were not in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for 30yrs prior to the filing of the application. Egro, the judicial confirmation of title cannot be granted.
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 1942 requires that the applicant prove: a. Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation b. For at least 30yrs c. Under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership When the law speaks of possession and occupation, it does not mean to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader because it includes constructive possession. Therefore, the law actually delimits the effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, it serves to highlight the fact that the possession required must not be mere fiction. Open patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine Continuous uninterrupted, unbroken, not intermittent Exclusive the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion Notorious so conspicuous that it is generally known Adverse open and notorious The action for ejectment arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes in the lessor, a right to the ownership or possession of the property. For this reason, the lessor cannot be compelled to prove his title thereto.
Pascual v. Angeles (1905)
Miguel Pascual alleged that Macario Angeles held under lease a land which formerly belonged to his (Pascuals) sister, and which he inherited from her. Angeles owed him for the use of the land. Demand was made (after the grant of an extension) for the payment and possession of the land, but Angeles refused. Since then, he has been in wrongful possession. Angeles denied the execution of the lease and alleged that he as the actual occupant of the land.
Angeles wrongfully possessed the land. The lease having been proven, and it appearing that Angeles failed to pay rent for several years, a sufficient cause existed for ejectment.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> B. Special Applications >> 2. Co-ownership Case (Year) Punzalan v. Boon This case is about Twenty-two Moros captured a whale, quartered it, Resolution Ahmad did not have the right to Legal Basis + Interpretation Arts. 609; 610 Common ownership was acquired through
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Liat (1923)
Twin Towers Condominium v. CA (2003)
and found a great quantity of ambergris in its stomach. They agreed to be the owners of the ambergris, and that none of them could sell it without the consent of the rest. However, one of them, Ahmad, upon the persuasion of an interested buyer, Teck, who claimed he could protect the former, sold the said ambergris. The twenty-one other Moros brought suit against Ahmad and Teck. Twin Towers Condominium Corporation filed a complaint with the SEC against ALS and Litonjua, corporate president of ALS and occupant of the Twin Towers unit, praying that the latter be ordered to pay solidarily the unpaid condominium assessments and dues. It also disallowed Litonjua from using the condominium facilities.
sell the ambergris. The ambergris was the undivided common property of the twenty-two Moros.
occupation.
ALS, as a unit owner at Twin Towers, is legally and contractually bound to pay for the maintenance of the common areas and facilities. Twin Towers House Rule 263 expressly authorizes the denial of the use of the condominium facilities to delinquent members.
Under the Condominium Act, the Master Deed may authorize the condominium corporation to collect reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures. For this purpose, each unit owner may be assessed separately for its share of such expenditures in proportion to the owners fractional interest in the common areas. The Condominium Act also empowers Twin Towers to promulgate House Rule 263.
VIII. Creation, Transmission and Termination of Property Rights >> B. Special Applications >> 3. Usufruct Case (Year) Lopez v. Constantino (1943) This case is about Appellant sold to her daughter, the appellee, a parcel of land with all the buildings and improvements thereon. The CFI later declared the sale subject to the condition that the vendor shall receive from the vendee, by way of life pension, one half of the rents from the properties. Such condition was annotated on the title. After a fire which totally destroyed the buildings, appellee sought the removal of the annotation of the condition, on the theory that her obligation to pay appellant a life pension had terminated upon the destruction of the building out of the rents from which said pension was payable. Sps. Paraiso owned a residential lot. Sps. Baluran owned an unirrigated Riceland. The two parties executed an agreement entitled, Barter. By virtue of such agreement, the parties stipulated that both Resolution Appellee's obligation towards appellant under the contract has not been extinguished. The obligation was an encumbrance on the buildings AND the lot, and so was not extinguished by the destruction of the buildings. Legal Basis + Interpretation But granting that the obligation of the appellee to pay to the appellant part of the rents of the building or of certain portions thereof is an encumbrance on the building alone such obligation may properly be considered as constituting the appellant a cousufructuary of said building. Art. 469; Art. 517
Baluran v. Navarro (1977)
The agreement did not transfer ownership.
The parties only acquired the right of usufruct. The name of the agreement is not controlling. The stipulations indicate that there was no intention to transfer ownership. All that was intended was to transfer material possession.
66
shall have the right to enjoy the material possession of their respective properties (Paraisos: reap the fruits of the Riceland; Balurans: build their own house on the lot), but that neither could encumber, alienate, or dispose of their respective properties. Antonio Obedencio filed a complaint to recover the residential lot from Avelino Baluran. Baluran alleged that the barter agreement transferred ownership of the lot to him. In Luis Palads last will and testament, a trusteeship was constituted over two parcels of land, where the income of such would be used for the benefit of the establishment of a secondary school. The school was then constructed and financed with the income of the lots. Plaintiffs, Palads successors, now allege that they are entitled to the reversion of the two lots, the trusteeship having been dissolved with the completion of the construction of the school.
Palad v. Navarro (1972)
The trust was not terminated with the completion of the construction of the school. The term established should not be limited to the initial construction of the school.
Art. 515 of the Old Civil Code prohibiting the creation of a usufruct for more than thirty (30) years in favor of any town, province, or association, does not apply to the instant case because what was constituted by the last will and testament of the late Luis Palad is a trust, not a usufruct Pursuant to Act No. 3232, amended by Act No. 3462, the Director of Education is authorized to receive from the provincial governor, as trustee, sums necessary for the operation, construction, and upkeep of the permanent buildings of the school.

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JM TUASON VS. VDA. DE LUMANLAN (1968)

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