5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

iep.utm.edu

http://www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/

GeorgeBerkeley(16851753)
GeorgeBerkeleywasoneofthethreemostfamousBritishEmpiricists.(The othertwoareJohnLockeandDavidHume.)Berkeleyisbestknownforhis earlyworksonvision(AnEssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision,1709)and metaphysics(ATreatiseconcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge, 1710ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous,1713). Berkeleysempiricaltheoryofvisionchallengedthethenstandardaccount ofdistancevision,anaccountwhichrequirestacitgeometricalcalculations. Hisalternativeaccountfocusesonvisualandtactualobjects.Berkeley arguesthatthevisualperceptionofdistanceisexplainedbythecorrelation ofideasofsightandtouch.Thisassociativeapproachdoesawaywith appealstogeometricalcalculationwhileexplainingmonocularvisionandthe moonillusion,anomaliesthathadplaguedthegeometricaccount. Berkeleyclaimedthatabstractideasarethesourceofallphilosophicalperplexityandillusion.Inhis IntroductiontothePrinciplesofHumanKnowledgehearguedthat,asLockedescribedabstractideas (BerkeleyconsideredLockesthebestaccountofabstraction),(1)theycannot,infact,beformed,(2)they arenotneededforcommunicationorknowledge,and(3)theyareinconsistentandtherefore inconceivable. InthePrinciplesandtheThreeDialoguesBerkeleydefendstwometaphysicaltheses:idealism(theclaim thateverythingthatexistseitherisamindordependsonamindforitsexistence)andimmaterialism(the claimthatmatterdoesnotexist).Hiscontentionthatallphysicalobjectsarecomposedofideasis encapsulatedinhismottoesseispercipi(tobeistobeperceived). AlthoughBerkeleysearlyworkswereidealistic,hesayslittleinthemregardingthenatureofones knowledgeofthemind.MuchofwhatcanbegleanedregardingBerkeleysaccountofmindisderived fromtheremarksonnotionsthatwereaddedtothe1734editionsofthePrinciplesandtheThree Dialogues. BerkeleywasapriestoftheChurchofIreland.Inthe1720s,hisreligiousinterestscametothefore.He wasnamedDeanofDerryin1724.HeattemptedtofoundacollegeinBermuda,spendingseveralyears inRhodeIslandwaitingfortheBritishgovernmenttoprovidethefundingithadpromised.Whenit becameclearthatthefundingwouldnotbeprovided,hereturnedtoLondon.Therehepublished Alciphron(adefenseofChristianity),criticismsofNewtonstheoryofinfinitesimals,TheTheoryofVision Vindicated,andrevisededitionsofthePrinciples,andtheThreeDialogues.HewasnamedBishopof Cloynein1734andlivedinCloyneuntilhisretirementin1752.Hewasagoodbishop,seekingthe welfareofProtestantsandCatholicsalike.HisQuerist(17351737)presentsargumentsforthereformof theIrisheconomy.Hislastphilosophicalwork,Siris(1744),includesadiscussionofthemedicinalvirtues oftarwater,followedbyproperlyphilosophicaldiscussionsthatmanyscholarsseeasadeparturefromhis earlieridealism.

TableofContents
1. LifeandWorks 2. EssaysonVision 3. AgainstAbstraction
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 1/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

4. IdealismandImmaterialism 5. Notions 6. ConcludingRemarks 7. ReferencesandFurtherReading

1.LifeandWorks
GeorgeBerkeleywasborninornearKilkenny,Irelandon12March1685.HewasraisedinDysartCastle. AlthoughhisfatherwasEnglish,BerkeleyalwaysconsideredhimselfIrish.In1696,heenteredKilkenny College.HeenteredTrinityCollege,Dublinon21March1700andreceivedhisB.A.in1704.Heremained associatedwithTrinityCollegeuntil1724.In1706hecompetedforaCollegeFellowshipwhichhad becomeavailableandbecameaJuniorFellowon9June1707.Aftercompletinghisdoctorate,hebecame aSeniorFellowin1717.AswascommonpracticeforBritishacademicsatthetime,Berkeleywas ordainedasanAnglicanpriestin1710. TheworksforwhichBerkeleyisbestknownwerewrittenduringhisTrinityCollegeperiod.In1709,he publishedAnEssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision.In1710,hepublishedATreatiseconcerningthe PrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,PartI.In1712,hepublishedPassiveObedience,whichfocusesonmoral andpoliticalphilosophy.In1713,hepublishedThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous.In1721,he publishedDeMotu.Inaddition,thereisasetofnotebooks,oftencalledthePhilosophicalCommentaries (PC),thatcoverstheperiodduringwhichhedevelopedhisidealismandimmaterialism.Thesewere personalnotebooks,andheneverintendedtopublishthem. WhileBerkeleywasassociatedwithTrinityCollegeuntil1724,hewasnotcontinuouslyinresidence.In 1713,heleftforLondon,inparttoarrangepublicationfortheThreeDialogues.Hebefriendedsomeofthe intellectuallightsofthetime,includingJonathanSwift,JosephAddison,RichardSteele,andAlexander Pope.Hecontributedseveralarticlesagainstfreethinking(agnosticism)toSteelesGuardian.Sincethe articleswereunsigned,disagreementremainsregardingwhicharticlesBerkeleywrote.Hewasthe chaplaintoLordPeterboroughduringhis17131714continentaltour.Thereissomeevidencethat BerkeleymettheFrenchphilosopherNicholasMalebrancheduringthattour,althoughthepopularmyth thattheirconversationoccasionedMalebranchesdeathisfalse:Malebranchediedin1715.Hewasthe chaperoneofyoungSt.GeorgeAshe,sonoftheTrinityCollegeprovost,duringhiscontinentaltourfrom 171621.ItwasduringthistourthatBerkeleylaterclaimedtohavelostthemanuscripttothesecondpart ofthePrinciples(Works2:282).HeobservedtheeruptionofMountVesuviusin1717andsenta descriptionofittotheRoyalSociety(Works4:247250).WhileinLyon,Francein1720,BerkeleywroteDe Motu,anessayonmotionwhichreflectshisscientificinstrumentalism.ThemanuscriptwasBerkeleys entryforadissertationprizesponsoredbytheFrenchAcademy.Itdidnotwin. InMay1724,BerkeleybecameAnglicanDeanofDerryandresignedhispositionatTrinityCollege.He wasneveradeaninresidence.Between1722and1728,Berkeleydevelopedaplantoestablisha seminaryinBermudaforthesonsofcolonistsandNativeAmericans.Heactivelylobbiedforhisproject. Heobtainedacharterforthecollege,privatecontributions,andapromiseforagrantof20,000fromthe BritishParliament.AftermarryingAnneFosteronAugust1,1728,heandhisbridedepartedforAmerica inSeptember1728.HesettlednearNewport,RhodeIsland,waitingforthepromisedgrant.Heboughta farmandbuiltahousenamedWhitehall,whichisstillstanding.Hewasanactiveclericduringhisstayin RhodeIsland.HewasincontactwithsomeoftheleadingAmericanintellectualsofthetime,including SamuelJohnson,whobecamethefirstpresidentofKingsCollege(nowColumbiaUniversity).Hewrote thebulkofAlciphron,hisdefenseofChristianityagainstfreethinking,whileinAmerica.Inearly1731, EdmundGibson,theBishopofLondon,informedBerkeleythatSirRobertWalpolehadinformedhimthat therewaslittlelikelihoodthatthepromisedgrantwouldbepaid.BerkeleyreturnedtoLondoninOctober 1731.BeforeleavingAmericahedividedhislibrarybetweentheHarvardandYalelibraries,andhegave
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 2/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

