Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Ruben D.

Torres 225 SCRA 417, August 19, 1993

Facts Petitioners herein filed a petition for prohibition against Executive Order No. 450 lifting the ban on new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of Labor may promulgate. They contended that the said E.O. is contrary to the Letter of Instruction issued by deposed President Marcos withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective January 1, 1982 except as he may otherwise direct as the latter was issued when President Marcos was holding dual powers, that of the executive and legislative, and that the latter has the force of law and the former, which is merely an administrative order, is subordinate thereto. Issue Whether or not Executive Order No. 450 may repeal Letter of Instruction 1190 issued by then President Marcos while he was still exercising legislative and executive powers. Ruling LOI 1190 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was issued in response to "a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter." The conspicuous absence of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive. Hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and must consequently be upheld.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals 240 SCRA 368, January 20, 1995

Facts On 22 August 1986, Executive Order 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donors taxes a nd taxes on business for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, ROH Auto parts Philippines Inc. filed its Tax Amnesty Return and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. The Company requested that the deficiency tax notice issued on August 13, 1986 be cancelled and withdrawn as it has availed of the tax amnesty. The Commissioner denied the request, construing that the amnesty coverage include only assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of EO 41 and not to assessments theretofore made. Issue Whether or not the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning and intent of executive Order No. 41. Ruling If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. The added exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope of the amnesty clearly amounts to an act of administrative legislation quite contrary to the mandate of the law which the regulation ought to implement. There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns and due payments made by the taxpayer did not conform with the conditions expressed in the amnesty order. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court of Appeals, sustaining that of the court of Tax Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998

Facts Respondent elevated a complaint against petitioner for unpaid fees for pilotage service rendered. Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay and prays be directed to pay with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint and other such other relief. The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the EO 1088 because (1) its interpretation and application are left to private respondent, a private person and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers, upon which respondent based its claims. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the administrative body vested under PD 857. The trial court directed the petitioner to pay respondent on sum of unpaid pilotage fees, legal rate of interest, attorney's fees and costs. The trial court added that the factual antecedents of the controversy are simple; the petitioner insists on paying the fees prescribed under PPA circulars because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner then assailed its constitutionality. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Courts decision. Issue Whether or not EO 1088 is unconstitutional. Ruling The petition has no merit. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

Ople vs. Torres 293 SCRA 141, July 23, 1998

Facts President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12, 1996 entitled Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference System or commonly known as National ID System. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Sup reme Court questioning the constitutionality of the said executive issuance on two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Issue Whether or not A.O. 308 violate the right to privacy. Ruling Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authoriti es to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.