G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970 MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V.

DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants. Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1 On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs. Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her. After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties. The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80 2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06 3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17 4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41 6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47 7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00 9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00 Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01 The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows: (1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime; (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above; (4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched. On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis: (a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the OppositorsAppellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not

compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced. Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56 2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42 3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04 4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38 5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04 6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13 7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50 9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80 T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78 while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes. The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix." From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: . 1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction; 2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and 3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix; which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below. The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8 The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee. 1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes. 2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him." 3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..." 4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16 Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17 Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs. Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left

merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed. 5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee. Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal. ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

G.R. No. L-21993

June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents. Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners. Torres and Torres for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorariand prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction. The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise: It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case". The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955. SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of

the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules): SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself. The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
1wph1.t

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us. In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that: "... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account. There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed; (3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code. Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued. Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez. Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

Now section 44, subpar. (e) of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296).

G.R. No. L-7188

August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants. C. de la Victoria for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said: . . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses. And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared: From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate. What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed. Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193). In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

G.R. No. L-5064

February 27, 1953

BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant. This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff. The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision: 1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children; 2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu; 3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property; 4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the support of her children; 5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle; 6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered up to the date; 7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses. As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777. Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says: The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.) The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share. On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.

G.R. No. L-21017

February 25, 1924

In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased. MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO, petitioners-appellees, vs. DEE TIM, YAP KIM TING, YAP KIM SENG, and YAP HU CHO, respondents-appellants. Salvador Barrios and Gabino S. Abaya for appellants. Felix B. Bautista and Jose Gutierrez David for appellees. JOHNSON, J.: It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1) and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased. Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock. In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great deal of proof was presented. Exhibits 1 and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents (Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap Siong had admitted in a public document that Maria Lao was his wife. The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the 14th day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A Exhibit A1. She contended that Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the ordinary and customary document issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had taken place. He described in detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance with the customs and practice in China. Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual proof or certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had taken place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and ordinary proof, or certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a marriage ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila. The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her contention that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three children Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children, born of her marriage with Yap Siong. To further sustain her contention she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, documents in which Yap Siong had expressly recognized his marriage to her. To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap Siong, the petitioner presented Exhibits 2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8. Said exhibits are alleged letters supposed to have been written by an

uncle in China of Yap Siong during the years 1900 to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of marrying, thus attempting to establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period was not a married man. When we first studied the record in this case we were inclined to give said letters great credit, but upon a further examination of the record and a further argument by the respective parties, we are now inclined to believe that said letters were fabricated for the very purpose of defeating the contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by persons who had reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually prepared in China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion, and we believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not be admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are now persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications. The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing that the marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason that Yap Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893, and that at that time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of Pampanga, and that he never left that municipality. A careful reading of their testimony, however, does not convince us that it is altogether reliable. The testimony which they gave was given in the month of January, 1923, and they testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places in the year 1897. Their testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or conditions which caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they testified. They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts of Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary there is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of times after his first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show that Yap Siong had admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida and not his wife. The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son, were not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit L is the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles, in which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of January, 1904, he baptized a child named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao, and whose father was unknown. Exhibit LL is a certificate of birth issued by the secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a natural son of Maria Lao. There is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows that Maria Lao was responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the statement that the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo Lao. There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose Martin Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that the baptism took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was then 34 days old. It is apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of said exhibits are untrue. And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the Filipino people in their relation with the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is easily understood, in view of the alleged fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had been joined in holy matrimony under the forms of the Protestant Church, why the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles stated in his certificate that the father of the child, then Jose Martin, was unknown. The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had never been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of witnesses to the fact that Yap Siong had on numerous occassions asserted that Maria Lao was his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason, that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information, that he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns, and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary. From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record, we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the following: (1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children born of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the fact that Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born of that wedlock; and that they had no reason to believe, until after the death of Yap Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein. (2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June, 1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man, without any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose Lao is the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao. In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double marriage. They were each married in good faith

and in ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other. Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the two families? Under theLeyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553.) A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish Law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. To remedy that hardship under the common law and following the wise jurisprudence of Spain, both England and many of the states of the United States adopted statutes. (Glass vs. Glass, 114 Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. S.], 114; Dyer vs.Brannock, 66 Mo., 391; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, 1 Tex., 621 [46 Am. Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs. Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587; Patton vs. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs. Abston, 15 La. Ann., 137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38 U.S., 404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.) The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng vs.Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been performed in China, that is, that the alleged Chines wife and the deceased in each of those cases had never been legally married. Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this court in the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the other one-half to Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to costs, it so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant. Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant. Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

STREET, J.: This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed. The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared: I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Buenovs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772). Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties. We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.

The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir. We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible. The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed ( incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession. The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)
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In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption against it, a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator. The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant. Avancea, C, J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents. Vicente R. Redor for petitioner. Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.: Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido Alvarado. On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna. 5Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied. On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served. The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with? Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at

three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on 14 December 1977. The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads: Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. 7 Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation. 8 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with. We agree with petitioner in this respect. Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him. The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit: The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . . Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with. Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires. Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed. We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied. This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. 15 Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17 As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied). Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant. Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.: This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. As found by the Court of Appeals: ... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds: (1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; (2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and (4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977. On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that: (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979. The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said: ... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence. On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors: I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF; II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL; III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL. The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.