The Dictators: Part 1The Rise of Ne Win By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On March 1, 2013 @ 6:16 am This is the

first installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. For most of the past half-century, Burma has been ruled by the successive iron fists of two ruthless menNe Win and Than Shwe. Ne Win was a product of the first struggle for independence and the era of communist and socialist ideology. Than Shwe was a product of Ne Wins authoritarian regime and failed socialist economic policies. Suu Kyi and her comrades who have fought to bring democracy and human rights to Burma are all, or course, extremely knowledgeable regarding the background and actions of these two men who personally shaped the current military regime and its psychological mindset. Every calculation and decision the opposition makes must have at its foundation an awareness of this history, because it reveals Than Shwe and his fellow generals current propensities. And every Burma watcher, whether full-blown participant or armchair analyst, should also be familiar with the two dictators that have turned Burma into the country that it isand is nottoday. Ne Win, whose given name was Shu Maung, was born in 1911 in the Prome District of Pegu Division, about 200 miles north of Rangoon, where he was raised in a middle class family and attended the National High School. As a youth, he had aspirations of becoming a physician, but his medical dreams were dashed when he didnt perform well at University College in Rangoon. After dropping out of college, Ne Win remained in Rangoon and hung out with a group of student friends who spent time every day discussing how to liberate Burma from the British. Along with U Nu, the president of the Rangoon University student union, and Aung San, the student union secretary, Ne Win became a member of the nationalist organization Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association). In 1941, Aung San and Ne Win were among the 30 young men chosen to receive military training in Japan who became known as the Thirty Comrades and formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Each if the Thirty Comrades chose a nom de guerre before returning to Burma. Aung San chose Bo Tay Za, and Shu Maung chose the nom de guerre Bo Ne Win, meaning The Radiant Sun. Aung San, the undisputed leader of the independence movement, was assassinated by a rival in 1947, and when Burma regained its independence in 1948 U Nu was appointed prime minister. In March of that year, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) went underground and resorted to armed struggle in hopes of building a Red Era in Burma. The first battle between government forces and the CPB broke out in Pegu, south of Rangoon, and the fighting soon spread to the communist stronghold in central Burma. At nearly the same time, ethnic Karen rebels began their armed effort to gain autonomy.

The fledgling Burmese army was in disarray and unable to maintain law and orderthere were many desertions and the communist and ethnic insurgents outnumbered the government troops. When Gen Ne Win took over as army chief of staff in February 1949, he had barely 2,000 soldiers and Burmas many young patriots thought the country was heading in a dangerous direction. To make matters worse, new trouble was brewing in Burmas far north. Chiang Kai-sheks nationalist Kuomingtang (KMT) troops from southern China had crossed the border into eastern Shan State following their defeat at the hands of the Chinese communists. These wellarmed KMT troops, backed by the CIA, rose from a mere 200 in 1949 to 12,000 in 1952. They set up bases along the border with Burma as far as Kengtung and Tachilek, and also built an air base in Mong Hsat where they received supplies and equipment transported by unidentified planes. Soon the KMT controlled the whole region east of the Salween River and fierce battles broke out between the ill-equipped Burmese forces and the Chinese intruders. Burmas early military campaigns against the KMT, including Operation Naga Naing and Operation Frost, failed as the KMTs superior firepower easily defeated the Burmese. Despite its initial lack of manpower and resources, Ne Win had an ambitious plan to lead the armed forces. To begin with, he and his senior officers removed many of their colleagues, including senior Karen army officers, British sympathizers and officers not sufficiently loyal to the top general. Many young officers from Ne Wins 4th Burma Rifles then took up the top posts in the army. In 1951, the 40-year-old Ne Win held a meeting with his commanding officers at the War Office in Rangoon and asked them to transform the army into a professional fighting force that was properly trained and equipped to fight against the external KMT aggressor, the CPB and the ethnic insurgents. Ne Wins loyal officers initiated military reform as requested and turned the Burmese military into a formidable army. The reform plan included recruitment and training to expand the military, establishment of effective intelligence services, setting up defense institutions, drawing up military doctrines and arms procurement. Ne Win and his senior officers also agreed at the time to set up an army psychological warfare department, with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of the population, insurgents and communist sympathizers. Officially founded in 1952, the Psychological Warfare Department was led by Lt-Col Ba Than. The size of the Psychological Warfare Department steadily grew and the department took on many projects, including the establishment of the Defense Services Historical Research Institute and the sponsorship of many culture festivals, radio shows and leaflet distributions countrywide. It also launched a magazine, Myawaddy, to counter anti-government publicationsMyawaddy has survived until present day and under the current regime has gone on to launch its own television programs as well. Ne Win recruited former communists Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing to be part of the Psychological Warfare Department. Saw Oo was once a staunch follower of communist leader Thakin Than Tun, who led the White Flag faction of the CPB. In the early 1950s, he took up arms against the government but later surrendered.

Chit Hlaing believed in both Buddhist philosophy and Marxism, and was a faithful follower of Thakin Soe, who was the leader of the Red Flag faction of the CPB. He studied Marxist philosophy during the Japanese occupation and in the early 1950s traveled extensively in Europe, splitting his time between Paris and Moscow. Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing remained civilians, but Saw Oos position was equivalent to a lieutenant colonel in the army and Chit Hlaings position was equivalent to the rank of major. In January 1952, Captain Ba Thaung, who led the mobile psychological warfare team, launched Operation Liberator in Kyaukse, where communist sympathizers and rebels roamed the surrounding area. During Ba Thaungs two-month stay in the Kyaukse region, his team distributed thousands of propaganda leaflets and cartoons depicting the threat of widespread civil war and destabilization of the country. Official government records state that from 1952 to 1953, as many as 1,150,000 leaflets were distributed by the mobile psychological warfare team throughout Burma. At the time Ba Thaung was in Kyaukse conducting Operation Liberator, a 20-year-old man who had matriculated from Kyaukse high school, and was now working as a postal clerk in nearby Meikhtila, enrolled in the Officers Training School (OTS) Intake 9. His colleagues recalled that this new recruit, the youngest of the OTS cadets in his class, would often be seen chewing betel nut, was rather dull and quiet and definitely not an outstanding cadet. His name was Than Shwe. The Dictators: Part 2Ne Win Tightens his Grip By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On March 8, 2013 @ 8:56 am This is the second installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. On what was probably a rainy day in July 1953, Second Lieutenant Than Shwe began serving in the Light Infantry Division No. 1. He traveled to Karen and Shan states and fought against ethnic insurgents, and while several officers confirmed that Than Shwe was a battle-shy officer, over the next five years he managed to rise to the rank of captain. Then in February 1958, Than Shwe received an order to come to Rangoon, where his new assignment was to study at the Psychological Warfare Department with Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing as his new bosses. Meanwhile, while attending their annual meeting in Meikhtila in 1956, the Burmese armys commanding officers learned that Ne Win had a plan to set up a new government and it was just a matter of time before a coup occurred. Ne Win didnt believe in either socialism or Buddhism, but he wanted to have a political ideology and doctrine to lead and steer the country once he took over state power. He relied heavily on Ba Than, Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing to develop military doctrine and socialist ideology, and he and his trusted colleagues believed that socialism was the best ideology to introduce to the country.