hisfarmtoYale. AfterhisreturntoLondon,BerkeleypublishedASermonbeforetheSocietyforthePropagationofthe GospelinForeignParts(1732),Alciphron:ortheMinutePhilosopher(1732),TheTheoryofVision,or VisualLanguageshewingtheimmediatePresenceandProvidenceofADeity,VindicatedandExplained (1733),TheAnalystor,aDiscourseAddressedtoanInfidelMathematician(1734),ADefenseofFree ThinkinginMathematics(1735),ReasonsfornotReplyingtoMrWaltonsFullAnswer(1735),aswellas revisededitionsofthePrinciplesandtheDialogues(1734).TherevisionsofthePrinciplesandDialogues containBerkeleysscantremarksonthenatureandonesknowledgeofmind(notions). WhiletheBermudaProjectwasapracticalfailure,itincreasedBerkeleysreputationasareligiousleader. ItisconsideredpartiallyresponsibleforhisappointmentasBishopofCloyneinJanuary1734.InFebruary 1734heresignedasDeanofDerry.HewasconsecratedBishopofCloyneinSt.PaulsChurch,Dublin,on 19May1734. Berkeleywasagoodbishop.AsbishopofaneconomicallypoorAnglicandioceseinapredominantly RomanCatholiccountry,hewascommittedtothewellbeingofbothProtestantsandCatholics.He establishedaschooltoteachspinning,andheattemptedtoestablishthemanufactureoflinen.HisQuerist (17351737)concernseconomicandsocialissuesgermanetoIreland.Amongotherthings,itcontainsa proposalformonetaryreform.HisSiris(1744)prefaceshisphilosophicaldiscussionswithanaccountof themedicinalvalueoftarwater.TherelationshipofSiristohisearlyphilosophycontinuestobeamatterof scholarlydiscussion. ExceptforatriptoDublinin1737toaddresstheIrishHouseofLordsandatriptoKilkennyin1750tovisit family,hewascontinuallyinCloyneuntilhisretirement.InAugust1752,BerkeleyandhisfamilyleftCloyne forOxford,ostensiblytooverseetheeducationofhissonGeorge.WhileatOxford,hearrangedforthe republicationofhisAlciphronandthepublicationofhisMiscellany,acollectionofessaysonvarious subjects.HediedonJanuary14,1753whilehiswifewasreadinghimasermon.Inkeepingwithhiswill, hisbodywaskeptfivedaysaboveground,eventillitgrowoffensivebythecadaveroussmell(Works 8:381),aprovisionthatwasintendedtopreventprematureburial.(Thiswastheageinwhichsome casketswerefittedwithbellsabovegroundsothedeadcouldringupiftheirbeneficiarieshadbeena bithasty.)