Ne Win told Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing, however, that he didnt want to repeat the blunder of Burmese communists who blindly copied Marxist ideology and followed it dogmatically. He also didnt want to follow former Prime Minister U Nu, who wanted to introduce Buddhism as the countrys official religion. But since most of the Burmese people were Buddhist, he wanted to make sure Buddhist philosophy would be included in the new political ideology. So Ne Win requested that Chit Hlaing and Saw Oo prepare a socialist ideology that incorporated Buddhist tenets and could be adapted to Burmese culture and society. The eventual result was the middle path introduced by Saw Oo in the Burmese Way to Socialism. The young Capt Than Shwe reportedly got along well with Saw Oo and was soon sent to Mandalay to become head of the division-level Psychological Warfare Department. Burma then had two commands: north and south. In 1959, Ne Wins protg Col San Yu became commander of the Northern Command where Than Shwe was posted, and Chit Hlaing recalled that Than Shwe served under San Yu and had direct communication with his boss. In March 1962, General Ne Win followed through with his earlier plan and overthrew U Nus government in a military coup. Then in July, Ne Wins Revolutionary Council announced the formation of the BSPP, whose members were none other than Ne Win and his loyal army officers. The following year, San Yu sent Than Shwe back to the newly opened Central School of Political Science, which in 1971 was upgraded to become an institute, in Mingaladon, a suburb of Rangoon. And in December 1963, Than Shwe reported back to his former bosses Saw Oo and Chit Hlaing, who were now posted at the school. Than Shwe was named chief of the Political History Department, and his duty was to teach new cadres political history and the Burmese Way to Socialism. At the time, the doctrine was known as Nama-Rupanma refers to the psychological elements of a human being and rpa refers to the physical. The Buddhist nma and rpa are mutually dependent and not separable: as nmarpa, they designate an individual being. Than Shwe taught classes every morning, and Chit Hlaing observed that the young captain had not changed much from his OTS dayshis students sometimes found it quite awkward to have a conversation with him. But despite the fact that Than Shwe rarely voiced his political inclinations, Chit Hlaing believed he was pragmatic, patriotic and a faithful follower of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Than Shwe normally refrained from rocking the boat, but he voiced a desire to go back to the infantry division where he would have a better opportunity for rapid promotion to a powerful position. His wish was fulfilled in January 1969, when he became a major and was assigned to the 77th Light Infantry Division in Karen State. As part of his new assignment, Than Shwe traveled to the Irrawaddy Delta, Pegu Yoma, Karen State and Mon State. In Mon State, Than Shwe met his beloved wife Kyaing Kyaing and instantly fell in love. She was the second youngest of 11 siblings; her father Kyuu Tin was pure Chinese and her mother Daw Bwa May was Pa-O. Bwa May didnt know the young officer, but after using her sources in the War Office to check his background, she gave the green light for Than Shwe to marry her daughter.

In December 1969, Than Shwe was summoned back to Rangoon to work in the War Office, where he was promoted to major at level G2 and given responsibility for managing operations in the Irrawaddy Delta and Arakan State. At that time, the military launched the Shwe Linn Yone, or Golden Eagle Operation, to flush out insurgents in the delta and cut the rebel link between the delta and Arakan State. Than Shwe and the other G2 officers in the War Office had more mundane, but still intriguing, responsibilities at the time as well. The mild-mannered San Yu was hard working but paranoid, and wanted the G2 officers to read letters coming from the frontline and military families and keep watch for poisoned mail. San Yu sometimes instructed the officers to investigate suspicious letters, even sending them to army battalions and frontline zones to do so. In the 1970s, although Ne Win still enjoyed strong backing in the armed forces, his popularity plummeted among the public and there was unrest on the streets of Rangoon between 1974 and 1976, first due to labor disputes and then triggered by the death of U Thant, the retired Secretary-General of the United Nations. Ne Win and U Thant lived in different worldsNe Win was a college dropout and army hero who launched a military coup; the respected diplomat was once a teacher and served under former Prime Minister U Nu, who Ne Win removed. One time when U Thant returned home from his New York office, Ne Win refused to meet him, and when Gen Tin Oo met U Thant and instantly admired him, Ne Win was reportedly furious. When U Thant died in New York in 1974 and his body was flown back to Burma to be buried, Ne Win refused to hold a state funeral for him. There were even hints by government authorities that it was illegal to bring the body back to Burma and the government might take action against the family members of U Thant if they attempted to do so. Finally, however, the government agreed to bury U Thant in a private cemetery. Students were upset and took U Thants coffin to Rangoon University. In an event that quickly became an anti-government gathering, they demanded he be honored in a dignified manner. Finally, the government agreed to build a mausoleum at the foot of Shwedagon Pagoda, where several prominent leaders, including Aung Sanand his slain cabinet members, were buried. But a radical student faction refused this gesture and decided to bury U Thants body on campus at the site of the demolished student union building. But more turmoil was just around the corner. The Dictators: Part 3Military Intelligence By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On March 15, 2013 @ 8:03 am This is the third installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them.

Ne Win must have had many sleepless nights in 1976, because in addition to the student protests and the purge of commander-in-chief and defense minister Tin Oo, that year Kachin rebels signed a military alliance with communist insurgents in the northern hills, Gen Kyaw Zawone of the Thirty Comradesquietly left Rangoon and joined the communists on the China border, and the government unearthed a failed coup plot. On New Years Eve, a frazzled and angry Ne Win stormed a boisterous party at the famous Inya Lake Hotel, not far from his presidential palace, and partygoers were shocked to see the general who ruled the country kick the drum set and manhandle a few in the room. One of the few allies the besieged Ne Win felt he could turn to at this time was his bespectacled intelligence chief, Myat Hmen Tin Oo (not to be confused with former defense minister Tin Oo), who was the dictators trusted aide camp. Born in Mudon, Mon State, Tin Oo was an ethnic Mon. He studied until the 10th standard and joined the Burmese army in 1945 when he was only 15 years oldhis tall height allowing him to get away with telling the recruiters he was 18. Tin Oo became a platoon commander when Burmese and Japanese troops marched to Rangoon after defeating the British troops. Ne Win met Tin Oo in Mudon after returning to Burma with the Japanese forces. Tin Oos parents (They both were involved in Thakin movement) asked Ne Win to take care of their four sons, who all joined the army, but Tin Oo lost two of his brothers during the war. Ne Win therefore decided to keep the bright and talented Tin Oo under his watch and not to send him to the battlefield. After independence, Tin Oo enrolled at Rangoon University, where he studied economics and history. He also studied Marxism at the university and met many students who believed in leftist ideology. One of his colleagues was Chan Aye (whose pen name is Maung Suu San and who in 1988 was one of the NLD executive committee members), who asked him to join the CPB. Tin Oo wasnt interested, however, and eventually returned to the army and became the aide de camp to then chief of staff Ne Win, who asked him shake up the ineffective intelligence service and build up a military intelligence unit. Ne Win sent Tin Oo to Saipan Island in the Pacific Ocean to receive training from the CIA, and he later received training from the Royal Military Police in England as well. After the 1962 coup, Tin Oo was assigned to take care of political prisoners, including former President Mahn Win Maung and former Prime Minister U Nu, who were being held in a special detention center called Ye Kyi Aing, located outside of Rangoon. Tin Oo made preparations to prevent any rescue attempts for U Nu and his cabinet members, and with help from the 4th Burma Rifles, prepared to respond to air raids or heli-borne operations by the special forces of a foreign country. He also flushed out several assassination attempts against Ne Win, which impressed the new dictator immensely. In addition, Tin Oo went into the field to confirm the death of Than Tun, a leader of the CPBs White Flag faction and a friend of the late Aung San, who in 1968 was killed in his jungle hideout by an assassin who claimed to be an army deserter.

A bookworm, Tin Oo set up a publishing house within Military Intelligence and recruited members of the communist movement to rejoin the government and work for the MI-funded operation. Two of the books he published, The Last Days of Thakin Than Tun and The last year of Zin & Chit, written by two surrendered ex-communists, Yebaw (Comrade) Mya and Yebaw Ba Khet, became effective anti-communist propaganda. Tin Oo was not yet head of the intelligence service, and at the time there was internal conflict in the department. On one side was Col Lwin, also known as Moustache Lwin, an old style soldier who was loyal to Ne Win but jealously guarded his intelligence service. On the other side was Brig Maung Maung, who with Ne Wins blessing received assistance and training from CIA officers at the US Embassy in Rangoon to revamp the intelligence unit. Ne Win was forced to settle the feud, and in February 1961 he fired Maung Maung, a move that soon allowed Tin Oo to rise to the top rapidly. At that time, whenever Ne Win went abroad he was usually accompanied by Kyaw Zwa Myint, an Anglo-Burmese operation commander who served in the intelligence units. But Kyaw Zwa Myint didnt like Burmese socialism and reports surfaced that he planned to kill Ne Win. The assassination did not work out, and before New Win learned of his scheme, Kyaw Zwa Myint fled to the Thai-Burmese border and then to Australia. Prior to Kyaw Zwa Myint leaving Burma, however, Tin Oos spy network in Pegu Yoma found out that he was in the area and sent news of his presence to spy headquarters with a question: What was he doing there? Tin Oo quickly queried the War Office, but he received no reply because Col Lwin was afraid of reporting the case to Ne Win. But Tin Oo went straight to his mentor, who summoned senior intelligence officers and told them from then on to report directly to him. Afterwards, Ne Win brought Tin Oo to the War Office and his career took off: he became head of the National Intelligence Bureau and created a new position of chief military assistant to the presidenta position more powerful than commander-in-chief. Tin Oo quickly acquired the nickname MI Tin Oo, the name most people in Burma recognize to this day. Tin Oo, however, lacked combat experience and knew his rivals in the infantry would use this to try and undermine his authority and influence. So he cleverly countered by convincing his colleagues that without sound intelligence, victory in the battlefield could not be achieved, and when the army launched several major offensives against communists and ethnic rebels in the 1970s, Tin Oo and his intelligence unit helped provide intelligence information to field army commanders. At the time, Tin Oo would personally fly to Pegu Yoma, once a communist stronghold, to help army commanders in their attempt to wipe out the communist insurgency once and for all. Meanwhile, Tin Oo and his intelligence network rapidly expanded. He initiated Naing Ngan Gong Ye titles, designed to honor Burmas former politicians and Thakin who fought against the British, and helped Ne Win award the titles. He also managed a secret fund for covert operations inside and outside of Burma, including the monitoring of Burmese living overseas such as embassy personnel and active exiled groups along the borders of Thailand, China and Bangladesh. Tin Oo even said that helped to retrieve money from Ne Wins secret savings account kept at a Swiss Bank.

Tin Oo knew where his bread was buttered and didnt hide his admiration for Ne Win. Whenever he had whiskey with his colleagues he would say, I have only one godGen Ne Win. On the flip side, Ne Win heavily relied on Tin Oo and would usually consult him first before making any decision regarding whom to appoint to the cabinet and top positions in the armed forces. Later, when Tin Oo was named joint general-secretary of the BSPP, Ne Wins staff began calling him number one and Tin Oo number one-and-a-halfbehind their backs, naturally. But, of course, such behavior would not go unnoticed by the intensely paranoid junta chief for long.

The Dictators: Part 4Ne Wins Paranoia Grows

By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY| March 22, 2013 |

This is the fourth installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them.

Despite his close relationship with Tin Oo, the paranoid Ne Win didnt trust anyone. He was afraid of being poisoned and his cook, Raju, would have to taste each dish in front of him (Raju himself was as powerful as a ministerit was rumored that he once slapped the face of young army colonel named Khin Nyunt because he didnt drink or play golf). In addition, Singapore elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew recalled seeing Ne Win on a golf course in Rangoon wearing a steel helmet with security guards surrounding him, and former officers working at the War Office in 1970s recalled that sometimes when

Ne Wins convoy and speedy Nissan patrol jeeps full of soldiers holding Israelmade Uzi machine guns arrived, Ne Win wasnt in his limousine, but rather at the back of one of the jeeps. Before Tin Oos rise to the top of the intelligence service, Ne Win would travel to Vienna, where he would see a well-known psychiatrist Dr. Hans Hoff. The secrets of what the Burmese dictator said on the couch remained locked in an Austrian office, whatever was troubling Ne Win, he stopped receiving therapy in the mid-1970s, wrote Thant Myint-U, a historian and the grandson of U Thant, in his book the River of Lost Footsteps. Around the time he stopped seeing Dr. Hoff in Vienna, Ne Win visited Pearl Island in the southern region of Burma to inspect a pearl-producing project. Myo Aung, whose elder brother Ba Thein Tin would become the chairman of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1975, welcomed the dictator and his delegation, and his presence perhaps made number one nervous. Ne Win stayed up late into the night, which kept his personal physicians busy monitoring his behavior, and then took a moonlight walk along the beach followed by dozens of security guards and worried army officers. Myo Aung stayed away from Ne Win, but his deputy Lt-Col Chit Swe followed. Number one nervously cracked jokes, but nobody laughed because they were all scared to death. When Chit Swe attempted to engage Ne Win in conversation, the dictator at first ignored him but was drawn in when Chit We brought up the subject of horse-racingwhatever horse Ne Win said was his favorite, Chit Swe readily agreed was the best. Then Ne Win became more nervous when he saw flickering lights from the communication room, which was busy informing the War Office of Ne Wins condition every five minutes, and yelled at officers to switch off the equipment. Then when Ne Win finally calmed down and agreed to retire to bed, he insisted on sleeping at a small jetty rather than in his bungalow, so soldiers hurriedly carried his mattress to the jetty and security guards waited nearby until morning. In the past, Tin Oo had told his colleagues that, If father gets upset, it wont last long. But he also confided that he had a premonition of one day being purged, and Ne Win finally began to doubt Tin Oo as well. In 1981, when Thaung Kyi, joint secretary of the BSPP, died of a heart attack while playing golf, Ne Win came to meet all senior party leaders at the hospital. Before his arrival, Tin Oo prepared a clever reshuffle that would have seen Gen Kyaw Htin take over Thaung Kyis position which would move the general from a powerful army post to a party post. But Ne Win wanted Gen Kyaw Htin to remain in the armed forces, and after hearing about the reshuffle he stepped in and asked Tin Oo to become joint secretary instead. Political observers said that Ne Win, a clever political chess player, perhaps foresaw Tin Oos next move and preempted it, and many in the BSPP agreed. Afterward, a rift between Ne Win and Tin Oo began to appear, and Tin Oos rivals fueled the fire by feeding Ne Win information about Tin Oo. After he was appointed joint secretary of the BSPP, Tin Oo promoted Mon culture through several statesponsored projects, including the Burmese Broadcasting Service, and a rumor then began to circulate suggesting that he was a Mon Pretender who wanted to govern Burma after Ne Wins passing. Several army officers including Sein Lwin, who is also

Mon and received the nickname The Butcher of Rangoon after the 1988 massacre, were behind the smear-campaign against Tin Oo. Just a few days before Tin Oos son held a lavish wedding party in Rangoon, many passengers at the Rangoon International Airport saw Ne Win board a special flight to Ngapali beach. Ne Win had been invited to honor the wedding with his attendance, but decided to skip the ceremony and banquet. The entire wedding party and all the guests were whispering about Ne Wins absence, but Tin Oo maintained his cordial smile. When all the guests had left, however, the once spy chief broke down and grabbed a bottle of whiskey and sat down with close comrades, where he expressed fear over Ne Wins wrath. Finally, in 1983, Tin Oo was sentenced to five life terms in prison for misuse of state funds and property. The government published a series of articles accusing Tin Oo of corruption, citing his sons lavish wedding and the red carpet treatment he received at the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok when he visited. Everyone knew the corruption charges were ridiculous, and observers speculated that Tin Oo was purged because he moved to consolidate his power too quickly. While being held in Insein Prison, Tin Oo wrote a letter appeal to Ne Win, saying that he feared reprisal and didnt want to become a monkey show. And when a prison riot broke out in 1988, prison officers immediately relocated him to a safe detention center fearing he would be killed. After the coup, Tin Oo was allowed to return to his house in Rangoon. Until his death in 1998, Tin Oo took refuge in meditation and, like many old soldiers, studied Buddhism. He never betrayed Ne Win, and colleagues who saw him after 1988 said that the former spy chief still kept many secrets and stories about the dictator that went with him to the grave in 1999, when Ne Win showed up to mourn. The Dictators: Part 5Ne Win Promotes Than Shwe By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, March 29, 2013 @ 4:58 am This is the fifth installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. Following of Tin Oos removal, Col Aung Koe was the spy chief, but he soon fell from grace when a bombing took place at Aung Sans Martyrs Mausoleum. Where the hell was he? Ne Win asked. The reply was that Aung Koe was playing golf, which prompted Ne Win to ask a second question: Can we get someone who doesnt play golf and doesnt drink? Brig-Gen Tint Swe, the Minister for Industry (1), proposed his former personal security officer, Khin Nyunt, a young, charming and ambitious colonel who previously served in the War Office in the 1970s and was currently serving in the 44th Light Infantry Division in Karen State. Khin Nyunt was educated at Rangoon University before joining the army, and Lee Kuan Yew once called him The most intelligent of the lot. Ne Win, who was then over 70, did not know Khin Nyunt but soon began to trust the young, efficient and loyal officer. Khin Nyunt became Ne Wins gatekeeper and was seen