2.EssaysonVision
In1709,BerkeleypublishedAnEssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision(NTV).Thisisanempiricalaccount oftheperceptionofdistance,magnitude,andfigure.TheNewTheoryofVisiondoesnotpresuppose immaterialism,and,althoughBerkeleyheldthatitwasconnectedwithhislaterworks,thedegreeof connectionishotlycontestedamongscholars.BerkeleyalsodiscussesvisioninDialogue4ofAlciphron (1732),and,inreplytoasetofobjections,intheTheoryofVisionVindicated(TVV).Healludestohis accountofvisioninthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge(PHK4244)andtheThreeDialogues(DHP1 201203). BerkeleysobjectiveintheNewTheoryofVisionwastoshewthemannerwhereinweperceivebysight thedistance,magnitude,andsituationofobjects.Alsotoconsiderthedifferencethereisbetwixttheideas ofsightandtouch,andwhethertherebeanyideacommontobothsenses(NTV1).Berkeleyagrees withotherwritersonopticsthatdistanceisnotimmediatelyseen(NTV2)andrecountsthepositionsof earlierwriters.Someheldthatwecorrelateourcurrentperceptionswithearlierperceptionsandjudgethat theobjectsaredistantbecausewehadexperiencedthelargesizeofintermediateobjects,orbecausethe objectswhichnowappearsmallandfainthadearlierappearedlargeandvigorous(NTV3).Some,such asDescartes,heldthatdistanceisjudgedbyanaturalgeometrybasedontheanglesbetweenthe perceivedobjectandtheeyesorontheanglesoftheraysoflightthatfallupontheeye(NTV4and6, andWorks1:237238Descartes1:170).Berkeleyrejectsthoseaccounts.
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 3/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Whenoneperceivesmediately,oneperceivesoneideabymeansofperceivinganother(NTV9),for example,oneperceivesthatsomeoneisfrightenedbyperceivingthepalenessofherface(NTV10). Empirically,thegeometricalaccountfails,sinceoneperceivesneithertherequisitelines,norangles,nor raysassuch(NTV1215),eventhoughsuchmathematicalcomputationscanbeusefulindetermining theapparentdistanceormagnitudeofanobject(NTV38,78TVV58).So,whataretheimmediate ideasthatmediatetheperceptionofdistance?First,therearethekinestheticsensationsassociatedwith focusingtheeyeswhenperceivingobjectsatvariousdistances(NTV16).Second,asobjectsarebrought closertotheeye,theirappearancebecomesmoreconfused(blurredordouble,NTV21).Third,asan objectapproachestheeyes,thedegreeofconfusioncanbemitigatedbystrainingtheeyes,whichis recognizedbykinestheticsensations(NTV27).Ineachcase,thereisnonecessaryconnectionbetween theideasanddistancethereismerelyacustomaryconnectionbetweentwotypesofideas(NTV17, 26,28).Anecessaryconnectionisarelationsuchasthatfoundamongnumbersintruearithmetic equations.Itisimpossiblefor7+3toequalanythingotherthan10,anditisimpossibletoimagineittobe anythingotherthan10.Acustomaryconnectionisarelationfoundinexperienceinwhichonetypeofidea isfoundwithorfollowedbyanother,butwhichonecouldimaginethesituationtobeotherwise.David Humesfamousexampleisthatexperienceshowsthatwheneveronebilliardballhitsanother,thesecond rollsaway,butthefactthatonecouldimagineanythinghappeningshowsthatthereismerelyacustomary connectionbetweentheactionsofthebilliardballs.Itisinthissensethatideasoftouchandsightare merelycustomarily,andnotnecessarily,connected.Theabsenceofanecessaryconnectionbetween theseideasisfurtherillustratedbythefactthatnearsighted(purblind)personsfindthatobjectsappear less,ratherthanmore,confusedastheyapproachtotheeyes(NTV37).Sinceoneperceivesdistance bysightmediatelythroughthecorrelationofvisualideaswithnonvisualideas,apersonbornblindand whocametoseewouldhavenonotionofvisualdistance:eventhemostremoteobjectswouldseemto beinhiseye,orratherhismind(NTV41)ThisisBerkeleysfirstallusiontoMolyneuxsmanbornblind madetosee(cf.Locke2.9.8,pp.145146),whichBerkeleyregularlyusestoshowtheconsequencesof histheoryofvision(seealsoNTV79,110,and132133TVV71).Molyneuxscontentionwasthatifa personwerebornblindandhadlearnedtodistinguishacubefromaspherebytouch,hewouldnot immediatelybeabletodistinguishavisualcubefromasphereifheweregivensight. Likemostphilosophersoftheperiod,Berkeleyseemstoassumethattouchprovidesimmediateaccessto theworld.Visualideasofanobject,ontheotherhand,varywithonesdistancefromtheobject.Asone approachesatoweronejudgestobeaboutamileaway,theappearancealters,andfrombeingobscure, small,andfaint,growsclear,large,andvigorous(NTV44).Thetoweristakentobeofadeterminate sizeandshape,butthevisualappearancecontinuallychanges.Howcanthatbe?Berkeleyclaimsthat visualideasaremerelysignsoftactileideas.Thereisnoresemblancebetweenvisualandtactileideas. Theirrelationshipislikethatbetweenwordsandtheirmeanings.Ifonehearsanoun,onethinksofan objectitdenotes.Similarly,ifoneseesanobject,onethinksofacorrespondingideaoftouch,which Berkeleydeemsthesecondary(mediate)objectofsight.Inbothcases,therearenonecessary connectionsbetweentheideas.Theassociativeconnectionisbasedonexperience(NTV51cf.TVV 40,Alciphron,Dialogue4). Hisdiscussionofmagnitudeisanalogoustohisdiscussionofdistance.Berkeleyexplorestherelationships betweentheobjectsofsightandtouchbyintroducingthenotionsofminimumvisiblesandtangibles,the smallestpointsoneactuallycanperceivebysightandtouch,pointswhichmustbetakentobeindivisible. Theapparentsizeofavisibleobjectvarieswithdistance,whilethesizeofthecorrespondingtangible objectistakentobeconstant(NTV55).Theapparentsizeofthevisualobject,itsconfusionor distinctness,anditsfaintnessorvigorplayrolesinjudgingthesizeofthetangibleobject.Allthingsbeing equal,ifitappearslarge,itistakentobelarge.But,betheideaimmediatelyperceivedbysightneverso large,yetifitbewithalconfused,Ijudgethemagnitudeofthethingtobebutsmall.Ifitbedistinctand clear,Ijudgeitgreater.Andifitbefaint,Iapprehendittobeyetgreater(NTV56seealso57).Asin thecaseofdistance,therearenonecessaryconnectionsbetweenthesensoryelementsofthevisualand tangibleobject.Thecorrelationsareonlyknownbyconsistentexperience(NTV59,6264),and
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 4/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Berkeleyarguesthatmeasurements(inches,feet,etc.)areapplicableonlytotangiblesize(NTV61). Theargumentsarerepeated,mutatesmutandis,regardingvisualandtangiblefigure(NTV105ff). Berkeleyarguesthattheobjectsofsightandtouchindeed,theobjectsofeachsensiblemodalitiesare distinctandincommensurable.Thisisknownastheheterogeneitythesis(seeNTV108ff).Thetower thatvisuallyappearstobesmallandroundfromadistanceisperceivedtobelargeandsquarebytouch. So,onecomplextactualobjectcorrespondstotheindefinitelylargenumberofvisualobjects.Sincethere arenonecessaryconnectionsbetweentheobjectsofsightandtouch,theobjectsmustbedistinct. Further,hisdiscussionofhearingthecoachapproachshowsthatthereisasimilardistinctionbetween theobjectsofhearingandtouch(NTV46).Giventhehypothesisthatthenumberofminimumvisibles seenisconstantandthesameamongindividualhumansandothercreatures(NTV8081),itfollows thattheobjectsseenwhenusingamicroscopearenotthesameasthoseseenbythenakedeye(NTV 85cf.NTV105andDHP3245246). BeforeturningtothediscussionsofBerkeleysidealismandimmaterialism,thereareseveralpointswe shouldnotice.First,therearevariouspointsintheNewTheoryofVisionwhereBerkeleywritesasifideas oftouchareorareofexternalobjects(cf.46,64,77,78,82,88,99,117,155).SincetheBerkeleyof thePrinciplesandDialoguescontendsthatallideasareminddependentandallphysicalobjectsare composedofideas,somehavequestionedwhetherthepositionintheNewTheoryofVisionisconsistent withtheworkthatimmediatelyfollows.Somescholarssuggestthateitherthattheworksonvisionare scientificworkswhich,assuch,makenometaphysicalcommitmentsorthatallusionstoexternalobjects arecasesofspeakingwiththevulgar.Secondly,insofarasinhislaterworksBerkeleyclaimsthatordinary objectsarecomposedofideas,hisdiscussionofthecorrelationofideasofsightandtouchtendsto anticipatehislaterviewbyexplaininghowonecollectstheideasofdistinctsensestoformonething. Finally,theNewTheoryofVisionincludesdiscussionsoftheprimary/secondaryqualitiesdistinction(43, 4849,61,109)andofabstraction(NTV122127)thatanticipatehislaterdiscussionsofthosetopics.

3.AgainstAbstraction
IntheIntroductiontothePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,Berkeleylamentsthedoubtanduncertainty foundinphilosophicaldiscussions(Intro.13),andheattemptstofindthoseprinciplesthatdrew philosophyawayfromcommonsenseandintuition(PHK4).Hefindsthesourceofskepticisminthe theoryofabstractideas,whichhecriticizes. Berkeleybeginsbygivingageneraloverviewofthedoctrine:

Itisagreedonallhands,thatthequalitiesormodesofthingsdoneverreallyexisteachof themapartbyitself,andseparatedfromallothers,butaremixed,asitwere,andblended together,severalinthesameobject.Butwearetold,themindbeingabletoconsidereach qualitysingly,orabstractedfromthoseotherqualitieswithwhichitisunited,doesbythat meansframetoitselfabstractideas.Notthatitispossibleforcolourormotiontoexist withoutextension:butonlythatthemindcanframetoitselfbyabstractiontheideaof colourexclusiveofextension,andofmotionexclusiveofbothcolourandextension.(Intro, 7)