accompanying the dictator on overseas trips beginning as early as 1984. When Ne Win received medical treatment in Cromwell Hospital in London in 1986 (the dictators last visit to the UK capital), Khin Nyunt hid a pistol in his jacket and stayed in the hospital overnight. When Ne Win went to meet Princess Alexandra in London, Khin Nyunt was seen sitting obediently in a Mercedes Benz opposite Ne Win and his daughter. Accompanying Ne Win and many top BSPP leaders on trips to the West allowed Khin Nyunt to learn the thinking of the regimes inner circle and, just as importantly, the outside world. While Tin Oo was rising to and falling from power and Khin Nyunt was becoming spy chief, Than Shwe was slowly, steadily and mostly anonymously working his way up the regime hierarchy. After becoming a lieutenant colonel in the 88th Light Infantry Division in Shan State, he returned to the War Office in 1975, this time at level G1. Officers there said they barely noticed Than Shwe, although they did observe that he still brought his betel nut to work, was one of the few officers who talked about Buddhism and didnt join the others when they were having a drink after work, preferring to go home to his wife and young kids. Since the time of their marriage, Kyaing Kyaing had been the guardian of Than Shwes house, managing everything from dawn to dusk, and she took her household duties to include keeping a close watch over her husbands career. In doing so, Kyaing Kyaing often saw palm readers, astrologers and monks to read her husbands future and provide advice on how to achieve the best outcomean activity that is almost custom among Burmese army officers wives. Around 1980, Kyaing Kyaing went with a group of officers wives to meet U Nyan Zaw, a famous astrologer, who told her that Than Shwe would one day become the king of Burma. At first, Kyaing Kyaing didnt believe the prediction, and fearing that her husband would be purged if it ever became public, she didnt tell anyone what the astrologer said. But she later went back alone to U Nyan Zaw, and after once again reading Than Shwes stars and Ztar (a calculation of planetary positions at the time of a persons birth that is written on a palm leaf), he said, He is going to be number one, and advised Kyaing Kyaing to help her husband along the way. Kyaing Kyaing was not the first person close to Than Shwes who believed he would someday rule Burma. His elder sister, Kyee Khin, said that when Than Shwe was born he had a sash of moles which Burmese traditionally believe foretell that the newborn will be king one day. Kyee Khin told relatives in Kyaukse that she believed her younger brother one day would become king of the country. While Than Shwe was still almost laughably far away from replacing Ne Win as dictator, following Kyaing Kyaings visit to U Nyan Zaw he appeared to be at least heading in the direction of entering the upper echelon of the Burmese regime. In 1980, Than Shwe became the commander of the 88th Light Infantry Division at the age of 47. And then in 1983, the year that Ne Wins heir apparent Tin Oo was removed, Than Shwe became head of the Southwest Command in the Irrawaddy Deltaa position that officers were often posted to before being promoted to top-ranked positions at the War Office.

From outward appearances, however, one would think the man-who-would-be-king of Burma was aspiring to be a mid-level bureaucrat. Officers who worked closely with Than Shwe in the Irrawaddy Delta recalled he was mostly interested in building roads and bridges, and when he gave public speeches they would be long-winded affairs praising the success of the socialist party. He was also far from the cloistered, paranoid man he would become in the future: his house was open to all and visitors would see him sitting on his couch with family members, flipping through TIME magazine or official bulletins delivered from Rangoon. Then in 1985, there was a meeting to select a new commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces. With many of Burmas most talented officers having been purged, to keep the system going Ne Win and the other regime leaders had to bring several young officers to the top level. Not caring whether they were intelligent or good people, Ne Win emphasized it was sufficient to be loyal, not allied to factions in the armed forces and not troublesome to the throne. Ne Win walked into the room where the commanders were having a discussion and asked: Who is the youngest in your group? The answer was Bulldog, Than Shwes nickname. Subsequently, Than Shwe was promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces and Saw Maung became commander-in-chief. Neither man had attended university, and when they decided to promote Saw Maung, Ne Win warned his officers: You better teach him how to handle a fork and knife [at the reception] and take him to attend some diplomatic receptions to open his eyes and learn a lesson or two. Many officers believed Saw Maung and Than Shwe were selected because Ne Win thought that he and his men at the top could handle them. With respect to Than Shwe, he was young and seemingly non-threateningnever questioning authority, he appeared to be the perfect yes man to maintain the corrupt system and keep New Win in power. But the gambler Ne Win didnt realize that he was betting on the wrong horse and promoting the person who would one day place him under house arrest and let him die in detention. The Dictators: Part 6Popular Dissent Grows By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, April 5, 2013 @ 7:25 am This is the sixth installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. Rumor had it that Sein Lwin, who was also from the 4th Burma Rifles, was the one who helped read the stars and the Ztar of young officers who were poised for promotion and inform Ne Win whether any of them were pretenders to the throne. It is not known whether Sein Lwin personally checked Than Shwes stars and Ztar according to some astrologers, he would usually consult a government astrologer, Yankin Tin

Aung, about who to appoint or reject. Apparently in Than Shwes case, a dictator-in-waiting slipped through the regimes astrological cracks. Indeed, in 1986 many people in Burma still knew nothing about the low-profile Than Shwe and his family. Even though revolution was less than two years away and Burmese campuses are a breeding ground for rebellion, Than Shwes daughter Kyi Kyi Shwe still attended classes at Regional College Number Two in Rangoon, although she did arrive each day in a Mazda 323 Sedanwhich the government then provided to family members of high-ranking officials. Like Kyi Kyi Shwe, many sons and daughters of high ranking officials either drove themselves to school or had chauffeurs. They were taught to be aware of whom they hung out with on campus and how they should behave, but most were friendly and would regularly come to the canteen. When they did, however, student activists didnt discuss politics and didnt open their school bags, which even in 1986 and 1987 were filled with subversive materials such as antigovernment leaflets. This was the calm before the storm, and Kyi Kyi Shwe and her colleagues wouldnt know who their friends and foes were until 1988. At one point, some of Kyi Kyi Shwes student friends were invited to her house and reported back that they had seen Than Shwe walking on the lawn and his wife Kyaing Kyaing taking care of the kitchen, and it appeared that the family lived a very boring, simple lifestyle with no idea what was happening outside of their sheltered the environment. They read love story novels and seem to have plenty of extra time, but they do nothing at home and complain that life is boring. They have absolutely no idea of life around them, and just think they are lucky and they have this life now because they have done good deeds in the past and the poor people are unlucky and subjects of the state because they have committed so many sins in a past life, said one female student who visited the Than Shwe household. At that time, there were many unlucky people in Burma who were essentially slaves of the state. The economy wasnt going well and the country had dropped far behind its neighbors. With respect to his failed economic policies, Ne Win once famously said: It was like having caught hold of a tigers tail, meaning that once the Burmese Way to Socialism had been adopted there was nothing else he could do but hang on to it. So Ne Win hung on and the country became one of the poorest nations in the world. Ne Wins neutral foreign policy didnt gain the country many friends either, but some allies were at least close to the regime enough to offer some helpful advicewhich of course went unheeded. Singapore elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew encouraged the new generation of officers to reform the economy, but nothing happened. And he also advised Burmas Prime Minister Maung Maung Kha, who had no authority, to open up the country to tourism. The prime minister politely told Lee that he would report back Ne Win, but it was suspected that he never dared do so. In August 1987, exactly one year before the full-blown 1988 uprising, Ne Win admitted in a brief public speech that all was not well in Burma and that mistakes had been made under his

rule. Although he was brave enough to concede his blunders, it was too late to reverse course the dictator had built a strong and brutal armed forces and an efficient secret police that had become a club of authoritarian rulers who would never willingly relinquish power. Sadly, if Ne Win had admitted his failure in the early 1980s and taken aggressive action to reform and open up the country, the story of Burma could have been very different. If the 1988 uprising never took place because by then it had become unnecessary, Saw Maung, a former electrician who was a loyal and honest soldier, probably would have served his full term and left the post. The former postal clerk Than Shwe would have followed suit and, like Saw Maung, soon disappeared from public view. And Khin Nyunt would have finished his term as intelligence chief and served as an ambassador somewhere. But thats not what happened, and when the demonstrations began in March 1988, family members of high-ranking officials and army leaders were advised to stay at home. Kyi Kyi Shwe stopped going to the college campus, and Than Shwes family was rumored to have stayed in their house behind locked doors for weekswith a speedboat ready on Inya Lake in back for a quick getawayuntil the military staged its coup. The house was well fortified and built on a hill at the dead end of the streetperfect from a military security standpoint as the inhabitants and their security detail could oversee and monitor incoming visitors and strangers. Another of Than Shwes daughters, who also studied at Rangoon University, said soldiers and army officers who guarded the house were ready to gun down any student who dared approach during the uprising. If students come, we can shoot them since we are situated a hill, she told shocked friends, without showing any expression. In September 1988, Ne Win summoned Saw Maung, Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt and other top brass to his home and ordered them to organize a coup, which they carried out swiftly, efficiently and brutally. Following the coup, the military government effectively relocated several colleges and universities and shut down private and state-owned hostelsthe breeding ground of underground student political activism. Several new colleges were opened in remote areas and the Distance Education system was vigorously reinforced, effectively dismembering student activist organizations. When Kyi Kyi Shwe returned to college, she found that some of her old colleagues had become members of the NLD and kept their distance from heran invisible wall had sprung up between former friends that was impossible to scale. At home, Kyi Kyi Shwes parents advised family members not to engage the public and be discreet for security reasons. To keep safe, she began skipping classes regularly, but could still be spotted shopping with her sisters in Rangoons Scott Market, better known as Bogyoke (market)Than Shwes daughters were not yet notorious: i.e. had not yet stormed gold shops in the market and demanded the owners shower them with merchandise.

Although the uprising limited Kyi Kyi Shwes life as a student, her life at home was not idle. Kyaing Kyaing, being in-charge of the household, proposed five bachelors as potential husbandsall with a military background. In the early 1990s, Kyi Kyi Shwe married a handsome young army doctor named Nay Soe Maung who had been educated at Rangoon Medical Science University and also studied in Queensland, Australia. His father was retired Major General Tin Sein, who served under Ne Win. Kyi Kyi Shwe and Nay Soe Maung soon had a son, Nay Shwe Thwe Aung, who is now better known as Pho La Pyae and has become Than Shwes infamous favorite grandson. But the doctor and the daughter of the soon to be dictator came from different worlds and their families didnt get along, so the marriage didnt last long. After the break-up, Nay Soe Maung became a lieutenant colonel and a lecturer at the University of Public Health, Ministry of Health. He also became a writer and mingled with some artists and writers in Rangoon. He was always seen as helpful to many of his colleagues, and some speculated that he wanted to show that he was different from Burmas top family. The Dictators: Part 7Than Shwes Reign Begins By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, April 19, 2013 @ 8:37 am This is the seventh installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. Saw Maung initially became the chairman of SLORC, the newly established ruling council, Than Shwe the vice-chairman, and Khin Nyuntthe powerful intelligence chief who had been well positioned ahead of the coup and helped create anarchy during the 1988 uprising that paved the way for the army to take overwas rewarded by being named Secretary-1. While Saw Maung took to the podium and gave speeches, the ubiquitous Khin Nyunt roamed around the city meeting people, inspecting projects and issuing orders. Both the public and the international community thought Khin Nyunt was calling the shots, but Khin Nyunts power was still based on Ne Win, who continued to pull strings after he left the political stage. At the Armed Forces Day dinner hosted by Saw Maung on March 27, 1989, Ne Win appeared together with top brass, all laughing and enjoying dinner. The photo of this gathering, printed on the front page of the state-run newspapers, provoked public anger by sending the dual message that the old man Ne Win was still a player and the generals were celebrating their victory in the bloody coup. And the Armed Forces Day get together between Ne Win and the SLORC elite was not an isolated event. Intelligence officers posted near Ne Wins house often saw vehicles carrying Saw Maung, Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt arrive at his residence. When Saw Maung was asked by Asiaweek whether Ne Win was still in power behind the scenes, the general answered, It is most difficult for us to explain these rumors and

allegations When people see me visit Ne Win, they think Im going for instruction or advice. But hes like a parent to me. But as Burmese prof. Kyaw Yin Hlaing noted in his paper, Power and Factional Struggles in Post-independence Burmese Governments, Saw Maungs comment to the journalists was classic Burmese misdirection. Whenever Ne Win summoned them to his residence, all senior SLORC officers had to go and see him, as if they were subordinates paying homage to a supreme commander, Kyaw Yin Hlaing wrote. Ne Win continued to exercise this type of influence for several years after the 1988 coup. In 1990, for example, intelligence officer Aung Lynn Htut and his team were taking care of security at the army golf course, which had been newly renovated by relocating thousands of people to new satellite towns where they had no water and no electricity. Aung Lynn Htut received a radio message saying that Magagyi Ne Wins secret code was coming to play golf, and the message was relayed to Than Shwe, who was also there playing with senior officers. Than Shwe immediately asked security officers to retrieve a Rangoon map, and when Ne Win arrived he grabbed the opportunity to impress his former boss by pointing out statesponsored road, bridge and town building projects. Aung Lyn Htut observed that Than Shwe treated Ne Win with full respect. During the 1990 election, which the NLD dominated at the polls, Saw Maung and the other SLORC leaders saw that the pro-democracy party received many votes from military personnel and their families. Before the election, Saw Maung had promised to hand over power to the winner, and he had once said, I am a person who never lies. But the frightened SLORC generals changed their minds after losing the election and were clearly not going to cede power to the NLD. SLORC Chairman Saw Maung came under heavy pressure and reportedly began drinking at home. He then began acting erratically, sometimes referring to himself as the reincarnation of an ancient Burmese king, Kyansittha, who founded the Pagan dynasty. At one point, Saw Maung was even seen waving his pistol on a military golf course and screaming, I am Kyansittha, which also means the remaining soldier. Some Burmese who loathed the generals found Saw Maung, despite his threats and intimidation, at least entertaining. His long speeches, which sometime lasted hours, became national jokes, with people laughing as they watched him on television or read the transcripts in the national newspaper. Saw Maungs fellow generals, however, were not laughing. When Min Lu, a famous poet and writer, wrote and distributed a satirical poem called What has become of us? that mocked Saw Maungs bizarre behavior, he was tracked down by the intelligence unit and arrested on charges of trying to create misunderstanding between the people and the Defense Services. In November 1990, he was sentenced to seven years in prison. As Saw Maung was slowly losing his grip both on power and reality, Khin Nyunt barked, flexed his muscles and built his own empire projecting himself as the hard working leader of Burma. In contrast, officers recalled that Than Shwe would sit silently in meetings at the

War Office, maintaining his sullen and expressionless countenanceunlike many powerful generals in the armed forces, Bulldog was never a fire-breathing dragon (although it would later would be discovered that his bite was much worse than his bark). Than Shwe still liked building roads, dams and bridges and soon received a second nickname: Dam and Bridge Minister. He was often seen touring upper and central Burma, where he and senior leaders attended numerous ribbon-cutting ceremonies. He could also be found inspecting agriculture projects and once told ministers that he wanted to keep the forests of Burma green, apparently not realizing that Burmas forests had already been devastated by his own regime and its cronies. In 1991, Than Shwe returned to the Irrawaddy Delta region that he had overseen in the 1980s, which had since become a stronghold for Suu Kyis NLD and a site of renewed activities by Karen insurgents. Karen leaders had plans to enter the delta, and in February 1991 the KNU began smuggling ammunition from Tavoy (Dawei) to the area. There were still many sleeper cells in the Irrawaddy Delta region that were ready to join the revolutionmany consisting of old KNDO members who had survived the offensive in the 1970sand the KNU thought was that if they could rise up in the delta, they could easily enter Rangoon. So from their jungle headquarters in Manerplaw on the Moei River, the KNU sent commandos to train local villagers in guerilla warfare tactics. And when a local police patrol intercepted a forward team carrying radio equipment and ammunition to Bogalay, an initial skirmish erupted that soon led to another full-blown government military operation. Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt oversaw the campaign in the Irrawaddy Delta, code named Operation Storm, alongside army chief of staff Maj-Gen Tin Oo and regional commander Maj-Gen Myint Aung. The generals were not going to take the chance of allowing armed infiltrators to come close to Rangoon, so they brought in Chinese-made helicopters, jet fighters and naval vessels to reinforce the ground troops and hunt down suspected Karen rebels who, for the most part, were just ordinary villagers. According to the regimes figures, 275 enemy combatants were killed in the campaign, 13 were arrested and three surrendered, but most analysts say the numbers were much higher. Than Shwe and the other top leaders who oversaw the operation had given a shoot to kill order, and many villagers were simply executed or became the victims of air raids. The survivors were not necessarily the lucky ones. Hundreds of Karen villagerssome as young as 15were thrown into prison and subjected to torture and inhumane interrogation techniques. Some Karen villagers are reportedly still being detained in prison, but they are not listed by political prisoner campaign groups because nobody knows who they are. In 1992, rumors spread that Saw Maung had suffered a serious nervous breakdown, and in April of that year SLORCs Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt and Secretary-2 Tin Oo visited Ne Win at his residence on Ady Road, where the supposedly retired dictator gave the order for Than Shwe to replace Saw Maung. The Dictators: Part 8Khin Nyunt Overplays his Hand