In89hedetailsthedoctrineintermsofLockesaccountintheEssayconcerningHuman Understanding.AlthoughtheoriesofabstractiondatebackatleasttoAristotle(Metaphysics,BookK, Chapter3,1061a291069b4),wereprevalentamongthemedievals(cf.Intro,17andPC779),andare foundintheCartesians(Descartes,1:212213ArnauldandNicole,pp.3738),thereseemtobetwo reasonswhyBerkeleyfocusedonLocke.First,Lockesworkwasrecentandfamiliar.Second,Berkeley

www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 5/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

seemstohaveconsideredLockesaccountthebestavailable.Ashewroteinhisnotebooks,Wonderfulin Lockethathecouldwnadvancdinyearsseeatallthroamistythadbeensolongagathering&was consequentlythick.Thismoretobeadmirdthanythedidntseefarther(PC567). AccordingtoLocke,thedoctrineofabstractideasexplainshowknowledgecanbecommunicatedandhow itcanbeincreased.Itexplainshowgeneraltermsobtainmeaning(Locke,3.3.120,pp.409420).A generalterm,suchascatreferstoanabstractgeneralidea,whichcontainsallandonlythoseproperties thatonedeemscommontoallcats,or,moreproperly,thewaysinwhichallcatsresembleeachother.The connectionbetweenageneraltermandanabstractideaisarbitraryandconventional,andtherelation betweenanabstractideaandtheindividualobjectsfallingunderitisanaturalrelation(resemblance).If Lockestheoryissound,itprovidesameansbywhichonecanaccountforthemeaningofgeneralterms withoutinvokinggeneralobjects(universals). Berkeleysattackonthedoctrineofabstractideasfollowsthreetracks.(1)ThereistheIcantdoit argumentinIntro.10.(2)ThereistheWedontneeditargumentinIntro.1112.And(3)thereisthe ThetheoryleadstoinconsistenciesargumentinIntro.13,whichBerkeleydeemedthekillingblow(PC 687).Asweshallsee,Berkeleyusesasimilartripartiteattackondoctrineofmaterialsubstance(see PHK1623). HavingoutlinedLockesaccountofabstractioninIntroduction89,whichallegedlyresultsintheideaof ahumanwhichiscoloredbuthasnodeterminatecolorthattheideaincludesageneralideaofcolor,but notaspecificcolorsuchasblackorwhiteorbrownoryellowwhichhasasizebuthasnodeterminate size,andsoforth,Berkeleyarguesin10thathecanformnosuchidea.Onthefaceofit,hisargumentis weak.Atmostitshowsthatinsofarashecannotformtheidea,andassumingthatallhumanshavesimilar psychologicalabilities,thereissomeevidencethatnohumanscanformabstractideasofthesortLocke described. Butthereisaremarkmadeinpassingthatsuggeststhereisamuchstrongerargumentimplicitinthe section.Berkeleywrites:

Tobeplain,Iownmyselfabletoabstractinonesense,aswhenIconsidersomeparticular partsorqualitiesseparatedfromothers,withwhichthoughtheyareunitedinsomeobject, yet,itispossibletheymayreallyexistwithoutthem.ButIdenythatIcanabstractonefrom another,orconceiveseparately,thosequalitieswhichitisimpossibleshouldexistso separatedorthatIcanframeageneralnotionbyabstractingfromparticularsinthe manneraforesaid.Whichtwolastaretheproperacceptationsofabstraction.(Intro.10)

ThisthreefolddistinctionamongtypesofabstractionisfoundinArnauldandNicolesLogicortheArtof Thinking.Thefirsttypeofabstractionconcernsintegralparts.Thehead,arms,torso,andlegsareintegral partsofabody:eachcanexistinseparationfromthebodyofwhichitisapart(ArnauldandNicole,p.37). Thesecondkindofabstractionariseswhenweconsideramodewithoutpayingattentiontoitssubstance, ortwomodeswhicharejoinedtogetherinthesamesubstance,takingeachoneseparately(Arnauldand Nicole,p.37).Thethirdconcernsdistinctionsofreason,forexample,conceivingofatriangleas equilateralwithoutconceivingofitasequiangular(ArnauldandNicole,p.38).Berkeleygrantsthathecan abstractinthefirstsenseIcanconsiderthehand,theeye,thenose,eachbyitselfabstractedor separatedfromtherestofthebody(Intro.10)buthedeniesthathecanabstractinthelattertwo senses.Thelattertwocasesrepresentimpossiblestatesofaffairs.In7Berkeleynotedthatthe abstractionistsheldthatitisimpossibleforamodetoexistapartfromasubstance.Manyabstractionists alsoacceptedaconceivabilitycriterionofpossibility:Ifonecan(clearlyanddistinctly)conceiveofastate ofaffairs,thenitispossibleforthatstateofaffairstoexistasconceived(cf.Descartes,2:54).This principleentailsthatimpossiblestatesofaffairsareinconceivable.So,grantingitisimpossibleforamode
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 6/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

toexistapartfromasubstance(Intro.7),itfollowsthatitisimpossibletoconceiveofamodeapartfrom asubstance,thatthesecondformabstractionisimpossible.Andifthesecondfalls,thethirdfallsaswell, sincethethirdrequiresthatalternativedescriptionsofanobjectpickoutnodifferencesinreality.So,a traditionaltheoryofmodesandsubstances,theconceivabilitycriterionofpossibility,andabstractionare aninconsistenttriad.Theinconsistencycanberesolvedbydroppingthedoctrineofabstractideas. BerkeleymadethispointexplicitlyinthefirstdraftoftheIntroduction:

Itis,Ithink,areceivdaxiomthatanimpossibilitycannotbeconceivd.Forwhatcreated intelligencewillpretendtoconceive,thatwhichGodcannotcausetobe?Nowitisonall handsagreed,thatnothingabstractorgeneralcanbemadereallytoexist,whenceit shouldseemtofollow,thatitcannothavesomuchasanidealexistenceinthe understanding.(Works2:125)