By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, April 26, 2013 @ 6:54 am This is the eighth installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. On April 23, 1992, the regimes radio station announced that Saw Maung had retired due to ill health and Than Shwe would take over as the chairman of SLORC. Saw Maung apparently wasnt listening, however, and the next morning he prepared to go to his office without realizing that he had been removed. The former commander-in-chief of the armed forces soon discovered that soldiers surrounded his home and he had been placed under house arrest. The infuriated Saw Maung yelled at his personal staff officers and family members, sending his wife rushing to the Defense Ministry on Signal Road, where she asked for a face-to-face meeting with top brass and lashed out to no avail at Than Shwe and Khin Nyuntall to the amusement of junior officers who were present. With Than Shwe now the chairman of the SLORC, astrologer U Nyan Zaws prediction that he would one day become king of Burma was looking less like a joke and more like a prescient prediction. But there was still an ongoing power struggle between Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt which neither could display in public. In addition, because there was no longer an all-powerful figure like Ne Win in the ruling council, decisions had to be made by consensus. Than Shwe knew the dynamics in the War Office and quietly observed that his power base was not solid because many members of SLORC were either his contemporaries or senior to him. But he quietly made the right moves behind the scenes, and a consensus was reached that Khin Nyunt could not fill the now vacant positions of vice chairman of SLORC and or commander-in-chief of the army because this could undermine unity in the armed forces or lead to another coup. The devas were smiling on Than Shwe, who was on a political roll, and he didnt forget to make merit after ascending to the top position of SLORC and keeping his chief rival out of the number two slot: the regime soon announced the convening of a National Convention to draft a new constitution, the release of some political prisoners and the halting of military operations against Karen insurgents on the Thai-Burmese border. These deceptive handouts, for which Than Shwe knew he could take credit as the new SLORC Chairman, were one of the initial signs of his cornerstone strategy to deflect domestic and international critics. At the same time, the USDA was formed by the regimes top generals in 1993 to foster political leadership among civilians and to form a peoples militia to carry out the regimes peoples war strategy which was intended to protect the state from internal and external threats while co-opting the entire nation into the generals military mentality. During the 1990s, civil servants (including the armed forces) and many teachers and students were coerced into joining the USDA. Ostensibly formed as a social organization, the USDA was in fact a civilian structure of the regime, and its policies mirrored those of the ruling junta. Wearing a white shirt and green longyi, the USDAs civilian uniform, the members of

the organization were used by the generals to promote the regimes image in the eyes of the public. All these moves could be interpreted as part of Than Shwes strategy to consolidate his power at the War Office. They were also an indication of Than Shwes long-term vision of how he would guide the country through a political transition that would have the faade of a civilian government while maintaining the militarys role in national politics. Also in 1993, there was a reorganization of the power structure at the Defense Ministry and an expansion of the cabinet. Regional army commanders Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, and Myint Aung were at loggerheads with intelligence chief Khin Nyunt, and to calm them they were appointed as ministers and relocated to Rangoon. This was also a deceptively sly move by Than Shwe, because afterwards he and senior officers at the War Office who were loyal to him were able to fill the vacant spots with officers who were also close to them. Than Shwes next strategic move came in March 1993, when he arranged to have Maung Aye, a member of SLORC, offered the still vacant posts of vice chairman of SLORC and army commander-in-chief. Born in Kantbalu, Maung Aye attended Defense Services Academy (DSA) Intake 1. He was not an outstanding cadet, was only interested in army affairs, was less cunning than Than Shwe and didnt understand the world of politics. But he was a loyal and useful ally for Than Shwe. Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba and Lt-Gen Tun Kyi, who were also from DSA Intake 1, were happy to see that Maung Aye became the army chief, and his appointment further defused the rising tension among field commanders and senior officers who disapproved of the rise of Khin Nyunt. But as could have been expected, as soon as Maung Aye reported to work at the War Office, a new tension between him and the powerful intelligence chief flared up. Maung Aye even set up his own intelligence unit and reportedly bought a powerful radio interceptor from a Western country to counter Khin Nyunt and his growing intelligence empire. Than Shwe was now forced to keep an eye on the bitter fight between Khin Nyunts intelligence faction and Maung Ayes military faction, and was bombarded by politically motivated reports from both sides. The hot-tempered and sharp tongued Lt-Gen Tun Kyi, who was now Trade Minister, would come into Than Shwes office and complain about Khin Nyunt, calling the intelligence chief Min Tha, meaning movie starit was rumored that well-dressed Khin Nyunt wore makeup and perfume and regularly received a facial massage. Khin Nyunt knew his enemies, however, and took a different approach to battling them. He rarely entered Than Shwes room and always treated him with full respect while working hard to prove corruption cases against rivals Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba and Myint Aung. Khin Nyunts sleeper cells in the ministries had done a great job of collecting first hand information about Tun Kyis Trade Ministry, Kyaw Bas Tourism Ministry and Myint Aungs Agriculture Ministry. In his paper, Power and Factional Struggles in Postindependence Burmese Governments, Kyaw Yin Hlaing wrote: According to well-placed sources, Khin Nyunt had long submitted reports on the corrupt activities of senior ministers and regional commanders to both Saw Maung and Than Shwe, but no action was taken until after Than Shwe angrily threw a tea cup at Tun Kyi when the latter disrespectfully ridiculed

his call for the need to reduce corruption in the government by saying that no one in the government was free from corruption (thereby suggesting that the senior general himself was also corrupt). Although Than Shwe had seen all the reports provided by Khin Nyunt and his intelligence services, he still didnt trust Khin Nyunt and so planted his own man in the intelligence chiefs inner circle. In 1994, Col Kyaw Win was appointed deputy chief of Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) as part of the checks and balances system in the War Office. His prime purpose for being there, of course, was to keep a close eye on Khin Nyunt. The bespectacled Kyaw Win, who studied psychology at Rangoon University in the 1960s before joining the army, previously served under Than Shwe when he was commander of the 88th Light Infantry Division. Kyaw Win was one of Than Shwes favorites and they remained close over the years. When Than Shwe became chairman of the SLORC in 1992, Kyaw Win was a major in military intelligence (1) in Mandalay and on the fast-track to the top ranks of the intelligence unit. In his spare time, the soft-spoken spook who was fluent in English was also an artist. His interests included drawing, painting and photography and he published books featuring his photography work. Despite Than Shwes internal consolidation of power, the energetic and ambitious Khin Nyunts hard-working style still had international observers believing that he was the most powerful figure in Burma. In 1994, however, when US Congressman Bill Richardson came to Burma and met detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the ubiquitous spy chief may have overplayed his hand. After the meeting with Suu Kyi, the congressman released a statement in Bangkok full of praise for her and saying Khin Nyunt is a pragmatic individual who is sincere. The congressman then went on to raise regime eyebrows by saying, I think the future of Burma will be determined by two people: Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi. Richardson was unaware that the meeting with Suu Kyi, which was purportedly arranged by Khin Nyunt, was in fact permitted by Than Shwe as one of his carefully crafted publicity ploys designed to cause a diversion and create confusion. The congressman had bet on the wrong horse, and may in fact have signed Khin Nyunts arrest warrant. The Dictators: Part 9Than Shwe Becomes King By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, May 3, 2013 @ 9:09 am This is the ninth installment in the The Dictators series by The Irrawaddy that delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them. In July 1995, when the regime surprised everyone by releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, Than Shwe took full credit. He sent a reconciliatory message to Suu Kyi informing her of her unconditional release, which his man Kyaw Win personally delivered to the pro-democracy leader at her home. Also in July 1995, while the power struggle between Than Shwe and