Oneofthemarksofthemodernperiodisanadherencetotheprincipleofparsimony(OckhamsRazor). Theprincipleholdsthatthetheoreticallysimpleroftwoexplanationsismoreprobablytrue.Inthe seventeenthandeighteencenturies,thiswassometimesexpressedasGoddoesnothinginvain(cf. DHP2214).So,ifitispossibletoconstructatheoryofmeaningthatdoesnotintroduceabstractideasas adistinctkindofidea,thattheorywouldbesimpleranddeemedmoreprobablytrue.Thisisthestrategy BerkeleyadoptsinIntroduction1112. GrantingLockethatallexistentsareparticulars(Locke3.3.6,p.410),Berkeleyremarks,Butitseemsthat awordbecomesgeneralbybeingmadethesign,notofanabstractgeneralideabut,ofseveralparticular ideas,anyoneofwhichitindifferentlysuggeststothemind(Intro.11).Ideasremainparticular,although aparticularideacanfunctionasageneralidea.Forexample,whenageometerdrawsalineona blackboard,itistakentorepresentalllines,eventhoughthelineitselfisparticularandhasdeterminate qualities.Similarly,aparticularideacanrepresentallsimilarideas.So,whetheronetakesBerkeleyto meanthatwordsapplyimmediatelytoobjectsorthatmeaningismediatedbyparadigmaticideas,the theoryissimplerthantheabstractionistsinsofarasallideasareparticularanddeterminate. InIntroduction13,BerkeleyturnstoLockesabstractgeneralideaofatriangle,anideawhichmustbe neitherobliquenorrectangle,neitherequilateral,equicrural,norscalenon,butallandnoneoftheseat once.Ineffect,itissomethingimperfectthatcannotexist,anideawhereinsomepartsofseveraldifferent andinconsistentideasareputtogether(Locke4.7.9,p.596quotedinIntro.13,Berkeleysemphasis). Uponquotingthepassage,Berkeleymerelyaskshisreaderwhetherheorshecanformtheidea,buthis pointseemstobemuchstronger.Thedescribedideaisinconsistent,andthereforerepresentsan impossiblestateofaffairs,anditisthereforeinconceivable,sincewhateverisimpossibleisinconceivable. ThisisexplicitinaparallelpassageintheNewTheoryofVision.Afterquotingthetrianglepassage, Berkeleyremarks,Buthadhecalledtomindwhathesaysinanotherplace,towit,Thatideasofmixed modeswhereinanyinconsistentideasareputtogethercannotsomuchasexistinthemind,i.e.be conceived.vid.B.iii.C.10.S.33.ibid.Isay,hadthisoccurredtohisthoughts,itisnotimprobablehe wouldhaveowneditaboveallthepainsandskillhewasmasterof,toformtheabovementionedideaofa triangle,whichismadeupofmanifest,staringcontradictions(NTV125). IfabstractideasarenotneededforcommunicationBerkeleytakesthefactthatinfantsandpoorly educatedpeoplecommunicate,whiletheformationofabstractideasissaidtobedifficult,asabasisfor doubtingthedifficultythesis(Intro.14)heisabletogiveshortshrifttothecontentionthatabstract ideasarenecessaryforknowledge.Theabstractionistsmaintainthatabstractideasareneededfor geometricalproofs.Berkeleyarguesthatonlypropertiesconcerning,forexample,atriangleassuchare germanetoageometricproof.So,evenifonesideaofatriangleiswhollydeterminate(considera diagramonablackboard),noneofthedifferentiatingpropertiespreventonefromconstructingaproof,
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 7/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

sinceaproofisnotconcernedsolelywiththeidea(ordrawing)withwhichonebegins.Hemaintainsthatit isconsistentwithhistheoryofmeaningtoselectivelyattendtoasingleaspectofacomplex,determinate idea(Intro.16). Berkeleyconcludeshisdiscussionofabstractionbynotingthatnotallgeneralwordsareusedtodenote objectsorkindsofobjects.Hisdiscussionofthenondenotativeusesoflanguageisoftentakento anticipateLudwigWittgensteinsinterestinmeaningasuse.

4.IdealismandImmaterialism
Berkeleysfamousprincipleisesseispercipi,tobeistobeperceived.Berkeleywasanidealist.Heheld thatordinaryobjectsareonlycollectionsofideas,whichareminddependent.Berkeleywasan immaterialist.Heheldthattherearenomaterialsubstances.Thereareonlyfinitementalsubstancesand aninfinitementalsubstance,namely,God.Onthesepointsthereisgeneralagreement.Thereisless agreementonBerkeleysargumentativeapproachtoidealismandimmaterialismandontheroleofsome ofhisspecificarguments.Hiscentralargumentsareoftendeemedweak. TheaccountdevelopedhereisbasedprimarilyontheopeningthirtythreesectionsofthePrinciplesof HumanKnowledge.Itassumes,contrarytosomecommentators,thatBerkeleysmetaphysicsrestson epistemologicalfoundations.Thisapproachisprimafacieplausibleinsofarasitexplainstheappealto knowledgeinthetitleofthePrinciples(cf.Intro.4),itisconsistentwithBerkeleysepistemicconcernsin otherwritings(cf.TVV18),anditprovidesanexplanatoryroleforabstractideas.Therewillbe occasionaldigressionsconcerningtheproblemsperceivedbythosewhoclaimthatBerkeleysapproach wasmorestraightforwardlymetaphysical. Berkeleybeginshisdiscussionasfollows:

Itisevidenttoanyonewhotakesasurveyoftheobjectsofhumanknowledge,thatthey areeitherideasactuallyimprintedonthesenses,orelsesuchasareperceivedby attendingtothepassionsandoperationsofthemind,orlastlyideasformedbyhelpof memoryandimagination,eithercompounding,dividing,orbarelyrepresentingthose originallyperceivedintheaforesaidways.(PHK1).

Thisseemstosaythatideasaretheimmediateobjectsofknowledgeinafundamentalsense (acquaintance).FollowingLocke,thereareideasofsense,reflection,andimagination.So,ordinary objects,asknown,arecollectionsofideasmarkedbyasinglename.Berkeleysexampleisanapple. Ifideasareconstruedasobjectsofknowledge,thentheremustalsobesomethingthatknowsor perceivesthem,andexercisesdiversoperations,aswilling,imagining,rememberingaboutthem(PHK 2cf.6).ThisBerkeleycallsthismindorspirit.Minds(asknowers)aredistinctfromideas(asthings known).Foranidea,tobeistobeperceived(known).Sincethisholdsforideasingeneral,itholdsfor sensationsorideasimprintedonthesenseinparticular(3). Berkeleycontendsthattheopinionstrangelyprevailingamongstmen,thathouses,mountains,rivers,and inaworldallsensibleobjectshaveanexistencenaturalorreal,distinctfrombeingperceivedis inconsistent,amanifestcontradiction(PHK4).Ifoneconstruessensibleobjectsasideasofsense, andideasareobjectsofknowledge,thenhavingarealexistencedistinctfrombeingperceivedwould requirethatanobjectbeknown(asanidea)andunknown(asathingdistinctfrombeingperceived), whichisinconsistent.Heexplainsthesourceoftheerroronthebasisofthedoctrineofabstractideas (PHK5),adiscussionwhichparallelsthediscussioninIntroduction10.
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 8/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Ordinaryobjects,asknown,arenothingbutcollectionsofideas.If,likeDescartes,Berkeleyholdsthat claimsofexistencearejustifiedifandonlyiftheexistentcanbeknown,thenordinaryobjectsmustbeat leastcollectionsofideas.AsBerkeleyputit,allthechoirofheavenandfurnitureoftheearth,inawordall thosebodieswhichcomposethemightyframeoftheworld,havenotanysubsistencewithoutamind,that theirbeingistobeperceivedorknown(PHK6).Theonlysubstancethatcanbeknownisaspiritor thinkingsubstance(PHK7).Butnoticewhathasnotyetbeenshown.Ithasnotbeenshownthatordinary objectsareonlycollectionsofideas,norhasitbeshownthatthinkingsubstancesareimmaterial. Berkeleysnextmoveistoaskwhethertherearegroundsforclaimingordinaryobjectsaresomething morethanideas. TheaboveaccountisnottheonlyinterpretationofthefirstsevensectionsofthePrinciples.Many commentatorstakeamoredirectlymetaphysicalapproach.Theyassumethatideasarementalimages (Pitcher,p.70cf.Winkler,p.13andMuehlmann,p.49),orobjectsofthought(Winker,p.6),ormodesofa mentalsubstance(Bracken,pp.76ff),orimmediateobjectsofperception(Pappas,pp.2122),oranyof Berkeleysotheroccasionalcharacterizationsofideas,andproceedtoshowthat,onthechosenaccount ofideas,Berkeleysargumentsfail.A.A.LucetellsusthatBerkeleyscharacterizationofanappleinterms ofideas(PHK1)isconcernedwiththeappleitself,ratherthanaknownapple(Luce1963,p.30cf. Tipton,p.70),whichsuggeststhatBerkeleybegsthequestionoftheanalysisofbody.Many commentatorstellusthatwhatseemstobeanallusiontoideasofreflectioninthefirstsentenceof1 cannotbesuch,sinceBerkeleyclaimsonehasnoideasofmindsormentalstates(PHK27,89,140, 142DHP2223,DHP3231233cf.Works2:42n1).Theyignorehisallusionstoideasofreflection(PHK 13,25,35,68,74,89)andthepresumptionthatiftherearesuchideas,theyaretheeffectsofanactive mind(cf.PHK27).Manycommentatorssuggestthattheargumentforesseispercipiisin3ignoring theconcludingwordsin2andfindthemanifestcontradictionin4puzzlingatbest.Most commentatorsassumethatthecaseforidealismthepositionthatthereareonlymindsandmind dependententitiesiscompleteby7andlamentthatBerkeleyhasnotestablishedtheonly.The epistemicinterpretationwehavebeendevelopingseemstoavoidtheseproblems. Berkeleyholdsthatordinaryobjectsareatleastcollectionsofideas.Aretheysomethingmore?In824 Berkeleyexaminestheprimecontendersforthissomethingmore,namely,theoriesofmaterial substance.Heprefaceshisdiscussionwithhislikenessprinciple,theprinciplethatnothingbutanideacan resembleanidea.Ifwelookbuteversolittleintoourthoughts,weshallfinditimpossibleforusto conceivealikenessexceptonlybetweenourideas(PHK8).Whyisthis?Aclaimthattwoobjects resembleeachothercanbejustifiedonlybyacomparisonoftheobjects(cf.PC377,##1618).So,if onlyideasareimmediatelyperceived,onlyideascanbecompared.So,therecanbenojustificationfora claimthatanidearesemblesanythingbutanidea.Ifclaimsofexistencerestonepistemicallyjustified principles,thelikenessprincipleblocksbothgroundsforclaimingthattherearemediatelyperceived materialobjectsandLockesclaimthattheprimaryqualitiesofobjectsresembleonesideasofthem (Locke,1.8.15,p.137). Oneofthemarksofthemodernperiodisthedoctrineofprimaryandsecondaryqualities.Althoughitwas anticipatedbyDescartes,Malebranche,andothers,thetermsthemselveswereintroducedinRobert BoylesOftheOriginsofFormsandQualities(1666)andLockesEssay.Primaryqualitiesarethe propertiesofobjectsassuch.Theprimaryqualitiesaresolidity,extension,figure,number,andmobility (Locke2.8.9,p.135cf.2.8.10,p.135).Secondaryqualitiesareeitherthethosearrangementsof corpusclescontainingonlyprimaryqualitiesthatcauseonetohaveideasofcolor,sound,taste,heat,cold, andsmell(Locke2.8.8,p.1352.8.10,p.135)or,onsomeaccounts,theideasthemselves.Ifthe distinctioncanbemaintained,therewouldbegroundsforclaimingthatordinaryobjectsaresomething morethanideas.ItisthistheoryofmatterBerkeleyconsidersfirst. AftergivingasketchofLockesaccountoftheprimary/secondaryqualitydistinction(PHK9),hisinitial salvofocusesonhispreviousconclusionsandthelikenessprinciple.Bymatterthereforeweareto
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 9/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

understandaninert,senselesssubstance,inwhichextension,figure,andmotion,doactuallysubsist (PHK9).Suchaviewisinconsistentwithhisearlierconclusionsthatextension,figure,andmotionare ideas.Thelikenessprincipleblocksanyattempttogobeyondideasonthebasisofresemblance. Combiningthepreviousconclusionswiththestandardaccountofprimaryqualitiesrequiresthatprimary qualitiesbothexistapartfromthemindandonlyinthemind.So,Berkeleyconcludesthatwhatiscalled matterorcorporealsubstance,involvesacontradictioninit(PHK9).Hethenturnstotheindividual qualities. Ifthereisadistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities,theremustbeagroundforthe distinction.Indeed,giventhecommoncontentionthatanefficientcausemustbenumericallydistinctfrom itseffect(seeArnauldandNicole,p.186ArnauldinDescartes,2:147Locke2.26.12,pp.324325),if onecannotshowthatprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesaredistinct,therearegroundsforquestioningthe causalhypothesis.Berkeleyarguesthatthereisnogroundforthedistinction.Appealingtowhatone knowsideasastheyareconceivedBerkeleyarguesthatonecannotconceiveofaprimaryquality suchasextensionwithoutsomesecondaryqualityaswell:onecannotframeanideaofabodyextended andmoved,butImustwithalgiveitsomecolourorothersensiblequalitywhichisacknowledgedtoexist onlyinthemind(PHK10).Ifsuchsensiblequalitiesascolorexistonlyinthemind,andextensionand motioncannotbeknownwithoutsomesensiblequality,thereisnogroundforclaimingextensionexists apartfromthemind.Theprimary/secondaryqualitydistinctioncollapses.Thesourceofthephilosophical erroriscitedasthedoctrineofabstractideas.HisargumentsinPrinciples1115showthatnoevidence canbefoundthatanyoftheothersocalledprimaryqualitiescanexistapartfromthemind. Afterdisposingoftheprimary/secondaryqualitydistinction,Berkeleyturnstoanoldertheoryofmaterial substance,asubstratumtheory.AtleastsinceAristotle,philosophershadheldthatqualitiesofmaterial objectsdependonandexistinasubstancewhichhasthosequalities.Thissupposedsubstanceallegedly remainsthesamethroughchange.Butifoneclaimstherearematerialsubstances,onemusthave reasonstosupportthatclaim.InPrinciples1624Berkeleydevelopsaseriesofargumentstotheeffect that(1)onecannotformanideaofasubstratum,(2)thetheoryofmaterialsubstanceplaysno explanatoryrole,and(3)itisimpossibletoproduceevidenceforthemerepossibilityofsuchanentity. Canoneformanideaasubstratum?No.Atleastonecannotformapositiveideaofamaterialsubstratum itselfsomethinglikeanimageofthethingitselfapointthatwasgrantedbyitsmostferventsupporters (seeDescartes1:210Locke2.23.3,p.295).ThemostonecandoisformAnobscureandrelativeIdea ofSubstanceingeneral(Locke2.23.3,p.296),thoughyouknownotwhatitis,yetyoumustbe supposedtoknowwhatrelationitbearstoaccidents,andwhatismeantbyitssupportingthem(PHK 16).BerkeleyarguesthatonecannotmakegoodonthenotionofsupportItisevidentsupportcannot herebetakeninitsusualorliteralsense,aswhenwesaythatpillarssupportabuilding:inwhatsense thereforemustitbetaken?(PHK16)soonedoesnotevenhavearelativeideaofmaterial substratum.Withoutaclearnotionoftheallegedrelation,onecannotsingleoutamaterialsubstanceon thebasisofarelationtosomethingperceived(PHK17). Ifanideaofamaterialsubstratumcannotbederivedfromsenseexperience,claimsofitsexistencemight bejustifiedifitisnecessarytoprovideanexplanationofaphenomenon.Butnosuchexplanationis forthcoming.AsBerkeleynotes:Butwhatreasoncaninduceustobelievetheexistenceofbodieswithout themind,fromwhatweperceive,sincetheverypatronsofmatterthemselvesdonotpretend,thereisany necessaryconnexionbetwixtthemandourideas?Isayitisgrantedonallhands(andwhathappensin dreams,phrensies,andthelike,putsitbeyonddispute)thatitispossiblewemightbeaffectedwithallthe ideaswehavenow,thoughnobodiesexistedwithout,resemblingthem(PHK18).Sincematerial substanceisnotnecessarytoprovideanexplanationofmentalphenomena,reasoncannotprovide groundsforclaimingtheexistenceofamaterialsubstance. BerkeleysfinalmoveagainstmaterialsubstanceissometimescalledtheMasterArgument.Ittakesthe formofachallenge,oneonwhichBerkeleyiswillingtoresthisentirecase.Itisbutlookingintoyourown
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 10/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