Khin Nyunt was becoming more contentious as Than Shwe gained power and stature, former dictator Ne Win, then 84, expressed to his long-time close aides that he was losing interest in politics altogether. Ne Win had a private meeting with Tin Aung Hein and Chit Hlaing, who was the architect of the Burmese Way to Socialism, and told them that he didnt want to hear anything about politics, but was only interested in the subjects of religion and meditation. After the coup in 1988, Chit Hlaing had presented Ne Win with a book by Ledi Sayadaw, the influential and revered monk who revived the traditional practice of vipassana meditation in Burma, and Ne Win now told him that since 1990 he had practiced meditation and had purified his mind and was at peace. He also said that that if he had read Ledi Sayadaws book earlier he would not have inflicted so many blunders upon the country. Many would argue, however, that it is not Ledi Sayadaws teaching that Ne Win should have read in the early days, but books on economic principles. Even if he had only appointed, like Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew, a Berkeley mafia to steer the economy, then he may have been remembered as an authoritarian ruler who made Burma prosperous, rather than one who drove the country to its knees. Despite his professed aversion to politics, Ne Win was not finished influencing the moves of his successors. In a surprise move in 1997, the aging former dictator flew to Indonesia to meet President Suharto, and immediately after his return he summoned the four leading figures in the SLORC Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye, and Tin Ooto his residence. This time, Ne Win talked about eradicating corruption rather than coups, but the end-result was nearly the same. Some analysts believed Suharto family members, who were interested in investing in Burma, complained about widespread corruption among top members of the Burmese regime, and as a result key members of the ruling councilincluding Tun Kyi, Myint Aung and Kyaw Bawere soon removed from their posts. Trade Minister Tun Kyi learned that he had been removed upon his return from the army golf club. He was taken to the interrogation center, where he was reduced to tears while providing details of tea money and corruption. It was rumored that Tun Kyi also admitted once inviting famous young movie stars to his ministry office, where he asked them to do a catwalk after they undressed. The regime first announced that the purged ministers had become advisors to the ruling council, which at the time was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). But the advisory posts were soon cancelled and it became clear that the powerful ministers, some of whom were placed under house arrest, were removed due to corruption. Afterward, observers noted that while Than Shwe collaborated with Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye on what in effect was a quiet coup against key lower-level members of the ruling council, the change of guards most benefitted Than Shwe because it cleared away potential rivals that could have challenge him in the future. After that time, Than Shwe was able to exercise the authority to hire and fire anyone, giving him the ability to consolidate and build up his power base at the War Office by appointing trusted aides to senior positions. Exercising this absolute power for the first time, he appointed trusted officers Gen Soe Win, Gen Shwe Mann, Gen Thein Sein and Gen Myint Swe to top positions, and it became clear that the once invisible hand of Than Shwe was now firmly at the helm.

Burma saw many other ups and downs in 1997. The country became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) despite criticism from the organizations Western partners, the Clinton administration imposed sanctions on the regime, and Saw Maung died of heart failure at the age of 68 while still under house arrest. Then in 1998, the regime held its first joint military exercises that included the navy, air force and army to add counteroffensive strategies to the existing peoples war doctrine. During these exercises the fire brigade, the Burmese Red Cross and the Union Solidarity Development Association were also mobilized. In his book Building the Tatmadaw, defense analyst Maung Aung Myoe said, The exercises revealed that the purpose of such a counteroffensive was to counter a low-level foreign invasion. According to the Maung Aung Myoe, the new peoples war doctrine developed by the regime dictated that should the standing conventional force fail to defeat an invading force on the beachheads or landing zones, resistance would be organized at the village, regional and national levels to sap the will of the invading force. When the enemys will is sapped and its capabilities are dispersed and exhausted, the Burmese army would be able to muster sufficient force to wage a counteroffensive that would drive the invader from Burma. In Than Shwes strange universe, external enemies were just biding their time, waiting to invade Burmabut then again he had the British and Japanese as not-so-distant examples. In 2002, Ne Wins final payback time arrived in traditional Burmese military style. The regime still listened to the old man and his favorite daughter, Khin Sandar Win, who remained involved in the big picture and was involved in the telecom business with her husband, Aye Zaw Win. Ne Wins favorite grandsons also grew up and were seen roaming around Rangoon and teaming up with the powerful scorpion gang, who were allegedly involved in crime, murder, violence, drugs and other mafia-style activities during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Then in 2002, Ne Win and his close relatives were accused of plotting to take state power. The regime removed Ne Wins personal security officers and placed him and his daughter Khin Sandar Win under house arrest, and they put his son-in-law and beloved grandsons in prison on charges of high treason. On Dec. 5, 2002 Ne Win died quietly in his house and his body was unceremoniously taken to a small cemetery, where family members were waiting. There was no public announcement and no state funeral. Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/33671

The Dictators: Part 10Than Shwe Enjoys Absolute Power By AUNG ZAW / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, May 10, 2013 @ 4:51 am This is the tenth and final installment in the series The Dictators, which delves into the lives and careers of Burmas two most infamous military chiefs and the cohorts that surrounded them.

With Ne Win now gone and Secretary-2 Tin Oo having been killed in a 2001 helicopter crash, Khin Nyunt was the only regime leader remaining who could claim a stature even approaching Than Shwes. The intelligence units public relations effort to portray Khin Nyunt as a moderate who was exposed to international affairs continued to cause concern among Than Shwe and Maung Aye, who had not had the same early opportunities for education and travel as Khin Nyunt. In addition, the tension between the army and the intelligence service had gone beyond compromise, with the infantry officers and field commanders all behind Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Everyone in the military was waiting to pop the champagne once the intelligence faction was purged. And Khin Nyunt had an even more dangerous enemy than the armys senior commanders Than Shwes wife. Kyaing Kyaing never hid her hatred toward Dr. Khin Win Shwe, the wife of Khin Nyunt, a medical doctor who attended many receptions and chaired several social welfare organizations. It was clear to most that in the eyes of Khin Nyunt and Khin Win Shwe, Than Shwe and Kyaing Kyaing were tasteless, dull, uneducated people, and the angry and jealous Kyaing Kyaing fought back by bringing gossip of the Khin Nyunt couple to Than Shwe, it being rumored that she even employed black magic against Khin Win Shwe. When Than Shwe appointed Khin Nyunt prime minister soon after the Depayin attack in May 2003, it was clear that he would be the fall guy and was now powerless to defend himself. Khin Nyunt being axed was just a matter of time, and his protg Foreign Minister Win Aung told his Asean counterparts that his boss was in danger and would need to flee the country. Burmas neighbors, however, wouldnt dare receive Khin Nyunt because of the diplomatic fallout that would occur. On Oct. 19, 2004, Khin Nyunt was arrested on his return from Mandalay, and within a few hours his entire intelligence unit had been raided and dismantled in an operation overseen by Than Shwe and Maung Aye to which there was no resistance. Charged with insubordination and corruption, Khin Nyunt was taken to Insein Prison, where he spent his time in a bungalow that he had ordered built to keep Aung San Suu Kyi. He later received a suspended sentence of 44 years in prison and was placed under house arrest. Following the purge, the DDSI was renamed Military Affairs Security and placed firmly under the commander-inchief of the armed forcesThan Shwe. At a special briefing following Khin Nyunts arrest, Gen Shwe Mann and Lt-Gen Soe Win gave local businessmen details about the purge and the corruption cases against DDSI officers, declaring that no one is above the law. The intended message was that the regime would take action against anyone found to be corrupt, but no one took the warning seriously. The irony is that corruption and bribery has since spread like cancer to the top levels of Than Shwes regime, and people in Burma now joke that it is not only a butcher, but also thieves and dacoits, who run the country. With all of his main individual rivals now either dead or sidelined, Than Shwe turned his attention to his legacy and protection from the more ambiguous threats of internal uprisings and foreign invasions, both military and diplomatic.