thoughts,andsotryingwhetheryoucanconceiveitpossibleforasound,orfigure,ormotion,orcolour,to existwithoutthemind,orunperceived.Thiseasytrialmaymakeyousee,thatwhatyoucontendfor,isa downrightcontradiction(PHK22).Berkeleyseemstoarguethatinanycaseonemightconsiderbooks inthebackofacloset,plantsdeepinawoodwithnooneabout,footprintsonthefarsideofthemoon theobjectsarerelatedtothemindconceivingofthem.So,itiscontradictorytoclaimthatthoseobjects havenorelationtoamind(PHK,2223cf.DHP1199201).ThisisgenerallynotconsideredBerkeleyat hisbest,sincemanycommentatorsarguethatitispossibletodistinguishbetweentheobjectconceived andtheconceivingofit.GeorgePappashasprovidedamoresympatheticinterpretationofthepassage. HecontendsthatBerkeleyiscallingforanimpossibleperformance(Pappas,pp.141144). Conceivabilityisthegroundforclaimingthatanobjectispossible.Ifoneconceivesofanobject,thenthat objectisrelatedtosomemind,namely,themindthatconceivesit.So,theproblemisthatitisnotpossible tofulfilltheconditionsnecessarytoshowthatitwouldbepossibleforanobjecttoexistapartfroma relationtoamind. Thus,Berkeleyconcludes,therearenogroundsforclaimingthatanordinaryobjectismorethana collectionofideas.Theargumentsin17showedthatordinaryobjectsareatleastcollectionsofideas ofsense.Theargumentsin824providegroundsforclaimingthatordinaryobjectsarenothingmore thanideas.So,Berkeleyisjustifiedinclaimingthattheyareonlyideasofsense.Berkeleysargumentfor immaterialismiscomplete,althoughhehasnotyetprovidedcriteriafordistinguishingideasofsensefrom ideasofmemoryandimagination.Thisishistaskin2933.Beforeturningtothis,Berkeleyintroduces severalremarksonmind. Berkeleyclaimsthataninspectionofourideasshowsthattheyarecausallyinert(PHK25).Sincethereis acontinualsuccessionofideasinourminds,theremustbesomecauseofit.Sincethiscausecanbe neitheranideanoramaterialsubstance,itmustbeaspiritualsubstance(PHK26).Thissetsthestage forBerkeleysargumentfortheexistenceofGodandthedistinctionbetweenrealthingsandimaginary things. Oneknowsthatonecausessomeofonesownideas(PHK28).Sincethemindispassiveinperception, thereareideaswhichonesownminddoesnotcause.Onlyamindorspiritcanbeacause.Thereis thereforesomeotherwillorspiritthatproducesthem(PHK29).Assuch,thisisnotanargumentforthe existenceofGod(seePHK146149),althoughBerkeleysfurtherdiscussionassumesthatatleastone mindisthedivinemind. Heisnowinapositiontodistinguishideasofsensefromideasoftheimagination:Theideasofsenseare morestrong,lively,anddistinctthanthoseoftheimaginationtheyhavelikewiseasteadiness,order,and coherence,andarenotexcitedatrandom,asthosewhicharetheeffectsofhumanwillsoftenare(PHK 30).Thisprovidesthebasisforboththedistinctionbetweenideasofsenseandideasofimaginationand forthedistinctionbetweenrealthingsandimaginarythings(PHK33).Realthingsarecomposedsolelyof ideasofsense.Ideasofsenseoccurwithpredictableregularitytheyformcoherentwholesthat themselvescanbeexpectedtobehaveinpredictableways.Ideasofsensefollow(divinelyestablished) lawsofnature(PHK30.34,36,62,104). So,Berkeleyhasgivenanaccountofordinaryobjectswithoutmatter.Ordinaryobjectsarenothingbut lawfullyarrangedcollectionsofideasofsense.

5.Notions
IfonereadsthePrinciplesandDialogues,onediscoversthatBerkeleyhaslittletosayregardingour knowledgeofminds,andmostofwhatisfoundwasaddedinthe1734editionsofthoseworks.The reasonisBerkeleyoriginallyintendedthePrinciplestoconsistofatleastthreeparts(cf.PC583).The secondwastoexamineissuesgermanetomind,God,morality,andfreedom(PC508,807).Hetold SamuelJohnson,hisAmericancorrespondent,thatthemanuscriptforthesecondpartwaslostduringhis
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 11/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

travelsinItalyinabout1716(Works2:282).Inthe1734editionsofthePrinciplesandDialogues,Berkeley includedbriefdiscussionsofournotionsofminds. Berkeleyclaimswedonothaveideasofminds,sincemindsareactiveandideasarepassive(PHK27 cf.89,140,142).Nonetheless,wehavesomenotionofsoul,spirit,andtheoperationsofthemind,such aswilling,loving,hating,inasmuchasweknoworunderstandthemeaningofthosewords(PHK27, 1734edition).GivenBerkeleystheoryofmeaning,thisseemstoimplythatsolongasoneabletopickout (distinguish)mindsfromotherthingsonecanhaveanotionofmind.SinceBerkeleyremarks,Suchisthe natureofspiritorthatwhichacts,thatitcannotbeofitselfperceived,butonlybytheeffectswhichit produceth(PHK27,alleditions),onemightcometobelievethatBerkeleyknowsmindsinmuchthe samewayasLockeknowsthem.Lockeclaimsonehasarelativeideaofsubstanceingeneral(Locke 2.23.3,p.296):oneisabletopickoutasubstanceassuchonthebasisofitsrelationtoadirectly perceivedideaorquality.WhilenominallydistinctfromLockeanrelativeideas,Berkeleycouldclaimthat notionspickoutanindividualmindasthethingthatperceivessomedeterminateidea(onesownmind)or whichcausessomedeterminateidea(Godor,perhaps,someotherspirit).SinceBerkeleyheldthatcausal andperceptualrelationsarenecessaryconnections,thisseemstoavoidtheproblemswithsupport discussedinPrinciples16.SuchapositionseemstobeconsistentwitheverythingsaidinthePrinciples andmuchofwhatissaidintheDialogues(DHP22:223DHP32:232233).However,therearetwo passagesintheThirdDialoguewhichsuggestthatonesownmindisknowndirectly,ratherthanrelatively. Philonoussays:

IownIhaveproperlynoidea,eitherofGodoranyotherspiritforthesebeingactive, cannotberepresentedbythingsperfectlyinert,asourideasare.Idoneverthelessknow, thatIwhoamaspiritorthinkingsubstance,existascertainly,asIknowmyideasexist. Farther,IknowwhatImeanbythetermsIandmyselfandIknowthisimmediately,or intuitively,thoughIdonotperceiveitasIperceiveatriangle,acolour,orasound.(DHP3 2:231,alleditions) HowoftenmustIrepeat,thatIknoworamconsciousof[myemphasis]myownbeingand thatImyselfamnotmyideas,butsomewhatelse,athinkingactiveprinciplethat perceives,knows,wills,andoperatesaboutideas.(DHP3233,1734edition)

Ifyouknowyourselfimmediatelybyareflexact(DHP3232,alleditions),andifthisisindependentofany relationtoanidea,thenitwouldseemthatnotionsofoneselfarenothingmorethanthatuniquewayin whichthemindknowsitself.Nothingmorecanbesaidofthem.Suchapositionseemstomakenotionsan adhocadditiontoBerkeleysphilosophy. But,perhaps,weneedtodrawadistinctionbetweenknowingthatthereisamindandknowingwhata mindis.Perhapsonemightknowdirectlythatonehasamind,butonecanknowwhatamindisonly relativetoideas:amindisthatwhichcausesorperceivesideas.Oneshouldnotbesurprisedifthisis Berkeleysposition.Sucharelativeunderstandingofthemindasknowerandideasastheknownis alreadyfoundintheopeningsectionsofthePrinciples.

6.ConcludingRemarks
AccordingtoBerkeley,theworldconsistsofnothingbutmindsandideas.Ordinaryobjectsarecollections ofideas.Alreadyinhisdiscussionofvision,hearguedthatonelearnstocoordinateideasofsightand touchtojudgedistance,magnitude,andfigure,propertieswhichareimmediatelyperceivedonlybytouch. Theideasofonesensebecomesignsofideasoftheothersenses.Inhisphilosophicalwritings,this coordinationofregularlyoccurringideasbecomesthewaytheworldisknownandthewayhumans
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 12/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

constructrealthings.Ifthereareonlymindsandideas,thereisnoplaceforsomescientificconstructs. Newtonianabsolutespaceandtimedisappear.Timebecomesnothingbutthesuccessionofideasin individualminds(PHK98).Motionisentirelyobjectrelative(PHK112117).Sciencebecomesnothing morethanasystemofnaturalsigns.Withthebanishingofabstraction,mathematicsisreducedtoa systemofsignsinwhichwordsornumeralssignifyotherwordsornumerals(PHK122).Spaceis reducedtosensibleextension,andsinceonecannotactuallydivideapieceofextensionintoaninfinite numberofsensibleparts,variousgeometricalparadoxesdissolve.AsBerkeleyunderstandsthem,science andChristiantheologybecomecompatible.

7.ReferencesandFurtherReading
Berkeley,George.PhilosophicalWorks,IncludingtheWorksonVision.EditedbyMichaelR.Ayers. Everymanedition.London:J.M.Dent,1975. ThisisthemostcomprehensiveonevolumeeditionofBerkeleysphilosophicalworks available.Whentheworkisnotdividedintosections,marginalreferencesaremadetothe pageinTheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley. Berkeley,George.TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley,BishopofCloyne.EditedbyA.A.LuceandT.E. Jessop.9volumes.London:ThomasNelsonandSons,19481957. ThisisthestandardeditionofBerkeleysworks.Pagereferencesabovearetothisedition. Arnauld,AntoineandNicole,Pierre.LogicortheArtofThinking.TranslatedbyJillVanceBuroker. CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996. Thiswasoneofthemostwidelyreadlogictextbooksoftheearlymodernperiod. Atherton,Margaret.BerkeleysRevolutioninVision.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1990. Belfrage,Bertil.TowardsaNewInterpretationofBerkeleysTheoryofVision(inFrench).In DominiqueBerlioz,editor,Berkeley:languagedelaperceptionetartdevoir.Paris:Presses UniversitiresdeFrance,2003. Berman,David.GeorgeBerkeley:IdealismandtheMan.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994. Boyle,Robert.SelectedPhilosophicalPapersofRobertBoyle.EditedbyM.S.Stewart. PhilosophicalClassics.Manchester:UniversityofManchesterPress,1979. Bracken,HarryM.Berkeley.PhilosophersinPerspective.NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1974. Dancy,Jonathan.Berkeley:AnIntroduction.Oxford:Blackwell,1987. Descartes,Ren.ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes.TranslatedandeditedbyJohn Cottingham,RobertStoothoff,DugaldSteward,and(volume3)AnthonyKenny.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1985,1984,1991. Flage,DanielE.BerkeleysDoctrineofNotions:AReconstructionbasedonhisTheoryofMeaning. LondonandNewYork:CroomHelmandSt.MartinsPress,1987. Grayling,A.C.Berkeley:TheCentralArguments.LaSalle,IL:OpenCourt,1986. Locke,John.AnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding.EditedbyPeterH.Nidditch.Oxford: ClarendonPress,1975. Luce,A.A.BerkeleysImmaterialism:ACommentaryonhisATreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesof HumanKnowledge.London:ThomasNelsonandSons,1945. Luce,A.A.TheDialecticofImmaterialism.London:HodderandStroughton,1963.
www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ 13/14

5/12/13

Berkeley, George [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Muehlmann,RobertG.BerkeleysOntology.Indianapolis:Hackett,1992. Pappas,GeorgeS.BerkeleysThought.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2000. Pitcher,George.Berkeley.TheArgumentsofthePhilosophers.London:RoutledgeandKegan Paul,1977. Stoneham,Tom.BerkeleysWorld:AnExaminationoftheThreeDialogues.Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2002. Tipton,I.C.Berkeley:ThePhilosophyofImmaterialism.London:Methuen,1974. Warnock,G.J.Berkeley.London:Penquin,1953. Winkler,KennethP.Berkeley:AnInterpretation.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989.

www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/

14/14