In 2006, the junta chief moved the capital from Rangoon to Naypyidawa newly constructed city in the remote, mountainous jungles around Pyinmana in central Burma, adjacent to Shan, Arakan and Chin states. In the generals point of view, from their new command center in the countrys inner frontier, the Burmese armed forces have the advantage of being able to launch a protracted peoples war in hopes that during a drawn out resistance it could lure the enemy deep into the countrys central jungles, where they would be vulnerable and could be defeated. In the 1960s and 1970s, Burmas external enemy was China in the North. At present, however, Than Shwe and his military commanders believe any external attack will either come from the south by an amphibious landing in Arakan State or from the east by a landbased invasion via Thailand into Karen State. Under either of these scenarios, or the simultaneous launching of both, Rangoon would be cut off and vulnerable, most likely falling to any significant foreign invasion within a few dayshence the move to Naypyidaw. Burmese military officers have poured over the invasion plans of Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the US-Afghanistan War and the recent Kosovo War, paying particular attention to US strategies. In addition, the junta generals have studied tunnel warfare, specifically North Koreas defense plan. Despite Chinas admonition that tunnel warfare is no longer viable given modern bombing technology, military sources have confirmed that the regime implemented tunnel warfare strategies as early as 2000 and sent several delegations to Pyongyang since normalizing relations with North Korea in 2007. However, in a paper entitled The Road to Naypyidaw: Making Sense of the Myanmar Governments Decision to Move its Capital, Maung Aung Myo asserted that despite the strategic move of the capital to a remote, fortress-like location, if Burma did come under attack its armed forces would be put to the test because of a lack of training, wartime experience and operational capability. These weaknesses were exposed in 2008, when the Tatmadaw appeared unable to synchronize its army, navy and air force to confront naval aid vessels from the US, Britain and France that had closed in on Burmese waters to deliver humanitarian aid to the victims of Cyclone Nargis. As a result of the perceived external threats and internal weaknesses, Than Shwe and his commanders also changed the military doctrine taught at the National Defense College, with the peoples war doctrine evolving into the peoples war under modern conditions doctrine, which along with guerrilla warfare and tunnel warfare, now incorporated cyber warfare and information warfare to deal with an external threat. Than Shwe also issued orders buy more military hardwarehis new shopping list included MiG 29 jet fighters, naval ships, missiles and submarines, and there have been reports and rumors that he is attempting to develop nuclear capabilities as well. Despite the strategic reasons for the relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw, some in Burma still say that Than Shwe built the new city on the advice of his astrologer, who reportedly told him and Kyaing Kyaing that the capital must be relocated before a catastrophe, which could be interpreted to be Cyclone Nargis or the 2007 Saffron Uprising. Whether this is even partially true is unknown, but the propensity of Than Shwe and his wife to resort to astrology, numerology and other forms of the occult is a widely known fact in Burma. For example, the juntas decision to construct a 31 building Parliament complex in Naypyidaw is a deliberate allusion to the Buddhist concept of the 31 planes of existence.

Similarly, the regime relocated its capital in November, the 11th month, because the number 11 is also quite popular with the regimein Burmese Buddhist tradition, there are eleven fires fueled by sentient attachment: greed, hatred, delusion, birth, aging, death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow and despair. In addition to constructing the new Parliament buildings, government offices and military command center, Than Shwe also built the Naypyidaw pagoda, a replica of the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. The Naypyidaw pagoda is 99 meters high and is covered in gold foil. The New Light of Myanmar reported that Than Shwe and his family donated a Buddha tooth relic that came from China to be placed inside the pagoda, which has ironically been given the name Uppatasanti, or Peace Pagoda. Uppatasanti is the name of a sutra written by a monk in the early 16th century that was intended to be recited in time of crisis, especially in the face of foreign invasion. Than Shwes program of building new pagodas and renovating old ones is seen by many as a cynical effort to win merit and compensate for his authorization of brute force to break up the monk-led September 2007 uprising. He also believes the pagodas possess supernatural properties that will protect his position of power. One of the most sacred places in the Shwedagon Pagoda is Aung Myay, the Victory Ground. Many people go there to pray and wish for success and fortune, and this is the place where kings, princes and generals of ancient kingdoms traditionally have come to pray for success before they leave for war. Burmese dissidents claim that in 2007, soldiers and officers went to the Aung Myay, pointed automatic rifles and bayonets at the ground and chanted To Victory before going out into the streets and firing upon unarmed demonstrators. Also in 2007, the regime ordered the countrys entire population to grow a nut called Jatropha Curcas that has a limited commercial use in the production of candles, soap and biodiesel fuel. Even city dwellers were instructed to grow the shrub (also known as physic nut) in their back yards and on balconies. The real reason for ordering people to grow physic nut became clear when it was noted that the Burmese name for the nut, kyet suu, has the astrological meaning of Monday-Tuesday, whereas Suu Kyi means Tuesday-Monday. Speculation rapidly grew that Than Shwes astrologer suggested that by planting kyet suu throughout the country, Suu Kyis powers could be neutralized. In the same year, farmers in the Pegu Division were forced to grow sunflowers, which in Burmese are called nay kyar, meaning long stay. Than Shwe was advised that this agricultural conversion would ensure his long stay in power, even if it meant forcing his rice-growing population to survive on sunflower seeds. Than Shwe is not the only general to use the occult in the performance of his official duties many are known to seek regular advice from astrologers, monks and soothsayers in search of answers to political conundrums, and they indulge in rituals to cure the problems of state. For instance, Ne Win was advised to ride a wooden horse on his aircraft and to ask the pilot to circle his birthplace nine times, as well as to issue banknotes in denominations of 45 and 90 kyat. And Khin Nyunt was advised to dress up in womens clothing, complete with the signature flower that Suu Kyi wears, in order to steal power from The Lady. The power of these

rituals is no laughing matter to Than Shwewhen both Ne Win and Khin Nyunt were arrested, he also ordered that their personal astrologers be detained. The aging dictator does not even hold a monopoly on narcissism and bizarre beliefs in his household. If he is a mad despot, his wife Kyaing Kyaing is the deranged queen and some of the acts and rituals employed by the powerful couple to ward off bad luck are peculiar in the extreme. For example, the peacock is a symbol on the student flag and also a symbol of the opposition NLD party. In the early 1990s, when the student movement remained a potential threat to the regime, four peacocks were brought to a pagoda and sacrificeda bewildered witness saw officials slit the throat of the peacocks and make an offering to the shrine. Then when the country was preparing to vote in the National Constitutional Referendum in May 2008, Kyaing Kyaing climbed to a plinth of the Shwedagon Pagoda, an area banned to women, and walked around the structure three times followed by attendants sheltering her with gold and white umbrellas shouting Aung Pyi, which means victory in Burmese. One of Than Shwes other acts of voodoo at the Shwedagon Pagoda had all the hallmarks of a man possessed. When United Nations chief Ban Ki-moon and envoy Ibrahim Gambari visited Shwedagon, they were guided to a newly installed Buddhist statue that appeared to be made of jade and had never been seen in public before. The UN dignitaries were each given photo-ops of them making an offering and praying in front of the sculpture. Although it apparently missed the gaze of Ban Ki-moon and Gambari, the Burmese did not fail to notice that the face of the statue was not that of the serene and enlightened Buddha, it was an effigy of the aggressive and brutal Than Shwe. Embarrassed regime officials later admitted that they were ordered to conduct this crazed ritual at the behest of their narcissistic octogenarian dictator. Then in 2010, a prophecy circulated in Burma that the next ruler would be a woman. Afterwards, a bizarre order was issued in Naypyidaw instructing government ministers to dress from head to toe in traditional Burmese finery normally reserved for Buddhist novitiation ceremonies: gaungbaung headdresses, immaculately white taikpon jackets and velvet sandals. In addition, the ministers were ordered to wear brightly colored silk longyi, which in Burma are usually worn by women on special occasions. This prompted superstitious Burmese to say that the order must have come from Kyaing Kyaing, who wanted to prevent any woman from becoming a leader in the future.